

The Transcendental Aesthetic
from
The Critique of Pure Reason
by Immanuel Kant

Translation and Comments by
Philip McPherson Rudisill
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This rendering of the Transcendental Aesthetic will vary from other translations in English primarily by the use here of “viewing” instead of the more traditional “intuition” for *Anschauung*. See [Translator’s Notes](#) for a more thorough description of the translation.

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Translator's Introduction And Summary

The objects of the senses are called spectral (appearances) in that they are objects which have their entire physical existence within the confines of what I call the brainarium¹. What strikes my eye is transformed into electrical impulses, sent to the brain, and there a projection unfolds full of myriad visions, not unlike a kaleidoscope or, perhaps even better, a planetarium. And since this projection is dependent upon electrical impulses from the eye, the entire brainarium world goes in and out of existence per the blinks of our eyes. And here all the objects that appear to us arise as appearances, the looks of something, a something that we notice or get out of the brainarium, e.g., a table, a face on the front of a human head and also in the cloud. This holds true for all the sense organs such that we can say that our entire physical existence along with what we call the entire universe are appearances and as such have no existence as such apart from the brainarium. In contrast to this spectral world we also imagine a physical world which the spectral world of appearances represents to us, which the spectral world stands for or represents in our brainarium. So the appearance of a table represents a real object which exists independently of the table in the eye which (appearance) changes shape and size with distance and its color depending upon the time of day. So we do not say that the appearance is an illusion when we recognize that it is not a real thing on its own (as it exists in the brainarium). It represents a real object to us. The only illusion that would arise would be to treat the appearance of the table in the brainarium as though it were a real thing which physically got smaller at a distance from us

¹ Kant does not use any such term but I think this expresses quite well his conception of the presentation of appearances (*Erscheinungen*) that occupy us in our quest for knowledge. It was suggested to me by my reading in Schopenhauer.

and physically itself changed color according to the time of day (being dark red at night and bright red in the day, for example).

The objects of our brainarium are totally spectral/appearances and appear to us in accordance with our way of viewing things. This way of viewing or looking at things is configurable, i.e., what we spy as an object appears as a singularity.² I use the word viewing (or also take) while most translators use intuition (and where Kant used *Anschauung*, or the “at-look”). There is no necessity in any such sighting, for as some objects come and go over time, e.g., the face in the cloud and, for example, the smiling face on the front of someone's head, even so can all appearances, as spectral, come and go. And for all we know one minute we see the appearance of a dog on the road ahead, and the next moment and upon a closer look it transforms into a mail box. And so the mountain before me, as appearance and having no existence apart from my brainarium, could, as far as I could tell from the looking itself, just as easily turn into a mail box or a dog or anything else. What we are speaking of now are the tentative and contingent objects that appear to us spectrally. They are the result of a perhaps happenstance viewing/*Anschauung*/intuition and, as appearances, are totally contingent and even ephemeral.

Now let's consider again and more fully the recognition of a world which exists apart from our brainarium and which the appearances of the brainarium represent to us. Accordingly there are real things all about us and the appearances are representations of these real things, how these real things appear to us. Those appearances which are representations of real things are called objects. Those appearances which do not represent real things are themselves the object as appearances, for example the rainbow or the Big Dipper or the face in the cloud. Hence once a spectral object is identified and determined, we consider it a real object apart from us and not an appearance like the rainbow, i.e., we look upon the appearance as a representation of this real object, an image of the real object.

Thus, for example, we look out and spy the table and above it, through the window, a cloud in which we see a face (our viewing) and perhaps a rainbow, and we recognize that the table is a real object while the face and the rainbow are just appearances and do not represent real things. So I see the table and walk over and touch it and notice its color and sheen and hardness, and I call that a real object. And when I walk away and look back I say that the table *looks* smaller, which is understood as the table remaining always constant and enduring, as a real object, and only *ap-*

² The seven stars of the Big Dipper appear altogether as a singularity once this “dipper” has been sighted.

pearing smaller due to the distance from it. In this way, as we mentioned, we avoid illusion.

And so in our imagination we conceive of a real world apart from the brainarium and to which the appearances of the brainarium correspond, and we imagine it looking like the world in the brainarium, a red table before the window for example. And this is a legitimate use of the imagination. On a deeper level, however, we must admit that all that we see in the brainarium is composed of our own sensations, the electrical impulses and the way the brain makes its projections (which it can do in dreams as well) and, therefore, it is not correct to assume that things on their own, independently of their representation by the appearances, have any meaningful relationship to the appearances. The table on its own (independent of our looking) is neither large nor small, it is not smooth or hard or red, for all of this is our viewing of the table (consisting of our our sensations) and that is always based on a mere appearance within the brainarium. And if we are speaking of what the table might be as a thing on its own without the least reference to any human perception of it, that is impossible to say. We can only say what it is not, not red for example,³ but never what it is.

So that is the situation with the objects which are given by the senses. They are entirely appearances and yet represent something real (and which we commonly refer to as [real] in terms of our viewing of them), but what that real might be independently of any looking, we have no idea.

I want to give an example of some other consideration of the things which the appearances represent to us. Instead of the spectral table representing a table, let it represent an angel who has no shape and is not even in time but who is able to cause the representation that we have of a table. I'm not suggesting this as factual, but want merely to remind us that while we commonly speak of the object as appearance as a facsimile of the real object, and while that is acceptable in every day and scientific speech, it is not valid for our transcendental consideration here. This transcendental consideration suggests then merely that there is a thing on its own which the appearance represents to us, but that we can say nothing at all about it (as a thing on its own) except in terms of what it certainly is not, e.g., the table is not heavy on its own, for heaviness is a sensation.

This then is our understanding of the brainarium and of the appearances which are projected within. A related consideration, and which is perhaps not so easily

³ Red is a color and hence is the way the brainarium reacts to certain stimulus arising via the optical nerve from the retina. The red is an aspect of the brainarium and not of the object.

grasped, is the fact that space and time, as we know anything about them, are nothing more than our way of looking at or viewing objects in the brainarium. They are the forms of our looking/viewing. And so the rainbow that we see in the distant rain as well as the raindrops themselves are entirely within the brainarium and even the space and time in which we spy all this is nothing but our own looking. There is no real space and real time existing apart from the brainarium from which we get our knowledge of space and time, and they are things that we know that we could not have gotten through any exposure to any real space and time (apart from the brainarium). Kant describes them as two infinite non-things which must exist in order for all existence of things is possible.

No matter how hard you look at the table, and the window behind it, you will not spy that the table is in front of the window (and it is not in front of the window when spied from the other side of the window, but rather on the other side the window!) for that information is not contained in the spectral objects, but rather is added to the appearances as the form of our viewing/*anschauung*/. We get this picture intuitively, for that's the way we see it. And since the "in front of" is not in the appearance, this means it is a sheer intuition or viewing or looking-at, how we consider the appearance.

If we had gotten our knowledge of space and time from something real on its own like we do other objects (of our viewing), then just like we can imagine the absence of any object by imagining a void space or a void time, we would be able to imagine the absence of space and time themselves. But we cannot do this. Space and time are not real things, but merely the form of our viewing, the way we look at objects.

Our concept of space and time is not like that of all other objects of the brainarium. Empirical (exposure based) objects are assembled as we recognize a table through the unification of top and legs and let this concept hold for many examples of a table. But the various spaces and times that we consider are simply parts of a single space and a single time, and indeed these parts are nothing else than limitations of that space and time, each of these two being a singularity. Thus we don't assemble space out of the unification of many spaces, but see all spaces as limitations of a single space and that is a viewing, our way of considering things in the brainarium, and the same thing holds of time.

Space and time are conceived of as infinite givens. For other concepts, e.g., table, the infinitude of possible examples are understood as being contained under the concept, while with space and time the infinitude of possible examples are under-

stood as being contained within the single space and single time.⁴ And so space and time are not at all like other concepts. They are based on pure viewings; indeed they are the form of our looking and viewing.

Hence our knowledge of space and time is not derived from real things (as is the case with all empirical objects). Space and time are nothing more than the human way of visualizing and viewing things and, as a consequence, they have no existence or use apart from the brainarium. The space and time of our brainarium do not represent anything real apart from the brainarium, and so in this regard are different from the appearances which do represent real objects. Space and time are nothing more than human viewings and represent nothing more than our way of considering the appearances in the brainarium.

Let's pause for a quick recap of what we have established. We are in the process of considering truth in objects provided by our sensitivity and our understanding and our reasoning. So far we have only been considering the objects of the senses as they appear to us in the brainarium.

We will now expand a bit on this topic of the objects of sensitivity. Actually there are two types of objects which appear in the brainarium, the objects as appearances that we have been speaking about and then pure viewings which we provide ourselves through our looking/viewing and indeed in space and time. A good example of the latter is the circle that we can describe pantomimicly with our finger tip out in space and “see” it there in that funny, imaginative way. Thus it is the work of our productive imagination; but we are able in our imagination to see the circle out in space before us and see it there, shimmering as it were.⁵ That circle can be required of all people (though some children will think we are only kidding) and can be pointed out and diameters added, etc.⁶

Now earlier we established that space and time are not things on their own, but merely the look of the brainarium projection to us, i.e., what our take of it is, or what we view or intuit. We did that by showing that our concept of space and time

⁴ Accordingly the concept of table would encompass myriad different tables under it as their common denominator. But space does not encompass many different spaces under it, for all spaces are merely limitations of the one single space. Likewise with time.

⁵ It is one thing to think about a circle, and another to picture it and “see” it out in space before one's eyes and where it can be pointed out to others.

⁶ Incidentally I note that time is also at play here, for it is in time that we distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant, e.g., we ignore the finger as it approaches the beginning position of Noon (when tracing out the circle in mid air), and then accumulating the path it traces out to 1 and 2 and on back around to Noon where it is then ignored again. See also [Drawing Circles In The Air](#).

could not have been derived from experience. Now we want to show an example of how space and time as viewings are able to teach us about pure objects, like circles traced out in mid air.

There are only two sources of knowledge, we must pause to inject, namely empirical and pure. Empirical knowledge arises through the recognition of real objects (phenomena/appearances) in space and time (and not just imaginary circles in the air, which are not real objects), and thus empirical knowledge is knowledge gleaned from the brainarium as sensed by us in time and space. In addition to being the form of all looking within the brainarium (appearances/*Erscheinungen*), space and time are themselves viewings and can provide their own objects.⁷

We will now consider the truth of mathematics and see that it actually depends upon an object which is provided, as with the circle in the air, as a pure viewing and still, because it is in space, has validity for any appearance that might ever appear (in other words, and perhaps now unnecessarily noted, we can see the form of a triangle, but it is another question as to whether there is any real object which has that shape).

Consider first the proposition that every two sides of every triangle are together greater than the third. When we analyze the concept of a triangle (for what is contained in the concept holds for all triangles automatically) you think three straight line segments, each with two end points, and each end point of each being an end point of two of the segments. Since this information is arrived at via an analysis of the concept it is called analytical. But with this you don't think: "any two sides are greater than the third" for that information is not contained in the concept, and hence is added to it, and accordingly is called synthetic.

There are two sorts of synthetic statements, as we might have guessed, the empirical and the pure. It is an synthetic statement to say of the table that it is heavy, for that is not contained in the concept of a table, but this is based entirely upon an exposure to the table, in lifting it. So it is synthetic but still empirical and might not be required of all people, e.g., those traveling in space. That is the mark of empiri-

⁷ At the end of his entire section and in a conceptual sense Kant comments on how the relegation of space and time to mere viewings frees God from limitations and makes him omnipotent and not subject to any real space and time. God does not think things, but rather views/intuits such that the viewed object comes into existence. We humans cannot go so far, but if we were divine then when we spied a circle in mid air there would be a real object there and not just the representation of a circle. All we can do is construct the shape of objects in space. Note: here Kant is not trying to establish the existence of God, but merely to indicate that if there is a God this God would not be limited by conditions of time and space, for time and space, as we have indicated, are not real things but merely the way we look at things.

cal statements, and they are all contingent, that they are based on exposure to the actual object, i.e., via experience with the object.

The other sort is a pure synthetic statement and that is the sort that we have been considering in the matter of the triangle and the length of its sides. First we will look at the triangle as we would an empirical object, and consider various examples, i.e., this triangle and that. We would see that any two sides of each triangle were always greater than the remaining side. That would be called batting 100%. And it would be our best bet for the future. But there would be no capacity to speak authoritatively of all triangles whatsoever without having to wait for further validation through experience, through inspection of actual triangles. The only way this certitude and authority can arise is by virtue of an actual construction of the object in question (in mid air even) so that it is not simply imagined to be in space, but is actually seen in that space as an object which could be required seeing of all people (for even though it is “in the air” it can be pointed out to other people). So in the construction of the triangle we will notice that two sides have to be greater than the third because otherwise we could not construct a triangle. We do have a certitude in mathematics (here geometry) by the provision of an actual object as a pure viewing and, furthermore, we can see then the application of this pure viewing to the spectral world of appearances, for it is in the space of the brainarium, and what holds in the pure viewing of an object as a shape holds in the empirical viewing of any real object of that shape.

The same effect is had from our knowledge of time, it being a way we look at the world. There is only one way that it is possible to make the empirical fact of change discernible and that is to see two different conditions in a time, where one is designated before and the other after and that two true statements cannot contradict each other, for example: before = the table is red and after = the table is black, and that is a contradiction except for the capacity of viewing which enables us to put two different appearances (red table and black table) into a single strand of time, and thereby avoid the contradiction (which would be the purely logical and analytical way, i.e., ignoring time as an infinite, existing nothing) and make possible the perception of a change, through our understanding given to us as a pure viewing. I.e., while earlier the table was red, now it is black.

Consider finally arithmetic, and especially the problem of $7+5$ and what it equals. Consider it first via dissection of the 7 and the 5 and an understanding of a unity, i.e., something which combines the 7 and the 5 in a unity, an object. The 12 will never come to mind, except as a guess and thus only contingently. So analytically

we cannot tell the answer is 12.⁸ Also empirically we don't know this, for even if many examples were given of $7+5=12$, and we were batting 100% in our predications, we would never know if perhaps $7+5$ might somehow be identified with 13. The only way is to use the hand as a constellation, as it were,⁹ to represent the 5 and putting the 7 in the mind as a total of all that preceded in arriving to the 7 and then continuing the count (thought to have resulted in the seven) by adding the units of the fingers to keep track of the 5 and finding that the answer, the object, is 12.¹⁰

Briefly recapping again: We are in search of truth and are considering the possible objects of human knowledge. Specifically we are viewing the objects of our sensitivity, our sensitive nature and capacity, and we are seeing them in space and time and recognizing them as real objects. We know that the space and time of our looking is nothing more than our own capacity for viewing/intuition/*Anschauung* within the brainarium. By virtue of this fact we are able to make statements regarding the appearances before we are exposed to them, e.g., that they are extended in space and time, and so in this way show how it is that mathematics is applicable to all that shall ever arise in space and time.

Before leaving this consideration of the spectral/appearance world we need to consider the fact that the perceiver himself is also known and recognized as an appearance, just like all objects in the brainarium. We have an inner sense (given in moments of time) and an outer sense (given in terms of space). In the inner sense we express all our feelings and emotions and also our thoughts, and they arise to our view (as a perceiver, here a self perceiver) only as appearances. And so we are in

⁸ There is a match and map view which is analytical. The 7 and the 5 are reduced to twelve 1's and 11 +'s. Likewise in the reduction of the 12. All the elements of one can be substituted for those of the other, i.e., they are interchangeable. That would be the result of the analysis, except for the fact of the incongruent counterparts (Kant's term) where two perfectly identical hands cannot wear the same glove and thus cannot be substituted for each other. Thus we cannot conclude from the identity of the elements of two wholes that the two wholes are congruent and substitutable for each other. Accordingly there is no certitude in the match and map approach, and the student must wonder. See especially a short essay on [7+5](#) where this is developed in more detail.

⁹ The fingers can represent a five as a singularity encompassing a multiplicity much as the Big Dipper in the sky could represent a seven. This is also and incidentally a characteristic of a viewing, namely that a manifold is taken and seen as a singularity, e.g., the Big Dipper comes across as a unity even though it is 7 unrelated and disjointed stars. And a face is seen as a singularity even though it will consist of two eyes and a nose, etc.

¹⁰ I'm taken by the fact that 12 is the first number that the student knows independently of the teacher. All the numbers, 1 through 9, are given by the teacher. And then the 10; but upon the 10 the student has reason to at least guess that another number is coming and that it will be 20. Then when the 11 is given the student sees immediately the pattern and conceives its logic and is able to produce the 12 as what is coming next on his or her own, and then of course all other possible numbers.

the same situation with regard to the soul as we are to the table which we see in space. In both cases we do not see the object as a thing on its own, but only its appearance. And so we know ourselves only as we appear to ourselves and not as we are on our own, just as the table is known only spectrally, as it appears to us and not as it is on its own. Again this does not mean that the soul is just an appearance. It is no more an appearance on its own than the table we spy is. Both appearances represent real objects which are considered as really existing things, but which are only known empirically, i.e., as they appear to us, i.e., spectrally in our brainarium. And so the soul is certainly no more an illusion than is the table.¹¹

After this final consideration we can then conclude that all our knowledge of objects of the senses deals solely with appearances (and with pure imaginaries [like the circle in the air] seen in space) and these are seen in a space and time of our own brainarium, and while they can represent real things existing apart from our brainarium, i.e., things on their own, we can never know any more about these real things than their appearances tell us in the brainarium; and what we ascribe to them as real objects apart from the brainarium is a overstepping of our bounds, and we can only speak negatively of them, namely that they are not appearances and thus not endowed with the characteristics of appearances, e.e., not large and not small. The only positive is that there is a real thing which the appearance represents or depicts (*vorstellt*) to us.

Note: See the [appendix](#) for information concerning terminology and the presentation in this translation.

¹¹ Kant takes advantage of this consideration to offer a refutation of Berkeley's dogmatic idealism. Berkeley held that the concept of space were absurd, a really existing infinite nothing which were necessary for the existence of all things, and the perception of things in space were, therefore, an illusion. Kant counters this by noting that since time is just as absurd, it would follow that the perceiver himself were an illusion and that we were dealing with perceptions without anything being perceived and with no one perceiving, and noted gratefully that no one had yet made that claim.

The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements

First Part

The Transcendental Aesthetic

First Part

No. 1

- 1.1 Regardless of the manner and the means whereby a recognition (*Erkenntnis*) may refer to objects, it is always the viewing/intuition (*Anschauung*) whereby it refers immediately to them, and it is to the viewing that all thinking is aimed as a means.
- 1.2 But this only occurs to the extent the object is given. But this in turn, at least for humans, is only possible by the mind being affected by the object in a certain way.
- 1.3 The capacity (receptivity) for obtaining representations in the way that objects affect us is called sensitivity.
- 1.4 It is then by means of sensitivity that objects are given to us, and they alone supply us with a viewing. But it is through the understanding that they are thought, and it is from that thinking that concepts arise.
- 1.5 But all thinking, be it directly or indirectly, must ultimately refer, by means of certain characteristics, to viewings, thus, with us, to sensitivity, because there is no other way that objects may be given to us.
- 2.1 The effect of an object upon the representational capacity, to the extent we are affected by it, is sensation (*Empfindung*).
- 2.2 That viewing, which refers to the object via sensation, is called empirical.
- 2.3 The undetermined object of an empirical viewing is called appearance

(*Erscheinung*).¹

- 3.1 That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation, I call its material; but that which entails the manifold of the appearance being ordered in certain relationships, I call the form of the appearance.
- 3.2 Since that, in which the sensation can alone be ordered and positioned in a certain form, cannot itself in turn be sensation, it follows that for us the material of every appearance can only be given a posteriori, but its form must already lie a priori in the mind, and in that way be subject to our consideration in isolation from all sensations.
- 4.1 I term all representations pure (in the transcendental sense) in which nothing which pertains to sensation is to be found.
- 4.2 Accordingly the pure forms of sensitive viewings in general are to be encountered in the mind a priori, in which all manifold of the appearances can be looked at and seen (*angeschaut*) in a certain form.
- 4.3 This pure form of sensitivity will also itself be pure viewing/intuition.
- 4.4 Accordingly if I remove from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, e.g., substance, power, divisibility, etc., and likewise that which belongs to sensitivity, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., then something still remains for me from this empirical viewing, namely extension and shape.²
- 4.5 These belong to pure viewing, which, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation, has a place a priori in the mind as a mere form of the sensitivity.
- 5.1 A science of all principles of sensitivity a priori would be a transcendental

¹ So the appearance represents the object of an empirical looking and it “pops up” or stands out as such from the background, as the face stands out in the cloud. Once we determine the object then it is either a physical object, e.g., a rain, or it remains a sheer appearance, e.g., a rainbow or a face in the cloud or the mirage water on the heated road ahead.

² Another example might be the circle or triangle which is traced out in mid air by the mime.

aesthetic.

- 5.2 There must be a science, therefore, which makes up the first part of a transcendental elementary doctrine, in contrast to that which contains the principles of pure thinking and which would be called transcendental logic.
- 6.1 In the transcendental aesthetic, therefore, we will first isolate the sensitivity by removing everything which the understanding thinks through its concept, so that nothing remains except empirical viewing.
- 6.2 Secondly we will remove from this remainder everything which belongs to sensation, so that nothing remains now except a pure viewing and the mere form of the appearances, which is all that the sensitivity can supply a priori.
- 6.3 By means of this procedure we will see that there are two pure forms of sensitive viewing as recognitional principles a priori, namely space and time, and it is to the exposition of these two that we now turn our attention.

No. 2. The Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space

- 1.1 By means of the external sense (an aspect of our minds) we represent objects as apart from us and these all together in space.³
- 1.2 In space their shape, size and relationship to one another are determined and determinable.⁴
- 1.3 The internal sense, by means of which the mind itself, or its internal state, is looked at, certainly does not give us a viewing of the soul itself as an object. But it is still a determined form, by means of which alone the viewing of its internal state is possible, so that everything which belongs to the internal determinations is represented in relationships of time.

³ This sense is fundamentally visual. We engage in experiments to calibrate other senses with this sighting. We are able to explain the movement of our limbs in space, which the blind can only feel, by reference to this visual space. Otherwise we would be as the blind and be able merely to discern the difference between a physical constraint and an ability to freely move our limbs, but not be able to explain it; for this recognition requires a visualization.

⁴ We can tell by looking that something, for example, is round or square, and large or small, and to the left or right of our visual field or to the left or right of another object.

- 1.4 Time cannot be viewed externally, any more than space can be seen as something internal.⁵
- 1.5 What then are space and time?⁶
- 1.6 Are they actual things?⁷
- 1.7a Are they simply determinations or even relationships of things, but which would pertain to them on their own, even if they were not being looked at,⁸
- 1.7b or are they such which adhere only to the form of the viewing and thus to the subjective condition of our mind, without which these predicates cannot be attributed to any thing whatsoever?⁹
- 1.8 In order to instruct ourselves about this we first want to articulate the concept of space.
- 1.9 But what I mean with exposition is the distinct (even if not detailed) representation of what belongs to a concept. This is a *metaphysical* exposition

⁵ When we look about us we can see objects of one color or another (or some degree of gray) and located here and there, and of this and that shape and size, but nothing in all that visual scene gives us the least inkling of time. Time is simply not visual. Likewise when we look about and see objects here and there, even though the sensations which make up these sightings are retinal material of our eyes and as such are within our eyes, still we cannot avoid seeing these objects in space apart from us.

⁶ There are four theories of space and time that Kant will contend with. Two of these are those of realism and two are illusionism. Of the former two, one, that of Isaac Newton, holds that space and time are real on their own and independent of all things which may be located in them. The other, that of Leibniz, asserts that time and space, while real enough, are not real on their own, but only as a function of real things, i.e., when God creates objects, then space and time come into existence in order for these objects to relate to each other. Kant intends to deal with these two realism theories here, for the other two, the dogmatic illusionism of George Berkeley and theoretical illusionism of René Descartes are not serious contenders, being at odds with clear recognition, and are dealt with later.

⁷ Yes according to Newton, and no according to Leibniz, at least not independently of existing things.

⁸ Precisely so, Leibniz would reply, namely space and time are real enough, but only contingently as a result of a world of objects created by God, and not on their own independently of this creation. When something is created, then likewise a congruent space also comes into being. This position is, of course, quite contrary to that of Newton.

⁹ Here Kant hints at his own theory, the validity of which he intends now to prove, and both negatively by showing that neither Newton nor Leibniz can explain common human recognition, and then also positively by showing how it is that his own theory of the ideality of space and time is able to produce this explanation.

when it contains a description of the concept as given a priori.¹⁰

- 2.1 1. Space is not an empirical concept which were derived from external experiences.
- 2.2 For in order that certain sensations be referred to something apart from me (i.e., to something in a location different from where I am located), or in order that I can represent them as apart from, and adjacent to, each other, and hence not merely as different, but as in different locations, the representation of space must perforce already precede as the foundation.¹¹
- 2.3 Accordingly the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the relationships of the external appearances through experience. Far rather it is only through this representation that this external experience is made possible in the first place.¹²
- 3.1 2. Space is a necessary a priori representation which is the basis for all external viewings.
- 3.2 It is impossible to imagine the absence of space, although we can easily imagine no objects being present in that space.
- 3.3 Therefore space is the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not to

¹⁰ There is considerable parallelism in Kant's treatment of space and time, so much so that I have deemed it expedient to present them in a parallel format and include comments about time as I deal with space.

¹¹ It is one thing to see a chair, and another thing to see it here or there. And it is one thing to picture a table and to consider it as now or as earlier, e.g., as a memory.

¹² Kant reasons so: if space and time were things on their own, or if they were encased, as it were, in objects as the realists (Newton and Leibniz, respectively) would have it, then it would be impossible for us ever to have come to any notion of them, for spatial and temporal terminology and references cannot arise from an examination of things. I can see that two things are different, but I cannot see in any comparison of the two, no matter how closely and attentively I focus on them, that they are apart from each other in space, for that is merely the way that I look at the objects, and that viewing or that way of look-see must precede in order to be able to notice such aspects. The same holds for time, namely no matter how long and intently I listen to a note of music, let us say, I can never hear in that note or sense in any way that that note follows another note or a moment of silence. Likewise when I look at two things next to each other in space, there is nothing at all in that picture which would suggest the notion of simultaneity, for that is simply not an aspect of things on their own at all. It is important to keep in mind here that Kant is merely trying to establish that we do not get our notions of time and space from experience, but rather that these notions must precede our exposure of objects in order to have experience in the first place.

be considered as some determination dependent upon them. It is a representation a priori which necessarily precedes as the basis of external representations.¹³

- 4.1 3. Space is not a discursive concept or, as we say, a general concept about relations of things in general, but rather a pure viewing.¹⁴
- 4.2 For in the first place we can only imagine a single space, and when we speak of many spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same singular space.
- 4.3 Furthermore these parts cannot precede this singular, all-enveloping space as though they were its component parts (from which its assembly were possible¹⁵), but rather can only be thought in it.
- 4.4 Space is essentially singular. The manifold in it, hence also the general concept of spaces in general, rests entirely on limitations.
- 4.5 From this it follows that with respect to space one viewing a priori (which is not empirical) lies as its basis.
- 4.6 Accordingly all geometric principles, e.g., that in a triangle two sides are greater than the third, can never be derived from general concepts of line and triangle, but rather from the viewing and indeed a priori and with apodictic

¹³ This might be called the anti-Leibnizian proof. According to Leibniz without created things there is no space and time, for these are merely the relationships between things (in space) or between perceptions (in time). Therefore space and time come into existence only upon the creation of things. But Kant reasons against Leibniz in this wise: if that were true, i.e., if space and time were merely determinations of existing things, then it would follow that upon imagining the absence of things we could also imagine the absence of space and time, since these are dependent upon real things. But we cannot do this, i.e., we can easily enough imagine a space and time devoid of things, but we cannot imagine or picture the absence of space or time.

¹⁴ Suppose we looked at a book and a lamp, and then at the moon and a star, do we really think that we could discern that the common denominator joining the two sets were the spatial relationship of separateness, and thereby come to the notion of space? by saying that the first two relate to each other in the same way that the second two do?

¹⁵ This is the way we come to assemble the first object out of its parts, e.g., a table being an elevated flat surface. But we cannot come to space this way, for every part of every space is also itself a space.

certainty.¹⁶

- 5.1 4. Space is represented as an infinite, given quantity.
- 5.2 Now we must think every concept as a representation which is contained in an infinite count of diverse, possible representations (as their common characteristic), and so as containing these *under* itself; but no concept as such can be so thought as though it contained an infinite count of representations *within* itself.
- 5.3 But that is precisely how space is thought (for all parts of space through infinity are simultaneous).
- 5.4 Therefore the original representation of space is viewing a priori and not a concept.¹⁷

No. 3 Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space

- 1.1 With a transcendental exposition I understand the explanation of a concept as a principle whereby the possibility of other synthetical a priori recognitions can be grasped.
- 1.2 For this purpose it is necessary that
such recognitions actually flow from the given concept and that

¹⁶ Empirical concepts arise when we compare two or more objects and abstract from what is different between them in order to focus on the similarity. That similarity then becomes the basis of a concept of these objects. For example I look at this tree and that tree and find that they are different in many ways, but that they are similar with regard to the trunk and branches and foliage, and so that becomes the concept of a tree, namely a trunk with branches and foliage. But this is not possible with regard to the notion of space and for this reason: we don't see different spaces originally in order then to abstract from the differences (locations) in order to come up with what is common, namely space. It is not possible in this way, for every space is always originally seen merely as a limitation of one and the same, all-embracing space. This means that space is essentially merely a way of viewing of things, and so resides within us as the form of our viewing.

¹⁷ Finally Kant notes that in the empirical way we consider a concept, developed as noted above, and then are able to imagine an infinite count of objects being contained under this concept, e.g., an infinite count of different tables *under* the concept of table. But space is entirely different in that space, which is thought of as an infinite given, is also conceived of as containing an infinite count of things *within* itself. And so it is entirely a priori and not an empirical concept at all.

these recognitions are only possible under the presupposition of a given explanatory method of this concept.

- 2.1 Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori.
- 2.2 But then what must the representation of space be in order that such a recognition of it be possible?
- 2.3 It must originally be viewing, for from mere concepts no proposition which goes out beyond the concept can be drawn. But this happens in geometry (Introduction V).
- 2.4 But this viewing must be a priori encountered within us, i.e., before all perception of an object, a pure, and not an empirical, viewing.
- 2.5 For the geometric propositions are all together apodictic, i.e., connected with the consciousness of their necessity, e.g., space has only three dimensions. But such propositions cannot be empirical judgments or those of experience, nor concluded from such (Introduction II).
- 3.1 Now how can an external viewing reside in the mind which precedes before the objects themselves, and in which the concept of the latter can be determined?
- 3.2 Obviously not otherwise than to the extent it is seated in the subject and merely as its formal constitution for being affected by objects, and thereby obtaining an immediate representation, i.e., a viewing; hence only as the form of the external sense in general.
- 4.1 Therefore it is our explanation alone which makes the possibility of geometry as a synthetical recognition a priori.
- 4.2 Any other method of explanation, which does not supply this, even if it seems similar, can be distinguished by this characteristic with the greatest

confidence.¹⁸

Conclusions from the above Concepts

- 5.1 a. Space does not represent any property of any sort of thing on its own, nor in the relationships of things to each other, i.e., no determination of theirs which would adhere to the objects themselves if we were to abstract from all subjective conditions of the viewing.
- 5.2 For neither absolute nor relative determinations can be viewed before the existence of the things to which they appertain, thus not a priori.¹⁹
- 6.1 b. Space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of the external sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensitivity, under which alone external viewing is possible for us.
- 6.2 Now because the receptivity of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily precedes all viewings of these objects, it is easy to understand how the form of all appearances must be able to precede all actual perceptions, thus a priori in the mind, and how it, as a pure viewing in which all objects must be determined, can contain principles of the relationships of these preceding all experience.
- 7.1 Accordingly we can speak of space or extended beings, etc., only from the standpoint of a human.

¹⁸ Finally Kant turns here to his transcendental exposition. He wants to explain how it is that certain recognitions can arise and to show that they cannot arise except in this one way. He uses the science of geometry as an example. The assertions of geometry are universal and necessary, e.g., that any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third. This information cannot arise from the concept of a triangle, for by means of the concept we are conscious merely of a three-sided figure, but not of the relative lengths of the side. Likewise an empirical viewing reveals only that this triangle and that triangle have this relationship, but not that all triangles have and must have this relationship. Therefore it is only possible for this information to arise if we have an a priori look-see, and this can arise only if space is the way that we look at things rather than something on its own.

¹⁹ And since we do determine such things as a triangle a priori, it follows that 5.1 is a correct conclusion. This is clearer in the sentence following, 6.1.

- 7.2 If we depart from the subjective condition, according to which alone we can receive external viewing, namely as we might be affected by objects, then the representation of space means nothing at all.
- 7.3 This predicate is ascribed to things only to the extent that they appear to us, i.e., as objects of the sensitivity.
- 7.4 The enduring form of this receptivity, which we term sensitivity, is a necessary condition of all relationships in which objects may be viewed as external to us and, if we abstract from these objects, is a pure viewing which bears the name of space.
- 7.5 Because we cannot make the particular conditions of sensitivity into the conditions of the possibility of things, but only of their appearances, we certainly can say that space encompasses all things which might appear outwardly to us, but not all things on their own, whether they be looked at or not, or by whatever subject we might wish.
- 7.6 For we cannot at all judge of the viewings of other, thinking beings, namely whether they are bound by the same conditions which limit our viewing and which are universally valid for us.
- 7.7 If we add the limitation of a judgment to the condition of the subject, then the judgment is unconditioned.
- 7.8 The proposition that all things are next to one another in space holds true under the limitation that these things are taken as objects of our sensitive viewing.
- 7.9 If I add here the condition to the concept and say that all things *as external appearances* are next to each other in space, then this rule holds true universally and without limitation.
- 7.10 Our expositions, therefore, teach the reality, i.e., the objective validity, of space with respect to everything which can be presented to us externally as an object; but at the same time the ideality of space with respect to things when they are considered by reason as something on their own, i.e., without regard to the constitution of our sensitivity.
- 7.11 Therefore we assert the empirical reality of space (with respect to every pos-

sible external experience), but still its transcendental ideality, i.e., that it is nothing as soon as we remove the condition of the possibility of any experience and assume it as something which stands as the basis to things on their own.

- 8.1 Now apart from space there is no other subjective representation referred to anything external, which could be termed a priori objective.
 - 8.2 For from nothing else could we derive synthetical proposition a priori as we can from space.
 - 8.3 Strictly speaking, therefore, no ideality at all can be attributed to them, even though they agree with the representation of space to extent that they pertain merely to the subjective constitution of our mode of sensing, e.g., seeing, hearing, feeling through the sensations of color, tone and warmth. But since they are merely sensations and not viewings, they do not permit any object to be recognized, much less a priori.
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- 9.1 The intention of this remark is merely cautionary, namely to keep us from trying to explain the asserted ideality of space through vastly inadequate examples where such [qualities] as color, taste, etc. are rightly considered not as consisting of things, but rather as alterations of our subject which can even be different with different people.²⁰
 - 9.2 For in such a case [i.e., making this mistake] what is originally itself only appearance, e.g., a rose, would hold in the empirical understanding as a thing on its own, but which still, with respect to its color, can appear differently in each eye.*
- [* In the first (A) version of the Aesthetic the following five sentences took the place of the preceding two sentences:
- A9.1 This subjective condition of all outer appearances cannot, therefore, be compared to any other.
 - A9.2 The taste of a wine does not belong to the objective determinations of the

²⁰ This may mean that we don't want to think of space as an alteration of our subject which can be different with different people?

wine, not even if by the wine as an object we mean the wine as appearance, but to the special constitution of sense in the subject that tastes it.

- A9.3 Colors are not properties of the bodies to the viewing of which they are attached, but only modifications of the sense of sight, which is affected in a certain manner by light.
- A9.4 Space, on the other hand, as condition of outer objects, necessarily belongs to their appearance or viewing.
- A9.5 Taste and colors are not necessary conditions under which alone objects can be objects of the senses for us.]

9.3 In contrast to this the transcendental concept of the appearances in space is a critical reminder that nothing at all that is viewed in space is a thing on its own, nor is space a form of things which were intrinsic to them on their own, but rather that the objects on their own are not known by us at all, and what we term external objects are nothing more than representations of our sensitivity, the form of which is space, but the true correlate, i.e., the thing itself on its own, is not recognized in that way at all, nor can be, but about which no questions are ever raised in experience.

No. 4 The Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Time

- 1.1 1. Time is not an empirical concept which were somehow derived from an experience.
- 1.2 For simultaneity or succession would not even enter into the perception if the representation of time were not already present a priori as the basis.
- 1.3 Only under its presupposition can anyone imagine that something were in one and the same time (simultaneously) or in different times (successively).
- 2.1 2. Time is a necessary representation preceding all viewings.
- 2.2 With regard to appearances in general we cannot cancel time, although we

can very easily remove the appearances from that time.

- 2.3 Time, therefore, is given a priori.
- 2.4 In it alone is every actuality of the appearances possible.
- 2.5 These can vanish, but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be removed.

- 3.1 3. Upon this a priori necessity the possibility of apodictic principles of the relationships of time or axioms of time in general is based.
- 3.2 Time has only one dimension; diverse times are not simultaneous, but successive (even as diverse spaces are not successive, but simultaneous).²¹
- 3.3 These principles can never be drawn from experience, for this would provide neither strict universality nor apodictic certitude.
- 3.4 We would only be able to say that common perception teaches this, but not that it *must* be this way.²²
- 3.5 These principles hold as rules, by means of which experience in general is

²¹ We might hear: “the sun is shining”, and then later would hear “the sun is not shining” and we would object, and rightly so, that this were illogical; and then we would be told “the sun was shining, but that was earlier, and it is not shining now,” and so would come to see that time were a modifier of the logic, and what is ordinarily a contradiction is not necessarily so in time. But I think by that we are learning that we are not speaking of a different time and that the same time arises, for couldn’t time be merely what we call different time? That would then make time something which could appear or not, and not be something which were always present (as the form of ow looking). See the Dissertation II 401 and p.66.

²² In other words, it would be impossible to say that the burning house and the house before the fire were not things which could just as easily exist at the same time in different tracks of time. We would not be able to insist that the burning house existed after the unburning house, but only that so far this is all that we had ever noticed. For different times don’t necessarily mean succession; they could mean different tracks at one and the same time.

possible, and instruct us *before* experience and not *through* experience.²³

- 4.1 4. Time is not a discursive concept, or, as we say, a general concept, but rather a pure form of sensitive viewing.
- 4.2 Diverse times are only parts of this time.
- 4.3 But a representation, which can only be given through a single object, is viewing.
- 4.4 And the proposition that diverse times cannot be simultaneous would not permit itself of being derived from a general concept.
- 4.5 The proposition is synthetic and cannot arise from concepts.
- 4.6 Therefore, it is contained immediately in the viewing and representation of time.
- 5.1 5. The infinitude of time means nothing more than all determined quantities of time are merely limitations of one time lying as their basis.
- 5.2 Hence the original representation of time must be given as unlimited.
- 5.3 But whereof the parts themselves and every size of an object can be represented determinedly only through a limitation, there the entire representation cannot have been given through concepts (for they contains only partial representations), but rather immediate viewing must lie as the basis.

²³ I think it is worthwhile to look at Kant's footnote on II 401 of the Inaugural Dissertation, namely "Simultaneous things are not so because they do not succeed one another. For when succession is removed there is indeed abolished some conjunction which was there because of the series of time, but there does not immediately arise from that another true relationships such as is the conjunction of all of them at the same moment. For simultaneous things are joined together at the same moment of time, just as successive things are joined together by different moments. So, though time be of one dimension only, yet the ubiquity of time (to speak with Newton), whereby all things sensitively thinkable are at some time, adds a further dimension to the quantity of actual things in as much as they hang, as it were, upon the same point of time. For if you were to describe time by a straight line produced to infinity and if you were to describe things simultaneous at any point of time by lines joining at right angles, the surface which is thus generated will represent the phenomenal world both as substance and as accidents."

No. 5 Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time

- 1.1 Here I can refer to item 3 above where, in order to be brief, I placed what is actually transcendental under the article of the metaphysical exposition.
- 1.2 Now I add that the concept of alteration, and with it that of motion (as alteration of location), is only possible through and in the temporal representation; and if this representation were not (internal) viewing, no concept, regardless of what, could make comprehensible the possibility of an alternation, i.e., a connection of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object (for example one and the same thing being in a location and not being in that very same location).
- 1.3 Only in time can both contradictorily opposed determinations be encountered in one thing, i.e., successively.
- 1.4 Therefore our concept of time explains the possibility of so many synthetic recognitions a priori, as the general doctrine of motion demonstrates; and which is more than just a little fruitful.

No. 6 Conclusions from the above Concepts

- 1.1 a. Time is not something which would exist on its own, or which would adhere to things as an objective determination and which therefore would remain if we abstract from all subjective conditions of their viewing; for in the first case it would be something which were actual even without actual objects,²⁴
- 1.2 and in the second case, it could not precede before the objects themselves as a determination or order adhering to them as their condition and which would be a priori recognized and viewed through synthetical propositions.²⁵

²⁴ In the Dissertation II 401 Kant indicates that time as something real on its own would be an imaginary entity, and in II 400 he declares such to be absurd (and is speaking of Newton's conception).

²⁵ This also indicates that we could not speak definitively in advance about different times, namely that they are successive and never simultaneous. This, it seems to me, is also a reference to Leibniz, and it suggests that the laws of time would be empirically conditioned, as was also the case with Leibniz's concept of space.

- 1.3 But this latter can easily occur if time is nothing more than the subjective condition by means of which all viewings can occur within us.²⁶
- 1.4 For then this form of internal viewing can be represented before the objects, and thus a priori.
 - 2.1 b. Time is nothing more than the form of the internal senses, i.e., viewing of ourselves and our internal state.
 - 2.2 For time can be no determination of external viewing; it belongs neither to a shape nor position, etc. On the contrary it determines the relationship of the representations in our internal senses.²⁷
 - 2.3 And precisely because this internal viewing presents no shape, we even seek to supplement this deficiency through analogies, and we represent the temporal sequence through a line advancing without end, in which the manifold makes up a row which is only of a single dimension, and conclude from the properties of this line to all properties of time apart from this single exception, namely that the parts of the line are simultaneous while those of the latter are always successive.²⁸
 - 2.4 From this it becomes clear that the representation of time is itself viewing, because all its relationships can be expressed in an external viewing.²⁹
- 3.1 c. Time is the formal condition a priori of all appearances in general.
- 3.2 Space, as the pure form of all external viewing, is limited as the condition a

²⁶ And so the only way we can have the laws of time that we do is if time is merely the subjective condition by means of which objects can appear to us.

²⁷ There is absolutely nothing in the external viewing which could denote time. There is no shape to the viewing of time, nothing which could be spied with our eyes in any way. And it is for this reason that Kant tells us in the following sentence that we must come up with some analogy in order to represent time to ourselves.

²⁸ If I look at the line I could hear said that time is exactly the same except the parts of space are simultaneous. From this I could not imagine what "not simultaneous" could be, except that I am able to imagine the drawing of this line and see that the parts are successively produced.

²⁹ Since space is a pure viewing, we can look at a line of space and project in it all the relationships of time, e.g., that between two moments there is a time.

priori of merely external viewings.

- 3.3 In contrast, since all representations, whether they have external things as objects or not, still, as determinations of the mind, belong to the internal state; but this internal state belongs under the formal condition of the internal viewing and hence of time; and so time is a condition a priori of all appearances in general and indeed the immediate condition of the internal appearances (of our soul) and in that way also mediately that of the external appearances.³⁰

- 4.1 If I can say a priori that external appearances are in space and a priori determined according to the relationships of space, then I certainly can say quite universally from the principle of the internal sense: all appearances in general, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time and necessarily in relations of time.

- 5.1 If we abstract from our mode of viewing of ourselves internally and also, by means of this viewing, of capturing all external viewings in the representational power, and thus treat objects as they might be on their own, then time is nothing.

- 5.2 It is of objective validity only with respect to the appearances, because these are already things which we assume as objects of our senses; but it is no longer objective if we abstract from the sensitivity of our viewing, hence from that representational manner which is peculiar to us, and so then speak of things generally.

- 6.1 Time, therefore, is simply a subjective condition of our (human) viewing (which is always sensitive, i.e., to the extent we are affected by objects), and nothing at all independently of the subject.

- 6.2 Nevertheless with respect to all appearances, hence also to all things which

³⁰ We look at all things, externally and also within us, in terms of time, and see them as simultaneous or a successive.

can come forth to us in experience, it is necessarily objective.³¹

- 6.3 We cannot say that all things are in time, because the concept of things in general is abstracted from the manner of their viewing, and this (manner of viewing) is the peculiar condition under which time belongs in the representation of things.³²
- 6.4 Now if the condition is added to the concept and we hear: all things as appearances (objects of the sensitive viewing) are in time, then the principle has its good, objective propriety and universality a priori.
- 7.1 Our assertions, therefore, teach the empirical reality of time, i.e., its subjective validity with respect to all objects which might ever be given to our senses.
- 7.2 And since our viewing is always sensitive, it follows that no object can ever be given to us in experience which did not belong under the condition of time.
- 7.3 On the other hand we deny to time every claim to absolute reality since it then, without regard to the form of our sensitive viewing, would adhere utterly to things as a condition or property.
- 7.4 Such properties, which would pertain to things on their own, can never be given to us through the senses.³³
- 7.5 It is in this, therefore, that the transcendental ideality of time consists, such that if we abstract from the subjective conditions of the sensitive viewing, time is nothing whatsoever and cannot be ascribed to the objects on their own (apart from their relationship to our viewing), neither as subsisting nor as inhering.

³¹ Here Kant enters upon the transcendental deduction of time, which naturally is a problem, for he has just indicated that time is a subjective condition of our human viewing, and not a thing on its own at all. But then since all things appear to us in time, it is also objective.

³² If we obtained time from experience or through reason, then we would be able to assert the ubiquity of time over things, even when not viewed, but this is not the case at all, and what we know of time we know only because we notice our own way of viewing of things, i.e., it is the form of our viewing capacity.

³³ The fact that we know something of time is ample proof that it is merely a form of our viewing, for if it were something on its own, then we would never know the first thing about it, not even the terminology would be anything to us, being somewhat like the “er” and “uh” sounds that we sprinkle in our speech.

- 7.6 But this ideality cannot be compared with the surreptitious aspects of the sensations any more than that of space can, because at the same time we presuppose of the appearance itself, to which these predicates inhere, that it have objective reality, which here is completely removed except to the extent that it is merely empirical, i.e., it views the object itself merely as appearance; concerning which the above remark of the first section should be reviewed.

No. 7. Exposition

- 1.1 Against this theory, which accords time empirical, but denies it absolute and transcendental, reality, I have heard such unanimous objections by thoughtful men that I must assume it arises naturally with every reader to whom this consideration is unfamiliar.
- 1.2 It goes like this: alterations are actual (which is proven by the alteration of our own representations, even if we wanted to deny all external appearances with their alterations).³⁴
- 1.3 Now alterations are only possible in time; hence: time is something actual.
- 1.4 The reply is without difficulty.
- 1.5 I admit the entire argument.
- 1.6 Time is certainly something actual, namely the actual form of our internal viewing.
- 1.7 It has, therefore, subjective reality with respect to the internal experience, i.e., I actually have the representation of time and my determinations in it.
- 1.8 It is therefore actually to be viewed not as object, but rather as the representational manner of myself as object.

³⁴ If we did not have an ability to sight things in time, then upon the series of representations, A B and C, upon B A would be out of mind and forgotten and the same with B upon C. And so while A might come to prompt B, upon B there would not be the consciousness that it followed upon A, for A would have vanished from mind.

- 1.9 But if I or another being could look at myself without this condition of sensitivity, then the very same determinations, which we now represent to ourselves as alternations, would render a recognition in which the representation of time, hence then also that of alteration, would not arise at all.³⁵
- 1.10 Time retains its empirical reality as a condition of all our experience.
- 1.11 Only the absolute reality cannot be permitted to time according to what was presented above.
- 1.12 It is nothing other than the form of our internal viewing.
- 1.13 If we were to remove from our viewing the peculiar condition of our sensitivity, then the concept of time would vanish, and it does not adhere to the objects themselves, but rather to the subject which views them.³⁶
- 2.1 But the reason why this objection is made so unanimously, and indeed by those who otherwise have nothing illuminating to say against the doctrine of the ideality of space, is this:
- 2.2 they hope not to be able to establish the absolute reality of space in an apodictic manner because opposing them is idealism, according to which the actuality of external objects is not subject to a rigorous proof. But on the other hand the absolute reality of the objects of our internal sense (of myself and my state) is immediately clear through consciousness.
- 2.3 The former could be a mere appearance, but this latter, they maintain, something undeniably actual.³⁷

³⁵ This suggests to me something akin to viewing of the planets and their motion. There, while they are in motion and therefore change their position in time, still, given our understanding of them as determined by the laws of gravity, we could look at them as changeless and as not doing anything, even though, when they come closer to some other body, they would change their position and their direction; but still we would say that nothing has happened and there has been no change. We would be looking at them as though they were clear to us as thing on their own traveling their own preset path, much as Leibniz conceived of the monads doing, and so where nothing really ever changed or happened.

³⁶ Hence Hobbes' village idiot is quite precise is reciting "one one one" as he hears the clock strike the hour of three.

³⁷ And so they want to play with the contrast in order to establish emphatically the reality of ourselves.

- 2.4 But they did not realize that both, without us challenging their actuality as representations, still only pertain to appearances which always has two sides, the one where the object is considered on its own (regardless of the manner of viewing it, but whose constitution for this reason always remains problematical); the other where the form of the viewing of this object is considered, which must be sought not in the object on its own, but rather in the subject to whom it appears, but which still pertains actually and necessarily to the appearance of this object.³⁸
- 3.1 Accordingly time and space are two sources of recognition from whence diverse synthetical recognitions can be created a priori, as is brilliantly exemplified in pure mathematics with regard to the recognition of space and its relationships.
- 3.2 In fact, considered together, they are pure forms of all sensitive viewing and thereby make synthetical propositions possible a priori.
- 3.3 But this source of a priori recognitions determine their borders (that they are merely conditions of sensitivity) by being applicable to objects merely to the extent they are thought of as appearances, but not as things on their own.
- 3.4 The former alone are the field of their validity whereof, if we depart, no further objective usage of them occurs.
- 3.5 By the way, this reality of space and time does not affect the security of the recognitions of experience, for we are just as sure of them whether the form adheres to the things on their own, or only to our viewing of these thing in a necessary way.³⁹
- 3.6 In contrast those who proclaim the absolute reality of space and time, be they taken as subsisting or only as inhering, are at odds with the principle of

³⁸ Here is where we must remind ourselves that our viewing reveals to us only spectral data, e.g., colors and sounds, etc., i.e., things that are our own reaction and affectation, and that there is absolutely no reason to think that this gives us all there is to know about an object, as opposed merely to the way the object happens to affect us; and which says far more about us than it does the object.

³⁹ For the only contact we can ever have of objects is when they appear to us in some way, and so essentially we can let these viewing forms attach to them; except that this occasions erroneous modes of thinking about them, especially when we are considering things from the standpoint of pure reason.

experience itself.⁴⁰

- 3.7 For if they opt for the former (which is commonly the party of the mathematical explorers of nature), then they must assume two eternal and infinite non-things (space and time) existing of themselves which are there (still without being anything actual), only in order to embrace everything that *is* actual.⁴¹
- 3.8 If we consider the second group (which includes some metaphysical teachers of nature), and space and time hold for them as relationships of the appearances (next to or after each other) which were abstracted from experience, even though confused in the isolation, then they must challenge the validity of the mathematical doctrine a priori with respect to actual things (e.g., in space), or at least the apodictic certitude, in that this can never occur a posteriori, and the concepts a priori of space and time are, according to this opinion, only creatures of the imagination whose actual source must be sought in experience, from whose abstracted relationships the imagination has made something which does indeed contain the generality of that, but which cannot occur without the restrictions which nature has connected with it.
- 3.9 The former win this much, that they keep the field of appearances open for mathematical assertions; but they stumble very much on these conditions when the understanding wants to go out beyond this field.
- 3.10` The second group wins indeed with respect to the latter, namely that the representations of space and time do not stand in their way when they wish to judge of things not as appearances, but rather merely with respect to the understanding; but then can provide neither for the possibility of mathematical recognitions a priori (due to the lack of any basis for a true and objectively valid viewing a priori) nor bring the propositions of experience into any necessary agreement with those assertions.
- 3.11 In our theory of the true condition of these two original forms of sensitivity both difficulties are removed.
- 4.1 Finally that the transcendental aesthetic can contain nothing more than these

⁴⁰ Subsisting would refer to space and time as things, the Newtonian conception; while inhering would denote space and time as belonging to things on their own, the Leibnizian conception.

⁴¹ And which makes absolutely no sense at all.

two elements, namely time and space, is clear from this: because all other concepts belonging to sensitivity, even that of motion, which unites both elements, presuppose something empirical.

- 4.2 For motion presupposes the perception of something mobile.
- 4.3 But in space, considered as such, there is nothing movable; hence the movable must be something which is found in space only through experience, thus be an empirical datum.
- 4.4 And for precisely the same reason the transcendental aesthetic cannot count the concept of the alterable a priori amongst its data; for time itself does not alter, but rather something which is in time.
- 4.5 For this, therefore, the perception of some sort of existence and the succession of its determination is required, hence: experience.

No. 8. General Remarks to the Transcendental Aesthetic

I.

- 1.1 First of all, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, it will be necessary to explain as clearly as possible what our opinion is with regard to the foundational make up of the sensitive recognition in general.
- 2.1 What we are trying to say is that all our viewing is nothing but the representation of appearances; and the things we look at are not on their own as we see them, nor are their relationships so constituted on their own as they appear to us, and if we were to remove our subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, all the make up, all the relationships of objects in space and time, indeed even space and time themselves would vanish, for as appearances they [these objects in space and time] cannot exist on their own, but rather only in us.⁴²

⁴² This is fairly straightforward, I would think; space is within us and the appearances, while in space, are actually nothing more than our own sensations projected in that space, e.g., retinal objects. It is more difficult for me to deal with appearances in time, but eventually we will see that they are of the same sort.

- 2.2 What sort of affinity there might be with the objects on their own and isolated from all this receptivity of our sensitivity, remains thoroughly unknown to us.⁴³
- 2.3 We only know our manner of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, but which also must not be necessarily attributed to all beings, though certainly to all humans.
- 2.4 With this alone are we occupied.
- 2.5 Space and time are the pure forms of this, sensation in general the material.
- 2.6 The former alone can we recognize *a priori*, i.e., before all actual perception, and for that reason it is called pure viewing. But this latter is what in our recognition makes us call a recognition *a posteriori*, i.e., empirical viewing.
- 2.7 The former pertain with utter necessity to our sensitivity regardless even of the mode of our sensations; the latter can be quite diverse.
- 2.8 Even if we could develop this our viewing to the highest degree of clarity, we still would not come any closer to the constitution of the objects on their own.
- 2.9 For in every case we would still only fully recognize our way of viewing, i.e., our sensitivity, and this always under conditions of space and time which adhere originally only to the subject. What the objects might be on their own would never be made known to us through even the clearest recognition of their appearance, and that is all that is given to us.
- 3.1 That our entire sensitivity be nothing other than the confused representation of things which contains solely what pertains to them on their own, only under an assemblage of characteristics and partial representations which we cannot separate clearly, is accordingly a falsification (*Verfälschung*) of the concept of sensitivity and of appearance, and one which makes the entire theory unusable and empty.
- 3.2 The difference between an indistinct and a distinct representation is merely

⁴³ For all we have is how these objects effect us, and nothing about the objects themselves and how they might be constituted in ways that cannot affect us in anyway.

logical and does not concern the content.

- 3.3 The concept of right utilized in the ordinary understanding most certainly contains exactly what the most subtle speculation can develop from it, with this exception: on a common and practical level we are not conscious of the multiple representations in these thoughts.⁴⁴
- 3.4 But we cannot for that reason declare that the ordinary concept is sensitive and contains a mere appearance, for what is right cannot appear at all. Far rather its concept is situated in the understanding and it represents a property of actions (the moral) which pertains to them on their own.⁴⁵
- 3.5 The representation of a body in the viewing, on the other hand, does not contain anything at all which could pertain to an object on its own, but concerns rather only the appearance of something and the way in which we are affected by this something; and this receptivity of our recognitional ability is called sensitivity and always remains vastly different from the recognition of an object on its own, even though we might scrutinize it (the appearance) down to its very foundation.⁴⁶
- 4.1 The Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy, therefore, by considering the distinction of the sensitivity from the intellectual as merely logical, has directed all investigations of nature and the origin of our knowledge in accordance with a decidedly incorrect point of view, for this distinction is obviously transcendental and concerns not merely the form of the distinctiveness or undistinctiveness, but rather its origin and content such that we not only do not recognize the constitution of things on their own through the former merely unclearly, as rather not at all, and as soon as we remove our subjective constitution, the represented object along with the properties which the sensitive viewing attributes to it is nowhere to be encountered nor can be, for it is pre-

⁴⁴ And so these multiple representations are brought into focus by means of analysis, and accordingly we have first an indistinct representation and then a distinct one.

⁴⁵ I.e., the ordinary concept is not an appearance, although by Leibniz's theory it would be, for what is right cannot appear. But the only difference between the indistinct and distinct understanding of right is logical, the latter being exhausted in nuance.

⁴⁶ When I see the "small house" at a distance I know that the house itself is not in this sighting, but that this small house is on my retina, and so, therefore, is the way that my sight organ is affected by something, presumably a real thing on its own, called the house, i.e., the so-called real house. The same holds true for all of my investigations as to the make up of this house, down to the material of its construction, e.g., even the atoms and subatomic particles.

cisely this subjective constitution that determines the form of this object as appearance.⁴⁷

- 5.1 Otherwise we judge very well concerning what of the appearance belongs to the viewing and adheres essentially to it and is valid for every human sense in general, and distinguish it from what pertains to the appearance only accidentally by holding for a particular position or organization of this or that sense and not for the referral of the sensitivity in general.⁴⁸
- 5.2 And here we term the first recognition such as represents the object on its own, but the second only its appearance.
- 5.3 But this distinction is only empirical.
- 5.4 If we remain there (as we usually do) and do not in turn consider (as we should) that this empirical viewing is a mere appearance such that nothing which could pertain to an object on its own could be encountered there, our transcendental distinction is lost and we still think we are recognizing things on their own even though everywhere (in the sense world), even down to the deepest investigation of its objects, we still have to do with nothing but sheer appearances.
- 5.5 We do indeed term the rainbow in the sun illuminated rain a mere appearance in contrast to the rain as the thing on its own, which is also correct to the extent we utilize this latter concept only physically as that which is determined in the universal experience under all diverse positions to the sense as being so in the viewing and not otherwise.⁴⁹
- 5.6 But if we consider this empiricity in general and ask whether this represents an object on its own (not the rain drops, for they, as appearances, are already empirical objects) without considering the agreement of this with

⁴⁷ It is not immediately apparent that rainbows are different from the rain in a different way than rain is different from other objects. For on their own, both the rain and the rainbow are made up of retinal material, and in this regard there is no distinction. For these objects of experience consists only of our own sensations construed in a form of space and time.

⁴⁸ For example, we know that the house we see is just an appearance and is small for that reason (seen at a distance) while the house itself is unchanged.

⁴⁹ Both the rain and the rainbow can be viewed in space, but only the rain can be physically located in space.

every human sense, then the question concerning the referral of the representation to the object is transcendental and not only are these drops sheer appearances, but also their round shape; and even the space in which they fall is nothing on its own but sheer modifications or foundations of our sensitive viewing, and the transcendental object remains unknown to us.⁵⁰

- 6.1 The second important matter of our transcendental aesthetic is this, that it not engender favor as an appealing hypothesis, but rather that it be so certain and as indubitable as we might require of a theory which is to serve as an organon.
- 6.2 In order to make this certitude entirely clear we will now choose a case whereon its validity will be clear to our sight and can serve to better clarify what has been introduced in section 3 above.
- 7.1 Assume that space and time were objective on their own and conditions of the possibility of things on their own, then we would see first of all that both render us a priori apodictic and synthetical proposition in great number, especially space, which we now in particular want to examine as an example.
- 7.2 Since the propositions of geometry are synthetic a priori and are recognized with apodictic certainty, I would like to inquire as to the origin of such propositions and what supports the understanding in order that it achieve to such utterly necessary and universally valid perceptions?
- 7.3 There is no way other than through concepts or through viewings, but both of which can be given either a priori or a posteriori.
- 7.4 The latter, namely empirical concepts, and likewise that whereon they are based, the empirical viewing, can render no synthetical proposition except such which are also merely empirical, i.e., experiential proposition, thus can never contain necessity and absolute universality, but which still are the characteristics of all propositions of geometry.⁵¹

⁵⁰ The rainbow and the rain are equally retinal material, but there is also contact with the rain through the other senses and regardless of viewpoint, while the rainbow exists only in the eye and from a particular viewpoint. See the appendix on Captain Hook.

⁵¹ Empirically we could say that all triangles examined this far reveal that any two sides are greater than the third, but not that this is the case for all triangles whether examined or not.

- 7.5 But what would be the first and only means, namely to achieve to such realizations through mere concepts or through viewings *a priori*, it is clear that no synthetical recognition at all can be achieved through mere concepts, but solely analytical.⁵²
- 7.6 Consider only the proposition that two straight lines cannot not in any way encompass a space, thus no figure being possible, and seek to derive that from the concept of straight lines and the number two; but also then that a figure is possible through three straight line, and seek that just as well out of these concepts.⁵³
- 7.7 Our entire endeavor is vain and we are necessitated to resort to a viewing [taking a look] as the geometrician also always do.
- 7.8 Therefore you present yourself with an object in the viewing; but then what sort is this? is it a pure viewing *a priori*, or an empirical one?
- 7.9 If it were the latter, then no universally valid proposition, and much less an apodictic one, could arise; for experience cannot never provide such.⁵⁴
- 7.10 Therefore you must give yourself an object *a priori* in viewing, and base your synthetical proposition on that.
- 7.11 If there were in you no capacity to look at things *a priori*; if this subjective condition with respect to the form were not simultaneously the universal condition *a priori*, under which alone the object of this (external) viewing were itself possible; were the object (the triangle) something on its own without reference to your subject; how could you say that what were necessarily in your subjective condition for constructing a triangle would also have to pertain to the triangle on its own?⁵⁵

⁵² I.e., in the concept of a triangle I think of three line segments such that each end point of each is an end point of two, there is not the least suggestion of the length of any of the sides. It would be impossible to know analytical that any two sides of a triangle are greater than the third.

⁵³ A current favorite of mine is to derive from the concept of two straight lines and that of an angle that with these two lines one, two or four angles can be constructed, but not three and not more than four.

⁵⁴ All experience could say is that as far as we have been able to tell thus far any two sides of a triangle have been greater than the third.

⁵⁵ It's like the construction of a triangle pantomimicly in mid air. It is our own viewing, produced by our imagination in the space that we spy about us.

- 7.12 For you could not add anything new (the figure) to your concepts (of the three lines), which for that reason would also have to correspond necessarily to the object, since this is given before your recognition and not through it.⁵⁶
- 7.13 Therefore were space (and also then time) not merely a form of your looking, which contains conditions *a priori*, according to which alone objects could be external objects for you, which apart from these subjective conditions are nothing at all, then you could make out synthetically absolutely nothing about external objects.
- 7.14 It is therefore unquestionably certain and not merely possible or just probable, that space and time, as the necessary conditions of all (external and internal) experience, are nothing other than subjective conditions of all our viewing, in relationship to which, therefore, all objects are merely appearances and not things given in this manner on their own, whereof then for that reason, concerning their form, much can be said *a priori*, but never the least about the things on their own which might be the foundations of these appearances.

II.

- 1.1 As a confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external as well as the internal sense, and hence of all objects of the senses as mere appearances, the following remark can be especially appropriate, namely: everything in our recognition which belongs to viewing (therefore excluding the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the will, which are not recognitions at all) contains nothing but mere relationships, of places in a viewing (extension), alteration of place (movement) and laws by means of which this alteration is determined (moving powers).⁵⁷
- 1.2 But what presently be in the place, or what, apart from the alteration of place, be efficacious in the things themselves, is not given by that.
- 1.3 Now through mere relationships a thing cannot be recognized on its own at

⁵⁶ Nothing in the notion of three lines with every end point common to two lines tells you that a space has been enclosed. A sighting is required for this.

⁵⁷ Perhaps: we have a from here to there (expansion), change in place (a movement) and the path of this movement through space.

all; therefore we can easily judge that since nothing except relational representations are given through the external sense, this can also contain only the relationship of an object to the subject in its representation, and not the internality which pertains to the object on its own.

- 1.4 With the internal viewing it is just the same.
- 1.5 Not only that in this the representations of the external sense make up the actual material with which our minds are occupied, but also time, in which we position these representations, which precedes before their consciousness in experience and, as formal condition of the manner as to how they are positioned in the mind, lies as the foundation, already contains relationships of succession, simultaneity and what which is simultaneous with the succession (the enduring).⁵⁸
- 1.6 Now that which, as representation, must precede all action of thinking something, is the viewing, and, if it contains nothing except relationships, it is the form of the viewing which, since it represents nothing except to the extent something is placed in the mind, can be nothing else than the manner in which the mind is affected through its own activity, namely this positioning of its representation, i.e., is an internal sense with respect to its form.
- 1.7 Everything which is represented through a sense is to this extent always appearance, and an internal sense would therefore either not be admissible at all, or else the subject, which is the object of that, would have to be represented through itself only as appearance, and not as it would judge of itself if its viewing were merely self active, i.e., intellectual.
- 1.8 Now the basis of all difficulty here rests on this: how a subject could look at itself internally; but this difficulty is common to every theory.
- 1.9 The consciousness of one's self (apperception) is the simple representation of the I, and if thereby alone all manifold of the object were given self-activity, then the internal viewing would be intellectual.
- 1.10 With humans this consciousness requires internal perception of the manifold which is precedes within the subject, and the manner whereby this is given

⁵⁸ I think this means that all internal representations, other than our own thinking, are looked upon by us as external to ourselves, as not-ourselves. And then it is for those who can see (and not the blind) to realize that space is the form of this not-ourselves.

in the mind without spontaneity, must be called sensitivity in order to maintain this distinction.

- 1.11 If the capacity for being conscious of the self is to seek out (apprehend) what is lying in the mind, then it must be able to affect that and only in this way can produce a viewing of itself, but whose form, which precedes in the mind as the basis, determines in the representation of time the manner as to how the manifold is assembled in the mind; since it then views itself, not as it would immediately represent itself self-actively, but rather according to the manner as it is internally affected, consequently as it appears to itself, but not as it is.

III.

- 1.1 When I say that in space and time the viewing represents both the external objects as well as the self viewing of the mind as they affect our senses, i.e., as they appear, that is not to say that these objects are merely illusions.
- 1.2 For in the appearance the objects, indeed even the properties which we attribute to them, are viewed as something actually given, but with this proviso: this property pertains to the viewing manner of the subject in relationship to the given object to the extent the object as appearance is distinguished from it as an object on its own.⁵⁹
- 1.3 Hence I do not say that bodies only *seem* to be apart from me or that my soul merely *seems* to be given in my self consciousness when I assert that the quality of space and time, conformable to which, as the condition of their existence, I place both of these (bodies and my soul), is situated in my viewing manner and not in these objects on their own.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ This is very true. I see things about me as really here and there in space and all about me. However, when pressed to speak with rigorous precision, I note that I see them only in the context of a viewing, namely as pictured in my eyes (with respect to space), and so I know that they are not themselves getting larger and smaller on their own. This must be what Kant is referring to here. Thus, for example, my house, in the evening, is not dimmer on its own, although it certainly looks dimmer, but that is because there is less light as the sun goes down. Or because there is a growing fog. Etc. On its own, i.e., with respect to its painted surfaces, there is not the least difference--it is just as it was in the bright sunlight. Nothing has changed to the house on its own.

⁶⁰ Or perhaps better said at this point: the house is no more a mirage than is my soul. The alternations that I perceive in my house are due to empirical conditions of my viewing, even as the alternations that I perceive in my soul are due to empirical conditions of my viewing.

- 1.4 It would be my own fault if I wanted to make sheer illusion out of what I count as appearance.*
- 1.5 But this does not occur according to our principle of the ideality of all sensitive viewings. Quite the contrary, if someone attributes objective reality to those representational forms then we cannot avoid everything being turned into sheer illusion.⁶¹
- 1.6 For if we view space and time as constitutions which, with regard to their possibility, would have to be encountered in objects on their own, and neglect the absurdities in which we are then entangled, in that two infinite things, which are not substance nor something actually inhering in those substances, but which still exist and indeed which must be the necessary condition of the existence of all things, also remain even if all existing things were annihilated, we certainly cannot blame the good Berkeley for demoting bodies to sheer illusion. Indeed our own existence itself would have to be transformed into mere illusion if in this way it were made dependent upon the self-existent reality of a non-thing like time, an absurdity into which no one has yet descended.⁶²

* Kant's footnote:

- 1.1 The predicates of appearance can be attributed to the object itself in relationship to our senses, e.g., the red color or the scent to the rose. But the illusion can never be attributed as a predicate to the object, and precisely because it would attribute to the object on its own that which only pertains to it in relationship to the senses or generally to the subject, e.g., the two handles which

⁶¹ This would be saying that bodies on their own are in space and that the soul on its own is in time, where Angry-philip would arise on his own to replace Sad-philip who goes out of existence, even as Bright-house displaces Dim-house.

⁶² Since time and space are nothing on their own, it make sense, as Berkeley insisted concerning space, that we will not be able to find them anywhere or anytime, for all we can sense are colors, sounds, etc., and we cannot sense nothings. Therefore, if space and time were really these non-things that were to be found within things on their own, then we would have to make illusions out of all things. This is what Berkeley did with external things, making them merely perceptions which God also perceived (in order to account for the continuing existence of the world).

What Berkeley did was to reason to the existence of the soul, for, as he put it, since I am conscious of my perceptions, it follows that there must be a perceiver. But actually, if he had been quite consistent with his own premises, he would have had to conclude that we ourselves were merely perceptions, and so if God did not perceive us, then we, since we would be merely perceptions and not things on our own, would not even exist ourselves, and this is what Kant means with an absurdity that no one yet has been guilty of.

some first ascribed to Saturn.⁶³

1.2 What cannot be encountered with the object on its own, but always in its relationship to the subject, is appearance and, therefore, the predicates of space and time are quite properly applied to the objects of the senses, and in this there is no illusion.⁶⁴

1.3 On the other hand, if I ascribe redness to the rose on its own, or the handles to Saturn, or extension to all external objects on their own without considering a determined relationship of these objects to the subject and limiting my judgment to that, it is only then that illusion arises.⁶⁵

IV.

1.1 In natural theology, where we must think an object which is not at all an object of viewing, but rather which cannot even be for itself an object of sensitive viewing, we are very careful to remove the conditions of time and space from its viewing (for such must all its recognitions be, and not thinking, which always means limitation).

1.2 But with what right can we do this if we have already made both of these into the forms of things on their own and indeed such which, as conditions of the existence of things *a priori*, remain even if we have removed the things themselves; for as conditions of all existence in general they would also have to be conditions of the existence of God.

1.3 If we do not want to make them into objective forms of all things, then nothing remains but to make them into subjective forms of all our external as well as our internal viewing which for that reason is called sensitive because it is not original, i.e., is not such through which the existence of the object of

⁶³ This is very revealing. We could say that Saturn had handles, and then that these handles occasionally vanished and were replaced by rings. In this case we ignore completely the fact of our own looking, i.e., that we are seeing Saturn from a certain angle and distance. And so the same thing would happen if we meant that the rose were red on its own without reference to ourselves as viewers. And so there is no illusion as long as we remember that we are dealing with things as appearances, i.e., as appearances existing in a space and time which is within us.

⁶⁴ Thus whenever we can use the expression “looks” or “seems” we are safe. The rose looks red, the objects seem small. In fact these expressions could not be arrived at via exposure to objects alone or via reasoning alone. A look is require, a viewing. And even a recognition that what is seen is being looked at.

⁶⁵ Applying extension to external objects on their own means that distant objects not only look smaller, they are smaller and would look so even if we happened to be closer at that moment. They go into a smaller space, we might even say.

the viewing would be given (and which, as far as we can tell, can only pertain to the original being), but rather adhere to the existence of the object, thus be only possible thereby that the representational capacity of the subject is affected through that.

- 2.1 It is also not necessary that we limit the viewingal mode in space and time to the sensitivity of humans; it may be that all finite, thinking beings would necessarily have to agree with the human in this regard (but concerning which we cannot decide), but despite that universality it does not cease to pertain to the sensitivity, and precisely for this reason, namely that it is derivative (*intuitus derivativus*) and not original (*intuitus originarius*), thus not intellectual viewing, which, per the reason cited above, would apparently pertain to the original being alone, and never to a being dependent with regard to his existence as well as to his viewing (which determines his existence with reference to given objects), although this latter remark must be counted to our aesthetical theory only as exposition and not as a basis of proof.

Next: [The Transcendental Logic leading to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories](#) of the *CPR*.

Appendix

Captain Hook and the Rainbow

I present this as a humorous assist in grasping the illusion that arises by virtue of treating appearances as things on their own.

Captain Hook, the great antagonist of the arch-hero, Peter Pan, finally developed a hypothesis regarding the rainbow. The facts he gathered through careful research are as follows:

1. Whenever any one is near him, and Hook spies a rainbow, the others admit also to seeing the rainbow, but
2. those who are not near often refuse such admission; and
3. when Hook does not spy a rainbow, those near him also say they see no rainbow, but, sometimes,
4. when they are further off they say they do see a rainbow even though it is clear to Hook that there is no rainbow.

In general: no one has ever contradicted Hook while close to him, nor in the absence of rain. (He has never had this problem in the absence of rain, for the rainbow has never yet appeared in the absence of rain) He has also never noticed any such penchant to contradict him with regard to other things, e.g., the rain itself, but only with the rainbow. It could be, Hook thinks, that the rainbow affects people mentally and drives them to taunt him (and perhaps other right thinking men), somewhat as people are occasionally alleged to be affected by the full moon.

Solution (Hook's hypothesis): Occasionally, and especially in wet weather, people (are driven [for some yet unknown reason] to) have no respect for Hook and think he is a fool, but are afraid to admit to that when they are close to him, for they know he will beat them.

Hook is as yet unable to account for this phenomenon,¹ except that in the sun-lit rain others occasionally gang up on him to make sport of him. And this he will not tolerate!

Consideration: if Hook views a rainbow in the same way that he does the rain and chairs, etc., then in the same way that the rainbow is funny, all things would be funny,² only we will simply

¹ I assume that the reader knows that rainbows are not in the rain at all, but only in the perception of the rain and thus only in the eye (or camera); and so to see a rainbow requires a particular configuration of rain, sun and perceiver/focus. Otherwise they miss the humor of this appendix, much as children, who are too young, miss the humor of Peter Pan's shadow being rolled up in Wendy's chest-of-drawers, and are even saddened by that state.

² But then, of course, nothing would be funny (in this regard) for nothing would be different, and questions regarding this behavior would never come to mind. It would be like trying to grasp the notion of time and or space from experience--since time (as well as space) is omnipresent, it could not even be noticed, like a certain buzz in one's ear from birth to death.

not yet have noticed a like penchant for coming into and going out of existence like that exemplified by the rainbow. Then missing or overlooked objects would not be stolen so much as merely have gone out of existence, or to rainbow land, wherever that might be.

Further consideration of Hook's frame of mind: it is a sheer viewing to notice the spatial and temporal sightings of any appearance, e.g., a rainbow or the rain. and that, since we are limited to subjective, split-finger space, is only possible if we dream up a so-called real space into which our own subjective, split-finger space might fit as a view point or perspective of that, and indeed it is only by means of this what we can make these spatial and temporal observations.

Another Hookian consideration. One day on the way home (on August 4, 1998), while riding my motorbike toward the foothills of the Georgia mountains and some distance in front of my wife (who was driving our motor home), a deer and I collided. While I remained upright (and I was only slightly injured), the deer (a doe) was tossed onto its back with legs kicking in the air before righting itself and scampering off, a bit dazed, no doubt, but apparently none the worse physically for the encounter. My wife reported to me later that at first sight she thought the deer were a piece of brown cardboard (trash on the highway) which I had sought to avoid hitting by swerving (when the deer actually collided with me) and which had been tossed up into the air through the wind that I was causing with my bulk and speed; and then as she came closer, she saw that she had been mistaken, and that it was actually a deer.^{3 4}

Had Captain Hook viewed this same scene in the place of my wife, his experience would have been quite different, for he would have been able to report that I had struck a piece of cardboard and then almost immediately, the cardboard turned into a deer and scampered off. "Damnedest thing you can imagine! turned suddenly into a deer. Probably a magician disguised to do me

³ Which expression intimates: it was a deer all along! It is my strongest conviction that such an experience as being mistaken in this way cannot possibly arise in the context of the empiricist schools of epistemology, nor even in the rationalist schools, but only via the capacity of human recognition as envisioned by Kant. It certainly could not have been an intuition, i.e., a direct, intellectual (or spiritual or intelligible?) sighting, for, in that case (it seems to me), it would never have been thought of as a cardboard in the first place.

⁴ Kant's greatest insight in his development from the Inaugural Dissertation to the Critique of Pure Reason was, in my opinion, the realization that the objects of this world are not givens which are intuited (Dissertation), but are merely appearances (Erscheinungen, things appearing, retinal objects) which we then assemble into objects (and which is the validation of the categories of pure understanding), and which we then see, as objects, so clearly before our eyes that we must think that they always existed as such, and which is precisely the meaning we give to the objects of experience. See Hume's *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Section 118. This understanding first came to me when I realized that little children were not imposed upon by the fact that Peter Pan's shadow was rolled up in Wendy's chest-of-drawers, but were more saddened by his plight of having lost that shadow.

harm, and was suddenly surprised by Philip on his motor bike and his evil intention against me thwarted."⁵ ⁶

If told that he must have been mistaken and that it only looked like a piece of cardboard, Hook would have most surely struck the speaker for his insolence and would have straightaway ordered him not again to use nonsense words (a la the surds of Leibniz) such as "looked like", words that have no reference, nothing to refer to.

Hook's compatriots soon learn, through many beatings, not to contradict their leader and never to use "seems to be" or "appears to be" for they can never find any example of that to be used to show Hook what they mean with these terms.

See also this humorous [Onion article](#) on size of humans (added 12/25/2013).

Next: [The Transcendental Logic Introduction](#) of the *CPR*.

⁵ According to the rationalist school, when we see the deer, this means that we would know immediately that the cardboard were only a mirage (*Erscheinung*). This is very close to the notion of an intuition, only here, with the rationalists, the senses would be charged with the perversion of our sighting and then corrected by the intellect. So perhaps intuition is an integral part of the rationalist system. Kant, of course, rejected the rationalist system when he realized that it would be impossible for a rationalist, like Hook, for example, to tell the difference between his left and right hand, for the description of the one would match perfectly the description of the other, when no reference to an externally encompassing space were made. Hook might marvel that his gloves fit sometimes (the left glove on the left hand) and not at others (the left glove and the right hand), but would have to ascribe that to some magic, and he might even figure out a counter-magic, e.g., switching the gloves, perhaps when saying some Hocus Pocus words. Furthermore the reference to space were only of temporary benefit in the rationalist system, and would be dispensed with eventually when everything were seen by us, like Paul says in 1 Corinthians 13, in the same way that we are seen by God, i.e., immediately, without need for categories of any sort. For example, I am sure Leibniz would have used an example like this: we say "the fellow over there" until we learn his name, and then we say "Joe" or whatever the name might be.

⁶ The rationalist, once having come to the conclusion (sheer awareness?) that the cardboard and the deer were related, since they would assert the principle of sufficient reason, would doubtlessly appeal to magic of some sort, or God, to account for the sudden change.

I think there is a basic inconsistency in this system in that I don't think that you would ever have come to the thought for a need of causation and adequate reason if you reasoned from within this intellectual system from the very beginning since, by Leibniz' own admission, each monad is a self-contained system or world and what we call causation of one thing to another is merely the march of the internal states of the monad, i.e., its perceptions and depictions, and so (the question must arise): what is the relationship of the depictions to real things existing independently of them and to which these depictions are supposed to refer? Especially since the rainbow is not an external thing, but looks as much external as the retinal image of the rain.