

The Critique Of Pure Reason

Transcendental Logic Preceding The Deduction Of The Categories

See [Translator's Technical Notes](#)

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The¹ Transcendental Logic

First Division. The Transcendental Analytic

- 1.1 This analytic is the dissection of our entire recognition a priori into the elements of the recognition of the pure understanding.
- 1.2 Here with this it depends upon the following pieces:
 - 1.3 1. that the concepts be pure and not empirical concepts;
 - 1.4 2. that they belong not to the viewing and sensitivity, but rather to thinking and understanding;
 - 1.5 3. that they be elementary concepts and clearly distinguished from those derived, or assembled together, from them; and
 - 1.6 4. that their table be complete and that they quite encompass the entire field of the pure understanding.
- 1.7 Now this completeness of a science cannot be assumed with confidence by the rough estimate of an aggregate brought forth merely by trial and error. Hence it is only possible by means of an idea of the whole of the understanding recognitions a priori and through the ensuing division of the concepts, which they make up, thus only by their cohesion in a system.
- 1.8 The pure understanding not only completely isolates itself from everything that is empirical, but even from all sensitivity.
- 1.9 It is, therefore, a unity existent for itself, sufficient unto itself and to be augmented by no externally additive codicils.
- 1.10 Accordingly, the complex of its recognition will make up a system to be encompassed and determined under a single idea, the completeness and articulation of which can simultaneously furnish a touchstone for the correctness and genuineness of all compatible recognitional elements.

¹ A64 B89

- 1.11 But this entire part of the transcendental logic consists of two books, whereof the one contains the concepts and the other the principles of the pure understanding.

The² Transcendental Analytic

First Book. Analytic of the Concepts

- 1.1 With the analytic of the concepts I do not mean their analysis or that usual procedure in philosophical investigations of dissecting concepts, which present themselves with respect to their content, and of bringing them to distinctness, in order to examine in that way the possibility of the concepts a priori, by seeking them out in the understanding alone as their birthplace, and by analyzing its pure usage in general; for this is the peculiar occupation of a transcendental philosophy. The remainder is the logical treatment of the concepts in philosophy in general.
- 1.2 Accordingly we will pursue the pure concepts back to their first germs and arrangements in human understanding in which they lie in readiness until finally, upon the occasion of experience, they are developed and, liberated from the empirical conditions attaching to them, are displayed in their purity through this very same understanding.

² A65 B90

The³ Analytic of the Concepts

Chapter 1. Clues for the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of Understanding

- 1.1 If we call a recognitional capacity into play, then, according to the various occasions, diverse concepts distinguish themselves, which make this capacity discernible and permit of collection into a more or less complete treatise, according as its observation were employed for a longer time or with greater acuteness.
- 1.2 Where this examination will be complete, according to this, as it were, mechanical procedure, can never be determined with certitude.
- 1.3 And the concepts, which we uncover only by circumstance, are also discovered in no order and not systematically, but rather are finally only paired according to similarity and placed into series according to the magnitude of their contents from the simple on to the more assembled, which is hardly produced systematically, although it is methodical to a certain degree.

- 2.1 The transcendental philosophy has not only an advantage in being able to search out its concepts according to a principle, but also the obligation to do so. And the reason for this is simply that they arise out of the understanding as absolute unity (pure and unmixed) and hence must cohere among themselves according to a concept or idea.
- 2.2 But such a cohesion gives a rule to hand, according to which the position for every pure understanding concept and the completeness for all together can be designated a priori, all of which otherwise would depend upon whim or chance.

³ A66 B91

First Section - The Logical Usage of Understanding in General ⁴

- 1.1 The understanding was explained above, and merely negatively, as a non-sensitive, recognitional capacity.
- 1.2 But independently of sensitivity we can partake of no viewing.
- 1.3 Therefore the understanding is not a capacity of viewing.
- 1.4 But then apart from the viewing there is no manner of recognizing except through concepts.
- 1.5 Therefore the recognition of every, at least human, understanding is a recognition through concepts, not intuitively but rather discursively.⁵
- 1.6 All viewings, as sensitive, depend upon affections; the concepts, therefore, upon functions.
- 1.7 But with function I understand the unity of the action in ordering diverse representations under a common one.⁶
- 1.8 Concepts, therefore, are based upon the spontaneity of the thinking, as sensitive viewing is upon the receptivity of the impressions.⁷
- 1.9 Now the understanding can make no use of these concepts other than judging by means of them.⁸
- 1.10 Since no representation, except the viewing alone, goes immediately to the object, it follows that a concept is never referred immediately to an object,

⁴ A67 B92

⁵ At this point we establish that the capacity for understanding is not intuitive but rather discursive, depending as it does upon concepts.

⁶ For example this table and that table are each a representation of table and are united under the concept of table. Or this chair and that table are united under the concept of furniture.

⁷ The concept is spontaneously dreamed up by the understanding in order to subsume diverse representations under a common heading or concept. This is what we mean by understanding.

⁸ I use the concept in order to make judgments concerning viewings as to whether it is a table or something else.

but rather to some other sort of representation of the object (be it viewing or even a concept).⁹

- 1.11 Hence the judgment is the mediate recognition of an object, thus the representation of a representation of the object.¹⁰
- 1.12 In every judgment there is a concept which holds for many representations, and among this many also encompasses a given one which is then referred directly to the object.
- 1.13 In the judgment “all bodies are divisible”, for example, the concept of divisibility is referred to diverse other concepts, but among which it is referred here in particular to the concept of body; but this to certain appearances in view.¹¹
- 1.14 Therefore these objects are represented mediately by the concept of divisibility.¹²
- 1.15 Accordingly all judgments are functions of the unity among our representations since, namely, instead of an immediate representation, a higher one which comprehends this and numerous others is used for the recognition of an object, and in this way many, possible recognitions are drawn together into one.
- 1.16 But we can trace all action of the understanding back to judgments so that the understanding in general can be represented as a capacity for judging.
- 1.17 For according to the above, it is a capacity for thinking.
- 1.18 Thinking is the recognition through concepts.

⁹ It is by means of my viewing that I see a table. So the concept of furniture can be referred to table and table to the object of my immediate looking.

¹⁰ The judgment then becomes the representation such that a concept (a representation) is applied to an appearance in the viewing.

¹¹ So bodies are divisible as are also numbers or even an appearance like a face, but here the focus is on bodies.

¹² The concept of the divisible does not belong to that of body like top does to table, but rather to many concepts, one of which is body, and then via body to appearances in view.

- 1.19 But concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, are referred to some sort of representation of a yet undetermined object.
- 1.20 So the concept of body means something, e.g., metal, which can be recognized through that concept.
- 1.21 Therefore, it is only a concept in that other representations are contained under it, by means of which it can be referred to objects.
- 1.22 Therefore, it is the predicate to a possible judgment, e.g., every metal is a body.
- 1.23 Therefore, the functions of the understanding can be all together found if we can completely describe the functions of the unity in the judgments.
- 1.24 But that this is quite easily accomplished, the following section will readily indicate.

Second Section

9 Regarding Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgments ¹³

- 1.1 If we abstract from all content of a judgment in general and attend only to the sheer understanding form in that, we find that the function of the thinking in that form can be brought under four titles, each of which contains three moments.
- 1.2 They can be conveniently represented in the following table:

1.	
<i>Quantity of the Judgments</i>	
Universal	
Particular	
Singular	
2.	3.
<i>Quality</i>	<i>Relations</i>
Affirming	Categorical
Denying	Hypothetical
Infinite	Disjunctive
4.	
<i>Modality</i>	
Problematic	
Assertoric	
Apodictic	

- 2.1 Since this division seems to deviate from the customary technique of the logician in some parts (though not in any essential parts), the following precautions against a feared misunderstanding may be necessary.
- 3.1 1. the logicians say quite properly that in the usage of judgments in rational inferences, we are able to treat the singular judgments like the universal ones.

¹³ A70 B95

- 3.2 For since precisely for that reason, that they have no scope at all, the predicate of the singular judgment cannot be drawn merely to some of what is contained under the concept of the subject, and excluded from the other.
- 3.3 It holds, therefore, of these concepts without exception, just as though it were a communally valid concept which had a scope for whose entire meaning the predicate held.
- 3.4 On the other hand if we compare a singular judgment to a commonly valid one merely as recognition according to its magnitude, it is related to this as unity is to infinity and is, therefore, on its own essentially distinguished from it.
- 3.5 If, therefore, I evaluate a singular judgment (*judicium singulare*) not merely according to its inner validity, but rather as a recognition in general according to the magnitude which it has in comparison with other recognitions, it is distinguished in every case from communally valid judgments (*judicia communia*) and deserves a particular position in a complete table of the moments of thinking in general (though, of course, not in a logic limited merely to the usage of the judgments among one another).
- 4.1 2. Likewise must the infinite judgments in a transcendental logic be distinguished from the affirming ones, even if they are properly counted among these in the universal logic and make up no particular number of the division.
- 4.2 The latter logic abstracts namely from all content of the predicate (even if it is denying) and looks only to whether it is attributed to the subject or opposed to it.
- 4.3 But the transcendental logic considers the judgment also according to the value or content of this logical affirmation by means of a mere denying predicate and what kind of gain this supplies with respect to the entire recognition.
- 4.4 Had I said of the soul, “it is not mortal” then by a denying judgment I had at least avoided an error.

- 4.5 Now indeed through the statement, “the soul is not mortal,” I have actually made an affirmation with regard to the logical form by placing the soul into the unlimited scope of the non-mortal entities.
- 4.6 Now because the mortal contains one part of the entire scope of possible entities, but the non-mortal the other, nothing other is said through my judgment than that the soul is one of the infinite number of things which remain if I remove the mortal all together.
- 4.7 But only the infinite sphere of all possible is restricted thereby to the extent the mortal is separated from it and the soul placed in the remaining scope of its space.
- 4.8 But this space remains with this exception yet always infinite, and several parts of the same can still be removed without the concept of the soul growing for that reason in the slightest and becoming determined affirmatively.
- 4.9 These infinite judgments, therefore, with respect to the logical scope, are actually merely restricting with respect to the content of the recognition in general, and to this extent they must not be overlooked in the transcendental table of all moments of the thinking in the judgments, because the functions of understanding exercised with that can perhaps be important in the field of its pure recognition a priori.
- 5.1 3. All relationships of the thinking in judgments are those
- a. of the predicate to the subject,
 - b. of the basis to the consequence, and
 - c. of the divided recognition and of the collected members of the division among one another.
- 5.2 In the first type of judgments, only two concepts are considered; in the second two judgments; in the third several judgments in relationship to each other.
- 5.3 The hypothetical proposition, “if there is a perfect justice, the persistently evil are punished” actually contains the relationship of two propositions, “there is a perfect justice” and “the persistently evil are punished”.

- 5.4 Whether both of these proposition are true on their own remains undecided here.
- 5.5 It is only the consequence which is though through this judgment.
- 5.6 Finally the disjunctive judgment contains a relationship between two or more propositions among one another, but not of succession, but rather of logical opposition to the extent the sphere of the one excludes that of the other, but still simultaneously of communality to the extent they together fill up the sphere of the actual recognition, therefore, a relationship of the parts of the sphere of a realization, since the sphere of each part is a complement of the sphere of the others for the entire complex of the partitioned recognition, e.g., “the world exists either through blind chance, or through internal necessity, or through an external cause.”
- 5.7 Each of these propositions takes in one part of the sphere of the possible recognitions about the existence of a world in general, all together the entire sphere.
- 5.8 Removing the recognition from one of these spheres means to place it in one of the remaining ones, and on the other hand placing it in one sphere means to remove it from the others.
- 5.9 In a disjunctive judgment, therefore, there is a certain communality of the recognitions which consists in them alternately excluding one another, but still determining in this way the true recognition in the whole in that they, taken together, make up the entire content of a single given recognition.
- 5.10 And this is also all that I find necessary to note with respect to what follows.
- 6.1 4. The modality of a judgment is an entirely particular function of judgment and has the solitary distinction that it contributes nothing to the content of the judgment (for apart from magnitude, quality and relationship there is nothing more to the content of a judgment), but rather has to do only with the value of the copula in reference to the thinking in general.
- 6.2 Problematical judgments are such where we assume the affirming or denying as merely possible (optional).

- 6.3 Assertorical, where it is considered as actual (true).
- 6.4 Apodictical, in which we view it as necessary.*
- 6.5 So both judgments, the relationship of which makes up the hypothetical judgment (anec. and consequ), and likewise in the mutual effect of which the disjunctive consists (member of the division), are all together only problematic.
- 6.6 In the above example the proposition, “there is a perfect justice”, is not spoken assertorically, but rather is only thought as an arbitrary judgment such that it is possible that someone may assume it and only the consequence is assertorical.
- 6.7 Hence such judgments can also be obviously false and still, taken problematically, be conditions of the recognition of truth.
- 6.8 Thus the judgment, “the world exists through blind chance,” in the disjunctive judgment is only of problematic meaning, namely that someone may perhaps assume this proposition for a moment and still (as the indication of the false way among the number of all those which we can take) serves for finding the true one.
- 6.9 Hence the problematical proposition is that which expresses only logical possibility (which is not objective), i.e., a free choice in allowing such a proposition to hold, a mere arbitrary admission of the same into the understanding.
- 6.10 The assertorical speaks of logical actuality or truth, somewhat as in a hypothetical rational inference where the antecedent comes forth problematically in the major premise, assertorically in the minor, and indicates that the proposition is already joined with the understanding according to its laws, the apodictic proposition thinks to itself the assertoric determined through these laws of the understanding and hence assertingly a priori and, in such way, expresses logical necessity.
- 6.11 Now because here everything is gradually annexed to the understanding, so that we first judge something problematically, and then also even accept it assertorically as true, and finally assert it as joined inseparably with the un-

derstanding, i.e., as necessary and apodictic, we can also term these three functions of modality so many moments of thinking in general.

* Kant's note.

1. Just as if the thinking in the first case were a function of the understanding, in the second of judgment, and in the third of reason.
2. A remark which awaits its clarification later.

Third Section

10 The Pure Concepts Of Understanding or Categories ¹⁴

- 1.1 Universal logic, as has been stated several times, abstracts from all content of the recognition and expects representations from elsewhere (regardless of where that might be) in order first to convert these into concepts. This proceeds analytically.¹⁵
- 1.2 Transcendental logic, on the other hand, confronts a priori a manifold of sensitivity offered by the transcendental Aesthetic in order to supply material to the concepts of the pure understanding; in lieu of which this logic would be without content and thus thoroughly empty.
- 1.3 Now space and time contain a manifold of the pure viewing a priori, but still belong to the conditions of the receptivity of our mind, by means of which alone it can receive representations of objects, which thus must also always affect of the concept of these objects.
- 1.4 But the spontaneity of our thinking requires that this manifold first be perceived, taken up and joined in a certain way in order to make a recognition out of it.¹⁶
- 1.5 This action I call synthesis.
- 2.1 In its most general sense synthesis means the action of adding various representations to one another and of comprehending their manifold in a recognition.¹⁷

¹⁴ A76 B102

¹⁵ Here I think Kant means that we compare representations and extract what is common and make this common aspect into a concept. Perhaps comparing a chair and sofa and find the common element to be a seat.

¹⁶ This hints at the apprehension, retention and unification steps to be presented shortly in the A version of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.

¹⁷ And so this is different from the formulation of concepts by abstracting from what is diverse and focusing on what is common. There must be a composite or manifold and this is what is given in the object of the viewing. Compare with 1.1 above.

- 2.2 Such a synthesis is pure if the manifold is not given empirically, but rather a priori (like that in space and time).
- 2.3 These representations must first be given before any analysis of them, and no concept can arise analytically with respect to its content.¹⁸
- 2.4 Rather it is the synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or a priori) that first produces a recognition, albeit indeed at the beginning often yet raw and confused and therefore in need of analysis. But the synthesis is still that which actually garners the elements for a recognition and unites them into a certain content. Thus it is the first thing we need to consider if we wish to judge about the first origin of our recognition.¹⁹
- 3.1 Synthesis in general, as we shall soon see, is the mere operation of the imagination, a blind albeit indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no recognition at all anywhere, but of which we are seldom even aware.
- 3.2 To bring this synthesis to concepts, however, is a function which belongs to understanding, and it first supplies us the recognition in the actual meaning.²⁰
- 4.1 Now the pure synthesis, represented universally, gives the pure understanding concept.

¹⁸ Here then we would not be comparing a chair and sofa as above, but rather assembling the elements of a chair. So this would have precede in order to have the object, chair, to compare with another, e.g., the sofa. The representations must precede and be unified in a recognition before any analysis of them can produce a concept. I am not yet sure what Kant means here. We must apparently add diverse representations together and grasp this diversity in a recognition. But this is not the analytical approach of comparison and extraction, but rather the accumulation and unification of a different sort of diversity besides merely space and time, which is what the analytical approach can take care of.

¹⁹ It seems then that universal logic compares diverse representations and comes up with the concept which unifies them, and does this analytically. But the content of a concept/recognition arises only through a synthesis of a manifold, be it given empirically or as pure.

²⁰ And so the imagination, in my example, would assemble the elements of the chair in a synthesis and then the understanding would produce a concept (rule) which determines the object (chair) and enables us to recognize it.

- 4.2 But with this synthesis I understand that which rests a priori upon a basis of the synthetical unity. Thus our counting (it is especially noticeable with larger numbers) is a synthesis according to concepts, because it occurs according to a communal basis of unity (e.g., the decade).
- 4.3 Under this concept, therefore, the unity in the synthesis of the manifold becomes necessary.
- 5.1 Diverse representations are brought under a concept analytically (a business with which the universal logic deals).
- 5.2 But the transcendental logic teaches of bringing to concepts not the representations but rather the pure synthesis of representations.
- 5.3 The first which must be a priori given to the recognition of all objects is the manifold of the pure viewing. The synthesis of this manifold through the imagination is the second, but is not yet a recognition.
- 5.4 The concepts, which give unity to this synthesis and consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, accomplish the third for the recognition of a forthcoming object and are based on the understanding.²¹
- 6.1 The same function which gives unity to the diverse representations in a judgment, also gives unity to the mere synthesis of diverse representations in a viewing, which function, expressed universally, is called the pure understanding concept.
- 6.2 Therefore, the same understanding, and indeed by precisely the same actions whereby it produced the logical form of a judgment in concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetical unity of the manifold in the viewing, for which reason they are called pure understanding concepts which go a priori to objects, which the universal logic cannot accomplish.

²¹ This suggests the TDA.II.1-3, the subjective deduction, i.e., the apprehension, reproduction and association and finally the recognition via some unifying concept supplied via the productive imagination.

- 7.1 In such way just as many pure understanding concepts arise, which go a priori to objects of the viewing in general, as there were logical functions in all possible judgments in the preceding table; for the understanding is completely exhausted by those cited functions, and its capacity entirely surveyed by them.
- 7.2 We want to name these concepts “categories” after those of Aristotle in that our intention is originally the same as his, even if these are quite remote from his in detail.

Table of the Categories

1.		
<i>Of the Quantity</i>		
Unity		
Plurality		
Totality		
2.	<i>Of the Quality</i>	3.
Reality	<i>Of the Relation</i>	Inherence and Substance
Negation		(substantia et accidens)
Limitation		Of Causality and Dependence
		(cause and effect)
		Of Communality
		(reciprocal effect between action and reaction)
4.		
<i>Of the Modality</i>		
Possibility - Impossibility		
Existence - Nonexistence		
Necessity - Contingency		

- 8.1 Now this is the register of all originally pure concepts of the synthesis which the understanding contains a priori in itself and only because of which it is also a pure understanding in that through them alone can it understand something with the manifold of the viewing, i.e., can think an object of the manifold.

- 8.2 This division is generated systematically from a communal principle, namely the capacity for judging (which is precisely as much as the capacity for thinking), and does not arise haphazardly from a search of pure concepts undertaken on luck, about the completeness of which no one could ever be certain, since they are inferred only through induction without realizing that in this latter manner we then still never see why exactly these and not other concepts reside with the pure understanding.
- 8.3 It was a stroke worthy of the man Aristotle to search out these base concepts.
- 8.4 But since he had no principle, he snatched them up as they occurred to him and at first rummaged up ten of them, which he termed categories (predicaments).
- 8.5 Subsequently he believed to have found five more of them, which he added under the name of the post-predicaments.
- 8.6 However his table remained yet always deficient.
- 8.7 Besides, among them are some modes of pure sensitivity (*quando, ubi, situs*, and likewise *prius, simul*) also an empirical one (*motus*), none of which belong in this source registry of the understanding. And also counted among the original concept are derived concepts (*actio, passio*) and several of the former are missing entirely.
- 9.1 Due to this latter, therefore, we need to note that the categories, as the true source concepts of the pure understanding, have also their just as pure, derived concepts which by no means can be overlooked in a complete system of the transcendental philosophy, but with whose mere mention I can be satisfied in what is only a critical attempt.
- 10.1 Permit me to term these pure but derived understanding concepts the predicables of the pure understanding (in contrast to the predicaments).
- 10.2 If we have the original and primitive concepts, the derived and subordinate ones are easily added and the family tree of the pure understanding completely pictured.

- 10.3 Since for me it has to do here not with the completion of a system, but rather only with the principles to a system, I save this supplementation for another employment.
- 10.4 But we can readily achieve this intention if we take the ontological instruction books in hand and, e.g., subordinate the predicables of force, action, suffering to the category of causality; those of the presence or resistance to that of communality; the predicables of origination, vanishing or alteration to the predicaments of modality, etc.
- 10.5 The categories connected with the modes of pure sensitivity, or also with one another, give a great number of derived concepts a priori, the notation and, where possible, the registration of which to completion would be a useful and not disagreeable, but here dispensable, endeavor.
- 11.1 The definitions of these categories I assiduously spare myself in this treatment, even though I might be in possession of them.
- 11.2 I will dissect these concepts to that degree which is sufficient for reference to the teaching of method, which I treat in the sequel.
- 11.3 In a system of pure reason one would properly be able to require them of me; but here they would only divert our focus from the main point of the examination by provoking doubt and attack which we, without eliminating anything from the essential intention, can quite well defer to another endeavor.
- 11.4 Nonetheless it is still evident from the little which I have brought out here that a complete dictionary with all explanation requisite to it not only is possible, but also easily produced.
- 11.5 The compartments are finally there; it is only necessary to fill them out, and with a systematic topic such as this present one, it is not easy to miss the place where each concept actually belongs, and at the same time those which are still empty, are easily noted.

11²²

- 1.1 Profitable observations can be employed concerning this table of the categories, which perhaps could have weighty consequences with respect to the scientific form of all rational recognitions.
- 1.2 For that this table be uncommonly serviceable, even indispensable, in the theoretical part of philosophy in completely designing the plan for the whole of a science to the extent it is based on concepts a priori, and in partitioning it mathematically according to determined principles, is itself clear from the cited table which completely contains all elementary concepts of the understanding, indeed even the form of a system of that, in human understanding, and consequently gives instructions for all moments of a proposed speculative science, in fact even its order, as I have also given a sample of it elsewhere.²³
- 1.3 Here now are some of these remarks.
 - 2.1 The first is that this table, which contains four classes of understanding concepts, can first be decomposed into two departments, the first of which is directed to objects of viewing (the pure as well as the empirical), but the second to the existence of these objects (either in reference to one another or to the understanding).
 - 3.1 The first class I would term the mathematical categories, the second the dynamic.
 - 3.2 The first class has, as we see, no correlates; these are encountered in the second class alone.
 - 3.3 Still this distinction must have a basis in the nature of the understanding.
 - 4.1 2nd Remark.

²² Sections 11 and 12 were additions of edition B.

²³ Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science.

- 4.2 There are an equal number of categories of each class, namely three, which calls for consideration just as much since, otherwise, all divisions a priori through concepts is a dichotomy.
- 4.3 But the third category arises in every case from the connection of the second to the first of their classes.
- 5.1 Thus totality is nothing else than the plurality considered as unity, limitation nothing but reality joined with negation, communality is the causality of one substance in determination of the other in an alternating way, finally necessity nothing else but existence given through the possibility itself.
- 5.2 But we should not indeed think that for that reason the third category were a merely derived and not an original concept of the pure understanding.
- 5.3 For the articulation of the first and the second, in order to bring forth the third concept, is a special act of the understanding which is not the same as that which is exercised with the first and second.
- 5.4 Thus the concept of a number (which belongs to the category of totality) is not always possible when the concept of quantity and unity are possible (e.g., in the representation of the infinite), nor is influence, i.e., how one substance can be the cause of something in another substance, to be immediately understood from my joining both the concept of a cause and that of a substance.
- 5.5 From this it becomes clear that a particular act of the understanding is requisite for this, and likewise with the others.
- 6.1 3rd Remark.
- 6.2 Of one single category, namely that of communality, which is located under the third title, the agreement with the form of a disjunctive judgment corresponding to it in the table of the logical functions is not so apparent as with the others.

- 7.1 In order to secure this agreement we must note that in all disjunctive judgments the sphere (the count of all that is contained under it) is represented as a whole partitioned into parts (the subordinate concepts), and because the one cannot be contained under the other they are thought of as coordinated, not subordinated, so that they determine one another not unilaterally, as in a series, but rather reciprocally, as in an aggregate (if one member of the division is given, all others are excluded, and vice-verse).
- 8.1 Now a similar connection is thought in a whole of things, since one as effect is not subordinated to another as cause of its existence, but rather is coordinated simultaneously and mutually as cause with respect to the determination of the other (e.g., in a body whose parts mutually attract and also resist one another). And this is an entirely different kind of connection than that which is encountered in the mere relationship of cause to effect (of the foundation to the consequence) in which the consequence does not mutually determine in turn the foundation and which for that reason does not make up with this a whole (as the world creator with the world).
- 8.2 The same procedure of the understanding, when imagining the sphere of a divided concept, is also observed when it thinks a thing as divisible and how the members of the division exclude one another in the concepts and are still joined in one sphere, thus it imagines the parts of the thing as such whose existence (as substance) befits also exclusively each of the others, but still as joined in a whole.

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- 1.1 But in the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there is found yet a section which contains pure understanding concepts which, even though they are not counted among the categories, nonetheless, like them, were supposed to hold of objects a priori, in which case however they would increase the number of the categories, which cannot be.
- 1.2 These, the proposition so involved by the scholastics, presented: *quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum*.²⁵
- 1.3 Now even though the use of this principle, with intention to the consequences (which gave sheer tautological propositions), came out very meagerly such that in recent times some even strive to position it in metaphysics almost only honorarily, nevertheless a thought which has persevered for such a long time, even as empty as it seems to be, always deserves an examination of its origin and warrants the suspicion that it has its basis in some sort of understanding rule which, as often happens, is only erroneously interpreted.
- 1.4 These alleged transcendental predicates of things are nothing other than logical requisites and criteria of every recognition of things in general and place, as their foundation, the categories of quantity, namely unity, plurality and totality; only that these, which actually would have to be taken materially as belonging to the possibility of things themselves, they use in fact only in a formal meaning as belonging to the logical requirements with respect to every recognition, and then carelessly make these criteria of thinking into a property of things on their own.
- 1.5 In every recognition of an object there is, namely, unity of the concept, which we can term qualitative unity to the extent that only the unity of the complex of the manifold of the recognition is thought by that, like the unity of the theme in a play, a speech or a fable.
- 1.6 Secondly, truth with respect to the consequences.

²⁴ Sections 11 and 12 were additions of edition B.

²⁵ Whatever exists is unity, truth, perfection.

- 1.7 The more true consequences from a given concept, the more indicators of its objective reality.
- 1.8 This we could term the qualitative plurality of the marks which belong to a concept as a communal basis (not thought in it as magnitude).
- 1.9 Third and finally: perfection which consists in this plurality being turned about and leading back together to the unity of the concept and agreeing together perfectly with this and with no other, which we can term the qualitative completeness (totality).
- 1.10 From this it is clear that these logical criteria of the possibility of the recognition in general concern here the three categories of magnitude, in which the unity of the generation of the quantum must be assumed as thoroughly homogeneous, only with an intention to the connection also of the non-homogeneous recognition pieces in a consciousness through the quality of a recognition as a principle.
- 1.11 Thus the criterion of the possibility of a concept (not of its object) is the definition in which the unity of the concept, the truth of all that which eventually may be derived from it, and finally the completeness of that which is drawn from it, make up for the manufacture of the entire concept the requisite aspect of that concept. Accordingly the criteria of a hypothesis is the comprehensibility of the assumed explanatory basis or its unity (without auxiliary hypotheses), the truth (agreement with itself and with experience) of the consequences to be derived from that, and finally the completeness of the explanatory base to those which refer back to nothing more or less than was assumed in the hypothesis, and then refers again a posteriori analytically that which was thought a priori synthetically and agrees together with that.--
- 1.12 Through the concept of unity, truth and perfection, therefore, the transcendental table of the categories are not supplemented at all, as though they were deficient, but rather, by putting the relationship of the concepts entirely to the side, the procedure with them are brought under the universal, logical rules of the agreement of the recognition with itself.

The Deduction of the Concepts of Pure Understanding

Chapter 2

13²⁶ The Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in General

- 1.1 The teachers of law in a legal process, when speaking of authorization and presumptions, distinguish the question concerning law (*quid juris*) from that concerning fact (*quid facti*). And while proof of both is required, the first, which is supposed to establish the authority or also the legal claim, they term the deduction.
- 1.2 We avail ourselves of a multitude of empirical concepts without anyone's challenge. And even without a deduction we hold ourselves justified in appropriating to them a sense and imagined meaning because we always have experience at hand to prove their objective reality.
- 1.3 However, there are also usurped concepts such as luck and fate, which roam about with almost universal indulgence indeed, but still occasionally are taken to task by the question: *quid juris*? Then we run into no little embarrassment about their deduction, for we can adduce no clear, legal basis, either from experience or reason, through which the authorization of their usage would be plain.
- 2.1 But among the many concepts which make up the very tangled web of human recognition, there are some which also are designated for pure usage a priori (completely independent of all experience), and the authority of these always has need of a deduction because proofs from experience are not sufficient for the legality of such usage, and yet we still must know how these concepts, which we obtain from no experience, can refer to objects.
- 2.2 Thus I term the explanation of the way in which concepts can refer a priori to objects, their transcendental deduction, and I distinguish it from the empirical deduction, which indicates the way in which a concept was acquired through experience and reflection about it, and thus does not concern the legality, but rather the fact by means of which the possession arose.

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- 3.1 We have now already two concepts of entirely diverse sorts which still agree with one another in referring, in both cases, completely a priori to objects, namely the concepts of space and time as forms of sensitivity, and the categories as concepts of understanding.
- 3.2 To want to attempt an empirical deduction of them would be entirely futile because the distinguishing aspect of their nature lies precisely their referral to their objects without having borrowed something for their representation from experience.
- 3.3 If a deduction of these is necessary, therefore, it will always have to be transcendental.
- 4.1 Nevertheless, for these concepts, as for every recognition, we can seek out in experience, if not the principles of their possibility, still the opportunity of their generation, where the impressions of the sense give the first occasion to open up the entire power of recognition with respect to them and to bring forth experience, which contains two very dissimilar elements, namely a material for the recognition out of the senses, and a certain form for ordering them out of the inner source of the pure viewing and thinking which, upon the prompt of the material, are first brought into exercise and produce concepts.
- 4.2 Such a tracking down of the first endeavors of our power of recognition to ascend from singular perceptions to universal concepts, doubtlessly has its great utility, and we can thank the celebrated Locke for first opening the way to that.
- 4.3 But a deduction of the pure concepts a priori never comes forth in this way, for it does not at all lie on this way, because with respect to their future use, which is supposed to be entirely independent of experience, they must have an entirely different birth certificate from that of a descent from experience.
- 4.4 This attempted, physiological derivation, which actually cannot at all be called a deduction, because it concerns a *questionem facti*, I will accordingly call the explanation of the possession of a pure recognition.

4.5 It is, therefore, clear that of these pure concepts there can only be a transcendental deduction and no empirical one at all, and that the latter, with respect to the pure concepts a priori, is nothing but a vain attempt with which only he can occupy himself who has failed entirely to comprehend the quite peculiar nature of these recognitions.

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5.1 Now even though the single manner of a possible deduction of pure recognitions a priori is admitted, namely that on the transcendental way, still it is not for that reason obvious that it be so unavoidably necessary.

5.2 Above we have tracked the concepts of space and time to their sources by means of a transcendental deduction, and have explained and determined their objective validity a priori.

5.3 Nonetheless, geometry goes its sure pace through clear recognitions a priori without needing to request a certificate of verification from philosophy about the pure and legal descent of its foundational concept of space.

5.4 But the usage of the concept in this science also goes only to the external sense world where space is the pure form of its viewing, in which therefore every geometrical recognition, because it is based upon viewing a priori, has immediate evidence, and the objects are given by the recognition itself a priori (according to the form) in the viewing.

5.5 On the other hand, with the pure understanding concepts and not only with these themselves, but also with space, the unavoidable need begins for seeking the transcendental deduction because, since they do not speak of objects through predicates of viewing and sensitivity, but rather of pure thinking a priori, they refer universally to objects without any condition of sensitivity, and which, since they are not based on experience, can also exhibit no objects in the a priori viewing upon which they would base their synthesis before all experience. Accordingly this arouses suspicion not only regarding the objective validity and limits of their usage, but also makes the concept of space equivocal by an inclination to use it beyond the conditions of the sensitive viewing, for which reason a transcendental deduction of its was also necessary earlier.

5.6 So then the reader must be convinced of the unavoidable necessity of such a transcendental deduction before he has taken a single step in the field of pure

reason, because otherwise he proceeds blindly and, after missing the mark several times, must still return again to the ignorance from whence he departed.

- 5.7 But he must also distinctly see the unavoidable difficulties in advance so that he does not complain about the obscurities where the matter itself is deeply enveloped, or be annoyed too early about the elimination of the obstacles, because upon this hangs the decision whether to give up completely all claim to insights of pure reason in that most beloved field, namely out beyond the limits of all experience, or to bring this critical examination to completion.
- 6.1 Above, with the concepts of space and time, we were able to make comprehensible with little effort how these as recognitions a priori must nonetheless refer necessarily to objects and would make possible a synthetic recognition a priori of them independently of all experience.
- 6.2 For since it is only by means of such pure forms of sensitivity that an object can appear to us, i.e., be an object of an empirical viewing, space and time are pure viewings which contain a priori the conditions of the possibility of the objects as appearances, and their synthesis has objective validity.
- 7.1 The categories of the understanding, on the other hand, do not at all present us with the conditions under which objects are given in the viewing, thus objects can certainly appear to us without necessarily having to refer to functions of the understanding in such way that these would contain the conditions of these objects a priori.
- 7.2 Thus a difficulty is indicated here which we did not encounter in the field of sensitivity, namely how the subjective conditions of thinking were supposed to have objective validity, i.e., render the conditions of the possibility of every recognition of objects; for without functions of the understanding appearances can certainly be given in the viewing.
- 7.3 I take for example the concept of cause which means a particular manner of synthesis where upon something, 'A', something entirely different, 'B', is granted according to a rule.

- 7.4 It is not a priori clear why appearances were supposed to contain something similar (for we cannot adduce appearances as proof because the objective validity of this concept must be able to be established a priori), and hence it is a priori doubtful whether such a concept not per chance be quite empty and encounter no object anywhere among the appearances.
- 7.5 For that objects of the sensitive viewing must be conformable to those formal conditions of sensitivity lying a priori in the mind is clear because otherwise they would not be objects for us. But that they also, beyond that, must be conformable to the conditions which the understanding has need of for the synthetical unity of the thinking, of this the chain of inference is not so easy to see.
- 7.6 For in any event, appearances could easily be so constituted that the understanding would find them not at all conformable to the conditions of its unity, and everything would lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the series of the appearances nothing would be presented which would give to hand a rule for the synthesis and, therefore, match the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would accordingly be entirely empty, idle and without meaning.
- 7.7 Nonetheless, appearances would present objects for our viewing, for in no way does viewing have need of the functions of thinking.
- 8.1 If someone thinks to rid himself of the tedium of this investigation by saying that experience offers unending examples of such a regularity of the appearances, which gives sufficient occasion for isolating from that the concept of cause, and likewise for confirming in that way the objective validity of such a concept, then that person does not notice that in this way the concept of cause cannot arise at all, but rather that it would have to be either based completely a priori in the understanding or given up entirely as a phantom of the brain.
- 8.2 For this concept thoroughly requires that something, A, be of the sort that something else, B, follows necessarily from that and according to an utterly universal rule.
- 8.3 Appearances give cases to hand indeed from which a rule is possible, according to which something happens customarily, but never that the outcome

be necessary; thus a dignity also attaches to the synthesis of cause and effect which we cannot express empirically at all, namely that the effect not merely came additively to the cause but rather is granted through that and results from it.

- 8.4 The rigorous universality of the rule is also not a property of empirical rules at all, which, through induction, can receive no other except comparative universality, i.e., extended utility.
- 8.5 But now the usage of pure understanding concepts would change entirely if we wanted to treat them only as empirical products.

14. Transition²⁷ to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

- 1.1 There are only two cases possible whereby a synthetical representation and its objects are able to coincide, refer to one another in a necessary way and accompany each other, as it were.
- 1.2 Either by the object alone making the representation possible, or the representation the object.
- 1.3 If it is the first, then this referral is only empirical and the representation is never possible a priori.
- 1.4 And this is the case with appearances regarding what belongs to it of sensation.
- 1.5 But if it is the second, then because a representation on its own does not produce its object with respect to its existence (for the question here does not at all concern its causality by means of the will), the representation is still a priori determining with respect to the object, if it is only possible through it alone to recognize something as an object.
- 1.6 But there are two conditions under which alone the recognition of an object is possible: first viewing, whereby the object is given, but only as appearance; and second concept, by means of which an object, which matches this viewing, is thought.
- 1.7 But it is clear from the above that the first condition, namely that under which alone objects can be look at lies in fact a priori in the mind as the basis to the objects with respect to their form.
- 1.8 With this formal condition of sensitivity, therefore, all appearances necessarily agree, because only through it do they appear, i.e., can be empirically looked at and given.²⁸
- 1.9 Now the question arises whether not also concepts precede a priori as conditions under which alone something, even if not looked at, still are thought as

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²⁸ We must remain always mindful that space and time are the forms of all our looking, and that we cannot look at, and thus see, anything except in terms of these two forms.

an object in general. In that case every empirical recognition of the objects would be necessarily conformable to such concepts, because without their presupposition nothing would be possible as an object of experience.²⁹

- 1.10 But now every experience, apart from the viewing of the senses whereby something is given, contains yet a concept of an object which is given in the viewing, or appears. Accordingly concepts of objects in general as conditions a priori will lie as basis for every experiential recognition. Consequently the objective validity of the categories, as concepts a priori, will rest on experience being possible through them alone (according to the form of the thinking).³⁰
- 1.11 For then they will refer to objects of experience in a necessary way and a priori because only by means of them in general could any kind of an object of experience be thought.
- 2.1 Therefore the transcendental deduction of all concepts a priori has a principle according to which the entire investigation must be directed, namely that they must be recognized as conditions a priori of the possibility of experience (be it of the viewing, which is encountered in the experience, or of the thinking).
- 2.2 Concepts which give the objective basis for the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason.
- 2.3 But the development of experience wherein they are encountered is not their deduction (but rather illustration), because with that development they would still remain only contingent.
- 2.4 Without this original referral to possible experience in which all objects of experience come forth, their reference to any kind of object cannot be comprehended at all.

[The next three paragraphs appear only in the B version of the *Critique*]

²⁹ So it seems there is also a form to our thinking of objects, certain concepts to which all objects would have to conform in order to be thought.

³⁰ So any experience is an experience with an object and this calls for a viewing and also a concept of the object being looked at, and so experience will be dependent upon the categories as the form of thinking about any object in general.

- 3.1B The celebrated Lock, lacking this consideration and because he encountered pure concepts of the understanding in experience, had also derived them from experience and yet proceeded so consistently that he dared to attempt with that to attain to recognitions which go far beyond all experiential limits.
- 3.2B David Hume recognized that in order to be able to do that, it would be necessary for these concepts to have had their origin a priori.
- 3.3B But since he could not at all explain how it would be possible for the understanding to have to think concepts, which are not combined on their own in the understanding, still as necessarily combined in the object, and did not light upon the notion of the understanding being able through these concepts, perhaps itself be the sire of the experience wherein his objects are encountered; so, driven by necessity, he derived them from experience (namely from a subjective necessity originated in experience through frequent association which finally is falsely held to be objective, i.e., custom), but proceeded afterwards very consistently in declaring it to be impossible to go out beyond the limits of experience with these concepts and the principles which they occasion.
- 3.4B But the empirical derivation, on which both men chanced, is incompatible with the reality of the scientific recognition a priori which we have, namely pure mathematics and the universal science of nature, and is therefore refuted by this fact.³¹
- 4.1B The first of these two famous men opened the gate to ecstasies because reason, once it has authority on its side, cannot be restricted by undetermined commendation of temperance. The second, once he believed to have discovered a universal deception of our recognition power seeming to be reason, surrendered entirely to skepticism.—
- 4.2B We are now poised to attempt whether we might not happily steer human reason between these two reefs, indicate its limits and still preserve the entire field of its purposeful activity open for it.

³¹ This constitutes already a “metaphysical deduction”, showing that it is impossible for the certitude of mathematics or of science to have arisen experientially.

- 5.1B At this point I only want to premise the explanation of the categories.
- 5.2B They are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its viewing is viewed as determined with respect to one of the logical functions of judging.
- 5.3B Thus the function of the categorical judgment was that of the relationship of the subject to the predicate, e.g., every body is divisible.
- 5.4B With respect to the mere logical use of the understanding, however, it remained undetermined to which of the two concepts we would want to given the function of the subject and to which that of the predicate.
- 5.5B For we can also say: some divisible is a body.
- 5.6B But through the category of substance, if I subsume the concept of body to it, it is determined that its empirical viewing in the experience would always have to be considered only as subject, never as mere predicate; and likewise in all remain categories.

[In place of the three preceding paragraphs (3B through 5B) the A edition contains the following:]

- 3.1A But there are three original sources (capabilities or capacities of the soul) which contain the conditions of the possibility of every experience and can themselves be derived from no other capacity of the mind, namely sense, imagination and apperception.
- 3.2A On these are based:
1. the synopsis of the manifold a priori through the sense;
 2. the synthesis of this manifold through the imagination; and finally
 3. the unity of this synthesis through the original apperception.
- 3.3A Apart from the empirical usage all of these capacities there is yet a transcendental usage which goes solely to the form and is possible a priori.

3.4A We have spoken of the first with respect to the sense above in the first part— but the other two we will now endeavor to penetrate according to their nature.

Next: [To the B version of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories of the CPR,](#)

or [To the A version of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories of the CPR.](#)