

**Introduction To The Second (B) Version
Of
The Critique Of Pure Reason**
by Immanuel Kant

Translation and Comments by
Philip McPherson Rudisill

See [Translator's Technical Notes](#)

Table Of Contents

<i>I. The Distinction between Pure and Empirical Recognition</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>II. We are in Possession of certain Recognitions a priori and even the Common Understanding is never without such.</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>III. Philosophy is in Need of a Science Which Determines the Possibility, Principles and Scope of All Recognitions A Priori.....</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>IV. The Distinction Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>V. Synthetical Judgments A Priori Are Contained As Principles In All Theoretical Sciences Of Reason.....</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>VI. The Universal Task of Pure Reason</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>VII Idea and Division of a Particular Science under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason</i>	<i>22</i>

I. The Distinction between Pure and Empirical Recognition¹

- 1.1 That all our recognitions begin with experience, of this there can be no doubt at all. For how else was the recognitional capacity to be awakened into use except through objects which stir our senses and partly effect representations of themselves, partly bring our understanding capacity into play to compare these and to connect or separate them, and so to process the raw material of sensitive impressions into a recognition of objects which is called experience?
- 1.2 With respect to time, therefore, no recognition in us precedes experience, and with this it all begins.
- 2.1 But even if all our recognitions arise with experience, that does not mean that all arise out of experience.
- 2.2 For it could very well be that even our experiential recognition is an assemblage of that which we receive from impressions and that which our own recognitional capacity (merely occasioned through sensitive impressions) gives forth of itself. And this contribution we do not distinguish from that basic material until long practice has made us attentive to it and skilled in its isolation.
- 3.1 Whether there be such recognitions independently of experience, and even from all impressions of the senses, is a question, therefore, in need of a closer examination and not to be dismissed out of hand.
- 3.2 We term such realizations “a priori” and distinguish them from the empirical, which have their sources “a posteriori”, namely in experience.
- 4.1 That expression, however, is not yet determined enough to indicate the entire sense commensurate to the question posed.

¹ B1, i.e., the first page of the second (B) version of the *Critique*.

- 4.2 For we are accustomed to saying of many recognitions derived from experiential sources that we are competent to, or possessive of, them a priori, because we do not derive them immediately from experience, but rather from a universal rule which, however, we nonetheless have borrowed from experience.
- 4.3 For example, we say of someone who undermined the foundation of his house “he could know a priori that it would fall”, i.e., “he did not need to wait for the experience of it actually collapsing”.
- 4.4 But still he could not have known this entirely a priori.
- 4.5 For that bodies are heavy and, hence, fall when their supports are removed first had to become known to him through experience.
- 5.1 In the course of this work, therefore, we will not understand with “recognitions a priori” such which take place independently of this or that experience, but utterly of every experience.
- 5.2 Opposed to them will be empirical recognitions, or such which are only possible a posteriori, i.e., through experience.
- 5.3 But of the recognitions a priori, those with which nothing empirical at all is mingled, are called pure.
- 5.4 Thus, e.g., the proposition, “every alteration has its cause”, is a proposition a priori, but not pure, because alteration is a concept which can only be drawn from experience.²

² In contrast then, when we determine that two sides of every triangle are greater than the remaining side, we are speaking of a pure recognition.

II. We are in Possession of certain Recognitions a priori and even the Common Understanding is never without such.

- 1.1 Here we are concerned about a mark, by means of which we can safely distinguish a pure recognition from an empirical one.
- 1.2 Experience teaches us indeed that something is constituted in this way or that, but not that it cannot be otherwise.
- 1.3 First, therefore, if a proposition is found which is thought simultaneously with its necessity, then it is a judgment a priori. If, moreover, it is also derived from no other proposition except which in turn itself holds as a necessary proposition, then it is utterly a priori.
- 1.4 Secondly, experience never gives true or strict universality to its judgments, but rather only presumptive and comparative (through induction). These should actually be worded, “as much as we have perceived thus far, no exception from this or that rule has occurred”.
- 1.5 Therefore if a judgment is thought in strict universality, i.e., so that no exception at all is admitted as possible, then it is not derived from experience, but rather is valid utterly a priori.
- 1.6 Empirical universality, therefore, is only an arbitrary enhancement of the validity from what holds in most cases to that which holds in all as, e.g., in the proposition, “all bodies are heavy.” On the other hand, when strict universality belongs essentially to a judgment, this points out a special recognition source of that, namely a capacity for recognitions a priori.
- 1.7 Necessity and strict universality, therefore, are secure indicators of a recognition a priori and also belong inseparable to one another.
- 1.8 But because it is often easier in application to show the empirical restraints in judgments than the contingency, or often times it is also clearer to show the unrestrained universality, which we attribute to a judgment, than its necessity, it is advisable to avail ourselves of both of these criteria separately, each of which is infallible by itself.

- 2.1 Now it is easy to show that there are truly such necessary and, in the strictest sense of the word, universal, hence pure judgments a priori in the human recognition.
- 2.2 If an example from science is desired, we only need look to all the propositions of mathematics. If one is desired from the usage of the most common understanding, this proposition can serve: that every alteration would have to have a cause. Indeed in this latter case, even the concept of a cause so plainly contains the concept of a necessity of the connection with an effect and a strict universality of the rule, that it would entirely disappear if we wanted to derive it, as Hume did, from a frequent association of that which happens with that which precedes, and a commensurate habit (hence only of subjective necessity) arising from such connecting of representations.
- 2.3 Also, without having need of such examples for the proof of the actuality of pure principles a priori in our recognition, we could establish the indispensability of these for the possibility of experience itself, hence a priori.
- 2.4 For where did even experience want to obtain its certitude if all rules, according to which it advances, were again always empirical, thus contingent? Thus we can hardly let these rules hold as first principles.
- 2.5 But here we can be content with having established the pure use of our recognitional capacity as a fact, along with its characteristics.
- 2.6 But not merely in judgments, but even in concepts, an origin of some of these is indicated a priori.
- 2.7 From your experiential concept of a body gradually remove everything which is empirical, e.g., the color, the hardness or softness, the weight, even the impregnability. Still the space remains, which the body (which has now vanished entirely) took up, and that space you cannot removed.³
- 2.8 Likewise if you remove from your empirical concept of every object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which experience teaches you, you still

³ This similar to No. 1 & 4.4 of the Aesthetic.

could not take from it that by which you think it as a substance or as appending to a substance (even though this concept contains more determination than that of an object in general).⁴

- 2.9 Convinced, therefore, by the necessity with which this concept forces itself upon you, you have to acknowledge that it has its seat a priori in your recognitional capacity.

⁴ Substance indicates an endurance in all time as indicated in the First Analogy to be treated in the Transcendental Logic.

III. Philosophy is in Need of a Science Which Determines the Possibility, Principles and Scope of All Recognitions A Priori

- 1.1 Yet what says far more than all of the above is this: that certain recognitions even leave the field of all possible experience and, through concepts to which no corresponding object anywhere can be given in experience, have the appearance of widening the scope of our judgments beyond all limits of that [possible experience].

- 2.1 And precisely in these latter recognitions, which go out beyond the world of sense where experience can give no clue nor correction whatsoever, lie the questions of our reason which, with respect to their importance, we hold to be far more exalted, and the final intention of which much more sublime than all that the understanding can learn in the field of appearances. And in this regard, and even at the risk of error, we first dare all before we should give up such consequential examinations due to any concern of doubt, or from disdain and indifference.

- 2.2 These unavoidable tasks of pure reason itself are God, Freedom and Immortality.

- 2.3 The science, however, the final intention of which, with all its preparation, is actually directed only toward the accomplishments of these, is called metaphysics, the procedure of which in the beginning is dogmatic, i.e., without a preceding test of the capacity or incapacity of reason confidently to take on the execution of such a large undertaking.

- 3.1 Now it seems natural indeed that as soon as we leave the floor of experience we would not at once erect a building with recognitions which we possess without knowing from where they arise and on the credit of base proposition, whose origins are unfamiliar to us; at least not without the foundations of that building first being secured through painstaking examination. Rather it would seem that long ago we would have raised the question; “how is the understanding able to come to all these recognitions a priori and what scope, validity and value may they have?”

- 3.2 As a matter of fact, there is also nothing more natural, if we understand with the world “natural” something happening in a fair and reasonable way. If, however, with that we mean what usually happens, then nothing is more natural or more comprehensible than this examination remaining neglected for so long.
- 3.3 For a portion of these recognitions, like the mathematical, is in ancient possession of reliability and, in that way, gives also a favorable expectation for others, even though these other may be of an entirely different nature.
- 3.4 Besides, when we are out beyond the circle of experience, then we are certain we will not be refuted by experience.
- 3.5 The excitement to extend our recognitions is so great, that we can be detained in our progress only by coming upon a clear contradiction.
- 3.6 But this can be avoided if we make our fabrications very cautiously, without them for that reason being any less fabrications.
- 3.7 Mathematics gives us a brilliant example of how far we can go in the recognition a priori independently of experience.
- 3.8 Now it is indeed occupied with objects and recognitions only as far as such are allowed to be described in a viewing (*Anschauung*).
- 3.9 But this circumstance is easily overlooked, because the mentioned viewing itself can be given a priori, thus is hardly distinguished from a mere pure concept.
- 3.10 Taken in by such a proof of the power of reason, the drive for expansion sees no boundaries.
- 3.11 The light dove, parting the air in free flight and feeling its resistance, could grasp the idea that it would succeed even better in airless space.
- 3.12 Just so did Plato abandon the sense world because it set such narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of ideas into

the empty space of pure understanding.

- 3.13 He did not notice that he made no progress through his efforts, for he had no resistance, no support, as it were, on which he could prop himself and to which he could apply his powers to bring the understanding from that position.
- 3.14 It is a usual fortune of human reason, however, only afterwards to inquire as to whether its foundation also be well laid.
- 3.15 But then all sorts of gloss are sought out to soothe us with its stability, or even rather to repulse a subsequent and dangerous test.
- 3.16 But what keeps us free from all care and suspicion during the construction and flatters us with apparent thoroughness is this:
- 3.17 A great part, and perhaps the greatest, of the business of our reason consists in the dissection of concepts which we already have of objects.
- 3.18 This supplies us with a number of recognitions which, even though they are nothing further than explanations or explications of what was already thought in our concept (though still in a confused manner), are yet valued, at least according to the form, as equivalent to new insights; though with respect to the material or content they do not expand the concepts which we have, but rather merely set them apart from one another.
- 3.19 Now as this procedure gives an actual recognition a priori, which has a sure and useful advance, reason, without itself noting anything under this dazzle, slips in assertions of an entirely different sort, where reason adds entirely foreign, and indeed a priori, concepts to given ones without our knowing how it would attain to these and without permitting such a question to even occur in thought.
- 3.20 Hence I will deal here at the very beginning with the distinction of this dual manner of recognition.

IV. The Distinction Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments

- 1.1 In all judgments in which the relationship of a subject to a predicate is thought (if I consider only the affirmative judgment, then the subsequent application to the negative is easy), this relationship is possible in two ways.
- 1.2 Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something which is contained in this concept A (in a hidden way); or B lies entirely apart from that concept A, though it indeed stands in connection with it.
- 1.3 In the first case I term the judgment analytical, in the other, synthetical
- 1.4 Analytical judgments (the affirmative) are, therefore, those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity. But those in which this connection is not so thought through identity are to be called synthetical judgments.
- 1.5 We could also term the first one explicative, the other expansionary, because the former adds nothing to the concept of the subject through the predicate, but rather only lays it out through dissection into its partial concepts which were already thought in it (though in a confused way). On the other hand the synthetical judgment adds a predicate to the concept of the subject, a predicate which was not thought in it at all and could not have been drawn out of it through any dissection of it.
- 1.6 E.g., if I say, “all bodies are extended”, then this is an analytical judgment.
- 1.7 For I do not have to go out beyond the concept which I join to “body” in order to find extension as connected with that, but rather only dissect that concept, i.e., merely become conscious of the manifold which I always think in it, in order to encounter this predicate in it. It, therefore, is an analytical judgment.
- 1.8 On the other hand, if I say, “all bodies are heavy”, then that “heavy” is something entirely different from what I think in the mere concept of a body in general.

- 1.9 The addition of such a predicate, therefore, gives a synthetical judgment.
- 2.1 Judgments of experience, as such, are all together synthetical.
- 2.2 For it would be absurd to base an analytical judgment on experience because I do not need to go out from my concept at all in order to formulate the judgment and, therefore, no certification of experience is necessary for it.
- 2.3 That a body be extended is a proposition which stands firmly priori, and is not a judgment of experience.
- 2.4 For before I go to experience, I have all the conditions to my judgment already in the concept, from which I only extract the predicate according to the proposition of contradiction and in that way can simultaneously become conscious of the necessity of the judgment which experience would not teach me at all.
- 2.5 On the other hand, although I do not at all include the predicate of heaviness in the concept of a body in general, body still designates an object of experience through a portion of the experience to which I can add yet other portions of precisely the same experience as belonging to the first portion.
- 2.6 I can recognize analytically in advance the concept of body through the marks of extension, impregnability, shape, etc., which all become thought in this concept.⁵
- 2.7 But now I expand my recognition and, by looking back on the experience from which I had derived this concept of body, I find every time also heaviness connected with the above marks, and, therefore, synthetically add this as a predicate to that concept.
- 2.8 It is, therefore, the experience on which the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of heaviness is based, because both concepts belong together, even if in a contingent way, even though one is not contained in the other, but still

⁵ The concept of body includes an extension and a resistance to entry (impregnability) and a shape. If there were no resistance then the body would be no more than a circle or triangle traced out in mid air. Predicates such as color and weight and texture, could only be applied through some exposure.

as parts of a whole, namely, of the experience, which itself is a synthetic combination of the viewing.⁶

- 3.1 But with synthetical judgments a priori, this assistance is entirely lacking.
- 3.2 If I am supposed to go out beyond the concept A to recognize another one, B, as joined with it, what is it on which I support myself and through which the synthesis becomes possible? for I do not have here the advantage of looking about for it in the field of experience.
- 3.3 Take the proposition, “everything which happens has its cause”.
- 3.4 In the concept of something which happens I think indeed an existence before which a time precedes, etc., and from this analysis judgments may be drawn.
- 3.5 But the concept of a cause lies entirely apart from that and indicates something different from that which happens, and is, therefore, not at all contained in this latter representation.
- 3.6 How then do I come to say something about it which is entirely different from what happens in general, and to recognize that the concept of cause, while indeed not contained in that, yet belongs to it and in fact necessarily so?
- 3.7 What is here the unknown = X upon which the understanding supports itself when, apart from the concept of A, it believes to come upon a predicate B, foreign to it, which it nonetheless deems to be connected with it?
- 3.8 It cannot be experience, because the cited principle adds this second representation to the first not only with greater universality, but also with the expression of necessity, thus entirely a priori and from mere concepts.

⁶ It seems then that regarding weight, we would try several bodies and finding them all to have some degree of weight we would connect weight synthetically with body. This will be covered in the Transcendental Logic. But this will always be contingent (as all experiential knowledge), and it could be that in outer space we would find no weight associated with some body.

3.9 Now upon such synthetical, i.e., expansionary, principles rests the entire final intention of our speculative recognitions a priori. For the analytical ones are indeed most important and necessary, but only to achieve to that clarity of the concepts which is required to a sure and widespread synthesis as a truly new acquisition.

V. Synthetical Judgments A Priori Are Contained As Principles In All Theoretical Sciences Of Reason

- 1.1 1. Mathematical judgments are all together synthetical.
- 1.2 Thus far this statement seems to have eluded the notice of the analysts of human reason, indeed to be diametrically opposed to all their suppositions, even though it is still irrefutably certain and very important in consequence.
- 1.3 For since we found that the conclusions of the mathematicians all comply with the proposition of contradiction (which the nature of every indubitable certitude requires), we were quite certain that the principles were also recognized from the principle of contradiction. But here we were mistaken. For while a synthetical proposition can certainly be recognized by means of the proposition of contradiction, this is true only because another synthetical proposition is presupposed from which this one can be inferred; but never on its own.⁷
- 2.1 First we need to note that actual mathematical propositions are always judgments a priori and not empirical, because they entail necessity which cannot be gleaned from experience.
- 2.2 But if this will not admitted, then well and good! I will restrict my proposition to pure mathematics whose concept already means that it does not contain empirical, but rather only pure recognitions a priori.
- 3.1 Indeed at first we would think that the proposition, $7 + 5 = 12$, were a mere analytical proposition which resulted from the concept of a sum of seven and five according to the principle of contradiction.
- 3.2 But if we consider the matter more closely, we find that the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing more than the union of both numbers into a

⁷ Once I come to recognize that 7 and 5 are unified in 12, then I have no need to worry that they might also be unified in another expression which were not in turn equal to 12. This occurs by the law of contradiction.

single number, but by means of which it is not at all given what this encompassing number might be.⁸

- 3.3 The concept of twelve is by no means already thought by my merely thinking this union of seven and five to myself and, dissect my concept of such a possible sum as long as I wish, still, in this way, I will not encounter the twelve in it.⁹
- 3.4 We must go beyond these concepts via the support of a viewing which corresponds to one of these two: our five fingers or (like Segner's arithmetic) five points, and thus gradually add the units of the five given in the viewing to the concept of seven.
- 3.5 First I take the number 7, and then using my fingers as a viewing for the concept of 5, I gradually place the units, which I earlier assembled to make up the number five, to the number 7 in this my picture and in this way see the number 12 arise.
- 3.6 That 7 should be added to 5, I have thought indeed in the concept of a sum = $7 + 5$, but not that this sum be equal to the number 12.¹⁰
- 3.7 Therefore the arithmetical proposition is always synthetic. This becomes much plainer when larger numbers are used. For then it is quite evident that, turn and twist our concept as we might, we would never be able to find our

⁸ Is this akin to thinking of something which precedes something else necessarily, such that we turn about and look for it, even though we cannot tell in advance what that something is? We notice a pattern, and then we test that pattern, this testing being based on the notion of necessity which is contained in the category of cause and effect.

⁹ When I am given the 7 and the 5 and told to unify them in a single number, then I know exactly what it is like. I sit there like a bump on a log and see if anything at all will come to mind. (I am reminded here of Wesley's comment on being ask how it is that he can know that he loves God and his fellows, "why, how do you know that the sun is shining? You open your eyes and look; and even so you look into your own heart, etc.") No telling what associations may produce! Eleven comes to my mind with reference to seven (due to the dice game, I guess, or due to the chain of convenience stores by that name, or the rhyme). The seven I can analyze, I suppose, into a five and a two, etc.

¹⁰ If we tried to use the approach of the match and map, i.e., set theory, school, we would have to keep guessing at the set and then would have to define that set and only then could we be sure. But that is like guessing a riddle, like what is black and white and red (read) all over (the newspaper, at least before the onset of color in newspapers). But this comes to us directly as soon as we know the rule for naming consecutive spaces, i.e., beginning with 1, continue with 2, 3, etc.

sum through the mere dissection of our concept without calling in viewing for assistance.¹¹

- 4.1 Just as little is any fundamental proposition of pure geometry analytic.
 - 4.2 That the straight line between two points is the shortest, is a synthetic proposition.
 - 4.3 For my concept of straight contains nothing of quantity, but only of quality.
 - 4.4 The concept of the shortest is wholly an addition, and cannot be derived from the concept of the straight line through any process of analysis.
 - 4.5 Viewing, therefore, must here be called in; only by its aid is the synthesis possible.
-
- 5.1 Some few fundamental propositions, presupposed by the geometrician, are, indeed, really analytical and rest on the principle of contradiction. But, as identical propositions, they serve only as links in the chain of method and not as principles; for instance, $a = a$; the whole is equal to itself; or $(a + b) > a$, that is, the whole is greater than its part.
 - 5.2 And even these propositions, though they are valid according to pure concepts, are only admitted in mathematics because they can be exhibited in a viewing.
 - 5.3 What causes us here commonly to believe that the predicate of such apodictic judgments is already contained in our concept, and that the judgment is therefore analytical, is merely the ambiguous character of the terms used.

¹¹ There is no longer any question, I think, that this is what Kant is talking about. The match and map school is merely mirroring Leibnitz, I think, in that his system of definitions would tell the match and map school how many 1's to include as the elements of the number of interest. Now it is true, I suppose, that the five fingers of one hand represent the elements of the set, 5, but the important point here is that the 12 can be attained to without any need of first having that set defined. Indeed it is by means of Kant's system that the elements of the 12 are first obtained in order then subsequently to be matched and mapped, and it is for this reason that the actual certitude of that school in its system is obtained.

- 5.4 We are required to join in thought a certain predicate to a given concept , and this necessity is inherent in the concepts themselves.
- 5.5 But the question is not what we ought to join to the given concept in thought, but what we actually think in it, even if only obscurely; and it is then manifest that, while the predicate is indeed attached necessarily to the concept, it is so by virtue of a viewing, which must be added to the concept, not as thought in the concept itself.
- 6.1 2. Natural science (*physica*) contains synthetical judgments a priori as principles within itself.
- 6.2 I will only cite a couple of propositions as examples, such as the proposition: “in all alterations of the physical world, the quantity of material remains unaltered”, or this: “in all communication of motions, effect and counter-effect must always be equal to each other”.
- 6.3 Not only is the necessity to both clear, thus their origin a priori, but also that they are synthetical propositions.
- 6.4 For in the concept of matter I do not think to myself the persistence, but rather merely its presence in space by the filling of space.
- 6.5 Therefore, I actually go out beyond the concept of material in order to additionally think a priori something to it which I did not think in it.
- 6.6 The proposition, therefore, is not thought analytically but rather synthetically, and yet still a priori, and likewise in the other propositions of the pure part of natural science.
- 7.1 3. In metaphysics, even if we view it only as a thus far merely attempted science, though still as an unavoidable one through the nature of human reason, synthetical propositions a priori are supposed to be contained. And it is, therefore, of no concern at all to metaphysics merely to dissect and, thereby, explain analytically concepts which we make a priori of things. We want rather to expand our realizations a priori. For this we must avail ourselves of

such principles which add something beyond the given concepts which was not contained in them and even to go out so far through synthetical judgments a priori that experience itself cannot follow, e.g., in the proposition, “the world must have a first beginning”, etc. So metaphysics, at least with respect to its purposes, consists of sheer synthetical propositions a priori.

VI. The Universal Task of Pure Reason

- 1.1 We already gain a great deal by bringing a number of examinations under the formula of a single task.
- 1.2 For in that way we not only facilitate our own affair for ourselves by precisely determining that affair, but also the judgment of anyone else who wants to review whether or not we have sufficiently performed with respect to our design
- 1.3 Now the actual task of pure reason is contained in the question, “how are synthetic judgments a priori possible?”

- 2.1 That metaphysics has remained in a vacillating state of uncertainty and contradictions until the present time is to be ascribed solely to the cause that this problem, and perhaps even the difference between analytical and synthetical judgments, did not occur to anyone sooner.
- 2.2 Now the standing and falling of metaphysics depends upon the solution of this problem, or upon sufficient proof that the possibility, which it demands to have explained, does not occur at all.
- 2.3 David Hume came closer to this problem than all philosophers, but did not by far consider it determined enough and in its universality, but remained merely with the synthetical proposition of the connection of the effect with its cause (*principium causaliatus*). He believed to have revealed that such a proposition a priori was entire impossible and, according to his conclusions, everything which we call metaphysics would amount to a delusion of alleged rational insight of what has actually been borrowed from experience, and which has taken on the appearance of necessity through custom. He would never have come to such a destruction of all pure philosophy if he had had our task before his eyes in its universality, for then he would have seen that there could not even be a pure mathematics according to his argument, because this mathematics contains certain synthetical propositions a priori. And his good sense would have prevented him from making such an assertion.

- 3.1 Along with the solution of the above task there is also included the possibility of the pure rational use in the establishment and completion of all sciences which contain theoretical recognitions a priori of objects, i.e., the answering of these two questions:
- 3.2 How is pure mathematics possible?
- 3.3 How is pure natural science possible?
- 3.4 Now with respect to these two sciences, since they actually do exist, it is indeed fitting to ask, “how are they possible?” For that they must be possible is proven through their actuality.*
- 3.5 But due to its former bad advance, and because we cannot assert that even a single discovery, with respect to its essential purpose, actually exists, everyone has a reason to doubt the very possibility of metaphysics.

* Kant’s annotation.

- 1.1 Some persons could doubt this latter concerning pure natural science.
 - 1.2 But we only need to review the diverse propositions which come forth at the beginning of actual (empirical) physics, such as that of the persistence of the same quantity of matter, or the inertia or the equality of effect and counter effect, etc. For then we are soon convinced that they constitute a *physicam puram* (or *rationalem*) where each deserves indeed, as an appropriate science, to be presented separately in its its entire scope, be it narrow or wide.
-
- 4.1 But now this manner of recognition is still also to be considered as given in a certain way, and metaphysics is given, even if not actually as a science, still as a natural predisposition (*metaphysica naturalis*).
 - 4.2 For human reason goes incessantly forth without the mere vanity of wide knowledge moving it, driven by its own need for such questions which can

be answered through no experiential use of reason nor from principles borrowed from that. And so in every age some sort of metaphysics is actually present and will also always remain there in all humans as soon as reason is expanded to speculation within them.

- 4.3 Now the question is also of this, “how is metaphysics possible as a natural predisposition”, i.e., “how do the questions, which pure reason poses to itself and which it is derived by its own needs to answer as best it can, arise out of the nature of universal human reason?”

- 5.1 But since all previous attempts at answering these natural questions, e.g., whether the world had a beginning or has always been, etc., have always met with unavoidable contradictions, we cannot let the matter rest with the mere natural disposition for metaphysics, i.e., with the pure rational capacity itself, from which indeed some sort of metaphysics always arises (be it what it will). Rather it must be possible to bring it up to certitude either in the knowledge or ignorance of the objects, i.e., either in the decision about the objects of its questions or about the capacity and incapacity of reason to judge something with respect to them; hence either confidently to expand our pure reason or to place determined and sure boundaries to it.
- 5.2 The last question which flows from the above universal task, would properly be this, “how is metaphysics possible as a science?”

- 6.1 Finally, therefore, the critique of reason leads necessarily to science, but the dogmatic use of it. On the other hand, without a critique, it leads to baseless assertions to which we can set contrary ones just as apparent, thus finally to skepticism.

- 7.1 Also this science cannot be of great, intimidating expanse because it does not have to do with objects of reason, whose multiplicity is infinite, but rather merely with itself, i.e., with problems which spring entirely from its bosom and are not presented to it through the nature of things which are distinguished from it, but rather through its own nature. For if it has previously obtained complete information about its own capacity with respect to objects

which might come forth to it in experience, then it must be easy to determine completely and with certitude the scope and the limits of its usage attempted beyond the limits of experience.

- 8.1 Therefore, we can and must view all previous attempts to produce a metaphysics dogmatically as unaccomplished; for what is analytical in any one of them, residing a priori with our reason, is not yet the purpose at all, but rather only a preparation for the actual metaphysics, namely to expand its recognition a priori synthetically. And it is unsuitable for this because it merely shows what is contained in these concepts, but not how we achieve a priori to such in order also to be able to determine accordingly their valid use with respect to objects of every recognition in general.
- 8.2 It also takes very little self indulgence to give up all these claims, for the undeniable and, in dogmatic procedures also, unavoidable contradictions of reason with itself have already long ago deprived every previous metaphysics of its reputation.
- 8.3 More perseverance will be necessary to avoid being halted by the difficulties inwardly and by the resistance outwardly to promote at last a science indispensable to human reason (whereof one can indeed cut down every emergent trunk, but not destroy the roots) to a healthy and fruitful growth through another treatment, entirely opposed to the former.

VII Idea and Division of a Particular Science under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason

- 1.1 Now from all this there emerges the idea of a particular science which can be called the critique of pure reason.
- 1.2 For reason is the capacity which renders the principles of the recognitions a priori.
- 1.3 Thus pure reason is what contains the principles for all absolutely a priori recognitions .
- 1.4 An organon of pure reason would be an epitome of those principles, according to which all pure recognitions a priori can be acquired and actually brought forth.
- 1.5 The detailed application of such an organon would supply a system of pure reason.
- 1.6 But since this is very demanding, and as it is as yet still undecided whether an expansion of our recognition in general be possible here, and in which case we can view a science of the mere evaluation of pure reason, its sources and limits, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason.
- 1.7 Such a science would not be called a doctrine as rather only a critique of pure reason. And, with respect to speculation, its usefulness would actually be only negative, not serving for the expansion, but rather only for the clarification, of reason and keeping it free of error, which is already a great gain.
- 1.8 I term every recognition transcendental which is occupied in general not with objects, but rather with our manner of recognizing objects to the extent this supposed to be possible a priori.
- 1.9 A system of such concepts would be called the Transcendental Philosophy.
- 1.10 But yet this again is still too much for the beginning.

- 1.11 For since such a science would have to completely contain the analytical as well as the synthetical recognitions a priori, it is, to the extent it concerns our intention, too large in scope, in that we need carry out the analysis only as far as is indispensably necessary for comprehending the principles of the synthesis a priori in their entirety, as to why it is a task for us.
- 1.12 This examination, which we are not actually able to term doctrine, but rather only transcendental critique, because it does not have the expansion of the recognitions themselves as its intention, but rather only their rectification and is supposed to render a touchstone of the value and lack of value of all recognitions a priori, it is that examination with which we are now occupied.
- 1.13 Such a critique is, accordingly, a preparation, where possible, to an organon, and if this should not succeed, at least to the canon, according to which, in any case, the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, be it an expansion or merely a limitation of its recognition, could someday be described analytically as well as synthetically.
- 1.14 For that this be possible, indeed that such a system could not be of large scope at all in order to hope to complete it entirely, can be estimated in advance from this: that here it is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but the understanding which judges of the nature of things, and this also in turn only with respect to its recognition a priori, that makes up the object whose content, because we still do not need to seek it externally, cannot remain concealed to us and, according to all supposition, is small enough to be completely catalogued, evaluated according to its value or worthlessness, and brought to a correct evaluation.
- 1.15 Even less may one expect here a critique of the books and systems of pure reason, but rather that of the pure rational capacity itself.
- 1.16 Only if this lies as the basis, however, do we have a sure touchstone for estimating the philosophical stance of old and new works in this field; where otherwise the unqualified scribe and judge evaluates the baseless assertions of another through his own assertions, which are equally baseless.

- 2.1 The Transcendental Philosophy is the idea of a science to which the critique of pure reason is supposed to lay out the entire plan architectonically, i.e., from principles, with a full guarantee as to the completeness and security of all pieces which make up this edifice.
- 2.2 It is the system of all principles of pure reason.
- 2.3 That this critique is not already called transcendental philosophy itself is based solely on this: in order to be a complete system it would have to contain also a detailed analysis of the entire human recognition a priori.
- 2.4 Now indeed in any case our critique must also present a complete enumeration of all stem concepts which make up the pure recognition cited.
- 2.5 However, it cannot reasonably engage in the detailed analysis of these concepts themselves, nor also in a critical review of each one derived from them, partly because this dissection would not be purposeful, not having the consideration which is encountered in a synthesis for the sake of which the entire critique actually exists, and partly because it would be contrary to the unity of the plan to deal with the responsibility for the completeness of such an analysis and derivation, which we could still be spared with respect to our intention.
- 2.6 Meanwhile, this completeness of the dissection as well as the derivation from the concepts a priori (soon to be supplied) is easy to supplement once they are given as detailed principles of the synthesis, and if nothing is lacking with respect to this essential intention.
- 3.1 To the critique of pure reason, accordingly, everything which makes up the Transcendental Philosophy belongs, and that is the complete idea of the Transcendental Philosophy, but not yet this science itself; because it goes only so far in the analysis as is required for a complete evaluation of the synthetic recognitions a priori.
- 4.1 The primary aim with the division of such a science is that no concepts whatsoever, which contain any kind of empirical element, may enter; i.e., that the

recognition a priori is completely pure.

- 4.2 Hence, although the highest base propositions of morality and the foundational concept of it are indeed recognitions a priori, they still do not belong in the transcendental philosophy because, while they do not actually place the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, desire and inclination, etc., (which are all together of empirical origin) as the basis of their proscriptions, though still in the concept of duty as an obstacle, which is supposed to be overcome or as an incitement which is not supposed to be made into a motive, they must instead be encompassed in the formulation of the system of pure morality.
- 4.3 Hence the Transcendental Philosophy is a worldly wisdom of pure, merely speculative reason.
- 4.4 For all practicality, to the extent it contains incentives, refers to feelings which belong to sources of empirical recognition.
- 5.1 Now if the division of this science is to be arranged from the universal standpoint of a system in general, then that which we now present would have to contain first an instruction of the elements of pure reason, and secondly a methodology.
- 5.2 Each of these primary parts would have its subdivision, the bases of which do not lend themselves to presentation here.
- 5.3 Only so much seems necessary as an introduction or as a preceding reminder: there are two stems of human recognition, which perhaps arise from a common root, though unknown to us, namely sensitivity and understanding. Through the first of these objects are given to us, and through the second they are thought.
- 5.4 Now to the extent that sensitivity should contain representations a priori which make up the conditions under which objects are given to us, it would belong to Transcendental Philosophy.
- 5.5 The transcendental teaching of senses would have to belong to the first por-

tion of the science of elements because the conditions, under which alone objects of human recognition are given, precede those under which these are thought.

Next: [The Transcendental Aesthetic of the *CPR*.](#)