

II Transcendental Methodology

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II Transcendental Methodology

- 1.1 If I view the summation of all recognitions of pure and speculative reason as a building, of which we at least have the Idea within us, then I can say that in the teaching of the elements we have roughly estimated and determined the construction material for what sort of building and of what height and stability it suffices.
 - 1.2 We found, of course, that even though we had a tower in mind which should have touched the sky, the supply of the materials reached only to a residence, one that was just spacious enough and tall enough for our occupations upon the plane of *experience* in surveying that plane. But this bold undertaking had to fall short due to the lack of material, without once taking into account the confusion of language which unavoidably had to divide the workers and scatter them throughout the world in order for each to build individually, each according to his own design.
 - 1.3 Now at this point we are concerned not so much about the materials as rather about the plan and, being warned not to venture upon an arbitrary and dazzling design, which perhaps could overstep our entire capacity, still nonetheless not being able to easily refrain from the erection of a sound residence, we are concerned about making the calculation for a building in relation to the supply which is given to us and simultaneously is commensurate to our need.
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- 2.1 With the transcendental methodology, therefore, I understand the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason.
 - 2.2 In this intention we will be concerned with a discipline, a canon, an architectonic and finally with a history of pure reason. And in an transcendental intention we will perform that which, under the name of a practical logic, is sought in the schools with respect to the use of the understanding in general, but is hardly performed. The reason for this failure is this: since the universal logic is limited to no particular type of understanding recognition (e.g., not to the pure), not even to certain objects, it, without borrowing information from other sciences, can do nothing more than to present the title for possible methods and technical expressions, of which we avail ourselves with respect to the systematical aspect in all sciences. This makes the ap-

prentice knowledgeable in advance of names, with whose meaning and use he first is suppose to become familiar with later.

1st Chapter - The Discipline of Pure Reason

- 1.1 The negative judgments, which are such not merely with respect to the logical form, but rather also to the content, stand in no special esteem with the desire of human curiosity. In fact we even view them as jealous enemies of our recognitional compulsion to strive incessantly to expansion, and there is almost a need of an apology for procuring them even indulgence, not even to speak of favor and high estimation.

- 2.1 We can indeed logically express all propositions we wish negatively. But with respect to the content of our recognition in general, whether they are expanded through a judgment or restricted, the negating ones have the peculiar occupation of solely preventing error.
- 2.2 It follows also that negative propositions, which are supposed to prevent a false recognition, though where an error is never possible, are indeed very true, but still empty, e.g., not at all commensurate to their purpose, and for that very reason are very often ridiculous.
- 2.3 As an example we have the proposition of a scholastic: that without an army Alexander could not have conquered any countries.

- 3.1 But where the limits of our possible recognition are very narrow and the enticement for judgments large, and the semblance, which offers itself, is very deceptive, and the disadvantage from error removable, then the negative of the instruction, which serves merely to protect us from error, has yet more importance than many a positive teaching through which our recognition could obtain increase.
- 3.2 The particular compulsion, by means of which the enduring propensity to diverge from certain rules is restricted and finally eradicated, we term discipline.
- 3.3 It is distinguished from cultivation, which is only supposed to supply an accomplishment, without, on the other hand, canceling another one already present.

3.4 To the development of a talent, which already has before itself a motive for expression, the discipline, therefore, will supply a negative* contribution, but the cultivation and doctrine a positive one.

* Kant's annotation.

1.1 I know very well that in academic speech, we endeavor to use the term of discipline synonymously with that of instruction.

1.2 But here, on the other hand, there are so many other cases where the first expression, as training, is carefully distinguished from the second, as instruction, and the nature of things themselves even required the conservation of the only suitable expression for this distinction, that I would wish us rather never to permit the use of that term in any other way apart from the negative meaning.

4.1 That the temperament, likewise those talents which gladly indulge in a free and unrestricted urge (as imagination and wit), have need of a discipline in many respects, everyone will easily admit.

4.2 But to think that reason, which is actually obligated to prescribe the discipline to all other endeavors, would itself need such, may certainly seem strange in any case, and indeed until now has also avoided such a mortification for precisely the reason because, with the ceremony and the thorough decorum with which it presents itself, no one could easily come upon the suspicion of a careless play with imagination instead of concepts, and with words instead of materials.

5.1 Reason has no need of any critique in the empirical usage, because its principles are subjected to a continuing test at the touchstone of experience. It is the same with mathematics, where the concepts must be presented immediately in concreto with the pure viewing, and all baseless and whimsical assertions are immediately revealed.

5.2 But where neither empirical nor pure viewing holds reason in a visible track, namely in its transcendental use according to mere concepts, there it is very much in need of a discipline which restrains its propensity for expansion beyond the narrow limits of possible experience, and keeps it from aberration and error, so much so that even the entire philosophy of pure reason has to do merely with this negative utility.

- 5.3 Individual mistakes can be remedied through censor and their cause through critique.
- 5.4 But where, as in pure reason, an entire system of deceptions and illusions is encountered which are united via connected and communal principles, an entirely peculiar and indeed negative legislation seems to be requisite, which, under the name of a discipline, erects out of the nature of reason and the objects of its pure usage a system of caution and self testing, against which no false pseudo-rational semblance can exist, but rather must immediately betray itself in spite of all cosmetic efforts.
- 6.1 But it is well to note that in this second part of the transcendental critique, I do not direct the discipline of pure reason to the content, but rather merely to the method of the recognition from pure reason.
- 6.2 The first has already happened in the instruction of the elements.
- 6.3 But there is so much similarity with rational usage, regardless to which object it may also be applied, and still, to the extent it is supposed to be transcendental, is simultaneously so essentially distinguished from all others that, without the warning of the negative instruction of a discipline particularly situated to it, the errors are not to be prevented, which must necessarily arise out of an unsuitable compliance of such methods, which indeed otherwise are suited to reason; but only not here.

1st Section. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Dogmatic Usage

- 1.1 Mathematics gives the most brilliant example of a pure reason successfully expanding itself without aid of experience.
- 1.2 Examples are infectious, especially for that same capacity which naturally flatters itself to have just the same fortune in other cases, which come to it partly in one case.
- 1.3 Hence pure reason hopes to be able to expand itself just as successfully and thoroughly in the transcendental usage as it has with mathematics, especially if it uses the same method in the transcendental which has been of such obvious use in mathematics.
- 1.4 There is much at stake, therefore, in knowing whether the method for achieving to apodictic certitude, which we term mathematical in the latter science, is the same where we seek that same certitude in philosophy, and where it would have to be termed dogmatic.
- 2.1 Philosophical recognition is the rational recognition from concepts, the mathematical from the construction of concepts.
- 2.2 But to construct a concept means to present a priori the viewing corresponding to it.
- 2.3 For the construction of a concept, therefore, a non-empirical viewing is required which consequently, as viewing, is a single object. But nevertheless the construction of a concept (of a universal representation) must express the universality in the representation for all possible viewings which belong under the same concept.
- 2.4 Hence I construct a triangle by presenting the object corresponding to the concept either through mere imagination in the pure or, in accordance with that on paper, in the empirical viewing, but in both cases completely a priori, without having borrowed the pattern for it from any experience.
- 2.5 The single drawn figure is empirical and serves nonetheless to express the concept with no injury to its universality because we always look only to the

action of the construction of the concepts with this empirical viewing, to which many determinations, e.g., size, sides, angles, are entirely indifferent, and it is abstracted, therefore, from these diversities which do not alter the concept of a triangle.

- 3.1 The philosophical recognition, therefore, considers the particular only in the universal, the mathematical considers the universal in the particular, and indeed even in the singular, but still a priori and by means of reason so that as this singularity is determined under certain universal conditions of the construction, so must also the object of the concept, to which this singularity corresponds only as its schema, be thought universally determined.
- 4.1 The essential distinction between these two types of rational recognitions, therefore, consists in this form and does not rest on the distinction of their material or object.
- 4.2 Those who wanted to distinguish philosophy from mathematics by saying of philosophy that it has as its object merely the quality, but that of mathematics only the quantity, have taken the effect for the cause.
- 4.3 The form of the mathematical recognition is the cause of why this can go solely to quanta.
- 4.4 For only the concept of magnitude allows of construction, i.e., exposition a priori in the viewing.
- 4.5 But qualities allow of presentation in no other way than empirical viewing.
- 4.6 Hence a rational recognition of that can only be possible through concepts.
- 4.7 Accordingly no one can take a viewing corresponding to the concept of reality from anywhere except experience, and never a priori out of himself nor become participant before the empirical consciousness of that.
- 4.8 The conical shape we will be able to make visible without any empirical assistance, merely according to the concept, but the color of this cone will have to have been given earlier in one experience or another.

- 4.9 The concept of a cause in general I can in no way present in the viewing except in an example which experience gives me, etc.
- 4.10 Incidentally philosophy deals with magnitude just as well as mathematics, e.g., of the totality, or infinity, etc.
- 4.11 Mathematics is also occupied with the distinction between the line and surface as spaces of diverse quality, with the continuity of expansion as a quality of that.
- 4.12 But although they have in such cases a communal object, the way of treating it through reason is still entirely different in the philosophical consideration than in the mathematical.
- 4.13 The former holds merely to universal concepts, the latter can arrange nothing with the mere concept but rather hurries immediately to viewing in which it considers the concept in concreto, but still not empirically but rather merely as such which it has presented a priori, i.e., constructed, and in which what follows from the universal conditions of construction, must also hold universally for the object of the constructed concept.
- 5.1 Give a philosopher the concept of a triangle and let him find out in his way how the sum of its angles may relate to the right angle.
- 5.2 Now he has nothing but the concept of a figure which is enclosed in three straight lines, and in it the concept of just so many angles.
- 5.3 Now let him consider this concept as long as he wishes, he will bring forth nothing new.
- 5.4 He can dismember and clarify the concept of a straight line or of an angle or the number three, but not come to other properties which do not lie at all in these concepts.
- 5.5 But let the geometer take up this question.
- 5.6 He starts immediately by constructing a triangle.

- 5.7 Because he knows that two right angles distribute just as much as all contiguous angles together which can be drawn out of a single point on a straight line, he lengthens one side of this triangle, and obtains two contiguous angles which are together equal to two right angles.
- 5.8 Then he partitions the extreme of these angles by drawing a line parallel to the opposite side of the triangle and sees a more extreme contiguous angle arises here which is the same as the inner one, etc.
- 5.9 In such way, through a chain of conclusions, always led by the viewing, he achieves to the completely illuminating and simultaneously universal solution of the question.
- 6.1 But mathematics does not construct merely magnitudes (*quanta*) as in geometry, but rather also merely magnitude (*quantitatem*) as in algebra, where it abstracts entirely from the constitution of the object, which is supposed to be thought according to such a concept of magnitude.
- 6.2 It chooses then a certain indication of all constructions of magnitudes in general (number) as addition, subtraction, etc., extraction of the root. Now after it has also indicated the universal concept of magnitudes according to their diverse relationships, it presents every treatment, which is generated and altered through the magnitude according to certain universal rules in the viewing. And where one magnitude is supposed to be divided by the other, it sets both of their characters together according to the indicated form of division, etc., and achieves, therefore, by means of a symbolic construction just as well as the geometer according to an ostensible or geometric construction (of the objects themselves), to which the discursive could never achieve by means of mere concepts.
- 7.1 What may be the cause of such a diverse situation in which two rational virtuosos find themselves, where one makes his way according to concepts, the other according to viewings which he presents a priori conformable to the concept?
- 7.2 According to the transcendental foundations doctrine presented above this cause is clear.

- 7.3 Here it depends not upon analytical propositions, which can be generated through mere dismemberment of the concepts (in which the philosopher would have the advantage over his rival without doubt), but rather synthetic ones and indeed such which are supposed to be recognized a priori.
- 7.4 For I am not supposed to look to what I actually think in my concept of triangle (this is nothing further than the mere definition). Far rather I am supposed to go out beyond it to properties which do not lie in this concept, but which still belong to it.
- 7.5 Now this is not possible otherwise than by determining my object according to the conditions of either the empirical or the pure viewing.
- 7.6 The first would render only an empirical proposition (by measuring its angles) which would contain no universality, much less necessity, and this is not what we are discussing.
- 7.7 But the second procedure is the mathematical and indeed here the geometrical construction, by means of which in a pure viewing, just as in the empirical one, I add the manifold which belongs to the schema of a triangle in general, thus to its concept, whereby in any case universal, synthetic propositions must be constructed.
- 8.1 Therefore I would philosophize in vain about the triangle, i.e., reflect discursively, without coming further in the least in that way except to the mere definition, from which however I would have properly started.
- 8.2 There is indeed a transcendental synthesis out of sheer concepts, which in turn the philosopher alone manages, but which never concerns more than a thing in general and under which conditions its perception is able to belong to possible experience.
- 8.3 But such as that and of existence in general is not at all the question with mathematical tasks, but rather of the properties of the objects on their own, solely to the extent these are connected with the concept of that.

- 9.1 We have only sought to make plain in the example introduced what great distinction is encountered between the discursive use of reason according to concepts and the intuitive through the construction of concepts.
- 9.2 Now the question arises in a natural way, what is the case which makes such a two-fold use of reason necessary, and by what conditions can we recognize whether only the first or also the second takes place?
- 10.1 All our recognitions still finally refer to possible viewings; for through these alone is an object given.
- 10.2 Now a concept (a non-empirical concept) already contains a priori within itself either a pure viewing, and then it can be constructed, or nothing except the synthesis of possible viewings which are not given a priori, and then we can indeed judge synthetically and a priori through it, but only discursively according to concepts and never intuitively through the construction of the concept.
- 11.1 Now of every viewing none is a priori given except the mere form of the appearances, space and time, and a concept of these, as quantity, allows of presentation either simultaneously with the quality of the same (their shape), or also merely their quantity (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous manifolds) through number and a priori in the viewing, i.e., construction.
- 11.2 But the material of the appearances, whereby things in space and time are given to us, can only be represented in the perception, thus a posteriori.
- 11.3 The single concept which a priori represents this empirical ingredient of the appearances is the concept of a thing in general, and the synthetical recognition of this can supply nothing further a priori than the mere rule for the synthesis of what the perception may a posteriori give, but never the viewing of the real object, because this must necessarily be empirical.
- 12.1 Synthetical propositions which go to things in general, the viewing of which does not permit of being given a priori at all, are transcendental.

- 12.2 Accordingly, transcendental propositions never permit of being given a priori through construction of concepts, but rather only according to concepts.
- 12.3 They contain merely the rule, according to which a certain synthetical unity of what cannot be represented visibly a priori (the perceptions) is supposed to be sought empirically.
- 12.4 But they can present not a single one of their concepts a priori in any case, but rather do this only a posteriori by means of experience which is first possible according to those synthetic base propositions.
- 13.1 If we are supposed to judge synthetically of a concept, we must go out beyond this concept and indeed to the viewing in which it is given.
- 13.2 For if we remained with what is contained in the concept, then the judgment would be merely analytical and an explanation of the thought according to what is actually contained in that concept.
- 13.3 But I can go from the concept to the pure or empirical viewing corresponding to it in order to ponder it in concreto in that viewing and to recognize a priori or a posteriori what befits the object of the viewing.
- 13.4 The first (the pure viewing) is the rational and mathematical recognition through the construction of the concept, the second (empirical viewing) the mere empirical (mechanical) recognition, which can never render necessary and apodictic propositions.
- 13.5 Hence I could dismember my empirical concept of gold without winning in that way anything further than the ability of enumerating everything which I actually think with this word, whereby indeed in my recognition a logical improvement proceeds, but no increase or supplementation generated.
- 13.6 But I take the material which comes forth under this name and employ with it perceptions which diverse synthetical, though empirical, propositions will give me.
- 13.7 The mathematical concept of a triangle I would construct, i.e., give a priori in the viewing, and in this way obtain a synthetical, though rational, recognition.

13.8 But if the transcendental concept of a reality, substance, force, etc., is given to me, then it indicates neither an empirical nor a pure viewing, but rather solely the synthesis of the empirical viewings (which, therefore, cannot be given a priori) and, therefore, because the synthesis cannot go out a priori to the viewing which corresponds to it, also no determining synthetical proposition can arise out of it, but rather only a base proposition of the synthesis* of possible empirical viewings.

13.9 A transcendental proposition, therefore, is a synthetical rational recognition with respect to mere concepts, and thus discursive via every synthetical unity of the empirical realization first becoming possible by means of it, but no viewing is given a priori by that.

* Kant's annotation.

1.1 By means of the concept of cause I actually go out from the empirical concept of an event (where something happens), but not to the viewing, which presents the concept of cause in concreto, but rather to the time conditions in general which might be found conformable to the concept of cause in the experience.

1.2 I proceed, therefore, merely according to concepts and cannot proceed through the construction of the concepts because the concept is a rule of the synthesis of the perceptions which are not pure viewings and, therefore, cannot be given a priori.

14.1 There is then a two-fold rational use, which despite the universality of the recognition and its generation a priori, which they have in common, is yet very diverse in the advancement, and indeed for that reason because in the appearance, through which all objects are given to us, there are two pieces: the form of the viewing (space and time), which can be recognized and determined completely a priori, and the material (the physical) or the ingredients, which means a something which is encountered in that space and time, and thus contains an existence and corresponds to the sensation.

14.2 With respect to the latter, which can never be given in a determined way otherwise than empirically, we can have nothing a priori except undetermined concepts of the synthesis of possible sensations to the extent they belong to the unity of the apperception (in a possible experience).

- 14.3 With respect to the form, we can determine our concepts a priori in the viewing, in that we create for ourselves in space and time the objects themselves through uniform synthesis by considering them merely as quanta.
- 14.4 The former are called a rational use according to concepts, in that we can do nothing further than to bring appearances under concepts according to the real content, which can be determined in that way not otherwise than empirically, i.e., a posteriori (but conformable to those concepts as rules of an empirical synthesis). The latter (the form) is the rational use through construction of the concepts, in that these, since they already go a priori to the viewing, also just for that reason can be given determined a priori and without any data in the pure viewing.
- 14.5 To consider everything which is (a thing in space or time), whether and how far it is a quantum or not, that an existence or deficiency of that would have to be represented, how far this something (which fills space and time) be a first substratum or mere determination, have a referral of its existence to something else as cause or effect, and finally stand isolated in reciprocal dependency with others with respect to existence, to ponder the possibility of this existence, the actuality and necessity or the opposite of these: all this belongs to rational recognition from concepts, which is termed philosophical.
- 14.6 But to determine a priori a viewing in space (shape), to partition time (duration), or to recognize merely the universal of the synthesis of one and the same in time and space, and the quantity of a viewing in general (number) arising from that; all this is a rational occupation through construction of the concepts, and is called mathematical.
- 15.1 The great fortune which rationality makes by means of mathematics, effects quite naturally the supposition that it will succeed even apart from the field of magnitudes, where not to it itself, still to its method, by bringing all its concepts to viewings, which it can give a priori and whereby it becomes master over nature, so to speak; since on the other hand, pure philosophy dabbles about a priori in nature with discursive concepts without being able to make the reality of those concepts viewable a priori and in that way also believable.

- 15.2 Also there seems to be no lack at all for the masters in this art of such confidence in themselves and for the commonweal of great expectations of their skill, if they should only engage themselves with this.
- 15.3 For since they have hardly ever philosophized about their mathematics (a difficult occupation indeed), the specific distinction of the one rational usage from the other does not arise to them in sense and thought. For them transitory and empirically used rules, which they borrow from common reasoning, hold in the place of axioms.
- 15.4 They do not bother themselves at all with the origin of the concepts of space and time, with which they are occupied (as the single original magnitude), and it likewise appears useless to them to investigate the origin of the pure understanding concepts and with that also with the scope of their validity, but rather only to avail themselves of them.
- 15.5 In all this they act quite properly, if only they do not overstep their appointed boundary, namely that of nature.
- 15.6 But in this way they stumble unnoticed from the field of sensitivity into the uncertain floor of pure and even transcendental concepts where the foundation (*in stabilis tellus, unnabilis unda*) allows them neither to stand nor swim, and lets them make only furtive steps, about which time does not retain the least trace, for, on the other hand, their way in mathematics makes a royal highway which the most remote posterity can yet treat with confidence.
- 16.1 Since we have taken upon ourselves the duty of determining exactly the boundaries of pure reason in the transcendental use and with certitude, but this manner of endeavor has that particular aspect on its own, despite the most emphatic and clearest warnings, of holding out yet always through the hope, before one entirely gives up the fight, of succeeding out beyond experience into the enticing areas of the intellectual, it is necessary yet to remove, as it were, the last anchor of a fantastic hope and to show that the adherence to the mathematical method in this manner of recognition is not able to supply the least advantage except for uncovering even more plainly the bareness of it itself, that surveying and philosophy are two entirely diverse things, even though they indeed offer one another the hand in the science of nature, thus the proceeding of the one is never able to be imitated by the other.

- 17.1 The thoroughness of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms and demonstrations.
- 17.2 I will be content with this in showing that none of these piece, in the sense in which the mathematician takes them, is able to be performed or imitated by the philosopher.
- 17.3 That the surveyor, according to his method, would produce nothing in philosophy except houses of cards, the philosopher, according to his method, would be able to excite only a babble in the participation of mathematics, even though philosophy consists precisely in being acquainted with its boundaries, and even the mathematician, if the talent is not per chance already limited by nature and restricted to its specialty, cannot ward off the warnings of philosophy, nor remove himself beyond them.
- 18.1 1. Concerning Definitions.
- 18.2 Defining, as the expression itself suggests, is supposed to mean only as much as presenting the detailed concept of a thing within its boundaries.*
- 18.3 According to such a requirement, an empirical concept cannot be defined at all, but rather only expounded.
- 18.4 For since we have in it only some identifying marks of a certain sort of objects of the senses, it is never certain whether with the word, which indicates the same object, we not think of more identifying marks of the object at one time and less at another time.
- 18.5 So one person can think in the concept of gold, apart from the weight, color, malleability, yet the property that it will not rust, about which some other person perhaps knows nothing.
- 18.6 We avail ourselves of certain identifying marks only so long as they are sufficient for differentiation. New observations, on the other hand, take some identifying marks away and add some to it, therefore the concept never stands between sure boundaries.

- 18.7 And for what purpose was it also supposed to serve in defining such a concept since, if, e.g., the discussion is of water and its properties, we do not want to dwell with what we think with the word water, but rather to proceed to trials, and the word, with the few identification marks which append to it, is only supposed to make up an indication and not a concept of the matter, thus the alleged definition is nothing else than word determination.
- 18.8 Also secondly, and to speak precisely, no a priori given concept can be defined, e.g., substance, cause, right, fairness, etc.
- 18.9 For I can never be sure that the clear representation of a (yet confused) given concept was developed in a detailed way except by knowing that it be adequate to the object.
- 18.10 But since the concept of the object, as it is given, can contain many obscure representations which we pass over in the dismemberment, even though we need them every time in the application, the detailedness of the dismemberment of my concept is always doubtful, and only through manifold, pertinent examples can it be made probable, but never apodictically certain.
- 18.11 Instead of the expression “definition” I would rather use that of “exposition”, which always remains yet cautious and with which the critic can allow them to hold to a certain degree and still, due to the detailedness, yet have misgivings.
- 18.12 Since therefore neither empirically nor a priori given concepts can be defined, no other meanings remain except ones thought via whim, on which we can try this artifice.
- 18.13 In such case I can always define my concept; for I must still know what I have wanted to think, since I have made it deliberately myself, and it was given to me neither through the nature of understanding, nor through experience, but I cannot say that I have defined a true object by means of that.
- 18.14 For if the concept rests upon empirical conditions, e.g., a ships clock, the object and its possibility are not yet given through this arbitrary concept. From this I do not even know whether it have anywhere an object, and my explanation can better be called a declaration (of my project) than a definition of an object.

- 18.15 No other concepts remain, therefore, which answer to the definition except such which contain a synthesis at whim, which can be constructed a priori, and thus only mathematics has definitions.
- 18.16 For the object which it thinks, it also presents a priori in the viewing and this can certainly contain neither more nor less than the concept does, because the concept of the object was given originally through the explanation, i.e., without deriving the explanation from anywhere.
- 18.17 For the expressions of “exposition”, “explication”, “declaration” and “definition”, the German language has nothing more than the one word, “explanation” and hence we must already deduce something from the rigor of the requirement since namely we refuse the honored name of definition to the philosophical explanation and want to restrict this entire comment to the following: that philosophical definitions can be produced only as expositions of given concepts, but mathematical as constructions of originally made ones, the former only analytically through dissection (whose completion is not apodictically certain), the latter synthetically and, therefore, constitutes the concept itself, opposed to which the philosophical can only explain it.
- 18.18 From this it follows:
- * Kant’s footnote
- 1.1 Here detail means the clarity and adequacy of the characteristics; boundaries, the precision that there are no more of them than belong to the detailed concept, but originally that this boundary determination is not derived from somewhere and, therefore, has no need of a proof which the alleged explanation would make incapable of standing at the pinnacle of all judgments about an object.
- 19.1 a. that in philosophy we would not be able to imitate mathematics in assuming definitions except perhaps merely as trials.
- 19.2 For since they are dissections of given concepts, those concepts precede, although still only confusedly, and the incomplete exposition goes before the complete exposition such that we can previously conclude some things out of some identifying marks which we have drawn out of a yet incomplete dissection, and before we have achieved to the complete exposition, i.e., to the

definition. In short: in philosophy the definition would better conclude the work, as precise clarity, than begin it.*

- 19.3 In mathematics, on the other hand, we have no concept at all before the definition which is how the concept is first given, therefore it must begin with that and also can begin with that every time.

* Kant's footnote

- 1.1 Philosophy swims in faulty definitions, especially such which contain actual elements for a definition, but are not yet complete.
 - 1.2 Now if we would be able to begin nothing at all with a concept until we had defined it, it would be quite bad for all philosophy.
 - 1.3 But since, as far as the elements (of the dissection) reach, a good and secure use can always be made of it, deficient definitions, i.e., propositions which are not yet definitions, but by the way are still true and, therefore, are approximations to them, can also be used quite advantageously.
 - 1.4 In mathematics the definition belongs *ad esse*, in philosophy *ad melius esse*.¹
 - 1.5 It is nice, but often very difficult, to achieve to such.
 - 1.6 The jurists are still seeking a definition for their concept of right.
- 20.1 b. Mathematical definitions can never err.
- 20.2 For since the concept is first given through the definition, it straightway contains only what the definition will have thought through it.
- 20.3 But although nothing improper with respect to the contents can come forth in it, still occasionally, although only rarely, there can be errors in the form (of the wording), namely with respect to the precision.
- 20.4 Thus the common explanation of the circle, that it is a curved line, all of the points of which stand equally removed from a single one (the center), contains the error that the determination "curved" has crept in unnecessarily.

¹ These mean, perhaps, "as existence" and "as better existence", respectively.

- 20.5 For there must be a particular theorem which is deduced from the definition and can be easily proven that every line, all of the points of which stand equally removed from a single one, is curved (no part of it straight).
- 20.6 Analytical definitions, on the other hand, can err in multiple ways, either by ushering in identification marks which actually did not lie in the concept, or by being deficient in the degree of detail which makes up the essential aspect of its definition, because we cannot be totally certain of the completeness of our dissection.
- 20.7 For that reason the method of mathematics in defining does not allow of imitation in philosophy.
- 21.1 2. Concerning Axioms.
- 21.2 These are synthetical base propositions a priori to the extent they are immediately certain.
- 21.3 Now one concept does not permit of connecting with any other synthetically and still immediately because, in order that we can go out beyond a concept, a third mediating recognition is necessary.
- 21.4 Now since philosophy is merely the rational recognition according to concepts, no base proposition will be encountered in it which deserves the name of axiom.
- 21.5 Mathematics, on the other hand, is capable of axioms because, by means of the construction of the concepts in the viewing of the object, it can connect the predicate of the object a priori and immediately, e.g., that three points always lie in a plane.
- 21.6 On the other hand, a synthetic principle can never be immediately certain merely from concepts, e.g., the proposition: “everything which happens has its cause,” for I must look about for a third, namely the conditions of the time determination in an experience and could not recognize such a proposition directly and immediately from the concepts alone.
- 21.7 Therefore discursive principles are something else entirely from intuitive ones, i.e., axioms.

- 21.8 Discursive principles still always require a deduction which the axioms can dispense with entirely, and since these are evident precisely because of the same basis which the philosophical principle, with all its certitude, still can never present, infinitely much is lacking with them that any sort of a synthetic proposition of pure and transcendental reason could be so obvious (as some endeavor to express it in a disdainful way) as the proposition that two times two makes four.
- 21.9 Indeed, in the analytic, with the table for the principles of pure understanding, I have thought certain axioms of the viewing, but the principle cited there was itself no axiom, but rather only served for issuing the principle of the possibility of axioms in general, and itself was only a principle out of concepts.
- 21.10 For even the possibility of mathematics must be indicated in the transcendental philosophy.
- 21.11 Therefore philosophy has no axioms and may never offer its principles a priori in such an immediate manner, but rather must be content with justifying its authority concerning the principles through deduction.
- 22.1 3. Concerning demonstrations.
- 22.2 Only an apodictic proof, to the extent it is intuitive, can be called demonstration.
- 22.3 Experience teaches us indeed what exists, but not at all that it cannot be otherwise.
- 22.4 Hence empirical proof foundations can supply no apodictic proof.
- 22.5 But from concepts a priori (in the discursive recognition) no viewed certainty, i.e., evidence, can ever arise despite how apodictically certain the judgment may be otherwise.
- 22.6 Therefore only mathematics contains demonstrations because it does not derive its relation out of concepts but rather out of the construction of those

concepts, i.e., out of the viewing which can be a priori given conformable to the concept.

- 22.7 Even the procedure of the algebraist with his equalities, from which he brings forth the truth together with the proof through reduction, is indeed no geometric construction, but still a characteristic one, in which we display with the symbol the concept in the viewing, especially concerning the relationship of magnitudes, and without once looking to the heuristic aspect, we secure all conclusions from error by placing each of them before our eyes.
- 22.8 Because, on the other hand, the philosophical recognition must dispense with this advantage by always having to consider the universal in abstracto (through concepts), while mathematics can ponder the universal in concreto (in the single viewing) and still a priori through pure representation in which every false step becomes visible.
- 22.9 Hence I would term the first acormatical (discursive) proofs, because they can be conducted only through sheer words (the object in thought), rather than demonstrations which, as the expression already indicates, advances in the viewing of the object.
- 23.1 Now from all of this follows that it is not at all fitting for the nature of philosophy, especially in the field of pure reason, to swell up in a dogmatic way and to adorn itself with the titles and ribbons of mathematics, in whose orders it still does not belong, although indeed it has every cause to hope for a sisterly union with that.
- 23.2 Those are vain pretensions which can never succeed. Far rather they must make its intention regressive, to lead the conceit of speculation back to that modest, but thorough, self-recognition.
- 23.3 Reason, therefore, in its transcendental attempts, will not be able to look out so confidently as though the way, which it has covered, led so entirely straightway to the goal and cannot so courageously reckon on its premises, laid as foundation, that it were not necessary to look back frequently and attend to whether or not perchance errors are found in the advance toward the conclusion, errors which were overlooked in the principles, and make it necessary either to determine them better or to change them entirely.

- 24.1 I divide all apodictical propositions (be they provable or even immediately certain) into dogmata and mathemata.
- 24.2 A direct synthetical proposition from concepts is a dogma; on the other hand, such a proposition, through construction of the concept, is a mathema.
- 24.3 Analytical judgments actually teach us nothing more of the object than what the concept, which we have of it, already contains within itself, because they do not expand the recognition beyond the concept of the subject, but rather only expound this.
- 24.4 Hence, and properly speaking, they cannot be called dogmas (which word we perhaps could translate with the instructional dictum).
- 24.5 But among the two cited types of synthetical propositions a priori, according to the common way of speaking, only what belongs to the philosophical recognition can bear this name, and the propositions of arithmetic or geometry we would hardly term dogmata.
- 24.6 Therefore this use certifies the explanation which we gave, that only judgments out of concepts can be called dogmatical, and not those out of the construction of the concept.
- 25.1 Now in all of pure reason, with respect to merely its speculative use, there is not a single directly synthetical judgment out of concepts.
- 25.2 For through Ideas, as we have indicated, reason is competent of no synthetical judgment at all which would have objective validity. But through concepts of the understanding, it erects indeed secure principles, but not directly out of concepts, but rather always only indirectly through referral of these concepts to something entirely contingent, namely possible experience; since then, if this (something as an object of possible experiences) is presupposed, the judgements are apodictically certain in every case, but on their own (directly) cannot even be recognized a priori at all.
- 25.3 Hence the proposition, “everything, which happens, has its cause”, cannot be totally penetrated from these given concepts alone.

- 25.4 Hence it is no dogma, even though from another point of view, namely the single field of its possible use, i.e., experience, it can be proven as such quite easily and indubitably.
- 25.5 But it is called a principle and not instructional proposition, even though it must be proven, because it has the particular property of making its proof basis, namely experience, itself first possible, and must always be presupposed with this.
- 26.1 Now if in the speculative use of pure reason, also with respect to the contents, there is no dogmata at all, then every dogmatical method, be it borrowed from the mathematical, or assumed to be of a peculiar type, is inappropriate for itself.
- 26.2 For it only buries the mistakes and errors, and deceives philosophy, the actual intention of which is to allow all steps of reason to be seen in the clearest of light.
- 26.3 Nonetheless the method can always be systematical.
- 26.4 For our reasoning (subjectively speaking) is itself a system, but its pure usage, by means of mere concepts, is only a system of inquiry per principles of unity, to which alone experience can prove the material.
- 26.5 But of the peculiar method of a transcendental philosophy nothing can be said here, since we only have to do with a critique of our capacities' circumstances as to whether we build anywhere, and how high we can likely erect our building or regarding the material which we have (the pure concepts a priori).

2nd Section. The Discipline of Pure Reason with Respect to the Polemical Use

- 1.1 In all its undertakings, reason must subject itself to the critique, and through no command can it interrupt the freedom of this without harming itself and drawing upon itself a suspicion which is disadvantageous to it.
- 1.2 Now there is nothing so important with respect to the utility, nothing so holy that it may excuse itself from this testing and inspecting examination, an examination which is acquainted with no consideration of the person.
- 1.3 On this freedom in fact rests the existence of reason, which has no dictatorial regard, and rather whose dictum is always nothing except the agreement of free citizens, to which each must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, without hesitation.

- 2.1 But now even though reason can never refuse critique, it still does not always have cause to fear it.
- 2.2 But pure reason in its dogmatical (not mathematical) use is not particularly aware of the most exact observation of its supreme laws that it would not have to appear with bashfulness, indeed with the entire rejection of all presumptuous dogmatical regard, before the critical eye of a higher and more proper reason.

- 3.1 It is quite a different matter if it has to do not with the censure of the judge but rather with the claim of its fellow citizens, and is merely supposed to defend itself against them.
- 3.2 For since these latter want to be dogmatical, though in the denial, just as well as the former do in the affirmation, a justification *κατ' ἀνθρώπων*² takes place which safeguards against all encroachment, and provides a titled possession which needs fear no foreign presumption, even though it itself *κατ' ἀλήθειαν*³ cannot be sufficiently proven.

² *katáthrōpon*, i.e., “according to man(kind)”. Thanks to Mr. Benjamin Turnbull for his aid here.

³ *katalētheian*, i.e., “according to truth”.

- 4.1 Now with the polemical use of pure reason I understand the defense of its propositions against their dogmatical denial.
- 4.2 Now here it does not matter whether its assertions might not also perhaps be false, but rather only that no one is ever able to assert the opposite with apodictic certitude (indeed even if with greater semblance).
- 4.3 For then we are still not in our possession in a petitionary way if we have before us a title of that, even if not sufficient. And it is completely certain that no one is ever able to prove the illegitimacy of this possession.

- 5.1 It is something troublesome and humiliating that there is in general an antithetic of pure reason, and that this, which still represents the supreme court on all conflicts, should come into conflict with itself.
- 5.2 Of course we had above such an apparent antithetic of that before us. But it was shown to rest upon a misunderstanding, since namely we, conformable to the common prejudice, took appearances as things on their own, and then demanded an absolute completion of their synthesis in one way or the other (but which was equally impossible in both ways), but which cannot at all be expected of appearances.
- 5.3 It was therefore then no actual contradiction of reason with itself with the propositions: “the series of given appearances on its own has an absolutely first beginning” and “this series is utterly and on its own without any beginning,” for both propositions exist quite well together, because appearances, with respect to their existence (as appearances), are nothing at all on their own, i.e., something contradictory and, therefore, the presupposition of which must naturally draw with itself contradicting consequences.

- 6.1 But such a misunderstanding cannot be subject to subterfuge and attributed in that way to the conflict of reason if per chance it were theistically asserted that “there is a highest entity” and atheistically in opposition, “there is no highest entity” or, in psychology, “everything, which thinks, is of absolutely enduring unity and, therefore, distinguished from all transitory, material unity” to which another, namely: “the soul is not immaterial unity and cannot become excepted from the perishability,” is contrarily opposed.

- 6.2 For the object of the question here is free of all dissimilarities, which contradict its nature, and the understanding has to do only with matters on their own, and not with appearances.
- 6.3 Here, of course, a true conflict would be encountered if only pure reason had something to say on the negating side, which came nearer to the foundation of an assertion. For concerning the critique of the proof foundation of the dogmatic-affirming, we can very well admit to that without for that reason giving up these propositions which still at least have the interest of reason for itself, and to these the opponent can not appeal at all.
- 7.1 Indeed I am not of the opinion, so often expressed by excellent and reflecting people (e.g., Sulzer), since they felt the weakness of the previous proofs, that we can hope one day to invent yet evident demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of our pure reason: there is a God, there is a future life.
- 7.2 I am far rather certain that this will never happen.
- 7.3 For where does reason want to obtain the basis for such synthetic assertions which do not refer to objects of experience and their inner possibility?
- 7.4 But it is also indubitably certain that no human will ever step forward who is able to assert the opposite with the least semblance, much less dogmatically.
- 7.5 For since he could establish this still merely through pure reason, he would have to undertake to prove that a highest entity and the subject thinking within us as pure intelligence are impossible.
- 7.6 But where will he obtain the information which justifies him in such a synthetic judgement of things beyond all possible experience?
- 7.7 Hence we can be entirely untroubled about someone ever proving the opposite to us someday, that we for that reason simply have no need of brooding about this with scholastic proofs. Rather we are able anyway to assume those propositions, which adhere quite will together with the speculative interest of our reason in the empirical usage and moreover are the singular means for uniting it with the practical interest.

- 7.8 For the opponent (who here must be considered merely as critic), we have our *non liquet*⁴ in readiness, which must infallibly confuse him, while we are not concerned about his retort of that to us, in that we continually have the subjective maxims of reason in reserve which the opponent necessarily lacks and under the protection of which we can view all his mock blows quietly and with indifference.
- 8.1 In this way there is actually no antithetic of pure reason at all.
- 8.2 For the single arena for it would be sought upon the field of pure theology and psychology. But on this field there is no knight in his entire armament and with weapons which were to be feared.
- 8.3 He can only step forth with derision or bragging, which can be ridiculed as a child's play.
- 8.4 That is a comforting remark which gives courage again to reason. For upon what else did it want to entrust itself, if it, which is called forth alone to dispose of all errors, were unhinged within itself, without being able to hope for peace and quite possession?
- 9.1 Everything, which nature itself arranges, is good for some sort of intention.
- 9.2 Even poisons serve in overcoming other poisons which are generated in our own fluids and hence are not to be missing in a complete collection of healing means (dispensary).
- 9.3 The objects against the persuasion and the conceit of our mere speculative reason are themselves raised through the nature of this reason and, therefore, will have their good determinations and intention which must not be ignored.
- 9.4 Why has providence placed many objects so high, even though they adhere together with our highest interest, that it is almost delightful for us to encounter them in an unclear perception and be almost doubted by us, whereby spying glances become more enticed than satisfied?

⁴ "It is not proven."

- 9.5 Whether it be useful, with respect to such views, to dare impudent determinations, is at least doubtful, perhaps even injurious.
- 9.6 But in any case and without any doubt it is useful to place researching, as well as appraising, reason in complete freedom, so that it can care for its own interest unhindered, which is promoted just as well by setting restrictions to its insights as by expanding such, and which suffers in any case if foreign hands meddle with it in order to steer it against its natural way by compelled intentions.
- 10.1 Accordingly let your opponent only say “reason” and then fight him merely with weapons of reason.
- 10.2 By the way, do not be troubled about the good consideration (of practical reason), for it never comes into play in the merely speculative conflict.
- 10.3 The conflict then discovers nothing except a certain antinomy of reason which, since it rests upon its nature, belongs necessarily and must be tested.
- 10.4 It cultivates that through consideration of its object on two sides, and rectifies its judgment by limiting such.
- 10.5 That which is disputable in this is not the matter, but rather its tone.
- 10.6 For there remains yet enough left for you to speak the speech of a firm faith justified against the fiercest reason, even if you have had to give up the speech of knowledge.
- 11.1 If we could ask the audacious David Hume, who was actually supplied as the counter-weight to the judgment, “what stirs you through tediously brooded considerations to undermine a persuasion so comforting and useful for the human that their rational insight achieve to the assertion of, and to the determined concept of, a highest entity?” he would answer, “nothing except the intention of bringing reason further in its self recognition and, simultaneously, a certain reluctance about the compulsion which some will inflict upon reason, in that we do great things with it, and simultaneously hinder it

in accounting for a frank acknowledgement of its weaknesses, which is revealed with a probe of itself.”

- 11.2 On the other hand, if you were to ask Priestly, who surrendered to the principles of the empirical, rational usage alone and diverged from all transcendental speculation, what his motivation was in tearing down freedom and immortality of our souls (the hope of a future life with him is only the expectation of a miracle in the restoration), which are two such fundamental pillars of all religion, and who himself is a devoted and enthusiastic teacher of religion; he would be able to answer in no other way than for the sake of the interest of reason, which loses by our wanting to remove certain objects from the laws of the material nature, the only ones which we can be precisely acquainted with and determine.
- 11.3 It would seem unreasonable to decry the latter, who knows how to unite his paradoxical assertion with the religious intention, and injure a well thinking man because he cannot find his way as soon as he has gone astray out of the field of instruction of nature.
- 11.4 But this favor must come forth just as well to Hume, not less well minded and blameless according to his moral character, who cannot leave his derived speculation for that reason because he properly holds that their object lies entirely outside of the limits of natural science and in the field of pure Ideas.
- 12.1 Now what is to be done with this, especially with regard to the danger which seems to threaten the common good?
- 12.2 Nothing is more natural nor anything more reasonable than the decision which they have to take on that score.
- 12.3 Let these people proceed; for if they show talent, if they show deep and new research, in brief, if they only show reason, then reason wins every time.
- 12.4 If you grasp other means than those of an uncompelled reason, if you scream about high treason, if you call together the commonweal as a fire brigade, as it were, one which does not understand such subtle treatments at all, you make yourselves ridiculous.

- 12.5 For the discussion is not at all about what is here advantageous or disadvantageous for the common good, but rather only how far reason probably is able to bring it in its speculation, abstracted from all interest, and whether we would have to reckon something to this in general, or rather even surrender it for the sake of the practical.
- 12.6 Therefore, instead of forging in that with the sword, serenely observe this conflict far rather from the secure seat of the critique, which must turn out as tiring for the participants as entertaining for you and, at a very definite bloodless termination, as profitable for your insights.
- 12.7 For it is something very absurd to expect enlightenment from reason and still to prescribe to it in advance the side that it necessarily would have to turn up with as victor.
- 12.8 Moreover reason of itself becomes already so well subdued through reason and held in restraints that it is not necessary at all to call out the watch in order to set up civil resistance against that portion, whose fearful ascendancy seems dangerous to you.
- 12.9 In this dialectic there is no victory about which you had cause to be concerned.
- 13.1 Also reason is very much in need of such a conflict, and it is unfortunate that it was not conducted earlier and with unrestricted public permission.
- 13.2 For then a mature critique would have come forth much earlier, at whose appearance all these conflicting actions would have ceased of themselves. For the combatants would have learned to penetrate their facades and prejudices, which they have placed into opposition to one another.
- 14.1 There is a certain impurity in human nature, which still at the end, as everything which comes from nature, must contain a makeup for good purposes, namely an inclination to conceal our true dispositions and to bear certain assumed ones which we hold for good and laudatory.
- 14.2 Without doubt, through this bent for suppressing themselves, as well also as assuming an appearance advantageous to them, the humans have not merely

civilized, but rather gradually, to a certain degree, moralized themselves, because no one was able to penetrate through the cosmetics of uprightness, honest and decency, and in this way to found a school of improvement for himself on alleged, genuine examples of the good which he saw about himself.

- 14.3 But this layout for pretending to be better than we are and to express dispositions which we do not have, serves only provisionally, as it were, to bring the human out of the rough, and allows him at first to assume at least the manners of the good with which he is acquainted. For afterwards, if the genuine principles are once developed and transferred over into the way of thinking, that duplicity must gradually be forcefully resisted, because otherwise it spoils the heart and does not allow good dispositions to arise from under the prolific weed of a nice semblance.
- 15.1 I am sorry to perceive the impurity, dissimulation and hypocrisy even in the expressions of the speculative way of thinking, in which still humans, to uncover the confession of their thoughts in cheap measure openly and without concealment, have far fewer obstacles and no advantage at all.
- 15.2 For what can be more disadvantageous to insights than communicating mere falsified thoughts to one another, concealing doubt which we feel against our own assertions, or conveying a coating of evidence to foundations of proof which are not sufficient even to ourselves?
- 15.3 Meanwhile, as long as merely the private conceit instigates these secret intrigues (which is usually the case in speculative judgments which have no particular interest and are not easily proficient for dogmatic certitude) the conceit resists with public permission and the matter finally comes there where the most sheer disposition and uprightness would have brought them much earlier anyway.
- 15.4 But where the commonweal considers ingenious rationalizers to go after nothing better than making the basic vestments of the public weal totter, there it seems not only conformable to prudence, but rather also allowed and indeed even laudatory, to come to the aid of the good cause rather through apparent foundations than leaving the alleged opponent of the good cause even the advantage of toning down of his pitch to the moderation of a mere

practical conviction, and of necessitating ourselves to acknowledge the lack of the speculative and dogmatical certitude.

- 15.5 Meanwhile I should think that nothing in the world allows more inappropriately of unification with the intention of asserting a good cause than fraud, deceit and cheating.
- 15.6 That everything would have to come about honestly in the weighing of the rational foundations of a mere speculation, surely that is the least that one can require.
- 15.7 But if we could safely count on no more than this little bit, the dispute of speculative reason about the important questions of God, immortality (of the soul) and freedom, could either have been decided long ago, or would be brought to an end very quickly.
- 15.8 Often does the integrity of the disposition stand in relationship to the good nature of the matter itself, and this perhaps has more honorable and sincere opponents than defenders.
- 16.1 I presuppose readers, therefore, who want to know no correct cause wrongly defended.
- 16.2 Now with respect to them, it is decided that, according to our principles of the critique, if we do not look to that which happens, but rather to what was reasonably supposed to happen, there would actually have to be no polemic of pure reason at all.
- 16.3 For how could two persons carry on a dispute about a matter, the reality of which neither of the two can present in an actual or even only in a possible experience, but about whose Idea it broods in order to produce something more out of it than the Idea, namely the actuality of the object itself?
- 16.4 By what means do they want to come out of the dispute, since neither of the two can make his case straightway comprehensible and certain, but rather only attack and refute that of this opponent?
- 16.5 For this is the fate of all assertions of pure reason, that since they go out beyond the conditions of all possible experience, apart from which no docu-

mentation of truth is encountered anywhere at all, but nonetheless must avail themselves of the laws of understanding, which are determined merely for the empirical usage, but without which not one step can be taken in the synthetic thinking, they give the opponent an opening every time and, for their part, take advantage of the exposure of their opponent.

- 17.1 We can consider the critique of pure reason as the true court for all controversies of this sort. For it is not embroiled in the understanding, except which go immediately to objects, but rather is established for the determination and judgment of the correctness of reason in general, according to the principles of its first institution.
- 18.1 Without this, reason is in the state of nature, as it were, and cannot make its assertions and claims otherwise valid or secure except through war.
- 18.2 The critique, on the other hand, which draws all decisions out of the foundational rules of its own establishment, the authority of which no one can doubt, supplies us with the tranquility of a legitimate state, in which we are not supposed to conduct our conflict otherwise than through proofs.
- 18.3 What ends the action in the first state is a victory, about which both parties boast, upon which very often only an uncertain peace follows, which the interceding authorities establish, but in the second, the aphorism, which, because it touches here the source of the dispute itself, must impart an eternal peace.
- 18.4 Also the endless conflicts of a merely dogmatic reason finally necessitates a search for peace in some sort of a critique of this reason itself and in a legislation which is based upon it; much as Hobbes asserts: “the state of nature is a state of injustice and might, and we would have to abandon it necessarily in order to subject ourselves to the lawful compulsion which limits all our freedom only so far that it is able to coexist with the freedom of every person and precisely in that way with the common good.”
- 19.1 To this freedom then belongs also that of exhibiting our thoughts and our doubts, which we cannot resolve for evaluation without being decried for that as an unruly and dangerous citizen.

- 19.2 This already lies in the original rights of human reason which recognizes no other judge than universal human reason itself, in which each has his vote, and since from this all improvements, to which our state is capable, must come, such a right is holy and may not be curtailed.
- 19.3 Also it is very unwise to proclaim as dangerous certain ventured assertions or considered attacks against that which already has on its side the determination of the greatest and best portion of the commonweal; for that is the same as giving them an importance which they were not at all supposed to have.
- 19.4 If I hear that an uncommon thinker is supposed to have demonstrated away the freedom of the human will, the hope of a future life and the existence of God, I am curious and want to read that book, for I expect from his talent that he will be able to bring my insight further.
- 19.5 I already know with complete certitude in advance that he will have performed nothing from all this, not because I per chance already believe myself to be in possession of incontrovertible proof of these important propositions. Rather the transcendental critique, which discloses to me the entire store of our pure reason, has completely convinced me that, as it is entirely inadequate to affirmations in this field, just as little and even less will it know in order to be able to assert something negative about this question.
- 19.6 For from whence does the alleged free spirit obtain this information that there is, e.g., no supreme entity?
- 19.7 This proposition lies outside of the field of possible experience and for that reason also apart from the limits of all human insight.
- 19.8 The dogmatic defender of the good side against this enemy I would not read at all, because I know in advance that he will attack the apparent foundations of the other side only in order to procure his own entrance, beyond which an common semblance still does not give as much material to new observations as one which is more strange and ingeniously thought.
- 19.9 On the other hand, the religious opponent of my critique, also dogmatic in his manner, would give some desired occupation and occasion to many recti-

fications of their principles, without there being anything to fear in the least on his part.

- 20.1 But the youth, which is entrusted to the academic instruction, is still at least to be warned about such writings and to be deferred from early acquaintance with such dangerous propositions before their judgmental capacity has matured, or rather until the teaching, which we will instill in them, is firmly rooted, so that they may forcefully withstand all persuasions to the contrary, regardless from whence it may arise.
- 21.1 If it would have to remain with the dogmatic proceeding in matters of pure reason and the dispatch of the opponent actually be polemical, i.e., so composed that we would engage ourselves in combat and arm ourselves with proof bases to contrary assertions, then of course nothing more advisable were at hand, but simultaneously nothing more conceited and fruitless in the long run, than to place the reason of the youth for a time under guardianship and at least to protect it that long from seduction.
- 21.2 But if, as a consequence, either due to curiosity or the vogue of the time, such writings slip into their hands, will then that youthful persuasion yet stand the test?
- 21.3 He who brings nothing with him but dogmatical weapons, in order to withstand the attacks of his opponent and does not know how to unravel the concealed dialectic which lies no less in his own bosom than in that of the opponent, sees apparent foundations which have the advantage of novelty come forth against apparent foundations which no longer have such novelty, but rather much more excites the suspicion of a misused credulity of the youth.
- 21.4 He does not believe himself better able to show that he has outgrown the child's harness than by removing himself beyond those well-intended warnings and, dogmatically accustomed, he drinks the poison in long draughts which dogmatically spoils his principles.

- 22.1 Precisely the opposite of what some recommend must occur in the academic instruction, but, of course, only under the presupposition of a basic instruction in the critique of pure reason.
- 22.2 For, in order to bring the principle of pure reason as soon as possible into practice, and to show their adequacy with the greatest dialectical semblance, it is thoroughly necessary to direct the attacks, so terrible for the dogmatists, against his reason, although still weak, but enlightened through critique, and to let him make the attempt of testing the baseless assertions of the opponent piece by piece on those principles.
- 22.3 It cannot at all be difficult for him to dissolve them into sheer vapor, and so he early enough feels his own power to completely secure himself against such damaging illusions, which finally must lose all semblance for him.
- 22.4 Now even though precisely these blows, which demolish the edifice of the enemy, must also be just as despoiling to his own speculative construction if he per chance thought to erect such, he is still entirely unconcerned about that, in that he has no need of it at all as a residence, but rather has yet a view into the practical field before himself, where he can hope with good reason for a firm footing for erecting in that his rational and salutary system.
- 23.1 So accordingly there is no actual polemic in the field of pure reason.
- 23.2 Both sides are windmill fighters, who box about with their shadows, for they go out beyond nature, where nothing to be grasped and held is available for their dogmatical clutches.
- 23.3 They have fun fighting. The shadows, which they sunder, grow back together in an instant like the heroes in Walhalla, in order to be able to delight themselves anew in bloodless combat.
- 24.1 But there is also no admissible skeptical use of pure reason which we could term the principles of neutrality with all its disputes.
- 24.2 To incite reason against itself, to pass out weapons to it on both sides, and then to contemplate its most ardent fencing tranquilly and mockingly, does

not look very well from a dogmatic point of view, but rather has the appearance of a gloating and mischievous type of mind.

- 24.3 Meanwhile, if we view the irreducible illusions and the great doings of the rationalizers, who will allow moderation through no critique, there is still actually no other council than of placing contrary to the great promises on the one side another which is footed upon just the same rights, only in order that reason is made at least perplexed through the resistance of an enemy, in order to place some doubts into their presumptions and for them to give ear to the critique.
- 24.4 But to let it rest entirely with these doubts, and to take exception to wanting to recommend the conviction and the acknowledgement of one's ignorance, not merely as a healing aid against the dogmatical self conceit, but rather simultaneously as the way of ending the conflict of reason with itself, is an entirely vain stroke and in no way can be suitable for supplying reason with a state of rest, but rather is at most only a means of awakening itself out of its sweet, dogmatic dreams in order to draw its state into a thorough test.
- 24.5 Meanwhile, since this skeptical maneuver for drawing itself, as it were, out of an annoying business, appears to be the shortest way for achieving an enduring philosophical tranquility, or at least the highway which those gladly strike out upon who mean to give themselves a philosophical appearance in a mocking scorn of all investigations of this manner, I find it necessary to present this manner of thinking in its peculiar light.

Concerning the Impossibility of a Skeptical Satisfaction of Pure Reason United with Itself

- 1.1 The consciousness of my ignorance (if this is not simultaneously recognized as necessary), instead of ending my researches, is far rather the actual cause of arousing them.
- 1.2 All ignorance is either that of things or of the determination and boundary of my recognition.
- 1.3 Now if the ignorance is contingent, it must in the first case impel the investigation of the things (objects) dogmatically; while in the second, the limits of my possible recognition critically.
- 1.4 But that my ignorance be utterly necessary, and hence releases me from all further investigation, is ascertained not empirically out of observation, but rather only critically through an explication of the first sources of our recognition.
- 1.5 The boundary determinations of our reason, therefore, only happen a priori according to foundations; but the restriction of that, which is a recognition, albeit only undetermined, of an ignorance never fully to be removed, can also be recognized a priori through that which, with all knowledge, remains yet to be known by us.
- 1.6 That recognition of our ignorance, possible alone through a critique of reason itself, is therefore science, while the latter is nothing but perception, of which we cannot say how far the conclusion out of that may reach.
- 1.7 If I represent to myself the surface of the earth (conformable to the visual semblance) as a plate, I cannot know how far it stretches.
- 1.8 But experience teaches me that no matter where I go, I always see a space around about me in which I could advance further. Thus I recognize the limits of my ever actual geography, but not the boundaries of all possible descriptions of the earth.
- 1.9 But, on the other hand, if I have come so far to know that the earth is a sphere and its surface a spherical surface, then out of a small portion of that,

e.g., the magnitude of a degree, I can also recognize the diameter as determined and according to principles a priori, and through this, the complete delineation of the earth, i.e., its outer surface. And even though I am ignorant with respect to the objects which this surface may contain, nevertheless I am not ignorant with respect to the scope which contains them, and of the magnitude and limits of those objects.

- 2.1 The epitome of all objects for our recognition seem to us to be a flat surface which has its apparent horizon, namely that which embraces the entire scope of that surface and is termed by us the rational concept of unconditioned totality.
- 2.2 It is impossible to reach that empirically, and all attempts in determining it a priori according to a certain principle for that have been in vain.
- 2.3 Nonetheless, all questions of our pure reason still go to what may lie outside of this horizon, or in every case also within its boundary lines.

- 3.1 The celebrated David Hume was one of these geographers of human reason who meant to have sufficiently disposed of these questions altogether, relegating them beyond the horizon of reason, which he still could not determine.
- 3.2 He tarried especially with the principle of causality and noted quite properly that we base its truth (indeed not even the objective validity of the concept of an effecting cause in general) on no insight, i.e., on no recognition a priori, at all, and that accordingly the necessity of this law does not in the least make of its authority. Rather the necessity of this law is a mere universal utility of it in the course of experience, and hence a subjective necessity, which he terms “custom,” arising from that utility.
- 3.3 Now from this incapacity of our reason to make a use of this principle going out beyond all experience, he concluded the futility in general of all presumptions of reason to go out beyond the empirical.

- 4.1 A procedure of this manner, of subjecting a fact of reason to the test and, according to the outcome, to the reproof of reason, we can term a censure of reason.
- 4.2 It is beyond doubt that this censorship would lead unavoidably to the dubiety of all transcendental utility of the principles.
- 4.3 But this is only the second step, which does not end the work by any means.
- 4.4 The first step in matters of pure reason, which marks the childhood of that, is dogmatic.
- 4.5 The just mentioned second step is skeptical, and this is evidence of the caution of the judgmental capacity sharpened through experience.
- 4.6 But now a third step is yet necessary, which befits only the matured and viril judgmental capacity, which has firm maxims as its foundation, maxims confirmed with respect to their universality; namely of exposing for estimation not facts of reason, but rather reason itself, with respect to its entire capacity and suitability for pure recognitions a priori. This is not the censorship, but rather the critique of reason, by means of which not merely limits, but rather the determined boundaries of that, not merely ignorance in one part or another, but with respect to all possible questions of a certain type, and are indeed not per chance only supposed, but rather proven out of principles.
- 4.7 So skepticism is a resting place for human reason, for it can ponder its dogmatic wanderings and make a sketch of the area where it finds itself so that it is able to choose its way further with more confidence. But it is not a homestead for a continuing response; for this can be encountered only in a complete certitude, be it now of the recognition of the objects themselves, or of the limits, within which all of our recognition of objects is enclosed.
- 5.1 Our reason is not per chance a plane spread out undeterminably far, the limits of which we recognize only generally, but rather must be compared to a sphere, the radius of which allows of ascertainment from the curvature of the circle on its outer surface (nature of synthetic propositions a priori), and from which also the content and the limitation of that is securely rendered.

- 5.2 Apart from this sphere (field of experience) nothing is an object for reason, indeed, even questions about such alleged objects concern only subjective principles of a thorough determination of the relationships which can come forth under the understanding concepts within this sphere.
- 6.1 We are actually in possession of synthetic recognitions a priori, as this establishes the understanding principles which anticipate experience.
- 6.2 Now if someone cannot make the possibility of these at all comprehensible to himself, he may indeed at the beginning doubt whether they even actually reside with us a priori, but he cannot yet pass this off as an impossibility of that through mere powers of the understanding, nor all steps, which reason takes according to the guideline of them, as inane.
- 6.3 He can only say, “if we penetrated their origin and authenticity, we would be able to determine the scope and the boundaries of our reason”. But before this has happened, all assertions of this sort are ventured blindly.
- 6.4 And in such way a thorough doubt of all dogmatic philosophy, which goes its way without critique of reason, would be quite will founded. But such an advance could still not for that reason be entirely denied to reason if the advance were prepared and secured through foundations which were more securely laid.
- 6.5 For once again: all concepts, indeed all questions which pure reason presents to us, do not per chance lie in experience, but rather actually in turn only in reason, and hence must be able to be solved and comprehended according to their validity or nullity.
- 6.6 We are also still not justified in dismissing this task under the pretext of our incapacity, as though its solution actually lay in the nature of things, and thus to refuse their further investigations, since reason alone has generated these Ideas itself within its womb, of whose validity or dialectic semblance it is, therefore, held to give an account.
- 7.1 All skeptical polemicizing is actually only turned against the dogmatist who, without positing any mistrust in his originally objective principles, i.e.,

without critique, sets forth gravely on his way. This polemicizing is actually merely in order to upset his concept and bring him to self-recognition.

- 7.2 On its own, with respect to what we can know and, on the other hand, what we cannot know, it does not matter at all.
- 7.3 All miscarrying dogmatic attempts of reason are facts (*Facta*), and it is always useful to subject such to censure.
- 7.4 But this can decide nothing about the expectation of reason in hoping for a better success of its further endeavors and in making claims about that. Therefore the mere censure can never bring the disputability about the proper source of human reason to an end.

- 8.1 Since among all skeptics, Hume is perhaps the most spirited and without challenge the most pre-eminent with respect to the influence which the skeptical procedure can have upon the awakening of a thorough test of reason, it is worthwhile to make representable the way of his conclusions and the mistakes of such a penetrating and valued man which still have started on the clues of truth, to the extent it is appropriate to my intention.

- 9.1 Hume has in mind, perhaps, although he never completely developed it, that we, in judgments of a certain type, go out beyond our concept of objects.
- 9.2 I have termed this sort of judgment ‘synthetic.’
- 9.3 How I am able to go out from my concept, which I have up to then, by means of experience, is subject to no scruple.
- 9.4 Experience itself is such a synthesis of perceptions, which increase my concept, which I have by means of a perception, through others being added to it.
- 9.5 However we also believe to be able to go out a priori from our concepts and to expand our recognitions.
- 9.6 This we attempt to do either through pure understanding, with respect to what at least can be an object of experience, or even through pure reason,

with respect to such properties of things, or indeed actually to the existence of such objects, which can never come forth in experience.

- 9.7 Our skeptic did not distinguish these two sorts of judgments as he actually should have done, and this increase of concepts out of themselves and, so to speak, the self-birth of our understanding (together with reason), without being pregnant via experience, Hume held straightway as impossible, and thus all alleged principles of experience as imagined a priori and found that they were nothing except a custom arising out of experience and its laws, thus merely empirical, i.e., rules contingent on their own, to which we attribute an alleged necessity and universality.
- 9.8 But for the assertion of this strange proposition he referred to the universally recognized principles of the relationship of cause to effect.
- 9.9 For since no understanding capacity can lead from the concept of a thing to the existence of something else which were given via that concept universally and necessarily, he believed himself able to decide from this that without experience we have nothing which could increase our concept and justify us to such a judgment expanding itself a priori.
- 9.10 That the sunlight, which illuminates the wax, simultaneously melts it, while hardening clay, no understanding could render out of concepts which we had preceding these things, much less legitimately conclude. Only experience would be able to teach us such a law.
- 9.11 On the other hand, we have seen in the transcendental logic that even though we are never able to go out immediately beyond the content of the concept which is given to us, still, completely a priori, though in referral to a third something, namely possible experience, therefore still a priori, we are able to recognize the law of the connection with other things.
- 9.12 If, therefore, previously firm wax melts, I can recognize a priori that something would have to have preceded (e.g., the warmth of the sun), whereupon this has followed according to an enduring law, even though, without experience, determined a priori and without the instruction of experience I could recognize neither the cause from the effect, nor the effect from the cause.
- 9.13 Therefore he concluded falsely from the contingency of our determinations according to the law, to the contingency of the law itself. And the expansion

from the concept of a thing to possible experience (which happens a priori and makes up the objective reality of that) he confused with the synthesis of the objects of actual experience, which, of course, is always empirical. But from that, out of a principle of affinity which has its seat in understanding and expresses necessary connection, he made a rule of association, which becomes encountered merely in the imitative imagination, and can present only contingent, and by no means objective, connection.

- 10.1 But the skeptical mistakes of this otherwise extremely acute man arose especially out of a deficiency which he had in common with all dogmatists after all, namely that he did not systematically survey all sorts of synthesis of the understand a priori.
- 10.2 For then he would have discovered, e.g., without here mentioning the remaining ones, the proposition of duration as such which anticipates experience just as much as that of causality.
- 10.3 In this way he would have also been able to point out determined boundaries of the understanding, which expands itself a priori, and of pure reason.
- 10.4 But since he only limited our understanding without delineating it and, indeed, produces a universal mistrust, but no determined information about the ignorance unavoidable to us, since he brings some principles of the understanding under censure without bringing this understanding, with respect to its entire capacity, to the testing scales of critique, and by denying to it what it actually cannot perform, goes further and impugns it of all capacity of expanding itself a priori; he disregards this entire capacity which was not drawn into the evaluation; such that that, which always suppresses skepticism, contradicts him, namely that he comes to doubt himself in that his challenges rest only on facts (*Facti*) which are contingent, but not on principles, which could effect a necessary renunciation of the right of dogmatic assertions.
- 11.1 Since he is also acquainted with no distinction between the established claims of understanding and the dialectic presumptions of reason, against which still his attacks are primarily directed, reason, whose entire peculiar play with this was not in the least disturbed, but rather only hindered, does

not feel the space to its expansion closed, and can never be entirely brought away from its attempts, despite it becoming occasionally annoyed.

- 11.2 For against attacks we arm ourselves for resistance and set our mind even more stubbornly for carrying through with our demands.
- 11.3 But a complete estimation of our entire capacity and the conviction of the certitude of a small possession arising from it, at the conceit of higher claims, stops all dispute and motivates the peaceful enjoyment of a restricted, but undisputed, ownership.
- 12.1 Against the uncritical dogmatist, who has not measured the sphere of his understanding, thus has not determined the limits of his possible recognition according to principles who, therefore, does not already know in advance how much he can do, but rather thinks to uncover it through mere attempts, the skeptical attacks are not only dangerous, but even despoiling.
- 12.2 For if he is encountered in a single assertion, which he cannot justify, but whose semblance he can also not develop out of principles, the suspicion falls on everything, regardless of how persuasive they may be otherwise.
- 13.1 And so the skeptic is the disciplinarian of the dogmatic pseudo-rationalizer on a healthy critique of the understanding and reason themselves.
- 13.2 If it has reached this far, he has no reason to fear any duel any more; for he distinguishes then his possession from what lies entirely apart from his possession, concerning which he makes no claim and about which can also not become involved in conflicts.
- 13.3 So the skeptical procedure is indeed on its own not satisfying for the questions of reason, but still is preparatory practice in order to awaken its cautions and to point to basic means, which can secure it in its rightful possession.

3rd Section. The Discipline of Pure Reason with respect to Hypotheses

- 1.1 Since then through critique of our reason we finally know this much, namely that we can in fact know nothing at all in its pure and speculative use, was it not supposed to open up an all the more wider field to hypotheses, since it at least is permitted to compose and to conjecture, even if not to assert?
- 2.1 Where, per chance, imagination is not supposed to revel, but rather to compose under the strict supervision of reason, something must always be completely certain previously, not fabricated or merely conjectured, and that is the possibility of the object itself.
- 2.2 Indeed it is because of the actuality of the object that we are permitted to take refuge in conjecture, but which, in order not to be without a foundation, must, as an explanatory basis, be brought into connection with what is actually given and, consequently, what is certain, and hence is called hypothesis.
- 3.1 Now since we cannot a priori make the least concept of the possibility of the dynamic connection, and since the category of pure understanding does not serve to devise such, but rather only to understand where it is encountered in experience, we cannot originally concoct a single object, according to a new and not empirically assignable composition, which would conform to these categories, and position it as the foundation to a permitted hypothesis, for this would be the same as adding empty brainstorm to reason instead of concepts of facts.
- 3.2 Thus it is not permitted to devise any sort of new, original forces, e.g., an understanding which would be empowered to look at its object without senses, or an expansionary power without any contact, or a new type of substance, e.g., which were present in space without impenetrability, consequently also no communality of substance which would be distinct from all that experience provides; no presence other than that in space; no duration except merely in time.
- 3.3 In short, it is only possible for our reason to need the conditions of possible experience as conditions of the possibility of the facts; but in no way to pro-

cure, as it were, something entirely independently of these, because such concepts, although without contradiction, would still also be without object.

- 4.1 The rational concepts, as stated, are merely Ideas, and have, of course, no object in any sort of an experience. But they still do not for that reason indicate objects contrived and simultaneously assumed as possible.
- 4.2 They are thought merely problematically in order to base regulative principles of the systematic use of the understanding in the field of experience in reference to them (as heuristic fictions).
- 4.3 If we depart from that, they are merely thought things whose possibility is not provable, and which accordingly also cannot be positioned as a basis to the explanation of actual appearances through an hypothesis.
- 4.4 To think of the soul as simple, is quite properly permitted in order to lay a complete and necessary unity to all mental powers as the principle of our estimation of their inner appearance according to this Idea, even though we cannot penetrate them immediately *in concreto*.
- 4.5 But to assume the soul as simple substance (a transcendental concept) would be a proposition, which would not only be unprovable (as are many physical hypotheses), but rather even ventured entirely arbitrarily and blindly because the simple cannot come forth in any experience whatsoever. And if we understand here with substance the enduring object of sensitive viewing, the possibility of a simple appearance is not at all to be penetrated.
- 4.5 Mere intelligible entities, or merely intelligible properties of things of the sense world, do not allow of being assumed as opinion by any authority of reason, although (because we have no concept of their possibility or impossibility) cannot be dogmatically denied through any allegedly superior insight.
- 5.1 For the explanation of given appearances no other things and explanatory foundations can be introduced except which are placed in connection with the given ones, hence according to already known laws of appearances.

- 5.2 A transcendental hypothesis, with which a mere Idea of reason were used for the explanation of that which we do not sufficiently understand from known empirical principles, would have to be explained by something, about which we understand nothing at all.
- 5.3 Also, the principle of such an hypothesis would actually serve only for the satisfaction of reason and not for the promotion of the understanding usage with respect to the objects.
- 5.4 Order and purposefulness in nature must in turn be explained out of natural foundations and according to natural laws, and here even the wildest hypotheses, if they are only physical, are more tolerable than a hyperphysical one, i.e., an appeal to a divine originator which we presuppose in aid of this.
- 5.5 For it would be a principle of lazy reason (*ignara ratioi*) to suddenly pass over all causes, with the objective reality of which, at least according to possibility, we can yet achieve acquaintance through advanced experience, in order to rest in a mere Idea which is very comfortable to reason.
- 5.6 But concerning the absolute totality of the explanatory basis in the series of this, this can be no obstacle with respect to the world objects, because, since these are nothing but appearances, never can something complete be hoped of them in the synthesis of the series of the conditions.
- 6.1 Availing ourselves of transcendental hypotheses of the speculative use of reason, and of a freedom in compensation for the deficiency in physical explanatory bases in all cases hyperphysical, cannot be permitted at all, partly because reason is not brought further at all in that way, but rather which much more cuts off the entire advance of its use, and partly because this license would finally have to deprive it of all fruits of the preparation of its very own floor, namely experience.
- 6.2 For if the natural explanation becomes difficult for us here and there, we have at hand continually a transcendental explanatory basis, which exempts us from that investigation, and concludes our researches not through insight, but rather through complete incomprehensibility of a principle which was already so thought out in advance that it had to contain the concept for the absolute first.

- 7.1 The second required piece for the acceptability of an hypothesis is its adequacy in determining from it a priori the consequences which are given.
- 7.2 If we are necessitated in calling forth auxiliary hypotheses to this purpose, they give the suspicion of a mere concoction, because each of these on its own has need of the same justification which had necessitated the thoughts laid as the basis and hence can render no sound witness.
- 7.3 If under the presupposition of an unrestrained perfect cause, indeed at the explanatory bases of all purposefulness, order and quantity which are found in the world, there is no deficiency, so still that has need of yet new hypotheses with the, at least with respect to our concepts, evident deviations and maladies in order to be rescued from these as challenges.
- 7.4 If the simple independence of the human soul, which is laid as the basis of its appearances, is embattled through the difficulties of its phenomena similar to the modification of a material (growth and decline), new hypotheses must be called up which indeed are not without semblance, but still without any certification apart from that which the opinion assumed as the primary basis gives them, to which they nonetheless are supposed to favor.
- 8.1 If the rational assertions cited here as examples (incorporeal unity of soul and existence of a highest being) are not supposed to hold as hypotheses, but rather as a priori proven dogmata, then the discussion is not at all of them.
- 8.2 But in such a case we would have to be mindful indeed that the proof would have the indubitable certitude of a demonstration.
- 8.3 For to want to make the actuality of such an Idea merely probable, is an absurd design, just as though we thought to prove a proposition of geometry merely probabilistically.
- 8.4 Sundered from all experience, reason can only recognize everything a priori and as necessary, or not at all. Hence its judgment is never opinion, but rather either abstinence from all judgment or indubitable certitude.
- 8.5 Opinions and probable judgments of what pertains to things, can only arise as explanatory foundations of what is actually given or as consequences ac-

according to empirical laws of what actually lies as a foundation, thus only in the series of the objects of experience.

- 8.6 Apart from this field, conjecture is the same as playing with thoughts, except that we would have merely the opinion of an unsure way of judgment to perhaps find the truth on that way.
- 9.1 But even though no hypothesis take place with merely speculative questions of pure reason for the sake of basing propositions on them, they are still entirely permissible if only to defend them, i.e., indeed not in dogmatical, but still in the polemical, usage.
- 9.2 But with defense I do not mean the increase of the proof foundation of our assertions, but rather the mere frustration of apparent insights of the opponent, which are supposed to injure our asserted propositions.
- 9.3 But now all synthetical propositions out of pure reason have the peculiarity as such, that if he, who asserts the reality of certain Ideas, still never even knows enough to make this his proposition certain, on the other side, the opponent can know just as little in asserting the counter play.
- 9.4 Now this equality in the speculative recognition, of the fate of human reason, does not indeed favor either of the two, and here also is the proper arena of a feud which is never to be laid aside.
- 9.5 But it will be revealed later that nevertheless, reason has a right of assuming something with respect to the use of practical reason, which it would in no way be authorized in presupposing in the field of mere speculation without sufficient foundations of proof, because all such presupposition of perfection does injury to speculation, about which however the practical interest is not at all concerned.
- 9.6 Here, therefore, reason has a possession, the legality of which it may not prove, and concerning which in fact it could not even conduct the proof.
- 9.7 The opponent is therefore responsible for all proving.
- 9.8 But since he knows just as little of the questionable object for establishing its non-being as the former, who asserts its actuality, an advantage is seen here

on the side of him who asserts something as a practically necessary presupposition (*melior est conditio possidentis*).

- 9.9 It is open to him namely to avail himself with just the same means for his good side in self defense, as it were, as the opponent against him, i.e., the hypotheses, which are not at all supposed to serve to strengthen the proof, but rather only to show that the opponent understands much too little of the object of the dispute to flatter himself of having an advantage of any speculative insight with respect to ourselves.
- 10.1 Hypotheses, therefore, are permitted in the field of pure reason only as weapons of war, not in order to base some right on them, but rather only to defend that right.
- 10.2 But the opponent here we must always seek within us ourselves.
- 10.3 For speculative reason in its transcendental use is dialectical as such.
- 10.4 The challenges which might be fearful, lie within us ourselves.
- 10.5 We must seek them out, equally old claims, but never out of date, in order to base an eternal peace on their destruction.
- 10.6 Outward tranquility is only apparent.
- 10.7 The kernel of the attacks, which lies in the nature of human reason, must be eradicated. But how can we eradicate it if we do not give it the freedom, indeed even the nourishment, to shoot forth sprouts in order to reveal itself in that way, and afterwards to annihilate it at the roots.
- 10.8 Accordingly we should even think up challenges, upon which yet no opponent has lighted, and even lend him weapons, or grant him the most advantages spot which he might only wish for himself.
- 10.9 There is nothing at all to be feared with this, though indeed something to be hoped for, namely that you will supply to yourselves a possession, never again in all the future to be attacked.

- 11.1 Now to your complete armament there also belongs the hypotheses of pure reason. And although they are only heavy leaden weapons (because they are hardened through no experience), they still always empower as much as those which any opponent may avail himself of to use against you
- 11.2 Therefore, if against (in some sort or another, non-speculative respect) the nature of the soul, assumed as immaterial and subjected to no corporeal transformation, the difficulty hits you that experience seems nonetheless to prove to you the cancellation as well as disarrangement of our spiritual powers merely as diverse modifications of our organs, you weaken the power of this proof by assuming our body to be nothing except a fundamental appearance, to which, as condition, the entire capacity of sensitivity and with that all thinking refers in the present state (in life).
- 11.3 The separation from body would be the end of this sensitive use of your recognition power and the beginning of the intellectual.
- 11.4 Therefore, the body would not be the cause of the thinking, but rather a merely restrictive condition for that, thus indeed to be viewed as promoter of the sensitive and animal life, but so much the more also as an obstacle to the pure and spiritual life, and the dependency of the former (the sensitive and animal life) upon the corporal composition would prove nothing about the dependency of our entire life upon the state of our organs.
- 11.5 But you could go even further and indeed even make discoverable new doubts, either not raised or not carried far enough.
- 12.1 The contingency of the reproduction, which with humans, as with irrational creatures, depends upon the opportunity, but beyond that also often upon the sustenance, upon the conduct, its moods and fancies, often even upon depravities, raises a great difficulty against the opinion of a continuation, stretching out into eternity, of a creature whose life has first begun under circumstances so trivial and left so entirely to our freedom.
- 12.2 Concerning the continuation of the entire species (here on earth), this difficulty with respect to this, has little to say, because the chance in the singular is subjected to nothing less of a rule in the whole. But with respect to each individual, to expect such a mighty effect from so insignificant a cause seems in any case thought provoking.

- 12.3 But against this you could summon up a transcendental hypothesis: that all life be actually only intelligible, and not at all subject to temporal changes, and has neither begun through birth, nor will end through death.
- 12.4 That this life be nothing except a mere appearance, i.e., a sensitive representation of the pure spiritual life, and that the entire sense world be a mere picture, which sways before our present manner of recognition and, as a dream, have on its own no objective reality; that if we should look at the matter and us ourselves as we are, we would see ourselves in a world of a spiritual nature, with which our single true communality would neither have begun through birth, nor would cease through the bodily death (as mere appearances), etc.
- 13.1 Now even though we do not know the least of all this which we throw up here hypothetically against the attack, nor assert it in earnest, indeed not everything being even a rational Idea, but rather concepts, thought out merely as a counterpunch, we still proceed here with entire rationality in that we only show the opponent, who thinks to have depleted all possibility by erroneously proclaiming the lack of empirical conditions as a proof of the entire impossibility of that which is believed by us: that through mere laws of experience he does not span the entire field of things on their own any more than we, apart from experience, can acquire something of a based manner for our rationality.
- 13.2 Such an hypothetical counterpunch provided against the presumptions of his audaciously denying opponent must not be so held as though he wanted to make them his own true opinions.
- 13.3 He abandons them as soon as he has dispatched the dogmatic conceit of the opponent.
- 13.4 For as modest and temperate as it is to be considered, if someone conducts himself merely in a rejecting and denying mode with respect to strange assertions, so still everything, as soon as he wants to make his object hold as proofs of the opposite, the claim is not less proud and conceited than as though he had grasped the affirming party and its assertions.

- 14.1 We see from this, therefore, that in the speculative use of reason hypotheses have no validity as opinions on their own, but rather only relatively to the opposing transcendent presuppositions.
- 14.2 For the expansion of principles of possible experience to the possibility of things in general, is just as transcendental as the assertion of the objective reality of such concepts, which can find their objects nowhere except outside the boundary of all possible experience.
- 14.3 What pure reason judges in an asserting way must (as everything, which reason recognizes) be necessary, or it is nothing at all.
- 14.4 Accordingly it contains in fact no opinions at all.
- 14.5 But the mentioned hypotheses are only problematical judgments which at least cannot be refuted, although of course not proven through anything, and therefore are purely private opinions, but still cannot conveniently be dispensed with (even for inner tranquility) against a scruple which arouses itself.
- 14.6 But in this quality we must retain them and indeed carefully preserve them, that they not step forward as certified on their own and of some absolute validity and drown reason with concoctions and illusions.

4th Section. The Discipline of Pure Reason with respect to its Proofs

- 1.1 Among all proofs of a synthetic recognition a priori, the proofs of transcendental and synthetic propositions have the peculiarity on their own, that with these reason may not be applied directly to the object by means of its concepts, but rather must first set forth a priori the objective validity of the concepts and the possibility of their synthesis.
- 1.2 This is not per chance merely a necessary rule of caution, but rather concerns the essentiality and possibility of the proofs themselves.
- 1.3 If I am supposed to go out a priori beyond the concept of an object, then this is impossible without a special guidance located apart from this concept.
- 1.4 In mathematics it is the viewing a priori which guides my synthesis, and there all conclusions can be conducted immediately from the pure viewing.
- 1.5 In the transcendental recognition, as long as it has to do only with concepts of the understanding, this guide is the possible experience.
- 1.6 The proof does not show that the given concept (e.g., the concept of that which happens) leads directly to another concept (that of a cause); for such a transition would be a jump which permits of no justification at all. Rather it shows that the experience itself, thus the object of experience, would be impossible without such an connection.
- 1.7 Therefore the proof had to indicate simultaneously the possibility of achieving synthetically and a priori to a certain recognition of things which was not contained in the concept of them.
- 1.8 Without this attention, the proofs flow out like water which breaks through its banks wildly and across the fields, where the slope of the concealed association accidentally leads it.
- 1.9 The semblance of the conviction which rests upon subjective causes of association and is held for insight of a natural affinity, can be no match at all for the scruple which must reasonably appear about such ventured steps.

- 1.10 Accordingly also all attempts to prove the proposition of sufficient reason, according to the universal acknowledgments of those with familiarity with that, have been in vain, and before the transcendental critique appeared, since we still could not abandon this principle, we have appealed definitely to the healthy human understanding (a sanctuary which proves every time that the matter of reason is doubtful) rather than to want to try new dogmatic proofs.
- 2.1 But if the proposition, of which a proof is supposed to be conducted, is an assertion of pure reason, and if I want to go out beyond my experiential concepts even by means of mere Ideas, then that would still have to contain within itself far more the justification of such a step of the synthesis (if it were otherwise possible) as a necessary condition of its power of proof.
- 2.2 Accordingly then, as apparent as the alleged proof of the simple nature of our thinking substance out of the unity of apperception may be, still a scruple stands unavoidable opposed to it, namely that since the absolute simplicity is still not a concept which can be referred immediately to a perception, but rather can merely be concluded as an Idea, it is not at all to be penetrated how the mere consciousness which is contained, or at least can be contained, in all thinking, though it is indeed to this extent a simple representation, is supposed to lead to the consciousness of, and familiarity with, a thing, in which the thinking alone can be contained.
- 2.3 For if I imagine the force of my body in motion, it is to this extent absolute unity for me, and my representation of it is simple. Accordingly I can also express this through the movement of a point, because its volume means nothing with this and, without reduction of the power, as small as we wish, and therefore also can be thought as located in a point.
- 2.4 But from this I will still not conclude that if nothing but the moving force of a body is given to me, the body can be thought as simple substance for that reason because its representation is abstracted from all magnitude of spatial content, and therefore is simple.
- 2.5 Now by the simple in the abstraction being entirely distinguished from the simple in the object, and by the "I," which in the first meaning embraces no manifold at all within itself, in the second, since it means the soul itself, be-

ing a very complex concept, namely to contain and to describe very much under itself, I detect a paralogism.

- 2.6 However in order to surmise this in advance (for without such a previous supposition we would embrace nothing at all against the proof), it is thoroughly necessary to have at hand perpetual criterion of the possibility of such synthetic propositions which are supposed to prove more than experience can provide, which consists in the proof not being conducted directly to the required predicate, but rather only by means of a principle of the possibility of expanding our given concept a priori up to the Ideas, and to recognize this.
- 2.7 If this care is always taken, if before the proof is even attempted, we first go wisely for consultation on how and with which basis of hope we could expect such an expansion through pure reason, and from whence we then in such cases want to obtain these insights which cannot be extracted out of the concept, and not even anticipated with regard to possible experience, in that we impute nothing to reason which obviously goes beyond its capacity, or even more, that we subject it, which does not gladly allow of restriction in a fit of its speculative expansion mania, to the discipline of temperateness.
- 3.1 The first rule, therefore, is this: to attempt no transcendental proofs without previously having reflected and justified to ourselves in these cases from whence we claim to take the principles on which we plan to erect them, and by what right we are able to expect good success with the conclusion from them.
- 3.2 If they are principles of understanding (e.g., of causality), it is vain to achieve to Ideas of pure reason by means of them, for they hold only for objects of possible experience.
- 3.3 If they were supposed to be principles from pure reason, then all effort in turn is vain.
- 3.4 For reason has them indeed, but as objective principles they are all together dialectical and in any case can only hold as regulative principles of the systematical linking of experience.

- 3.5 But if such alleged proofs are already at hand, then the deceptive conviction sets the *non liquet*⁵ of your mature judgmental capacity into opposition and even though you cannot yet penetrate the illusion of that, you still have the complete right to demand the deduction of the principles used in that which, if they are supposed to have arisen out of sheer reason, can never be delivered to you.
- 3.6 And so you do not simply have the necessity of occupying yourself with the development and refutation of each baseless semblance, but rather can at once dismiss in great heaps all mischievous dialectic at the court of a critical reason which demands laws.
- 4.1 The second peculiarity of transcendental proofs is this: that only a single proof can be found for each transcendental proposition.
- 4.2 If I am not suppose to conclude from concepts, but rather from the viewing which corresponds to a concept, be it a pure viewing as in mathematics or an empirical one as in natural science, then the viewing laid as foundation gives me multitudinous material for synthetic propositions, which I can connect in more than one manner and, by being able to go out from more than one point, achieve to the same concept by diverse ways.
- 5.1 But now every transcendental proposition goes out merely from one concept and expresses the synthetic condition of the possibility of the object according to this concept.
- 5.2 The basis of proof, therefore, can only be a single one, because apart from this concept there is nothing further whereby the object could be determined. The proof, therefore, can contain nothing further than the determination of an object in general according to this concept, which is also only a single one.
- 5.3 We had, e.g., in the transcendental analytic, extracted the principle: “Everything which happens has a cause”, out of the single condition of the objective possibility of a concept of that which happens in general: that the deter-

⁵ “not proven”.

mination of an event in time, thus this (event) as belonging to experience, would be impossible without standing under such a dynamic rule.

- 5.4 Now this is also the single, possible basis of proof. For only by an object being determined to the concept by means of the law of causality, does the represented event have objective validity, i.e., truth.
- 5.5 One has indeed attempted other proofs of this principle, e.g., from contingency. However, if this is carefully considered, we can discover no indicator of the contingency except the occurrence, i.e., the existence before which a non-existence of the object precedes and, therefore, this also comes back in turn to the cited basis of proof.
- 5.6 If the proposition, “everything which thinks is simple,” is supposed to be proven, we do not dwell on the manifold of the thinking, but rather stick merely to the concept of the “I” which is simple, and to which all thinking is referred.
- 5.7 In exactly this way it is related to the transcendental proof of the existence of God which rests solely upon the reciprocal play of the concepts of the most real and necessary entity, and can be sought nowhere else.
- 6.1 By means of this warning, the critique of rational assertions is brought very much into detail.
- 6.2 Where reason conducts its occupation through mere concepts, there is only a single proof possible, if one is even possible at all.
- 6.3 Hence if we see the dogmatist stepping forth directly with ten proofs, we can safely believe that he has none at all.
- 6.4 For if he had one, which (as it must be in matters of pure reason) would prove to be indubitable, why does he have need of the remaining ones?
- 6.5 His intention, like that of those parliamentary advocates, is only this: one argument is for this person, and another for that person, namely to make use of the weakness of his judges who, without getting too deeply involved and wish to quickly escape from the occupation, grasp the first one which occurs to them, and decide according to it.

- 7.1 The third peculiar rule of pure reason, if it is subjected to a discipline with respect to transcendental proofs, is that its proofs must never be apagogical, but always ostensive.
- 7.2 The direct or ostensive proof, in every sort of recognition, is that which along with the conviction of the truth, simultaneously connects insight into the source of that. The anagogic proof,⁶ on the other hand, can produce certitude indeed, but not comprehensibility of the truth with respect to the cohesion with the foundations of its possibility.
- 7.3 Hence the latter are more a needed aid than a procedure, one which provides satisfaction to all intentions of reason.
- 7.4 Still these do have a preference of evidence over the direct proof in that the contradiction always entails more clarity in the representation than the best connection, and more nearly approximates in that way the intuitive aspect of a demonstration.
- 8.1 The actual cause of the use of apagogic proofs in the various sciences is probably this.
- 8.2 If the foundations, from which a certain recognition is supposed to be derived, are too numerous or lie too deeply concealed, we attempt to see whether it might not be attainable through the consequences.
- 8.3 Now here the *modus ponens*, i.e., inferring to the truth of a recognition from the truth of its consequences, would then be allowed only if all possible consequences from it are true; for then to this only a single foundation is possible, which therefore is also the true one.
- 8.4 But this procedure is unfeasible because it goes beyond our powers to discern all possible consequences of some sort of an assumed proposition. Nevertheless, we avail ourselves of this manner of concluding, although of course with a certain indulgence, if it is concerned in proving something merely as hypothesis, in that we admit the conclusion according to an anal-

⁶ If proposition A contradicts proposition B, then by showing that A is false, the suggestion, but not the proof, that B is true.

ogy: that if as many consequences as we may have attempted agree well with an assumed foundation, all remaining possible ones will agree with it.

- 8.5 In this way an hypothesis can never be transformed into a demonstrated truth.
- 8.6 The *modus tollens* of rational inferences, which conclude from the consequence to the foundation, proves not only rigorously, but furthermore even easily.
- 8.7 For if even only one single false consequence can be drawn out of a proposition, this proposition is false.
- 8.8 Now instead of going over the entire series of the foundations in an ostensive proof which can be laid to the truth of a recognition by means of the most complete insight into its possibility, we need only to find a single false one among the consequences flowing out of its opposite, then this opposite is also false, hence the recognition which we wanted to prove is true.
- 9.1 But the apagogical proof manner can be allowed only in those sciences where it is impossible to ascribe the subjective aspect of our representations to the objective, namely to the recognition of that which is on the object.
- 9.2 But where this latter rules, it frequently happens that either the opposite of a certain proposition contradicts merely the subjective conditions for the thinking, but not the object; or both propositions contradict one another only under a subjective condition which was held erroneously for objective, and, since the condition is false, both propositions can be false without being able to conclude from the falsity of the one to the truth of the other.
- 10.1 In mathematics this subreption or trickery is impossible; accordingly here these apagogical proofs are valid.
- 10.2 In the natural science, because everything there is based on empirical viewing, that subreption can often be prevented indeed through many compared observations; but this apagogical style of proof there is still often times insignificant.

- 10.3 But the transcendental attempts of pure reason are actually employed altogether within the peculiar medium of the dialectical semblance, i.e., of the subjective. This offers, or even compels, itself to reason in its premises as objective.
- 10.4 Now here with regard to synthetic propositions, it cannot be allowed at all to justify our assertions by refuting the contrary.
- 10.5 For either this refutation is nothing other than the mere representation of the conflict of the contrarily opposed opinion with the subjective conditions of the comprehensibility through our reason, which does nothing at all for the repudiation of the matter itself (so as, e.g., the unconditioned necessity in the existence of an entity cannot be comprehended by us whatsoever, and hence is not properly opposed subjectively to every speculative proof of a necessary supreme entity, but improperly to the possibility of such an original being on its own), or both the asserting as well as the denying part, deceived through the transcendental semblance, place an impossible concept of objects as foundation. And here holds the rule: *non entis nulla sunt praedicata*, i.e., both what we affirm, as well as what we deny, of the object are improper and we cannot achieve the recognition of truth apagogically through the refutation of the contrary.
- 10.6 So, for example, if it is presupposed that the sense world on its own is given with respect to its totality, it is false that it would have to be either infinite with respect to space or finite and bounded, because both are false.
- 10.7 For appearances (as mere representations), which still would be given on their own (as objects), are impossible, and the infinity of this imagined whole would be unconditioned indeed, but (because everything with appearances is conditioned) would contradict the unconditioned magnitude determination, which still is presupposed in the concept.
- 11.1 The apagogical style of proof is also the actual illusion with which the admirer of the thoroughness of our dogmatic sophisticates is contained every time. It is, as it were the champion, who claims to prove the honor and the undisputed right of his party and who offers to scuffle with everyone who claimed to doubt it, although through such bombast nothing in the matter is made out except only the respective strengths, and indeed only on the side of the one who has acted aggressively.

- 11.2 The spectators, seeing that each in turn alternates, now being victor and then being subdued, often take occasion from that to doubt skeptically the object of the dispute itself.
- 11.3 But they have no cause to do so, and it is enough to call out to them: “*non defensoribus istis tempus eget.*”⁷
- 11.4 Each must conduct his matter by means of a basis of proof, i.e., directly, so that we see what his rational claims have to adduce for themselves.
- 11.5 For if his opponent is positioned on subjective foundations, then he is, of course, easy to refute; but without advantage for the dogmatist, who usually adheres just as much to the subjective causes of the judgment and can be driven likewise into a corner by his opponent.
- 11.6 But if both partners proceed merely directly, they will either themselves note the difficulty, indeed the impossibility, of finding out the title of their assertions, and finally be able to appeal only to assertion, or else the critique will easily uncover the dogmatic semblance and necessitate pure reason to give up its claims as pressed too far in speculative use, and to draw back within the limits of its peculiar area, namely practical principles.

⁷ Virgil: Not such defenders does the time require.

2nd Chapter. The Canon of Pure Reason

- 1.1 It is humiliating for human reason that it can provide nothing in its pure usage, and indeed even has need of a discipline in order to restrain its excesses and to prevent the illusions which arise from that pure usage.
- 1.2 But on the other hand it is elevated in turn and given a confidence by being able to practice this discipline itself, and indeed having to do so and without permitting another censor over itself, and likewise by securing against all attacks the limits, which it is necessitated to place on its speculative use--while at the same time restraining the engineered presumptions of every opponent--and thus securing in this wise everything which might still remain from its previously exaggerated demands.
- 1.3 Therefore the greatest and perhaps only utility of all philosophy of pure reason is surely only negative. For it does not serve as an organon for expansion, but rather as a discipline for the determination of boundaries. And instead of uncovering truth, it has merely the quiet merit of preventing errors.
- 2.1 Nonetheless somewhere there must still be a source of positive recognitions which belong to the jurisdiction of pure reason, and which perhaps give occasion to error only through some misunderstanding, but in fact make up the goal of the endeavor of reason.
- 2.2 For otherwise indeed to what cause were we to attribute the irresistible appetite for taking sure footage somewhere entirely out beyond the limits of experience?
- 2.3 It is suspicious of objects which entail a great interest for it.
- 2.4 It sets out on the way of mere speculation, in order to approach them. But these flee before it.
- 2.5 Supposedly on the single way which is yet left to it, namely that of the practical usage, there will be hope for better fortune in this its endeavor.

- 3.1 With a canon I understand the summary of foundational propositions a priori for the proper use of certain recognitional capacities in general.
- 3.2 Thus the universal logic in its analytical portion is a canon for understanding and reason in general, but only with respect to form, for it abstracts from all content.
- 3.3 Thus the transcendental analytic was the canon of pure understanding; for it alone is competent of true synthetic recognitions a priori.
- 3.4 But where no proper use of a recognitional capacity is possible, there is no canon.
- 3.5 Now according to all proofs conducted thus far every synthetic recognition by pure reason in its speculative use is entirely impossible.
- 3.6 Therefore there is no canon at all of the speculative use of reason (for this is thoroughly dialectic). Indeed all transcendental logic in this intention is nothing except discipline.
- 3.7 Accordingly if there is a proper use of pure reason anywhere, and in which case there must also be a canon of that, this will not deal with the speculative, but rather with the practical use of reason, and which for that reason we now want to investigate.

1st Section. The Ultimate Purpose of the Pure Use of Our Reason

- 1.1 Reason is driven through a bent of its nature to go out beyond the experiential use, to venture about in a pure employment and, by means of mere Ideas, out to the extreme limits of all recognitions, and not to find peace except in the completion of its course in a systematic whole existing of itself.
- 1.2 Now is this striving based merely upon its speculative, or much more solely and alone upon its practical, interest?
- 2.1 I will now set aside the fortune which pure reason attains in the speculative intention, and ask only about the attainability of those tasks, the solution of which makes up its ultimate purpose, and with respect to which all other tasks have merely the value of means.
- 2.2 These highest purposes, according to the nature of reason, will in turn have to have unity in order to promote in a unified way that interest of humanity which is subordinate to none higher.
- 3.1 The final intention, to which the speculation of reason finally arrives in the transcendental usage, concerns three objects: freedom of will, immortality of soul and the existence of God.
- 3.2 With respect to all three the merely speculative interest of reason is only very paltry. And in that regard such a tiring work of transcendental investigation, wrenching in unceasing obstacles, would hardly be undertaken, because despite all discoveries which might be made with that, we still can make no usage which might prove its utility in *concreto*, i.e., in the investigation of nature.
- 3.3 The will may indeed be free, but this still can only concern the intelligible cause of our willing.
- 3.4 For concerning the phenomena of the expression of that willing, i.e., the actions, and in accordance with an inviolable, foundational maxim, without which we can exercise no reasoning in the empirical use, we must never ex-

plain these phenomena otherwise than as all remaining appearances of nature, namely in accordance with invariable laws of that nature.⁸

- 3.5 Secondly we may even be able to comprehend the spiritual nature of the soul (and with that also its immortality). Nevertheless no reckoning can be made on either with respect to the appearances as an explanatory basis nor on the particular constitution of the future state. The reason for this is that our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative and does not expand our recognition in the least, nor does it offer any suitable material for conclusions, except per chance for such which can hold only for fictions, but which cannot be permitted of philosophy.⁹
- 3.6 Thirdly, even if the existence of a highest intelligence were proven, while we would indeed in that way make the purposefulness in the layout and order of the world comprehensible in general, we would in no way be authorized to derive or, where it is not perceived, to conclude boldly any sort of a particular institution and order from that. For it is a necessary rule of the speculative use of reason not to ignore natural causes and relinquish that, by means of which we can be instructed through experience, in order to derive that, with which we are familiar, from that which exceeds all our familiarity entirely.¹⁰
- 3.7 In short, these three propositions remain always transcendent for speculative reason and have no immanent use at all, i.e., are not permissible for objects of experience, thus are not usable in any manner for us. Rather, considered on their own, they are entirely idle and even so still require an exceedingly difficult exertion of reason.
- 4.1 If, accordingly, these three cardinal propositions are not at all necessary for our knowledge, and nonetheless are urgently commended through our reason, their importance will most assuredly have to concern the practical alone.

⁸ As made clear in the [Third Antinomy](#) of the *CPR*, it is easy enough to dream up something like transcendental freedom, but there is never any occasion or need to utilize such a notion in any experience. So in that regard it is essentially useless and meaningless.

⁹ It is also easy to conceive of a soul which is not material and which endures after life, but there is no possible way of using such a negative notion in the scientific investigation of the individual. It is essentially useless and sterile. This was presented in the Paralogisms of the *CPR*.

¹⁰ Knowledge of a God would not be helpful at all in the examination of the world as experienced, for we would be trying to conclude from something beyond our ken, i.e., God, to something that we are already familiar with via experience.

- 5.1 Everything which is possible through freedom is practical.
- 5.2 But if the conditions of the execution of our free choice are empirical, then in that way reason can have no other use except regulative and can serve only to effect the unity of empirical laws, e.g., in the instruction of prudence reason can effect the unification of goals which are proposed to us by our inclinations into a single one, namely happiness, and a like agreement of the means for achieving to that. And this unification makes up the entire occupation of reason, which accordingly can supply no other laws than pragmatic ones of free behavior for the achievement of the purposes commended to us through the senses. Therefore here reason can supply no pure laws which are fully determined a priori.¹¹
- 5.3 On the other hand pure practical laws whose purpose is given completely a priori through reason and which are not empirically conditioned, but rather are utterly commanding, would be the product of pure reason.
- 5.4 But such are the moral laws. Hence these alone belong to the practical use of pure reason, and permit a canon.
- 6.1 Therefore the entire mission of reason in the treatment, which we can term pure philosophy, is in fact directed only to the three mentioned problems.
- 6.2 But these themselves have in turn their more remote intentions, namely: what is to be done if the will is free, if there is a God and a future world?
- 6.3 Now since this concerns our conduct in reference to the highest purpose, the final intention of nature, wisely maintaining us with the institution of our reason, is actually furnished only for the moral.
- 7.1 But since we now turn our attention to an object which is foreign* to the transcendental philosophy, caution is necessary in order not to digress into fragmented episodes and to injure the unity of the system nor also, from an-

¹¹ We can expect reason to aid us in coordinating our inclinations to a single one of happiness, and then also determining the means to that happiness. This would be the most to be expected from an empirical application of practical reason.

other side, to let it lack in distinctiveness or conviction by saying too little of our new material.

7.2 I hope to achieve both by holding myself as closely as possible to the transcendental, and by putting entirely to the side that which might per chance be psychological, i.e., empirical.

* Kant's annotation.

1.1 All practical conceptions are aimed at objects of pleasure or displeasure, i.e., desire and repulsion, thus, at least indirectly, at objects of our feeling.

1.2 But since feeling is not a power of representation, but rather lies apart from the entire power of recognitions, the elements of our judgments, to the extent they refer to desire or repulsion, thus the elements of the practical judgments, do not belong in the summary of the transcendental philosophy which has to do solely with pure recognitions a priori.

8.1 And here then I note first of all that I will temporarily make use of the concept of freedom only in the practical understanding. And unlike what I did above, I will set aside understanding in the transcendental meaning which cannot be empirically presupposed as an explanatory basis of the appearances.

8.2 Now a discretionary choice [Willkür], which cannot be determined otherwise than through sensitive drives, e.g., pathologically, is merely animal (*arbitrium brutum*).

8.3 But that which can be determined independently of sensitive drives, hence through an inducement which can only be represented by reason, is called free choice (*arbitrium liberum*), and everything, which coheres together with this, be it as foundation or consequence, is termed practical.

8.4 Practical freedom can be proven through experience.

8.5 For not merely that which excites, i.e., immediately affects the senses, determines human choice. Rather we have a capacity for overcoming the impressions on our sensitive desire capacity through representations of what is itself useful or injurious in a more remote manner. But these deliberations of

what is desirable, i.e., good and useful with respect to our entire state, depend on reason.¹²

8.6 Accordingly this also renders the laws which are imperatives, i.e., objective laws of freedom, and which say what is supposed to happen, even if perhaps it never does happen. And in that regard these laws are distinguished from natural laws which deal only with what happens. It is then also for this reason that they are called practical laws.

9.1 But it could be that reason itself in these actions, through which it prescribes laws, is in turn determined through other further influences, and what is called freedom with respect to sensitive drives might in turn be nature through higher and more remotely effecting causes. But then that does not concern us regarding the practical, since at this point we only ask reason about the precepts of conduct. Besides that notion of other further influences is a merely speculative question which, as long as our intention is directed to doing and refraining, we can set aside.¹³

9.2 Through experience, therefore, we recognize practical freedom as one of the natural causes, namely a causality of reason in the determination of the will.¹⁴ Transcendental freedom, on the other hand, requires an independence of this reasoning itself (with respect to its causality in starting a series of appearances) from all determining causes of the sense world. And to this extent it seems to be contrary to the natural law, hence to all possible experience, and therefore remains a problem.¹⁵

¹² If we were merely animals, then when hungry we could not resist available food. But the human has the capacity of thinking about things in general and using his reason. And even though hungry, he could reason, for example, that he ought to wait before eating in order to accomplish some other purpose, e.g., conveying the impression that he is under self control and is polite, or perhaps knows the food is tainted.

¹³ Here we are concerned with the consciousness of actually determining laws for conduct, and so where it does not matter as to hidden and unconscious causes.

¹⁴ Accordingly the practical usage of our reason finds effect in the sense world by means of the actions which ensue from the precepts we rationally devise.

¹⁵ Whereas practical reason means a capacity for acting independently of the sensitive desires and finding a choice where the animals cannot, transcendental freedom denotes an action which is entirely independent from all conditions of the sense world and thus is absolute spontaneity. We find expression of this absolute spontaneity in the categorical imperative of the moral law.

- 9.3 For reason in the practical use, however, this problem is not pertinent.¹⁶ In a canon of pure reason, therefore, we have to do with only two questions, both of which concern the practical interest of pure reason, and with respect to which a canon of its use must be possible, namely: is there a God, and is there a future life?¹⁷
- 9.4 The question about transcendental freedom concerns merely the speculative knowledge, which here we can set to the side as entirely extraneous, if it has to do with the practical and which a sufficient exposition is already to be found in the antinomy of pure reason.¹⁸

¹⁶ We are concerned here only with reason's capacity to determine conduct, and are not interested in the speculative question of independence not only from prior causes but even from all circumstances.

¹⁷ We specified three problems, freedom, God and immortality and have concluded that there is no "pertinent" question regarding freedom, and so this leaves only the latter two to be considered.

¹⁸ In the [Third Antinomy](#) we saw the compatibility of two causalities, freedom and nature, with regard to one and the same effect.

2nd Section. The Ideal of the Highest Good as a Determination Basis of the Ultimate Purpose of Pure Reason

- 1.1 Reason in its speculative usage led us through the field of experience and, because there complete satisfaction can never be encountered for it, continued on to speculative Ideas, but which finally led us in turn back to experience and, therefore, fulfilled its intention and indeed in a very productive manner, but not at all commensurate with our expectation.
- 1.2 There still remains an attempt to determine whether pure reason also be encountered in the practical employment, i.e., whether in that way it leads to the Ideas which reach the highest purposes of pure reason (which we have just cited¹⁹) and, therefore, whether this, from the standpoint of its practical interest, not be able to impart what it entirely refuses to us with respect to the speculative.
- 2.1 Every interest of my reason (speaking of the speculative as well as the practical) is united in the following three questions:
 1. What can I know?
 2. What should I do?
 3. What may I hope?
- 3.1 The first question is merely speculative.
- 3.2 We (as I flatter myself) have exhausted all possible replies to this question and have finally discovered that with which reason must indeed be content, and, as long as it does not look to the practical, also has cause to be content. But we still remained just as far removed from the two great purposes toward which this entire endeavor of pure reason was actually directed, as though for the sake of convenience we had refrained from this work at the very outset.

¹⁹ Kant is speaking specifically of God and immortality.

- 3.3 With respect to knowledge, therefore, at least this much is safe and determined, i.e., regarding those two tasks such knowledge can never be imparted to us.²⁰
- 4.1 The second question is merely practical.
- 4.2 As such it can indeed belong to pure reason. But since it is not transcendental, but rather moral, it cannot be dealt with in our critique as such.²¹
- 5.1 The third question, namely: “if I now do what I am supposed to do, then what may I hope?” is simultaneously both practical and theoretical, such that the practical precedes only as a clue for the reply to the theoretical and, if this goes well, to the speculative question.
- 5.2 For every hope aims at happiness and, with intention to the practical and the moral law, it is just the same as is knowledge and the law of nature with respect to the theoretical recognition of things.²²
- 5.3 The former finally culminates with the conclusion that something be (which determines the ultimate possible purpose) because something is supposed to happen; the latter, that something be (which is effectual as supreme cause) because something does happen.
- 6.1 Happiness is the satisfaction of all our inclinations (extensively according to their manifold, intensively with respect to degree, and expansively with respect to duration).

²⁰ Essentially from the speculative use of reason we end up as agnostics regarding God and immortality.

²¹ For this we must await the [Critique of Practical Reason](#).

²² This may mean that a person living with a hope will lead a life as affected by that hope just as one's living will be affected by knowledge of the world of experience.

- 6.2 The practical law from the motivational basis of happiness I term pragmatic (rules of prudence). But that which has no other motivational basis than the *worthiness* to be happy, I call moral (law of morality).²³
- 6.3 The first advises as to what is to be done if we want to partake of happiness. The second commands how we are to conduct ourselves in order just to become worthy of happiness.
- 6.4 The first is based on empirical principles. For it is only by means of experience that I can know which inclinations exist which want to be satisfied, or also what the natural causes are which can effect their satisfaction.
- 6.5 The second abstracts from inclinations and the natural means of satisfying them, and instead considers only the freedom of a rational being in general and the necessary conditions under which alone that freedom accords with the distribution of happiness according to principles, and can, therefore, at least be based, and a priori recognized, on mere Ideas of pure reason.
- 7.1 I assume that there actually are pure moral laws which (without regard to empirical motivational bases, i.e., happiness) completely and a priori determine the doing and refraining, i.e., the use of the freedom of a rational being in general. I assume further that these laws command utterly (not merely hypothetically under the presupposition of other empirical purposes) and hence are necessary in every intention.²⁴
- 7.2 This proposition I can properly presuppose not only by appealing to the proofs of the most enlightened moralists, but even to the moral judgment of every human if he will distinctly think such a law to himself.
- 8.1 Pure reason, therefore, though not in its speculative employment, but still in a certain practical employment, i.e., the moral, contains principles of the possibility of experience, namely of such actions, conformable to the moral precepts, which could be met with in the history of humans.

²³ In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant does not want to use “law” with regard to any principles in pursuit of happiness, for the principles of prudence are always hypothetical and depend upon a person’s inclinations and expectations.

²⁴ While Kant assumes these presently, he will present a proof of them later in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

- 8.2 For since it commands that such actions are supposed to happen, they must also be able to happen, and therefore a particular manner of systematic unity, namely the moral, must be possible. The systematic *natural* unity according to speculative principles, on the other hand, could not be proven, because reason has causality indeed with respect to freedom, but not with respect to the whole of nature. And moral rational principles can produce free actions, but not natural laws.
- 8.3 Accordingly the principles of pure reason have objective reality in their practical, and especially in their moral, employment.
- 9.1 The world, to the extent it were conformable to all moral laws (as it can be with respect to the freedom of rational beings, and is supposed to be according to the necessary laws of morality), I term a moral world.
- 9.2 Thus far it is thought merely as an intelligible world because in it we have abstracted from all conditions (purposes) and even from all obstacles to morality (weakness or sordidness of human nature).
- 9.3 To this extent, therefore, it is a mere Idea, albeit a practical Idea which can have and is supposed to have an influence on the sense world in order to make it conform as much as possible to this Idea.
- 9.4 Hence the Idea of a moral world has objective reality, but not as though it went to an object of an intelligible viewing (*Anschauung*) (which we cannot conceive of at all). Rather it applies to the sense world, but then as to an object of pure reason in its practical employment, and to a *corpus mysticum*²⁵ of rational beings within it, to the extent their free choice has on its own thoroughly systematic unity not only with itself under moral laws, but also with the freedom of every other rational being.
- 10.1 That was the reply to the first of those two questions of pure reason which touched on practical interests, i.e., “do what makes you worthy of happiness.”

²⁵ Mystical body.

- 10.2 The second questions now arises: “if I conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of happiness, how may I hope to participate in that happiness?”
- 10.3 The reply to *this* questions depends on whether the principles of pure reason, which a priori prescribe the laws, also connect this hope necessarily with these laws.
- 11.1 I say, accordingly, that just as the moral principles are necessary according to reason in their practical employment, it is also just as necessary according to reason in its theoretical employment to assume that everyone has cause to hope for happiness in the same measure as he has made himself worthy of it in his conduct and, therefore, that the system of morality is inseparably connected with that of happiness, but only in the Idea of pure reason.
- 12.1 Now in an intelligible, i.e., a moral, world, in whose concept we abstract from all obstacles to morality (of inclination), such a system can even be thought as necessary with the morality of connected, proportionate happiness because freedom itself, partly moved and partly restrained by moral laws, would be the cause of universal happiness. Accordingly the rational beings themselves, under the guidance of such principles, would be originators of their own enduring welfare and simultaneously that of others.
- 12.2 But this system of morality rewarding itself is only an Idea whose execution rests on the condition of each person doing as he is supposed to do, i.e., all actions of rational entities occurring as though they sprang from a supreme will which encompasses every personal choice within, or under, itself.
- 12.3 But since the obligation arising from the moral law remains valid for each particular employment of freedom, even if others did not comport themselves according to this law, it follows that neither from the nature of things of the world nor from the causality of actions itself and their relationship to morality is it determined how their consequences will relate to happiness. And if we position nothing else than nature as a foundation, the indicated necessary connection of the hope to be happy with the incessant striving to make ourselves worthy of happiness cannot be recognized through reason. Instead this connection may only be hoped for if, as its foundation, a supreme reason, commanding according to moral laws, is simultaneously positioned as the cause of nature.

- 13.1 The Idea of such an intelligence, in which the morally most perfect will, connected with the highest blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in the world, to the extent that happiness stands in precise relationship with morality (as the worthiness to be happy), I term the Ideal of the highest good.
- 13.2 Only in the Ideal of the highest original good, therefore, can pure reason encounter the basis of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the highest derived good, namely of an intelligible, i.e., moral, world.
- 13.3 Since we must necessarily represent ourselves through reason as belonging to such a world, even though the senses present nothing to us except a world of appearances, we will have to assume this world of morality and happiness to be a consequence of our conduct in the sense world, and since this sense world does not offer us such a connection, as a future world for us.
- 13.4 God, therefore, and a future life are two presuppositions which are not to be separated from the obligation²⁶ which pure reason lays upon us according to principles of that very same reason.

- 14.1 Morality on its own makes up a system, but not happiness, except to the extent it is distributed in precise proportion to morality.
- 14.2 But this is only possible in the intelligible world under a wise originator and governor.
- 14.3 Such a governor, together with life in such a world (which we must consider to be a future one), reason sees itself necessitated to assume in order to avoid considering the moral laws as empty make-believe. The reason for this is that the necessary success²⁷ of those laws, which the selfsame reason connects

²⁶ This would be the categorical imperative of the moral law, to universalize our maxims of action.

²⁷ The "success" would be the happiness that should attend those who have proven themselves to be morally worthy of happiness.

with them, would have to cease without the assumption of that presupposition.²⁸

- 14.4 Accordingly everyone understands the moral laws as commands, but which they could not be if they did not a priori connect commensurate consequences with their rule and therefore entail promises and threats.²⁹
- 14.5 But this they also cannot do where they do not lie in a necessary being as the highest good which alone can make such a purposeful unity possible.³⁰
- 15.1 The world, to the extent we attend only to the rational beings in it and their cohesion according to moral laws and the government of the highest good, Leibniz termed the realm of grace. He then distinguished that from the realm of nature, where these beings also stand under moral laws, but expect no other consequence of their conduct except according to the course of nature of our sense world.
- 15.2 Therefore, to see ourselves in the realm of grace, where all happiness waits on us except to the extent we ourselves restrict our portion of it through the unworthiness of being happy, is a practically necessary Idea of reason.³¹
- 16.1 Practical laws, to the extent they simultaneously become subjective bases of action, i.e., subjective foundational propositions, are called maxims.
- 16.2 The evaluation of morality, with respect to its purity and consequences, happens according to Ideas. The compliance with its laws happens according to maxims.

²⁸ According to this, without God and immortality for the highest good, the moral law would be considered as inane and a vanity. And so it seems that we must either posit such a governor and a future life or else give up the moral law as meaningless for us.

²⁹ The effect of the highest good would be that of meaningfulness, i.e., that there is a consequence to moral conduct and that it is not a phantasy. Hence it makes a difference, i.e., something is accomplished, as to whether we are moral or not.

³⁰ It is only in the context of the highest good that the moral law is provided with a connection of performance and commensurate recompense. For it is in this highest good that we find the necessity of a God.

³¹ Accordingly happiness is ours by virtue of being rational beings and then to the extent we do not prove ourselves as unworthy through violations of our moral duty.

- 17.1 It is necessary that our entire life course be subject to moral maxims. But at the same time it is impossible for this to happen if reason does not connect with the moral law, which is a mere Idea, an effecting cause which, with respect to conduct, determines to that life a culmination corresponding precisely to our highest purposes, be it in this life or in subsequent one.
- 17.2 Therefore, without a God and a world not visible for us now, but hoped for, the splendid Ideas of morality are indeed objects of acclaim and amazement, but not motives for resolution and execution, because they do not fulfill the entire purpose which naturally, and through just this same pure reason, is a priori determined and necessary for every rational being.
- 18.1 Happiness alone is by far not the most complete good for our reason.
- 18.2 Reason does not sanction such (even as much as inclination may wish that) where it is not united with the worthiness to be happy, i.e., with the morally proper conduct.
- 18.3 But morality alone, and with it the mere worthiness to be happy, is also not by far the highest good.³²
- 18.4 In order to complete this he who has conducted himself as not unworthy of happiness, must be able to hope to become participant with it.
- 18.5 Even if reason, freed of all private intention and without drawing a personal interest into consideration, places itself in the position of a being which had to distribute all happiness to others, cannot judge otherwise.³³ For in the practical Idea both pieces are joined essentially, although in this order: that the moral disposition, as condition, first makes possible the participation in happiness, and not vice-verse, i.e., where the prospect of happiness would fashion the moral disposition.³⁴

³² Morality alone would be similar to the Stoic's conception of happiness, consciousness of virtue and of no self recrimination.

³³ In Par. 8 of the "Preface" to Kant's *Religion*, Kant touches on this again, showing how a morally inclined person would naturally want the highest good to be the arbiter between virtue and happiness.

³⁴ And this latter is similar to the position of the Epicurean, where knowledge of true happiness would result in moral maxims.

- 18.6 For in the latter case it would not be moral and, therefore, also not worthy of the entire happiness, for reason recognizes no other reservation except that which comes from our immoral conduct.³⁵
- 19.1 Happiness, therefore, in precise proportion to the morality of rational beings, by means of which they are worthy of that happiness, makes up alone the highest good of a world in which we must thoroughly place ourselves according to the precepts of pure, albeit practical, reason. This, of course, is only an intelligible world, since the sense world does not promise us the same systematic unity of purposes from the nature of things, whose reality also can be based on nothing else than on the presupposition of a highest original good. For independent reason, armed with all sufficiency of a supreme cause, enables, preserves and completes the universal order of things according to the most perfect purposefulness, though very concealed from us in the sense world.
- 20.1 Now this moral theology has the peculiar superiority over the speculative by leading unavoidably to the concept of a single, all perfect and rational being, which speculative theology does not at all indicate to us out of objective bases, much less being able to convince us of that.
- 20.2 For neither in the transcendental nor in natural theology, as far as reason may also lead us in them, do we find a unifying and meaningful basis for even assuming a single being which we position before all natural causes, and upon which we simultaneously had sufficient cause to make these dependent in all respects.
- 20.3 On the other hand, if from the standpoint of moral unity as a necessary world law, we ponder the cause which alone can give this the appropriate effect, hence also binding force for us, it must be a single supreme will which encompasses all these laws within itself.
- 20.4 For how did we want to find perfect unity of purposes among diverse wills?

³⁵ And so pure reason would grant happiness to all people except solely to the extent they prove themselves unworthy in their actions. And in [IX](#) of the Dialectic we see that such an arrangement (happiness determining morality) would result in the death of morality and duty and even of freedom.

- 20.5 This will must be all powerful so that all nature and its referral to morality in the world be subjected to it; all knowing so that it recognizes the most inner of the dispositions and their moral worth; omnipresent so that it be immediately adjacent to every need which the supreme world best requires; eternal so that in no time is there a lack of this agreement of nature and freedom, etc.
- 21.1 But this systematic unity of purposes in this world of intelligences, which as mere nature can only be termed a sense world, but as system of freedom, can be termed an intelligible, i.e., a moral, world (*regum gratise*³⁶), also leads unavoidably to the purposeful unity of all things which make up this grand whole according to laws of nature just as the former does according to universal and necessary moral laws, and unites practical reason with the speculative.
- 21.2 The world must be represented as having arisen from an Idea, if it is supposed to cohere together with that rational use, without which we would hold ourselves even unworthy of reason, namely the moral, as thoroughly resting on the Idea of the highest good.
- 21.3 In this way every investigation of nature obtains a direction with respect to the form of a system of purposes, and in it the highest expansion becomes physico-theology.
- 21.4 But this, since it still arose from the moral order as a unity established in the being of freedom and not contingently founded through external laws, brings the purposefulness of nature to foundations which must be a priori and inseparably connected with the inner possibility of things, and in that way to a transcendental theology which takes the Idea of the highest ontological perfection as a principle of the systematical unity, which connects all things according to universal and necessary laws of nature because they all have their origin in the absolute necessity of single, original being.
- 22.1 What kind of use can we make of our reason even with respect to experience, if we did not propose purposes to ourselves?³⁷

³⁶ Kingdom of grace.

³⁷ Practical reason is a means of attaining to purposes and thus is able to implement actions in pursuit of these purposes.

- 22.2 But the highest purposes are those of morality, and only pure reason can give these to us to be recognized.
- 22.3 Furnished now with these and with their guidance for us, we can make no purposeful use of the familiarity with nature itself with respect to the recognition, where nature has not itself laid down purposeful unity. For without this we would not even have reason itself, because we would have no school for it, and no cultivation through objects, which offered the material for such concepts.
- 22.4 But that purposeful unity is necessary. And based in the being of choice itself, this, which contains the condition of the application of that in concreto, must also, therefore, be it. Thus the transcendental ascension of our rational knowledge would not be the cause, but rather the effect of the practical purposefulness which pure reason imposes upon us.
- 23.1 Accordingly we also find in the history of human reason that before the moral concepts were sufficiently cleansed and determined and before the systematic unity of the purposes according to them was penetrated from necessary principles, the familiarity with nature and even an appreciable degree of the cultivation of reason in many other sciences could produce partly only rough and slippery concepts of divinity, and partly left an amazing and general indifference with respect to those questions.
- 23.2 A greater treatment of moral Ideas, which was made necessary through the most extreme pure moral law of our religion, sharpened reason on this object via the interest which it necessitated reason to take in that, and, without contributing to it either expanded recognitions of nature nor proper and reliable transcendental insights (for these have been lacking at all times), they brought forth a concept of the divine being which we now hold to be the proper one, not because speculative reason convinces us of its accuracy, but rather because it agrees perfectly with the moral rational principles.
- 23.3 And so still at the end, only pure reason, but only in its practical usage, has the merit of tying a recognition, which the mere speculation only fancies but cannot make valid, to our highest interest and in that way making not at all a demonstrated dogma, but still an absolutely necessary presupposition with its most essential purposes.

- 24.1 But now if practical reason has reached this pinnacle, namely the concept of a single original being as the highest good, it is not at all allowed to venture forth as though it had elevated itself above all empirical conditions of its application and had conjured up immediate information concerning new objects, and had soared forth from this concept to derive the moral law itself from that.
- 24.2 For those were precisely that whose inner practical necessity led us to the presupposition of a self-supporting cause or a wise world governor in order to give effect to those laws. Accordingly we cannot consider them with respect to this in turn as contingent and derived from the mere will, in particular from such a will, of which we would have no concept at all if we had not fashioned it conformable to those laws.³⁸
- 24.3 To the extent practical reason leads us, we will hold actions as binding not because they are commands of God, but rather treat them as commands of God because we are obligated to those actions inwardly.
- 24.4 We will study freedom under the purposeful unity according to principles of reason and believe ourselves to be conformable to the divine will only to the extent we hold the moral law, which reason teaches us out of the nature of actions themselves, as holy, and believe ourselves to serve it only by promoting the world best in us and in others.³⁹
- 24.5 Therefore the moral theology is only of immanent use, namely to fulfill our determination here in the world by adapting to all purposes in the system, and not by leaving the clue of the morally legislating reason fancifully or indeed even frivolously in the good course of life, in order to tie it immediately to the Idea of the highest being, which would provide a transcendental use, but just like that of sheer speculation, must pervert and frustrate the ultimate purpose of reason.⁴⁰

³⁸ To make the moral law meaningful we need the connection with happiness and that called for God. And now we can not turn around and declare the moral law simply a willful law of this same God and so where the authority of the moral law would arise from the will of this God.

³⁹ We have to consider ourselves as pleasing to God only by virtue of our compliance with the moral law.

⁴⁰ We come to God through the moral law and not to the moral law through God.

3rd Section. Concerning Opinion, Knowledge and Belief

- 1.1 The avowal is an occurrence in our understanding which may rest upon objective foundations, but which also requires subjective causes in the mind of the person so judging.
- 1.2 If it is valid for everyone, to the extent that person has reason, the foundation of that is objectively sufficient and the avowal is then called conviction.
- 1.3 If it has its foundation only in the particular constitution of the subject, it is termed persuasion.

- 2.1 Persuasion is mere semblance, because the basis of the judgment, which lies solely in the subject, is held as objective.
- 2.2 Hence such a judgment also has only private validity and the avowal cannot be communicated to others.⁴¹
- 2.3 But truth depends upon agreement with the object, with respect to which, consequently, the judgment of every understanding must be of one accord (*consentientia uni tertio, consentiunt inter se*).
- 2.4 The touchstone, therefore, of whether the avowal is conviction or merely persuasion is externally the possibility of communicating it and of finding the avowal valid for every human's reason. For in that case there is at least a supposition that the foundation of the accord of all judgments (disregarding the diversity of the subjects among one another) will rest on the communal foundation, namely the object, with which they all will agree together, and by means of which the truth of the judgment will be proven.

- 3.1 Accordingly indeed persuasion cannot be subjectively distinguished from conviction if the subject has the avowal before his eyes merely as the appearance of his own mind. But still the attempt we make with the foundations of that, which are valid for us, on the reason of another to ascertain whether they have just the same effect on a foreign reason as on ours, is one means (though only subjective), indeed not to effect conviction, but still to

⁴¹ This might then include the alleged Wesleyan experience of making progress in one's ability to love others.

uncover the merely private validity of the judgment, i.e., something in it which is merely persuasion.

- 4.1 If beyond that we can develop the subjective causes of the judgment which we take for objective foundations of that, and hence explain the deceptive avowal as an occurrence in our minds without needing the constitution of the object for that, we expose the semblance and so are no longer fooled by it, although still tempted to a certain degree if the subjective cause of the semblance adheres to our nature.

- 5.1 I can assert nothing, i.e., pronounce judgment necessarily valid for everyone, except what effects conviction.
- 5.2 Persuasion I can keep for myself if I find myself comfortable with that, but cannot, and am not supposed to want to, make it valid apart from myself.

- 6.1 The avowal, or the subjective validity of the judgment in reference to the conviction (which simultaneously holds objectively), has the following three levels: opinion, belief and knowledge.
- 6.2 Opinion is an avowal consciously insufficient subjectively as well as objectively.
- 6.3 If the latter is only subjectively sufficient and is held simultaneously as objectively insufficient, it is called belief.
- 6.4 Finally the avowal sufficing both subjectively and objectively is called knowledge.
- 6.5 The subjective sufficiency is called conviction (for myself), the objective, certitude (for everyone).
- 6.6 I will not detain myself with any exposition of such easily grasped concepts.

- 7.1 I must never venture to make an opinion without at least knowing something by means of which the judgment, merely problematic on its own, obtains an

connection with truth which, even though not complete, is still more than willful fiction.⁴²

- 7.2 Moreover, the law of such an connection must be certain.
- 7.3 For if I also have nothing except opinion with respect to something, then everything is only a play of imagination, without the least referral to truth.
- 7.4 In judgments from pure reason, opinion is not allowed at all.
- 7.5 For since they are not supported by foundations of experience, but rather everything is supposed to be recognized a priori (where everything is necessary), the principle of connection requires universality and necessity, hence complete certitude, and in the contrary case no conduit to truth is encountered at all.
- 7.6 Hence opinion in pure mathematics is absurd. Here we must know or refrain from all judgments.
- 7.7 It is also the case with the foundational propositions of morality. For we may not dare an action on the mere opinion that something is allowed, but rather must know this.⁴³
- 8.1 In the transcendental use of reason, on the other hand, opinion is of course too little, but knowledge also too much.
- 8.2 In the merely speculative intention, therefore, we cannot judge of this at all. Indeed the subjective foundations of the avowal, like those which can effect belief, deserve no acclaim with speculative questions, since they do not keep themselves free from all empirical assistance, nor allow of communication to others in a like fashion.
- 9.1 But nowhere except solely in the practical referral can the theoretically insufficient avowal be termed belief.

⁴² It would then be one thing to assert the reality of God, and quite another to assert that of an invisible unicorn.

⁴³ In *Religion* in the section concerning [conscience](#), Kant takes the Inquisitor to task for this very reason.

- 9.2 Now this practical intention is either that of skill or of morality, the first for arbitrary and contingent purposes, but the second for utterly necessary purposes.
- 10.1 Once a purpose is presupposed, the conditions for the achievement of that are hypothetically necessary.
- 10.2 This necessity is subjective, but still only comparatively sufficient if I do not know any other conditions under which the purpose were attainable. But it is sufficient utterly and for everyone if I know with certainty that no one can be acquainted with other conditions which lead to the presupposed purpose.
- 10.3 In the first case my presupposition and the avowal of certain conditions is merely a contingent belief. In the second case, however, we are dealing with a necessary belief.
- 10.4 Regarding a sick person who is in danger, the physician must do something, but is not familiar with the sickness.
- 10.5 He looks to the appearances and, because he knows nothing better, judges it to be consumption.
- 10.6 His belief is merely contingent even in his own judgment. Another might come closer to the mark.
- 10.7 I term such as this contingent beliefs. But that which lies as a foundation for the actual use of the means to certain actions, I call pragmatic belief.
- 11.1 The usual touchstone of whether something which someone asserts is merely persuasion, or at least subjective conviction, i.e., firm belief, is the wager.
- 11.2 Often times someone expresses his propositions with such confident and intractable defiance that he seems to have entirely discarded all concern for error.
- 11.3 A wager catches him off balance.

- 11.4 Occasionally it indicates that indeed he possesses persuasion enough which can be estimated at one dollar in value, but not ten.
- 11.5 The first he will quite easily dare. But with the ten he first becomes aware of what he previously did not note, namely that it is quite possible for him to have erred.
- 11.6 If we represent to ourselves in thought that we are supposed to stake on that the fortune of our entire life, our triumphant judgment dwindles very much indeed, so that we become quite timid and in this way first discover that our belief does not reach so far.
- 11.7 So the practical belief has only a degree which, according to the diversity of the interest which is in play, can be great or also small.
- 12.1 But even if we can undertake nothing at all with reference to an object (the avowal, therefore, being merely theoretical), nevertheless since we can in many cases grasp an undertaking in thought and imagine it to ourselves, to which we think to have an adequate basis, if there were a means of ascertaining the certainty for the matter, then in mere theoretical judgments there is an analogy of the practical, to whose avowals the word "belief" is suited, and which we can term the doctrinal belief.
- 12.2 If it were possible to be ascertained through some sort of an experience, I might well stake all that I have on there being inhabitants on at least one of the planets which we see.
- 12.3 Hence, I say, it is not merely opinion but a strong belief (on whose correctness I would dare many advantages of life), that there are inhabitants on other worlds.
- 13.1 Now we must insist that the teaching of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief.
- 13.2 For even though with respect to the theoretical world recognition I have nothing to account for which necessarily presupposes this belief as a condition of my explanation of the appearances of the world, but rather much more am bound to so utilize my reason as though everything were mere na-

ture, nevertheless since a purposeful unity is such a great condition of the application of reason to nature, and moreover since experience is rich with examples of such unity, I cannot at all ignore them.

- 13.3 But with regard to this unity I am aware of no other condition which would make it the guide of investigations of nature for me unless I presuppose that a highest intelligence has so ordered everything according to the wisest purposes.⁴⁴
- 13.4 Consequently it is a condition of an intention, contingent indeed, but still not insignificant, namely to presuppose a wise world originator in order to have a guide into the investigation of nature.
- 13.5 Also the result of my attempts so often certifies the utility of this presupposition—and nothing can be decisively taught against it—that I say much too little if I wanted merely to term my avowal an opinion, but rather even in this theoretical relation it can be said that I believe firmly in a God. But then this belief in a rigorous meaning is not practical, but rather must be termed a doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature (physico-theology) must necessarily produce in every case.
- 13.6 With respect to just the same wisdom and in regard to the superb make up of human nature and the shortness of life which is so badly suited to that nature, an adequate basis for a doctrinal belief in a future for the human soul can be encountered just as well.
- 14.1 The expression of belief in such cases is an expression of modesty in an objective intention, and yet at the same time also an expression of firmness of confidence in a subjective intention.
- 14.2 Even if I wanted here to term the merely theoretical avowal an hypothesis, I would already be professing to have more concept of the constitution of a world cause and another world than I actually can demonstrate. For concerning that which I also assume only as hypothesis, I must at least be familiar enough with respect to its properties that I may not fabricate its concept, but only its existence.

⁴⁴ Kant might then be surprised by the theory of evolution which holds the make up of the world to be a function of a mindless aberration which occasionally results in a better fitness for survival. Now the Roman Catholics accept evolution, although they do not count it as random, but rather as directed.

- 14.3 But the word “belief” goes only to the route which gives me an Idea and to the subjective influence upon the promotion of my rational actions which hold me firmly to that, even though I am not in position to account for that in a speculative intention.
- 15.1 There is something unstable, however, in the sheer doctrinal belief. We are often moved away from that doctrinal belief through difficulties which arise in speculation. However we always and unavoidably return back to it again.
- 16.1 It is entirely different with the moral belief.
- 16.2 For there it is utterly necessary that something must happen, namely that I comply with the moral law in all particulars.
- 16.3 Here the purpose is unavoidably established, and according to all my insight there is only a single condition possible under which this purpose coheres with all purposes together and in that way has practical validity,⁴⁵ namely that there be a God and a future world.⁴⁶ I also know with complete certitude that no one is familiar with other conditions which lead to the same unity of purposes under the moral law.
- 16.4 But since, therefore, the moral precept is simultaneously my maxim (as also reason commands it to be), I will invariably believe in the existence of the God and a future life. And I am confident that nothing is able to shake this belief because otherwise my moral foundational propositions themselves would topple. And these I cannot renounce without being worthy of abhorrence in my own eyes.
- 17.1 In such way, after the frustration of all ambitious intentions of a reason roaming about beyond the limits of all experience, enough yet remains for us to have cause to be satisfied with that in the practical intention.

⁴⁵ Here the Idea of the highest good reconciles the purposes of prudence with those of morality.

⁴⁶ The highest good is the purpose of the moral law and the conditions for the possibility of that highest good is God and immortality.

- 17.2 Of course no one indeed will be able to laud himself about knowing if there is a God and a future life, for, if he knows that, he is the very man whom I have long sought.
- 17.3 All knowledge (if it concerns an object of sheer reason) we can communicate, and therefore I would also be able to hope to see my knowledge expanded to such a marvelous degree through that man's instruction.
- 17.4 No! The conviction is not logical certitude, but moral, and since it rests upon subjective bases (of the moral disposition), I must not even say, "it is morally certain that there be a God, etc.," but rather "I am morally certain, etc."
- 17.5 This means that the belief in God and another world is so intertwined with my moral disposition that I am just as little in danger of forfeiting the former two, as I am concerned that someone might ever be able to tear the latter from me.
- 18.1 The only reservation to be found here is that this rational belief is based upon the presupposition of a moral disposition.
- 18.2 If we deviate from this and take a belief which were entirely indifferent with respect to moral laws, then the question which reason raises becomes merely a task for speculation. Then indeed it can be supported with strong foundations from analogy, but not with such that would force the most stubborn skepticism to yield.*
- 18.3 But with these questions no man is free of all interest.
- 18.4 For even though he might be separated from the moral via a lack of a good disposition, still even in this case enough remains to insure his fear of a divine being and a future life.
- 18.5 For nothing more is required for that except that he at least can plead no certainty that there be no such being and no future life. And the reason is that because it would have to be proven through mere reason, thus as apodictic, he would have to establish the impossibility of both, which certainly no rational being can undertake to do.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ The rational thinker can at most be an agnostic, but certainly not an atheist.

18.6 So such belief would be a negative belief, which indeed could not effect morality or a good disposition, but still the analogy of that, namely it would powerfully restrain the outbreak of an evil disposition.

* Kant's annotation.

1.1 The human mind (as I believe occurs necessarily with every rational being) takes a natural interest in morality, even if it is not undivided or practically paramount.

1.2 Strengthen and enlarge this interest and you will find reason very teachable and even enlightened in order to unify the practical and speculative interest.

1.3 But if you do not first take care to make people good, at least halfway, then you will also never make sincere believers out of them.

19.1 But is that all, someone will ask, that pure reason furnishes by opening prospects out beyond the limits of experience: nothing more than two articles of belief? That much even the common understanding could have furnished without turning to philosophers for advice!

20.1 I will not praise here the merit, which philosophy has through the tedious strivings of its critique on behalf of human reason, even granted that ultimately it was deemed to be merely negative. We will see in the following undertaking that something more will come yet from that.⁴⁸

20.2 But do you then demand that a recognition, which concerns all human beings, is supposed to rise above the common understanding and be revealed to you only through philosophy?

20.3 Precisely that which you fault is the best certificate of the correctness of the assertions thus far, for it uncovers what we could not have predicted at the beginning, namely that nature, in that which is invested to humans without distinction, is guiltless of any partisan distribution of its talents, and with respect to the essential purposes of human nature the highest philosophy is unable to bring matters further than the guidance which it has bestowed to even the most common understanding.

⁴⁸ This is a reference to [The Critique of Practical Reason](#).

3rd Chapter. Architectonic of Pure Reason

- 1.1 With “architectonic” I understand the art of systems.
- 1.2 Because the systematic unity is what first makes common recognition into a science, i.e., a system out of a mere aggregate of that, it follows that architectonic is the teaching of the scientific in our recognition in general and, therefore, it belongs necessarily to the methodology.
- 2.1 Under the government of reason, our recognitions may not constitute in general any rhapsody, but rather must constitute a system, in which alone they can support and promote the essential purpose of government.
- 2.2 But with a system I understand the unity of multiple recognitions under one Idea.
- 2.3 This is the rational concept of the form of a whole to the extent the scope of the manifold, as well as the position of the parts relative to each another, is determined a priori through that concept.
- 2.4 The scientific rational concept, therefore, contains the purpose and the form of the whole which is congruent with that.
- 2.5 The unity of the purpose to which all parts are referred and in the Idea of which also among one another makes it such that any missing part can be noted through familiarity with the others, and no accidental contribution of undetermined magnitude of perfection, which does not have its a priori determined limits, may occur.
- 2.6 The whole, therefore, is segmented (*articulatio*) and not accumulated (*coacervatio*). It can grow inwardly indeed (*per intus susceptionem*), but not outwardly (*per a positionem*), as an animal body whose growth adds not members but rather, without alteration of the proportion, makes each stronger and more hearty.

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- 3.1 The Idea has need of a schema for the execution, i.e., an essential manifold and order of the parts determined a priori out of the principle of the purpose.
- 3.2 The schema, which is not devised according to an Idea, i.e., out of the primary purpose of reason, but rather empirically according to contingently presenting intentions (the count of which we cannot know in advance) gives technical unity, but only what arises as the consequence of an Idea (where reason renders the purposes a priori, and does not expect empirically) enables architectonical unity.
- 3.3 That which we term science cannot arise technically from the similarity of the manifold or from the contingent use of the recognition *in concreto* to all sorts of arbitrary external purposes, but rather architectonically, for the sake of the kinship and the derivation from a single supreme and inward purpose which first makes the whole possible. The schema of that science must contain the outline (*monogramma*) and the division of the whole into members, conformable to the Idea, i.e., a priori, and distinguish this from all others securely and according to principles.
- 4.1 No one attempts to bring forth a science without having an Idea lying to it as base.
- 4.2 In the working out of that, however, the schema, indeed even the definition, which is given at the very start of the science, very seldom matches this Idea: for this lies, as a sprout, in reason, in which all parts lie yet buried and much entangled and hardly discernible to the microscopic observation.
- 4.3 Because of this and because they still are all thought out from the viewpoint of a certain universal interest, we must explain and determine sciences not according to the description, which their originator of that gives to them, but rather according to the Idea, which we find from the natural unity of the parts, which that originator has brought together based in reason itself.
- 4.4 For there it is found that the originator, and often even his most recent disciples, wander about an Idea, which they themselves have not been able to make distinct and hence cannot determine the peculiar contents, the articulation (systematical unity) and limits of the science.

- 5.1 It is unfortunate that only after we have gathered many recognitions rhapsodically for a long time, according to the direction of an Idea lying concealed within us, and have referred them to it as construction material, and indeed even for a long time have technically assembled them, that it is possible for us to view the Idea in a brighter light and to design a whole architectonically according to the purposes of reason.
- 5.2 The systems seem, like worms, to have been fashioned through a *generatio aequivoca* out of the mere flowing together of accumulated concepts, truncated at the beginning, completed in time, even though together with their schema, they had, as the original sprout in reason, merely developing out of itself, and for that reason, not only segmented each for itself according to an Idea, but rather yet are all in turn united with each other purposefully to that in a system of human recognitions as segments of a whole, and allow an architectonic of all human knowledge, which in the current time, since so much material has already been gathered, or can be taken out of the ruins of collapsed, old buildings, would not only be possible, but rather not even difficult at all.
- 5.3 Here we are content with the completion of our occupation, namely of designing solely the architectonic of all recognitions out of pure reason and we start from the point where the universal root of our recognition capacity divides and renders up two trunks, of which one is reason.
- 5.4 But with the term “reason”, I understand here the entire supreme recognition capacity and, accordingly, oppose the rational to the empirical.
- 6.1 If I abstract from all content of the recognition, considered objectively, then each recognition, considered subjectively, is either historical or rational.
- 6.2 The historical realization is *cognitio ex datis*, but the rational *cognitio ex principiis*.
- 6.3 A recognition may be originally given, from whence it will, and so with him who posses it, it is historical if he recognizes it only to the degree and to the extent it was given to him from elsewhere, be this given to him through immediate experience or a narration, or also as instruction (universal recognitions).

- 6.4 Hence he who has actually learned a philosophy, e.g., the Wolffian, even though he had all principles, explanation and proofs, together with the division of the entire instructional edifice in his head and could count everything on his fingers, still has none other than historical recognition of the Wolffian philosophy—he knows and judges only as much as was given to him.
- 6.5 Deny a definition to him, and he does not know where he is supposed to obtain another.
- 6.6 He develops according to foreign reason, but the imitating capacity is not the generating one, i.e., the recognition did not arise with him out of reason, and even though, objectively, it was a rational recognition, so still, subjectively, with him it is merely historical.
- 6.7 He has grasped and retained well, i.e., learned, and is a plaster cast of a living person.
- 6.8 Rational recognitions which are objective (i.e., at the beginning are able to arise only out of the personal reasoning of the human) may only then alone also carry subjectively this name if they are created out of universal sources of reason, from which also the critique, indeed even the repudiation of the learned, can arise, i.e., out of principles.
- 7.1 Now every rational recognition is either from concepts or from the construction of concepts. The first is called philosophical, the second mathematical.
- 7.2 With the internal distinction of each, I have already dealt with in the first section.
- 7.3 Accordingly a realization can be objectively philosophical, and still remain subjectively historical, as with most apprentices and with all who never look beyond the schools and who remain apprentices all of their lives.
- 7.4 But it is still strange that the mathematical recognitions, just as one has acquired it, can still hold even subjectively as a rational recognition and such a distinction with it does not take place with it as with the philosophical.
- 7.5 The reason for this is because the sources of recognition, from which the teacher alone can glean, lie nowhere else than in the essential and genuine

principles of reason and hence cannot be obtained, nor perhaps even disputed, by the apprentice, and this indeed for the reason because here the use of reason happens only *in concreto*, although still a priori, namely in the pure and, just because of that, faultless viewing, and excludes every deception and error.

7.6 Of all (a priori) sciences of reason, therefore, we can learn only mathematics, but never philosophy (except it be historically), but rather, concerning reason, at most to philosophize.

8.1 Now the system of all philosophical recognition is philosophy.

8.2 We must take it objectively, if we understand with that the prototype of the estimation of all attempts to philosophize, which is supposed to serve for estimating every subjective philosophy, whose edifice is often so manifold and so alterable.

8.3 In this way philosophy is a mere Idea of a possible science which is given nowhere *in concreto*, but which we seek to approximate in diverse ways until the single step, much overgrown through sensitivity, is discovered, and until the thus far faulty imitation, to the extent it is granted to humans, succeeds in making it equal to the prototype.

8.4 Until then we cannot learn philosophy; for, where is it? Who has possession of it? And in what way does it allow of recognition?

8.5 We can only learn to philosophize, i.e., practice the talent of reason in compliance with its universal principles on certain present attempts, still always with the reservation of the right of reason to investigate and to certify or to reject those even in their sources.

9.1 But until then the concept of philosophy is only an academic concept, namely of a system of recognition which, as science, is only sought without having more than the systematic unity of this knowledge, hence the logical perfection of the recognition, as purpose.

9.2 But there is yet a world concept (*conceptus cosmicus*), which has always been the basis of this denomination, especially if we were to personify it, as

it were, and represent it to ourselves in the Ideal of the philosophers as a prototype.

- 9.3 In this intention philosophy is the science of the referral of all recognitions to the essential purposes of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*), and the philosopher is not a rational artist, but rather the legislator of human reason.
- 9.4 In such meaning it would be very vainglorious to term oneself a philosopher, and to presume to be equivalent to the prototype, which only lies in the Idea.
- 10.1 The mathematician, the natural researcher, the logician, even as admirably as the former may advance in rational recognitions in general, the second especially in the philosophical recognition, still are only artists of reason.
- 10.2 There is still a teacher in the Ideal who estimates all these, using them as tools, in order to promote the essential purposes of human reason.
- 10.3 This one alone we would have to term the philosopher. But since he himself still is nowhere encountered but the Idea of his legislation is everywhere in every human reason, we want to hold solely to the latter, and more closely determine what philosophy, according to this world concept* prescribes for systematic unity from the standpoint of purposes.

* Kant's annotation.

- 1.1 World concept here means that which concerns what is necessarily interesting to every person. Hence I determine the intention of a science according to academic concepts if they are considered only as one of the skills to certain arbitrary purposes.
- 11.1 Essential purposes are not yet for that reason the highest, of which (at the perfect systematic unity of reason) only a single one can be.
- 11.2 Hence they are either the final purpose, or subordinate purposes which belong necessarily to the former as means.
- 11.3 The first is none other than the entire determination of humans, and the philosophy about this is called moral.

- 11.4 Due to this preference which the moral philosophy has before all other rational applications, with the name of the philosopher we understand, along with the ancients, always simultaneously and preferentially the moralist, and even the outward semblance of self-control through reason makes us even now term someone, with his restricted knowledge, philosopher according to a certain analogy.

- 12.1 Now the legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom, and contains, therefore, the natural law as well as the moral law, at first in two particular philosophical systems, but finally in a single one.
- 12.2 The philosophy of nature goes to everything which is present; that of morals only to that which is supposed to be present.

- 13.1 But every philosophy is either recognition out of pure reason, or rational recognition out of empirical principles.
- 13.2 The first is called pure, the second empirical, philosophy.

- 14.1 Now the philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic (preparation), which investigates the capacity of reason with respect to all pure recognitions a priori and is called critique, or secondly, the system of pure reason (science), the whole (true as well as apparent) philosophical recognition out of pure reason in systematical cohesion and is called metaphysics; although this name can also be given to the entire pure philosophy at the summary of the critique, in order to grasp together the investigation of all that can ever be recognized as well as the description of what which makes up a system of pure philosophical recognition of this type, but is distinguished from all empirical, likewise the mathematical, rational usage.

- 15.1 Metaphysics is divided into that of the speculative and that of the practical use of pure reason, and is, therefore, either metaphysic of nature or metaphysic of morals.

- 15.2 The former contains all pure principle of reason out of sheer concept of the theoretical recognitions of all things (hence excluding mathematics); the latter the principles which a priori determine and make necessary action as well as restraint.
- 15.3 Now morality is the single legality of action which can be derived out of principles fully a priori.
- 15.4 Hence the metaphysics of morals is actually the pure moral, in which no anthropology (no empirical condition) is placed as foundation.
- 15.5 Now the metaphysics of speculative reason is that which we strive to call metaphysics in the more narrow meaning. But to the extent that pure moral instruction still nonetheless belongs to the particular root of human and indeed philosophical recognitions out of pure reason, we want to retain that denomination for it, although here we set it to the side as not belonging presently to our purposes.
- 16.1 It is of extreme importance to isolate recognitions which are distinguished from others with respect to their class and origin, and carefully to prevent their flowing into a mixture with others, with which they are usually joined in usage.
- 16.2 What the chemists do with the separation of matter, and the mathematicians in their pure magnitude instruction, is yet far more incumbent upon the philosopher so that he can securely determine the actual value and influence of the portion which a particular manner of recognition has to the rambling usage of understanding.
- 16.3 Hence human reason, from the time of thinking it or far rather reflecting on it, has never been able to dispense with a metaphysics, but nonetheless has not been able to describe it sufficiently purified from all extraneous elements.
- 16.4 The Idea of such a science is just as old as speculative human reason, and what reason does not speculate, be it in a scholastic or popular manner?
- 16.5 Meanwhile we must admit that the distinction of the two elements of our recognition, of which one is completely a priori, the other can only be taken

a posteriori out of experience, remains only very vague even with professional thinkers, and hence could never bring forth the limit determination of a particular manner of recognition, thus of the genuine Idea of a science which has occupied reason so long and so much.

- 16.6 If someone said, “metaphysics is the science of the first principles of human recognition,” we do not note in such way a completely particular manner, but rather only a rank with respect to the universality, whereby therefore it could be discernibly distinguished from the empirical. For even among empirical principles some are more universal and, for that reason, higher than others, and in the series of such a subordination (since we cannot distinguish that which is recognized completely a priori from that which is recognized a posteriori), where shall we make the part which distinguished the first and the supreme part from the last and the subordinated?
- 16.7 What would we say if the calculation of time could only indicate the epochs of the world so that it divided them into the first centuries and the ones following after that?
- 16.8 Does the fifth century, the tenth, etc., belong also the first ones, we would ask? Just so ask I, “does the concept of expansion belong to metaphysics”. You reply, “Indeed”. “Well, but also that of body?” “yes.” “And that of fluid bodies?” You become perplexed, for, if it continues like this, everything will belong to metaphysics.
- 16.9 We see from this that the mere degree of subordination (the particular under the universal) can determine no limits of a science, but rather, in our case, the entire dissimilarity and diversity of the origin.
- 16.10 But what obscures the basic Idea of a metaphysics yet on another side, was that it as recognition a priori shows a certain similarity with mathematics, which indeed, concerning the origin a priori, makes them kin to one another, but concerning the manner of recognition out of concepts with the former, in comparison with the manner of judging merely through the construction of concepts a priori with the latter, hence the distinction of a philosophical recognition from the mathematical one; it indicates such a decisive dissimilarity which indeed we always felt, as it were, but could never bring to distinct criterion.

- 16.11 Now thereby it has happened that since philosophers erred even in the development of the Idea of their science, the treatment of the science could have no determined purpose and no secure guideline, and with such a willfully made design, unknowing of the way which they had to take, and always disputing among themselves about the discoveries which each claimed to have made on his own, first brought their science with others and finally in fact with themselves into disrespect.
- 17.1 Therefore every pure recognition a priori, empowered by the particular recognition capacity in which it alone can have its seat, makes up a particular unity, and metaphysics is that philosophy, which is supposed to describe that recognition in this systematic unity.,
- 17.2 The speculative portion of this which has commandeered even this more preferential name, namely that which we term metaphysics of nature, and which ponders everything to the extent it is (and not that, which is supposed to be) a priori out of concepts, becomes now divided in the following manner.
- 18.1 The so-called metaphysics in a more narrow meaning consists of the transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason.
- 18.2 The first considers only understanding and reason itself in a system of all concepts and principles which refer in general to objects, without assuming objects which were given (*ontologia*). The second considers nature, i.e., the encompassment of given objects (they may given to the senses or, if you will, to another sort of viewing), and is therefore physiology (although only *rationalis*).
- 18.3 But now the use of reason in this rational consideration of nature is either physical or hyperphysical, or better: either immanent or transcendent.
- 18.4 The first goes to nature as far as its recognition can be applied in experience (*in concreto*), the second to that connection of objects in experience which oversteps every experience.
- 18.5 Accordingly this transcendental physiology has either an inner connection, or outer, but both go out beyond possible experience. The former is the

physiology of the whole nature, i.e., the transcendental recognition of world, the other of the coherence of the whole of nature with an entity beyond nature, i.e., the transcendental God recognition.

- 19.1 The immanent physiology on the other hand considers nature as the summary of all objects of the sense, thus so as they are given to us, but only according to conditions a priori under which they can be given to us in general.
- 19.2 But there are only two types of objects of that physiology.
- 19.3 1. Those of the outer sense, hence the summary of that, the corpuscular nature.
- 19.4 2. The object of the inner sense, the soul, and according to the foundational concepts of that on their own, the thinking nature.
- 19.5 The metaphysics of the corpuscular nature is called physics, but because it is supposed to contain a priori the principles of its recognition, it is called rational physics.
- 19.6 The metaphysics of the thinking nature is called psychology, and out of the cause just cited only the rational recognition is to be understood here.
- 20.1 Accordingly the entire system of metaphysics consists of four main parts.
- 20.2 1. Ontology.
- 20.3 2. Rational physiology.
- 20.4 3. Rational cosmology.
- 20.5 4. Rational theology.
- 20.6 The second part, namely the nature instruction of pure reason, contains two compartments, the *physica realionalis*,* and *psychologia rationalis*.

* Kant's annotation.

- 1.1 Let no one think that I mean with this what we normally term *physica generalis* and which is more mathematics than philosophy.
 - 1.2 For the metaphysics of nature is entirely isolated from mathematics, and has by far not so many expansive insights to offer as mathematics does, but is still very important with respect to the critique of those understanding recognitions in general, applicable to nature. At the lack of these, even mathematics, by attaching to certain, though in fact, metaphysical concepts, which have unknowingly burdened the instruction of nature with hypotheses, which vanish at a critique of these principles, still without there injuring the use of mathematics in the field (which is entirely indispensable) in any way at all.
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- 21.1 The original Idea of a philosophy of pure reason itself prescribes this division. It is therefore architectonic, conformable to its essential purposes, and not merely technical, according to contingently perceived kinships and positioned as it were by good fortune, but just for that reason also unalterable and legislative.
 - 21.2 But some points are found with this which can excite reservation and weaken conviction of the legitimacy of that.
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- 22.1 First how can I expect a recognition a priori, hence metaphysics of objects, to the extent that they are given to our senses, hence a posteriori? And how is it possible according to principles a priori to recognize the nature of things and to achieve to a rational physiology?
 - 22.2 Here is the answer: we take nothing further from experience except what is necessary for giving us an object, partly of the external and partly of the internal sense.
 - 22.3 The former occurs according to the mere concept of material (impenetrable, lifeless expansion), the other through the concept of a thinking entity (in the empirical, inner representation, "I think").
 - 22.4 By the way, in the entire metaphysics of these objects, we would have to refrain from all empirical principles entirely, which might add some sort of an experience additively yet beyond the concept, in order to judge something about these objects from that.

- 23.1 Second: what happens then with the empirical psychology which has so long asserted its place in metaphysics and from which we have expected such great things for the explanation of that in our times, after we give up the hope of furnishing something suitable a priori?
- 23.2 I answer, “it comes to where the actual (empirical) doctrine of nature must be positioned, namely: on the side of applied philosophy, for which pure philosophy contains the principles a priori which therefore must be connected indeed with the them, but not mixed.
- 23.3 Empirical psychology, therefore, must be banned entirely from metaphysics, and is already excluded entirely from that through the Idea of metaphysics.
- 23.4 Nonetheless someone will still always have to permit a small place in metaphysics for the empirical psychology according to the scholastic usage (although only as an episode), and indeed out of economical motives because it is not yet so rich that it alone makes up a study, and still too important for us to throw out entirely or to attach somewhere else where I might encounter even less kinship than in metaphysics.
- 23.5 Therefore it is so far merely a sheltered stranger, whom we allow to sojourn for a while until it will be able to move into its own housing in a determined anthropology (the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature).
- 24.1 That is the universal Idea of metaphysics, therefore, which, since we at the beginning impute to it more than can reasonably be demanded, and amuse ourselves for a time with pleasant expectations, has finally fallen into universal contempt, for we find ourselves deceived in our hopes.
- 24.2 Out of the entire course of our critique we will have adequately convinced ourselves that even if metaphysics cannot be the foundational vestments of religion, so it would still always have to remain standing as the defender of religion. And reason, which is already dialectic through the alignment of its nature, can never dispense with such a science, which bridles it and, through a scientific and fully illuminated self-recognition, checks the desolation which a lawless, speculative reason would otherwise provide quite unfailingly in morals as well as religion.

- 24.3 We can also be confident, therefore, as inflexible or depreciating as these also are who know to judge a science not according to its nature, but rather only from its contingent effects, we will always return to her as though to a beloved divided between us, because reason, since here it concerns essential purposes, must work without rest either on basic insight or on the destruction of good insights already present.
- 25.1 Therefore metaphysics, as much of nature as of morality, especially the critique of reason venturing on its own wings, which precedes preparatorily (propaedeutically), actually make up that alone which we can term philosophy in the genuine meaning.
- 25.2 This refers everything to wisdom, but through the way of science, the only way which, if it is once paved, will never become overgrown and will permit no error.
- 25.3 Mathematics, natural science, and even the empirical familiarity with humans have a high value as means, mainly to contingent, but still finally to necessary and essential, purposes of humanity, but then only by means of a rational recognition out of mere concepts which, we may denominate it as we will, is actually nothing except metaphysics.
- 26.1 Precisely for that reason, metaphysics is also the fulfillment of all cultivation of human reason, which is indispensable, even if we set to the side its influence, as science, upon certain determined purposes.
- 26.2 For it considers reason according to its elements and supreme maxims, which themselves must lie as foundation to the possibility of some sciences and to the use of all.
- 26.3 That it, as mere speculation, serves more to restrain errors than to expand recognition does not detract from its value, but rather much more gives it dignity and esteem through the function of censoring, which secures the universal order and concord, indeed the welfare, of the scientific communal entity, and performs its courageous and fruitful treatment, not to remove itself from the principal purpose, i.e., universal happiness.

4th Chapter. The History of Pure Reason

- 1.1 This title stands here only in order to indicate a position which remains in a system and must be completed in the future.
- 1.2 I am content to cast a fleeting glance from a a merely transcendental viewpoint, namely the nature of pure reason at the whole of the previous treatment of it, which of course represents indeed a building to my eye, but only in ruins.
- 2.1 It is noteworthy enough, even though it could not naturally proceed otherwise, that in the childhood of philosophy humans began where we now would like to end, namely to study first the recognition of God and the hope, or indeed even the constitution, of another world.
- 2.2 What kind of rude religious concepts the old customs, which yet remained from the raw state of the people, may have introduced, this still did not hinder the enlightened portion from dedicating itself to free inquiry about this object, and we easily saw that there can be no enabling and more dependable way of pleasing the invisible power which governed the world, in order at least to be happy in another world, than good habits of living.
- 2.3 Hence theology and morals were the two motivational, or better, referral points to all honed rational inquiry, to which one always afterwards dedicated oneself.
- 2.4 The former was that, however, which gradually drew mere speculative reason into the occupation which subsequently became famous under the name of metaphysics.
- 3.1 I will not now distinguish the times in which this or that alteration of metaphysics arose, but rather only present in a cursory delineation the diversity of the Idea which occasioned the primary revolutions.
- 3.2 And here I find a three-fold intention, in which the most preeminent alterations were established on this stage of conflict.

- 4.1 1. With respect to the object of all our rational recognitions some were sensual, others merely intellectual, philosophers.
- 4.2 Epicurus can be termed the most distinguished philosopher of sensitivity, Plato of the intellectual.
- 4.3 But this distinction of the schools, as subtle as it may be, had already begun in the earliest times and has maintained itself without interruption for a long time.
- 4.4 Those of the first asserted all actuality to be the objects of the senses, everything else being imagination. Those of the second said, on the other hand, in the sense is nothing but semblance, and only understanding recognizes the true.
- 4.5 For that reason the former still did not deny reality to the understanding, but rather only for them it was only logical, but for the latter it was mystical
- 4.6 The former admitted intellectual concepts, but assumed merely sensitive objects.
- 4.7 The latter demanded that the true objects were merely intelligible and asserted a viewing through the pure understanding accompanied by no senses and, according to their opinion, was merely confused.

- 5.1 2. With respect to the origin of pure rational recognitions, whether they have their source derived out of experience or independently of it in reason.
- 5.2 Aristotle can be viewed as the head of the empiricists, but Plato of the noologist.
- 5.3 Locke, who in more recent times followed the former, and Leibniz, the second (though with sufficient distance from his mystical system), have nonetheless been able to bring no decision into this dispute.
- 5.4 At least Epicurus proceeded for his part much more consistently with respect to his sensual system (for he never went with his conclusions further than experience) than did Aristotle and Locke (but especially the latter) who, after

he had derived all concepts and principles from experience, goes so far in the use of that to assert our ability to prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul (although both objects lie entirely beyond the boundaries of possible experience) just as evidently as any sort of a mathematical principle.

- 6.1 With respect to method.
- 6.2 If we are supposed to term something method, it must be a procedure according to principles.
- 6.3 Now we can divide the method, prevailing now in this branch of inquiry, into the naturalist and the scientific.
- 6.4 The naturalist of pure reason takes as base proposition: “through common reason without science (which he calls healthy reason) more can be accomplished merely with respect to the most sublime questions which make up the task of metaphysics than through speculation.”
- 6.5 He asserts therefore that “we can more precisely determine the magnitude and scope of the moon by visual estimation than through mathematical circumlocution.”
- 6.6 It is merely misology, brought to principles and, even more absurd, the neglect of all artificial means, and extolled as a personal method of expanding one’s recognition.
- 6.7 For concerning the naturalist in deficiency of several insights, we have no basis to charge anything to them.
- 6.8 They follow common reason without boasting of their ignorance, which was supposed to contain the secret truth out of the deep well of Democritus.
- 6.9 *Quod sapio, satis est mihi; non ego curo, esse quod Arcesilas aenumnosique Solones, pers* is their motto, with which they can live entertained and worthy of acclaim, without bothering themselves about science, nor to confuse their occupation.

- 7.1 Now with regard to the observers of a scientific method, they have here the choice of proceeding either dogmatically or skeptically, but in all cases still the obligation to proceed systematically.
- 7.2 If I term here with respect to the first the famous Wolff, with the second David Hume, I can leave the others unnamed in accordance with my present intention.
- 7.3 The critical way alone is yet open.
- 7.4 If the reader has had the courtesy and patience to wander through this in my company, he may now judge whether, if it pleases him, to contribute something to it of his own in order to make this path into a royal highway that, which many centuries could not perform, may yet be reached before the end of the present century; namely to bring human reason, in that which always has occupied its longing to know, and vain until now, to full satisfaction.