

Preface To The Second (B) Edition¹
Of
The Critique Of Pure Reason
by Immanuel Kant

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See [Translator's Technical Notes](#)

- 1.1 Whether the treatment of the recognitions which belong to the affairs of reason tread the sure path of a science or not can soon be appraised by the results.
- 1.2 If after many fabricated foundations and preparations it comes to a standstill as soon as it approaches the objective or, if in order to reach it, must often withdraw again and strike out on a new way, likewise if it is not possible to make the various colleagues unanimous concerning the way of achieving the common purpose, then we can always be assured that such a study has by no means yet set out on the sure path of a science, but rather is merely a tinkering about. And reason is already served by making this way discoverable where possible, even if much of what was contained in that purpose, assumed without prior reflection, must be given up as vain.
- 2.1 That logic has treaded this sure path from the most remote times is seen by its not having to take a single step backward since Aristotle, if we will not count as an improvement something like the eradication of certain dispensable subtleties, or a clear determination of the presentation, but which belongs more to the elegance than to the reliability of the science.
- 2.2 Logic is yet remarkable in that even up to now it has been able to take no step forward, and thus from any view seems to be concluded and completed.

¹ B vii, i.e., appearing on page vii of the second (B) version of the academic version of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

- 2.3 For if some contemporaries thought to expand it by including partly psychological capital from the recognition powers (imagination, wit), partly metaphysical from the origin of recognitions or the various manners of certitude according to the variety of the objects (idealism, skepticism, etc.), partly anthropological from prejudices (their origins and remedies), then this proceeds from their misapprehension of the peculiar nature of this science.
- 2.4 It is not increase, but rather distortion of the sciences, if we let their boundaries run into one another. The limit of logic, however, is entirely determined by it being a science which rigorously proves and amply sets forth nothing but the formal rules of all thinking (be it a priori or empirical, letting it have an origin or object as it will, and whether it meets in our minds with contingent or natural obstacles).
- 3.1 From this advantage of having been so successful, logic has to thank merely its restrictions by which it is justified, indeed enjoined, to abstract from all objects of the recognition and their distinction. In logic, therefore, the understanding has to do with nothing further than itself and its form.
- 3.2 Naturally it had to be far more difficult for reason to light upon the sure path of science if it has to do not merely with itself, but rather also with objects. Thus logic, as propaedeutic, constitutes also only the vestibule of the sciences, as it were, and if we are speaking of knowledge, then we presuppose indeed a logic for the evaluation of that knowledge, but must seek its acquisition actually and objectively in the so-called sciences.
- 4.1 To the extent that reason is supposed to be in these sciences, something a priori must be recognized, and their recognition can be referred to their object in two ways; either merely to determine this and its concept (which must be given from elsewhere), or to make it actual.
- 4.2 The first is the theoretical recognition of reason, the other is the practical.
- 4.3 The pure part in both, as much or as little as it may contain, namely the part in which reason determines its object entirely a priori, must be presented alone, and that part which comes from other sources, must not be mingled

with it. For it is bad business to pay out blindly that comes in without being able afterwards, if the business comes to a standstill, to distinguish which part of the revenue can bear the expenditure and which calls for a reduction.

- 5.1 Mathematics and physics are two theoretical recognitions of reason which are supposed to determine their objects a priori, the former entirely pure, the second at least partly pure, but then also according to the standard of sources of recognition other than reason.
- 6.1 Mathematics has treaded the sure path of science since the earliest times to which the history of human reason reaches—in the amazing Greeks.
- 6.2 We need not think, however, that it was as easy for mathematics as for logic (where reason has only to do with itself) to light upon that royal road or, even more, to prepare the way.
- 6.3 I believe, far rather, that mathematics remained a long time with tinkering about (especially among the Egyptians) and that this metamorphose is attributable to a revolution which the fortunate flash of a single man brought forth in an experiment by which the road which we had to take was no longer mistakable, and the sure path of a science was hit upon and marked for all time and in infinite expansion.
- 6.4 The history of this revolution of the thinking manner (which was much more important than the discovery of the way around the famous promontory) and of the fortunate person who brought it forth has not been retained for us.
- 6.5 However, the legend which Diogenes of Laertius transmits to us, mentioning the supposed originator of the least elements of the geometrical demonstration and which, with respect to common judgment, do not even need a proof, proves that the remembrance of the change, which was effected through the first trace of the discovery of this new way, must have seem extremely important to the mathematicians and accordingly became unforgettable.
- 6.5 To the first person who demonstrated an isosceles triangle (he may have been called Thales or something else) a light came on; for he found that he would have to investigate not what he saw in the figure, or to track down the

mere concept of that and learn its properties from it, as it were, but rather to bring forth only that which he himself thought a priori into it according to concepts and presented (through construction); and that he, in order to know something a priori with confidence, would have to attribute to the matter nothing except what followed necessarily from that which he had included in it himself in conformity with his concept.

- 7.1 With natural science it progressed far slower in reaching the royal way of science. For it has only been about a century and a half since the suggestion of the ingenious Sir Francis Bacon partly occasioned this discovery and partly, since we already had the scent of it, more animated it; which can be explained just as well [as the triangle above] only by a suddenly occurring revolution in the manner of thinking.
- 7.2 Here I only want to touch on natural science to the extent it is based on empirical principles.
- 8.1 When Galileo rolled his spheres down the incline with a weight which he selected himself, or when Torricelli let the air carry a weight which he had previously imagined to be equal to a known column of water, or yet later when Stahl converted metals into chalk and that in turn into metals by removing something from them and then restoring it, a light came on for all researchers of the science of nature.
- 8.2 They comprehended that reason penetrates only what it itself brings forth according to its design, that it would have to proceed with principles of its judgment according to enduring laws and to require nature to answer its questions, but not to let itself totter, as it were, at the end of a leash of nature. For otherwise accidental observations, made according to no previously thought-out plan, do not cohere at all in a single necessary law, which reason still seeks and needs.
- 8.3 With its principles in one hand, according to which alone agreeing appearances can hold for laws, and with the experiment in the other, which it thought up with respect to those principles, reason must indeed go to nature to be taught by it, but not in the role of a school boy who allows everything

to be dictated as the teacher wishes, but rather as an invested judge who requires the witnesses to answer the questions which he poses to them.

- 8.4 And thus even physics has to attribute this so advantageous revolution of its manner of thinking to the sudden notion of seeking (not fictionalizing) in nature, and commensurate to what reason itself puts into it, that which it must learn from nature and of which reason would know nothing of itself.
- 8.5 In this way natural science was first brought to the sure path of a science after having been nothing further than a mere tinkering about for so many centuries.

- 9.1 Metaphysics is an entirely isolated, speculative, rational recognition which elevates itself completely above the teaching of experience and indeed by mere concepts (not as with mathematics, by application of them to viewing) and where, therefore, reason itself is supposed to be its own student. And so far the fate of this recognition has not yet been so fortunate to have been able to light upon the sure path of a science. Although metaphysics is older than all the others and would remain even if the others should be completely swallowed up in the abyss of an all destroying barbarism.
- 9.2 For reason continually comes to a standstill in metaphysics, even when it wants to penetrate a priori those very laws which the most common experience verifies (as it presumes).
- 9.3 In it we must constantly turn back on the way because we find that it does not go where we wish and, concerning the unanimity of its adherents in assertions, it is still so far removed from that, that it is far rather a battle arena which seems actually to be determined for practicing our powers in jousting, and where no jouster has ever been able to win for himself even the least position where he might establish a permanent victory.
- 9.4 There is no doubt, therefore, that the conduct of reason has been thus far a mere tinkering about and, what is worse, among mere concepts.

- 10.1 Now why is it that no sure way of science has yet been found here?

- 10.2 Is it per chance impossible?
- 10.3 If so, then why did nature afflict our reason with this unceasing endeavor to locate metaphysics as one of its most important affairs?
- 10.4 Yet more, how little cause do we have to place trust in our reason if it not only forsakes us in one of the most important pieces of our inquisitiveness, but even delays us with dazzling deceptions and, yet at the same time, cheats us!
- 10.5 Or if we have only missed it so far, what indication can we make use of in a renewed search to hope that we will be more fortunate than those before us have been?
- 11.1 I am of the opinion that the examples of mathematics and natural science, which have become what they are now through a revolution, brought forth suddenly, would be remarkable enough to ponder the essential pieces of the alteration in the manner of thinking which has been so advantageous to them and, at least as an attempt, to imitate them to the extent that their analogy, as rational recognition, is permitted with metaphysics.
- 11.2 Until now we have assumed that each of our recognitions would have to be governed according to the object. But all our attempts at making out something about these objects a priori through concepts, by means of which our recognition would be expanded, came to naught under this presupposition.
- 11.3 Hence let us try for once whether we might not fare better with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must be governed by our realization, which already does accord better with the demanded possibility of a recognition of them a priori, which is supposed to specify something about objects before they are given to us.
- 11.4 This is the same situation as with the first thoughts of Copernicus who, after things did not work out very well with the explanation of the movements of the stars, when he assumed that the host of stars revolved around the spectator, tried whether it might not succeed better if he let the spectator revolve and, in contrast, leave the stars at rest.

- 11.5 Now concerning the viewing of the objects in metaphysics, we can try it in a similar way.
- 11.6 If the viewing would have to be governed by the nature of the objects, I do not see how someone can know something about them a priori. But if the object (as object of the senses) should be governed by the nature of our viewing capacity, I can conceive this possibility quite well.
- 11.7 But because I cannot stop with these viewings, if they are to be recognitions, but rather must refer them as representations to something else as an object and determine this object through them, I can either assume that the concepts, by which I bring forth this determination, are governed by the object, and in which case I am in the same fix concerning the manner of how I can know something about this object a priori. Or I can assume that the objects, or (which is the same thing) the experience in which they alone (as given objects) are recognized, is governed by these concepts. And in this case I immediately see an easier way out. And this is because experience itself is a manner of recognition which requires understanding, the rule of which I must presuppose within me even before objects are given to me, thus a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori by which, therefore, all objects of experience must be governed necessarily and with which they must agree.
- 11.8 Concerning the objects to the extent they can be thought merely through reason and indeed necessarily so, which however (at least as reason thinks them) cannot be given at all in experience, the attempt to think them (for they must still be subject to thought) will render afterwards a splendid touchstone of what we assume as the altered method of the manner of thinking, namely that we recognize a priori of things just what we ourselves put into them.*

* Kant's footnote.

- 1.1 This method of imitating the investigators of nature consists, therefore, in seeking the elements of pure reason in what allows of confirmation or rejection via an experiment.
- 1.2 Now no experiment to the test the propositions of pure reason, especially if they are ventured out beyond all boundaries of possible experience, can be made with their objects (as in natural science). Therefore, it will only be fea-

sible with concepts and principles which we assume a priori, namely by so organizing them that the same objects can be considered on the one hand as objects of the senses and understanding for the sake of experience, and on the other hand as objects which we merely think, i.e., objects of an isolated reason striving out beyond boundaries of experience; thus from two diverse sides.

- 1.3 Now if, by considering things from such a double point of view, we find that an agreement with the principles of pure reason takes place, while with a single point of view there arises an unavoidable contradiction of reason with itself, then the experiment demonstrates the correctness of this distinction [i.e., of the two points of view].

- 12.1 This attempt succeeds as intended and promises the sure path of a science to metaphysics in its first part, since it is occupied namely with concepts a priori, to which corresponding objects commensurate to them can be given in experience.
- 12.2 For according to this alteration in the manner of thinking, we can quite easily explain the possibility of a recognition a priori and, even more, we can furnish the laws which lie a priori as the basis of nature considered as the sum total of the objects of experience, along with their sufficient proofs, neither of which were possible according to the previous manner of thinking.
- 12.3 But from this deduction of our capacity to recognize a priori, there arises a strange result, which apparently is quite disadvantageous to the entire purpose of what occupies the second part, namely that with it we can never come out beyond the boundaries of a possible experience, but which is precisely the essential concern of this science.
- 12.4 But just in this does the experiment of a control test of the truth of these result of that first assessment of our rational recognition a priori lie, namely that it goes only to appearances, leaving the matter on its own, on the other hand, as actual indeed for itself, but unrecognized by us.
- 12.5 For that which necessarily drives us to go out beyond the boundary of experience and all appearances is the conditioned which reason necessarily, and quite properly, requires in things on their own for all conditions and by which the series of conditions is completed.

- 12.6 Now if we assume that our experiential recognition is governed by objects as things on their own, we find that the unconditioned cannot even be thought without contradiction. But on the other hand, if we assume that our representation of things, as they are given to us, are not governed by these as things on their own, but rather these objects, as appearances, are governed by our representational manner, we find the contradiction ceases. And if, consequently, the unconditioned would have to be encountered not with things to the extent we are familiar with them (to the extent they are given to us), but indeed with them to the extent, as matters on their own, we are not familiar with them, then this indicates that what we at first only assumed as a trial, is well founded.*
- 12.7 Now after denying all progress to speculative reason in this field of the supersensitive, we can still inquire as to whether or not data is found in its practical recognition such that we can determine this transcendental, rational concept of the unconditioned and, in this way with our possible a priori knowledge, succeed in conformity with the wish of metaphysics, i.e., out beyond the boundaries of all possible experience, even though only in a practical referral.
- 12.8 And with such a procedure speculative reason has always at least made room for such an expansion, even if it had to leave it empty; and so we are free, indeed even challenged by speculative reason, to occupy it through practical data, if we can.**

* Kant's footnote.

- 1.1 This experiment of pure reason is quite similar to that of the chemists which they sometimes call the trial of reduction, but in general the synthetic procedure.
- 1.2 The analysis of the metaphysician divided the pure recognitions a priori into two very dissimilar elements, namely that of things as appearances and then of things on their own.
- 1.3 The dialectical joins both in turn for unanimity with the necessary rational idea of the unconditioned, and infds that this unanimity never comes forth otherwise than through that distinction, which therefore is the true one.

** Kant's footnote.

- 1.1 So did the central law of the movement of the heavenly bodies provide confirmed certitude to what Copernicus at first only assumed as an hypothesis, and simultaneously prove the invisible force joining the world edifice (the Newtonian attraction) which would have always remained undiscovered had not the former (Copernicus) dared in a manner contrary to sense, but still true, to seek the observed movements not in the objects of the heavens but rather in their spectator.
 - 1.2 The alteration of the manner of thinking presented in the critique in analogy to that hypothesis, I advance in the preface as hypothesis (even though it is proven, not hypothetically, but rather apodictically in the treatment itself from the nature of our representations of space and time and the elementary concepts of the understanding) only to make notable the first attempts of such an alteration, which are always hypotheticalal.
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- 13.1 The quest of this critique of pure, speculative reason consists in an attempt to alter the previous method of metaphysics by undertaking for it a thorough revolution following the examples of the geometricians and natural scientists, that
 - 13.2 It is a treatise of the method and not a system of the science itself. But nonetheless it specifies the entire outline of that science both with regard to its boundaries and to its entire organization.
 - 13.3 For this is peculiar to pure, speculative reason as such, that it can, and is supposed to, survey its own capacity with respect to the diversity of the manner of choosing objects for thinking, and indeed even to enumerate completely the various ways of displaying problems, and in this way to specify the entire framework for a system of metaphysics. Because, concerning the first of these, nothing can be attributed to the objects in the recognition a priori except what the thinking subject himself provides. And regarding the second, with respect to the principles of recognition, speculative reason is an entirely isolated unity existing of itself, in which each and every part, as in one organized body, exists for the sake of all and all for the sake of each, and no principle can be taken with certitude in one referral without simultaneously having examined it in a comprehensible referral to the entire use of pure reason.

- 13.4 As a result, however, metaphysics also has the rare fortune in which no other science of reason can partake. This has to do with objects (for logic is occupied only with the form of thinking in general), namely if it can be brought through this critique to the sure path of a science, it can fully grasp the entire field of the recognitions belonging to itself and, therefore, can complete its work and pass it on for the use of our posterity as a consummation, never to be increased, because it has to do merely with principles and the delineations of these principles, which delineations themselves are determined by the principles.
- 13.5 To achieve this completeness, therefore, metaphysics is also obligated as a fundamental science, and we must be able to say of it: *nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum*.²
- 14.1 But then what kind of treasure is that, someone will ask, that we think to leave to our descendants, such a metaphysics, purified through critique, but also brought in that way into an enduring state?
- 14.2 With a merely fleeting review of this work we will believe that its benefit were still negative, i.e., never to dare us with speculative reason to venture out beyond the limits of experience; and that is also indeed its first benefit.
- 14.3 But this soon becomes positive, if we become conscious that the foundational propositions, with which reason dares out beyond its boundaries, have, as an unavoidable result in fact, not the expansion, but rather, if we consider it more closely, the narrowing of our rational use in that speculative reason actually threatens to expand the boundaries of sensitivity, to which they actually belong, beyond everything, and thus even to dislodge the pure (practical) use of reason.
- 14.4 Hence a critique, which restricts the former, is indeed to that extent negative. But at the same time, by removing an obstacle, which limits the use of the latter or even threatens to destroy it, it is in fact of positive and important benefit as soon as we are convinced that there is an utterly necessary, practical use of pure reason (the moral) where it inevitably expands itself out beyond the boundaries of sensitivity. Now it indeed has no need of assistance

² Nothing has been finished if something still remains to be done.

from speculative for this expansion, although it must be secured against the reaction of that speculative reason in order not to fall into contradictions with itself.

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- 14.5 To gainsay positive benefit to this service of the critique would be the same as saying the police provide no positive benefit because their main concern is still only to check the violence which citizens have to fear from citizens so that every person can conduct his affairs peacefully and safely.
- 14.6 That space and time are only forms of the sensitive viewing, only contentions therefore of the existence of things as appearances, that we have no further understanding concepts, thus also no elements at all for the recognition of things except to the extent that a corresponding viewing can be given to these concepts, consequently that we can have a recognition of no object as a thing as such on its own but rather only as far as it is an object of the sensitive viewing i.e., as appearance, all of this is proven in the analytical part of this critique. From then of course it follows that all possible speculative recognition of reason is restricted to mere objects of experience.
- 14.7 Nonetheless and this must be kept in mind, with this it is still always reserved that we must at least be able to think, even if not to recognize, just these objects also as things as such on their own.*
- 14.8 For otherwise the absurd proposition would follow that appearances would be without something appearing there.
- 14.9 Now let us assume that the distinction, made necessary through our critique, of things as objects of experience from precisely the same as things on their own, had not been made at all. Then the base proposition of causality and hence of natural mechanism in determination of the same would hold thoroughly as effective cause of all things in general.
- 14.10 Of just the same entity therefore, e.g., the human soul, I would not be able to say "its will is free" and still at the same time "it is subject to natural necessity, i.e., not free" without entailing an obvious contradiction. The reason is that in both propositions I have taken the soul in the same sense, namely as a thing in general (as a thing on its own) and also could not take it otherwise without a preceding critique.

- 14.11 If however the critique has not erred when it teaches the assumption of the object in two senses, namely as an appearance or as a thing on its own, if the deduction of its understanding concepts is correct, thus if the base proposition of causation holds only for things taken in the first sense, namely to the extent they are objects of experience, but precisely the same are not subject to it according to the second mean. Then just the same will in the appearance (the visible actions) be thought as necessarily conformable to the laws of nature and to this extent not free, and still on the other hand, as pertaining to a thing on its own, not subject to it, and thus as free and without a contradiction occurring in this way.
- 14.12 Now even though I can recognize my soul, considered from the latter aspect, through no speculative reason (even less through an empirical observation), thus cannot recognize freedom as the property of an entity to whom I ascribe effects in the sensible world, and for that reason because I would have to recognize such with respect to its existence and still not in time (which is impossible because I can underlay no viewing to my concept). Nevertheless I can think freedom, i.e., the representation of its at least contains no contradiction within itself if our critical distinction of both (the sensitive and the intellectual) representational manners has its place and with it the restrictions of the pure understanding concepts proceeding from it, thus also the base proposition flowing from that.
- 14.13 Now let us suppose that morality would necessarily presuppose freedom (in the most rigorous sense) as a property of our wills by a priori adducing practical, original base propositions lying in our reason as the data of it, which would be utterly impossible without the presupposition of freedom which, however, speculative reason could have proven that this does not permit of being thought at all, thus the presupposition, namely the moral one, must necessarily yield to that whose opposite contains an obvious contradiction, at least freedom and with it morality (for their opposite contains no contradiction if freedom is not already presupposed) give way to the natural mechanism.
- 14.14 But so since I need nothing further for morals than that freedom only not contradict itself and therefore still at least allow of being thought without needing to penetrate it further, that it therefore place no obstacles in the way of the natural mechanism of precisely the same action (taken in another referral); then the instruction of morality asserts its position, and the instruction

of nature also its own, which could not have taken place if the critique had not first taught us of our unavoidable ignorance with respect to things on their own and had not restricted everything which we recognize theoretically, to mere specters.

- 14.15 Precisely this explication of the positive utility of the critical base propositions of pure reason is indicated with regard to the concept of God and of the simple nature of our souls, but which I pass over for the sake of brevity.
- 14.16 I can not once assume God, freedom and immortality in aid of the necessary practical use of my reason, therefore, if I do not simultaneously take away from speculative reason its presumption of supersensitive insights, because in order to achieve to this, reason must avail itself of such base propositions which by reaching in fact merely to objects of possible experience, if they nonetheless are applied to that which cannot be an object of experience, actually change this every time into appearance, and thus declare all practical expansion of pure reason to be impossible.
- 14.17 I had to reduce knowledge, therefore, in order to make room for faith, and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice of advancing in metaphysics without a critique of pure reason, is the true source of all disbelief clashing with morality, which disbelief in fact is always very dogmatic.—
- 14.18 Therefore even if it cannot be difficult with a systematic metaphysics, composed in accordance with the standard of the critique of pure reason, to leave a legacy to posterity, this is a gift not to be disposed. We may now look to the cultivation of reason through the sure path of a science in general in comparison with the baseless fumbling and frivolous rambling about that without a critique, or even to the better application of the tie of an inquisitive youth, who obtain with the usual dogmatism such early and so much encouragement to rationally orchestrate indolently about things of which they understanding nothing and into which, even as no one else in the world, they will never penetrate, or even to go in for inventions of new thoughts and opinions and so miss the acquisition of basic science. But most of all, if we bring into account the inestimable advantage of ending for all time all objections against morality and religion in the Socratic manner, namely through the clearest proof of the ignorance of the opponent.

14.19 For there has always been and likely always will be some sort of metaphysics in the world, but with it also a dialectic of pure reason because it is natural to metaphysics.

14.20 It is therefore the first and most important concern of philosophy to remove once and for all all disadvantageous influence by blocking off the sources of error.

* Kants' Footnote:

1.1 Recognizing an object requires that I can prove its possibility (according to the testimony of experience from its reality, or a priori through reason).

1.2 But I can think whatever I wish as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought, even though indeed I cannot guarantee whether an object corresponds to this or not in the sum total of all possibilities.

1.3 But to attribute objective reality (real possibility, for the first was merely logical possibility) to such a concept, something more is required.

15.1 With this important alteration in the field of the sciences, and with the loss which speculative reason must suffer in its previously imagined possession, everything with general human affairs and with the utility which the world drew from the teachings of pure reason, remains yet in the same advantageous state as it always was, and the loss touches only the monopoly of the schools but in no way the interest of mankind.

15.2 I ask the most inflexible dogmatist whether the following, after they emanated from the schools, have ever been able to reach the public and to have the least influence on its conviction, namely:

the proof of the continuation of our souls after death from the simplicity of substance, or

that of the freedom of will against the universal mechanism through the subtle, indeed, feeble, distinction of subjective and objective necessity in a practical sense, or

that of the existence of God from the concept of a most real entity (of the contingency of the alterable and of the necessity of a prime mover)?

- 15.3 Now if this has not happened and, due to the unfitness of the common, human understanding for such subtle speculations, can never be expected; if far rather, concerning the first, the disposition of his nature, noticeable to every human, never to be able to be satisfied through the temporal (as inadequate for the dispositions of his entire determination), has to effect quite alone the hope for a future life; if with respect to the second, the sheer clear description of duties in opposition to all claims of the inclination does the same for the consciousness of freedom, and finally, concerning the third, if the splendid order, beauty and provision, which ever peers out in nature, effect entirely alone the faith in a wise and great world originator, which depends on rational foundations for an expanding conviction with the public; then not only does this possession remain undisturbed, it far rather even gains yet in esteem by teaching the schools to presume no higher and expanded insight regarding a point which the great (for us most estimable) crowds can just as easily achieve and, therefore, to limit themselves to the cultivation of these universally conceivable and, in a moral intention, sufficing bases of proof.
- 15.4 The alteration, therefore, concerns merely the arrogant claims of the schools, which want very much to hold themselves up in this (as otherwise properly in many other things) as the sole informants and preservers of such truths, of which they communicate to the public only the use, keeping the key for themselves (*quod mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri*³).
- 15.5 Still provision is also made for one reasonable claim of the speculative philosopher.
- 15.6 He always remains exclusively the trustee of one science useful to the public, without its knowledge, namely the critique of reason; for that can never become popular, but also does not have to be so because, as little understood as the finely spun arguments for useful truths are with the people, just as little do the equally subtle objections make sense to them.

On the other hand, because the schools, like every person appealing to speculation, come upon both, the philosopher is bound by thorough research of the rights of speculative reason to obviate the scandal, which sooner or later must break out even with the public from the disputes in which, without

³ What he does not know with me, he will seem to know alone.

a critique, the metaphysicians (and as such finally also the clergy) unavoidably entangle themselves and afterwards even debase their own teachings.

- 15.7 Now solely in this way alone can the root to materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking disbelief, fanaticism and superstitions be cut, all of which are actually more dangerous for the schools, and can scarcely spill over to the public.
- 15.8 If governments find it good to occupy themselves with the matters of scholars, it would be far more fitting, for their wise provision of the sciences as well as for humans, to favor the freedom of such a critique, by means of which alone the rational treatment can be placed on a firm footing; and this instead of supporting the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry about public dangers wherever any one tears their webs, which, however, the public has never noticed and the loss of which, therefore, also it can never experience.
- 16.1 The critique is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in its pure recognition as science (for this must be dogmatic every time, i.e., proven rigorously out of secure principle a priori), but rather against dogmatism, i.e., the presumption of making progress with a pure recognition from concepts alone (the philosophical) according to principles, even as reason has used them for so long without an inquiry into the manner and the right of having achieved to these.
- 16.2 Dogmatism, therefore, is the dogmatic procedure of pure reason without a preceding critique of its own capacity.
- 16.3 Accordingly, this opposition is not supposed to speak in favor of the loquacious babble under the presumptuous name of popularity, or even indeed of skepticism which makes short shrift of all metaphysics. The critique is far more the necessary, preceding arrangement for the promotion of a thorough metaphysics as science, which must be necessarily executed dogmatically and systematically according to the most rigorous requirement, thus scholastically (not popularly), for this requirement to it, since it pledges to execute the concerns of speculative reason entirely a priori, thus to its full satisfaction, is unremitting.

- 16.4 In the execution of the plan which the critique prescribes, therefore, i.e., in the future system of metaphysics, we must some day follow the rigorous method of the famous Wolff, the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers, who first gave the example (and through this example became the founder of the not yet extinguished spirit of thoroughness in Germany) of how the sure path of a science is to be taken through lawful establishment of principles, clear determination of concepts, tried rigor of proofs, prevention of bold jumps in inference, which for that very reasons also was especially suited for placing such as metaphysics in this rank, if it had occurred to him to first prepare the field through a critique of the organ, namely of pure reason itself; a deficiency which is to be ascribed not so much to him as far more to the dogmatical manner of thinking of his age and about which philosophers of his time as well as all preceding ages have nothing with which to blame one another.
- 16.5 Those who discard his manner of instruction and still simultaneously also the procedure of the critique of pure reason can have nothing else in mind than to case aside the shackles of science, change work into play, certainty into opinion and philosophy into philodoxy.⁴
- 17.1 Concerning this second edition, as is reasonable, I have not wanted to let this opportunity pass without remedying as much as possible the difficulties and the obscurity from which some misinterpretations may have originated, which acute men, not without my fault perhaps, have chanced upon in the evaluation of this book.
- 17.2 With the propositions themselves and the bases of proof, likewise with the form as well as the completeness of the plan, I have found nothing to alter, which is to be ascribed partly to the lengthy test to which I subjected it before presenting it to the public, and partly to the constitution of the matter itself, namely the nature of a pure speculative reason which contains a true structure in which everything is an organ, namely all for the sake of the one and the one for the sake of all, thus every even small infirmity, be it a mistake (error) or shortcoming, must unavoidably betray itself with the use.
- 17.3 This system will, as I hope, also continue to hold firm with this inalterability.

⁴ Love on one's own opinion, and entranced by augmentation.

- 17.4 It is not self conceit which justifies me with this confidence, but merely the evidence which the experiment of the equality of the results obtains in starting from the smallest elements and going up to the whole of pure reason, and then in the return from the whole (for this is also given for itself by the final intention of that in the practical) to each part, in that the attempt to change even the smallest part immediately gives rise to contradictions, not merely of the system but of universal human reason.
- 17.5 However there is yet much to do in the presentation and with this I have attempted improvements in this edition, which are aimed partly at removing the obscurity of the deduction of the understanding concepts, partly at remedying the alleged lack of sufficient evidence in the proofs of the base proposition of pure understanding, and finally partly at obviating the misinterpretation of the paralogisms advanced by rational psychology.
- 17.6 This far (namely on to the end of the first part of the transcendental dialectic) and not further do modifications in the notations reach,* because time was too short and also no misunderstanding of the competent and impartial examiners had come to my attention with respect to the remainder, the consideration for whom, which I have given to their suggestions, even without my having to mention them with their well deserved praise, will arise in place.
- 17.7 But a small loss is joined with this improvement for the reader, which was not to be avoided without making the book much too voluminous, namely that sundries, which indeed do not belong essentially to the completeness of the whole, but which some readers might not like to miss, in that they can be useful in an other intention, had to be left out or abbreviated in order to make room for my now, as I hope, more comprehensive description, which utterly changes nothing fundamental with respect to the propositions and even their bases of proof, but deviate here and there from the former in the method of presentation such that it cannot be achieved through insertion.
- 17.8 This small loss, which besides can be counteracted , as one wishes, by a comparison with the first edition, will be, as I hope, amply compensated for by the greater comprehensiveness.

- 17.9 In various public works (partly at the occasion of reviews of some books, partly in particular treatments), I have perceived with grateful pleasure that the spirit of thoroughness has not died out in Germany, but rather was only shouted down for a short while by the modernity of tone and ingenious freedom in thinking, and that the thorny paths of critique, which lead to a scholarly, but as such however, permanent and thus highly necessary science of pure reason, has not hindered courageous and clear heads in mastering it.
- 17.10 To these deserved men, who so fortunately still join the talent of a lucid description (of which I simply am not conscious of in myself) with the profundity of insight, I leave the completion of my work, perhaps yet deficient here and there with respect to the latter; for there is no danger of being refuted in this case, though still of not being understood.
- 17.11 For my part I can no longer engage in disputes, though indeed I will give careful attention to all indications, be they from friends or opponents, to use such in the future design of the system conformable to this propaedeutic.
- 17.12 Since I have already progressed rather far in age during these works (this month into my sixty-fourth year), I must be conservative with time if I will execute my plan to supply the metaphysics of nature as well as of the morals as confirmation of the correctness of the critique of the speculative as well as practical reason, and must expect the clarification of the obscurities, hardly avoidable in the beginning of this work as well as the defense of the whole, by the deserved men who have turned it into their own undertaking.
- 17.13 In individual places every philosophical presentation is strained (for it cannot come forth as ironclad as the mathematical), while the organization of the system, considered as a unity, runs not the least risk in that way, for its overview, when it is new, only few possess the agility of spirit, even fewer however the desire, because all innovation comes inconveniently.
- 17.14 Also apparent contradictions are to be picked out in every writing, especially that departing from clear speech, if one compares single passages, taken out of context, with one another, which casts a adverse light in the eyes of him who depends upon foreign appraisal, but which to him, who has mastered the idea as a whole, are to be easily resolved.

17.15 Consequently if a theory has stability within itself, then action and reaction, which threaten it at first with great danger, serve in time only to polish out its unevenness and also, if men of impartiality, insight and true popularity occupy themselves with it, to provide it in short order with the requisite elegance.

* Kant's footnote

- 1.1 An actual addition, but still only in the manner of proof, I could only term that which I have made by a new refutation of the psychological idealism and by a rigorous (and, as I believe, also the only possible) proof of the objective reality of external viewing.
- 1.2 With respect to the essential purpose of metaphysics, idealism may be held as quite harmless (though in fact it is not).
- 1.3 But having to assume on mere faith the existence of things apart from us (from which we still obtain for our internal sense the entire matter for recognitions themselves), and being unable to oppose any adequate proof to someone, if it occurs to him to doubt this, still remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason.
- 1.4 Because some obscurity is found in the expressions of the proof from the third to the sixth sentence, I want to change this to: "This enduring, however cannot be a viewing within me.
- 1.5 "For all determinations bases of my existence which can be encountered within me, are representations and, as such, have need themselves of something enduring distinct from them in reference to which their alternation, thus my existence in the time in which they alternate, can be determined."
- 1.6 Someone will probably say against this proof that I am still only immediately conscious of what which is within me, i.e., my representations of outer things. Consequently it still remains yet undecided whether something responding to them be external to me or not.
- 1.7 But I am conscious of my existence in time (consequently also of the determinability of myself in this time) through inner experience, and this is more than me being conscious merely of my representation, though still identical with the empirical consciousness of my existence which is determinable only by referral to something which, joined with my existence, is apart from me.

- 1.8 This consciousness of my existence in time is, therefore, identically connected with the consciousness of a relationship to something outside, and it is, therefore, experience and not fiction, sense and not imagination, which inseparably couples the external with my inner sense. For the outer sense is already on its own the referral of the viewing to something actual apart from me, and the reality of that, as being different from the imagination, rests only on it being inseparably joined with the inner experience itself as the condition of its possibility, which is the case here.
- 1.9 If with the intellectual consciousness of my existence in the representation “I am”, which accompanies all my judgments and understanding activities, I could at the same time join a determination of my existence through intellectual viewing, then the consciousness of a relationship to something apart from me would not necessarily belong to that.
- 1.10 But this intellectual consciousness does indeed precede, but the inner viewing, in which alone my existence can be determined, is sensitive and bound to conditions of time. But this determination, thus the inner experience itself, depends on something enduring which is not in me, thus only in something apart from me, in contrast to which I must consider myself in relation. Thusly the reality of the outer sense is necessarily joined with that of the inner for the possibility of an experience in general, i.e., I am conscious that there are things outside of me which refer to my sense just as surely as I am conscious that I myself exist determined in time.
- 1.11 But now to which given viewings actual objects correspond and which belong therefore to the outer sense, to which and not to the imagination they are to be ascribed, must be made out in each particular case according to the rules with respect to which experience in general (even the inner) is differentiated from imagination, whereby the proposition, “there is really an external experience” must lie as basis.
- 1.12 We can add yet here the remark, “the representation of something enduring in existence is not the same as an enduring representation: for the former can be very variable and alternating, as are all our representations and even the representation of material, and still refer to something enduring which, therefore, must be an external thing and different from all of my representations, the existence of which is necessarily included along in the determination of my own existence and makes up with that a single experience which would not even take place inwardly if it were not (partly) simultaneously external.

1.13 The “how?” is just as little subject to further explanation as how we think the stationary in time in general, whose simultaneity with the alternating produces the concept of alteration.

18.1 Koenigsberg in the month of April, 1787.

Next: [The Introduction to the *CPR*](#).