

# **The Third Antinomy from the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason***

Comments and Remarks by Philip McPherson Rudisill

For the text of the Third Antinomy see  
[Dialectic, 2nd Chapter, Third Conflict.](#)

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## Summary by Translator

### The Antinomy in General.

The antinomy arises by the juxtaposition of two contradictory assertions and where it is clear that one must be true and the other false. For example the following could constitute an antinomy (albeit quite contrived):

Judy smells better than Bill *versus* Bill smells better than Judy.

It is obvious (at first glance) that there is a contradiction and both assertions cannot be true. The proofs could proceed as follows: For the thesis, i.e., if Bill smelled better than Judy then people would not be holding their noses when around Bill but not around Judy; but they do precisely this and so Judy must smell better than Bill. And as far as the antithesis is concerned we can say, i.e., that if Judy smells better than Bill, then Judy would discern the slight odors that Bill does, but tests prove that she cannot, and so it is clear that Bill must smell better than Judy.

The solution to this conflict is, of course, very simple: the term “smell” is taken into two different senses, once as an unpleasant odor, and secondly as a capacity for discerning odors.

We should note that this example does not capture the full sense of the antinomy indicated by Kant. In the first place if I had stated the matter as: Judy smells better than Bill *does*, versus: Bill smells better than Judy *can*, then it would be clear that we were speaking of two different uses of the term “smell”, and there would be no illusion.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore with an antinomy proper, there is no appeal to experience directly, for the argument is based on reasoning alone, i.e., out beyond any possible experience.<sup>2</sup> But the example still gives us the feel of the antinomy and how there can be an illusion involved which is based on a different use and meaning of the same terms. It is also clear that in such an argument as an antinomy, whoever presents the last argument wins, for since each is able to prove his point by refuting the premise of the other, it follows that whoever argues last would prove his point by refuting his opponent.

Now while in the case of some of the four antinomies that Kant examines, the solution arises that both arguments are false and due to the relevant terms having no objective meaning, the case

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<sup>1</sup> There is still another alternative, namely: both could be false, and this would be the case if neither person smelled better than the other in that both were without smell or both lacked any capacity for smelling odors. Another example of a both-correct antinomy (where driving is on the right side of the road, as in England): to drive on the left side is to drive on the right side, and to drive on the right side is to drive on the wrong side. Following the logic: therefore to drive on the left side is to drive on the wrong side. But that is false. Here both statements are true, for the left is spatial (opposed to right) and the “right” in the second part means proper or correct (and opposed to wrong). Right is understood here in two different ways. And so there is no contradiction at all and both statements are true.

<sup>2</sup> The reasoning begins with experience, but then goes out beyond any experience in pursuit of the unconditioned.

with others, as with our example here (the third antinomy), is that both sides can be true and where the illusion arises in the use of the same term in a different meaning.

### **The Third Antinomy.**

Here the thesis has it that not all causality in the world is natural and that there must be some freedom. And the antithesis asserts that all causality in the world is that of the laws of nature, and so there is no freedom. We now look at the summaries of these arguments in the style of Kant who wanted to present them side by side, and where we can clearly see that neither can be proven on its own and directly, but only by a proof that the opposing argument must be false.

Since, as we warned, the argument for each side is based solely on proving the opposite side false, and since both sides can do this, and yet since the arguments are mutually contradictory, the question must now arise as to whether reason itself is irrational? Unless a solution can be found for this, such a conclusion will be obvious. We now turn to a investigation of a solution to this antinomy.

#### **The Thesis**

The causality according to laws of nature is not the only one from which the appearances of the world can all together be derived. For there is a causality through freedom to be assumed necessarily for their explanation

#### **The Antithesis**

There is no freedom, but rather everything in the world happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature.

#### **Thesis Proof**

Without freedom every cause must itself be previously caused and thus the chain of causation would go on forever. But in this way there could never be a first link to the chain and so the whole idea is preposterous. Therefore there must have been an original spontaneous causality in order to account for the necessary first link in the chain of causes, and thus of the entire chain.

#### **Antithesis Proof**

Such an alleged spontaneity must itself be caused. But this assumes a preceding, and as yet inactive, causation. But with a spontaneous action there is no causal cohesion at all with anything preceding (for it is spontaneous). Therefore in this way there can be no unity of experience and so this alleged spontaneity ends up simply as a figment of imagination. And even though such a spontaneity relieves the difficulties of comprehending an endless chain of causality, it also removes all necessary connection and in that way then also removes the coherence of experience.

Then Kant makes some remarks to each of these “proven” assertions.

### **Remarks to Thesis Proof**

We don't have to know how a spontaneity is possible, for we don't even understand how laws of nature are possible. Having now proven a spontaneous origin of the world, we can also assume freedom now and then in the course of the sequences of that (and not be constrained solely by an original freedom). We are not concerned about the sequence in time, but only of causality, and so while a free action may follow upon a previous state, it does not arise from that state. And we can easily see why all ancient philosophies (except that of Epicurus) called for a prime, original mover.

### **Remarks to Antithesis Proof**

There is no more reason to assert a dynamical first with respect to causality than there is to assert a beginning in time. And while it is true that we cannot comprehend an unending chain of causes and effects, it is equally true that we cannot comprehend any causation chain and relationship in general, and so this is no argument. In order to conceive of such a spontaneity we would have to position it entirely apart of the world. And we certainly cannot assume any such spontaneous causality regarding the substances of the world, for then the cohesion of experience would vanish and with it also then experience itself.

### **Conceivable Solution of Third Antinomy.**

As we have seen from the previous consideration of experience<sup>3</sup> we are not allowed to break the chain of causation we find for nature and so this must extend backwards without reference to any spontaneous action. Thus the antithesis must be asserted a priori, namely that every event is caused and that cause itself is an event which has arisen and so which must have been caused, and so on. Accordingly the only possible solution would arise if one and the same event could be the effects of two different causalities, one of nature and the other of freedom. This would show that both sides can be right.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> This is based on the Second Analogy of the Transcendental Analytic where we see that the principle of universal causation is necessary for the recognition of an event and thus of experience itself, i.e., to recognize that something has happened. Without this there is no way of distinguishing an objective event from a subjective event, e.g., that the table has been moved to the window versus noticing that a table is in front of the window. In the first case we become aware that earlier the table was not in front of the window and in the second case we only notice the relationship of the table to the window, but not that it has come about, for it could be that we simply did not notice a continuing relationship earlier, i.e., the table was always in front of the window and we had not paid any attention.

<sup>4</sup> This solution will not prove any fact of freedom, but only that freedom is compatible with the necessity of nature by speaking of two different causalities, i.e., nature and freedom.

### **Dual Causality as a Solution.**

One aspect that will be helpful is to recognize Kant's point in the remarks to the thesis where we understand that we can look at freedom more generally, and not consider just an *original* spontaneous action, but to allow such spontaneous actions to arise at any time in the march of time.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly we will conceive of a current natural reaction to circumstances and conditions of the past and consider the possibility that what passes here as a *natural reaction* could also at the same time be a *free action* by considering a different, albeit simultaneous, causality. In anticipation of such a solution we need first to understand what we mean regarding the object.

### **Transcendental Idealism.**

We first need to grasp what we mean with the objects that we see here and there and now and then. According to common and scientific understanding light waves from the sun strike a tree before us in the yard, to use as an example, and some light is absorbed by the tree and that the light that we call the color of the tree is reflected and some of it enters into the eye through the lens and is projected upside down and with left and right reversed on the retina. Then optical nerves relay this information electrically to the brain and there, after adjustments are made for the distortion by the lens of the eye, a *visa* unfolds which we call the tree, and more precisely the appearance of the tree or an image of the tree. This appearance of the tree along with the sky and ground and everything else appearing to us would have its existence *as an appearance* in what we might call the brainarium. This would be on the order of a planetarium, and would exist only within the confines of our skulls.

Now there are two ways of considering this appearance. We could conceive of it to be a real thing just as it appears to us and which, for example, would physically get larger and smaller depending on the distance from us. And if this were the case then our connective understanding would have no basis for any sort of judgments about this appearance. The most we could do would be to get used to this difference in size relative to distance and come to expect it à la David Hume.

On the other hand we can also consider the appearance to be just what it is, namely an appearance and not a real thing at all. In this case the tree we spy would be only the *representation* of a tree and we would not think that the tree, which this appearance represents to us, were changing shape or size.

We come to this second understanding by considering a priori and in advance of all experience that all appearances are connected in a single object which call nature. With this suggestion of

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<sup>5</sup> Thus if freedom could exemplify itself even once, then why not twice, etc.? Kant gives an example of such a sudden spontaneous action of suddenly rising from his chair without any reason, and thus which is independent of the laws of nature and which then also starts a new series on its own.

connection, which is a manifestation of our connective understanding (connecting diverse representations by means of certain categories), we are on the lookout for hints of this connection and are especially taken by coincidences and undertake experiments to discover and recognize the connections. This routine enables us ultimately to conceive of a real thing, which we call the object of experience (a technical term), i.e., the tree in our example, which we think of as existing in a real space and time<sup>6</sup> and independently of us and in accordance with certain laws of nature.<sup>7</sup> And is by virtue of this conceived real tree that we are able to realize and recognize that what we actual see is an appearance within our brainarium, which indeed is the beginning of all experience. David Hume knew this but could not figure out how he could have known it, and so resorted to “academic skepticism” where he doubted even his own system.<sup>8</sup>

So and as a recap: for the sake of experience it is necessary that we posit this thing on its own (and which assumption is then validated by the fact of experience itself, for only in this way can experience ever arise in the human being). But since we are dependent upon our looking and our thinking (via the connective understanding) the thing that we actually see is the object of experience, i.e., how this thing appears in time and space and how it is subject to laws of nature (conceived of by our understanding). This is a limitation of our knowledge and a very important point and bears repeating: we conceive of the thing on its own, but we can only recognize the object of experience. From a common and scientific standpoint we say that the object of experience *is* the thing on its own. But in a transcendental setting we see that the object of experience is merely a conceptual device for combining the appearances and making them perspectives of this object, and fundamentally nothing more is actually available or give to us than the appearances. Hence from a transcendental perspective, this object of experience is merely itself an appearance, how the thing on its own appears within a brainarium, and not how it is on its own independently from any looking.

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<sup>6</sup> It is needful to realize that this “real” space and time in which we position the tree as an object of experience is itself a projection of the space and time of the brainarium. For it is one thing to notice the tree, and another thing to notice it now to the left of the bush where earlier it was in front of the bush (per our looking). And so space and time are the way that we look at things within the brainarium; they are the forms of our looking; they are what we can notice when we look at things, but which are not in the objects looked at at all, but solely and entirely within us, within our brainarium. Time and space seem real enough independently of us, but this is the illusion of the refrigerator light: every time we open the refrigerator door we see that the interior is illuminated, and so it seems like it is always illuminated. Likewise space and time seem omnipresent, but that’s because anytime we want to look at anything we are looking in terms of space and time.

<sup>7</sup> These laws are suggested by our connective understanding and are discerned in particular experiments to be laws of this nature, e.g., action and reaction are equal or cooled air causes some liquids to solidify.

<sup>8</sup> According to Hume’s system we are dealing with things on their own and so where we could never come to any necessity and so where what is causation is merely a customary occurrence, e.g., on a certain road I always spy a dog sitting by the road, and when I reach the end of the road I see that the dog has morphed into a mailbox. Hume knew this was incorrect, but was never able to account for the recognition we have that the dog was not a thing, but only the appearance of a something. He knew it was an appearance but was unable to explain how it is that we could realize that it was only an appearance.

### **The Two Characters.**

Now when we consider the thing on its own transcendently we can know that it can never appear to us as a thing on its own, but only as looked at and thought about as the object of experience. In other words there can be other properties of this thing besides what is attributed to the object of experience, properties which cannot appear within a brainarium. Such properties might be called intelligible, to indicate a reality which cannot appear within a brainarium. Such a property of the human, for example, *might* be the capacity of freedom, transcendental freedom, i.e., a capacity for a spontaneous action which is not caused by the laws of nature, even if that free event might also be expected in the course of the things of a lawful nature. Such a property, like the thoughts and motives of another person, cannot appear to us within a brainarium, and must be inferred, if at all, from the appearances, from that person's actions and speech.

The solution to the third antinomy then can lie in the hypothesis of a transcendental freedom, the capacity to start a series any time in time but independently of the determinations of time, and as a property of the thing on its own, an intelligible property which can be expressed in the brainarium in terms of its actions, but which can no more be sensed than the blind can sense color or the deaf sound.<sup>9</sup> All that is available to the eye of science will be the empirical character which can be completely explained in terms of experience and the laws of nature.

### **The Empirical Character.**

Now we turn to the human and consider his condition. He reasons about things and this is reflected in what we might call the empirical character, i.e., the object of experience in sociology and psychology. And he uses his reasoning to fashion rules of conduct, even though this formulation may be accomplished subconsciously. And the goals for the rules of accomplishing something will be a function of his background and upbringing and various (and often conflicting) desires. And so his use of reason will be a function of his makeup and mentality. So then we infer a person's motives and temperament from his actions and speech and even gestures and then we can trace this empirical character back to his childhood and upbringing and other conditions and understand how he could come to possess such a characteristic way of behavior, and finally then we can utilize this character to predict with accuracy all of the future actions of the individual, given the circumstances and occasions that arise in time.

Let us take the example that Kant suggests in the solution to this antinomy, namely a person who voluntarily lies and produces in that way a certain confusion into society. This person will have a certain background and makeup and a temperament which arouses resentments against people whom he perceives to treat him in a disparaging way. As a result of these elements he will tend to

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<sup>9</sup> Perhaps an analogy arises in modern theoretical physics in the form of dark matter which cannot be seen or sensed, but the effects of which (or at least of something) are noted in the otherwise inexplicable movements of visible bodies.

respond to perceived slights in a way designed for retribution. All this is understandable and expected and this routine represents a characteristic of his personality. Thus when the appropriate circumstances arise, he reacts according to his character and seeks his revenge by telling lies about the person who has offended him. And he utilizes his own reason to assist him how best to express himself, and this becomes part and parcel of his empirical character.

Another example might be the case of St. Paul of Christian fame. He started off as a young man with a determination to keep his Jewish culture free of the influences of the new Christian movement and sought to persecute and to deter the early Christians who were Jews. Later he changed his mind and obtained a new understanding and orientation, and started working on behalf of the Christian faith. What remain constant was his zeal and dedication for what he understood to be the will of God, be it for the Jews against the Christians, or be it, as later, on behalf of the Christians. He exemplified an empirical character which was constant as expected, and which will have been a product of his mentality and temperament and upbringing, etc. His behavior was remained consistent with his empirical character although it was affected by his particular understanding.

So the empirical character constitutes a customary behavior which comes into play when the opportunities arise. In this way everything is explained and there is no question as to how it is that the individual developed the rules that he did. And in this way the use of reason also becomes one of the laws of nature, and certain effects, e.g., a malicious lie, arise by means of that.<sup>10</sup>

### **The Intelligible Character.**

Now at the same time (and drawing on the notion of the thing on its own versus the object of experience as indicated above in the section on the Transcendental Idealism) we can look upon the human being as an intelligible being with an intelligible character and (here posited only as a fiction, to prove the point of compatibility) as a transcendently free agent who can act independently of the laws of nature, and so to which we ascribe responsibility of the empirical character. In that case all of the faults of the person (the malicious liar cited above) we can ascribe to the person and declare that he did not have to choose as he did, and that he could have chosen different rules and different actions, and the reason is that he himself knows that he *ought* to have chosen differently. And so what he did he chose to do and chose to do so freely and without the compulsions of any laws of nature. And so in the case just described we can hold the individual responsible for his actions in telling the lie, i.e., we can consider him as free in a transcendental way and thus where the empirical character is a freely chosen appearance of his intelligible character.

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<sup>10</sup> Then, as Hume asserted, reason is considered as the "slave to passion" and is utilized to further the interest of the individual in terms of his empirical character.

We might look at a rather silly example for emphasis, and consider a tree to have an empirical character and an intelligible one. On the intelligible basis, the tree actually decides freely to put out leaves in the spring and to discard them in fall, and it just looks like it is the work of nature. It is a spontaneous action on the part of the tree and it could have decked itself out in the middle of the winter if it had so chosen. The empirical character, in contrast, is putting out leaves in spring and discarding in fall, and this is a work of nature and there is no basis for any consideration of something called freedom. And so we can simply assert as an arbitrary fiction that the tree is free and is deliberately and unilaterally putting forth and discarding leaves, and that it is only a coincidence that this occurs when the weather changes. Such an assertion is of no use at all to science, of course, but it can be arbitrarily maintained without contradiction (which is all that Kant wants to accomplish at this stage in his thinking).<sup>11</sup>

### **Solution to the Third Antinomy.**

In this wise then we have the solution to this antinomy: we can look at a single event (the lie in the case of our example) and declare it to be both a necessary effect of some natural cause (the background and temperament, etc.) and still also the effect of a free action (being a product of reason), depending upon whether we are considering the empirical character as the object of experience (which is the way of science) or merely as an appearance of the intelligible character, i.e., a freely chosen action, and which would be considering the human as a thing on its own independently from all appearances of the brainarium.

### **Transcendental Reflection.**

It is worthwhile to compare the thing on its own with the object of experience, which is essentially merely an abbreviation for some connected appearances, e.g., the tree in winter and the tree in summer. As a thing on its own the tree is conceived of as given in its totally and all of its conditions. But this does not hold of the tree as an appearance. As an appearance none of the conditions are given, but only what is discernible in the appearance. With a tree at first all that is given is the external appearance. When we dig into the tree and find pulp and further that the pulp consists of cells. And so far all that is given in the appearance are these cells. Next we can look and dig closer and find molecules and then atoms and finally (so far in our looking) we find particles which *appear* to bounce around and in and out of existence, and, so it appears, at random.

In the case of this Third Antinomy the world as a thing on its own is conceived of given with all of its conditions. But this is not the case of the world as an appearance, and all that is ever given

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<sup>11</sup> We do accept this freedom concerning the human because he has reasoning and he understands what "ought" means and he knows (or believes to know) that for any reasoned action he could have acted differently than he did.

in the appearance is what has actually appeared to us in one way or another, and nothing else is given.

### **Practical versus Transcendental Freedom.**

Now we want to focus on the critical element in the Third Antinomy, that of freedom, and specifically practical and transcendental freedom. Here are excerpts from several of Kant's writings on this subject:

### **Critique of Pure Reason - Antinomy - 9th Section**

- 3.1 It is worth noting that the practical concept of freedom depends upon this transcendental idea of freedom, and it is the latter which constitutes the particular difficulties which questions about the possibility of the former have always entailed.
- 3.2 From a practical standpoint freedom denotes an independence of the discretionary choice (*Willkür*) from any necessity through the drives of sensitivity.
- 3.3 For discretionary choice is sensitive to the extent it is affected pathologically (through motivational causes of the sensitivity). It is termed animal (*arbitrium brutum*) if it can be pathologically necessitated.
- 3.4 Human discretionary choice is indeed an *arbitrium sensitivum*, though not *brutum*, but rather *liberum*, because sensitivity does not make human actions necessary, for there is a capacity in the human whereby one is determined of oneself independently of necessitation through sensitive drives.
- 4.1 It is easy to see that if all causality in the world of sense were merely nature, then every event would be determined through another event in time and in accordance with necessary laws, and hence, since appearances, to the extent they determine the volition, would have to necessitate every action as their natural consequence, it follows that the elimination of transcendental freedom would simultaneously eradicate all practical freedom.
- 4.2 For the latter presupposes that even though something did not happen, it still should have happened, and so its cause in the appearance was not so determining that a causality could not exist in our volition to produce something which were completely independent of that natural cause and even in opposition to its power and influence, and hence (there is the assumption that) it could begin a series of events completely of itself.

### **Critique of Pure Reason, Canon - Ultimate Purpose**

- 8.4 Practical freedom can be proven through experience.
- 8.5 For not merely that which excites, i.e., immediately affects the senses, determines human choice. Rather we have a capacity for overcoming the impressions on our sensitive desire capacity through representations of what is itself useful or injurious in a more remote manner. But these deliberations of what is desirable, i.e., good and useful with respect to our entire state, depend on reason.
- 8.6 Accordingly this also renders the laws which are imperatives, i.e., objective laws of freedom, and which say what is supposed to happen, even if perhaps it never does happen. And in that regard these laws are distinguished from natural laws which deal only with what happens. It is then also for this reason that they are called practical laws.
- 9.1 But it could be that reason itself in these actions, through which it prescribes laws, is in turn determined through other further influences, and what is called freedom with respect to sensitive drives might in turn be nature through higher and more remotely effecting causes. But then that does not concern us regarding the practical, since at this point we only ask reason about the precepts of conduct. Besides that notion of other further influences is a merely speculative question which, as long as our intention is directed to doing and refraining, we can set aside.<sup>12</sup>
- 9.2 Through experience, therefore, we recognize practical freedom as one of the natural causes, namely a causality of reason in the determination of the will. Transcendental freedom, on the other hand, requires an independence of this reasoning itself (with respect to its causality in starting a series of appearances) from all determining causes of the sense world. And to this extent it seems to be contrary to the natural law, hence to all possible experience, and therefore remains a problem.

### **Critique of Practical Reason Critical Illumination**

- 7.1 But instead of the deduction of the supreme principle of pure practical reason, i.e., the explanation of the possibility of such a recognition a priori, nothing further could be introduced except this: if we penetrated the possibility of the freedom of an effective cause, we could penetrate not only merely the possibility, but rather even the necessity, of the moral law as the supreme practical law of rational beings, to whom one attributes freedom to the causality of their will. The reason for this is that both concepts are so inseparably con-

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<sup>12</sup> Here we are concerned with the consciousness of actually determining laws for conduct, and so where it does not matter as to hidden and unconscious causes.

nected, that one could also define practical freedom as independence of the will from any law except the moral law alone.

It would seem then that practical freedom indicates a causality of reason in determining the will, i.e., an independence of action from the excitements of the senses, and where the goals of the individual are represented rationally and where this rationality is one of the natural causes. But the implication might remain that it is in pursuit of personal goals that reason is utilized in this practical sense.<sup>13</sup> In that case then the distinguishing mark of transcendental freedom means a determination of the will via pure reason and which is independent of all personal goals arising in the world of sense, i.e., which is absolutely spontaneous and not subject to prior condition. And so when we speak about practical freedom of the human we are thinking specifically of that quality which is denoted by transcendental freedom, i.e., the capacity to determine the will independently of all desires of the individual, and indeed in opposition to them.

In the quotation below, the first case is obviously practical freedom in the sense of ignoring the immediate excitement of the senses for the sake of a longer ranged goal, but one which is a natural inclination, i.e., for life. In the second case we are speaking of a transcendental freedom where we are able to disregard all concern for individual goals of the sensitivity and have pure reason itself determine the will, and indeed even in opposition to all the desires of sensitivity.

### Critique of Practical Reason - 2nd Task

- 3.10 Suppose that some one were to aver of his most passionate desire that it were irresistible if the alluring object and the opportunity to it were at hand; ask him whether he might not be able to master this desire if a gallows were erected before the house where he is to avail himself of this opportunity, in order that he might be hanged there immediately after his savored passion . . . it won't take long to guess his answer.
- 3.11 But inquire of him further: suppose his sovereign, threatening him with the same inexorable death penalty, should require him to bear false witness against an upright man whom the king very much wishes to ruin through trumped up charges, and given how much his love for life might be, ask him whether he would consider it possible that he might overcome this love of life?

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<sup>13</sup> We can then also say that the human considers himself free if he can do what he *feels* like doing or wants to do (which would be the psychological definition of freedom). But of course then his feelings and his wants will be a function of his makeup, etc., and so this freedom is really an illusion and he is thoroughly determined in all regards. And this is the understanding of the human on the part of science. In this wise we see that the actions and thinking and rule-making are all totally conceived by reason but always in conformity with the background and upbringing, etc., and thus where there is no freedom at all. Accordingly the individual does not *act* so much as rather *reacts* to his circumstances in accordance with his temperament and traits and reasoning based on them.

- 3.12 Whether he would do it or not, he may not be able to say; but that it be possible for him to do so, this he will admit without hesitation.
- 3.13 Therefore he judges that he can do something for the simple reason that he is aware that he ought to do so, and recognizes within himself the freedom which otherwise, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him.

Note: we need to keep in mind that this selection from *The Critique of Practical Reason* goes to the *fact* of transcendental freedom which is not yet of concern in this Third Antinomy. For in this present work we are not concerned at all with the reality of freedom, or even with its possibility, but solely with the question as to whether freedom is compatible with the universal necessitation according to laws of nature.

### Comments on the Translation

I have chosen to number each of Kant's sentences and paragraphs in a formate such as 4.2, which would indicate the fourth paragraph and then the second sentence of that paragraph. I may break up Kant's sentences into several, but they will be included all together under that single number. For example, sentence 2.2 of one of the sections reads:

- 2.2 In it no action would commence or cease. Hence then also it would not be subject to laws of the time determination of everything that is alterable, i.e., where everything which happens encounters its cause in the appearance (of the preceding state).

And here I have divided the original German sentence into two English sentences, but still under the indicator of sentence 2.2.

My comments are given as footnotes to the text. Kant's own footnotes I have shown as paragraph notes, following the relevant paragraph, and I have used a smaller font.

The reader is invited to consider [Kant in a Nutshell](#) for a cursory review of Kant's effort in the *Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)*, the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Moral (GMM)*, the *Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR)* and *Religion Within The Bounds Of Sheer Reason (Religion)*. This may help in establishing the context of this present work as well as a short summary.

And I cordially invite the reader who spies any errors or has any suggestions to contact me at [pmr#&kantwesley.com](mailto:pmr#&kantwesley.com) where #& are replaced by @.

Now we can turn to the text of Kant's Third Conflict and begin with the formal presentation of the Third Antinomy concerning natural causes versus freedom. Following that we will find the solution that Kant proposes.

Translator's Notes to the Third Antinomy of the Dialectic of Pure Reason

For the text of the Third Antinomy, go to the [Dialectic, 2nd Chapter, Third Conflict](#).