

**Transcendental Deduction Of
The Pure Concepts Of Understanding
From the Second (B) Version of Kant's
*Critique Of Pure Reason***

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For technical notes by the translator please refer to [Translator's Notes](#).

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#15¹ Possibility of a Connection in General

- 1.1 A manifold of representations can be given in a viewing (*Anschauung*²) which is merely sensitive, i.e., nothing except receptivity, and the form of this viewing can lie a priori in our representational capacity, and still not be anything other than the way the subject is affected.
- 1.2 But the connection (*coniunctio*) of a manifold in general, can never come to us through the senses and, therefore, cannot be contained simultaneously in the pure form of the sensitive viewing; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the representational capacity. Now since we must term this *understanding* in order to distinguish it from the sensitivity, it follows that whether we are conscious of it or not, and whether it be a connection of the manifold of a viewing or of various concepts, and if the former, whether it be a sensitive or non-sensitive viewing, every connection is an act of the understanding. And this connection we generally denominate *synthesis* in order simultaneously to note that we cannot represent anything as combined in the object without first having combined it ourselves. Of all representations the connection is the only one which cannot be given through objects, but rather can only be effected by the subject.
- 1.3 We can easily see here that this synthesis would originally have to be one and the same, and equally valid for every connection, and that the dismemberment, analysis, which seems to be its opposite, still always presupposes it. For where the understanding has not previously combined, it also cannot dismember, because it is only through itself (the understanding) that it was able to be given to the representational capacity as connected.
- 2.1 But beyond the concept of the manifold and its synthesis, the notion of connection includes that of its unity.
- 2.2 Connection is the representation of the synthetic unity of a manifold*
- 2.3 The representation of this unity, therefore, cannot be taken from the connection since it far rather makes the concept of connection first possible by its

¹ This section begins on page 129 of the 2nd (B) version of the *Critique of Pure Reason (CPR)* in the Academic Edition.

² This is usually rendered as “intuition” in English works on Kant. See also [Anschauung](#).

addition to the representation of the manifold.

- 2.4 This unity, preceding as it does all concepts of connection, is not per chance the category of unity (#10); for all categories are based on logical functions in judging, and in these connection, and hence unity of the given concepts, is already assumed.
- 2.5 The category, therefore, already presupposes connection.
- 2.6 Hence we must seek this unity even higher (as qualitative, #12), namely in that which contains even the basis of the unity of diverse concepts in judgments, hence in the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical usage.

* Kant's footnote.

- 1.1 Whether the representations themselves are identical, and therefore whether one could be thought analytically through the other, is not a consideration here.
- 1.2 The consciousness of the one, to the extent we are speaking of a manifold, is always distinguishable from that of another, and here we are concerned only with the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness.

#16 Originally Synthetic Unity Of Apperception

- 1.1 The "I think" must be able to accompany all of my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not at be thought, which would mean that the representation would either be impossible, or at least nothing to me.
- 1.2 That representation which can be given before all thinking is called viewing.
- 1.3 Hence all of the manifold of a viewing has a necessary reference to the "I think" in the same subject in which this manifold is encountered.
- 1.4 But this representation (the "I think") is an act of spontaneity, i.e., it cannot be considered as belonging to the sensitivity.
- 1.5 I call it the pure apperception (to distinguish it from the empirical apperception) or the original apperception because it is that self consciousness which,

by producing the “I think”, must be able to accompany all others and, by remaining one and the same even as they vary, cannot be derived from any other one.

- 1.6 I also call its unity the transcendental unity of the self-consciousness in order to indicate the possibility of recognitions a priori from it.
- 1.7 For the manifold representations which are given in any given viewing would not be altogether *my* representations if they did not belong altogether to one self-consciousness. This is to say that as my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such [as being my representations]) they must conform necessarily to the condition under which alone they can cohere together in a general self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not thoroughly belong to me.
- 1.8 A great deal follows from this original representation.
 - 2.1 Namely: this thorough identity of the apperception encompassing a manifold given in the viewing contains a synthesis of the representations, and is only possible through this synthesis.
 - 2.2 For the empirical consciousness, which accompanies diverse representations, is distracted as such and without reference to the identity of the subject.³
 - 2.3 This referral, therefore, does not occur merely because I accompany each representation with consciousness, but rather because I connect one with the other and am conscious of their synthesis.⁴
 - 2.4 Hence only by being able to combine a manifold of given representations into a single consciousness is it even possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations, i.e., the analytical unity of the apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some sort of syn-

³ See [Transcendental Deduction, version A](#) (TDA) II 3, 8.

⁴ To be conscious of the moon, and then of the chair, and then of the flower, and then of the car sound, etc., etc., is merely a tramp of appearances and each of these is isolated and disjointed and could only be held together by rote, but always as disparate.

thetic unity.*⁵

- 2.5 The thought that these representations, given in the viewing, all belong to me means that I unite them in a single self-consciousness, or at least can do so; and even if it is not yet the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations, it nonetheless still presupposes the possibility of that, i.e., it is only because I can grasp their manifold in one consciousness that I term them all together my representations; for otherwise I would have a self which were as multifaceted and diverse as the representations of which I am conscious.⁶
- 2.6 Synthetic unity of the manifold of the viewings, as given a priori, is therefore the basis of the identity of the apperception itself, which precedes a priori all my determined thought.⁷
- 2.7 But connection does not lie in the objects and cannot per chance be obtained from them through perception and afterwards taken into the understanding, but rather is uniquely a construction of the understanding which itself is nothing more than the capacity for connecting a priori and for bringing the manifold of given representations to the unity of the apperception, which is the highest principle in all of human recognition.⁸

* Kant's footnote.

- 1.1 The analytical unity of the consciousness adheres to all communal concepts as such. E.g., when I think of red in general, I think of a property which (as characteristic) can be encountered here or there, or can be combined with

⁵ It is not that I consider the consciousness of the moon (in the preceding note) and then that of the chair and find that the common element is my consciousness. I have to make a connection, e.g., the manifold of a chair, i.e., the back and seat and legs, before I can come to the analytical unity of my consciousness of self.

⁶ If I spy something which doesn't "make sense" then it is a subjective perception which is kept separate in the mind (and usually put in the back of the mind in a temporary forgetfulness). And I should more properly say: doesn't make sense *yet*, for the constant assumption is that all appearances fit together.

⁷ In other words while the original and transcendental apperception must precede connection as the *potential* for connection, the consciousness of self cannot be expressed or recognized without first an actual connective synthesis of some composite.

⁸ So the apperception is the potential for a unified consciousness of self which is to stretch over and encompass every consciousness, and the understanding is the form of the synthesis such that a manifold can be connected. And so, as we shall see, the connections actually made in order to have an expressible consciousness of self will depend upon the categories of the understanding (as utilized by the productive imagination in its search for connective relationships).

other representations. Thus it is only by means of a previously thought, possible, synthetic unity that I can represent the analytical.

- 1.2 A representation which, as diverse, is to be thought as common, will be viewed as belonging to such which apart from it have some diversity on their own, hence it must be thought in advance in synthetic unity with others (even if only possible representations) before I can think regarding it the analytical unity of the consciousness, which makes it a *conceptus communis*.
 - 1.3 And so the synthetic unity of the apperception is the highest point to which one must attach the use of the understanding, in fact the entire logic and finally the transcendental philosophy. Indeed, this capacity is the understanding itself.
-
- 3.1 Now this principle of the necessary unity of the apperception is itself identical, hence an analytical proposition, but still indicates the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold given in a viewing, without which the thorough identity of the self-consciousness cannot be thought.
 - 3.2 For through the “I” as a simple representation no manifold is given. This (manifold) can only be given in the viewing, which is different from it, and only thought through a connection in one consciousness.
 - 3.3 An understanding in which all manifold were simultaneously given through the self-consciousness would view; but ours can only think and must seek its viewing in the senses.
 - 3.4 Therefore I am conscious of my identical self with respect to the manifold of the representations given to me in a viewing because I term them altogether my representations which make up a single one.
 - 3.5 But that means that I am conscious of their necessary synthesis a priori which is called the original, synthetic unity of the apperception, subject to which all representations given to me must stand, but subject to which also they must be brought by means of a synthesis.

#17 Principle Of The Synthetic Unity Of The Apperception Is The Supreme Principle Of Every Usage Of The Understanding

- 1.1 According to the [Transcendental Aesthetic](#), the supreme principle of the pos-

sibility of every viewing with respect to the sensitivity was that every manifold of the viewing had to be subject to the formal conditions of space and time.

- 1.2 The supreme principle of every viewing with respect to the understanding is that every manifold of the viewing is subject to conditions of the original, synthetic unity of apperception.*
- 1.3 All manifold representations of the viewing are subject to the first principle to the extent they are given to us; and to the second, to the extent they must be subject to connection in one consciousness; for without that nothing can be thought or recognized because the given representations would not share the act of apperception, the “I think”, and would not be grasped in a single self-consciousness by means of that.

* Kant’s annotation:

- 1.1 Space and time and all their parts are viewings, hence singular representations with a manifold which they contain within themselves (see the [Transcendental Aesthetic](#)), hence not merely concepts, whereby precisely the same consciousness which is contained in many representations is encountered, but rather whereby many representations are contained in one, and their consciousness, thus as assembled, and so the unity of the consciousness is encountered as synthetic, but still as original.
- 1.2 This detail is important in application (See No. 25).
- 2.1 Speaking generally, the understanding is the capacity for recognitions.
- 2.2 These consist in the determined referral of given representations to an object.
- 2.3 But an object is that, in whose concept the manifold of a given viewing is united.
- 2.4 But now every unification of representations requires unity of the consciousness in their synthesis.
- 2.5 Consequently, the unity of the consciousness is what constitutes the referral of the representations to an object, and uniquely so, hence their validity, consequently that they become recognitions, and whereupon, finally, the possi-

bility of understanding depends.

- 3.1 The first, pure understanding recognition, therefore, whereupon its entire remaining usage depends and which at the same time is also independent of all conditions of the sensitive viewing, is the principle of the original, synthetic unity of apperception.
- 3.2 Hence the mere form of the external, sensitive viewing, space, is not yet a recognition; it only presents the manifold of the viewing a priori for a possible recognition.
- 3.3 But in order to recognize something in space, e.g., a line, I must draw it and thereby produce synthetically a determined connection of the given manifold such that the unity of this action is simultaneously the unity of the consciousness (in referral to a line) and only in that way will an object (a determined space) be recognized.
- 3.4 The synthetic unity of the consciousness, therefore, is an objective condition of all recognitions, not only which I need in order merely to recognize an object, but rather to which every viewing must be subject in order even to be an object for me, because in any other way and without this synthesis, the manifold would not be united in one consciousness.
- 4.1 This last sentence, as I indicated, is itself analytical, even though it makes synthetic unity a condition of all thinking; for all it really says is that all my representations in a given viewing must be subject to the condition, under which alone I can count them to the identical self as my representations and, therefore, can grasp them, as synthetically connected in one apperception, through the general expression, "I think".
- 5.1 But nonetheless this principle is not a principle for every possible understanding but rather only for one, by means of the pure apperception of which no manifold at all is given in the representation, "I am".
- 5.2 An understanding, through whose self-consciousness the manifold of a viewing were simultaneously given, an understanding, through whose representation the object of this representation simultaneously existed, would have no

need of a particular act of the synthesis of the manifold for the unity of the consciousness, an act which the human understanding, which merely thinks and does not look, very definitely needs.⁹

- 5.3 But it is still unavoidably the first principle for the human understanding, so much so that we can in no way imagine any other, possible understanding, neither which itself viewed, nor, if it possessed a sensitive viewing as a basis, then one which were different from that in space and time.

#18 Objective Unity Of The Self-Consciousness

- 1.1 The transcendental unity of the apperception is that whereby all of the manifold given in a viewing is united in a concept of the object.
- 1.2 For that reason it is called objective and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of the consciousness which is a determination of the internal sense whereby that manifold is given empirically to the viewing for such a connection.¹⁰
- 1.3 Whether I can be empirically aware of the manifold as simultaneous or successive, for example, depends upon circumstances or empirical conditions.
- 1.4 Hence the empirical unity of the consciousness by means of the association of the representations, actually concerns an appearance and is entirely contingent.
- 1.5 In contrast, the pure form of the viewing in time, merely as a viewing in general which contains a manifold, is subject to the original unity of the consciousness and solely through the necessary referral of the manifold of the viewing to a single, "I think"; hence through the pure synthesis of the understanding which is the a priori basis of the empirical synthesis.
- 1.6 That original unity alone is objectively valid; the empirical unity of apperception, which we do not consider here and which is also merely derived from the former under given conditions *in concreto*, has only subjective va-

⁹ This may have reference to the last section of the [Aesthetic](#) (No. 8, IV) where Kant speaks of a divine viewing.

¹⁰ The latter is the *subjective* perception and the former (recognition) the *objective*.

lidity.

- 1.7 One person joins the representation of a certain word with one thing, another with another; and the unity of the consciousness in what is empirical is not necessary and universally binding with respect to what is given.

#19 Logical Form Of All Judgments Consists In The Objective Unity Of The Apperception Of The Concepts Contained In Them

- 1.1 I have never been satisfied with the logician's explanation of a judgment in general; it is, they say, the representation of a relationship between two concepts.
- 1.2 Now without quarreling with them here about the deficiency of this explanation (even though many disadvantageous consequences have arisen in logic as a result of this error,* that in any case it only applies to categorical judgments, and not to hypothetical nor disjunctive ones (the latter not even containing a relationship of concepts but rather of judgments), I only note that in this way it is not determined in what this relationship consists.

* Kant's footnote.

- 1.1 The widespread doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns only the categorical syllogisms, and even though it is nothing more than an art of feigning the appearance of obtaining more conclusions than are in the first figure through the concealment of immediate consequences under the premises of a pure, rational syllogism, they would not ever have the least, particular fortune through that alone if it had not succeeded in presenting the categorical judgment in exclusive esteem as that whereupon all others would have to be referred, but which is false according to paragraph No. 9.
- 2.1 But when I examine very carefully the relationship of given recognitions in every judgment and distinguish those relationships belonging to the understanding from those according to laws of the reproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity), I find that a judgment is nothing other than the way of bringing given recognitions to the objective unity of the apperception.
- 2.2 To this end the little coupler "is" is directed in them, i.e., to distinguish the

objective unity of given representations from the subjective.

- 2.3 For this “is” denotes the reference of the judgment to the original apperception and its necessary unity, even if the judgment itself is empirical, hence contingent, e.g., bodies are heavy.
- 2.4 I do not mean, of course, that these representations belong necessarily to one another in the empirical viewing, but rather that they belong to one another in the synthesis of the viewing by means of the necessary unity of the apperception, i.e., according to principles of the objective determination of all representations, to the extent that a recognition can arise from that, which principles are all derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of the apperception.
- 2.5 From this alone does a judgment arise out of this relationship, i.e., a relationship which is objectively valid and which is sufficiently distinguished from the relationship of the very same representations which is valid only subjectively, e.g., according to the laws of association,¹¹
- 2.6 where, for example, I would only be able to say, “when I hold a body, I feel a pressure of heaviness”, but not, “it, the body, is heavy”; which indicates that these two representations are combined in the object, i.e., without regard to the state of the subject, and are not merely adjacent to one another in the perception (regardless of how often it might be repeated).

#20 All Sensitive Viewings Are Subject To The Categories As Conditions Under Which Alone Their Manifold Can Cohere In A Consciousness

- 1.1 The manifold in a given, sensitive viewing pertains necessarily to the original, synthetic unity of apperception because it is only by means of this that the unity of the viewing is possible (#17).
- 1.2 But the action of the understanding, through which the manifold of given representations (regardless of whether viewing or concept) are brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments (#19).

¹¹ Here laws of association would refer to the working of the associations a la Hume (See [Aesthetic](#), Second Part, No. II) and not the rule of association which is a means of the productive imagination as it seeks to find a unification which will match a unification in the apperception. I also think Kant means the holding together a manifold by rote in the subjective perception.

- 1.3 Hence every manifold, to the extent it is given in a single, empirical viewing, is determined with respect to one of the logical functions of judging, through which namely it is brought for a consciousness in general.
- 1.4 But now the categories are nothing except these very functions of judging to the extent the manifold of a given viewing is determined with respect to them (#10).
- 1.5 Thus the manifold in a given viewing is necessarily subject to the categories.

#21 Remark

- 1.1 A manifold which is contained in a viewing which I call my own is represented as pertaining to the necessary unity of self-consciousness by the synthesis of the understanding, and this occurs through the category.*
- 1.2 This indicates, therefore, that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold of a single viewing is as subject to a pure self-consciousness a priori as an empirical viewing is to a pure sensitive one, which is equally a priori.--
- 1.3 In the above sentence, therefore, the beginning of a deduction of the pure understanding concepts has been made where, since the categories only arise in the understanding independently of the sensitive, I must abstract from the manner in which the manifold is presented for an empirical viewing, in order to focus on the unity which is added to the viewing by the understanding by means of the categories.
- 1.4 Later (#26) it will be shown from the manner of giving the empirical viewing in the sensitivity, that its unity is none other than that which the category prescribes to the manifold of a given viewing in general according to the above (#20), and in this way, by explaining its validity a priori with respect to all objects of our senses, the intention of the deduction will be completed.

* Kant's annotation.

- 1.1 The basis of the proof of this is the represented unity of the viewing, through which an object is given, which always encompasses a synthesis of the manifold for a given viewing and already contains the referral of this latter to the unity of apperception.

- 2.1 But one thing I still could not eliminate in the above proof, namely that the manifold for the viewing would have to be given before the synthesis of the understanding and independently of it (although how this is accomplished remains undetermined at this point).
- 2.2 For if I wanted to conceive of an understanding which itself viewed (like perchance a divine one, which did not represent given objects to itself, but rather through whose representation the objects themselves were simultaneously given or produced), then the categories would have no meaning at all with regard to such a recognition.
- 2.3 They are only rules for an understanding whose entire capacity consists in thinking, i.e., in the action of bringing the synthesis of the manifold, which has been given to it from elsewhere via the viewing, to the unity of apperception, which therefore recognizes nothing of itself, but rather only combines and orders the content for the recognition, i.e., the viewing, which must be given to it through the object.
- 2.4 But the peculiarity of our understanding, i.e., producing unity of apperception a priori only by means of the categories and only in this way and count, cannot be explained any more than why we have only these and no other functions of judging, or why time and space are the only forms of viewing possible to us.

#22 The Category Serves No Other Purpose For The Recognition Of Things Than Its Application To Objects Of Experience

- 1.1 Thinking an object, therefore, and recognizing an object are not the same at all.
- 1.2 Two components are involved with a recognition: first the concept whereby in general an object is thought (the category), and secondly the viewing whereby it is given; for if no viewing could be given to correspond to the concept, it would be a thought with regard to form, but without any object, and through it no recognition of any sort of thing would be possible at all because, as far as I would know, there would be nothing which could be given to which my thought could be applied.

- 1.3 Now since the only viewing possible for us is sensitive (per the Aesthetic); the thinking of an object in general through a pure concept of the understanding can become a recognition for us only to the extent that it is referred to objects of the senses.
- 1.4 Sensitive viewing is either a pure viewing (space and time) or an empirical viewing of something that is immediately represented through sensation as actual in space and time.
- 1.5 Through the determination of the first of these we can obtain recognitions a priori of objects (in mathematics), but only with respect to their form as appearances; whether there be things which would have to be viewed in this form or not, is not yet determined.
- 1.6 Hence no mathematical concept is of itself a recognition; unless one assumes there are things which can only be perceived by us according to the form of that pure, sensitive viewing.
- 1.7 But things in space and time are given only to the extent that they are perceptions (representations accompanied by sensation), hence only through empirical representation.
- 1.8 Consequently, the pure concepts of the understanding, even when they are applied to viewings a priori (as in mathematics), provide a recognition only to the extent that these and also, therefore, the concepts of the understanding by means of these, can be applied to empirical viewings.
- 1.9 Hence the categories, by means of the viewing, also provide us with no recognition of things except by means of their possible application to empirical viewings, i.e., they serve only for the possibility of empirical viewing.
- 1.10 But this is called experience.
- 1.11 Consequently, the categories have no other usage for the recognition of things except to the extent that these are taken as objects of possible experience.

#23

- 1.1 The above statement is of the greatest importance; for it exactly determines the boundaries of the usage of pure concepts of understanding with respect to objects even as the transcendental aesthetic determined the boundaries of the usage of the pure form of our sensitive viewing.
- 1.2 Space and time, as conditions of the possibility of the way that objects can be given to us, are not valid except for objects of the senses, hence then only for experience.
- 1.3 Beyond these boundaries they represent nothing at all; for they exist only in the senses and have no reality out beyond them.
- 1.4 The pure concepts of understanding are free of this restriction and reach out to objects of viewings in general regardless of whether they are ours or not, as long as they are sensitive and not intellectual.
- 1.5 But this widened expansion of the concepts out beyond our sensitive viewing avails us not a wit,
- 1.6 for then they are empty concepts of objects, concerning which we cannot utilize the former [space and time] to judge whether they are even possible or not. They are mere forms of thought without objective reality, because we have no viewing at hand to which the synthetic unity of apperception, which contains them alone, could be applied and they could then determine an object.
- 1.7 Our sensitive and empirical viewing alone can provide them with sense and meaning.
- 2.1 Therefore, if we assume an object of a non-sensitive viewing as given, then we can, of course, represent it through all the predicates which are contained in that supposition, that nothing belonging to the sensitive viewing is suitable to it. We can say, therefore, that it is neither extended nor in space, that its continuation is not of time, that in it no alteration (succession of the de-

terminations in time) is encountered, etc.¹²

- 2.2 But when I merely indicate what the viewing of an object is not, without being able to say what *is* contained in it, then I have not made an actual recognition. I have not represented the possibility of an object to my pure concept of understanding, because I have not been able to give any viewing which corresponds to it, but rather could only indicate how ours is not valid for it.
- 2.3 But the most interesting aspect here is that to such a something not a single category could ever be applied, e.g., the concept of substance, i.e., of something which could exist as subject but never merely as a predicate; for I do not know at all whether there could be such a thing to correspond with this determination of thought were not empirical viewing available for an application of it.
- 2.4 But more of this later.

#24 Application Of The Categories To Objects Of The Senses In General

- 1.1 The pure concepts of understanding, through the sheer understanding, refer to objects of viewing in general, regardless of whether they are like ours or of another sort, as long as they are sensitive. But still for all that they are merely forms of thought through which still no determined object is recognized.
- 1.2 The synthesis or combination of the manifold in these objects was referred solely to the unity of the apperception, and in that way the basis of the possibility of recognitions to the extent they depend upon the understanding was a priori and, hence, not only transcendental but even entirely and purely intellectual.¹³
- 1.3 But because a particular form of viewing a priori is fundamental for us, one which depends upon the receptivity of the representational capacity (sensitivity), the understanding, as spontaneity, can determine the inner sense

¹² This reminds me of how some Hindus refer to God, namely he is not this and he is not that, i.e., pointing out everything in existence and declaring that it is not God.

¹³ Here we are looking not just at the apperception as necessary and enabling for a connection, but realizing that it is entirely intellectual and that nothing sensitive is involved here.

through the manifold of given representations according to the synthetic unity of the apperception, and thus think synthetic unity of apperception to the manifold of the sensitive viewing a priori as the condition, to which all objects of our (human) viewing are necessarily subject. In that way then the category, as a mere form of thought, achieves objective reality, i.e., application to objects which can be given to us in a viewing, but only as appearances; for only of these are we a priori qualified for viewing.

- 2.1 This synthesis of the manifold of the sensitive viewing, which is a priori possible and necessary, can be termed figurative (*synthesis speciosa*) to distinguish it from that which would be thought with respect to the manifold of a viewing in general in the mere category and which is called a connection of the understanding (*synthesis intellectualis*). Both are transcendental, not merely because they precede a priori, but also because they establish the possibility of other recognitions a priori.
- 3.1 But the figurative synthesis, when directed solely to the original synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., the transcendental unity which is thought in the category, must be called the transcendental synthesis of the imagination in order to distinguish it from the merely intellectual connection.
- 3.2 Imagination is the capacity of representing an object even without its presence in the viewing.
- 3.3 Now since all our viewing is sensitive, the imagination belongs to the sensitivity, because of the subjective condition under which alone it can give the concept of the understanding a corresponding viewing. But to the extent its synthesis is an exercise of the spontaneity which is determining and not, like the senses, merely determinable, hence can determine a priori the form of the sense according of the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a capacity for determining the sensitivity a priori, and its synthesis of the viewings, conformable to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is an effect of the understanding on the sensitivity and the first exercise of that (and simultaneously the basis of all other) on objects of any viewings possible to us.¹⁴

¹⁴ And so our play with a viewing is not idle or random, but is directed by the categories of the understanding, namely to find a configuration or manifold which matches a category and which fits in with the total unified apperception.

3.4 Now to the extent the imagination is spontaneity, I frequently call it the “productive imagination” to distinguish it from the “reproductive imagination” whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of association, and which therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of recognitions a priori. And for which reason does not belong in the transcendental philosophy but rather in psychology.¹⁵

* * *

4.1 Here now is the place to elucidate the paradox which must have been apparent to everyone at the exposition of the form of the inner sense (#6): namely how this represents ourselves to our own consciousness not as we are on our own, but rather only the way in which we appear to ourselves, since namely we see ourselves only as we are internally affected, which seems to be contradictory in that we would have to act on ourselves passively. It is for this reason that most scholars would rather identify the inner sense with the capacity of apperception in the systems of psychology (but which we carefully distinguish).

5.1 What determines the inner sense is the understanding and its original capacity for combining the manifold of the viewing, i.e., for subjecting it to an apperception (on which even the possibility of an understanding depends).

5.2 Now since the human understanding is not a viewing capacity, and, therefore, even though viewings are given in the sensitivity, it still cannot apprehend them within itself in order to connect the manifold of its own viewing, as it were, it follows that its synthesis, considered of and for itself alone, is nothing other than the unity of the action (of which it is conscious as such even without sensitivity, but) through which it is empowered to determine even the sensitivity internally with respect to the manifold, regardless of the form of its viewing in presenting it.

5.3 Under the denomination of a transcendental synthesis of the imagination, therefore, the understanding exercises that action on the passive subject, whose capacity it is, whereby we say quite properly that the inner sense is

¹⁵ And so it is one thing to remember something, but another thing entirely to play with that memory and to configure and think the object in a certain way, a way that fits in with a unified apperception called experience.

affected by that understanding.

- 5.4 The apperception, along with its synthetic unity, is so vastly different from the inner sense that it, as the source of all combination and under the name of the categories, is far rather applicable to the manifold of viewings in general, [and goes] to objects in general before any sensitive viewing; while the inner sense contains the sheer form of the viewing but without any combination of the manifold in it, hence no *determined* viewing whatsoever, which is only possible through the consciousness of its determination through the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding upon the inner sense), which I have termed the figurative synthesis.
- 6.1 This we perceive in us all the time.
- 6.2 We cannot even represent a line to ourselves without drawing it in thought, nor a circle without describing it, nor the three dimensions of space without placing three lines perpendicular to each other at a single point, nor even time itself without drawing a straight line (which is to be its outward, figurative representation) and being conscious merely of the action of the synthesis of the manifold by determining the inner sense successively and thereby attending to the succession of this determination in it.
- 6.3 Movement as an action of the subject (not as the determination of an object)* consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, if we abstract from this space and consider merely the action whereby we determine the inner sense according to its form, it is this movement that actually first produces the concept of succession.¹⁶
- 6.4 The understanding, therefore, does not perchance already find such a connection of the manifold in this inner sense, but rather produces it by affecting the inner sense.
- 6.5 But how the I which thinks I, differs from the I which looks at itself (in that we can imagine other ways of viewing as at least possible) and still be identical with the latter as the same subject, therefore how I can say, “I, as intelligence and thinking subject, recognize myself as a thought object, to the ex-

¹⁶ So I peruse a room to take it all in, and this action, when I reflect on it, gives me the notion of succession. Presumably I contrast the constancy of the room with the changes in the viewing of the room and come to the notion of a succession in time.

tent I am additionally given in the viewing, but, like other phenomena, not as I am for the understanding but rather only as I appear”, entails no more and no less difficulty than how I can in general be an object to myself and indeed of viewing and inner perception.

- 6.6 But that it really would have to be so can be established if we let space hold as a mere form of the appearances of the external sense, where time, which is not at all an object of external viewing, cannot be made representable for us in any other way than through the picture of a line, to the extent we draw it. And without this descriptive manner we could not at all recognize the unity of its dimension, even as we likewise must always derive the determination of the length of time or even the temporal positionings for all internal perceptions from that which external things present as changeable. Hence we must order the determinations of the internal sense as appearances in time precisely in the same way that we order those of the external sense in space. Hence, if we admit of the latter that we recognize objects only to the extent that we are externally affected, we must also insist of the inner sense that we even see ourselves only as we are inwardly affected by ourselves, i.e., concerning the internal viewing, we recognize our own subject only as appearance, but not according to what it is on its own.**

* Kant's footnote.

- 1.1 Movement of an object in space does not belong in a pure science, and hence not in geometry; because the capacity of something for movement cannot be recognized a priori but rather only through experience.
- 1.2 But movement as a description of a space is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the manifold in the external viewing in general through the productive imagination and belongs not only in geometry, but indeed also to the transcendental philosophy.

** Kant's Footnote

- 1.1 I do not understand why people find so much difficulty about the inner sense being affected by ourselves.
- 1.2 Every time we pay attention to something we have an example of this,
- 1.3 for there the understanding always determines the inner sense conformable to the connection which it thinks to the inner viewing which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding.
- 1.4 How frequently the mind is affected in this way can be easily perceived

within each person.¹⁷

#25

- 1.1 On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of representations in general, hence in the synthetic, original unity of apperception, I am aware of myself not as I appear to myself nor as I am on my own, but rather only that I am.
- 1.2 This representation is a thought, not a viewing.
- 1.3 Now in addition to the action of thinking, whereby the manifold of every possible viewing is brought to the unity of apperception, the recognition of our own selves requires yet a determined manner of viewing whereby this manifold is given. It follows therefore that while my own existence is by no means appearance (much less an illusion), the determination of my existence* can occur only according to the form of the inner sense according to the way in which the manifold, which I combine, is given in the internal viewing, and therefore I have no recognition of myself as I am, but rather merely as I appear to myself.
- 1.4 The consciousness of one's self, therefore, is still very far indeed from a recognition of one's self independently of all categories which constitute the thinking of an object in general through connection of the manifold in an apperception.
- 1.5 For a recognition of an object which is apart from me, in addition to the thinking of an object in general (in the category), I need also a viewing whereby I determine that general concept. Likewise for the recognition of my own self, in addition to the consciousness, [i.e.,] in addition to the thinking of my own self, I need also a viewing of the manifold in me whereby I determine this thought. And I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its capacity of connecting, but with respect to the manifold which is to be combined, one [an intelligence] that is subject to a limiting condition which is termed the inner sense, making that connection only according to relationships of time, which are located entirely apart from the actual concepts of understanding, and therefore can recognize itself in relationship to a

¹⁷ When we pay attention to something we affect the inner sense by distinguishing time (and the content of that time) into an irrelevant and a relevant, and ignore the former and focus on the viewing in the latter.

viewing (which is not intellectual and cannot be given through the understanding itself) still only as it appears to itself, but not as it would recognize itself if its viewing were intellectual.

* Kant's Footnote

- 1.1 The "I think" expresses the act of determining my existence.
- 1.2 Hence my existence is already given thereby, but the manner of determining it, i.e., the manner of locating within me the manifold belonging to it, is not yet given by that.
- 1.3 In order to accomplish that, a self-viewing is needed, and that has an a priori given form, i.e., time, as its foundation, which is sensitive and pertains to the receptivity of the determinable.
- 1.4 Now if I do not yet have another self viewing giving the determining in me, of whose spontaneity I am only conscious, just as much before the act of the determining as time does the determinable, then I cannot determine my existence as a self-active being. Rather I represent to myself only the spontaneity of my thinking, i.e., of the determining, and my existence remains always only sensitively determinable, i.e., as the existence of an appearance.¹⁸
- 1.5 But this spontaneity does enable me to call myself an intelligence.

#26 Transcendental Deduction Of The Universally Possible Usage Of The Pure Concepts Of Understanding In Experience.

- 1.1 In the metaphysical deduction the origin of the categories a priori was described through their complete accord with the universal, logical functions of thinking. In the transcendental deduction this is accomplished through their possibility as recognitions a priori of objects of a viewing in general (#20, #21).
- 1.2 Now we are to explain the possibility of recognizing a priori through the categories any objects which might ever arise to viewing through our senses and indeed not with regard to the form of their viewing, but rather according to the laws of their connection; hence the assignment of laws to nature, as it were, and even making it [nature] possible.

¹⁸ So I discover that I like bacon and adventure films and this kind of music, etc., and all this arises in time, and so I never recognize myself as a given thing but always only as an appearance. I cannot tell in advance that I will like or dislike some food, but require an exposure.

- 1.3 For without this it would not be clear how these categories would be suitable for subjecting everything which could come before our senses to laws which arise a priori from the understanding.
- 2.1 I note in advance that with “synthesis of the apprehension” I mean the assemblage of the manifold in an empirical viewing, whereby perception, i.e., its empirical consciousness (as appearance), becomes possible.¹⁹
- 3.1 With the representations of space and time we have forms of external and internal sensitive viewing a priori, and to these the synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold must always be conformable because it is only by means of these forms that a manifold can arise.
- 3.2 But space and time are not only forms of sensitive viewing, they are also viewings themselves (which contain a manifold), and hence are represented with the determination of the unity of this manifold within them a priori (see the Transcendental Aesthetic).*
- 3.3 Therefore unity of the synthesis of the manifold apart from or within us and therefore also a connection to which everything which is to be represented as determined with regard to space or time must conform, is simultaneously given along with (though not *in*) these viewings as a condition of the synthesis of every apprehension.²⁰
- 3.4 This synthetic unity, however, can be none other than that of the connection of the manifold of a given viewing in general in an original consciousness conformable to the categories and merely applied to our sensitive viewing.
- 3.5 Consequently every synthesis, whereby perception is even possible, is subject to the categories. And since experience is recognition through connected perceptions, it follows that the categories are conditions of the possibility of

¹⁹ Thinking back to the A version of this deduction I remember that the perception (careful-take) requires paying attention and the reproductive imagination in order to establish something called a fact. This is the subjective perception. When the manifold is tackled by the productive imagination and is assembled according to the rule of association (looking for connections) and this fits with the apperception (the unified consciousness with regard to all perceptions) then we move to a recognition or objective perception.

²⁰ What is given *in* the viewings of space and time are the infinitude of different spaces and times which are nothing more but limitations of these two infinite singularities.

experience and are valid, therefore, a priori also of all objects of experience.

* Kant's annotation.

- 1.1 Space, considered as an object (as is actually required in geometry), contains more than the mere form of viewing. It also contains an assemblage of the manifold in an viewable representation according to the form of the sensitivity given, such that the form of the viewing renders merely manifold, but formal viewing *unity* of the representation.
- 1.2 In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensitivity, but only in order to note that it preceded all concepts, even though it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong in the senses, but through which all concepts of space and time first became possible.
- 1.3 For since through this unity (the understanding determining the sensitivity) space and time are first given as viewings, it follows that the unity of this viewing a priori belongs to space and time and not to the concepts of the understanding (#24).

* * *

- 4.1 If therefore and for example I turn the empirical viewing of a house into a perception through the apprehension of its manifold, then the necessary unity of space and of the external, sensitive viewing in general are the underlying foundation, and I draw, as it were, its shape conformable to this synthetic unity of the manifold in space.
- 4.2 But just this very synthetic unity, when I abstract from the form of space, has its seat in the understanding and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in a viewing in general, i.e., the category of quantity, to which, therefore, the synthesis of the apprehension, i.e., the perception, must be thoroughly conformable.^{21*}

* Kant's annotation:

1. In this way it is proven that the synthesis of the apprehension, which is empirical, would necessarily have to be conformable to the synthesis of the apprehension which is intellectual and is contained entirely in the category.
2. It is one and the same spontaneity which there under the name of the imagi-

²¹ With the perception of the house, we mean the accumulation of the multiplicity in anticipation of a recognition. And so even this perception (merely leading toward a recognition, and whether that is achieved to or not) requires the category.

nation and here under the name of the understanding produces connection in the manifold of the viewing.

- 5.1 If (in another example) I perceive the freezing of water, then I apprehend two states (the liquid and the solid) as such which stand in a relationship of time to each other.
- 5.2 But in the time which I place as the basis to the appearance as the inner viewing, I represent the necessary, synthetic unity of the manifold, without which that relationship could not be given as determined (with respect to a temporal series) in a viewing.²²
- 5.3 But now this synthetic unity, as a condition a priori under which I combine the manifold of a viewing in general, if I abstract from the continuing form of my internal viewing, time, is the category of cause which, when I apply it to my sensitivity, determines everything which occurs according to its relationships in time in general.
- 5.4 Hence the apprehension in such an event, and therefore also the event itself, is subject to the concepts of the relationships of effects and causes with respect to a possible perception, and so on in all other cases.²³

* * *

- 6.1 Categories are concepts which prescribe a priori laws to the appearances, hence to nature as the complex of all appearances (*natura materialiter spectata*).
- 6.2 And now the question occurs: since they are not derived from nature and do

²² By determined I do not yet mean a recognition of the relationship of *cold* to ice, but rather only (though critically importantly) of the relationship of ice and water. Thus it is this second look (perception) that I am speaking about and its possibility depends upon the category which binds *through* time, namely causation.

²³ Here again it is the category (of cause) which makes possible not only the recognition, but even the perception of an event, which can lead to an eventual recognition of it as an effect (although it might also not), i.e., the accumulation of the manifold, consisting of objects. In the case of the slamming door (see Technical Notes in the [A version of the Deduction](#)), the perception of an event, that something had changed, came about when I carefully reopen and tried the door to make sure. This experiment was made possible through the presupposition of universal connection of all appearances (and their reproducibility) and (in this case) via the concept of cause and effect. It is this awareness that something had happened which then prompts us to seek the cause, i.e., the actual connection.

not order themselves according to the pattern of nature (because otherwise they would be merely empirical), how can we understand that nature would have to order itself according to them, i.e., how can they a priori determine the connection of the manifold of nature without deriving these from nature?

6.3 Here is the answer to this riddle.

7.1 It is no more curious for the laws of appearances in nature to have to accord with the understanding and its a priori form, i.e., with its capacity for combining a manifold in general, than it is for the appearances themselves to have to agree with the a priori form of the sensitive viewing.

7.2 For laws do not exist in the appearances but rather only relative to the subject in whom the appearances inhere, to the extent it has understanding; in the same way that these appearances do not exist on their own, but rather only relative to the same being to the extent it has senses.

7.3 Things on their own would conform necessarily with their own laws even without an understanding to recognize them.

7.4 But appearances are only representations of things which are completely unknown with respect to what they might be on their own.

7.5 As mere representations, however, they are subject to no laws of connection whatsoever except those which the connecting capacity prescribes.

7.6 Now what connects the manifold of the sensitive viewing is imagination, and this depends upon the understanding with regard to the unity of its intellectual synthesis and upon the sensitivity with regard to the manifold of the apprehension.

7.7 Now since all possible perceptions depend upon the synthesis of the apprehension, but it, this empirical synthesis, upon the transcendental synthesis, hence upon the categories, it follows that all possible perceptions, hence then also everything which can ever achieve to an empirical consciousness, i.e., all appearances of nature, are subject to the categories (with respect to their connection) on which nature (considered merely as nature in general) depends as the original basis of its necessary regularity (as *natura formaliter*

spectata).²⁴

- 7.8 But the capacity for understanding achieves no further than to laws upon which is based a nature in general, as the regularity of the appearances in space and time, and not to the a priori prescription of laws to the appearances through the categories.
- 7.9 Particular laws, because they concern empirically determined appearances, cannot be completely derived from these categories, even though they all ultimately stand under them.
- 7.10 Experience is needed in order to become familiar with the latter; but concerning experience in general and that which can be recognized as its object, those laws alone render the instruction a priori.

#27 Result Of This Deduction Of The Concept Of Understanding

- 1.1 We cannot think an object without categories. We can recognize no thought object except by viewing which corresponds to those concepts.
- 1.2 Now all our viewings are sensitive and this recognition, to the extent its object is given, is empirical.
- 1.3 But empirical recognition is experience.
- 1.4 Hence no recognition is possible for us a priori except solely of objects of a possible experience.*

* Kant's annotation:

- 1.1 In order that we not stumble too hastily on the feared disadvantageous consequences of this proposition, I want only to remind everyone that the categories are not limited in thought by the conditions of our sensitive viewing, but rather are opened to an unlimited field, and only the recognition of that which we think to ourselves, [i.e.] the determining of the object, has need of

²⁴ The appearances are not things on their own but reside only in our brainariums ([A version](#) of the Deduction, Notes on viewing & understanding). Thus they have no laws. We intervene in the tramp of the appearances and apprehend manifolds and achieve to subjective and then to objective perceptions by the productive imagination combining the manifolds into configurations which correspond to one of the categories. The subjective perception anticipates the connection and the objective perception achieves it.

viewing. And at the lack of the latter, the thought of the object might happen always to be quite true and can have profitable consequences upon the usage of reason by the subject, but which, since it is not always aimed at the determination of the object, and hence not at a recognition, but rather at the subject and his wanting, has no appropriate place in the discussion just here.²⁵

- 2.1 But this recognition, which is limited merely to objects of experience, is not for that reason entirely borrowed from experience, but rather, with regard to the pure viewing as well as the pure concept of understanding, there are elements of the recognition which are encountered a priori within us
- 2.2 Now there are only two ways to think a necessary agreement between experience and the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible, or these concepts the experience.
- 2.3 The former does not take place with regard to the categories (nor with the pure, sensitive viewing); for they are concepts a priori, hence independent of experience (the assertion of an empirical origin would be a sort of *generatio aequivoca*).
- 2.4 Hence there remains only the latter (a system, as it were, of the epigenesis of pure reason), namely that the categories contain the basis of the possibility of all experience in general from the side of the understanding.
- 2.5 But how they make experience possible, and which principles of its possibility they provide in their application on appearances, this the following section on the transcendental usage of the judgmental capacity will treat.
- 3.1 If someone wanted to find a middle way between the two solitary ones, namely [that] they are neither self-thought, first principles a priori of our recognition nor derived from experience, but rather a subjective make up for thinking instilled simultaneously with our existence, which had been so fashioned by our creator that their usage corresponded precisely with the laws of nature, according to which experience proceeded (a sort of preformation system of pure reason), then (apart from the fact that with such hypotheses there

²⁵ I wonder if this last sentence has reference to the practical usage of reason, dealing with “the subject and his wanting”.

is no end to how far one might take the presupposition of predetermined make up for future judgments) the fact that in such a case the categories would be devoid of the necessity which belongs essentially to their concept, could be decisive against such a middle way.²⁶

- 3.2 For, e.g., the notion of cause, which expresses the necessity of a succession under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only upon an arbitrarily instilled, subjective necessity of ours to combine certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relationships.
- 3.4 I would not be able to say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but rather only that I am so organized that I cannot think this representation otherwise than so connected, which is precisely what the skeptic wishes most. For then all our insight through the alleged, objective validity of our judgment is nothing but sheer illusion and there would be no lack of people who would not confirm this subjective necessity (which must be felt). But at least no one could argue with anyone about what depends merely on the way in which the subject is organized.

Short Concept Of This Deduction

- 1.1 This is the description of the pure concepts of understanding (and with them also all theoretical realizations a priori) as principles of the possibility of experience, but this as a determination of the appearances in space and time in general, finally this from the principle of the original, synthetic unity of the apperception, as the form of understanding with regard to space and time as the original forms of sensitivity.

* * *

- 2.1 I consider the division of paragraphs to be necessary only this far because we were working with the elementary concepts.
- 2.2 Since we want to make their use representable, the presentation may now advance in continuous coherence without these divisions.

²⁶ Here the reference is to Leibniz and his harmonious coordination between the mind and the world.

Next: [To the A version of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories of the CPR.](#)

The remainder of the Transcendental Analytic to be added soon.