

| | |
|--|----------|
| The Critique Of Pure Reason | 2 |
| Second Part - The Transcendental Logic | 2 |
| Introduction. Idea of a Transcendental Logic | 2 |
| I. Concerning Logic in General..... | 2 |
| II. Transcendental Logic..... | 6 |
| III. The Division of Universal Logic into Analytic and Dialectic | 8 |
| IV The Division of Transcendental Logic into the Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic..... | 11 |

The Critique Of Pure Reason

Instruction¹ of the Transcendental Elements

Second Part - The Transcendental Logic

Introduction. Idea of a Transcendental Logic

I. Concerning Logic in General

- 1.1 Our recognition arises from two basic sources of the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), and the second is the capacity for recognizing an object through these representations (spontaneity of concepts). Through the first an object is given to us, and through the second this object is thought in relationship to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind).
- 1.2 Viewing and concepts therefore make up the elements of all our recognition and, therefore, neither concepts without viewing corresponding to them in some way, nor viewing without concepts, can provide a recognition.
- 1.3 Both are either pure or empirical.
- 1.4 Our recognition is empirical if sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained in it; but pure if no sensation is mingled in with the representation.
- 1.5 We can term the former the *material* of the sensitive recognition.
- 1.6 Hence pure viewing contains solely the form by which something is looked at and pure concepts only the form of the thinking of an object in general.
- 1.7 Only pure viewings or concepts are possible a priori; empirical ones only a posteriori.

¹ A50 B74, pages in the Academic Edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

- 2.1 If we want to call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations, to the extent it is affected in some way, sensitivity; then in contrast the capacity of producing representations of itself, or the spontaneity of the recognition, is the understanding.²
- 2.2 Our nature is so composed that the viewing can never be other than sensitivity, i.e., containing merely the way we are affected by objects.
- 2.3 In contrast the capacity to think the object of sensitive viewing is the understanding.
- 2.4 Neither of these properties is to be preferred over the other.
- 2.5 Without sensitivity no object would be given to us, and without understanding, none thought.
- 2.6 Thoughts without content are empty. Viewing without concepts are blind.
- 2.7 Hence it is just as necessary to make the concepts sensitive (i.e., to append the object to them in the viewing) as to make the viewings understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts).
- 2.8 Also both capacities or capabilities cannot exchange functions.
- 2.9 The understanding is empowered to look at (view) nothing, and the senses to think nothing.
- 2.10 Only from their union can recognition arise.
- 2.11 But we should not for that reason mingle their contribution. Rather we have great cause for carefully isolating and distinguishing the one from the other.
- 2.12 Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of sensitivity in general, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of understanding in general, i.e., the logic.

² We can spy the object of the viewing as an appearance readily enough as it stands out from the background, e.g., the manifold that makes up a face or the stars of the Big Dipper, but what that appearance represents is another matter and is a function of the understanding.

- 3.1 Now in its turn logic can be considered in a two-fold intention, either as logic of the universal, or of the particular, usage of the understanding.
 - 3.2 The first contains the utterly necessary rules of thinking without which no use of the understanding takes place at all and which, therefore, goes to this use without regard to the diversity of the objects to which it may be directed.
 - 3.3 The logic of the particular understanding usage contains the rules for proper thinking about a certain type of object.³
 - 3.4 The former we can term the elementary logic, but the latter, the organon of this or that science.
 - 3.5 This latter, for the most part, is premised in the schools as propaedeutic of the science, although, according to the course of human reason, it is the last to which it finally achieves when the science has already been finished for a good while and has need only of the final touch for its rectification and completeness.
 - 3.6 For we must already be familiar with the object to a rather high degree before issuing the rules about how a science arises from them.
-
- 4.1 Now universal logic is either pure or applied.
 - 4.2 In the former we abstract from all empirical conditions under which our understanding is exercised, e.g., from the influence of the senses, from the play of the imagination, the laws of memory, the power of custom, inclination, etc., thus also from the sources of prejudices, indeed in general even from all causes from which certain recognitions may arise to us or be asserted, because they concern the understanding merely under certain circumstances of its application. And to discern these, experience is required.
 - 4.3 Therefore a universal, though pure, logic has to do with sheer principles a priori and is a canon of the understanding and reason, but only with respect to the formality of their use, the content be what it will (empirical or transcendental).

³ This may have to do with specific applications, e.g., in physics or in mathematics.

- 4.4 But then a universal logic is called applied if it is directed to the rules of the usage of understanding under the subjective, empirical conditions which psychology teaches us.
- 4.5 Therefore it has empirical principles, although it is indeed universal to the extent that it goes to the understanding usage without distinction of the objects.
- 4.6 For that reason it is also neither a canon of understanding in general nor an organon of particular sciences, but solely a catharticon of the common understanding.⁴
- 5.1 In the universal logic, therefore, the part which is supposed to make up the pure rational teaching must be entirely isolated from what makes up the applied (but still always universal) logic.
- 5.2 The first alone is actually science, although short and dry as the scholastically proper description of an elementary instruction of understanding requires.
- 5.3 In this, therefore, the logicians must always have two rules before their eyes.
- 6.1 1. As a universal logic, it abstracts from all content of the understanding recognition and from the diversity of its objects, and has to do with nothing except the mere form of the thinking.
- 7.1 2. As pure logic, it has no empirical principles, thus it acquires nothing (as some have frequently persuaded themselves) from psychology, which has therefore no influence at all on the canon of the understating.
- 7.2 It is a demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain completely a priori.

⁴ I wonder if the applied universal understanding has to do with how people think in actuality.

- 8.1 What I term applied logic (contrary to the common meaning of this word, according to which it is supposed to contain certain exercises to which pure logic gives the rules) is a representation of the understanding and of the rules of its necessary usage in concreto, namely under the chance conditions of the subject which can hinder or promote this usage, and all of which are given empirically.
- 8.2 It deals with the attention, its obstructions and consequences, with the origin of error, with the state of doubt, or scruples or conviction, etc., and to which the universal and pure logic stands as does the pure moral, which contains merely the necessary moral laws of a free will in general, to the actual, instruction of virtue which considers these laws under the obstructions of the feelings, inclinations and passions to which humans are more or less subjected, and which can never furnish a true and demonstrated science because it, just as well as that applied logic, has need of empirical and psychological principles.

II.⁵ Transcendental Logic

- 1.1 Universal logic, as we indicated, abstracts from all content of the recognition, i.e., from all reference of the recognition to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relationship of the recognitions among one another, i.e., the form of thinking in general.
- 1.2 But now because there are also pure as well as empirical viewings (as the transcendental Aesthetic establishes), a distinction between pure and empirical thinking of objects might very well also be encountered.
- 1.3 In this case there would a logic in which we did not abstract from all content of the recognition; then that which contained merely the rules of the pure thinking of an object would exclude all those recognitions which were of empirical content.
- 1.4 It would also go to the origin of our recognitions of objects to the extent it cannot be ascribed to the objects, since, in contrast, universal logic has nothing to do with the origin of the recognition but rather considers the representations--be they given originally in us ourselves a priori, or only empirically--merely according to the laws, according to which the

⁵ A53 B79

understanding needs them in relationship to one another when it thinks and, therefore, deals only of the understanding form which can be supplied to the representations, they having originated from where they will.⁶

- 2.1 And here I make a remark which extends its influence over all subsequent considerations and concerning which we must always be mindful, namely: not each and every recognition a priori would have to be called transcendental, but rather only those, by which we recognize that, and how, certain representations (viewings or concepts) are solely applied or are possible a priori, (i.e., the possibility of the recognition or its use a priori).
- 2.2 Hence neither space nor any sort of geometrical determination of space are a transcendental representation. Instead only the recognition that these representations are not at all of empirical origin and the possibility of how they nonetheless are able to refer a priori to objects of experience, can be called transcendental.
- 2.3 Likewise the usage of space concerning objects in general would also be transcendental; but if it is solely restricted to objects of sense, it is called empirical.
- 2.4 The difference, therefore, between the transcendental and empirical only pertains to the critique of recognitions and does not concern their referral to their objects.
- 3.1 In the expectation, therefore, that there can perhaps be concepts a priori which may reference a priori to objects and not as pure or sensitive viewings, but rather merely to dealings of the pure thinking, which thus are concepts, but neither of empirical nor aesthetic origin, we make for ourselves in advance the idea of a science of the pure understanding and of rational recognitions by which we think objects completely a priori.
- 3.2 Such a science, which would determine the origin, scope and objective validity of such recognitions, would have to be called transcendental logic, because it has to do merely with the laws of understanding and reason, but solely to the extent it is referred to objects a priori and not, as the universal

⁶ It seems to me then that the transcendental logic would be a special logic, how we are to think about particular items, like a particular science.

logic, to the empirical as well as the pure rational recognitions without distinction.

III.⁷ The Division of Universal Logic into Analytic and Dialectic

- 1.1 There was an ancient and celebrated question, with which some thought to force logicians into a corner and to bring them so far so to end up either with a pitiful circle or a confession of their ignorance, and so to reveal the conceit of their entire art, namely: what is truth?
- 1.2 The verbal explanation for truth, namely that it be the agreement of the recognition with its object, is granted here and presupposed. But we require to know what is the universal and sure criterion of the truth of each and every recognition.
 - 2.1 It is already a great and necessary proof of prudence or insight to know what we are reasonably supposed to ask.
 - 2.2 For if the question is absurd on its own, and requires unnecessary answers, then besides the shame of him who raises it, it frequently has the disadvantage of misleading the unwary hearers of that to absurd answers and suggests the ridiculous spectacle of one milking the stag (as ancients put it) while the other holds a sieve.
- 3.1 If truth consists in the agreement of a recognition with its object, then this object must be differentiated by that from other objects; for a recognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is referred, even though it contains something which could easily hold of other objects.
 - 3.2 Now a universal criterion of truth would be that which would be valid for all recognitions without distinction of their objects.
 - 3.3 But it is clear that since with these recognitions we abstract from all content (reference to its object), and since truth has to do with precisely this content, it is entirely impossible and absurd to ask about a mark of the truth of the

⁷ A57 B82

content of the recognition and, therefore, a sufficient and, at the same time, universal indicator of truth cannot possibly be given.

- 3.4 Since above we have already termed the content of a recognition the material of the recognition, we will have to say that no universal indicator of the truth of the recognition with respect to its material can be required, because it is itself contradictory.
- 4.1 But concerning the recognition with respect to the mere form (setting aside all content), it is just as clear that a logic, to the extent it delivers the universal and necessary rules of the understanding, would have to lay out criteria of truth precisely in these rules.
- 4.2 For what contradicts this is false because in that way the understanding clashes with its universal rules of thinking, thus with itself.
- 4.3 These criteria, however, concern only the form of truth, i.e., the thinking in general, and are to this extent correct, but not sufficient.
- 4.4 For although a recognition might be completely conformable to the logical form, i.e., did not contradict itself, yet it can still always contradict the object.
- 4.5 Therefore, the mere logical criterion of truth, namely the agreement of a recognition with the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason is indeed the *conditio sine qua non*, thus the negative condition of all truth; but logic cannot go further, and through no touchstone can it discover the error which does not concern the form, but only the content.
- 5.1 Now universal logic reduces the entire formal occupation of understanding and reason into its elements, and presents them as principles of every logical evaluation of our recognition.
- 5.2 This part of logic, therefore, can be called analytic and, precisely for that reason, is the at least negative touchstone of truth in that before anything else we must test and evaluate all recognitions with respect to their form by these rules before we examine them with respect to their content in order to make out whether they contain positive truth with respect to the object.

- 5.3 But because the mere form of a recognition, as much as it may agree with logical laws, does not suffice by far for making out the material (objective) truth for the recognition, no one can dare to judge about objects merely with logic and to assert anything without having previously collected from them sound information apart from logic, in order afterwards to attempt merely the utilization and connection of that information in a cohesive whole according to logical laws, but better yet, to test it solely according to those laws.
- 5.4 Nonetheless something so seductive lies in the possession of such an apparent art of giving the form of understanding to all our recognitions, even though we may yet be very empty and poor with respect to their content, that the universal logic, which is merely a canon to the evaluation, was used as an organon, as it were, for the actual production, or at least for the illusion, of objective assertions, and thus in that way was in fact misused.
- 5.5 Now universal logic, as intended organon, is called dialectic.
- 6.1 Even as diverse as the meaning is in which the ancients availed themselves of this denomination of a science or art, we can still safely gather from the actual use of the denomination that with them it was nothing other than the logic of semblance.
- 6.2 A sophisticated art to give the air of truth to their ignorance, indeed even to their premeditated illusions, that some imitated the method of thoroughness which logic prescribes in general, and utilized its topic for the varnishing of each empty assertion.
- 6.3 Now we can note as a sure and useful warning: universal logic, considered as organon, is always a logic of semblance, i.e., dialectic.
- 6.4 For since it teaches nothing at all about the formal conditions of the agreement with the understanding, which, by the way, are entirely indifferent with respect to the objects, the unreasonable demand to use it as a tool (organon) to broaden and expand our information, at least with respect to the allegations, must turn out to be nothing except rational jugglery of asserting with some semblance everything we wish or also contest at our whim.

- 7.1 Such an instruction is in no way conformable to the dignity of philosophy.
- 7.2 For that reason we have counted this a denomination of dialectic to the logic, rather than a critique of the dialectical semblance, and we also claim to understand it as such here.

IV⁸ The Division of Transcendental Logic into the Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic

- 1.1 In a transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (even as we did above in the transcendental aesthetic with the sensitivity) and lift out from our recognition merely that part of the thinking which has its origin solely in the understanding.
- 1.2 But the use of this pure recognition is conditioned upon objects being given to us in the viewing, on which that can be employed.
- 1.3 For without viewing our recognitions lack all objects, and they remain then completely empty.
- 1.4 The part of the transcendental logic, therefore, which presents the elements of the recognitions of pure understanding and the principles without which no object anywhere can be thought, is the transcendental analytical, and is simultaneously a logic of truth.
- 1.5 For no recognition can contradict it without simultaneously losing all content, i.e., all reference to any sort of an object, thus all truth.
- 1.6 But because it is very enticing and seductive to avail ourselves of these pure understanding recognitions and base propositions alone and even out beyond the limits of experience, which still singularly and alone can give us the material (objects) to hand, upon which those pure understanding concepts can be applied: the understanding runs into danger through empty, rational gaming (*Vernünteleyen*) of making a material usage of the merely formal principles of the pure understanding and of judging about objects without

⁸ A62 B87

distinction, which still are not given to us, indeed perhaps cannot be given to us in any way whatsoever.

- 1.7 Since therefore it was actually only supposed to be a canon of the appraisal of the empirical usage, it is misused if we allow it to hold as the organon of a universal and unrestricted usage, and venture with only the pure understanding in general to judge, assert and decide synthetically about objects in general.
- 1.8 Accordingly then the usage of the pure understanding would be dialectic.
- 1.9 Therefore, the second part of the transcendental logic must be a critique of the dialectic semblance and is called transcendental dialectic, not as a device for dogmatically stimulating such semblance (sadly a very prevalent art of multifaceted, metaphysical conjure artists), but rather as a critique of the understanding and reason with respect to their hyperphysical usage in order to uncover the false semblance of their baseless pretensions, overthrow their claims to invention and expansion, which they intend to achieve merely through transcendental base propositions, and merely to appraise and preserve the pure understanding from sophistical illusion.

Continue with the [Transcendental Analytic](#)