Kant and the morally inclined atheist
October 25, 2009
It just occurred to me that Kant’s conception of the rational, morally inclined man is directed toward the atheist.
In the General Remarks to Book I of his work on rational religion Kant conceives of a morally inclined man who is guided by practical reason and who has the power to fashion a world in which he would also have to be born and live. Presumably the world will exist and the atheist has merely to fashion the relationship of morality to happiness.
In the first place, Kant asserts, and because the atheist is guided by practical reason, he would have to fashion the world in accordance with practical reason, i.e., the Highest Good, where moral perfection is possible and a happiness commensurate to that degree of perfection necessary.
Moreover, Kant asserts further, the atheist (since he is morally inclined) would want to will a world of the Highest Good; for the moral law requires him to promote moral perfection and that means, in the moment of the fashioning, to fashion a world of the Highest Good. And this he would also want to do even though he would not be certain as to his own capacity in that world to become morally perfect in order to achieve to perfection in happiness. He would want this Highest Good in order to provide meaning to his moral duties.
And so the atheist will have to admit, according to Kant, that if he were responsible for the relationship of morality and happiness in a world, he would opt for a world of the Highest Good. And since, I think Kant means, he would be obligated to fashion such a world, and since he can consider himself as able to fashion such a world (in his own conduct), he would be obligated to strive to do so immediately. And thus he would be obligated to promote a moral world and that means the promotion of the Highest Good as the point of the moral law and act (for without the Highest Good there is no point to the moral law). But this then means the postulation of eternal life and God.
Filed under: Kant