The Refutation of Idealism.
November 16, 2009
It is not enough that we imagine an outer sense and expect to use that as the contrast to the inner sense (needed for the differentiation between the inside and the outside worlds), the real world and the dream world. We must actually envisage the external object, i.e., we must see it in the same way that we see the face in the cloud or the leaves on the tree, or the cube in the Necker Cube. This envisagement/intuition/Anschauung is the way we distinguish the imagination (without necessity) from external perception (with necessity). We see the objects of the external world when we take a look, and then we can close our eyes and imagine them and make a distinction between them and the dreams or imaginings of them. And so it is only by virtue of the actual recognition of external objects in space that we are able to conceive of and distinguish between and finally recognize a dream.
The envisagement differs from the imagination as the sighting of a face in the cloud differs from an imagined face in the cloud.
[Interesting distinction also between just imagining a circle and seeing that imagined circle out in space. I know that the circle is my imagination but I still can locate it in space and point it out to others who see the circle too (although I suspect you have to be above the age 5 or 6 to admit to seeing something which isn’t there).
Filed under: Kant