The Critique Of Pure Reason
by Immanuel Kant

Translation and Comments by
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This translation is of the second (B) version of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. In the attached Kantian appendices will be found those major portions of the first (A) version which are not included in the second version, primarily: the Preface, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories and the Paralogisms.

It is highly recommended for the reader to review the Translator’s Appendix II.1 (page 788) for the translator’s Introductory Notes and Comments on the entire Critique, and especially to justify the use of “perspective” for the German “Anschauung” instead of the more commonly utilized “intuition.”

There is a concise summation of the Critique beginning on page v of Kant’s Religion Within The Bounds Of Sheer Reason. It may be helpful to peruse Tips For Novices To Kantland.

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Preface

1.1 Whether the treatment of the recognitions [Erkenntnisse] which belong to the affairs of reason treads the sure path of a science or not can soon be appraised by the results.

1.2 If after many fabricated foundations and preparations it comes to a standstill as soon as it approaches the objective or, if in order to reach it, it must often withdraw again and strike out on a new way, likewise if it is not possible to make the various colleagues unanimous concerning the way of achieving the common purpose, then we can be assured that such a study has by no means set out on the sure path of a science, but rather is merely a tinkering about. And reason is already served by making this way discoverable where possible, even if much of what was contained in that purpose, assumed without prior reflection, must be given up as vain.

2.1 That logic has treaded this sure path from the most remote times is seen by its not having to take a single step backward since Aristotle, if we will not count as an improvement something like the eradication of certain dispensable subtleties, or a clear determination of the presentation, but which belongs more to the elegance than to the reliability of the science.

2.2 Logic is yet remarkable in that even up till now it has not been able to take any step forward, and thus from any viewpoint seems to be concluded and completed.

2.3 For if some contemporaries thought to expand it by including partly psychological capital from the recognitional powers (imagination, wit), partly metaphysical from the origin of recognitions or the various manners of certitude according to the variety of the objects (idealism, skepticism, etc.), and partly anthropological from prejudices (their origins and remedies), then this proceeds from their misapprehension of the peculiar nature of this science.

2.4 It is not increase, but rather distortion, of the sciences if we let their boundaries overlap one another. The limit of logic, however, is entirely determined by it being a science which rigorously proves and amply sets forth nothing but the formal rules of all thinking (be it a priori or empirical, letting it have an origin or object as it will, and whether it meets in our minds with contingent or natural obstacles).
3.1 For this advantage of having been so successful, logic has to thank merely its restrictions by which it is justified, indeed enjoined, to abstract from all objects of the recognition and their distinction. In logic therefore the understanding has to do with nothing further than itself and its form.

3.2 Naturally it had to be far more difficult for reason to light upon the sure path of science if it has to do not merely with itself, but rather also with objects. Thus logic, as propaedeutic, constitutes also only the vestibule of the sciences, as it were, and if we are speaking of knowledge, then we presuppose indeed a logic for the evaluation of that knowledge, but must seek its acqui-sition actually and objectively in the so-called sciences.

4.1 To the extent that reason is supposed to be present in these sciences, some-thing a priori must be recognized, and their recognition can be referred to their object in two ways; either merely to determine this and its concept (which must be given from elsewhere), or to make it actual.

4.2 The first is the theoretical recognition of reason, the other is the practical.

4.3 The pure part in both, as much or as little as it may contain, namely the part in which reason determines its object entirely a priori, must be presented alone, and that part which comes from other sources must not be mingled with it. For it is bad business to pay out blindly what comes in without being able afterwards, if the business comes to a standstill, to distinguish which part of the revenue can bear the expenditure and which calls for a reduction.

5.1 Mathematics and physics are two theoretical recognitions of reason which are supposed to determine their objects a priori, the former entirely pure, the second at least partly pure but then also according to the standard of sources of recognition other than reason.

6.1 Mathematics has treaded the sure path of science since the earliest times to which the history of human reason reaches—in the amazing Greeks.
6.2 We need not think, however, that it was as easy for mathematics as for logic (where reason has only to do with itself) to light upon that royal road or, even more, to prepare the way to that road.

6.3 I believe far rather that mathematics remained a long time with tinkering about (especially among the Egyptians) and that the metamorphose is attributable to a revolution which the fortunate flash of a single man brought forth in an experiment by which the road which we had to take was no longer mistakable, and the sure path of a science was hit upon and marked out for all time and in infinite expansion.

6.4 The history of this revolution of the thinking manner (which was much more important than the discovery of the way around the famous promontory) and of the fortunate person who brought it forth has not been retained for us.

6.5 However, the legend which Diogenes of Laertius transmits to us, mentioning the supposed originator of the least elements of the geometrical demonstration and which, with respect to common judgment, do not even need a proof, shows that the remembrance of the change, which was effected through the first trace of the discovery of this new way, must have seem extremely important to the mathematicians and accordingly became unforgettable.

6.5 To the first person who demonstrated an isosceles triangle (he may have been called Thales or something else) a light came on; for he found that he would have to investigate not what he saw in the figure, or to track down the mere concept of that and learn its properties from that concept, as it were, but rather to bring forth only that which he himself thought a priori into it according to concepts and presented (through construction); and that he, in order to know something a priori with confidence, would have to attribute to the matter nothing except what followed necessarily from what he had included in the matter himself in conformity with his concept.

7.1 With natural science it progressed far slower in reaching the royal way of science. For it has only been about a century and a half since the suggestion of the ingenious Sir Francis Bacon partly occasioned this discovery and partly, since we already had the scent of it, more animated it; which can be explained just as well as with the triangle above only by a suddenly occurring revolution in the manner of thinking.
7.2 Here I only want to touch on natural science to the extent it is based on empirical principles.

8.1 When Galileo rolled his spheres down the incline with a weight which he selected himself, or when Torricelli let the air carry a weight which he had previously imagined to be equal to a known column of water, or yet later when Stahl converted metals into chalk and that in turn into metals by removing something from them and then restoring it,* a light came on for all researchers of the science of nature.

8.2 They comprehended that reason penetrates only what it itself brings forth according to its design, and that it would have to proceed with principles of its judgment according to enduring laws and to require nature to answer its questions, but not to let itself totter, as it were, at the end of a leash of nature. For otherwise accidental observations, made according to no previously conceived plan, do not at all cohere in a single necessary law, which reason still seeks and needs.

8.3 With its principles in one hand, according to which alone harmonious appearances can hold for laws, and with the experiment in the other, which it conceived with respect to those principles, reason must indeed go to nature to be taught by it, but not in the role of a school boy who allows everything to be dictated as the teacher wishes, but rather as an invested judge who requires the witnesses to answer the questions which he poses to them.

8.4 And thus even physics has to attribute this exceptionally advantageous revolution of its manner of thinking to the sudden notion of seeking (not fictionalizing) in nature--and commensurate to what reason itself puts into it--that which it must learn from nature and of which reason would know nothing of itself.

8.5 In this way natural science was first brought to the sure path of a science after having been nothing further than a mere toying around for so many centuries.

* Kant’s annotation:

1. Here I do not follow precisely the thread of the history of the experimental method, for the first beginning is also not well known.
9.1 Metaphysics is an entirely isolated, speculative, rational recognition which elevates itself completely above the teaching of experience and indeed by mere concepts (not as with mathematics, by application of them to some perspective) and where therefore reason itself is supposed to be its own student. And so far the fate of this recognition has not yet been so fortunate to have been able to light upon the sure path of a science. Although indeed metaphysics is older than all the others and would remain even if the others should be completely swallowed up in the abyss of an all destroying barbarism.

9.2 For reason continually comes to a standstill in metaphysics, even when it wants to penetrate a priori those very laws which the most common experience verifies (as it presumes).

9.3 In it we must constantly turn back on the way because we find that it does not go where we wish and, concerning the unanimity of its adherents in assertions, it is still so far removed from that, that it is far rather a battle arena which actually seems to be determined for practicing our powers in jousting, and where no jouster has ever been able to win for himself even the least position whereupon he might establish a permanent victory.

9.4 There is no doubt therefore that the conduct of reason has thus far been a mere tinkering about and, what is worse, among sheer concepts.

10.1 Now why is it that no sure way of science has yet been found here?

10.2 Is it per chance impossible?

10.3 If so, then why did nature afflict our reason with this unceasing endeavor to locate metaphysics as one of its most important affairs?

10.4 Yet more, how little cause do we have to place trust in our reason if it not only forsakes us in one of the most important pieces of our inquisitiveness, but even delays us with dazzling deceptions and, yet at the same time, cheats us!
10.5 Or if we have only missed it so far, what indication can we make use of in a renewed search to have hope that we will be more fortunate that those before us have been?

11.1 I am of the opinion that the examples of mathematics and natural science, which have become what they are now through a sudden revolution, would be remarkable enough to ponder the essential pieces of the alteration in the manner of thinking which has been so advantageous to them and, at least as an attempt, to imitate them to the extent that their analogy, as rational recognition, is permitted with metaphysics.

11.2 Until now we have assumed that each of our recognitions would have to be governed according to the object. But all our attempts at making out something about these objects a priori through concepts, by means of which our recognition would be expanded, came to naught under this presupposition.

11.3 So then let us attempt whether we might not fare better with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must be governed by our recognition, which already accords better with the demanded possibility of a recognition of them a priori, which is supposed to specify something about objects before they are given to us.

11.4 This is the same situation as with the first thoughts of Copernicus who, after things did not work out very well with the explanation of the movements of the stars when he assumed that the host of stars revolved around the spectator, tried whether it might not succeed better if he let the spectator revolve and, in contrast, leave the stars at rest.

11.5 Now concerning the perspective of the objects in metaphysics, we can try it in a similar way.

11.6 If the perspective would have to be governed by the nature of the objects, I do not see how someone can know something about them a priori. But if the object (as object of the senses) should be governed by the nature of our perspective capacity, I can conceive this possibility quite well.

11.7 But because I cannot stop with these perspectives, if they are to be recognitions, but rather must refer them as representations to something else as an object and determine this object through them, I can either assume that the
concepts, by which I bring forth this determination, are governed by the object, and in which case I am in the same fix concerning the manner of how I can know something about this object a priori. Or I can assume that the objects or (which is the same thing) the experience, in which they alone (as given objects) are recognized, is governed by these concepts. And in this case I immediately see an easier solution. And this is because experience itself is a manner of recognition which requires understanding, the rule of which I must presuppose within me even before objects are given to me, thus a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori by which therefore all objects of experience must be governed necessarily and with which they must agree.

11.8 Concerning the objects to the extent they can be thought merely through reason and indeed necessarily so, which however (at least as reason thinks them) cannot be given at all in experience, the attempt to think them (for they must still be subject to thought) will render afterwards a splendid touchstone of what we assume as the altered method of the manner of thinking, namely that we recognize a priori of things just what we ourselves put into them.*

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 This method of imitating the investigators of nature consists therefore in seeking the elements of pure reason in what allows of confirmation or rejection via an experiment.

1.2 Now no experiment to test the propositions of pure reason, especially if they are ventured out beyond all boundaries of possible experience, can be made with their objects (as in natural science). Therefore it will only be feasible with concepts and principles which we assume a priori, namely by so organizing them that the same objects can be considered on the one hand as objects of the senses and understanding for the sake of experience, and on the other hand as objects which we merely think, i.e., objects of an isolated reason striving out beyond boundaries of experience; thus from two diverse sides.

1.3 Now if, by considering things from such a double point of view, we find that an agreement with the principles of pure reason takes place, while with a single point of view there arises an unavoidable contradiction of reason with itself, then the experiment demonstrates the correctness of this distinction of the two points of view.
12.1 This attempt succeeds as intended and promises the sure path of a science to metaphysics in its first part, since it is occupied namely with concepts a priori to which corresponding objects commensurate to them can be given in experience.

12.2 For according to this alteration in the manner of thinking, we can quite easily explain the possibility of a recognition a priori and, even more, we can furnish the laws which lie a priori as the basis of nature considered as the sum total of the objects of experience along with their sufficient proofs, neither of which were possible according to the previous manner of thinking.

12.3 But from this deduction of our capacity to recognize a priori, there arises a strange result, which apparently is quite disadvantageous to the entire purpose of what occupies the second part, namely that with it we can never come out beyond the boundaries of a possible experience, but which is precisely the essential concern of this science of metaphysics.

12.4 But just in this lies the experiment of a controlled test of the truth of the results of that first assessment of our rational recognition a priori, namely that it goes only to appearances, leaving the matter on its own, on the other hand, as actual indeed for itself, but unrecognized by us.

12.5 For that, which necessarily drives us to go out beyond the boundary of experience and all appearances, is the conditioned which reason necessarily, and quite properly, requires in things on their own for all conditions and by which the series of conditions is completed.

12.6 Now if we assume that our experiential recognition is governed by objects as things on their own, we find that the unconditioned cannot even be thought without contradiction. But on the other hand, if we assume that our representation of things, as they are given to us, are not governed by these as things on their own, but rather these objects, as appearances, are governed by our representational manner, we find the contradiction ceases. And if, consequently, the unconditioned would have to be encountered not with things to the extent we are familiar with them (to the extent they are given to us), but indeed with them to the extent, as matters on their own, we are not familiar with them, then this indicates that which we at first only assumed as a trial is well founded.*
12.7 Now after denying all progress to speculative reason in this field of the supersensitive, we can still inquire as to whether or not data is found in its practical recognition such that we can determine this transcendental, rational concept of the unconditioned and, in this way with our possible a priori knowledge, succeed in conformity with the wish of metaphysics, i.e., out beyond the boundaries of all possible experience, even though only in a practical referral.

12.8 And with such a procedure speculative reason has always at least made room for such an expansion, even if it had to leave it empty; and so we are free, indeed even challenged by speculative reason, to occupy it through practical data, if we can.**

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 This experiment of pure reason is quite similar to that of the chemists which they sometimes call the trial of reduction, but more generally the synthetic procedure.

1.2 The analysis of the metaphysician divided the pure recognitions a priori into two very dissimilar elements, namely that of things as appearances and then of things on their own.

1.3 The dialectical joins both in turn for unanimity with the necessary rational idea of the unconditioned, and finds that this unanimity never comes forth otherwise than through that distinction, which therefore is the true one.

** Kant’s annotation:

1.1 So did the central law of the movement of the heavenly bodies provide confirmed certitude to what Copernicus at first only assumed as an hypothesis, and simultaneously prove the invisible force joining the world edifice (the Newtonian attraction) which would have always remained undiscovered had not the former (Copernicus) dared in a manner contrary to common sense, but still true, to seek the observed movements not in the objects of the heavens but rather in their spectator.

1.2 The alteration of the manner of thinking presented in the critique in analogy to that hypothesis I advance in the preface as an hypothesis (even though it is proven, not hypothetically, but rather apodictically in the treatment itself from the nature of our representations of space and time and the elementary concepts of the understanding) only to make notable the first attempts of such an alteration, which are always hypothetical.
13.1 The quest of this critique of pure, speculative reason consists in an attempt to alter the previous method of metaphysics by undertaking for it a thorough revolution following the examples of the geometricians and natural scientists.

13.2 It is a treatise of the method and not a system of the science itself. But nevertheless it specifies the entire outline of that science both with regard to its boundaries and to its entire organization.

13.3 For this is peculiar to pure, speculative reason as such, that it can and is supposed to survey its own capacity with respect to the diversity of the manner of choosing objects for thinking, and indeed even to enumerate completely the various ways of displaying problems, and in this way to specify the entire framework for a system of metaphysics. Because, concerning the first of these, nothing can be attributed to the objects in the recognition a priori except what the thinking subject himself provides. And regarding the second, with respect to the principles of recognition, speculative reason is an entirely isolated unity existing of itself, in which each and every part, as in one organized body, exists for the sake of all and all for the sake of each, and no principle can be taken with certitude in one referral without simultaneously having examined it in a comprehensible referral to the entire use of pure reason.

13.4 As a result, however, metaphysics also has the rare fortune in which no other science of reason can partake. This has to do with objects (for logic is occupied only with the form of thinking in general), namely if through this critique it can be brought to the sure path of a science, it can fully grasp the entire field of the recognitions belonging to itself and therefore can complete its work and pass it on for the use of our posterity as a consummation, never to be increased, because it has to do merely with principles and the delineations of these principles, which delineations themselves are determined by the principles.

13.5 To achieve this completeness therefore metaphysics is also obligated as a fundamental science, and we must be able to say of it: *nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum*.¹

¹ Nothing has been finished if something still remains to be done.
14.1 But then what kind of treasure is that, someone will ask, that we think to leave to our descendants, namely such a metaphysics, purified through critique, but also brought in that way into an enduring state?

14.2 With a merely fleeting review of this work we will believe that its benefit were still negative, i.e., never to dare us with speculative reason to venture out beyond the limits of experience; and that is also indeed its first benefit.

14.3 But this soon becomes positive if we realize that the principles, with which reasons dares out beyond its boundaries, have, as an inevitable success in fact, not the expansion but rather, if we consider it more closely, the narrowing of our rational use, since speculative reason actually threatens to expand the boundaries of sensitivity, to which these principles actually belong, beyond everything, and thus even threaten to dislodge the pure (practical) use of reason.

14.4 Hence a critique, which restricts the former, is indeed to that extent negative. But at the same time, by removing an obstacle which limits the use of the latter or even threatens to destroy it, it is in fact of positive and important benefit as soon as we are convinced that there is an utterly necessary, practical use of pure reason (the moral) where it inevitably expands itself out beyond the boundaries of sensitivity. Now indeed it has no need of assistance from speculative for this expansion, although it must be secured against the reaction of that speculative reason in order not to fall into contradictions with itself.

14.5 To gainsay positive benefit to this service of the critique would be the same as saying the police provide no positive benefit because their main concern is still only to check the violence which citizens have to fear from each other so that every person can conduct his affairs peacefully and safely.

14.6 That space and time are only forms of the sensitive perspective, only contents therefore of the existence of things as appearances, that we have no further understanding concepts, thus also no elements at all, for the recognition of things except to the extent that a corresponding perspective can be given to these concepts, consequently that we can have a recognition of no object as a thing as such on its own, but rather only as far as it is an object of the sensitive perspective i.e., as appearance, all of this is proven in the analytical part of this critique. From then, of course, it follows that every possi-
ble speculative recognition of reason is restricted to mere objects of experience.

14.7 Nonetheless, and this must be kept in mind, with this it is still always reserved that we must at least be able to think, even if not to recognize, these same objects also as things as such on their own.*

14.8 For otherwise the absurd proposition would follow that appearances would be without something appearing there.

14.9 Now let us assume that the distinction, made necessary through our critique, of things as objects of experience from precisely the same as things on their own, had not been made at all. Then the base proposition of causality and, hence, of natural mechanism in the determination of causality would hold thoroughly as effective cause of all things in general.

14.10 Of just the same entity therefore e.g., the human soul, I would not be able to say “its will is free” and still at the same time “it is subject to natural necessity, i.e., not free” without entailing an obvious contradiction. The reason is that in both propositions I have taken the soul in the same sense, namely as a thing in general (as a thing on its own) and also could not take it otherwise without a preceding critique.

14.11 If, however, the critique has not erred when it teaches the assumption of the object in two senses, namely as an appearance or as a thing on its own, if the deduction of its understanding concepts is correct, thus if the principle of causation holds only for things taken in the first sense, namely to the extent they are objects of experience, but precisely the same are not subject to it according to the second meaning, then just the same will in the appearance (the visible actions) will be thought as necessarily conformable to the laws of nature and to this extent not free, and still on the other hand, as pertaining to a thing on its own, not subject to those laws, and thus as free and without a contradiction occurring in this way.

14.12 Now even though I can recognize my soul, considered from the latter respect as a thing on its own, through no speculative reason (even less through an empirical observation), thus cannot recognize freedom as the property of an being to whom I ascribe effects in the sense world, and for the reason because I would have to recognize such with respect to its existence and still not in time (which is impossible because I can underlay no perspective to my
concept), still I can think freedom, i.e., the representation of it at least contains no contradiction within itself if our critical distinction of both (the sensitive and the intellectual) representational manners has its place and with it the restrictions of the pure understanding concepts proceeding from it, thus also the principle flowing from that.

14.13 Now let us suppose that morality would necessarily presuppose freedom (in the most rigorous sense) as a property of our wills by a priori citing practical, original principles lying in our reason as the data of that presupposition, which would be utterly impossible without the presupposition of freedom which, however, speculative reason could have proven that this does not permit of being thought at all, thus the presupposition, namely the moral one, must necessarily yield to that whose opposite contains an obvious contradiction, at least freedom and with it morality (for their opposite contains no contradiction if freedom is not already presupposed) yield to the natural mechanism.

14.14 But then since I need nothing further for morals except only that freedom not contradict itself and therefore still at least allows of being thought without needing to penetrate it further, that it therefore places no obstacles in the way of the natural mechanism of precisely the same action (taken in another referral); then the instruction of morality assets its position, and the instruction of nature also its own position, which could not have taken place if the critique had not first taught us of our unavoidable ignorance with respect to things on their own and if the critique had not restricted everything which we recognize theoretically to mere appearances.

14.15 And just this explication of the positive utility of the critical principles of pure reason is manifested with regard to the concept of God and of the simple nature of our souls, but which I now pass over for the sake of brevity.

14.16 Hence I can not once assume God, freedom and immortality in aid of the necessary practical use of my reason if I do not simultaneously take away from speculative reason its presumption of supersensitive insights, because in order to achieve to this assumption, reason must avail itself of such principles which by reaching in fact merely to objects of possible experience, if they nonetheless are applied to that which cannot be an object of experience, actually change this every time into appearance, and thus declare all practical expansion of pure reason to be impossible.
14.17 I had to limit knowledge therefore in order to make room for faith. And the
dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice of advancing in metaphysics
without a critique of pure reason, is the true source of all disbelief clashing
with morality, which disbelief in fact is always very dogmatic.—

14.18 Therefore even if it cannot be difficult with a systematic metaphysics, com-
posed in accordance with the standard of the critique of pure reason, to leave
a legacy to posterity, this is a gift not to be disposed of. We may now look to
the cultivation of reason through the sure path of a science in general in
comparison with the baseless fumbling and frivolous rambling about that
without a critique, or even to the better application for an inquisitive youth,
who with the usual dogmatism obtain such early and so much encourage-
ment to be comfortable with rationally contriving about things of which they
understanding nothing and into which, even as no one else in the world, they
will never penetrate, or even to go in for inventions of new thoughts and
opinions and so miss the acquisition of basic science; but most of all, if we
bring into account the inestimable advantage of ending for all time all objec-
tions against morality and religion in the Socratic manner, namely through
the clearest proof of the ignorance of the opponent.

14.19 For there has always been and likely always will be some sort of metaphys-
ics in the world, but with it also a dialectic of pure reason because it is natu-
ral to metaphysics.

14.20 It is therefore the first and most important concern of philosophy to remove
once and for all all disadvantageous influence by blocking off the sources of
error.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Recognizing an object requires that I can prove its possibility (according to
the testimony of experience from its reality, or a priori through reason).

1.2 But I can think whatever I wish as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e., as
long as my concept is a possible thought, even though indeed I cannot guar-
dantee whether an object corresponds to it or not in the sum total of all possi-
bilities.

1.3 But to attribute objective reality to such a concept (real possibility, for the
first was merely logical possibility) something more is required.

1.4 But this more need not be sought only in the sources of theoretical recogni-
tions, but can also lie in the practical.
15.1 With this important alteration in the field of the sciences, and with the loss which speculative reason must suffer in its previously imagined possession, everything with general human affairs along with the utility which the world drew from the teachings of pure reason remains yet in the same advantageous state as it always was, and the loss touches only the monopoly of the schools, but in no way the interest of mankind.

15.2 I ask the most inflexible dogmatist whether the following, after they emanated from the schools, have ever been able to reach the public and to have the least influence on its conviction, namely:

the proof of the continuation of our souls after death from the simplicity of substance, or

that of the freedom of will against the universal mechanism through the subtle, indeed feeble, distinction of subjective and objective necessity in a practical sense, or

that of the existence of God from the concept of a most real entity (of the contingency of the alterable and of the necessity of a prime mover)?

15.3 Now if this has not happened and, due to the unfitness of common human understanding for such subtle speculations, can never be expected; if far rather, concerning immortality, the disposition of one’s nature, noticeable to every human, never to be able to be satisfied through the temporal (as inadequate for the dispositions of his entire determination), has to effect quite alone the hope for a future life; if with respect to the freedom of will, the sheer and clear description of duties in opposition to all claims of the inclination accomplishes the same for the consciousness of freedom, and finally, concerning the existence of God, if the splendid order, beauty and provision, which ever peers out in nature, effects entirely alone the faith in a wise and great world originator, which depends on rational foundations for an expanding conviction with the public; then not only does this possession remain undisturbed, it far rather even gains yet in esteem by teaching the schools to presume no higher and expanded insight regarding a point which the (for us most convincible) public can just as easily achieve and therefore to limit themselves to the cultivation of these universally conceivable and, in a moral intention, sufficing foundations of proof.
15.4 The alteration therefore concerns merely the arrogant claims of the schools, which want very much to hold themselves up in this matter (as otherwise properly in many other things) as the sole informants and preservers of such truths, of which they communicate to the public only the use, keeping the key for themselves (*quod mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri*). 

15.5 Still provision is also made for one reasonable claim of the speculative philosopher.

15.6 He always remains exclusively the trustee of one science useful to the public, without its knowledge, namely the critique of reason; for that can never be made popular, but also does not have to be so because, as little understood as the finely spun arguments for useful truths are with the people, just as little do the equally subtle objections make sense to them. On the other hand, because the schools, like every person appealing to speculation, come upon both, the philosopher is bound by thorough research of the rights of speculative reason to avoid the scandal, which sooner or later must break out even with the public from the disputes in which, without a critique, the metaphysicians (and as such finally also the clergy) unavoidably entangle themselves and afterwards even debase their own teachings.

15.7 Now solely in this way alone can the root to materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking disbelief, fanaticism and superstitions be cut off, all of which are actually more dangerous for the schools, and can scarcely spill over to the public.

15.8 If governments find it good to occupy themselves with the matters of scholars, it would be far more fitting, for their wise provision of the sciences as well as for humans, to favor the freedom of such a critique, by means of which alone the rational treatment can be placed on a firm footing; and this instead of supporting the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry about public dangers wherever any one tears their webs, which, however, the public has never noticed and the loss of which therefore also it can never experience.

16.1 The critique is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in its pure recognition as science (for this must be dogmatic every time, i.e., proven

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2 What he does not know with me, he will seem to know alone.
rigorously out of secure principle a priori), but rather against dogmatism, i.e., the presumption of making progress with a pure recognition from concepts alone (the philosophical) according to principles, even as reason has used them for so long without an inquiry into the manner and the right of having achieved to these.

16.2 Dogmatism therefore is the dogmatic procedure of pure reason without a preceding critique of its own capacity.

16.3 Accordingly, this opposition is not supposed to speak in favor of the chatty babble under the presumptuous name of popularity, or even indeed of skepticism which makes short shrift of all metaphysics. The critique is far more the necessary and advanced arrangement for the promotion of a thorough metaphysics as science, which must be necessarily executed dogmatically and systematically according to the most rigorous requirement, thus scholastically (not popularly), for this requirement to it, since it pledges to execute the concerns of speculative reason entirely a priori, thus to its full satisfaction, is unremitting.

16.4 In the execution of the plan which the critique prescribes therefore i.e., in the future system of metaphysics, we must some day follow the rigorous method of the famous Wolff, the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers, who first gave the example (and through this example became the founder of the not yet extinguished spirit of thoroughness in Germany) of how the sure path of a science is to be taken through lawful establishment of principles, clear determination of concepts, tried rigor of proofs, and prevention of bold jumps in inference, which for those very reasons also was especially suited for placing such as metaphysics in this rank, if it had occurred to him to first prepare the field through a critique of the organ, namely of pure reason itself; a deficiency which is to be ascribed not so much to him as far more to the dogmatical manner of thinking of his age and about which philosophers of his time as well as all preceding ages have nothing with which to blame one another.

16.5 Those who discard his manner of instruction and still simultaneously also the procedure of the critique of pure reason can have nothing else in mind than to cast aside the shackles of science, change work into play, certainty into opinion and philosophy into philodoxy.³

³ Love on one’s own opinion, and entranced by augmentation.
17.1 Concerning this second edition, as is reasonable, I have not wanted to let this opportunity pass without remedying as much as possible the difficulties and the obscurity from which some misinterpretations may have originated, which acute men, not without my fault perhaps, have chanced upon in the evaluation of this book.

17.2 With the propositions themselves and the bases of proof, likewise with the form as well as the completeness of the plan, I have found nothing to alter, which is to be ascribed partly to the lengthy test to which I subjected it before presenting it to the public, and partly to the constitution of the matter itself, namely the nature of a pure speculative reason which contains a true structure in which everything is an organ, namely all for the sake of the one and the one for the sake of all, thus every even small infirmity, be it a mistake (error) or shortcoming, must unavoidably betray itself with the use.

17.3 This system will, as I hope, also continue to hold firm with this inalterability.

17.4 It is not self conceit which justifies me with this confidence, but merely the evidence which the experiment of the equality of the results obtains in starting from the smallest elements and going up to the whole of pure reason, and then in the return from the whole (for this is also given for itself by the final intention of that in the practical) to each part, in that the attempt to change even the smallest part immediately gives rise to contradictions, not merely of the system, but of universal human reason.

17.5 There is, however, still much to do in the presentation, and with this I have attempted improvements in this edition, improvements which are aimed partly at removing the obscurity of the deduction of the understanding concepts, partly at remedying the alleged lack of sufficient evidence in the proofs of the principles of the pure understanding, and finally partly at avoiding the misinterpretation of the paralogisms advanced by rational psychology.

17.6 This far (namely on to the end of the first part, the paralogisms, of the transcendental dialectic) and not further do modifications in the notations reach,* because time was too short and also no misunderstanding of the competent and impartial examiners had come to my attention with respect to the remainder, the consideration for whom, which I have given to their sug-
gestions, even without my having to mention them with their well deserved praise, will arise in place.

17.7 But a small loss is joined with this improvement for the reader, which was not to be avoided without making the book much too voluminous, namely that sundries, which indeed do not belong essentially to the completeness of the whole, but which some readers might not like to miss, in that they can be useful in an other intention, had to be left out or abbreviated in order to make room for my now, as I hope, more comprehensive description, which utterly changes nothing fundamental with respect to the propositions and even their foundations of proof, but deviate here and there from the former in the method of presentation such that it cannot be achieved through insertion.

17.8 This small loss, which besides can be counteracted, as one wishes, by a comparison with the first edition, will be, as I hope, amply compensated for by the greater comprehensiveness.

17.9 In various public works (and partly at the occasion of reviews of some books, partly in particular treatments) I have perceived with grateful pleasure that the spirit of thoroughness has not died out in Germany, but rather was only shouted down for a short while by the modernity of tone and ingenious freedom in thinking, and that the thorny paths of critique, which lead to a scholarly, but as such, however, permanent and thus highly necessary science of pure reason, has not hindered courageous and clear heads in mastering it.

17.10 To these deserved men, who so fortunately still join the talent of a lucid description (which I simply am not conscious of in myself) with the thoroughness of insight, I leave the completion of my work, perhaps yet deficient here and there with respect to the clarity; for there is no danger of being refuted in this case, though still of not being understood.

17.11 For my part I can no longer engage in disputes, though indeed I will give careful attention to all indications, be they from friends or opponents, to use such in the future design of the system conformable to this propaedeutic.

17.12 Since I have already progressed rather far in age during these works (this month into my sixty-fourth year), I must be conservative with time if I will execute my plan to supply the metaphysics of nature as well as of morals as
confirmation of the correctness of the critique of the speculative as well as practical reason, and must expect the clarification of the obscurities, hardly avoidable in the beginning of this work, as well as the defense of the whole by the deserved men who have turned it into their own undertaking.

17.13 In individual places every philosophical presentation is strained (for it cannot come forth as ironclad as the mathematical), while the organization of the system, considered as a unity, runs not the least risk in that way, for its overview, when it is new, only few posses the agility of spirit, even fewer, however, the desire, because all innovation comes inconveniently.

17.14 Also apparent contradictions are to be picked out in every writing, especially that departing from clear speech, if one compares single passages, taken out of context, with one another, which casts a adverse light in the eyes of him who depends upon foreign appraisal, but which to him, who has mastered the idea as a whole, are to be easily resolved.

17.15 Consequently if a theory has stability within itself, then action and reaction, which threaten it at first with great danger, serve in time only to polish out its unevenness and also, if men of impartiality, insight and true popularity occupy themselves with it, to provide it in short order with the requisite elegance.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 An actual addition, but still only in the style of proof, I could only term that which I have made by a new refutation of the psychological idealism and by a rigorous (and, as I believe, also the only possible) proof of the objective reality of external perspective.

1.2 With respect to the essential purpose of metaphysics, idealism may be held as quite harmless (though in fact it is not). But having to assume on mere faith the existence of things apart from us (from which we still obtain for our internal sense the entire matter for recognitions themselves), and being unable to oppose any adequate proof to someone, if it occurs to him to doubt this, still remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason.

1.3 Because some obscurity is found in the expressions of the proof from the third to the sixth sentence, I want to change this to: “This enduring, however, cannot be a perspective within me.”

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4 This refers to the 3rd paragraph of the Refutation Of Idealism beginning on page 244. See also Recognizing Dreams.
1.4 “For all determination foundations of my existence which can be encountered within me, are representations and, as such, have need themselves of something enduring distinct from them in reference to which their alternation, thus my existence in the time in which they alternate, can be determined.”

1.5 Someone will probably say against this proof that I am still only immediately conscious of what is within me, i.e., my representations of outer things. Consequently it still remains undecided whether something corresponding to them be external to me or not.

1.6 But I am conscious of my existence in time (consequently also of the determinability of myself in this time) through inner experience, and this is more than me being conscious merely of my representation, though still identical with the empirical consciousness of my existence which is determinable only by referral to something which, joined with my existence, is apart from me.

1.7 This consciousness of my existence in time is therefore identically connected with the consciousness of a relationship to something outside, and it is therefore experience and not fiction, sense and not imagination, which inseparably couples the external with my inner sense. For the outer sense is already on its own the referral of the perspective to something actual apart from me, and the reality of that, as being different from the imagination, rests only on it being inseparably joined with the inner experience itself as the condition of its possibility, which is the case here.

1.8 If with the intellectual consciousness of my existence in the representation “I am”, which accompanies all my judgments and understanding activities, I could at the same time join a determination of my existence through intellectual perspective, then the consciousness of a relationship to something apart from me would not necessarily belong to that.

1.9 And this intellectual consciousness does indeed precede, but the inner perspective, in which alone my existence can be determined, is sensitive and bound to conditions of time. But this determination, thus the inner experience itself, depends on something enduring which is not within me, thus only in something apart from me, in contrast to which I must consider myself in relation. Thusly the reality of the outer sense is necessarily joined with that of the inner for the possibility of an experience in general, i.e., I am conscious that there are things outside of me which refer to my sense just as surely as I am conscious that I myself exist determined in time.

1.10 But now to which given perspectives actual objects correspond and which therefore belong to the outer sense, to which and not to the imagination they
are to be ascribed, must be made out in each particular case according to the rules with respect to which experience in general (even the inner) is differentiated from imagination, whereby the proposition, “there really is an external experience” must lie as foundation.

1.11 We can add yet here the remark, “the representation of something enduring in existence is not the same as an enduring representation.” For the former can be very variable and alternating, as are all our representations and even the representation of material, and still refer to something enduring which therefore must be an external thing and different from all of my representations, the existence of which is necessarily included along in the determination of my own existence and makes up with that a single experience which would not even take place inwardly if it were not (partly) simultaneously external.

1.12 The “how?” is just as little subject to further explanation as how we think the stationary in time in general, whose simultaneity with the alternating produces the concept of alteration.

18.1 Königsberg in the month of April, 1787.
Introduction

I. The Distinction between Pure and Empirical Recognitions

1.1 That all our recognitions begin with experience, of this there can be absolutely no doubt. For how else could the recognitional capacity be awakened into use except through objects which stir our senses and partly effect representations of themselves, partly bring our understanding capacity into play to compare these and to connect or separate them, and so to process the raw material of sensitive impressions into a recognition of objects which is called experience?

1.2 With respect to time therefore no recognition in us precedes experience, and with this it all begins.

2.1 But even if all our recognitions arise with experience, that does not mean that all arise out of experience.

2.2 For it could very well be that even our experiential recognition is an assemblage of what we receive from impressions and what our own recognitional capacity (merely occasioned through sensitive impressions) provides of itself. And this contribution we do not distinguish from that basic material until long practice has made us attentive to it and skilled in its isolation.

3.1 Whether there be such recognitions independently of experience, and even from all impressions of the senses, is a question therefore in need of a closer examination and not to be dismissed out of hand.

3.2 We term such recognitions “a priori” and distinguish them from the empirical, which have their sources “a posteriori,” namely in experience.

4.1 That expression, however, is not yet determined enough to indicate the entire sense commensurate to the question posed.

4.2 For we are accustomed to saying of many recognitions derived from experi-

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5 Instead of the text of the Introduction in I and II, the A version has its own text shown in Appendix I.4.
ential sources that we are capable, or possessive, of them a priori, because we do not derive them immediately from experience, but rather from a universal rule which, however, we nonetheless have borrowed from experience.

4.3 For example, we say of someone who undermined the foundation of his house “he could known a priori that it would fall,” i.e., “he did not need to wait for the experience of it actually collapsing.”

4.4 But still he could not have known this entirely a priori.

4.5 For that bodies are heavy and, hence, fall when their supports are removed first had to become known to him through experience.

5.1 In the course of this work therefore we will not understand with “recognitions a priori” such which take place independently of this or that experience, but utterly of every experience.

5.2 Opposed to them will be empirical recognitions, or such which are only possible a posteriori, i.e., through experience.

5.3 But of the recognitions a priori, those with which nothing empirical at all is mingled are called pure.

5.4 Thus, e.g., the proposition, “every alteration has its cause”, is a proposition a priori, but not pure, because alteration is a concept which can only be drawn from experience.⁶

II. We are in Possession of certain Recognitions a priori and even the Common Understanding is never without such

1.1 Here we are concerned about a mark, by means of which we can safely distinguish a pure recognition from an empirical one.

1.2 Experience teaches us indeed that something is constituted in this way or

⁶ In contrast then, when we determine that two sides of every triangle are greater than the remaining side, we are speaking of a pure recognition.
that, but not that it cannot be otherwise.

1.3 First therefore if a proposition is found which is thought simultaneously with its necessity, then it is a judgment a priori. If, moreover, it is also derived from no other proposition except which in turn itself holds as a necessary proposition, then it is utterly a priori.\(^7\)

1.4 Secondly, experience never gives true or strict universality to its judgments, but rather only presumptive and comparative (through induction). These should actually be worded, “as much as we have perceived thus far, no exception from this or that rule has occurred.”

1.5 Therefore if a judgment is thought in strict universality, i.e., so that no exception at all is admitted as possible, then it is not derived from experience, but rather is valid utterly a priori.

1.6 Empirical universality therefore is only an arbitrary enhancement of the validity from what holds in most cases to that which holds in all as, e.g., in the proposition, “all bodies are heavy.” On the other hand, when strict universality belongs essentially to a judgment, this points out a special recognition source of that, namely a capacity for recognitions a priori.

1.7 Necessity and strict universality therefore are secure indicators of a recognition a priori and also belong inseparable to one another.

1.8 But because it is often easier in application to show the empirical restraints in judgments than the contingency, or often times it is clearer to show the unrestrained universality, which we attribute to a judgment, than its necessity, it is advisable to avail ourselves of both of these criteria separately, each of which is infallible by itself.

2.1 Now it is easy to show that there are truly such necessary and, in the strictest sense of the word, universal, hence pure judgments a priori in the human recognition.

2.2 If an example from science is desired, we only need look to all the propositions of mathematics. If an example is desired from the usage of the most

\(^7\) The assertion in 4.3 in I above is a priori, but not utterly since experience is required to recognize that all bodies to fall.
common understanding, this proposition can serve: that every alteration would have to have a cause. Indeed in this latter case, even the concept of a cause so plainly contains the concept of a necessity of the connection with an effect and a strict universality of the rule, that it would entirely disappear if we wanted to derive it, as Hume did, from a frequent association of what happens with what precedes, and a commensurate habit (hence only of subjective necessity) arising from such connecting of representations.

2.3 Also, without having need of such examples for the proof of the actuality of pure principles a priori in our recognition, we could establish the indispensability of these for the possibility of experience itself, hence a priori.

2.4 For where did even experience want to obtain its certitude if all rules, according to which it advances, were again always empirical, thus contingent? Thus we can hardly let these rules hold as first principles.

2.5 But at this point we can be content with having established the pure use of our recognitional capacity as a fact, along with its characteristics.

2.6 But not merely in judgments, but even in concepts, an origin of some of these is indicated a priori.

2.7 From your experiential concept of a body gradually remove everything which is empirical, e.g., the color, the hardness or softness, the weight, even the impregnability. Still the space remains, which the body (which has now vanished entirely) took up, and that space you cannot removed.8

2.8 Likewise if you remove from your empirical concept of every object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which experience teaches you, you still could not take from it that by which you think it as a substance or as appending to a substance (even though this concept contains more determination than that of an object in general).9

2.9 Convinced therefore by the necessity with which this concept forces itself upon you, you have to acknowledge that it has its seat a priori in your recognitional capacity.

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8 This would encompass the shape and extension of the body, and is similar to 4.4 of the Aesthetic No 1.

9 Substance indicates an endurance in all time as indicated in the First Analogy to be treated in the Transcendental Analytic.
III. Philosophy is in Need of a Science which determines the Possibility, Principles and Scope of all Recognitions A Priori

1.1 Yet what says far more than all of the above is this: that certain recognitions even leave the field of all possible experience and, through concepts to which no corresponding object anywhere can be given in experience, have the appearance of widening the scope of our judgments beyond all limits of that possible experience.

2.1 And it is precisely in these latter recognitions, which go out beyond the world of sense and thus where experience can give neither clue nor correction, that we find the questions of our reason which, with respect to their importance, we hold to be far more exalted and the final intention of which much more sublime than all that the understanding can learn in the field of appearances. And in this regard, and even at the risk of error, we first dare all before we should give up such consequential examinations due to any concern of doubt, or from disdain and indifference.

2.2 These unavoidable tasks of pure reason itself are God, Freedom and Immortality.

2.3 The science, however, the final intention of which, with all its preparation, is actually directed only toward the accomplishments of these, is called metaphysics, the procedure of which in the beginning is dogmatic, i.e., without a preceding test of the capacity or incapacity of reason confidently to take on the execution of such a large undertaking.

3.1 Now it seems natural indeed that as soon as we leave the floor of experience we would not at once erect a building with recognitions which we possess without knowing from whence they arise and on the credit of principles, whose origins are unfamiliar to us; at least not without the foundations of that building first being secured through painstaking examination. Rather it would seem that long ago we would have raised the question; “how is the understanding able to come to all these recognitions a priori and what scope, validity and value may they have?”
3.2 As a matter of fact, there is also nothing more natural, if we understand with
the “natural” something happening in a fair and reasonable way. If, however,
with that we mean what usually happens, then nothing is more natural or
more comprehensible than this examination remaining neglected for so long.

3.3 For a portion of these recognitions, like the mathematical, is in ancient pos-
session of reliability and, in that way, also gives a favorable expectation for
others, even though these others may be of an entirely different nature.

3.4 Besides, when we are out beyond the realm of experience, then we can be
certain that we will not be refuted by experience.

3.5 The excitement to extend our recognitions is so great, that we can be de-
tained in our progress only by coming upon a clear contradiction.

3.6 But this can be avoided if we make our fabrications very cautiously, without
them for that reason being any less fabrications.

3.7 Mathematics gives us a brilliant example of how far we can go in the recog-
nition a priori independently of experience.

3.8 Now it is indeed occupied with objects and recognitions only as far as such
are allowed to be described in a perspective (Anschauung).

3.9 But this circumstance is easily overlooked, because the mentioned perspec-
tive itself can be given a priori, thus is hardly distinguished from a mere pure
concept.

3.10 Taken in by such a proof of the power of reason, the drive for expansion sees
no boundaries.

3.11 The light dove, parting the air in free flight and feeling its resistance, could
grasp the representation that it would succeed even better in airless space.

3.12 Just so did Plato abandon the sense world, because it set such narrow limits
to the understanding, and ventured out beyond that world on the wings of
Ideas into the empty space of pure understanding.

3.13 He did not notice that he made no progress through his efforts, for he had no
resistance, no support, as it were, on which he could prop himself and to
which he could apply his powers to bring the understanding from that position.

3.14 It is a usual fortune of human reason, however, only afterwards to inquire as to whether its foundation also be well laid.

3.15 But then all sorts of gloss are sought out to soothe us with its stability, or even rather to repulse a subsequent and dangerous test.

3.16 But what keeps us free from all care and suspicion during the construction and flatters us with apparent thoroughness is this:

3.17 a great part, and indeed perhaps the greatest part, of the business of our reason consists in the dissection of concepts which we already have of objects.

3.18 This supplies us with a number of recognitions which, even though they are nothing further than explanations or explications of what was already thought in our concept (though in a confused manner), are yet valued, at least according to the form, as equivalent to new insights; though with respect to the material or content they do not expand the concepts which we have, but rather merely set them apart from one another.

3.19 Now as this procedure gives an actual recognition a priori, which has a sure and useful advance, reason, without itself noting anything under this dazzle, slips in assertions of an entirely different sort, where reason adds entirely foreign, and indeed a priori, concepts to given ones without our knowing how it would attain to these and without permitting such a question to even occur in thought.

3.20 Hence I will deal here at the very beginning with the distinction of this dual manner of recognition.

IV. The Distinction Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgments

1.1 In all judgments, in which the relationship of a subject to a predicate is thought (if I consider only the affirmative judgment, then the subsequent application to the negative is easy), this relationship is possible in two ways.
1.2 Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something which is contained in the concept A (in a hidden way); or B lies entirely apart from that concept A, though it indeed stands in connection with it.

1.3 In the first case I term the judgment Analytical, in the other, Synthetic.

1.4 Analytical judgments (the affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity. But those, in which this connection is not thought through identity, are to be called Synthetic judgments.

1.5 We could also term the first one explicative, the other expansionary, because the former adds nothing to the concept of the subject through the predicate, but rather only lays it out through dissection into its partial concepts which were already thought in it (though in an indistinct way). The Synthetic judgment, on the other hand, adds a predicate to the concept of the subject, a predicate which was not thought in the concept at all and could not have been drawn out of it through any dissection of it.

1.6 E.g., if I say, “all bodies are extended”, then this is an Analytical judgment.

1.7 For I do not have to go out beyond the concept which I join to “body” in order to find extension as connected with that, but rather only dissect that concept, i.e., merely become conscious of the manifold which I always think in it in order to encounter this predicate in it. It therefore is an Analytical judgment.

1.8 On the other hand, if I say, “all bodies are heavy”, then that “heavy” is something entirely different from what I think in the mere concept of a body in general.

1.9 The addition of such a predicate therefore gives a Synthetic judgment.

2.1 Judgments of experience, as such, are all together Synthetic.

2.2 For it would be absurd to base an Analytical judgment on experience, because in that case I do not need to go out from my concept at all in order to formulate the judgment and therefore no certification of experience is necessary for
2.3 That a body be extended is a proposition which stands firmly priori, and is not a judgment of experience.

2.4 For before I go to experience, I have all the conditions to my judgment already in the concept, from which I only extract the predicate according to the proposition of contradiction and in that way can simultaneously become conscious of the necessity of the judgment which experience would not teach me at all.

2.5 On the other hand, although I do not at all include the predicate of heaviness in the concept of a body in general, body still designates an object of experience through a portion of the experience to which I can add yet other portions of precisely the same experience as belonging to the first portion.

2.6 I can recognize analytically in advance the concept of body through the marks of extension, impregnability, shape, etc., which all become thought in this concept.\(^{10}\)

2.7 But now I expand my recognition and, by looking back on the experience from which I have derived this concept of body, I find every time also heaviness connected with the above marks, and therefore synthetically add this as a predicate to that concept.

2.8 It is therefore the experience on which the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of heaviness is based, because both concepts (body and heaviness) belong together, even if in a contingent way, even though one is not contained in the other. But they still belong together as parts of a whole, namely, of the experience, which itself is a synthetic combination of the perspective.\(^{11}\)

3.1 But with synthetical judgments a priori, this assistance is entirely lacking.

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\(^{10}\) The concept of body includes an extension and a resistance to entry (impregnability) and a shape. If there were no resistance then the body would be no more than a circle or triangle traced out in mid air. But then predicates such as color and weight and texture, could only be applied through some exposure.

\(^{11}\) It seems then that regarding weight, we would try several bodies and finding them all to have some degree of weight we would connect weight synthetically with body. This will be covered in the Transcendental Analytic. But this will always be contingent (as all experiential knowledge), and it could be that in outer space, for example, we would find no weight associated with some body.
3.2 If I am supposed to go out beyond the concept A to recognize another one, B, as joined with it, what is it on which I support myself and through which the synthesis becomes possible? for I do not have here the advantage of looking about for it in the field of experience.

3.3 Take the proposition, “everything which happens has its cause.”

3.4 In the concept of something which happens I think indeed an existence before which a time precedes, etc., and from this analysis judgments may be drawn.

3.5 But the concept of a cause lies entirely apart from that and indicates something different from that which happens, and is therefore not at all contained in this latter representation.

3.6 How then do I come to say something about it which is entirely different from what happens in general, and to recognize that the concept of cause, while indeed not contained in what happens, yet belongs to it and indeed necessarily so?

3.7 What is here the unknown = X upon which the understanding supports itself when, apart from the concept of A, it believes to come upon a predicate B foreign to it, which it nonetheless deems to be connected with it?

3.8 It cannot be experience, because the cited principle adds this second representation to the first not only with greater universality, but also with the expression of necessity, thus entirely a priori and from mere concepts.

3.9 Now upon such synthetical, i.e., expansionary, principles rests the entire final intention of our speculative recognitions a priori. For the analytical ones are indeed most important and necessary, but only to achieve to that clarity of the concepts which is required to a sure and widespread synthesis as a truly new acquisition.
V. Synthetical Judgments A Priori are Contained as Principles in all Theoretical Sciences of Reason

1.1 1. Mathematical judgments are all together synthetical.

1.2 Thus far this statement seems to have eluded the notice of the analysts of human reason, indeed to be diametrically opposed to all their suppositions, even though it is still irrefutably certain and very important in consequence.

1.3 For since we found that the conclusions of the mathematicians all comply with the proposition of contradiction (which the nature of every indubitable certitude requires), we were quite certain that the principles were also recognized from the principle of contradiction. But here we were mistaken. For while a synthetical proposition can certainly be recognized by means of the proposition of contradiction, this is true only because another synthetical proposition is presupposed from which this one can be inferred; but never on its own.\(^{12}\)

2.1 First we need to note that actual mathematical propositions are always judgments a priori and not empirical, and indeed because they entail necessity which cannot be gleaned from experience.

2.2 But if this will not admitted, then well and good. For I will restrict my proposition to pure mathematics whose concept already means that it does not contain empirical, but rather only pure, recognitions a priori.

3.1 Indeed at first we would think that the proposition, \(7 + 5 = 12\), were a mere analytical proposition which resulted from the concept of a sum of seven and five according to the principle of contradiction.

3.2 But if we consider the matter more closely, we find that the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing more than the union of both numbers into a single number, but by means of which it is not at all given what this encom-

\(^{12}\) Once I come to recognize that 7 and 5 are unified in 12, then I have no need to worry that they might also be unified in another expression which were not in turn equal to 12. This occurs by the law of contradiction.
passing number might be.\textsuperscript{13}

3.3 The concept of twelve is by no means already thought by my merely thinking this union of seven and five to myself and, dissect my concept of such a possible sum as long as I will, still, in this way, I will not encounter the twelve in it.\textsuperscript{14}

3.4 We must go beyond these concepts via the support of a perspective which corresponds to one of these two: our five fingers or (like Segner’s arithmetic) five points, and thus gradually add the units of the five, given in the perspective, to the concept of seven.

3.5 Accordingly then I first take the number 7, and then using my fingers as a perspective for the concept of 5, I gradually place the units, which I earlier assembled to make up the number five, to the number 7 in this my picture, and in this way see the number 12 arise.

3.6 That 7 should be added to 5, I have thought indeed in the concept of a sum = $7 + 5$, but not that this sum be equal to the number 12.\textsuperscript{15}

3.7 Therefore the arithmetical proposition is always synthetic. This becomes much plainer when larger numbers are used. For then it is quite evident that, turn and twist our concept as we might, we would never be able to find our sum through the mere dissection of our concept without calling in perspective

\textsuperscript{13} This might be akin to thinking of something which precedes something else necessarily, such that we turn about and look for it, even though we cannot tell in advance what that something is?

\textsuperscript{14} When I am given the 7 and the 5 and told to unify them in a single number, then I know exactly what the situation is like. I sit there like a bump on a log and see if anything at all will come to mind. No telling what associations may produce! Eleven comes to my mind with reference to seven (due to the dice game, I guess, or due to the chain of convenience stores by that name, or the rhyme). The seven I can analyze, I suppose, into a five and a two, etc., but go no further in this way. Perhaps I would think that the union is 7, for a 5 is included in the concept of the 7. See essay on $7+5$.

\textsuperscript{15} The match and map approach would have us dissecting the 7 and the 5 into a group of 1’s, and then likewise with the 12, and finding that the two groups can be substituted for each other. But this is no guarantee that the 7 and 5 can be substituted for the 12, for the left and right hands are identical, for example, but not substitutable, i.e., cannot wear the same glove.
4.1 Just as little is any fundamental proposition of pure geometry analytic.

4.2 That the straight line between two points is the shortest, is a synthetic proposition.

4.3 For my concept of straight contains nothing of quantity, but only of quality.

4.4 The concept of the shortest is wholly an addition, and cannot be derived from the concept of the straight line through any process of analysis.

4.5 A Perspective therefore must here be called in; only by its aid is this synthesis possible.

5.1 Some few fundamental propositions, presupposed by the geometrician, are indeed really analytical and rest on the principle of contradiction. But, as identical propositions, they serve only as links in the chain of method and not as principles; for instance, \( a = a \); the whole is equal to itself; or \( (a + b) > a \), that is, the whole is greater than its part.

5.2 And even these propositions, though they are valid according to pure concepts, are only admitted in mathematics because they can be exhibited in a perspective.

5.3 What causes us here commonly to believe that the predicate of such apodictic judgments is already contained in our concept, and that the judgment is therefore analytical, is merely the ambiguous character of the terms used.

5.4 We are required to join in thought a certain predicate to a given concept, and this necessity is inherent in the concepts themselves.

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16 There is no longer any question, I think, that this is what Kant is talking about. The match and map school is merely mirroring Leibnitz, I think, in that his system of definitions would tell the match and map school how many 1’s to include as the elements of the number of interest. Now it is true, I suppose, that the five fingers of one hand represent the elements of the set, 5, but the important point that Kant is promoting here is that the 12 can be attained to without any need of first having that set defined. Indeed it is by means of Kant's system that the elements of the 12 are first obtained in order then subsequently to be matched and mapped, and it is for this reason that the actual certitude of that school in its system is obtained.
5.5 But the question is not what we ought to join to the given concept in thought, but what we actually think in it, even if only obscurely; and it is then manifest that while the predicate is indeed attached necessarily to the concept it is so by virtue of a perspective, which must be added to the concept, and not as thought in the concept itself.

6.1 2. Natural science (physica) contains synthetical judgments a priori as principles within itself.

6.2 I will only cite a couple of propositions as examples, such as the proposition: “in all alterations of the physical world, the quantity of material remains unaltered,” or this: “in all communication of motions effect and counter-effect must always be equal to each other.”

6.3 Not only is the necessity to both clear, thus their origin a priori, but also that they are synthetical propositions.

6.4 For in the concept of matter I do not think to myself the persistence, but rather merely its presence in space by the filling of space.

6.5 Therefore I actually go out beyond the concept of material in order to additionally think a priori something to it, something which I did not think in it.

6.6 The proposition therefore is not thought analytically, but rather synthetically, and yet still a priori, and likewise in the other propositions of the pure part of natural science.

7.1 3. In metaphysics, even if we consider it only as a thus far merely attempted science, though still as an unavoidable one through the nature of human reason, synthetical propositions a priori are supposed to be contained. And it is therefore of no concern at all to metaphysics merely to dissect and, thereby, explain analytically, concepts which we make a priori of things. We want rather to expand our realizations a priori. For this we must avail ourselves of such principles which add something beyond the given concepts, something which was not contained in them, and even to go out so far through synthetical judgments a priori that experience itself cannot follow, e.g., in the proposition, “the world must have a first beginning”, etc. So metaphysics, at least
with respect to its purposes, consists of sheer synthetical propositions a priori.

VI. The Universal Task of Pure Reason

1.1 We already gain a great deal by bringing a number of examinations under the formula of a single task.

1.2 For in that way we not only facilitate our own affair for ourselves by precisely determining that affair, but also the judgment of anyone else who wants to review whether or not we have sufficiently performed with respect to our design.

1.3 Now the actual task of pure reason is contained in the question, “how are synthetic judgments possible a priori?”

2.1 That metaphysics has remained in a vacillating state of uncertainty and contradictions until the present time is due solely to the cause that this problem, and perhaps even the difference between analytical and synthetical judgments, did not occur to anyone sooner.

2.2 Now the standing and falling of metaphysics depends upon the solution of this problem, or upon sufficient proof that the possibility, which it demands to have explained, does not occur at all.

2.3 David Hume came closer to this problem than all philosophers, but did not by far consider it determined enough and in its universality, but remained merely with the synthetical proposition of the connection of the effect with its cause (principium causaliatus). He believed to have revealed that such a proposition a priori was entire impossible and, according to his conclusions, everything which we call metaphysics would amount to a delusion of alleged rational insight of what has actually been borrowed from experience, and which has taken on the appearance of necessity through custom. He would never have come to such a destruction of all pure philosophy if he had had our task before his eyes in its universality, for then he would have seen that there could not even be a pure mathematics according to his argument, be-
cause this mathematics contains certain synthetical propositions a priori. And his good sense would have prevented him from making such an assertion.

3.1 Along with the solution of the above task there is also included the possibility of the pure rational use in the establishment and completion of all sciences which contain theoretical recognitions a priori of objects, i.e., the answering of these two questions:

3.2 “How is pure mathematics possible?”

3.3 “How is pure natural science possible?”

3.4 Now with respect to these two sciences, since they actually do exist, it is indeed fitting to ask, “how are they possible?” For that they must be possible is proven through their actuality.*

3.5 But due to the former bad advancement of metaphysics, and because we cannot assert that even a single discovery, with respect to its essential purpose, actually exists, everyone has a reason to doubt its very possibility.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Some persons could doubt this latter concerning pure natural science.

1.2 But we only need to review the diverse propositions which come forth at the beginning of actual (empirical) physics, such as that of the persistence of the same quantity of matter, or the inertia or the equality of effect and counter effect, etc. For then we are soon convinced that they constitute a physicam puram (or rationalem) where, as an appropriate science, it deserves indeed to be presented separately in its entire scope, be it narrow or wide.

4.1 But now this manner of recognition is still also to be considered as given in a certain way, and metaphysics is actual, even if not as a science, still as a natural predisposition (metaphysica naturalis).

4.2 For human reason goes incessantly forth without the mere vanity of wide knowledge moving it, driven by its own need for such questions which can be answered through no experiential use of reason nor from principles borrowed from that. Accordingly then in every age some sort of metaphysics is actually present and will also always remain in all humans as soon as reason
is expanded to speculation within them.

4.3 Now the question is also of this, “how is metaphysics possible as a natural disposition of the human?” i.e., “how do the questions, which pure reason poses to itself and which pure reason is driven by its own needs to answer as best it can, arise out of the nature of universal human reason?”

5.1 But since all previous attempts at answering these natural questions, e.g., whether the world had a beginning or has always been, etc., have always met with unavoidable contradictions, we cannot let the matter rest with the mere natural disposition for metaphysics, i.e., with the pure rational capacity itself, from which indeed some sort of metaphysics always arises (be it as it will). Rather it must be possible to bring it up to certitude either in the knowledge or ignorance of the objects, i.e., either in the decision about the objects of its questions or about the capacity and incapacity of reason to judge something with respect to them; hence either confidently to expand our pure reason or to place determined and sure boundaries to it.

5.2 The last question which flows from the above universal task, would properly be this, “how is metaphysics possible as a science?”

6.1 Finally therefore the critique of reason leads necessarily to science, but the dogmatic use of it, on the other hand, i.e., without a critique, leads to baseless assertions to which we can set contrary ones which are just as apparent, thus finally to skepticism.

7.1 Also this science cannot be of great, intimidating expanse because it does not have to do with objects of reason, whose count is infinite, but rather merely with itself, i.e., with problems which spring entirely from its own bosom and are not presented to it through the nature of things which are distinguished from it, but rather through its own nature. For if it has previously obtained complete information about its own capacity with respect to objects which might come forth to it in experience, then it must be easy to determine completely and with certitude the scope and the limits of its usage attempted beyond the limits of experience.
8.1 Therefore we can and must treat all previous attempts to produce a metaphysics dogmatically as unaccomplished; for what is analytical in any one of them, residing a priori with our reason, is not yet the purpose at all, but rather only a preparation for the actual metaphysics, namely to expand its recognition a priori synthetically. And it is unsuitable for this because it merely shows what is contained in these concepts, but not how we achieve a priori to such in order also to be able to determine accordingly their valid use with respect to objects of every recognition in general.

8.2 It also takes very little self indulgence to give up all these claims, for the undeniable and also, in dogmatic procedures, unavoidable contradictions of reason with itself have already long ago deprived every previous metaphysics of its reputation.

8.3 More perseverance will be necessary to avoid being halted by the difficulties inwardly and by the resistance outwardly to promote at last a science indispensable to human reason (whereof one can indeed cut down every emerging trunk, but not destroy the roots) to a healthy and fruitful growth through another treatment, entirely opposed to the former.

VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science under the Name of a Critique of Pure Reason

1.1 Now from all this there emerges the idea of a particular science which can be called the critique of pure reason.

1.2 For reason is the capacity which renders the principles of the recognitions a priori.

1.3 Thus pure reason is what contains the principles for all absolutely a priori recognitions.

1.4 An organon of pure reason would be an epitome of those principles, according to which all pure recognitions a priori can be acquired and actually brought forth.

1.5 The detailed application of such an organon would supply a system of pure
reason.

1.6 But since this is very demanding, and as it is as yet still undecided whether an expansion of our recognition in general be possible and in which cases it might be possible, we can treat a science of the mere evaluation of pure reason, its sources and limits, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason.

1.7 Such a science would not be called a doctrine as rather only a critique of pure reason. And, with respect to speculation, its usefulness would actually be only negative, not serving for the expansion of reason, but rather only for its clarification, and keeping it free of error, and that is already a great gain.

1.8 I term every recognition transcendental which is occupied in general not with objects, but rather with our manner of recognizing objects to the extent this is supposed to be possible a priori.

1.9 A system of such concepts would be called the Transcendental Philosophy.

1.10 But again this is still too much for the beginning.

1.11 For since such a science would have to completely contain the analytical as well as the synthetical recognitions a priori, it is, to the extent it concerns our intention, too large in scope, in that we need carry out the analysis only as far as is indispensably necessary for comprehending the principles of the synthesis a priori in their entirety, and why it is a task for us.

1.12 This examination, with which we are now occupied, we are not actually able to term doctrine, but rather only transcendental critique, because it does not have the expansion of the recognitions themselves as its intention, but rather only their rectification, and is supposed to render a touchstone of the value and lack of value of all recognitions a priori.

1.13 Accordingly, such a critique is a preparation, where possible, to an organon, and if this should not succeed, at least to a canon, according to which, in any case, the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, be it an expansion or merely a limitation of its recognition, could someday be described analytically as well as synthetically.

1.14 For that this be possible, indeed that such a system could not be of large scope at all in order to hope to complete it entirely, can be estimated in ad-
vance from this: that here it is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but the understanding which judges of the nature of things, and this in turn only with respect to its recognition a priori, that makes up the object whose content, because we still do not need to seek it externally, cannot remain concealed to us and, according to all supposition, is small enough to be completely catalogued, judged according to its value or worthlessness, and brought to a correct evaluation.

1.15 Even less may one expect here a critique of the books and systems of pure reason, but rather that of the pure rational capacity itself.

1.16 Only if such a critique lies as the basis, however, do we have a sure touchstone for estimating the philosophical stance of old and new works in this field. For otherwise the unqualified scribe and judge evaluates the baseless assertions of another through his own assertions, which are equally baseless.

2.1 The Transcendental Philosophy is the idea of a science to which the critique of pure reason is supposed to lay out the entire plan architectonically, i.e., from principles, with a full guarantee as to the completeness and security of all pieces which make up this edifice.

2.2 It is the system of all principles of pure reason.

2.3 That this critique is not already called transcendental philosophy itself is due solely to this: in order to be a complete system it would have to contain also a detailed analysis of the entire human recognition a priori.

2.4 Now indeed in any case our critique must also present a complete enumeration of all stem concepts which make up the pure recognition indicated.

2.5 However, it cannot reasonably engage in the detailed analysis of these concepts themselves, nor also in a critical review of each one derived from them, partly because this dissection would not be purposeful, not having the consideration which is encountered in a synthesis for the sake of which the entire critique actually exists, and partly because it would be contrary to the unity of the plan to deal with the responsibility for the completeness of such an analysis and derivation, which we could still be spared with respect to our intention.
2.6 Meanwhile, this completeness of the dissection as well as the derivation from the concepts a priori (soon to be supplied) is easy to supplement once they are given as detailed principles of the synthesis, and if nothing is lacking with respect to this essential intention.

3.1 To the critique of pure reason, accordingly, everything which makes up the Transcendental Philosophy belongs, and that is the complete idea of the Transcendental Philosophy, but not yet this science itself; because it goes only so far in the analysis as is required for a complete evaluation of the synthetical recognitions a priori.

4.1 The primary aim with the division of such a science is that no concepts whatsoever, which contain any kind of empirical element, may enter, i.e., that the recognition a priori is completely pure.

4.2 Hence, although the highest base propositions of morality and the foundational concept of it are indeed recognitions a priori, they still do not belong in the Transcendental Philosophy because, while they do not actually place the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, desire and inclination, etc., (which are all together of empirical origin) as the basis of their proscriptions, though still in the concept of duty as an obstacle, which is supposed to be overcome or as an motivational basis which is not supposed to be made into a motive, they must instead be encompassed in the formulation of the system of pure morality.

4.3 Hence the Transcendental Philosophy is a worldly wisdom of pure, merely speculative reason.

4.4 For all practicality, to the extent it contains incentives (Triebfeden), refers to feelings which belong to sources of empirical recognition.

5.1 Now if the division of this science is to be arranged from the universal standpoint of a system in general, then that which we now present would have to contain first an instruction of the elements of pure reason, and secondly a methodology.

5.2 Each of these primary parts would have its subdivision, the bases of which
do not lend themselves to a presentation here.

5.3 Only so much seems necessary as an introduction or as a preceding reminder: there are two stems of human recognition, which perhaps arise from a common root, though unknown to us, namely sensitivity and understanding. Through the first of these objects are given to us, and through the second they are thought.

5.4 Now to the extent that sensitivity should contain representations a priori which make up the conditions under which objects are given to us, it would belong to Transcendental Philosophy.

5.5 The transcendental doctrine of senses would have to belong to the first portion of the science of elements, because the conditions, under which alone objects of human recognition are given, precede those under which these are thought.
1. The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements

First Part.

The Transcendental Aesthetic

1.

See Translator’s Notes and Comments on this Part in Appendix II.3

1.1 Regardless of the manner and the means whereby a recognition (Erkenntnis) may refer to objects, it is always the perspective/intuition (Anschauung) whereby it refers immediately to them, and it is to the perspective that all thinking is aimed as a means.

1.2 But this only occurs to the extent the object is given. But this in turn, at least for humans, is only possible by the mind being affected by the object in a certain way.

1.3 The capacity (receptivity) for obtaining representations in the way that objects affect us is called sensitivity.

1.4 It is then by means of sensitivity that objects are given to us, and they alone supply us with a perspective. But it is through the understanding that they are thought, and it is from that thinking that concepts arise.

1.5 But all thinking, be it directly or indirectly, must ultimately refer, by means of certain characteristics, to perspectives, thus, with us, to sensitivity, because there is no other way that objects may be given to us.

2.1 The effect of an object upon the representational capacity, to the extent we are affected by it, is sensation (Empfindung).

2.2 That perspective, which refers to the object via sensation, is called empirical.

2.3 The undetermined object of an empirical perspective is called appearance (Erscheinung).\(^{17}\)

\(^{17}\) Thus the appearance represents the object of an empirical looking/perspective and it “pops up” or stands out as such from the background, as the face stands out in the cloud. Once we determine the object then it is either a physical object, e.g., a rain, or it remains a sheer appearance, e.g., a rainbow or a face in the cloud or the mirage water on the heated road ahead.
3.1 That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation, I call its material; but that which entails the manifold of the appearance being ordered in certain relationships, I call the form of the appearance.

3.2 Since that, in which the sensation can alone be ordered and positioned in a certain form, cannot itself in turn be sensation, it follows that for us the material of every appearance can only be given a posteriori, but its form must already lie a priori in the mind, and in that way be subject to our consideration in isolation from all sensations.

4.1 I term all representations pure (in the transcendental sense) in which nothing which pertains to sensation is to be found.

4.2 Accordingly the pure forms of sensitive perspectives in general are to be encountered in the mind a priori, in which all manifold of the appearances can be looked at (angeschauet) under certain circumstances.

4.3 This pure form of sensitivity will also itself be called pure perspective.

4.4 Accordingly if I remove from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, e.g., substance, power, divisibility, etc., and likewise that which belongs to sensitivity, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., then something still remains for me from this empirical perspective, namely extension and shape.¹⁸

4.5 These belong to pure perspective, which, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation, has a place a priori in the mind as a mere form of the sensitivity.

5.1 A science of all principles of sensitivity a priori would be a transcendental aesthetic.*

5.2 There must be a science therefore which makes up the first part of a transcendental doctrine of elements, in contrast to that which contains the prin-

¹⁸ Another example might be the circle or triangle which is traced out in midair by the mime.
ciples of pure thinking and which would be called transcendental logic.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Only the Germans use the word Aesthetic to indicate what others call the critique of taste.

1.2 Here a misguided hope lies as a foundation, which encompasses the admirable analysis of Baumgarten, to bring the critical judgment of the beautiful under principles of reason.

1.3 But this endeavor is hopeless.

1.4 For the cited rules, or criterion, are simply empirical according to their intended sources and can therefore never serve as determined laws a priori, according to which our judgment of taste can orientate itself, and far rather make the latter the actual touchstone of the former.

1.5 For that reason it is advisable either to let this terminology fade away and to hold to that doctrine which is true science (whereby we also would tread closer to the speech and to the sense of the ancients, by which the division of the recognition as αἰσθητὰ καὶ νοητά was quite rightly asserted), or else to divide the denomination with the speculative philosophy and to take the aesthetic partly in a transcendental sense and partly in a psychological meaning.

6.1 In the transcendental aesthetic therefore we will first isolate the sensitivity by removing everything which the understanding thinks through its concept, so that nothing remains except empirical perspective.

6.2 Secondly we will remove from this remainder everything which belongs to sensation, so that nothing remains now except a pure perspective and the mere form of the appearances, which is all that the sensitivity can supply a priori.

6.3 By means of this procedure we will see that there are two pure forms of sensitive perspective as recognitional principles a priori, namely space and time, and it is to the exposition of these two that we now turn our attention.
The Transcendental Aesthetic

1st Section. Concerning Space

2. The Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space

1.1 By means of the external sense (an aspect of our minds) we represent objects as apart from us and these all together in space.\(^{19}\)

1.2 In space their shape, size and relationship to one another are determined and determinable.\(^{20}\)

1.3 The internal sense, by means of which the mind itself, or its internal state, is looked at, certainly does not give us a perspective of the soul itself as an object. But it is still a determined form, by means of which alone the perspective of its internal state is possible, so that everything which belongs to the internal determinations is represented in relationships of time.

1.4 Time cannot be looked at externally, any more than space can be seen as something internal.\(^{21}\)

1.5 What then are space and time?\(^{22}\)

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\(^{19}\) This sense seems to be fundamentally visual. We engage in experiments to calibrate other senses with this sighting. We are able to explain the movement of our limbs in space, which the blind can only feel, by reference to this visual space. Otherwise we would be as the blind and able only to discern the difference between a physical constraint and an ability to freely move our limbs, but not able to explain it; for this recognition requires taking a look.

\(^{20}\) We can tell by looking that something, for example, is round or square, and large or small, and to the left or right of our visual field or to the left or right of another object.

\(^{21}\) When we look about us we can see objects of one color or another (or some degree of gray) and located here and there, and of this and that shape and size, but nothing in all that visual scene gives us the least inkling of time. Time is simply not visual. Likewise when we look about and see objects here and there, even though the sensations which make up these perspectives are retinal material of our eyes and as such are within our eyes, still we cannot avoid seeing these objects in space apart from us.

\(^{22}\) There are four theories of space and time that Kant will contend with. Two of these are those of realism and two are of illusionism. Of the former two, one, that of Isaac Newton, holds that space and time are real on their own and independent of all things which may be located in them. The other, that of Leibniz, asserts that time and space, while real enough, are not real on their own, but only as a function of real things, i.e., when God creates objects, then space and time come into existence in order for these objects to relate to each other. Kant intends to deal with these two realism theories here, for the other two, the dogmatic illusionism of George Berkeley and theoretical illusionism of René Descartes are not serious contenders, being at odds with clear recognition, and are dealt with later.
1.6 Are they actual things?23

1.7 Are they simply determinations or even relationships of things, but which would pertain to them on their own, even if they were not being looked at,24 or are they such which adhere only to the form of the perspective and thus to the subjective condition of our mind, without which these predicates cannot be attributed to any thing whatsoever?25

1.8 In order to instruct ourselves about this we first want to explicate the concept of space.

1.9 But what I mean with explication is the distinct (even if not detailed) representation of what belongs to a concept. It is a metaphysical explication when it contains a description of the concept as given a priori.26

2.1 1. Space is not an empirical concept which were derived from external experiences.

2.2 For in order that certain sensations be referred to something apart from me (i.e., to something in a location different from where I am located), or in order that I can represent them as apart from, and adjacent to, each other and, hence, not merely as different, but as in different locations, the representation of space must perforce already precede as the foundation.27

2.3 Accordingly the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the rela-

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23 Yes according to Newton, and no according to Leibniz, at least not independently of existing things.

24 Precisely so, Leibniz would reply, namely space and time are real enough, but only contingently as a result of a world of objects created by God, and not on their own independently of this creation. When something is created, then likewise a congruent space also comes into being. This position is, of course, quite contrary to that of Newton.

25 Here Kant hints at his own theory, the validity of which he intends now to prove, and both negatively by showing that neither Newton nor Leibniz can explain common human recognition, and then also positively by showing how it is that his own theory of the ideality of space and time is able to produce this explanation.

26 There is considerable parallelism in Kant's treatment of space and time, so much so that I have deemed it expedient to present them in a parallel format and include comments about time as I deal with space.

27 It is one thing to see a chair, and another thing to see it here or there. And it is one thing to picture a table and to look at it as now (a perspective) or as earlier (also a perspective), e.g., as a memory.
tionships of the external appearances through experience. Far rather it is only through this representation that this external experience is made possible in the first place.  

3.1 2. Space is a necessary a priori representation which is the basis for all external perspectives.

3.2 It is impossible to imagine the absence of space, although we can easily imagine no objects being present in that space.

3.3 Therefore space is the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not to be considered as some determination dependent upon them. It is a representation a priori which necessarily precedes as the basis of external representations.

4.1 3. Space is not a discursive concept or, as we say, a general concept about

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28 Kant reasons so: if space and time were things on their own, or if they were encased, as it were, in objects as the realists (Newton and Leibniz, respectively) would have it, then it would be impossible for us ever to have come to any notion of them, for spatial and temporal terminology and references cannot arise from an examination of things. I can see that two things are different, but I cannot see in any comparison of the two, no matter how closely and attentively I focus on them, that they are apart from each other in space, for that is merely the way that I look at the objects, and that perspective or that way of looking must precede in order to be able to notice such aspects. The same holds for time, namely no matter how long and intently I listen to a note of music, let us say, I can never hear in that note or sense in any way that that note follows another note or a moment of silence. Likewise when I look at two things next to each other in space, there is nothing at all in that picture which would suggest the notion of simultaneity, for that is simply not an aspect of things on their own at all. It is important to keep in mind here that Kant is merely trying to establish that we do not get our notions of time and space from experience, but rather that these notions must precede our exposure of objects in order to have experience in the first place.

29 This might be called the anti-Leibnizian proof. According to Leibniz without created things there is no space and time, for these are merely the relationships between things (in space) or between perceptions (in time). Therefore space and time come into existence only upon the creation of things. But Kant reasons against Leibniz in this wise: if that were true, i.e., if space and time were merely determinations of existing things, then it would follow that upon imagining the absence of things we could also imagine the absence of space and time, since these are dependent upon real things. But we cannot do that, i.e., we can easily enough imagine a space and time devoid of things, but we cannot imagine or picture the absence of space or time.
relations of things in general, but rather a pure perspective.  

4.2 For in the first place we can only imagine a single space, and when we speak of many spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same singular space.

4.3 Furthermore these parts cannot precede this singular, all-enveloping space as though they were its component parts (from which its assembly were possible), but rather can only be thought in it.

4.4 Space is essentially singular. The manifold in it, hence also the general concept of spaces in general, rests entirely on limitations.

4.5 From this it follows that with respect to space one perspective a priori (which is not empirical) lies as its basis.

4.6 Accordingly all geometric principles, e.g., that in a triangle two sides are greater than the third, can never be derived from the general concepts of line and triangle, but rather from the perspective and indeed a priori and with apodictic certainty.

5.1 4. Space is represented as an infinite, given quantity.

5.2 Now we must think every concept as a representation which is contained in an infinite count of diverse, possible representations (as their common characteristic), and so as containing these under itself; but no concept as such

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30 Suppose we looked at a book and a lamp, and then at the moon and a star, do we really think that we could discern that the common denominator joining the two sets were the spatial relationship of separateness, and thereby come to the notion of space? by saying that the first two relate to each other in the same way that the second two relate to each other?

31 This is the way we come to assemble the first object out of its parts, e.g., a table being an elevated flat surface. But we cannot come to space this way, for every part of every space is also itself a space.

32 Empirical concepts arise when we compare two or more objects and abstract from what is different between them in order to focus on the similarity. That similarity then becomes the basis of a concept of these objects. For example I look at this tree and that tree and find that they are different in many ways, but that they are similar with regard to the trunk and branches and foliage, and so that becomes the concept of a tree, namely a trunk with branches and foliage. But this is not possible with regard to the notion of space and for this reason: we don’t see different spaces originally in order then to abstract from the differences (locations) in order to come up with what is common, namely space. It is not possible in this way, for every space is always originally seen merely as a limitation of one and the same, all-embracing space. This means that space is essentially merely a way of looking at things, and so resides within us as the form of our perspective.
can be so thought as though it contained an infinite count of representations \textit{within} itself.

5.3 But that is precisely how space is thought (for all parts of space through infinity are simultaneous).

5.4 Therefore the original representation of space is perspective a priori and not a concept.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{3. Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space}

1.1 With a transcendental exposition I understand the explanation of a concept as a principle whereby the possibility of other synthetical a priori recognitions can be grasped.

1.2 For this purpose it is necessary that such recognitions actually flow from the given concept and that these recognitions are only possible under the presupposition of a given explanatory method of this concept.

2.1 Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori.

2.2 But then what must the representation of space be in order that such a recognition of it be possible?

2.3 It must originally be perspective, for from mere concepts no proposition which goes out beyond the concept can be drawn. But this happens in geometry (Introduction V).

2.4 But this perspective must be a priori encountered within us, i.e., before every perception of an object, and be a pure, and not an empirical, perspective.

2.5 For the geometric proposition are all together apodictic, i.e., connected with

\textsuperscript{33} Finally Kant notes that in the empirical way we consider a concept, developed as noted above, we are able to imagine an infinite count of objects being contained under this concept, e.g., an infinite count of different tables \textit{under} the concept of table. But space is entirely different in that space, which is thought of as an infinite given, is also conceived of as containing an infinite count of things \textit{within} itself. And so it is entirely a priori and not an empirical concept at all.
the consciousness of their necessity, e.g., space has only three dimensions. But such propositions cannot be empirical judgments or those of experience, nor concluded from such (see Introduction II).

3.1 Now how can an external perspective reside in the mind which precedes the objects themselves, and in which the concept of these objects can be determined?

3.2 Obviously not otherwise than to the extent the perspective is seated in the subject and merely as its formal constitution for being affected by objects and, thereby, obtaining an immediate representation, i.e., a perspective; hence only as the form of the external sense in general.

4.1 Therefore it is our explanation alone which makes the possibility of geometry as a synthetical recognition a priori.

4.2 Any other method of explanation, which does not supply this, even if it seems similar, can be distinguish by this characteristic with the greatest confidence.34

Conclusions from the above Concepts

1.1 a. Space does not represent any property of any sort of thing on its own, nor in the relationships of things to each other, i.e., no determination of theirs which would adhere to the objects themselves if we were to abstract from all subjective conditions of the perspective.

1.2 For neither absolute nor relative determinations can be looked at before the

34 Finally Kant turns here to his transcendental exposition. He wants to explain how it is that certain recognitions can arise and to show that they cannot arise except in this one way. He uses the science of geometry as an example. The assertions of geometry are universal and necessary, e.g., that any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third. This information cannot arise from the concept of a triangle, for by means of the concept we are conscious merely of a three-sided figure, but not of the relative lengths of the side. Likewise an empirical perspective reveals only that different triangles have this relationship, but not that all triangles have and must have this relationship. Therefore it is only possible for this information to arise if we have an a priori looking/perspective, and this can arise only if space is the way that we look at things rather than something on its own.
existence of the things to which they appertain, thus not a priori.

2.1 b. Space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of the external sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensitivity, under which alone external perspective is possible for us.

2.2 Now because the receptivity of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily precedes all perspectives of these objects, it is easy to understand how the form of all appearances must be able to precede all actual perceptions, thus a priori in the mind, and how it, as a pure perspective in which all objects must be determined, can contain principles of the relationships of these preceding all experience.

3.1 Accordingly we can speak of space or extended things, etc., only from the standpoint of a human.

3.2 If we depart from the subjective condition according to which alone we can receive external perspective, namely as we might be affected by objects, then the representation of space means nothing at all.

3.3 This predicate is ascribed to things only to the extent that they appear to us, i.e., as objects of the sensitivity.

3.4 The enduring form of this receptivity, which we term sensitivity, is a necessary condition of all relationships in which objects may be looked at as external to us and, if we abstract from these objects, is a pure perspective which bears the name of space.

3.5 Because we cannot make the particular conditions of sensitivity into the conditions of the possibility of things, but only of their appearances, we certainly can say that space encompasses all things which might appear outwardly to us, but not all things on their own, whether they be looked at or not, or by whatever subject we might wish.

3.6 For we cannot at all judge of the perspectives of other, thinking beings, namely whether they are bound by the same conditions which limit our perspective and which are universally valid for us.
3.7 If we add the limitation of a judgment to the condition of the subject, then the judgment is unconditioned.

3.8 The proposition that all things are next to one another in space holds true under the limitation that these things are taken as objects of our sensitive perspective.

3.9 If I add here the condition to the concept and say that all things as external appearances are next to each other in space, then this rule holds true universally and without limitation.

3.10 Our expositions therefore teach the reality, i.e., the objective validity, of space with respect to everything which can be presented to us externally as an object; but at the same time the ideality of space with respect to things when they are considered by reason as something on their own, i.e., without regard to the constitution of our sensitivity.

3.11 Therefore we assert the empirical reality of space (with respect to every possible external experience), but still its transcendental ideality, i.e., that it is nothing as soon as we remove the condition of the possibility of any experience and assume it as something which stands as the basis to things on their own.

4.1 Now apart from space there is no other subjective representation referred to anything external, which could be termed a priori objective.

4.2 For from nothing else could we derive synthetical proposition a priori as we can from space.

4.3 Strictly speaking therefore no ideality at all can be attributed to them, even though they agree with the representation of space to extent that they pertain merely to the subjective constitution of our mode of sensing, e.g., seeing, hearing, feeling through the sensations of color, tone and warmth. But since they are merely sensations and not perspectives, they do not permit any object to be recognized, much less a priori.

5.1 The intention of this remark is merely cautionary, namely to keep us from trying to explain the asserted ideality of space through vastly inadequate ex-
amples where such qualities as color, taste, etc. are rightly considered not as consisting of things, but rather as alterations of our subject which can even be different with different people.\textsuperscript{35}

5.2 For in such a case what is originally itself only appearance, e.g., a rose, would hold in the empirical understanding as a thing on its own, but which still, with respect to its color, can appear differently in each eye.

5.3 In contrast to this the transcendental concept of the appearances in space is a critical reminder that nothing at all that is looked at in space is a thing on its own, nor is space a form of things which were intrinsic to them on their own, but rather that the objects on their own are not known by us at all, and what we term external objects are nothing more than representations of our sensibility, the form of which is space, but the true correlate, i.e., the thing itself on its own, is not recognized in that way at all, nor can be, but about which no questions are ever raised in experience.

\textsuperscript{35} This may mean that we don’t want to think of space as an alteration of our subject which can be different with different people. Rather there is an objective aspect, such that I perspective of things in space can be coordinated with that of other people, e.g., when facing someone, my right will be the left of the other person. See also the \textit{color of the dress}. 
The Transcendental Aesthetic

2nd Section. Concerning Time

4. The Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Time

1.1 1. Time is not an empirical concept which were somehow derived from an experience.

1.2 For simultaneity or succession would not even enter into the perception if the representation of time were not already present a priori as the basis.

1.3 Only under its presupposition can anyone imagine that something were in one and the same time (simultaneously) or in different times (successively).

2.1 2. Time is a necessary representation preceding all perspectives.

2.2 With regard to appearances in general we cannot cancel time, although we can very easily remove the appearances from that time.

2.3 Time therefore is given a priori.

2.4 In it alone is every actuality of the appearances possible.

2.5 These can vanish, but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be removed.

3.1 3. Upon this a priori necessity the possibility of apodictic principles of the relationships of time or axioms of time in general is based.

3.2 Time has only one dimension; diverse times are not simultaneous, but successive (even as diverse spaces are not successive, but simultaneous).\(^{36}\)

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\(^{36}\) We might hear: “the sun is shining”, and then later would hear “the sun is not shining” and we would object, and rightly so, that this were a contradiction; and then we would be told “the sun was shining, but that was earlier, and it is not shining now,” and so would come to see that time were a modifier of the logic, and what is ordinarily a contradiction is not necessarily so in time. And also any representation of an earlier perception is always now when being remembered, and so where any “before” is always “now” when in mind. Thus there is no meaning to “before” except as a way of looking at some “now” and seeing it as a memory, i.e., as earlier. See also the footnote to sentence 3.5 below.
3.3 These principles can never be drawn from experience, for this would provide neither strict universality nor apodictic certitude.

3.4 We would only be able to say that common perception teaches this, but not that it must be this way.\(^\text{37}\)

3.5 These principles hold as rules, by means of which experience in general is possible, and instruct us before experience and not through experience.\(^\text{38}\)

4.1 4. Time is not a discursive concept or, as we say, a general concept, but rather a pure form of sensitive perspective.

4.2 Diverse times are only parts of one and the same time.

4.3 But a representation, which can only be given through a single object, is perspective.

4.4 And the proposition that diverse times cannot be simultaneous would not permit itself of being derived from a general concept.

4.5 The proposition is synthetic and cannot arise from concepts.

4.6 Therefore it is contained immediately in the perspective and representation of time.

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\(^{37}\) In other words, it would be impossible to say that the burning house and the house before the fire were not things which could just as easily exist at the same time in different tracks of time. We would not be able to insist that the burning house existed after the unburned house, but only that so far this is all that we had ever noticed. For different times don’t necessarily mean succession; they could mean different tracks at one and the same time.

\(^{38}\) I think it is worthwhile to look at Kant’s footnote on Il 401 of the Inaugural Dissertation, namely “Simultaneous things are not so because they do not succeed one another. For when succession is removed there is indeed abolished some conjunction which was there because of the series of time, but there does not immediately arise from that another true relationship such as is the conjunction of all of them at the same moment. For simultaneous things are joined together at the same moment of time, just as successive things are joined together by different moments. So, though time be of one dimension only, yet the ubiquity of time (to speak with Newton), whereby all things sensitively thinkable are at some time, adds a further dimension to the quantity of actual things in as much as they hang, as it were, upon the same point of time. For if you were to describe time by a straight line produced to infinity and if you were to describe things simultaneous at any point of time by lines joining at right angles, the surface which is thus generated will represent the phenomenal world both as substance and as accidents.”
5. The infinitude of time means nothing more than all determined quantities of time are merely limitations of a single time lying as their basis.

5.2 Hence the original representation of time must be given as unlimited.

5.3 But where the parts themselves and every size of an object can be represented determinedly only though a limitation, there the entire representation cannot have been given through concepts (for they contains only partial representations), but rather an immediate perspective must lie as the basis.

5. Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Time

1.1 Here I can refer to item 3 above where, in order to be brief, I placed what is actually transcendental under the article of the metaphysical exposition.

1.2 Now I add that the concept of alteration, and with it that of motion (as alteration of location), is only possible through and in the temporal representation; and if this representation were not (internal) perspective, no concept, regardless of what, could make comprehendible the possibility of an alternation, i.e., a connection of contradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object (for example one and the same thing being in a location and not being in that very same location).

1.3 Only in time can both contradictorily opposed determinations be encountered in one thing, i.e., successively.

1.4 Therefore our concept of time explains the possibility of so many synthetic recognitions a priori, as the general doctrine of motion demonstrates; and which is more than just a little fruitful.

6. Conclusions from the above Concepts

1.1 a. Time is not something which would exist on its own, or which would adhere to things as an objective determination and which therefore would remain if we abstract from all subjective conditions of their perspective; for in
the first case it would be something which were actual even without actual objects, 39

1.2 and in the second case, it could not precede before the objects themselves as a determination or order adhering to them as their condition and which would be a priori recognized and viewed through synthetical propositions. 40

1.3 But this latter can easily occur if time is nothing more than the subjective condition by means of which all perspectives can occur within us. 41

1.4 For then this form of internal perspective can be represented before the objects, and thus a priori.

2.1 b. Time is nothing other than the form of the internal senses, i.e., perspective of ourselves and our internal state.

2.2 For time can be no determination of external perspective; it belongs neither to a shape nor position, etc. On the contrary it determines the relationship of the representations in our internal senses. 42

2.3 And precisely because this internal perspective presents no shape, we even seek to supplement this deficiency through analogies, and we represent the temporal sequence through a line advancing without end, in which the manifold makes up a row which is only of a single dimension, and we conclude from the properties of this line to all properties of time apart from this single exception, namely that the parts of the line are simultaneous while those of

39 In the Inaugural Dissertation II 401 Kant indicates that time as something real on its own would be an imaginary entity, and in II 400 he declares such to be absurd (and is speaking of Newton’s conception).

40 This also indicates that we could not speak definitively in advance about different times, namely that they are successive and never simultaneous. This, it seems to me, is also a reference to Leibniz, and it suggests that the laws of time would be empirically conditioned, as was also the case with Leibniz’s concept of space.

41 And so the only way we can have the laws of time that we do is if time is merely the subjective condition by means of which objects can appear to us.

42 There is absolutely nothing in the external perspective which could denote time. There is no shape to the perspective of time, nothing which could be spied with our eyes in any way. And it is for this reason that Kant tells us in the following sentence that we must come up with some analogy in order to represent time to ourselves.
Concerning Time

the latter are always successive.⁴³

2.4 From this it becomes clear that the representation of time is itself perspective, because all its relationships can be expressed in an external perspective.⁴⁴

3.1 c. Time is the formal condition a priori of all appearances in general.

3.2 Space, as the pure form of all external perspective, is limited as the condition a priori of merely external perspectives.

3.3 In contrast, since all representations, whether they have external things as objects or not, still, as determinations of the mind, belong to the internal state; but this internal state belongs under the formal condition of the internal perspective and hence of time; and so time is a condition a priori of all appearances in general and indeed the immediate condition of the internal appearances (of our soul) and in that way also mediately that of the external appearances.⁴⁵

3.4 If I can say a priori that external appearances are in space and a priori determined according to the relationships of space, then I certainly can say quite universally from the principle of the internal sense: all appearances in general, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time and necessarily in relations of time.

4.1 If we abstract from our mode of perspective of ourselves internally and also, by means of this perspective, of capturing all external perspectives in our representational capacity, and thus treat objects as they might be on their own, then time is nothing.

4.2 It is of objective validity only with respect to the appearances, because these

⁴³ If I looked at this line I could hear it said that time is exactly the same except the parts of space are simultaneous. From this I could not imagine what “not simultaneous” could be, except that I am able to imagine the drawing of this line and see that the parts are successively produced.

⁴⁴ Since space is a pure perspective, we can look at a line of space and project in it all the relationships of time, e.g., that between two moments there is a time.

⁴⁵ We look at all things, externally and also within us, in terms of time, and see them as simultaneous or a successive.
are already things which we assume as objects of our senses; but it is no longer objective if we abstract from the sensitivity of our perspective, hence from that representational manner which is peculiar to us, and so then speak of things generally.

4.3 Time therefore is simply a subjective condition of our (human) perspective (which is always sensitive, i.e., to the extent we are affected by objects), and nothing at all independently of the subject.

4.4 Nevertheless with respect to all appearances, hence also to all things which can come forth to us in experience, it is necessarily objective.⁴⁶

4.5 We cannot say that all things are in time, because the concept of things in general is abstracted from the manner of their perspective, and this (manner of perspective) is the peculiar condition under which time belongs in the representation of things.⁴⁷

4.6 Now if the condition is added to the concept and we hear: all things as appearances (objects of the sensitive perspective) are in time, then the principle has it’s good, objective propriety and universality a priori.

5.1 Our assertions therefore teach the empirical reality of time, i.e., its subjective validity with respect to all objects which might ever be given to our senses.

5.2 And since our perspective is always sensitive, it follows that no object can ever be given to us in experience which did not belong under the condition of time.

5.3 On the other hand we deny to time every claim to absolute reality since it then, without regard to the form of our sensitive perspective, would adhere utterly to things as a condition or property.

⁴⁶ Here Kant enters upon the transcendental deduction of time, which naturally is a problem, for he has just indicated that time is a subjective condition of our human perspective, and not a thing on its own at all. But then since all things appear to us in time, it is also objective, and we are able to correlate our own perspective in time with that of other people.

⁴⁷ If we obtained time from experience or through reason, then we would not be able to assert the ubiquity of time over things, even when not looked at, but this is not the case at all, and what we know of time we know only because we notice our own way of looking at things, i.e., it is the form of our perspectiveal capacity.
5.4 Such properties, which would pertain to things on their own, can never be given to us through the senses.\textsuperscript{48}

5.5 It is in this therefore that the transcendental ideality of time consists, such that if we abstract from the subjective conditions of the sensitive perspective, time is nothing whatsoever and cannot be ascribed to the objects on their own (apart from their relationship to our perspective), neither as subsisting nor as inhering.

5.6 But this ideality cannot be compared with the surreptitious aspects of the sensations any more than that of space can, because at the same time we presuppose of the appearance itself, to which these predicates inhere, that it have objective reality, which here is completely removed except to the extent that it is merely empirical, i.e., it looks at the object itself merely as appearance; concerning which the above remark of the first section should be reviewed.

7. Exposition

1.1 Against this theory, which accords time empirical, but denies it absolute and transcendental, reality, I have heard such unanimous objections by thoughtful people that I must assume it arises naturally with every reader to whom this consideration is unfamiliar.

1.2 It goes like this: alterations are actual (which is proven by the alteration of our own representations, even if we wanted to deny all external appearances with their alterations).\textsuperscript{49}

1.3 Now alterations are only possible in time; hence: time is something actual.

\textsuperscript{48} The fact that we know something of time is ample proof that it is merely a form of our perspective, for if it were something on its own, then we would never know the first thing about it, not even the terminology would be anything to us, being somewhat like the “er” and “uh” sounds that we sprinkle in our speech. For all that we sense is always now.

\textsuperscript{49} If we did not have an ability to look at things in time, then upon the series of representations: A B and C, upon B A would be out of mind and forgotten and the same with B upon C. And so while A might come to prompt B, upon B there would not be the consciousness that it followed upon A, for A would have vanished from the mind.
1.4 The reply is without difficulty.

1.5 I admit the entire argument.

1.6 Time is certainly something actual, namely the actual form of our internal perspective.

1.7 It has therefore subjective reality with respect to the internal experience, i.e., I actually have the representation of time and my determinations in it.

1.8 It is therefore actually to be looked at not as an object, but rather as the representational manner of myself as an object.

1.9 But if I or another being could look at myself without this condition of sensitivity, then the very same determinations, which we now represent to ourselves as alterations, would render a recognition in which the representation of time, hence then also that of alteration, would not arise at all.\(^\text{50}\)

1.10 Time retains its empirical reality as a condition of all our experience.

1.11 Only the absolute reality cannot be permitted to time according to what was presented above.

1.12 It is nothing other than the form of our internal perspective.*

1.13 If we were to remove from our perspective the peculiar condition of our sensitivity, then the concept of time would vanish, and it does not adhere to the objects themselves, but rather to the subject which looks at them.\(^\text{51}\)

* Kant's annotation:

1.1 I can say indeed: my representations follow one another; but that means

\(^{\text{50}}\) This suggests to me something akin to the appearance of the planets and their motion. There, while they are in motion and therefore changing their position through time, still, given our understanding of them as determined by the laws of gravity, we could look at them as unchanging and as not doing anything, even though, when they come closer to some other body, they would change their position and their direction; but still we would say that nothing has happened and there has been no change. We would be looking at them as though they were clear to us as things on their own traveling their own preset path, much as Leibniz conceived of the monads doing, and so where nothing really ever changed or happened.

\(^{\text{51}}\) Hence Hobbes' village idiot is quite precise is reciting “one one one” as he hears the clock strike the hour of three. And so there are two ways of looking at or considering the elements of the tolling, i.e., “one” (each strike being isolated) or “three” (summation of the strikes).
only that we are conscious of them as in a temporal series, i.e., according to the form of the inner sense.

1.2 Hence time is not something on its own, nor is it a condition adhering objectively to things.

2.1 But the reason why this objection is made so unanimously, and indeed by those who otherwise have nothing illuminating to say against the doctrine of the ideality of space, is this:

2.2 They hope not to be able to establish the absolute reality of space in an apodictic manner because opposing them is idealism, according to which the actuality of external objects is not subject to a rigorous proof. But on the other hand, the absolute reality of the objects of our internal sense (of myself and my state) is immediately clear through consciousness.

2.3 The former could be a mere appearance, but this latter, they maintain, something undeniably actual.\(^{52}\)

2.4 But they did not realize that both, without us challenging their actuality as representations, still only pertain to appearances which always have two sides, the one where the object is considered on its own (regardless of the manner of looking at it, but whose constitution for this reason always remains problematical); the other where the form of the perspective of this object is considered, which must be sought not in the object on its own, but rather in the subject to whom it appears, but which still pertains actually and necessarily to the appearance of this object.\(^{53,54}\)

3.1 Accordingly time and space are two sources of recognition from whence diverse synthetical recognitions can be created a priori, as is brilliantly exem-

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\(^{52}\)And so they want to play with the contrast in order to establish emphatically the reality of ourselves.

\(^{53}\)Here is where we must remind ourselves that our perspective reveals to us only spectral data, e.g., colors and sounds, etc., i.e., things (appearances) that are our own reaction, and that there is absolutely no reason to think that this gives us all there is to know about an object, as opposed merely to the way the object happens to affect us; and which may say more about us than it does the object.

\(^{54}\)And this gets closer to the meaning of the perspective. There are two different ways of looking at and considering the appearances, either as appearances within us or as things on their own independent of our looking. This is the reason that Kant uses perspective (Anschauung) for all our lookings, to suggest a peculiar or particular way of looking at something, and that there can also be another way of looking at it.
plified in pure mathematics with regard to the recognition of space and its relationships.

3.2 In fact, considered together they are pure forms of all sensitive perspective and thereby make synthetical propositions possible a priori.

3.3 But this source of a priori recognitions determine their borders (that they are merely conditions of sensitivity) by being applicable to objects merely to the extent they are thought of as appearances, but not as things on their own.

3.4 The former alone are the field of their validity whereof, if we depart, no further objective usage of them occurs.

3.5 By the way, this reality of space and time does not affect the security of the recognitions of experience, for we are just as sure of them whether the form adheres to the things on their own, or only to our perspective of these thing in a necessary way.\(^{55}\)

3.6 In contrast those who proclaim the absolute reality of space and time, be they taken as subsisting or only as inhering, are at odds with the principle of experience itself.\(^{56}\)

3.7 For if they opt for the former (which is commonly the party of the mathematical explorers of nature), then they must assume two eternal and infinite non-things (space and time) existing of themselves which are there (still without being anything actual), only in order to embrace everything that is actual.\(^{57}\)

3.8 If we consider the second group (which includes some metaphysical teachers of nature), and space and time hold for them as relationships of the appearances (next to or after each other) which were abstracted from experience, even though confused in the isolation, then they must challenge the validity of the mathematical doctrine a priori with respect to actual things (e.g., in

\(^{55}\) For the only contact we can ever have with objects is when they appear to us in some way, and so essentially we can let these perspectiveal forms attach to them on their own (in common and scientific talk); except that this occasions erroneous modes of thinking about them, especially when we are considering things from the standpoint of pure reason and in a transcendental sense.

\(^{56}\) Subsisting would refer to space and time as things, the Newtonian conception; while inhering would denote space and time as belonging to things on their own, the Leibnizian conception.

\(^{57}\) And which makes no sense intellectually at all.
space), or at least the apodictic certitude, in that this can never occur a posteriori, and the concepts a priori of space and time are, according to this opinion, only creatures of the imagination whose actual source must be sought in experience, from whose abstracted relationships the imagination has made something which does indeed contain the generality of that, but which cannot occur without the restrictions which nature has connected with it.

3.9 The former win this much, that they keep the field of appearances open for mathematical assertions.

3.10 But they stumble very much on these conditions when the understanding wants to go out beyond this field.

3.11 The second group wins indeed with respect to the latter, namely that the representations of space and time do not stand in their way when they wish to judge of things not as appearances, but rather merely with respect to the understanding; but then can provide neither for the possibility of mathematical recognitions a priori (due to the lack of any basis for a true and objectively valid perspective a priori) nor bring the propositions of experience into any necessary agreement with those assertions.

3.12 In our theory of the true condition of these two original forms of sensitivity both difficulties are removed.

4.1 Finally that the transcendental aesthetic can contain nothing more than these two elements, namely time and space, is clear from this: because all other concepts belonging to sensitivity, even that of motion, which unites both elements, presuppose something empirical.

4.2 For motion presupposes the perception of something movable.

4.3 But in space, considered as such, there is nothing movable; hence the movable must be something which is found in space only through experience, thus be an empirical datum.

4.4 And for precisely the same reason the transcendental aesthetic cannot count the concept of the alterable a priori amongst its data; for time itself does not alter, but rather something which is in time.
4.5 For this therefore the perception of some sort of existence and the succession of its determination is required, hence: experience.
8. General Remarks to the Transcendental Aesthetic

1.1 I. First of all, in order to avoid all misunderstanding, it will be necessary to explain as clearly as possible what our opinion is with regard to the foundational makeup of the sensitive recognition in general.

2.1 What we are trying to say is that all our perspective is nothing but the representation of appearances; and the things we look at are not on their own as we see them, nor are their relationships so constituted on their own as they appear to us, and if we were to remove our subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, all the makeup, all the relationships of objects in space and time, indeed even space and time themselves would vanish, for as appearances they cannot exist on their own, but rather only in us.\textsuperscript{58}

2.2 What sort of affinity there might be with the objects on their own and isolated from all this receptivity of our sensitivity, remains thoroughly unknown to us.\textsuperscript{59}

2.3 We only know our manner of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, but which also must not be necessarily attributed to all beings, though certainly to all humans.

2.4 With this alone are we occupied.

2.5 Space and time are the pure forms of this, sensation in general the material.

2.6 The former alone can we recognize \textit{a priori}, i.e., before all actual perception, and for that reason it is called pure perspective. But this latter is what in our recognition makes us call a recognition \textit{a posteriori}, i.e., empirical perspective.

2.7 The former pertain with utter necessity to our sensitivity regardless even of

\textsuperscript{58} This is fairly straightforward, I would think; space is within us and the appearances, while in space, are actually nothing more than our own sensations projected in that space, e.g., retinal objects. And with regard to time, we are dealing with projections (the appearances) in terms of now versus before and earlier).

\textsuperscript{59} For all we know is how these objects effect us, and nothing about the objects themselves and how they might be constituted in ways that might now affect us in anyway.
the mode of our sensations; the latter can be quite diverse.

2.8 Even if we could develop this our perspective to the highest degree of clarity, we still would not come any closer to the constitution of the objects on their own.

2.9 For in every case we would still only fully recognize our manner of perspective, i.e., our sensitivity, and this always under conditions of space and time which adhere originally only to the subject. What the objects might be on their own would never be made known to us through even the clearest recognition of their appearance, and that is all that is ever given to us.

3.1 That our entire sensitivity be nothing other than the confused representation of things which contains solely what pertains to them on their own, only under an assemblage of characteristics and partial representations which we cannot clearly separate, is accordingly a falsification (*Verfälschung*) of the concept of sensitivity and of appearance, and one which makes the entire theory unusable and empty.

3.2 The difference between an indistinct and a distinct representation is merely logical and does not concern the content.

3.3 The concept of right utilized in the ordinary understanding most certainly contains exactly what the most subtle speculation can develop from it, with this exception: on a common and practical level we are not conscious of the multiple representations in these thoughts.\(^{60}\)

3.4 But we cannot for that reason declare that the ordinary concept is sensitive and contains a mere appearance, for what is right cannot appear at all. Far rather its concept is situated in the understanding and it represents a property of actions (the moral) which pertains to them on their own.\(^{61}\)

3.5 The representation of a body in the perspective, on the other hand, does not contain anything at all which could pertain to an object on its own, but con-

\(^{60}\) And so these multiple representations are brought into focus by means of analysis and, accordingly, we first have an indistinct representation and then a distinct one.

\(^{61}\) I.e., the ordinary concept is not an appearance, although by Leibniz’s theory it would be, for what is right cannot appear. But the only difference between the indistinct and distinct understanding of right is logical, the latter (distinct) being exhausted in nuance.
cerns rather only the appearance of something and the way in which we are affected by this something; and this receptivity of our recognitional ability is called sensitivity and always remains vastly different from the recognition of an object on its own, even though we might scrutinize it (the appearance) down to its very foundation.  

4.1 The Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy therefore by considering the distinction of the sensitivity from the intellectual as merely logical, has directed all investigations of nature and the origin of our knowledge in accordance with a decidedly incorrect point of view, for this distinction is obviously transcendental and concerns not merely the form of the distinctiveness or undistinctiveness, but rather its origin and content such that we not only do not recognize the constitution of things on their own through the former merely unclearly, as rather not at all, and as soon as we remove our subjective constitution, the represented object along with the properties which the sensitive perspective attributes to it is nowhere to be encountered nor can be, for it is precisely this subjective constitution that determines the form of this object as appearance.

5.1 Otherwise we judge very well concerning what of the appearance belongs to the perspective and adheres essentially to it and is valid for every human sense in general, and distinguish it from what pertains to the appearance only accidentally by holding for a particular position or organization of this or that sense and not for the referral of the sensitivity in general.

5.2 And here we term the first recognition such as represents the object on its own, but the second only its appearance.

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62 When I see the “small house” at a distance I know that the house itself is not in this sighting, but that this small house is on my retina, and so therefore is the way that my sight organ is affected by something, presumably a real thing on its own, called the house, i.e., the so-called real house. The same holds true for all of my investigations as to the make up of this house, down to the material of its construction, e.g., even the atoms and subatomic particles.

63 It is not immediately apparent that rainbows are different from the rain in a different way than rain is different from other objects. For as appearances both the rain and the rainbow are made up of retinal material, and in this regard there is no distinction. For these objects of experience consists only of our own sensations construed in a form of space and time.

64 For example, we know that the house we actually see is just an appearance (on our retina) and is small for that reason (seen at a distance) while the house itself is unchanged.
5.3 But this distinction is only empirical.

5.4 If we remain there (as we usually do) and do not in turn consider (as we should) that this empirical perspective is a mere appearance such that nothing which could pertain to an object on its own could be encountered there, our transcendental distinction is lost and we still think we are recognizing things on their own even though everywhere (in the sense world), even down to the deepest investigation of its objects, we still have to do with nothing but sheer appearances.

5.5 We do indeed term the rainbow in the sun-illuminated rain a mere appearance in contrast to the rain as the thing on its own, which is also correct to the extent we utilize this latter concept only physically as that which is determined in the universal experience under all diverse positions to the sense as being so in the perspective and not otherwise.\textsuperscript{65}

5.6 But if we consider this empiricality in general and ask whether this represents an object on its own (not the rain drops, for they, as appearances, are already empirical objects) without considering the agreement of this with every human sense, then the question concerning the referral of the representation to the object is transcendental and not only are these drops sheer appearances, but also their round shape; and even the space in which they fall is nothing on its own but sheer modifications or foundations of our sensitive perspective, and the transcendental object remains unknown to us.\textsuperscript{66}

6.1 The second important matter of our transcendental aesthetic is this, that it not engender favor as an appealing hypothesis, but rather that it be as certain and indubitable as we might require of a theory which is to serve as an organon.

6.2 In order to make this certitude entirely clear we will now choose a case whereon its validity will be clear to our sight and can serve to better clarify what has been introduced in section 3 above.

\textsuperscript{65} Both the rain and the rainbow can be viewed in space, but only the rain can be physically located in space.

\textsuperscript{66} The rainbow and the rain are equally retinal material, but there is also contact with the rain through the other senses and regardless of viewpoint, while the rainbow exists only in the eye and from a particular viewpoint. See the Addendum of Appendix II.2 on Captain Hook.
7.1 Assume that space and time were objective on their own and conditions of the possibility of things on their own, then we would see first of all that both render us a priori apodictic and synthetical proposition in great number, especially space, which we now in particular want to examine as an example.

7.2 Since the propositions of geometry are synthetic a priori and are recognized with apodictic certainty, I would like to inquire as to the origin of such propositions and what supports the understanding in order that it achieve to such utterly necessary and universally valid perceptions?

7.3 There is no way other than through concepts or through perspectives, but both of which can be given either a priori or a posteriori.

7.4 The latter, namely empirical concepts, and likewise that whereon they are based, the empirical perspective, can render no synthetical proposition except such which are also merely empirical, i.e., experiential proposition, thus can never contain necessity and absolute universality, but which still are the characteristics of all propositions of geometry.67

7.5 But what would be the first and only means, namely to achieve to such realizations through mere concepts or through perspectives a priori, it is clear that no synthetical recognition at all can be achieved through mere concepts, but solely analytical.68

7.6 Consider only the proposition that two straight lines cannot in any way encompass a space, thus no figure being possible in that way, and seek to derive that from the concept of straight lines and the number two; but also then that a figure is possible through three straight line, and seek that just as well out of these concepts.69

7.7 Our entire endeavor is vain and we are necessitated to resort to a perspective

67 Empirically we could say that all triangles examined this far reveal that any two sides are greater than the third, but not that this is the case for all triangles not yet examined.

68 I.e., in the concept of a triangle I think of three line segments such that each end point of each is an end point of two (and only a point of two), and there is not the least suggestion of the length of any of the sides. It would be impossible to know analytical that any two sides of a triangle are greater than the third.

69 An interesting example: from the concept of two straight lines and that of an angle that with these two lines one, two or four angles can be constructed, but not three and not more than four. A recognition based on a pure perspective.
as the geometrician also always do.

7.8 Therefore you present yourself with an object in the perspective; but then what sort is this? is it a pure perspective a priori, or an empirical one?

7.9 If it were the latter, then no universally valid proposition, and much less an apodictic one, could arise; for experience can never provide such.  

7.10 Therefore you must give yourself an object a priori in perspective, and base your synthetical proposition on that.

7.11 If there were in you no capacity to look at things a priori; if this subjective condition with respect to the form were not simultaneously the universal condition a priori, under which alone the object of this (external) perspective were itself possible; were the object (the triangle) something on its own without reference to your subject; how could you say that what were necessarily in your subjective condition for constructing a triangle would also have to pertain to the triangle on its own? For you could not add anything new (the figure) to your concepts (of the three lines), which for that reason would also have to correspond necessarily to the object, since this is given before your recognition and not through it.

7.12 Therefore were space (and also then time) not merely a form of your perspective, which contains conditions a priori, according to which alone objects could be external objects for you, which apart from these subjective conditions are nothing at all, then you could make out synthetically absolutely nothing about external objects.

7.13 It is therefore unquestionably certain, and not merely possible or just probable, that space and time, as the necessary conditions of all (external and internal) experience, are nothing other than subjective conditions of all our perspective, in relationship to which therefore all objects are merely appearances and not things given in this manner on their own, whereof then for that

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70 All that experience could teach is that as far as we have been able to tell thus far any two sides of a triangle have been greater than the third, but not that this necessarily true for all triangles.

71 It’s like the construction of a triangle pantomimicly in mid air. It is our own perspective, produced by our imagination in the space that we spy about us.

72 Nothing in the notion of three line segments with every end point common to two segments and a point of only two of the segments) tells you that a space has been enclosed. A look/perspective is required for this.
reason, concerning their form, much can be said *a priori*, but never the least about the things on their own which might be the foundations of these appearances.

8.1 II. As a confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external as well as the internal sense, and hence of all objects of the senses as mere appearances, the following remark can be especially appropriate, namely: everything in our recognition which belongs to perspective (Therefore excluding the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and also the will, which are not recognitions at all) contains nothing but mere relationships: of places in a perspective (extension), alteration of place (movement) and laws by means of which this alteration is determined (moving powers).⁷³

8.2 But what presently be in the place, or what, apart from the alteration of place, be efficacious in the things themselves, is not given by that.

8.3 Now through mere relationships a thing cannot be recognized on its own at all; therefore we can easily judge that since nothing except relational representations are given through the external sense, this can also contain only the relationship of an object to the subject in its representation, and not the internality which pertains to the object on its own.

8.4 With the internal perspective it is just the same.

8.5 Not only that in this the representations of the external sense make up the actual material with which our minds are occupied, but also time, in which we position these representations, which precedes before their consciousness in experience and, as formal condition of the manner as to how they are positioned in the mind lying as the foundation, already contains relationships of succession, simultaneity and what is simultaneous with the succession (the enduring).⁷⁴

8.6 Now that which, as representation, must precede all action of thinking something, is the perspective, and if it contains nothing except relationships it is

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⁷³ Perhaps: we have a from here to there (expansion), change in place (a movement) and the path of this movement through space.

⁷⁴ I think this means that all internal representations, other than our own thinking, are looked upon by us as external to ourselves, as not-ourselves. And then it is for those who can see (and not the blind) to realize that space is the form of this not-ourselves.
the form of the perspective which, since it represents nothing except to the extent something is placed in the mind, can be nothing else than the manner in which the mind is affected through its own activity, namely this positioning of its representation, i.e., is an internal sense with respect to its form.

8.7 Everything which is represented through a sense is to this extent always appearance, and an internal sense would therefore either not be admissible at all, or else the subject, which is the object of that, would have to be represented through itself only as appearance, and not as it would judge of itself if its perspective were merely self active, i.e., intellectual.

8.8 Now the basis of all difficulty here rests on this: how a subject could look at itself internally; but this difficulty is common to every theory.

8.9 The consciousness of one’s self (apperception) is the simple representation of the I, and if thereby alone all manifold of the object were given self-activity, then the internal perspective would be intellectual.

8.10 With humans this consciousness requires internal perception of the manifold which precedes within the subject, and the manner, whereby this is given in the mind without spontaneity, must be called sensitivity in order to maintain this distinction.

8.11 If the capacity for being conscious of the self is to seek out (apprehend) what is lying in the mind, then it must be able to affect that and only in this way can it produce a perspective of itself, but whose form, which precedes in the mind as the basis, determines in the representation of time the manner as to how the manifold is assembled in the mind; since it then looks at itself, not as it would immediately represent itself self-actively, but rather according to the manner as it is internally affected, consequently as it appears to itself, but not as it is.

9.1 III. When I say that in space and time the perspective represents both the external objects as well as the self perspective of the mind as they affect our senses, i.e., as they appear, that is not to say that these objects are merely illusions.

9.2 For in the appearance the objects, indeed even the properties which we attribute to them, are viewed as something actually given, but with this pro-
viso: this property pertains to the perspective manner of the subject in relationship to the given object to the extent the object as appearance is distinguished from it as an object on its own.75

9.3 Hence I do not say that bodies only seem to be apart from me or that my soul merely seems to be given in my self consciousness when I assert that the quality of space and time, conformable to which, as the condition of their existence, I place both of these (bodies and my soul), is situated in my perspective manner and not in these objects on their own.76

9.4 It would be my own fault if I wanted to make sheer illusion out of what I count as appearance.*

9.5 But this does not occur according to our principle of the ideality of all sensitive perspectives. Quite the contrary, if someone attributes objective reality to those representational forms then we cannot avoid everything being turned into sheer illusion.77

9.6 For if we consider space and time as constitutions which, with regard to their possibility, would have to be encountered in objects on their own, and neglect the absurdities in which we are then entangled, in that two infinite things, which are not substances nor something actually inhering in those substances, but which still exist and indeed, which must be the necessary condition of the existence of all things, also remain even if all existing things were annihilated, we certainly cannot blame the good Berkeley for demoting bodies to sheer illusion. Indeed our own existence itself would have to be transformed into mere illusion if in this way it were made dependent upon

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75 This is very true. I see things about me as really here and there in space and all about me. However, when pressed to speak with rigorous precision, I note that I see them only in the context of a perspective, namely as pictured in my eyes (with respect to space), and so I know that they are not themselves getting larger and smaller on their own. This must be what Kant is referring to here. Thus, for example, my house, in the evening, is not dimmer on its own, although it certain looks dimmer, but that is because there is less light as the sun goes down. Or because there is a growing fog. Etc. On its own, i.e., with respect to its painted surfaces, there is not the least difference--it is just as it was in the bright sunlight. Nothing has changed to the house on its own.

76 Or perhaps better said at this point: the house is no more a mirage than is my soul. The alternations that I perceive in my house are due to empirical conditions of my perspective, even as the alternations that I perceive in my soul are due to empirical conditions of my internal perspective.

77 This would be saying that bodies on their own are in space and that the soul on its own is in time, where Angry-philip would arise on his own to replace Sad-philip who goes out of existence, even as Bright-house displaces Dim-house.
the self-existent reality of a non-thing like time, an absurdity into which no one has yet descended.\textsuperscript{78}

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 The predicates of appearance can be attributed to the object itself in relationship to our senses, e.g., the red color or the scent to the rose. But the illusion can never be attributed as a predicate to the object, and precisely because it would attribute to the object on its own that which only pertains to it in relationship to the senses or generally to the subject, e.g., the two handles which some first ascribed to Saturn.\textsuperscript{79}

1.2 What cannot be encountered with the object on its own, but always in its relationship to the subject, is appearance and therefore the predicates of space and time are quite properly applied to to the objects of the senses, and in this there is no illusion.\textsuperscript{80}

1.3 On the other hand, if I ascribe redness to the rose on its own, or the handles to Saturn, or extension to all external objects on their own without considering a determined relationship of these objects to the subject and limiting my judgment to that, it is only then that illusion arises.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{78} Since time and space are nothing on their own, it make sense, as Bishop Berkeley insisted concerning space, that we will not be able to find them anywhere or anytime, for all we can sense are colors, sounds, etc., and we cannot sense nothings. Therefore if space and time were really these non-things that were to be found within things on their own, then we would have to make illusions out of all things. This is what Berkeley did with external things, making them merely perceptions which God also perceived (in order to account for the continuing existence of the world). What Berkeley did was to reason to the existence of the soul, for, as he put it, since I am conscious of my perceptions, it follows that there must be a perceiver. But actually, if he had been quite consistent with his own premises, he would have had to conclude that we ourselves were merely perceptions, and so if God did not perceive us, then we, since we would be merely perceptions and not things on our own, would not even exist ourselves, and this is what Kant means with an absurdity that no one yet has been guilty of.

\textsuperscript{79} This is very revealing. We could say that Saturn had handles, and then that these handles occasionally vanished and were replaced by rings. In this case we ignore completely the fact of our own looking, i.e., that we are seeing Saturn and its circles from a certain angle and distance. And so the same thing would happen if we meant that the rose were red on its own without reference to ourselves as viewers. And so there is no illusion as long as we remember that we are dealing with things as appearances, i.e., as appearances existing in a space and time which is within us.

\textsuperscript{80} Thus whenever we can use the expression “looks” or “seems” we are safe. The rose looks red, the objects seem small. In fact these expressions could not be arrived at via exposure to objects alone or via reasoning alone. A look is require, a perspective. And even a recognition that what is seen is being looked at.

\textsuperscript{81} Applying extension to external objects on their own means that distant objects not only look smaller, they are smaller and would look so even if we happened to be closer at that moment. They go into a smaller space, we might even say. Sort of an Alice In Wonderland situation.
10.1 IV. In natural theology, where we must think an object which is not at all an object of perspective, but rather which cannot even be for itself an object of sensitive perspective, we are very careful to remove the conditions of time and space from its perspective (for such must all its recognitions be, and not thinking, which always means limitation).

10.2 But with what right can we do this if we have already made both of these into the forms of things on their own and indeed such which, as conditions of the existence of things \textit{a priori}, remain even if we have removed the things themselves; for as conditions of all existence in general they would also have to be conditions of the existence of God.

10.3 If we do not want to make them into objective forms of all things, then nothing remains but to make them into subjective forms of all our external as well as our internal perspective which for that reason is called sensitive because it is not original, i.e., is not such through which the existence of the object of the perspective would be given (and which, as far as we can tell, can only pertain to the original being), but rather adhere to the existence of the object, thus be only possible by the representational capacity of the subject being affected through that.

11.1 It is also not necessary that we limit the perspective mode in space and time to the sensitivity of humans; it may be that all finite, thinking beings would necessarily have to agree with the human in this regard (but concerning which we cannot decide), but despite that universality it does not cease to pertain to the sensitivity, and precisely for this reason, namely that it is derivative (\textit{intuitius derivativius}) and not original (\textit{intuitius originarius}), thus not intellectual perspective, which, per the reason cited above, would apparently pertain to the original being alone and never to a being dependent with regard to his existence as well as to his perspective (which determines his existence with reference to given objects), although this latter remark must be counted to our aesthetic theory only as an exposition and not as a basis of proof.
Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic

1.1 Here we now have one of the required parts to the solution of the universal task of the Transcendental-philosophy, i.e., “how are synthetical proposition a priori possible?” namely space and time as pure perspectives a priori, in which, if we want to go beyond the given concept in the judgment, we encounter what cannot be discovered a priori in the concept, though still in the perspective which corresponds to it, and can be connected with the concept synthetically. These judgments, however, can reach no further than objects of the senses and can only be valid for objects of a possible experience.
1.1 Our recognition arises from two basic sources of the mind, the first being the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), and the second the capacity for recognizing an object through these representations (spontaneity of concepts). Through the first an object is given to us, and through the second this object is thought in relationship to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind).

1.2 Perspective and concepts therefore make up the elements of each of our recognitions and therefore neither concepts without perspective corresponding to them in some way, nor perspective without concepts, can provide a recognition.

1.3 Both are either pure or empirical.

1.4 Our recognition is empirical if sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained in it; but pure if no sensation is mingled in with the representation.

1.5 We can term the former the *material* of the sensitive recognition.

1.6 Hence pure perspective contains solely the form by which something is looked at and pure concepts only the form of the thinking of an object in general.

1.7 Only pure perspectives or concepts are possible a priori; empirical ones only a posteriori.

2.1 If we want to call the receptivity of our mind to receive representations, to the extent it is affected in some way, sensitivity; then in contrast the capacity
of producing representations of itself, or the spontaneity of the recognition, is the understanding. 82

2.2 Our nature is so composed that the perspective can never be other than sensitivity, i.e., containing merely the way we are affected by objects.

2.3 In contrast the capacity to think the object of sensitive perspective is the understanding.

2.4 Neither of these properties is to be preferred over the other.

2.5 Without sensitivity no object would be given to us, and without understanding, none thought.

2.6 Thoughts without content are empty. Perspectives without concepts are blind.

2.7 Hence it is just as necessary to make the concepts sensitive (i.e., to append the object to them in the perspective) as to make the perspectives understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts).

2.8 Also neither of these capacities or capabilities can exchange functions with the other.

2.9 The understanding is empowered to look at nothing, and the senses to think nothing.

2.10 Only from their union can recognition arise.

2.11 But we should not for that reason mingle their contribution. Rather we have great cause for carefully isolating and distinguishing the one from the other.

2.12 Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of sensitivity in general, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of understanding in general, i.e., the logic.

82 We can spy the object of the perspective as an appearance readily enough as it stands out from the background, e.g., the manifold that makes up a face or the stars of the Big Dipper, but what that appearance represents is another matter and is a function of the understanding.
Concerning Logic In General

3.1 Now for its part logic can be considered in a two-fold intention, either as logic of the universal, or of the particular, usage of the understanding.

3.2 The first contains the utterly necessary rules of thinking without which no use of the understanding takes place at all and which therefore goes to this use without regard to the diversity of the objects to which it may be directed.

3.3 The logic of the particular understanding usage contains the rules for proper thinking about a certain type of object.  

3.4 The former we can term the elementary logic, but the latter, the organon of this or that science.

3.5 For the most part this latter is premised in the schools as propaedeutic of the science, although, according to the course of human reason, it is the last to which it finally achieves when the science has already been finished for a good while and has need only of the final touch for its rectification and completeness.

3.6 For we must already be familiar with the object to a rather high degree before issuing the rules about how a science arises from them.

4.1 Now universal logic is either pure or applied.

4.2 In the former we abstract from all empirical conditions under which our understanding is exercised, e.g., from the influence of the senses, from the play of the imagination, the laws of memory, the power of custom, inclination, etc., thus also from the sources of prejudices, indeed in general even from all causes from which certain recognitions may arise to us or be asserted. The reason for this is because they concern the understanding merely under certain circumstances of its application. And experience is required to discern these.

4.3 Therefore a universal, though pure, logic has to do with sheer principles a priori and is a canon of the understanding and reason, but only with respect to the formality of their use, the content be what it will (empirical or transcendental).

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83 This may have to do with specific applications, e.g., in physics or in mathematics.
4.4 But then a universal logic is called applied if it is directed to the rules of the usage of understanding under the subjective, empirical conditions which psychology teaches us.

4.5 Therefore it has empirical principles, although it is indeed universal to the extent that it goes to the understanding usage without distinction of the objects.

4.6 For that reason it is also neither a canon of understanding in general nor an organon of particular sciences, but solely a catharticon of the common understanding. 

5.1 In the universal logic therefore the part which is supposed to make up the pure rational teaching must be entirely isolated from what makes up the applied (but still always universal) logic.

5.2 The first alone is actually science, although short and dry as the scholastically proper description of an elementary instruction of understanding requires.

5.3 In this therefore the logicians must always have two rules before their eyes.

6.1 1. As a universal logic, it abstracts from all content of the understanding recognition and from the diversity of its objects, and has to do with nothing except the mere form of the thinking.

7.1 2. As pure logic, it has no empirical principles, thus it acquires nothing (as some have frequently persuaded themselves) from psychology, which has therefore no influence at all on the canon of the understating.

7.2 It is a demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain completely a priori.

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84 Perhaps the applied universal understanding has to do with how people actually think.
8.1 What I term applied logic (contrary to the common meaning of this word, according to which it is supposed to contain certain exercises to which pure logic gives the rules) is a representation of the understanding and of the rules of its necessary usage in concreto, namely under the adventitious conditions of the subject which can hinder or promote this usage, and all of which are given empirically.

8.2 It deals with the attention, its obstructions and consequences, with the origin of error, with the state of doubt, or scruples or conviction, etc., and to which the universal and pure logic stands as does the pure moral, which contains merely the necessary moral laws of a free will in general, to the actual instruction of virtue which considers these laws under the obstructions of the feelings, inclinations and passions to which humans are more or less subjected, and which can never furnish a true and demonstrated science because it, just as well as the applied logic, has need of empirical and psychological principles.
II. Transcendental Logic

1.1 Universal logic, as we have indicated above, abstracts from all content of the recognition, i.e., from all reference of the recognition to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relationship of the recognitions among one another, i.e., the form of thinking in general.

1.2 But now because there are also pure as well as empirical perspectives (as the Transcendental Aesthetic establishes), a distinction between pure and empirical thinking of objects might very well also be encountered.

1.3 In this case there would a logic in which we did not abstract from all content of the recognition. Then that, which contained merely the rules of the pure thinking of an object, would exclude all those recognitions which were of empirical content.

1.4 It would also go to the origin of our recognitions of objects to the extent it cannot be ascribed to the objects, since, in contrast, universal logic has nothing to do with the origin of the recognition but rather considers the representations--be they given originally in us ourselves a priori, or only empirically--merely according to the laws, according to which the understanding needs them in relationship to one another when it thinks and therefore deals only of the understanding form which can be supplied to the representations, they having originated from where they will.\(^85\)

2.1 And here I make a remark which extends its influence over all subsequent considerations and concerning which we must always be mindful, namely: not each and every recognition a priori would have to be called transcendental, but rather only those, by which we recognize that, and how, certain representations (perspectives or concepts) are solely applied or are possible a priori, (i.e., the possibility of the recognition or its use a priori).

2.2 Hence neither space nor any sort of geometrical determination of space are a transcendental representation. Instead only the recognition that 1. these representations are not at all of empirical origin and 2. the possibility of how they nonetheless are able to refer a priori to objects of experience, can be called transcendental.

\(^{85}\) It seems then that the transcendental logic would be a special logic, how we are to think about particular items, like a particular science.
2.3 Likewise the usage of space concerning objects in general would also be transcendental; but if it is solely restricted to objects of sense, it is called empirical.

2.4 The difference therefore between the transcendental and empirical only pertains to the critique of recognitions and does not concern their referral to their objects.

3.1 In the expectation therefore that there can perhaps be concepts a priori which may reference a priori to objects and not as pure or sensitive perspectives, but rather merely to dealings of the pure thinking, which thus are concepts, but neither of empirical nor aesthetic origin, we make for ourselves in advance the idea of a science of the pure understanding and of rational recognitions by which we think objects completely a priori.

3.2 Such a science, which would determine the origin, scope and objective validity of such recognitions, would have to be called transcendental logic, because it has to do merely with the laws of understanding and reason, but solely to the extent it is referred to objects a priori and not, as the universal logic, to the empirical as well as the pure rational recognitions without distinction.
III. The Division of Universal Logic into the Analytic and Dialectic

1.1 There was an ancient and celebrated question, by means of which some thought to force logicians into a corner and to bring them so far as to end up either in a pitiful circle or with a confession of their ignorance, and so to reveal the conceit of their entire art, namely: what is truth?

1.2 The verbal explanation for truth, namely that it is the agreement of the recognition with its object, is granted here and presupposed. But we want to know what is the universal and sure criterion of the truth of each and every recognition.

2.1 It is already a great and necessary proof of prudence or insight to know what we are reasonably supposed to ask.

2.2 For if the question is absurd on its own, and requires unnecessary answers, then besides the shame of him who raises it, it frequently has the disadvantage of misleading the unwary hearers of that question to absurd answers and suggests the ridiculous spectacle of one person milking the stag (as ancients put it) while the other holds a sieve.

3.1 If truth consists in the agreement of a recognition with its object, then this object must be differentiated by that from other objects; for a recognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is referred, even though it contains something which could easily hold of other objects.

3.2 Now a universal criterion of truth would be that which would be valid for all recognitions without distinction of their objects.

3.3 But it is clear that since with these recognitions we abstract from all content (reference to its object), and since truth has to do with precisely this content, it is entirely impossible and absurd to ask about a mark of the truth of the content of the recognition in such cases and therefore a sufficient and, at the same time, universal indicator of truth cannot possibly be given.

3.4 Since above we have already termed the content of a recognition the material of the recognition, we will have to say that no universal indicator of the
truth of the recognition with respect to its material can be required, because it is itself contradictory.

4.1 But concerning the recognition with respect to the mere form (setting aside all content), it is just as clear that a logic, to the extent it delivers the universal and necessary rules of the understanding, would have to lay out criteria of truth precisely in these rules.

4.2 For what contradicts this is false, because in that way the understanding clashes with its universal rules of thinking, thus with itself.

4.3 These criteria, however, concern only the form of truth, i.e., the thinking in general, and are to this extent correct, but not sufficient.

4.4 For although a recognition might be completely conformable to the logical form, i.e., did not contradict itself, yet it can still always contradict the object.

4.5 Therefore the mere logical criterion of truth, namely the agreement of a recognition with the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason is indeed the \textit{conditio sine qua non} (an indispensable condition), thus the negative condition of all truth. But logic cannot go further, and through no touchstone can it discover the error which does not concern the form, but only the content.

5.1 Now universal logic reduces the entire formal occupation of understanding and reason into its elements, and presents them as principles of every logical evaluation of our recognition.

5.2 This part of logic therefore can be called analytic and, precisely for that reason, is the at least negative touchstone of truth in that before anything else we must test and evaluate all recognitions with respect to their form by these rules before we examine them with respect to their content in order to make out whether they contain positive truth with respect to the object.

5.3 But because the mere form of a recognition, as much as it may agree with logical laws, does not suffice by far for making out the material (objective) truth for the recognition, no one can dare to judge about objects merely with
logic and to assert anything without having previously collected from them sound information apart from logic, in order afterwards to attempt merely the utilization and connection of that information in a cohesive whole according to logical laws, but better yet, to test it solely according to those laws.

5.4 Nonetheless something so seductive lies in the possession of such an apparent art of giving the form of understanding to all our recognitions, even though we may yet be very empty and poor with respect to their content, that the universal logic, which is merely a canon to the evaluation, was used as an organon, as it were, for the actual production, or at least for the illusion, of objective assertions, and thus in that way was in fact misused.

5.5 Now universal logic, as intended organon, is called dialectic.

6.1 Even as diverse as the meaning is in which the ancients availed themselves of this denomination of a science or art, we can still safely gather from the actual use of the term that with them it was nothing other than the logic of semblance.

6.2 It was a sophistical art to give the air of truth to their ignorance, indeed even to their premeditated illusions, that some imitated the method of thoroughness which logic prescribes in general, and utilized its topic for the varnishing of each empty assertion.

6.3 Now we can note as a sure and useful warning: universal logic, considered as organon, is always a logic of semblance, i.e., dialectic.

6.4 For since it teaches nothing at all about the formal conditions of the agreement with the understanding, which, by the way, are entirely indifferent with respect to the objects, the unreasonable demand to use it as a tool (organon) to broaden and expand our information, at least with respect to the allegations, must turn out to be nothing except rational jugglery of asserting with some semblance everything we wish or also contest, and at our whim.

7.1 Such an instruction is in no way conformable to the dignity of philosophy.
7.2 For that reason we have assigned this denomination of the dialectic to the logic, rather than a critique of the dialectical semblance, and we also claim to understand it as such here.
IV. Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic

1.1 In a transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (even as we did above in the transcendental aesthetic with the sensitivity) and lift out from our recognition merely that part of the thinking which has its origin solely in the understanding.

1.2 But the use of this pure recognition is conditioned upon objects being given to us in the perspective, on which that can be employed.

1.3 For without perspective our recognitions lack all objects, and then they remain completely empty.

1.4 The part of the transcendental logic therefore which presents the elements of the recognitions of pure understanding and the principles without which no object anywhere can be thought, is the transcendental analytical, and is simultaneously a logic of truth.

1.5 For no recognition can contradict it without simultaneously losing all content, i.e., all reference to any sort of an object, thus all truth.

1.6 But because it is very enticing and seductive to avail ourselves of these pure understanding recognitions and principles alone and even out beyond the limits of experience, which still singularly and alone can give us the material (objects) to hand, upon which those pure understanding concepts can be applied, the understanding runs into danger through empty, rational contriving (Vernünteleien) of making a material usage of the merely formal principles of the pure understanding and of judging about objects without distinction, which still are not given to us, indeed perhaps cannot be given to us in any way whatsoever.

1.7 Since therefore it was actually only supposed to be a canon of the appraisal of the empirical usage, it is misused if we allow it to hold as the organon of a universal and unrestricted usage, and venture with only the pure understanding in general to judge, assert and decide synthetically about objects in general.

1.8 Accordingly then the usage of the pure understanding would be dialectic.
Therefore the second part of the transcendental logic must be a critique of the dialectic semblance and is called transcendental dialectic, not as a device for dogmatically stimulating such semblance (sadly a very prevalent art of multifaceted, metaphysically contriving artists), but rather as a critique of the understanding and reason with respect to their hyperphysical usage in order to uncover the false semblance of their baseless pretensions, overthrow their claims to invention and expansion, which they intend to achieve merely through transcendental principles, and merely to appraise and preserve the pure understanding from sophistical illusion.
The Transcendental Logic

First Division. The Transcendental Analytic

1.1 This analytic is the dissection of our entire recognition a priori into the elements of the recognition of the pure understanding.

1.2 In this regard it depends upon the following units:

1.3 1. that the concepts be pure and not empirical concepts;

1.4 2. that they belong to thinking and understanding and not to the perspective and sensitivity;

1.5 3. that they be elementary concepts and clearly distinguished from those derived or assembled together from them; and

1.6 4. that their table be complete and that they encompass the entire field of the pure understanding.

1.7 Now this completeness of a science cannot be assumed with confidence by the rough estimate of an aggregate produced merely by trial and error. Hence it is only possible by means of an idea of the whole of the understanding recognitions a priori and through the ensuing division of the concepts which they make up, thus only by their cohesion in a system.

1.8 The pure understanding not only completely isolates itself from everything that is empirical, but even from all sensitivity.

1.9 It is therefore a unity existent for itself, sufficient unto itself and to be augmented by no externally additive codicils.

1.10 Accordingly, the epitome of its recognition will make up a system to be encompassed and determined under a single idea, the completeness and articulation of which can simultaneously furnish a touchstone for the correctness and genuineness of all compatible recognitional elements.

1.11 But this entire part of the transcendental logic consists of two books, one of which contains the concepts and the other the principles of the pure understanding.
1.1 With the analytic of the concepts I do not mean their analysis or that usual procedure in philosophical investigations of dissecting concepts, which present themselves with respect to their content, and of bringing them to distinctness, as rather the even less attempted dissection of the capacity of the understanding itself in order to examine in that way the possibly of the concepts a priori by seeking them out in the understanding alone as their birthplace, and by analyzing its pure usage in general; for this is the peculiar occupation of a transcendental philosophy. The remainder is the logical treatment of the concepts in philosophy in general.

1.2 Accordingly we will pursue the pure concepts back to their first germs and structures in human understanding in which they lie in readiness until finally, upon the occasion of experience, they are developed and, liberated from the empirical conditions attaching to them, are displayed in their purity through this very same understanding.
First Book. The Analytic of the Concepts

1st Chapter. Clues for the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of Understanding

1.1 If we call a recognitional capacity into play, then, according to the various occasions, the diverse concepts distinguish themselves, which make this capacity discernible, and permit of a collection into a more or less complete treatise according to whether observation of this capacity were employed for a longer time or with greater acuteness.

1.2 Where this examination will be complete, according to this, as it were, mechanical procedure, can never be determined with certitude.

1.3 And the concepts, which we uncover only by circumstance, are also discovered in no order and not systematically, but rather are finally only paired according to similarity and placed into series according to the magnitude of their contents from the simple on to the more assembled, which is hardly produced systematically, although it is methodical to a certain extent.

2.1 The transcendental philosophy not only has an advantage in being able to search out its concepts according to a principle, but also the obligation to do so. And the reason for this is simply that they arise out of the understanding as absolute unity (pure and unmixed) and hence must cohere among themselves according to a concept or Idea.

2.2 But such a cohesion gives a rule to hand, according to which the position for every pure understanding concept and the completeness for all together can be designated a priori, all of which otherwise would depend upon whim or chance.
Transcendental Clues for Discovering all Pure Concepts of Understanding

1st Section. The Logical Usage of Understanding in General

1.1 The understanding was explained above, and merely negatively, as a non-sensitive recognitional capacity.

1.2 But independently of sensitivity we can partake of no perspective.

1.3 The understanding therefore is not a capacity of perspective.

1.4 But then apart from the perspective there is no manner of recognizing except through concepts.

1.5 The recognition of every, at least human, understanding therefore is a recognition through concepts, not intuitively but rather discursively.  

1.6 All perspectives, as sensitive, depend upon affections; the concepts therefore upon functions.

1.7 But with function I understand the unity of the action in ordering diverse representations under a common one.

1.8 Concepts therefore are based upon the spontaneity of the thinking, as sensitive perspective is upon the receptivity of the impressions.

1.9 Now the understanding can make no use of these concepts other than judging by means of them.

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86 At this point we establish that the capacity for understanding is not intuitive but rather discursive, depending as it does upon concepts.

87 For example this table and that table are each a representation of table and are united under the concept of table. Or this chair and that table are united under the concept of furniture. Or oil and water are united via the concept of liquid.

88 The concept is spontaneously devised by the understanding in order to subsume diverse representations under a common heading or concept. In general the understanding has to do with formulating concepts and of making connections.

89 We use the concept in order to make judgments concerning perspectives as to whether, e.g., it is a table or furniture or something else. Otherwise there is not much point in combining diverse representations under a more general representation.
1.10 Since no representation, except the perspective alone, goes immediately to the object, it follows that a concept is never referred immediately to an object, but rather to some other sort of representation of the object (be it perspective or even a concept).\(^{90}\)

1.11 Hence the judgment is the mediate recognition of an object, thus the representation of a representation of the object.\(^{91}\)

1.12 In every judgment there is a concept which holds for many representations, and among this many also encompasses a given one which is then referred directly to the object.\(^{92}\)

1.13 In the judgment “all bodies are divisible”, for example, the concept of divisibility is referred to diverse other concepts, but among which here it is referred in particular to the concept of body; but this to certain appearances arising to us.\(^{93}\)

1.14 Therefore these objects are represented mediately by the concept of divisibility.\(^{94}\)

1.15 Accordingly all judgments are functions of the unity among our representations since, namely, instead of an immediate representation, a higher one which comprehends this and numerous others is used for the recognition of

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\(^{90}\) It is by means of my perspective that I look at an object and have it represent something, e.g., a table, or even an unknown something. So the concept of furniture can be referred to (encompass) table and then table in turn to the object of my immediate perspective. Also when someone looks at any object, the perspective (how the object is looked at and viewed) is what that object represents to that onlooker.

\(^{91}\) The judgment then becomes the representation such that a concept (a representation) is applied to an appearance in the perspective. It is by means of the judgment that we see that furniture is included in the concept of household articles, for example (along with such as appliances), and then by means of that a chair can be seen as included in household articles. And so my first perspective might be of a table, but then I can come to see it as a household article via the judgment: a chair is a piece of furniture and furniture is part of house articles, and accordingly the chair I spy is also representative of household articles.

\(^{92}\) Per the preceding footnote, since a chair is a piece of furniture, we can now look at the chair before us as simply a chair or also as a piece of furniture.

\(^{93}\) So bodies are divisible as are also numbers or even an appearance like a face, but here the focus is on bodies. Once I conclude that a chair is a body, then it follows that the material of the chair can be divided.

\(^{94}\) The concept of the divisible does not belong to that of body like top does to table, but rather to many concepts, one of which is body, and then via body to appearances in the perspective.
an object, and in this way many, possible recognitions are drawn together into one.\footnote{Accordingly this chair and that chair are are united with footstool and table as furniture and these with appliances as household articles. And household articles are bodies and since all bodies are divisible, it follows that furniture and chairs are divisible.}  

1.16 But we can trace all action of the understanding back to judgments so that the understanding in general can be represented as a capacity for judging.  

1.17 For according to the above, it is a capacity for thinking.  

1.18 Thinking is the recognition through concepts.  

1.19 But concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, are referred to some sort of representation of a yet undetermined object.  

1.20 So the concept of body means something, e.g., metal, which can be recognized through that concept.  

1.21 Therefore it is only a concept in that other representations are contained under it, by means of which it can be referred to objects.  

1.22 Therefore it is the predicate to a possible judgment, e.g., every metal is a body.\footnote{So per my perspective I can look at an object and see it as representing something to me, e.g., a chair or a piece of furniture or even a certain color or shape. There are many ways of looking at objects and it depends upon the perspective for it to represent something to the onlooker. So two people looking at the same object may spy different things. One sees a cloud and another spies a face. One sees a young man, and another person a sailor and another a husband or son. See \textit{Anschauung} for more on this.}  

1.23 Therefore all the functions of the understanding can be found if we can completely describe the functions of the unity in the judgments.  

1.24 But that this is quite easily accomplished, the following section will readily indicate.
Transcendental Clues for the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of Understanding
2nd Section

#9. Regarding the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgments

1.1 If we abstract from all content of a judgment in general and attend solely to the understanding form in that, we find that the function of the thinking in that form can be brought under four titles, each of which contains three moments.

1.2 All these can be conveniently represented in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity of the Judgments</th>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Relations</th>
<th>Modality</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Affirming</td>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>Problematic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Particular</td>
<td>Denying</td>
<td>Hypothetical</td>
<td>Assertoric</td>
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<td>Singular</td>
<td>Infinite</td>
<td>Disjunctive</td>
<td>Apodictic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.1 Since this division seems to deviate from the customary technique of the logician in some parts (though not in any essential parts), the following precautions against a feared misunderstanding may be necessary.

3.1 1. the logicians say quite properly that in the usage of judgments in rational inferences we are able to treat the singular judgments like the universal ones.

3.2 For since precisely for the reason that they have no scope at all, the predicate of the singular judgment cannot be drawn merely to some of what is contained under the concept of the subject, and excluded from the other.
3.3 It holds therefore of these concepts without exception, just as though it were a communally valid concept which had a scope for whose entire meaning the predicate held.

3.4 On the other hand if we compare a singular judgment to a commonly valid one merely as recognition according to its magnitude, it is related to this as unity is to infinity and is therefore on its own essentially distinguished from it.

3.5 If therefore I evaluate a singular judgment (*judicium singulare*) not merely according to its inner validity, but rather as a recognition in general according to the magnitude which it has in comparison with other recognitions, it is distinguished in every case from communally valid judgments (*judicia communia*) and deserves a particular position in a complete table of the moments of thinking in general (though, of course not, in a logic limited merely to the usage of the judgments among one another).

4.1 Likewise the infinite judgments in a transcendental logic must be distinguished from the affirming judgments, even if they are properly counted among these in the universal logic and make up no particular number of the division.

4.2 Namely the latter logic abstracts from all content of the predicate (even if it is denying) and looks only to whether it is attributed to the subject or opposed to it.

4.3 But the transcendental logic considers the judgment also according to the value or content of this logical affirmation by means of a merely denying predicate and what sort of gain this supplies with respect to the entire recognition.

4.4 Had I said of the soul, “it is not mortal” then by a denying judgment I had at least avoided an error.

4.5 Now indeed through the statement, “the soul is not mortal,” I have actually made an affirmation with regard to the logical form by placing the soul into the unlimited scope of the non-mortal entities.
4.6 Now because the mortal contains one part of the entire scope of possible entities, but the non-mortal the other, nothing other is said through my judgment than that the soul is one of the infinite number of things which remain if I remove the mortal all together.

4.7 But in this way only the infinite sphere of all possible is restricted to the extent the mortal is separated from it and the soul placed in the remaining scope of its space.

4.8 But with this exception this space remains yet always infinite, and several parts of that can still be removed without the concept of the soul growing for that reason in the slightest and becoming determined affirmatively.

4.9 These infinite judgments therefore with respect to the logical scope, are actually merely restricting with respect to the content of the recognition in general, and to this extent they must not be overlooked in the transcendental table of all moments of the thinking in the judgments, because the functions of understanding exercised with that can perhaps be important in the field of its pure recognition a priori.

5.1 3. All relationships of the thinking in judgments are those
   a. of the predicate to the subject,
   b. of the basis to the consequence, and
   c. of the divided recognition and of the collected members of the division among one another.

5.2 In the first type of judgments, only two concepts are considered; in the second two judgments; in the third several judgments in relationship to each other.

5.3 The hypothetical proposition, “if there is a perfect justice, the persistently evil are punished” actually contains the relationship of two propositions, “there is a perfect justice” and “the persistently evil are punished.”

5.4 Whether both of these proposition are true on their own remains undecided here.

5.5 It is only the consequence which is thought through this judgment.
5.6 Finally the disjunctive judgment contains a relationship between two or more propositions among one another, but not of succession, but rather of logical opposition to the extent the sphere of the one excludes that of the other, but still simultaneously of communality to the extent they together fill up the sphere of the actual recognition therefore a relationship of the parts of the sphere of a realization, since the sphere of each part is a complement of the sphere of the others for the entire complex of the partitioned recognition, e.g., “the world exists either through blind chance, or through internal necessity, or through an external cause.”

5.7 Each of these propositions takes in one part of the sphere of the possible recognitions about the existence of a world in general, and all together the entire sphere.

5.8 Removing the recognition from one of these spheres means to place it in one of the remaining ones, and on the other hand placing it in one sphere means to remove it from the others.

5.9 In a disjunctive judgment therefore there is a certain communality of the recognitions which consists in them excluding one another in an alternating way, but still determining in this way the true recognition in the whole by, taken together, making up the entire content of a single given recognition.

5.10 And this is also all that I find necessary to mention with respect to what follows.

6.1 4. The modality of a judgment is an entirely particular function of judgment and has the solitary distinction that it contributes nothing to the content of the judgment (for apart from magnitude, quality and relationship there is nothing more to the content of a judgment), but rather has to do only with the value of the copula in reference to the thinking in general.

6.2 Problematical judgments are such where we assume the affirming or denying as merely possible (optional).

6.3 Assetorical, where it is considered as actual (true).

6.4 Apodictical, in which we consider it as necessary.*
6.5 So both judgments, the relationship of which makes up the hypothetical judgment (anec. and consequ), and likewise in the mutual effect of which the disjunctive consists (member of the division) are all together only problematic.

6.6 In the above example the proposition, “there is a perfect justice,” is not spoken assertorically, but rather is only thought as an arbitrary judgment such that it is possible that someone may assume it and only the consequence is assertorical.

6.7 Hence such judgments can also be obviously false and still, taken problematically, be conditions of the recognition of truth.

6.8 Thus the judgment, “the world exists through blind chance,” in the disjunctive judgment is only of problematic meaning, namely that someone may perhaps assume this proposition for a moment and still (as the indication of the false way among the number of all those which we can take) serves for finding the true one.

6.9 Hence the problematical proposition is that which expresses only logical possibility (which is not objective), i.e., a free choice in allowing such a proposition to hold, to wit: a merely arbitrary admission of that into the understanding.

6.10 The assertorical speaks of logical actuality or truth, somewhat as in a hypothetical, rational inference where the antecedent comes forth problematically in the major premise, assertorically in the minor, indicating that the proposition is already joined with the understanding according to its laws, and the apodictic proposition thinks to itself the assertoric determined through these laws of the understanding and hence assertingly a priori and, in such way, expresses logical necessity.

6.11 Now here everything is gradually annexed to the understanding, so that we first judge something problematically, and then also even accept it assertorically as true, and finally assert it as joined inseparable with the understanding, i.e., as necessary and apodictic, and because of this we can also term these three functions of modality so many moments of thinking in general.

* Kant’s annotation:
Regarding the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgments

1. Just as if in the first case the thinking were a function of the understanding, in the second of judgment, and in the third of reason.

2. A remark which awaits its clarification later.
Transcendental Clues for the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of Understanding
3rd Section

#10. The Pure Concepts of Understanding or Categories

1.1 Universal logic, as has been stated several times, abstracts from all content of the recognition and expects representations from elsewhere (regardless of where that might be) in order first to convert these into concepts. This proceeds analytically.\(^97\)

1.2 Transcendental logic, on the other hand, confronts a priori a manifold of sensitivity offered by the Transcendental Aesthetic in order to supply material to the concepts of the pure understanding; in lieu of which this logic would be without content and thus thoroughly empty.

1.3 Now space and time contain a manifold of the pure perspective a priori, but still belong to the conditions of the receptivity of our mind, by means of which alone it can receive representations of objects, which thus must also always affect of the concept of these objects.

1.4 But the spontaneity of our thinking requires that this manifold first be perused, taken up and joined in a certain way in order to make a recognition out of it.\(^98\)

1.5 This action I call synthesis.

2.1 In its most general sense synthesis means the action of adding various representations to one another and of comprehending their manifold in a recognition.\(^99\)

\(^97\) Here I think Kant means that we compare representations and extract what is common and make this common aspect into a concept. Perhaps comparing a chair and sofa and find the common element to be a seat.

\(^98\) This hints at the apprehension, retention and unification steps to be presented in the A version of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. See Appendix I.2, beginning on or near page 711.

\(^99\) And so this is different from the formulation of concepts by abstracting from what is diverse and focusing on what is common. Here there must be a composite or manifold and this is what is given in the object of the perspective. Compare with 1.1 above.
2.2 Such a synthesis is pure if the manifold is not given empirically, but rather a priori (like that in space and time).

2.3 These representations must first be given before any analysis of them, and no concept can arise analytically with respect to its content.\textsuperscript{100}

2.4 Rather it is the synthesis of a manifold (be it given empirically or a priori) that first produces a recognition, albeit indeed at the beginning often yet raw and confused and therefore in need of analysis. But the synthesis is still that which actually garners the elements for a recognition and unites them into a certain content. Thus it is the first thing we need to consider if we wish to judge about the first origin of our recognition.\textsuperscript{101}

3.1 Synthesis in general, as we shall soon see, is the mere operation of the imagination, a blind albeit indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no recognition at all anywhere, but of which we are seldom even aware.

3.2 To bring this synthesis to concepts, however, is a function which belongs to understanding, and it first supplies us the recognition in the actual meaning.\textsuperscript{102}

4.1 Now the pure synthesis, represented universally, gives the pure understanding concept.

\textsuperscript{100} Here then we would not be comparing a chair and sofa as above, but rather assembling the elements of a chair. So this would have preceded in order to have the object, chair, to compare with another, e.g., the sofa or another chair. The representations must precede and be unified in a recognition before any analysis of them can produce a concept. We must apparently add diverse representations together and grasp this diversity in a recognition. But this is not the analytical approach of comparison and extraction, but rather the accumulation and unification (via a synthesis) of a different sort of diversity besides merely space and time, which is what the analytical approach can take care of.

\textsuperscript{101} It seems then that universal logic compares diverse representations and comes up with the concept which unifies them, and does this analytically. But the content of a concept/recognition arises only through a synthesis of a manifold given in a perspective, be it given empirically or as pure.

\textsuperscript{102} And so the imagination, in my example, would assemble the elements of the chair in a synthesis and then the understanding would produce a concept (rule) which determines the object (chair) and enables us to recognize it, thus also binding the manifold.
4.2 But with this synthesis I understanding that which rests a priori upon a basis of the synthetical unity. Thus our counting (it is especially noticeable with larger numbers) is a synthesis according to concepts, because it occurs according to a communal basis of unity (e.g., the decade).

4.3 By means of this concept therefore the unity in the synthesis of the manifold becomes necessary.

5.1 Diverse representations are brought under a concept analytically (a business with which the universal logic deals).

5.2 But the transcendental logic teaches of bringing to concepts not the representations but rather the pure synthesis of representations.

5.3 The first which must be a priori given to the recognition of all objects is the manifold of the pure perspective. The synthesis of this manifold through the imagination is the second, but is not yet a recognition.

5.4 The concepts, which give unity to this synthesis and consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, accomplish the third for the recognition of a forthcoming object and are based on the understanding. 103

6.1 The same function which gives unity to the diverse representations in a judgment, also gives unity to the mere synthesis of diverse representations in a perspective, which function, expressed universally, is called the pure understanding concept.

6.2 Therefore the same understanding, and indeed by precisely the same actions whereby it produced the logical form of a judgment in concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetical unity of the manifold in the perspective, for which reason they are called pure understanding concepts which go a priori to objects, which the universal logic cannot accomplish.

103 This suggests the TDA.II.1-3 (see Appendix I.2, beginning on or near page 711) the subjective deduction, i.e., the apprehension, reproduction and association and finally the recognition via some unifying concept supplied via the productive imagination.
7.1 In this way just as many pure understanding concepts arise, which go a priori to objects of the perspective in general, as there were logical functions in all possible judgments in the preceding table; for the understanding is completely exhausted by those cited functions, and its capacity entirely surveyed by them.

7.2 We want to name these concepts “categories” after those of Aristotle in that our intention is originally the same as his, even if these are quite remote from his in detail.

Table of the Categories

1. *Of the Quantity*
   - Unity
   - Plurality
   - Totality

2. *Of the Quality*
   - Reality
   - Negation
   - Limitation

3. *Of the Relation*
   - Inherence and Substance (substantia et accidens)
   - Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)
   - Communality
   - (reciprocal effect between action and reaction)

4. *Of the Modality*
   - Possibility - Impossibility
   - Existence - Nonexistence
   - Necessity - Contingency

8.1 Now this is the register of all originally pure concepts of the synthesis which the understanding contains a priori in itself, and only because of which it is also a pure understanding in that through them alone can it understand something with the manifold of the perspective, i.e., can think an object of the manifold.
8.2 This division is generated systematically from a communal principle, namely the capacity for judging (which is precisely as much as the capacity for thinking), and does not arise haphazardly from a search of pure concepts undertaken by chance, concerning the completeness of which no one could ever be certain, since they are inferred only through induction without realizing that in this manner we never see why exactly these and not other concepts reside with the pure understanding.

8.3 It was a stroke worthy of the man Aristotle to search out these foundational concepts.

8.4 But since he had no principle, he snatched them up as they occurred to him. At first he rummaged up ten of them, which he called categories (predicaments).

8.5 Later he believed to have found five more. These he added under the name of the post-predicaments.

8.6 But his table still remained deficient.

8.7 And besides, among them are some modes of pure sensitivity (quando, ubi, situs, and likewise prius, simul) and also an empirical one (motus), none of which belong in this source registry of the understanding. And also counted among the original concept are derived concepts (actio, passio), and several of the categories are missing entirely.

9.1 Due to this latter deficiency therefore we need to note that the categories, as the true source concepts of the pure understanding, also have their just as pure, derived concepts which can be overlooked by no means in a complete system of the transcendental philosophy, but with whose mere mention I can be satisfied in what is only a critical attempt.

10.1 Permit me to term these pure, but derived, understanding concepts the predicables of the pure understanding (in contrast to the predicaments).
10.2 If we have the original and primitive concepts, the derived and subordinate ones are easily added and the family tree of the pure understanding completely pictured.

10.3 Since for me it has to do here not with the completion of a system, but rather only with the principles to a system, I save this supplementation for another employment.

10.4 But we can readily achieve this intention if we take the ontological instruction books in hand and, e.g., subordinate the predicables of force, action, suffering to the category of causality; those of the presence or resistance to that of communality; the predicables of origination, vanishing or alteration to the predicaments of modality, etc.

10.5 The categories connected with the modes of pure sensitivity, or also with one another, give a great number of derived concepts a priori, the notation and, where possible, the registration of which to completion would be a useful and not disagreeable, but here dispensable, endeavor.

11.1 The definitions of these categories I assiduously spare myself in this treatment, even though I might be in possession of them.

11.2 I will dissect these concepts to the degree which is sufficient for reference to the methodology, which I treat in the sequel.

11.3 In a system of pure reason one would properly be able to require them of me; but here they would only divert our focus form the main point of the examination by provoking doubt and attack which we, without eliminating anything from the essential intention, can quite well defer to another endeavor.

11.4 Nonetheless it is still evident from the little which I have brought out here that a complete dictionary with all explanation requisite to it not only is possible, but also easily produced.

11.5 The compartments are finally there; it is only necessary to fill them out, and with a systematic topic such as this present one, it is not easy to miss the place where each concept actually belongs, and at the same time those which are still empty, are easily noted.
1.1 Profitable observations can be employed concerning this table of the categories, which perhaps could have weighty consequences with respect to the scientific form of all rational recognitions.

1.2 For that this table be uncommonly serviceable, even indispensable, in the theoretical part of philosophy in completely designing the plan for the whole of a science to the extent it is based on concepts a priori, along with partitioning it mathematically according to determined principles, is itself clear from the cited table which completely contains all elementary concepts of the understanding, indeed even the form of a system of that, in human understanding, and consequently gives instructions for all moments of a proposed speculative science, in fact even its order, as I have also given a sample of it elsewhere.\textsuperscript{104}

1.3 Here now are some of these remarks.

2.1 The first is that this table, which contains four classes of understanding concepts, can first be decomposed into two departments, the first of which is directed to objects of perspective (the pure as well as the empirical), but the second to the existence of these objects (either in reference to one another or to the understanding).

3.1 The first class I would term the mathematical categories, the second the dynamic.

3.2 The first class has, as we see, no correlates; these are encountered in the second class alone.

3.3 Still this distinction must have a basis in the nature of the understanding.

4.1 2nd Remark.

\textsuperscript{104} Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science.
4.2 There are an equal number of categories of each class, namely three, which calls for consideration just as much since, otherwise, all divisions a priori through concepts is a dichotomy.

4.3 But the third category arises in every case from the connection of the second to the first of their classes.

5.1 Thus totality is nothing else than the plurality considered as unity, limitation nothing but reality joined with negation, communality is the causality of one substance in determination of the other in an alternating way, finally necessity nothing else but existence given through the possibility itself.

5.2 But we should not indeed think that for that reason the third category were a merely derived and not an original concept of the pure understanding.

5.3 For the articulation of the first and the second, in order to bring forth the third concept, is a special act of the understanding which is not the same as that which is exercised with the first and second.

5.4 Thus the concept of a number (which belongs to the category of totality) is not always possible when the concept of quantity and unity are possible (e.g., in the representation of the infinite), nor is influence, i.e., how one substance can be the cause of something in another substance, to be immediately understood from my joining both the concept of a cause and that of a substance.

5.5 From this is becomes clear that a particular act of the understanding is requisite for this, and likewise with the others.

6.1 3rd Remark.

6.2 Of one single category, namely that of communality, which is located under the third title, the agreement with the form of a disjunctive judgment corresponding to it in the table of the logical functions is not so apparent as with the others.
7.1 In order to secure this agreement we must note that in all disjunctive judgments the sphere (the count of all that is contained under it) is represented as a whole partitioned into parts (the subordinate concepts), and because the one cannot be contained under the other they are thought of as coordinated, not subordinated, so that they determine one another not unilaterally, as in a series, but rather reciprocally, as in an aggregate (if one member of the division is given, all others are excluded, and vice-verse).

8.1 Now a similar connection is thought in a whole of things, since one as effect is not subordinated to another as cause of its existence, but rather is coordinated simultaneously and mutually as cause with respect to the determination of the other (e.g., the parts of a body mutually attract and also resist one another). And this is an entirely different kind of connection than that which is encountered in the mere relationship of cause to effect (of the foundation to the consequence) in which the consequence does not mutually determine in turn the foundation and which for that reason does not make up with this a whole (as the world creator with the world).

8.2 The same procedure of the understanding, when imagining the sphere of a divided concept, is also observed when it thinks a thing as divisible and how the members of the division exclude one another in the concepts and are still joined in one sphere, thus it imagines the parts of the thing as such whose existence (as substance) befits also exclusively each of the others, but still as joined in a whole.
1.1 But in the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there is found yet a section which contains pure understanding concepts which, even though they are not counted among the categories, nonetheless, like them, were supposed to hold of objects a priori, in which case however they would increase the number of the categories, which cannot be.

1.2 These, the proposition so involved by the scholastics, presented: quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum.105

1.3 Now even though the use of this principle, with intention to the consequences (which gave sheer tautological propositions), came out very meagerly such that in recent times some even strive to position it in metaphysics almost entirely honorarily, nevertheless a thought which has persevered for such a long time, even as empty as it seems to be, always deserves an examination of its origin and warrants the suspicion that it has its basis in some sort of understanding rule which, as often happens, is only erroneously interpreted.

1.4 These alleged transcendental predicates of things are nothing other than logical requisites and criteria of every recognition of things in general, and place, as their foundation, the categories of quantity, namely unity, plurality and totality; only that these, which actually would have to be taken materially as belonging to the possibility of things themselves, they use in fact only in a formal meaning as belonging to the logical requirements with respect to every recognition, and then carelessly make these criteria of thinking into a property of things on their own.

1.5 In every recognition of an object there is, namely, unity of the concept, which we can term qualitative unity to the extent that only the unity of the complex of the manifold of the recognition is thought by that, like the unity of the theme in a play, a speech or a fable.

1.6 Secondly, truth with respect to the consequences.

1.7 The more true consequences from a given concept, the more indicators of its objective reality.

105 Whatever exists is unity, truth, perfection.
1.8 This we could term the qualitative plurality of the marks which belong to a concept as a communal basis (not thought in it as magnitude).

1.9 Third and finally: perfection which consists in this plurality being turned about and leading back together to the unity of the concept and agreeing together perfectly with this and with no other, which we can term the qualitative completeness (totality).

1.10 From this it is clear that these logical criteria of the possibility of the recognition in general concern here the three categories of magnitude, in which the unity of the generation of the quantum must be assumed as thoroughly homogeneous, only with an intention to the connection also of the non-homogeneous recognition pieces in a consciousness through the quality of a recognition as a principle.

1.11 Thus the criterion of the possibility of a concept (not of its object) is the definition in which the unity of the concept, the truth of all that which eventually may be derived from it, and finally the completeness of that which is drawn from it, make up for the manufacture of the entire concept the requisite aspect of that concept. Accordingly the criteria of a hypothesis is the comprehensibility of the assumed explanatory basis or its unity (without auxiliary hypotheses), the truth (agreement with itself and with experience) of the consequences to be derived from that, and finally the completeness of the explanatory base to those which refer back to nothing more or less than was assumed in the hypothesis, and then refers again a posteriori analytically that which was thought a priori synthetically and agrees together with that.--

1.12 Through the concept of unity, truth and perfection therefore the transcendental table of the categories are not supplemented at all, as though they were deficient, but rather, by putting the relationship of the concepts entirely to the side, the procedure with them are brought under the universal, logical rules of the agreement of the recognition with itself.
#13. Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in General

1.1 The teachers of law in a legal process, when speaking of authorization and presumptions, distinguish the question concerning law (*quid juris*) from that concerning fact (*quid facti*). And while proof of both is required, the first, which is supposed to establish the authority or also the legal claim, they term the deduction.

1.2 We avail ourselves of a multitude of empirical concepts without anyone’s challenge. And even without a deduction we hold ourselves justified in appropriating to them a sense and imagined meaning because we always have experience at hand to prove their objective reality.

1.3 However, there are also usurped concepts such as luck and fate, which roam about with indeed almost universal indulgence, but still occasionally are taken to task by the question: *quid juris*? Then we run into no little embarrassment about their deduction, for we can adduce no clear, legal basis either from experience or reason, through which the authorization of their usage would be plain.

2.1 But among the many concepts which make up the very tangled web of human recognition, there are some which are also designated for pure usage a priori (completely independent of all experience), and the authority of these always has need of a deduction because proofs from experience are not sufficient for the legality of such usage, and yet we still must know how these concepts, which we obtain from no experience, can refer to objects.

2.2 Thus I term the explanation of the way in which concepts can refer a priori to objects, their transcendental deduction, and I distinguish it from the empirical deduction, which indicates the way in which a concept was acquired through experience and reflection about it, and thus does not concern the legality, but rather the fact by means of which the possession arose.
3.1 Now already we have two concepts of entirely diverse sorts which still agree with one another in referring, in both cases, completely a priori to objects, namely the concepts of space and time as forms of sensitivity, and the categories as concepts of understanding.

3.2 To want to attempt an empirical deduction of them would be entirely futile because the distinguishing aspect of their nature lies precisely their referral to their objects without having borrowed something for their representation from experience.

3.3 If a deduction of these is necessary therefore it will always have to be transcendental.

4.1 Nevertheless, for these concepts, as for every recognition, we can seek out in experience, if not the principles of their possibility, still the opportunity of their generation, where the impressions of the sense give the first occasion to open up the entire power of recognition with respect to them and to bring forth experience, which contains two very dissimilar elements, namely a material for the recognition out of the senses, and a certain form for ordering them out of the inner source of the pure perspective and thinking which, upon the prompt of the material, are first brought into exercise and produce concepts.

4.2 Such a tracking down of the first endeavors of our power of recognition to ascend from singular perceptions to universal concepts, doubtlessly has its great utility, and we can thank the celebrated Locke for first opening the way to that.

4.3 But a deduction of the pure concepts a priori never comes forth in this way, for it does not at all lie on this way, because with respect to their future use, which is supposed to be entirely independent of experience, they must have an entirely different birth certificate from that of a descent from experience.

4.4 This attempted, physiological derivation, which actually cannot at all be called a deduction, because it concerns a questionem facti, I will accordingly call the explanation of the possession of a pure recognition.

4.5 It is therefore clear that of these pure concepts there can only be a transcendental deduction and no empirical one at all, and that the latter, with respect
to the pure concepts a priori, is nothing but a vain attempt with which only he can occupy himself who has failed entirely to comprehend the quite peculiar nature of these recognitions.

5.1 Now even though the single manner of a possible deduction of pure recognitions a priori is admitted, namely that on the transcendental way, still it is not for that reason obvious that it be so unavoidably necessary.

5.2 Above we have tracked the concepts of space and time to their sources by means of a transcendental deduction, and have explained and determined their objective validity a priori.

5.3 Nonetheless, geometry goes its sure pace through clear recognitions a priori without needing to request from philosophy a certificate of verification about the pure and legal descent of its foundational concept of space.

5.4 But the usage of the concept in this science also goes only to the external sense world where space is the pure form of its perspective, in which therefore every geometrical recognition, because it is based upon perspective a priori, has immediate evidence, and the objects are given by the recognition itself a priori (according to the form) in the perspective.

5.5 On the other hand, with the pure understanding concepts and not only with these themselves, but also with space, the unavoidable need begins for seeking the transcendental deduction because, since they do not speak of objects through predicates of perspective and sensitivity, but rather of pure thinking a priori, they refer universally to objects without any condition of sensitivity, and which, since they are not based on experience, can also exhibit no objects in the a priori perspective upon which they would base their synthesis before all experience. Accordingly this arouses suspicion not only regarding the objective validity and limits of their usage, but also makes the concept of space equivocal by an inclination to use it beyond the conditions of the sensitive perspective, for which reason a transcendental deduction of its was also necessary earlier.

5.6 So then the reader must be convinced of the unavoidable necessity of such a transcendental deduction before he has taken a single step in the field of pure reason, because otherwise he proceeds blindly and, after missing the mark
several times, must still return again to the ignorance from whence he de-
parted.

5.7 But he must also distinctly see the unavoidable difficulties in advance so that he does not complain about the obscurities where the matter itself is deeply enveloped, or be annoyed too early about the elimination of the obstacles, because upon this hangs the decision whether to give up completely all claim to insights of pure reason in that most beloved field, namely out beyond the limits of all experience, or to bring this critical examination to completion.

6.1 Above, with the concepts of space and time, we were able with little effort to make comprehensible how these as recognitions a priori must nonetheless refer necessarily to objects and would make possible a synthetic recognition a priori of them independently of all experience.

6.2 For since it is only by means of such pure forms of sensitivity that an object can appear to us, i.e., be an object of an empirical perspective, space and time are pure perspectives which contain a priori the conditions of the possibility of the objects as appearances, and their synthesis has objective validity.

7.1 The categories of the understanding, on the other hand, do not at all present us with the conditions under which objects are given in the perspective, thus objects can certainly appear to us without necessarily having to refer to functions of the understanding in such way that these would contain the conditions of these objects a priori.

7.2 Thus a difficulty is indicated here which we did not encounter in the field of sensitivity, namely how the subjective conditions of thinking were supposed to have objective validity, i.e., render the conditions of the possibility of every recognition of objects; for without functions of the understanding appearances can certainly be given in the perspective.

7.3 Take for example the concept of cause which means a particular manner of synthesis where upon something, ‘A’, something entirely different, ‘B’, is granted according to a rule.
7.4 It is not a priori clear why appearances were supposed to contain something similar (for we cannot adduce appearances as proof because the objective validity of this concept must be able to be established a priori), and hence it is a priori doubtful whether such a concept not per chance be quite empty and encounter no object anywhere among the appearances.

7.5 For that objects of the sensitive perspective must be conformable to those formal conditions of sensitivity lying a priori in the mind is clear because otherwise they would not be objects for us. But that they also, beyond that, must be conformable to the conditions which the understanding has need of for the synthetical unity of the thinking, of this the chain of inference is not so easy to see.

7.6 For in any event, appearances could easily be so constituted that the understanding would not at all find them conformable to the conditions of its unity, and everything would lie in such confusion that, e.g., in the series of the appearances nothing would be presented which would provide a rule for the synthesis and therefore match the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would accordingly be entirely empty, idle and without meaning.

7.7 Nonetheless, appearances would present objects for our perspective, for in no way does perspective have need of the functions of thinking.

8.1 If someone thinks to rid himself of the tedium of this investigation by saying that experience offer unending examples of such a regularity of the appearances, which gives sufficient occasion for isolating from that the concept of cause, and likewise for confirming in that way the objective validity of such a concept, then that person does not notice that in this way the concept of cause cannot arise at all, but rather that it would either have to be based completely a priori in the understanding or given up entirely as a phantom of the brain.

8.2 For this concept thoroughly requires that something, A, be of the sort that something else, B, follows necessarily from that and according to an utterly universal rule.

8.3 Appearances give cases to hand indeed from which a rule is possible, according to which something happens customarily, but never that the outcome be necessary; thus a dignity also attaches to the synthesis of cause and effect
which we cannot express empirically at all, namely that the effect not merely comes additively to the cause but rather is granted through that and results from it.

8.4 The rigorous universality of the rule is also not a property of empirical rules at all, which, through induction, can receive no other universality except comparative, i.e., extended utility.

8.5 But now the usage of pure understanding concepts would change entirely if we wanted to treat them only as empirical products.
14. Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

1.1 There are only two cases possible whereby a synthetical representation and its objects are able to coincide, refer to one another in a necessary way and accompany each other, as it were.

1.2 Either by the object alone making the representation possible, or the representation the object.

1.3 If it is the first, then this referral is only empirical and the representation is never possible a priori.

1.4 And this is the case with appearances regarding what belongs to it of sensation.

1.5 But if it is the second, then because a representation on its own does not produce its object with respect to its existence (for the question here does not at all concern its causality by means of the will), the representation is still a priori determining with respect to the object, if it is only possible through it alone to recognize something as an object.

1.6 But there are two conditions under which alone the recognition of an object is possible: first perspective, whereby the object is given, but only as appearance; and second the concept, by means of which an object, which matches this perspective, is thought.

1.7 But it is clear from the above that the first condition, namely that under which alone objects can be looked at lies in fact a priori in the mind as the basis to the objects with respect to their form.

1.8 With this formal condition of sensitivity therefore all appearances necessarily agree, because only through it do they appear, i.e., can be empirically looked at and given.\(^{106}\)

1.9 Now the question arises whether concepts not also precede a priori as conditions under which alone something, even if not looked at, still is thought as an object in general. In that case every empirical recognition of the objects

\(^{106}\) We must remain always mindful that space and time are the forms of all our looking, and that we cannot look at, and thus see, anything except in terms of these two forms.
would be necessarily conformable to such concepts, because without their presupposition nothing would be possible as an object of experience.\textsuperscript{107}

1.10 But now every experience, apart from the perspective of the senses whereby something is given, contains yet a concept of an object which is given in the perspective, or appears. Accordingly concepts of objects in general as conditions a priori will lie as basis for every experiential recognition. Consequently the objective validity of the categories, as concepts a priori, will rest on experience being possible only through them (according to the form of the thinking).\textsuperscript{108}

1.11 For then they will refer to objects of experience in a necessary way and a priori because only by means of them in general could any kind of an object of experience be thought.

2.1 The transcendental deduction of all concepts a priori therefore has a principle according to which the entire investigation must be directed, namely that they must be recognized as conditions a priori of the possibility of experience (be it of the perspective, which is encountered in the experience, or of the thinking).

2.2 Concepts, which give the objective basis for the possibility of experience, are necessary for that very reason.

2.3 But the development of experience, wherein they are encountered, is not their deduction (but rather illustration), because with that development they would still remain only contingent.

2.4 Without this original referral to possible experience in which all objects of experience come forth, their reference to any kind of object cannot be comprehended at all.

\textsuperscript{107} So it seems there is also a form to our thinking of objects, certain concepts to which all objects would have to conform in order to be thought.

\textsuperscript{108} So any experience is an experience with an object and this calls for a perspective and also a concept of the object being looked at, and so experience will be dependent upon the categories as the form of thinking about any object in general.
3.1 The celebrated Lock, lacking this consideration and because he encountered pure concepts of the understanding in experience, had also derived them from experience and yet proceeded so consistently that he dared to attempt with that to attain to recognitions which go far beyond all experiential limits.

3.2 David Hume recognized that in order to be able to do that, it would be necessary for these concepts to have had their origin a priori.

3.3 But since he could not at all explain how it would be possible for the understanding to have to think concepts, which are not combined on their own in the understanding, still as necessarily combined in the object, and did not light upon the notion of the understanding being able through these concepts to be perhaps itself the sire of the experience wherein his objects are encountered; so, driven by necessity, he derived them from experience (namely from a subjective necessity originated in experience through frequent association which finally is falsely held to be objective, i.e., custom), but proceeded afterwards very consistently in declaring it to be impossible to go out beyond the limits of experience with these concepts and the principles which they occasion.

3.4 But the empirical derivation, on which both men chanced, is incompatible with the reality of the scientific recognition a priori which we have, namely pure mathematics and the universal science of nature, and is therefore refuted by this fact.\(^{109}\)

4.1 The first of these two famous men opened the gate to ecstasies because reason, once it has authority on its side, cannot be restricted by undetermined commendation of temperance. The second, once he believed to have discovered a universal deception of our recognition power seeming to be reason, surrendered entirely to skepticism.—

4.2 We are now poised to attempt whether we might not happily steer human reason between these two reefs, indicate its limits and still preserve the entire field of its purposeful activity open for it.

5.1 At this point I only want to premise the explanation of the categories.

\(^{109}\) This essentially constitutes already a “metaphysical deduction,” showing that it is impossible for the certitude of mathematics or of science to have arisen experientially.
5.2 They are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its perspective is viewed as determined with respect to one of the logical functions of judging.

5.3 Thus the function of the categorical judgment was that of the relationship of the subject to the predicate, e.g., every body is divisible.

5.4 With respect to the mere logical use of the understanding, however, it remained undetermined to which of the two concepts we would want to give the function of the subject and to which that of the predicate.

5.5 For we can also say: some divisible is a body.

5.6 But through the category of substance, if I subsume the concept of body to it, it is determined that its empirical perspective in the experience would always have to be considered only as subject, never as mere predicate; and likewise in all remain categories.
Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding
2nd Chapter

2nd Section. Transcendental Deduction Of The Categories

#15. Possibility of a Connection in General

1.1 A manifold of representations can be given in a perspective which is merely sensitive, i.e., nothing except receptivity, and the form of this perspective can lie a priori in our representational capacity, and still not be anything other than the way the subject is affected.

1.2 But the connection (coiunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses and therefore cannot be contained simultaneously in the pure form of the sensitive perspective; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the representational capacity. Now since we must term this understanding in order to distinguish it from the sensitivity, it follows that whether we are conscious of it or not, and whether it be a connection of the manifold of a perspective or of various concepts, and if the former, whether it be a sensitive or non-sensitive perspective, every connection is an act of the understanding. And this connection we generally denominate synthesis in order to note at the same time that we cannot represent anything as combined in the object without first having combined it ourselves. Of all representations the connection is the only one which cannot be given through objects, but rather can only be effected by the subject.

1.3 We can easily see here that this synthesis would originally have to be one and the same and equally valid for every connection, and that the dismemberment, analysis, which seems to be its opposite, still always presupposes it. For what the understanding has not previously combined, it also cannot dismember, because it is only through itself (the understanding) that it was able to be given to the representational capacity as connected.

2.1 But beyond the concept of the manifold and its synthesis, the notion of connection includes that of its unity.

2.2 Connection is the representation of the synthetic unity of a manifold*

2.3 The representation of this unity therefore cannot be taken from the connection since it far rather makes the concept of connection first possible by its
addition to the representation of the manifold.

2.4 This unity, preceding as it does all concepts of connection, is not per chance the category of unity (#10), for all categories are based on logical functions in judging, and in these connection, and hence unity of the given concepts, is already assumed.

2.5 The category therefore already presupposes connection.

2.6 Hence we must seek this unity even higher (as qualitative, #12), namely in that which contains even the basis of the unity of diverse concepts in judgments, hence in the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical usage.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Whether the representations themselves are identical and therefore whether one could be thought analytically through the other, is not a consideration here.

1.2 The consciousness of the one, to the extent we are speaking of a manifold, is always distinguishable from that of another, and here we are concerned only with the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness.

#16. Originally Synthetic Unity of Apperception

1.1 The “I think” must be able to accompany all of my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not at be thought, which would mean that the representation would either be impossible or at least nothing to me.

1.2 That representation which can be given before all thinking is called perspective.

1.3 Hence all of the manifold of a perspective has a necessary reference to the “I think” in the same subject in which this manifold is encountered.

1.4 But this representation (the “I think”) is an act of spontaneity, i.e., it cannot be considered as belonging to the sensitivity.

1.5 I call it the pure apperception (to distinguish it from the empirical appercep-
tion) or the original apperception, because it is that self consciousness which, by producing the “I think”, must be able to accompany all others and, by remaining one and the same even as they vary, cannot be derived from any other one.

1.6 I also call its unity the transcendental unity of the self-consciousness in order to indicate the possibility of recognitions a priori from it.

1.7 For the manifold representations which are given in any given perspective would not be altogether my representations if they did not belong altogether to one self-consciousness. This is to say that as my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as being my representations) they must conform necessarily to the condition under which alone they can cohere together in a general self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not thoroughly belong to me.

1.8 A great deal follows from this original connection.

2.1 Namely: this thorough identity of the apperception encompassing a manifold given in the perspective contains a synthesis of the representations, and is only possible through this synthesis.

2.2 For the empirical consciousness, which accompanies diverse representations, is distracted as such and without reference to the identity of the subject.¹¹⁰

2.3 This referral therefore does not occur merely because I accompany each representation with consciousness, but rather because I connect one with the other and am conscious of their synthesis.¹¹¹

2.4 Hence only by being able to combine a manifold of given representations into a single consciousness is it even possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations, i.e., the analytical unity of the apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some sort of syn-

¹¹⁰ See also TDA II.3, 8., i.e., Appendix I.2, Section 2, Part 3, Par. 8.

¹¹¹ To be conscious of the moon, and then of the chair, and then of the flower, and then of the car sound, etc., etc., is merely a tramp of appearances, and each of these is isolated and disjointed and could only be held together by rote, but always as disparate, much as the letters of the alphabet.
thetic unity.*\(^{112}\)

2.5 The thought that these representations, given in the perspective, all belong to me means that I unite them in a single self-consciousness, or at least can do so; and even if it is not yet the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations, it nonetheless still presupposes the possibility of that, i.e., it is only because I can grasp their manifold in one consciousness that I term them all together my representations; for otherwise I would have a self which were as multifaceted and diverse as the representations of which I am conscious.\(^{113}\)

2.6 Synthetic unity of the manifold of the perspectives, as given a priori, is therefore the basis of the identity of the apperception itself, which precedes a priori all my determined thought.\(^{114}\)

2.7 But connection does not lie in the objects and cannot per chance be obtained from them through perception and afterwards taken into the understanding, but rather is uniquely a construction of the understanding which itself is nothing more than the capacity for connecting a priori and for bringing the manifold of given representations to the unity of the apperception, which is the highest principle in all of human recognition.\(^{115}\)

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 The analytical unity of the consciousness adheres to all communal concepts as such. E.g., when I think of red in general, I think of a property which (as characteristic) can be encountered here or there, or can be combined with

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\(^{112}\) It is not that I consider the consciousness of the moon (in the preceding note) and then that of the chair and find that the common element is my consciousness. I have to make a connection, e.g., the manifold of a chair, i.e., the back and seat and legs, before I can come to the analytical unity of my consciousness of self.

\(^{113}\) If I spy something which doesn’t “make sense” then it is a subjective perception which is kept separate in the mind (and usually put in the back of the mind in a temporary forgetfulness). And I should more properly say: doesn’t make sense yet, for the constant assumption is that all appearances fit together.

\(^{114}\) In other words while the original and transcendental apperception must precede connection as the potential and even possibility for connection, the consciousness of self cannot be expressed or recognized without first an actual connective synthesis of some manifold.

\(^{115}\) So the apperception is the potential for a unified consciousness of self which is to stretch over and encompass every consciousness, and the understanding is the form of the synthesis such whereby a manifold can be connected. And so, as we shall see, the connections actually made in order to have an expressible consciousness of self will depend upon the categories of the understanding (as utilized by the productive imagination is its search for connective relationships for given manifolds).
other representations. Thus it is only by means of a previously thought, possible, synthetic unity that I can represent the analytical.

1.2 A representation which, as diverse, is to be thought as common, will be viewed as belonging to such which apart from it have some diversity on their own, hence it must be thought in advance in synthetic unity with others (even if only possible representations) before I can think regarding it the analytical unity of the consciousness, which makes it a *conceptus communis*.

1.3 And so the synthetic unity of the apperception is the highest point to which one must attach the use of the understanding, in fact the entire logic and finally the transcendental philosophy. Indeed, this capacity is the understanding itself.

3.1 Now this principle of the necessary unity of the apperception is itself identical, hence an analytical proposition, but still indicates the necessity of a synthesis of the manifold given in a perspective, without which the thorough identity of the self-consciousness cannot be thought.

3.2 For through the “I” as a simple representation no manifold is given. This (manifold) can only be given in the perspective, which is different from it, and only thought through a connection in one consciousness.

3.3 An understanding in which all manifold were simultaneously given through the self-consciousness would be able to look; but ours can only think and must seek its perspective in the senses.

3.4 I am conscious therefore of my identical self with respect to the manifold of the representations given to me in a perspective because I term them altogether my representations which make up a single one.

3.5 But that means that I am conscious of their necessary synthesis a priori, which is called the original, synthetic unity of the apperception, subject to which all representations given to me must stand, but subject to which also they must be brought by means of a synthesis.

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#17. Principle of the Synthetic Unity of the Apperception is the Supreme Principle of Every Usage of the Understanding

1.1 According to the Transcendental Aesthetic, the supreme principle of the pos-
sibility of every perspective with respect to the sensitivity was that every manifold of the perspective had to be subject to the formal conditions of space and time.

1.2 The supreme principle of every perspective with respect to the understanding is that every manifold of the perspective is subject to conditions of the original, synthetic unity of apperception.*

1.3 All manifold representations of the perspective are subject to the first principle to the extent they are given to us; and to the second, to the extent they must be subject to connection in one consciousness; for without that nothing can be thought or recognized because the given representations would not share the act of apperception, the “I think”, and would not be grasped in a single self-consciousness by means of that.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Space and time and all their parts are perspectives, hence singular representations with a manifold which they contain within themselves (see the Transcendental Aesthetic), hence not merely concepts, whereby precisely the same consciousness which is contained in many representations is encountered, but rather whereby many representations are contained in one representation, along with their consciousness, thus as assembled, and so the unity of the consciousness is encountered as synthetic, but still as original.

1.2 This detail is important in application (See No. 25).

2.1 Speaking generally, the understanding is the capacity for recognitions.

2.2 These consist in the determined referral of given representations to an object.

2.3 But an object is that, in the concept of which the manifold of a given perspective is united.

2.4 But now every unification of representations requires unity of the consciousness in their synthesis.

2.5 Consequently, the unity of the consciousness is what constitutes the referral of the representations to an object, and uniquely so, hence their validity, and consequently that they become recognitions, and whereupon, finally, the
possibility of understanding depends.

3.1 The first, pure understanding recognition therefore whereupon its entire remaining usage depends and which at the same time is also independent of all conditions of the sensitive perspective, is the principle of the original, synthetic unity of apperception.

3.2 Hence the mere form of the external, sensitive perspective, space, is not yet a recognition; it only presents the manifold of the perspective a priori for a possible recognition.

3.3 But in order to recognize something in space, e.g., a line, I must draw it and thereby produce synthetically a determined connection of the given manifold such that the unity of this action is simultaneously the unity of the consciousness (in referral to a line) and only in that way will an object (a determined space) be recognized.

3.4 The synthetic unity of the consciousness therefore is an objective condition of all recognitions, not only which I need in order merely to recognize an object, but rather to which every perspective must be subject in order even to be an object for me, because in any other way and without this synthesis, the manifold would not be united in one consciousness.

4.1 This last sentence, as I indicated, is itself analytical, even though it makes synthetic unity a condition of all thinking; for all it really says is that all my representations in a given perspective must be subject to the condition, under which alone I can count them to the identical self as my representations and therefore can grasp them, as synthetically connected in one apperception, through the general expression, “I think.”

5.1 But nonetheless this principle is not a principle for every possible understanding but rather only for one, by means of the pure apperception of which no manifold at all is given in the representation, “I am.”

5.2 An understanding, through whose self-consciousness the manifold of a perspective were simultaneously given, an understanding, through whose representation the object of this representation simultaneously existed, would
have no need of a particular act of the synthesis of the manifold for the unity of the consciousness, an act which the human understanding, which merely thinks and does not look, very definitely needs.\textsuperscript{116}

5.3 But it is still unavoidably the first principle for the human understanding, so much so that we can in no way imagine any other, possible understanding, neither which itself looked, nor, if it possessed a sensitive perspective as a basis, then one which were different from that in space and time.

\textbf{#18. Objective Unity Of The Self-Consciousness}

1.1 The transcendental unity of the apperception is that whereby all of the manifold given in a perspective is united in a concept of the object.

1.2 For that reason it is called objective and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of the consciousness which is a determination of the internal sense whereby that manifold is given empirically to the perspective for such a connection.\textsuperscript{117}

1.3 Whether I can be empirically aware of the manifold as simultaneous or successive, for example, depends upon circumstances or empirical conditions.

1.4 Hence the empirical unity of the consciousness by means of the association of the representations, actually concerns an appearance and is entirely contingent.\textsuperscript{118}

1.5 In contrast, the pure form of the perspective in time, merely as a perspective in general which contains a manifold, is subject to the original unity of the consciousness and solely through the necessary referral of the manifold of

\textsuperscript{116} This may have reference to the last section of the Transcendental Aesthetic, No. 8, IV (beginning on or near page 69) where Kant speaks of a divine perspective.

\textsuperscript{117} The latter is the \textit{subjective} perception and the former (recognition) the \textit{objective}. In the case of the Slamming Door (Appendix II.3, beginning on or near page 809), for example, I was conscious of the manifold, i.e., of the elements of the manifold, before I finally achieved a unification. Until a unification (and thus a recognition of the object) I was conscious of the elements, but only in a rote fashion, but still in the expectation of an ultimate unification. The elements were together as a (subjectively) perceived manifold, but not at first as a recognition (as unified in an object, and also called an objective perception).

\textsuperscript{118} Here (I think) the association means the deliberate holding of as yet disjointed representations in mind in an effort to find an object which might unify their manifold.
the perspective to a single, “I think”; hence through the pure synthesis of the understanding which is the a priori basis of the empirical synthesis.

1.6 The original unity alone is objectively valid; the empirical unity of apperception, which we do not consider here and which is also merely derived from the former under given conditions in concreto, has only subjective validity.

1.7 One person joins the representation of a certain word with one thing, another with another; and the unity of the consciousness in what is empirical is not necessary and universally binding with respect to what is given.

#19. Logical Form of All Judgments Consists In the Objective Unity of the Apperception of the Concepts Contained in Them

1.1 I have never been satisfied with the logicians’ explanation of a judgment in general; it is, they say, the representation of a relationship between two concepts.

1.2 Now without quarreling with them here about the deficiency of this explanation (even though many disadvantageous consequences have arisen in logic as a result of this error,* that in any case it only applies to categorical judgments, and not to hypothetical nor disjunctive ones (the latter not even containing a relationship of concepts but rather of judgments), I only note that in this way it is not determined in what this relationship consists.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 The widespread doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns only the categorical syllogisms, and even though it is nothing more than an art of feigning the appearance of obtaining more conclusions than are in the first figure through the concealment of immediate consequences under the premises of a pure, rational syllogism, they would not ever have the least, particular fortune through that alone if it had not succeeded in presenting the categorical judgment in exclusive esteem as that upon which all others would have to be referred, but which is false according to paragraph No. 9.

2.1 But when I examine very carefully the relationship of given recognitions in every judgment and distinguish those relationships belonging to the understanding from those according to laws of the reproductive imagination
(which has only subjective validity), I find that a judgment is nothing other than the way of bringing given recognitions to the objective unity of the apperception.

2.2 It is to this end that the little coupler “is” is directed in them, i.e., to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective.

2.3 For this “is” denotes the reference of the judgment to the original apperception and its necessary unity, even if the judgment itself is empirical, hence contingent, e.g., bodies are heavy.

2.4 I do not mean, of course, that these representations belong necessarily to one another in the empirical perspective, but rather that they belong to one another in the synthesis of the perspective by means of the necessary unity of the apperception, i.e., according to principles of the objective determination of all representations, to the extent that a recognition can arise from that, which principles are all derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of the apperception.

2.5 From this alone does a judgment arise out of this relationship, i.e., a relationship which is objectively valid and which is sufficiently distinguished from the relationship of the very same representations which is valid only subjectively, e.g., according to the laws of association,

2.6 where, for example, I would only be able to say, “when I hold a body, I feel a pressure of heaviness,” but not, “it, the body, is heavy;” which indicates that these two representations are combined in the object, i.e., without regard to the state of the subject, and are not merely adjacent to one another in the perception (regardless of how often it might be repeated).

#20. All Sensitive Perspectives are Subject to the Categories as Conditions Under Which Alone their Manifold can Cohere in a Consciousness

1.1 The manifold in a given, sensitive perspective pertains necessarily to the original, synthetic unity of apperception because it is only by means of this

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119 Here laws of association would refer to the working of the associations a la Hume (See the A version of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, 2nd Section, 2, Appendix I.2 and beginning on or near page 713) and not the rule of association which is a means of the productive imagination as it seeks to find a manifold and order which will match a unification or synthesis in the apperception. I also think Kant means the holding together a manifold merely by rote in the subjective perception.
apperception that the unity of the perspective is possible (#17 above).

1.2 But the action of the understanding, through which the manifold of given representations (regardless of whether perspective or concept) are brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments (#19 above).

1.3 Hence every manifold, to the extent it is given in a single, empirical perspective, is determined with respect to one of the logical functions of judging, through which namely it is brought into a consciousness in general.

1.4 But now the categories are nothing except these very functions of judging to the extent the manifold of a given perspective is determined with respect to them (#10 above).

1.5 Thus the manifold in a given perspective is necessarily subject to the categories.

#21. Remark

1.1 A manifold which is contained in a perspective which I call my own is represented as pertaining to the necessary unity of self-consciousness by the synthesis of the understanding, and this occurs through the category.*

1.2 This indicates therefore that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold of a single perspective is as subject to a pure self-consciousness a priori as an empirical perspective is to a pure sensitive one, which is equally a priori.--

1.3 In the above sentence therefore the beginning of a deduction of the pure understanding concepts has been made where, since the categories arise only in the understanding and independently of the sensitive, I must abstract from the manner in which the manifold is presented for an empirical perspective, in order to focus on the unity which is added to the perspective by the understanding via the categories.

1.4 Later (#26) it will be shown from the manner of giving the empirical perspective in the sensitivity, that its unity is none other than that which the category prescribes to the manifold of a given perspective in general accord-
ing to the above (#20), and in this way, by explaining its validity a priori with respect to all objects of our senses, the intention of the deduction will be completed.

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 The basis of the proof of this is the represented unity of the perspective, through which an object is given, which always encompasses a synthesis of the manifold for a given perspective and already contains the referral of this to the unity of apperception.

2.1 But one thing I still could not eliminate in the above proof, namely that the manifold for the perspective would have to be given before the synthesis of the understanding and independently of that (although how this is accomplished remains undetermined at this point).

2.2 For if I wanted to conceive of an understanding which itself looked (like perchance a divine one, which did not represent given objects to itself, but rather through whose representation the objects themselves were simultaneously given or produced), then the categories would have no meaning at all with regard to such a recognition.

2.3 They are only rules for an understanding whose entire capacity consists in thinking, i.e., in the action of bringing the synthesis of the manifold, which has been given to it from elsewhere via the perspective, to the unity of apperception, which therefore recognizes nothing of itself, but rather only combines and orders the content for the recognition, i.e., the perspective, which must be given to it through the object.

2.4 But the peculiarity of our understanding, i.e., producing unity of apperception a priori only by means of the categories and only in this way and count, cannot be explained any more than why we have only these and no other functions of judging, or why time and space are the only forms of perspective possible to us.

22. The Category Serves no Other Purpose for the Recognition Of Things than its Application to Objects of Experience

1.1 Thinking an object therefore and recognizing an object are not at all the
same.

1.2 Two components are involved with a recognition: first the concept whereby in general an object is thought (the category), and secondly the perspective whereby it is given. Indeed if no perspective could be given to correspond to the concept, it would be a thought with regard to form, but without any object, and through it no recognition of any sort of thing would be possible at all because, as far as I would know, there would be nothing which could be given to which my thought could be applied.

1.3 Now since the only perspective possible for us is sensitive (per the Aesthetic), the thinking of an object in general through a pure concept of the understanding can become a recognition for us only to the extent that it is referred to objects of the senses.

1.4 Sensitive perspective is either a pure perspective (space and time) or an empirical perspective of something that is immediately represented through sensation as actual in space and time.

1.5 Through the determination of the first of these we can obtain recognitions a priori of objects (in mathematics), but only with respect to their form as appearances. And whether there be things which would have to be viewed in this form or not, is not yet determined.

1.6 Hence of itself no mathematical concept is a recognition; unless one assumes there are things which can only be perceived by us according to the form of that pure, sensitive perspective.

1.7 But things in space and time are given only to the extent that they are perceptions (representations accompanied by sensation), hence only through empirical representation.

1.8 Consequently, the pure concepts of the understanding, even when they are applied to perspectives a priori (as in mathematics), provide a recognition only to the extent that these and also therefore the concepts of the understanding by means of these, can be applied to empirical perspectives.

1.9 Hence the categories, by means of the perspective, also provide us with no recognition of things except by means of their possible application to empirical perspectives, i.e., they serve only for the possibility of empirical per-
But this is called experience.

Consequently, the categories have no other usage for the recognition of things except to the extent that these are taken as objects of possible experience.

The above statement is of the greatest importance; for it exactly determines the boundaries of the usage of pure concepts of understanding with respect to objects, even as the Transcendental Aesthetic determined the boundaries of the usage of the pure form of our sensitive perspective.

Space and time, as conditions of the possibility of the way that objects can be given to us, are not valid except for objects of the senses; accordingly then only for experience.

Beyond these boundaries they represent nothing at all; for they exist only in the senses and have no reality out beyond them.

The pure concepts of understanding are free of this restriction and reach out to objects of perspectives in general, regardless of whether they are ours or not, as long as they are sensitive and not intellectual.

But this widened expansion of the concepts out beyond our sensitive perspective avails us not a wit,

for then they are empty concepts of objects, concerning which we cannot utilize the former [space and time] to judge whether they are even possible or not. They are mere forms of thought without objective reality, because we have no perspective at hand to which the synthetic unity of apperception, which contains them alone, could be applied and by means of which they could then determine an object.

Our sensitive and empirical perspective alone can provide them with sense and meaning.
2.1 Therefore if we assume an object of a non-sensitive perspective as given, then we can, of course, represent it through all the predicates which are contained in that supposition, that nothing belonging to the sensitive perspective is suitable to it. We can say therefore that it is neither extended nor in space, that its continuation is not of time, that in it no alteration (succession of the determinations in time) is encountered, etc.\textsuperscript{120}

2.2 But when I merely indicate what the perspective of an object is not, without being able to say what \textit{is} contained in it, then I have not made an actual recognition. I have not represented the possibility of an object to my pure concept of understanding, because I have not been able to give any perspective which corresponds to it, but rather could only indicate how our perspective capacity is not valid for it.

2.3 But the most interesting aspect here is that to such a something not a single category could ever be applied, e.g., the concept of substance, i.e., of something which could exist as subject but never merely as a predicate; for I do not know at all whether there could be such a thing to correspond with this determination of thought were not empirical perspective available for an application of it.

2.4 But more of this later.

\textbf{#24. Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in General}

1.1 The pure concepts of understanding, through the sheer understanding, refer to objects of perspective in general, regardless of whether they are like ours or of another sort, as long as they are sensitive. But still for all that they are merely forms of thought through which still no determined object is recognized.

1.2 The synthesis or combination of the manifold in these objects was referred solely to the unity of the apperception, and in that way the basis of the possibility of recognitions, to the extent they depend upon the understanding, was a priori and, hence, not only transcendental but even entirely and purely

\textsuperscript{120} This reminds me of how some Hindus refer to God, namely he is not this and he is not that, i.e., pointing out everything in existence and declaring that it is not God.
But because a particular form of perspective a priori is fundamental for us, one which depends upon the receptivity of the representational capacity (sensitivity), the understanding, as spontaneity, can determine the inner sense through the manifold of given representations according to the synthetic unity of the apperception, and thus think synthetic unity of apperception to the manifold of the sensitive perspective a priori as the condition, to which all objects of our (human) perspective are necessarily subject. In that way then the category, as a mere form of thought, achieves objective reality, i.e., application to objects which can be given to us in a perspective, but only as appearances; for only of these are we a priori qualified for perspective.

This synthesis of the manifold of the sensitive perspective, which is a priori possible and necessary, can be termed figurative (synthesis speciosa) to distinguish it from that which would be thought with respect to the manifold of a perspective in general in the mere category and which is called a connection of the understanding (synthesis intellectualis). Both are transcendental, not merely because they precede a priori, but also because they establish the possibility of other recognitions a priori.

But the figurative synthesis, when directed solely to the original, synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., the transcendental unity which is thought in the category, must be called the transcendental synthesis of the imagination in order to distinguish it from the merely intellectual connection.

Imagination is the capacity of representing an object even without its presence in the perspective.

Now since all our perspective is sensitive, the imagination belongs to the sensitivity because of the subjective condition under which alone it can give the concept of the understanding a corresponding perspective. But to the extent its synthesis is an exercise of the spontaneity which is determining and not, like the senses, merely determinable, hence can determine a priori the form of the sense according of the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a capacity for determining the sensitivity a priori, and its syn-

121 Here we are considering not just the apperception as necessary and enabling for a connection, but realizing that it is entirely intellectual and that nothing sensitive is involved here.
thesis of the perspectives, conformable to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is an effect of the understanding on the sensitivity and the first exercise of that (and simultaneously the basis of all others) on objects of any perspectives possible to us.\textsuperscript{122}

3.4 As figurative it is distinguished from the intellectual synthesis merely through the understanding without any action of the imagination.

3.5 Now to the extent the imagination is spontaneity, I frequently call it the “productive imagination” to distinguish it from the “reproductive imagination” whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of association, and which therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of recognitions a priori. And for which reason it does not belong in the transcendental philosophy but rather in psychology.\textsuperscript{123}

* * *

4.1 Here now is the place to elucidate the paradox which must have been apparent to everyone at the exposition of the form of the inner sense (#6): namely how this represents ourselves to our own consciousness not as we are on our own, but rather only the way in which we appear to ourselves, since namely we see ourselves only as we are internally affected, which seems to be contradictory in that we would have to act on ourselves passively. It is for this reason that most scholars would rather identify the inner sense with the capacity of apperception in the systems of psychology (but which we carefully distinguish).

5.1 What determines the inner sense is the understanding and its original capacity for combining the manifold of the perspective, i.e., for subjecting it to an apperception (on which even the possibility of an understanding depends).

5.2 Now since the human understanding is not a perspective capacity, and therefore even though perspectives are given in the sensitivity, it still cannot ap-

\textsuperscript{122} And so our play with a perspective is not idle or random, but is directed by the categories of the understanding, namely to find a configuration of a manifold which matches a category and which fits in with the total unified apperception.

\textsuperscript{123} And so it is one thing to remember something, but another thing entirely to play with that memory and to configure and think the object in a certain way, a way designed to fit in with a unified apperception called experience.
prehend them within itself in order to connect the manifold of its own perspective, as it were, it follows that its synthesis, considered of and for itself alone, is nothing other than the unity of the action (of which it is conscious as such even without sensitivity, but) through which it is empowered to determine even the sensitivity internally with respect to the manifold, regardless of the form of its perspective in presenting it.

5.3 Under the denomination of a transcendental synthesis of the imagination therefore the understanding exercises that action on the passive subject, whose capacity it is, whereby we say quite properly that the inner sense is affected by that understanding.

5.4 The apperception, along with its synthetic unity, is so vastly different from the inner sense that it, as the source of all combination and under the name of the categories, is far rather applicable to the manifold of perspectives in general, and goes to objects in general before any sensitive perspective; The inner sense, on the other hand, contains the sheer form of the perspective, but without any combination of the manifold in it, hence no determined perspective whatsoever, which is only possible through the consciousness of its determination through the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding upon the inner sense), which I have termed the figurative synthesis.

6.1 This we perceive in us all the time.

6.2 We cannot even represent a line to ourselves without drawing it in thought, nor a circle without describing it, nor the three dimensions of space without placing three lines perpendicular to each other at a single point, nor even time itself without drawing a straight line (which is to be its outward, figurative representation) and being conscious merely of the action of the synthesis of the manifold by determining the inner sense successively and thereby attending to the succession of this determination in it.

6.3 Movement as an action of the subject (not as the determination of an object)* consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, if we abstract from this space and consider merely the action whereby we determine the inner sense according to its form, it is this movement that actually first pro-
duce the concept of succession.124

6.4 The understanding therefore does not perchance already find such a connec-
tion of the manifold in this inner sense, but rather produces it by affecting
the inner sense.

6.5 But how the I which thinks I, differs from the I which looks at itself (in that
we can imagine other ways of perspective as at least possible) and still be
identical with the latter as the same subject, therefore how I can say, “I, as
intelligence and thinking subject, recognize myself as a thought object, to
the extent I am additionally given in the perspective, but, like other phenom-
ena, not as I am for the understanding but rather only as I appear,” entails no
more and no less difficulty than how I can in general be an object to myself
and indeed of perspective and inner perception.

6.6 But that it really would have to be so can be established if we let space hold
as a mere form of the appearances of the external sense, where time, which
is not at all an object of external perspective, cannot be made representable
for us in any other way than through the picture of a line, to the extent we
draw it. And without this descriptive manner we could not at all recognize
the unity of its dimension, even as we likewise must always derive the de-
termination of the length of time or even the temporal positionings for all
internal perceptions from that which external things present as changeable.
Hence we must order the determinations of the internal sense as appearances
in time precisely in the same way that we order those of the external sense in
space. Hence, if we admit of the latter that we recognize objects only to the
extent that we are externally affected, we must also insist of the inner sense
that we even see ourselves only as we are inwardly affected by ourselves,
i.e., concerning the internal perspective, we recognize our own subject only
as appearance, but not according to what it is on its own.**

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Movement of an object in space does not belong in a pure science, and
hence not in geometry; because the capacity of something for movement
cannot be recognized a priori but rather only through experience.

1.2 But movement as a description of a space is a pure act of the successive syn-
thesis of the manifold in the external perspective in general through the pro-
ductive imagination and belongs not only in geometry, but indeed also to the
transcendental philosophy.

** Kant’s Footnote

1.1 I do not understand why people find so much difficulty about the inner sense
being affected by ourselves.

1.2 Every time we pay attention to something we have an example of this,

1.3 for then the understanding always determines the inner sense conformable to
the connection which it thinks to the inner perspective, which corresponds to
the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding.

1.4 How frequently the mind is affected in this way can be easily perceived
within each person.¹²⁵

#25.

1.1 On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of repre-
sentations in general, hence in the synthetic, original unity of apperception, I
am aware of myself not as I appear to myself nor as I am on my own, but
rather only that I am.

1.2 This representation is a thought, not a perspective.

1.3 Now in addition to the action of thinking whereby the manifold of every
possible perspective is brought to the unity of apperception, the recognition
of our own selves requires yet a determined manner of perspective by means
of which this manifold is given. It follows therefore that while my own exis-
tence is by no means appearance (much less an illusion), the determination
of my existence* can occur only according to the form of the inner sense and
in the way in which the manifold, which I combine, is given in the internal
perspective. Accordingly I have no recognition of myself as I am, but rather
merely as I appear to myself.

1.4 The consciousness of one’s self therefore is still very far indeed from a rec-
ognition of one’s self independently of all categories, which constitute the

¹²⁵ When we pay attention to something we affect the inner sense by distinguishing time (and the content
of that time) into an irrelevant and a relevant, and ignore the former and focus on the perspective in the
latter.
thinking of an object in general through connection of the manifold in an ap-

1.5 For a recognition of an object which is apart from me, in addition to the
thinking of an object in general (in the category), I need also a perspective
whereby I determine that general concept. Likewise for the recognition of
my own self, in addition to the consciousness, i.e., in addition to the thinking
of my own self, I also need a perspective of the manifold within me whereby
I determine this thought. And I exist as an intelligence which is conscious
solely of its capacity of connecting, but with respect to the manifold which is
to be combined, I am an intelligence that is subject to a limiting condition
which is termed the inner sense, making that connection only according to
relationships of time, which are located entirely apart from the actual con-
cepts of understanding and therefore this intelligence can recognize itself in
relationship to a perspective (which is not intellectual and cannot be given
through the understanding itself) still only as it appears to itself, but not as it
would recognize itself if its perspective were intellectual.

* Kant’s Footnote

1.1 The “I think” expresses the act of determining my existence.

1.2 By means of that therefore my existence is already given, but the manner of
determining it, i.e., the manner of locating within me the manifold belonging
to it, is not yet given by that.

1.3 In order to accomplish that, a self-perspective is needed, and that has an a
priori given form, i.e., time, as its foundation, which is sensitive and pertains
to the receptivity of the determinable.

1.4 Now if I do not yet have another self perspective giving the determining in
me, of whose spontaneity I am only conscious, just as much before the act
of the determining as time does the determinable, then I cannot determine
my existence as a self-active being. Rather I represent to myself only the
spontaneity of my thinking, i.e., of the determining, and my existence re-
 mains always only sensitively determinable, i.e., as the existence of an
appearance.126

1.5 But this spontaneity does enable me to call myself an intelligence.

126 So I discover, for example, that I like bacon and adventure films and this kind of music, etc., and all
this arises in time, and so I never recognize myself as a given thing, but always only as an appearance. I
cannot tell in advance that I will like or dislike some food, but require an exposure to discern my reaction.
#26. Transcendental Deduction of the Universally Possible Usage of the Pure Concepts of Understanding in Experience.

1.1 In the metaphysical deduction the origin of the categories a priori was described through their complete accord with the universal, logical functions of thinking. In the transcendental deduction this is accomplished through their possibility as recognitions a priori of objects of a perspective in general (#20, #21).

1.2 Now we are to explain the possibility of recognizing a priori through the categories any objects which might ever arise to perspective through our senses and indeed not with regard to the form of their perspective, but rather according to the laws of their connection; hence the assignment of laws to nature, as it were, and even making nature possible.

1.3 For without this it would not be clear how these categories would be suitable for subjecting everything which could come before our senses to laws which arise a priori from the understanding.

2.1 I note in advance that with “synthesis of the apprehension” I mean the assemblage of the manifold in an empirical perspective whereby perception, i.e., its empirical consciousness (as appearance), becomes possible.  

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3.1 With the representations of space and time we have forms of external and internal sensitive perspective a priori, and to these the synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold must always be conformable, because it is only by means of these forms that a manifold can arise.

3.2 But space and time are not only forms of sensitive perspective, they are also perspectives themselves (which contain a manifold), and hence are represented with the determination of the unity of this manifold within them a priori (see the Transcendental Aesthetic, beginning on or near page 45).*

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127 Thinking back to the A version of this deduction (Appendix I.2, beginning on or near page 710) I remember that the perception (Wahrnehmung = “careful-take”) requires paying attention and the reproductive imagination (on or near pages 712 & 713) in order to establish something called a fact. This is the subjective perception. When the manifold is tackled by the productive imagination and is assembled according to the rule of association (looking for connections) and this fits with the apperception (the unified consciousness with regard to all perceptions) then we have an objective perception, i.e., a recognition.
3.3 Therefore unity of the synthesis of the manifold apart from or within us and also therefore a connection to which everything which is to be represented as determined with regard to space or time must conform, is simultaneously given along with (though not in) these perspectives as a condition of the synthesis of every apprehension.  

3.4 This synthetic unity, however, can be none other than that of the connection of the manifold of a given perspective in general in an original consciousness conformable to the categories and merely applied to our sensitive perspective.

3.5 Consequently every synthesis, whereby perception is even possible, is subject to the categories. And since experience is recognition through connected perceptions, it follows that the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and are valid therefore a priori also of all objects of experience.

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 Space, considered as an object (as is actually required in geometry), contains more than the mere form of perspective. It also contains an assemblage of the manifold in a viewable representation according to the form of the sensitivity given, such that the form of the perspective renders merely a manifold, but formal perspective unity of the representation.

1.2 In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensitivity, but only in order to note that it preceded all concepts, even though it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong in the senses, but through which all concepts of space and time first became possible.

1.3 For since through this unity (the understanding determining the sensitivity) space and time are first given as perspectives, it follows that the unity of this perspective a priori belongs to space and time and not to the concepts of the understanding (#24).

* * *

4.1 If, therefore and for example, I turn the empirical perspective of a house into a perception through the apprehension of its manifold, then the necessary unity of space and of the external, sensitive perspective in general are the underlying foundation, and I draw, as it were, its shape conformable to this

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128 What is given in the perspectives of space and time are the infinitude of different spaces and times which are nothing but limitations of these two infinite singularities.
synthetic unity of the manifold in space.

4.2 But just this very synthetic unity, when I abstract from the form of space, has its seat in the understanding and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in a perspective in general, i.e., the category of quantity, to which therefore the synthesis of the apprehension, i.e., the perception, must be thoroughly conformable.129*

* Kant’s annotation:

1. In this way it is proven that the synthesis of the apprehension, which is empirical, would necessarily have to be conformable to the synthesis of the apprehension which is intellectual and is contained entirely in the category.

2. It is one and the same spontaneity which there under the name of the imagination and here under the name of the understanding produces connection in the manifold of the perspective.

5.1 If (in another example) I perceive the freezing of water, then I apprehend two states (the liquid and the solid) as such which stand in a relationship of time to each other.

5.2 But in the time, which I place as the basis to the appearance as the inner perspective, I represent the necessary, synthetic unity of the manifold, without which that relationship could not be given as determined (with respect to a temporal series) in a perspective.130

5.3 But now this synthetic unity, as a condition a priori under which I combine the manifold of a perspective in general, if I abstract from the continuing form of my internal perspective, time, is the category of cause which, when I apply it to my sensitivity, determines everything which occurs according to its relationships in time in general.

5.4 Hence the apprehension in such an event and therefore also the event itself,

129 With the perception of the house, we mean the accumulation of the multiplicity in anticipation of a recognition. And so even this perception (merely leading toward a recognition, and whether that is achieved to or not) requires the category.

130 By determined I do not yet mean a recognition of the relationship of cold to ice, but rather only (though of critical importance) of the relationship of ice and water. Thus it is this “second look” (perception, i.e., paying close attention) that I am speaking about and its possibility depends upon the category which binds through time, namely causation.
is subject to the concepts of the relationships of effects and causes with respect to a possible perception, and so on in all other cases.  

* * *

6.1 Categories are concepts which prescribe a priori laws to the appearances, hence to nature as the complex of all appearances (*natura materialiter spectata*). And now the question occurs: “since they are not derived from nature and do not order themselves according to the pattern of nature (because otherwise they would be merely empirical), how can we understand that nature would have to order itself according to them, i.e., how can they a priori determine the connection of the manifold of nature without deriving these from nature?”

6.2 Here is the answer to this riddle.

7.1 It is no more curious for the laws of appearances in nature to have to accord with the understanding and its a priori form, i.e., with its capacity for combing a manifold in general, than it is for the appearances themselves to have to agree with the a priori form of the sensitive perspective.

7.2 For laws do not exist in the appearances, but rather only relative to the subject in whom the appearances inhere, to the extent it has understanding; and in the same way that these appearances do not exist on their own, but rather only relative to the same being to the extent it has senses.

7.3 Things on their own would conform necessarily with their own laws even without an understanding to recognize them.

7.4 But appearances are only representations of things which are completely unknown with respect to what they might be on their own.

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131 Here again it is the category (of cause) which makes possible not only the recognition, but even the perception of an event, which can lead to an eventual recognition of it as an effect (although it might also not), i.e., the accumulation of the manifold, consisting of objects. In the case of the slamming door (see Technical Notes in the A version of the Transcendental Deduction, Appendix II.3, the perception of an event, that something had changed, came about when I carefully reopened and tried the door to make sure (See “Slamming Door” on or near page 809)). This experiment was made possible through the presupposition of universal connection of all appearances (and their reproducibility) and (in this case) via the concept of cause and effect. It is this awareness that something had happened which then prompts us to seek the cause, i.e., the actual connection.
7.5 As mere representations, however, they are subject to no laws of connection whatsoever except those which the connecting capacity prescribes.

7.6 Now what connects the manifold of the sensitive perspective is imagination, and this depends upon the understanding with regard to the unity of its intellectual synthesis and upon the sensitivity with regard to the manifold of the apprehension.

7.7 Now since all possible perceptions depend upon the synthesis of the apprehension, but it, this empirical synthesis, upon the transcendental synthesis, hence upon the categories, it follows that all possible perceptions, hence then also everything which can ever achieve to an empirical consciousness, i.e., all appearances of nature, are subject to the categories (with respect to their connection) on which nature (considered merely as nature in general) depends as the original basis of its necessary regularity (as *natura formaliter spectata*).\(^{132}\)

7.8 But the capacity for understanding achieves no further than to laws upon which is based a nature in general, as the regularity of the appearances in space and time, and not to the a priori prescription of laws to the appearances through the categories.

7.9 Particular laws, because they concern empirically determined appearances, cannot be completely derived from these categories, even though they all ultimately stand under them.

7.10 Experience is needed in order to become familiar with the latter; but concerning experience in general and that which can be recognized as its object, those laws alone render the instruction a priori.

### #27. Result of this Deduction of the Concepts of Understanding

1.1 We cannot think an object without categories. We can recognize no thought

\(^{132}\) The appearances are not things on their own but reside only in our brainariums (Appendix II.3, Notes on perspective & understanding, beginning on or near page 802). Thus they have no laws. We intervene in the tramp of the appearances and apprehend manifolds and achieve to subjective and then to objective perceptions by the productive imagination combining the manifolds into configurations which correspond to one of the categories. The subjective perception anticipates the connection and the objective perception achieves it. Here also we see the refutation of Hume’s complaint about the limitations of recognitions.
object except by a perspective which corresponds to those concepts.

1.2 Now all our perspectives are sensitive and this recognition, to the extent its object is given, is empirical.

1.3 But empirical recognition is experience.

1.4 Hence no recognition is possible for us a priori except solely of objects of a possible experience.*

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 In order that we not stumble too hastily on the feared, disadvantageous consequences of this proposition, I want only to remind everyone that the categories are not limited in thought by the conditions of our sensitive perspective, but rather are opened to an unlimited field, and only the recognition of what we think to ourselves, i.e., the determining of the object, has need of perspective. And at the lack of the latter, the thought of the object might happen always to be quite true and can have profitable consequences upon the usage of reason by the subject, but which, since it is not always aimed at the determination of the object, and hence not at a recognition, but rather at the subject and his wanting, has no appropriate place in the discussion just here.133

2.1 But this recognition, which is limited merely to objects of experience, is not for that reason entirely borrowed from experience, but rather, with regard to the pure perspective as well as the pure concept of understanding, there are elements of the recognition which are encountered a priori within us.

2.2 Now there are only two ways to think a necessary agreement between experience and the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible, or these concepts the experience.

2.3 The former does not take place with regard to the categories (nor with the pure, sensitive perspective); for they are concepts a priori, hence independent of experience (the assertion of an empirical origin would be a sort of generatio aequivoca).

133 This last sentence will have reference to the practical usage of reason, dealing with “the subject and his wanting.”
2.4 Hence there remains only the latter (a system, as it were, of the epigenesis of pure reason), namely that the categories contain the basis of the possibility of all experience in general from the side of the understanding.

2.5 But how they make experience possible, and which principles of its possibility they provide in their application on appearances, this the following section on the transcendental usage of the judgmental capacity will treat.

3.1 If someone wanted to find a middle way between the two solitary ones, namely they are neither self-thought, first principles a priori of our recognition nor derived from experience, but rather a subjective makeup for thinking which was instilled simultaneously with our existence, which had been so fashioned by our creator that their usage corresponded precisely with the laws of nature, according to which experience proceeded (a sort of preformation system of pure reason), then (apart from the fact that with such hypotheses there is no end to how far one might take the presupposition of predetermined makeup for future judgments) the fact that in such a case the categories would be devoid of the necessity which belongs essentially to their concept, could be decisive against such a middle way.\(^\text{134}\)

3.2 For, e.g., the notion of cause, which expresses the necessity of a succession under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only upon an arbitrarily instilled, subjective necessity of ours to combine certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relationships.

3.3 I would not be able to say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but rather only that I am so organized that I cannot think this representation otherwise than as so connected, which is precisely what the skeptic wishes most of all. For then all our insight through the alleged, objective validity of our judgment would be nothing but sheer illusion and there would be no lack of people who would not confirm this subjective necessity (which must be felt). But at least no one could argue with anyone concerning what depends merely on the way in which the subject is organized.

\(^{134}\) Here the reference will be to Leibniz and his harmonious coordination between the mind and the world.
Short Encapsulation of this Deduction

1.1 This is the description of the pure concepts of understanding (and with them also all theoretical recognitions a priori) as principles of the possibility of experience, but this latter as a determination of the appearances in space and time in general, and finally this from the principle of the original, synthetic unity of the apperception as the form of understanding with regard to space and time as the original forms of sensitivity.

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2.1 I consider the division of paragraphs to be necessary only this far because we were working with the elementary concepts.

2.2 Since we want to make their use representable, the presentation may now advance in continuous coherence without these divisions.
The Transcendental Analytic

Second Book. Analytic of the Principles

1.1 Universal logic is erected upon a foundation plan which coincides precisely with the division of the higher recognition capacities.

1.2 These are understanding, judgment and reason.

1.3 Accordingly this doctrine, in its analytic of concepts, judgments and conclusions, deals in precise conformity with the functions and order of those mental powers which we comprehend in the widespread nomenclature of the understanding.

2.1 Since the merely formal logic cited above abstracts from all content of the recognition (whether pure or empirical) and is occupied merely with the form of thinking in general (the discursive recognition), it can also include in its analytical part the canon for reason, the form of which has its sure prescription which, without drawing into consideration the particular nature of the recognition used by that, can be seen a priori through a mere dissection of the actions of reason into its moments.

3.1 The transcendental logic, on the other hand, since it is restricted to a determined content, namely just the pure recognitions a priori, cannot emulate the formal logic in this division.

3.2 For transcendental logic indicates that the transcendental use of reason is not objectively valid at all, and thus does not belong to the logic of truth, i.e., the analytic, but rather, as a logic of semblance, requires a particular part of the edifice of scholastic teaching under the name of transcendental dialectic.

4.1 Accordingly, understanding and judgment have their canon of objectively valid, thus true, usage in the transcendental logic and therefore belong in its analytical part.

4.2 But reason, in its attempts to make out something a priori about objects and to expand the recognition beyond the limits of possible experience, is wholly
dialectical, and its apparent assertions are not at all adaptable to a canon which the analytic is supposed to contain.

5.1 Accordingly, the analytic of the principles will be solely a canon for the judgment, and will instruct judgment in the application of the understanding concepts, which contain the conditions for rules a priori, to appearances.

5.2 For this reason, taking the actual principles of understanding as a theme, I will avail myself of the nomenclature of a doctrine of judgment, which designates this occupation more precisely.
Introduction. The Transcendental Judgment in General

1.1 If understanding in general is explained as the capacity for rules, judgment is the capacity for subsuming under rules, i.e., for distinguishing whether something stands under a rule (casus datae legis) or not.135

1.2 Universal logic contains utterly no proscriptions for the judgmental capacity, nor can it.

1.3 For since it abstracts from all content of the recognition, nothing remains except the occupation of analytically separating the mere form of the recognition into concepts, judgments and conclusions, and in that way producing formal rules of all usage of the understanding.

1.4 Now if it wanted to indicate universally how we were supposed to subsume under the rules, i.e., distinguish whether something might stand under a rule or not, this could not occur except again through a rule.

1.5 But this, for the very reason that it is a rule, requires instruction anew by the judgment and thus indicates that the understanding is capable indeed of instruction and preparation through rules, but that judgment is a particular talent which will not be instructed at all but rather only utilized.

1.6 This is that specific aspect of the so-called mother wit, the deficiency of which no education can remedy. For even though education can proffer and, as it were, implant in a restricted understanding sufficient rules borrowed from foreign insight, still the capacity of properly utilizing such rules must belong to the student himself. And no rule which we might prescribe to him in this regard is secure against misuse in the absence of such a natural gift.*

1.7 A doctor therefore a judge or a statesman can have in mind many good pathological, juridical or political rules, to the degree even that he can become a thorough teacher, and nonetheless will easily blunder in the application of these rules, either because he is naturally deficient in the capacity of judgment (though not in understanding) and can see indeed the universal in abstracto, but cannot distinguish whether a case in concreto belongs there, or else because he was not coached enough in this judgment through examples and actual dealings.

135 By means of the understanding we formulate rules, and via the judgment we apply these rules.
This is also the single and great use of examples, that they sharpen the capacity for making judgments.

For concerning the correctness and precision of understanding insight, examples far more frequently do injury to judgments because only seldom do they adequately fulfill the conditions of the rule. And often times they weaken the exertion of understanding to see rules in the universal according to their adequacy and independently from the particular circumstances of experience and hence, finally, they tend to be used more as formula than principles.

So examples are the crutches of judgment which he, who is deficient in the natural talent of judgment, can never dispense with.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Deficiency in judgment is actually what we term stupidity, and such an infirmity is beyond all remedy.

1.2 A truncated or limited mind, to which nothing is lacking except a requisite degree of understanding and the appropriate concepts pertaining to that, can be equipped well enough through education, even to the point of scholarship.

1.3 But since there usually remains a tendency for error with that (the secunda Petri), it is not uncommon to encounter well educated men who, in the use of their science, allow frequent glimpses of that deficiency which can never be improved.

But now even though the same, universal logic can give no proscriptions to the judgmental capacity, it is still a quite different matter with transcendental logic. In fact it seems that the actual occupation for the latter is directing and securing the capacity of judgment in the usage of the pure understanding through determined rules.

For to procure expansion for the understanding in the field of pure recognitions a priori, thus doctrine, it seems that philosophy is not at all necessary or, what is more, to be even ill suited, because after all previous attempts with that we still have made little or no progress. Rather philosophy, as critique, in order to prevent the missteps of the judgmental capacity (lapus ju-
dici) in the usage of the few pure understanding concepts which we have, is summoned to that with its entire acuteness and manner of testing (although the use is then only negative).

3.1 But the transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity: apart from the rule (or far rather apart from the universal condition for rules), which is given in the pure concepts of understanding, it can simultaneously indicate the case a priori to which they are to be applied.

3.2 The cause for this superiority which it has in this regard over all other instructional sciences (other than mathematics) lies in this: it deals with concepts which are supposed to refer a priori to objects. Thus its objective validity cannot be demonstrated a posteriori, for that would leave its dignity entirely unaffected, but rather it must set forth simultaneously the conditions under which objects can be given in agreement with those concepts in universal, but sufficiently discerning, characteristics, failing which they would be without any content, hence mere logical forms and not pure understanding concepts.

4.1 Now this transcendental doctrine of the judgment will contain two main parts: the first deals with the sensitive condition under which pure concepts of the understanding alone can be utilized, i.e., of the schematism of the pure understanding. The second deals with the synthetic judgments which arise a priori from those pure concepts of the understanding under these conditions, and which lies as basis to all other recognitions a priori, i.e., of the principles of the pure understanding.
The Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment (or the Analytic of the Principles)

1st Chapter. Schema of the Pure Understanding Concepts

1.1 With every subsumption of an object under a concept, the representation of the first must be homogeneous with the latter, i.e., the concept must contain what is represented in the object to be subsumed under it. For the expression, “an object is contained under a concept,” means exactly that.

1.2 Thus the empirical concept of a dinner plate has homogeneity with the pure geometrical concept of a circle in that the roundness which is thought in the plate permits of perspective in the circle.

2.1 But now pure understanding concepts, in comparison with empirical (even generally in sensitive) perspectives, are entirely heterogeneous and can never be met with in any sort of perspective.

2.2 How then is the subsumption of the perspective under these concepts possible, thus how can the category be applied to appearances? For still no one will say, “this”, e.g., causality, “can also be looked at through the senses and be contained in the appearance.”

2.3 Now this so natural and compelling question is actually the reason making a transcendental doctrine of the capacity of judgment necessary; namely to show the possibility of how pure understanding concepts can be applied to appearances in general.

2.4 In all other sciences, where the concepts, through which the object is universally thought, are not so distinct and heterogeneous from those which represent this object in concreto as it is given, it is unnecessary to give a particular explication on behalf of the application of the concept to the object.

3.1 Now it is clear that there would have to be a third something which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one side and with the appearance on the other, and which enables the former to be applied to the latter.

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136 These schemata strike me as being instructions (of the understanding) to the productive imagination both in apprehending the empirical perspective and in looking to arrange the objects of experience in terms of possible connections.
3.2 This transmitting representation must be pure (without any empirical element) and still intellectual on the one hand and sensitive on the other.

3.3 Such a representation is the transcendental schema.

4.1 The understanding concept contains the pure and synthetic unity of a manifold in general.

4.2 Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, and thus of the connection of all representations, contains a manifold a priori in the pure perspective.

4.3 Now a transcendental time determination is homogeneous with the category (which makes up the unity of that determination to the extent it is universal and is based a priori on a rule).

4.4 But, on the other hand, it is also homogeneous with the appearance to the extent that time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold.

4.5 Thus an application of the category to appearances will be possible by means of the transcendental time determination which, as the schema of the understanding concept, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category.

5.1 Hopefully, after what was shown in the deduction of the categories, no one will be in doubt in deciding the question about whether these pure understanding concepts be of merely empirical or also of transcendental usage, i.e., whether they, as conditions of a possible experience, refer a priori to appearances alone, or whether they, as conditions of the possibility of things in general, are extended out to objects on their own (without any restriction to our sensitivity).

5.2 For in that deduction we saw that concepts are entirely impossible and can have no meaning at all where an object is not given either to themselves or at least to the elements of which they consist. Accordingly they cannot go to things on their own at all (without regard to whether and how such things might be given to us). Furthermore the only way that objects are given to us
is the modification of our sensitivity. And finally, the pure concepts a priori, apart from the function of the understanding in the category, must still contain a priori the formal conditions of sensitivity (namely of the inner sense), which contain the universal conditions under which alone the category can be applied to any kind of object.

5.3 This formal and pure condition of sensitivity, to which the understanding concept is restrained in its use, we want to term the schema of this understanding concept, and the proceeding of the understanding with these schemati, the schematism of the pure understanding.

6.1 On its own the schema is always only a product of the imagination. But since the synthesis of the imagination has no individual perspective as its intention, but rather solely the unity in the determination of the sensitivity, the schema is still to be distinguished from the image.

6.2 Thus if I set five points after one another like this . . . .” then this is an image of the number five.

6.3 On the other hand, if I only think a number in general, be it five or a hundred, then this thinking is more the representation of a method for representing an amount (e.g., a thousand) in an image than this image itself; for in this case, i.e., the amount of a thousand, I would hardly be able to glance over such an image and compare it with the concept.

6.4 Now this representation of a universal procedure of the imagination for procuring the image for a concept I term the schema to this concept.

7.1 In fact it is not at all images of objects that lie as the basis to our pure sensitive concept, but rather schemata.

7.2 To the concept of triangle in general, no image at all would ever be adequate.

7.3 For it would not attain to the universality of the concept which makes this hold for every triangle, right angled, acute angled, etc., but rather always would be restricted to only a part of this sphere of possible triangles.
7.4 The schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere except in thought and means a rule for the synthesis of the imagination with respect to pure shapes in space.\textsuperscript{137}

7.5 Yet far less does an image of an object of experience ever attain the empirical concept. Rather this concept always refers immediately to the schema of imagination as a rule for the determination of our perspective conformable to a certain universal concept.

7.6 The concept of dog means a rule according to which my imagination can universally specify the shape of a four-footed animal without being restricted to any single particular shape which experience offers me, or also to every possible image which I present in concreto.

7.7 This schematism of our understanding, with respect to the appearances and their mere form, is a concealed art in the depths of the human soul, whose true handle we will hardly ever divine of nature and lay uncovered before our eyes.

7.8 This much only can we say: the image is a product of the empirical capacity of the productive imagination, the schema of sensitive concepts (like figures in space) a product and, as it were, a monogram of the pure imagination a priori, through which and according to which the images first are possible, but which must always be connected with the concept only by means of the schema which they denote, and on their own do not entirely coincide with them.

7.9 In contrast the schema of a pure understanding concept is something which can be brought into no image at all, but rather is only the pure synthesis conformable to a rule of unity according to concepts in general which the category expresses. It is a transcendental product of the imagination which concerns the determination of the inner sense in general according to conditions of its form (time) with respect to all representations to the extent these were supposed to cohere a priori with concepts conformable to the unity of apperception.

\textsuperscript{137} The schema of a triangle might be expressed in this way: a triangle consists of three straight lines, each endpoint of each being an endpoint of two (and a point of only two [avoiding having a divided straight line count as three lines]). With this rule we can now provide images for any number of triangles.
8.1 Now without taking time with a dry and monotonous dissection of what is required for the transcendental schemata of pure understanding concepts in general, we want rather to present them according to the order of the categories and in connection with these.

9.1 The pure image of every dimension (quantorum) for the outward sense is space; but of every object of the sense in general, time.

9.2 The schema of magnitude (quantitatis), as a concept of understanding, is number, which is a representation which embraces the successive addition of one to one (homogeneities).

9.3 Number therefore is nothing other than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous perspective in general through my generating time itself in the apprehension of the perspective.

10.1 Reality is that in the pure understanding concept which corresponds to a sensation in general. Therefore it is that the concept of which on its own indicates a being (in time).

10.2 Negation is that the concept of which represents a not-being (in time).

10.3 Therefore the opposition of both occurs in the distinction of the same time, as a filled or empty time.

10.4 Since time is only the form of the perspective, thus of objects as appearances, then that which matches sensation in these is the transcendental material of all objects as things on their own (factuality, reality).

10.5 Now every sensation has a degree or magnitude according to which it can more or less fill this same time, i.e., the inward sense with respect to the same representation of an object, until it ends in nothing (= 0 = negatio).  

10.6 Hence from reality to negation is a relationship and cohesion, or rather a bridge, which makes that reality representable as a quantum. And the schema

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138 Upon a given intensity of red in a space, for example, I can imagine it more (or less) intensive, thus more (or less) filling in the same moment of time. The same would hold of a sound, becoming louder or softer.
of a reality, as the quantity of something to the extent it fills time, is precisely this continuous and uniform generation of that in time by our descending in time from the sensation, which has a certain degree, down to the vanishing of that, or gradually ascending from the negation to its magnitude.

11.1 The schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, i.e., the representation of it as a substratum of the empirical time determination in general which therefore remains while everything else changes.

11.2 (Time does not pass, but rather in it passes the existence of the mutable.

11.3 To time therefore which itself is immutable and abiding, there corresponds in the appearance that immutability in the existence, i.e., substance, and merely by it can the succession and the simultaneity of appearances be determined according to time).

12.1 The schema of cause and of the causality of a thing in general is that real upon which, if it is arbitrarily granted, something else always follows.

12.2 It consists therefore in the succession of the manifold to the extent this succession is subjected to a rule.

13.1 The schema of communality (mutual effect), or the reciprocal causality of substances with respect to their accidents, is the simultaneity of the determinations of the one with those of the others according to a rule.

14.1 The schema of possibility is the harmony of the synthesis of various representations with the conditions of time in general (e.g., where contraries cannot be in a thing simultaneously, but rather only successively). Therefore it is the determination of the representation of a thing at any time.

15.1 The schema of actuality is the existence in a determined time.

16.1 The schema of necessity is the existence of an object at all times.
17.1 Now we see from all this that the schema of every single category, like that of magnitude, contains and makes representable the generation (synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object; the schema of quality, the synthesis of sensation (perception) with the representation of time or the filling of time; that of the relationships the relationship of the perceptions among one another in all time (i.e., according to a rule of time-determination); finally the modality and its categories, time itself as the correlate of the determination of an object, whether and how it belongs to time.

17.2 Thus the schemata are nothing but time determinations a priori according to rules. And according to the order of the categories these go to the time series, time content, time order, finally the time concept with respect to all possible objects.

18.1 Now it is clear from this that the schematism of the understanding through the transcendental synthesis of the imagination comes to nothing else than the unity of all the manifold of the perspective in the inward sense, and thus indirectly to the unity of apperception as the function which corresponds to the inward sense (a receptivity).

18.2 The schemata of pure understanding concepts therefore are the true and only conditions for procuring a referral, thus meaning, to objects for these categories. And thus ultimately the categories are of no other use except a possible empirical one, in that they serve merely to subject appearances to general rules of synthesis through foundations of an a priori, necessary unity (due to the necessary union of every consciousness in an original apperception) and in that way to make them suitable for a thorough connection in one experience.

19.1 But in the whole of all possible experience do all our recognitions lie, and in the universal referral to this does the transcendental truth consist, which precedes before every empirical truth and makes it possible.

20.1 But it also quite evident that although the schemata of the sensitivity make the categories real in the first place, they still also nonetheless restrain them,
i.e., restrict them to conditions which lie outside of understanding (namely in sensitivity).

20.2 Hence the schema is actually only the phenomenon or the sensitive concept of an object in agreement with the category (*numerus est quantitas phaenomenon, sensation realitas phaenomenon, constans et perdurabile rerum substantia phaenomenon, aeternitas, necessitas phaenomena*, etc.).

20.3 Now if we remove a restricting condition, then we amplify, as it would seem, the previously limited concept. Accordingly the categories in their pure meaning were supposed to hold without any conditions of sensitivity for all things in general as they are, instead of their schemata only representing them as they appear and therefore to have meaning independently of all schemata and extended much further.

20.4 Actually in every case, even after the isolation of every sensitive condition, there remains a meaning to the pure understanding concepts, but only a logical meaning of the mere unity of representations, but to which no object, thus also no meaning, is given which would render a concept of an object.

20.5 Thus, for example, substance, if we left out the sensitive condition of the persistence, would mean nothing further than a something which can be thought as subject (without being a predicate of something else).

20.6 Now I can make nothing out of this representation, in that it does not at all indicate to me what determination the thing has which is supposed to hold for such a first subject.

20.7 Without schemata therefore the categories are only functions of the understanding in concepts, but represent no object.

20.8 This meaning comes to them from sensitivity which makes the understanding real by simultaneously restricting it.
The Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment (or the Analytic of the Principles)

2nd Chapter. System of All Principles of Pure Understanding

1.1 In the preceding chapter we considered the transcendental judgment only according to the general conditions under which alone it is empowered to use the pure understanding concepts for synthetical judgments.

1.2 Our task now is to present the judgments, which the understanding per this critical caution actually brings forth a priori, in systematic connection, for which, without doubt, our table of the categories must give the natural and sure guidance.

1.3 For these are precisely that, the referral of which to every possible experience must constitute all pure understanding recognitions. Accordingly then the relationship of these to sensitivity in general will describe every transcendental principle of the understanding usage completely and in one system.

2.1 Principles a priori bear this name not merely because they contain in themselves the basis of other judgments, but also because they themselves are not enabled in higher and more universal recognitions.

2.2 This property, however, does not relieve them of proof.

2.3 For although this could not be conducted further objectively, but rather lies as the foundation to all recognition of objects, still this does not hinder the procurement of a proof from the subjective sources of the possibility of a recognition of the object in general being possible, indeed even necessary, because otherwise and nonetheless the proposition would bring on itself the greatest suspicion of a merely surreptitious assertion.

3.1 Secondly, we will restrict ourselves merely to those principles which refer to the categories.

3.2 The principles of the transcendental aesthetic therefore according to which space and time are the conditions of the possibility of all things as appearances, likewise the restriction of these principles, namely that they cannot be
referred to things on their own, do not belong in this contrasted field of examination.

3.3 Likewise the mathematical principles make up no part of this system, because they are only drawn out of the perspective, and not out of the pure understanding concepts. Still their possibility, because they are nonetheless synthetic judgments a priori, will necessarily find a place here, indeed not in order to prove their correctness and indubitable certainty, but rather only to make comprehensible and deduce the possibility of such evident recognitions a priori.

4.1 But we will also have to speak of the principle of analytical judgments, and this indeed in contrast with that of the synthetical judgments (with which we are actually occupied) because just this juxtaposition frees the theory of the latter from all misunderstanding and lays it distinctly before us in its peculiar nature.
The System of the Principles of Pure Understanding

1st Section. Highest Principle of All Analytical Judgments

1.1 Regardless of what the content our recognition may be and how it may refer to the object, still the universal, although only negative, condition of all of our judgments in general is that they do not contradict themselves, in which case these judgments would be nothing on their own (even without regard to the object).

1.2 But even if there is no contradiction in our judgment, it can still join concepts in a way that the object does not warrant, or also without a basis being given either a priori or a posteriori which would justify such a judgment, and so even if a judgment is free of every inner contradiction, it still can be either false or without any foundation.

2.1 Now the proposition, “no object obtains a predicate which contradicts it,” is called the proposition of contradiction, and it is a universal, though merely negative, criterion of every truth. But it also for that reason belongs merely to logic because it holds for recognitions merely as recognitions in general regardless of their content, and says that the contradiction entirely destroys and invalidates them.

3.1 But we can still also make a positive use of them, i.e., not merely to banish falsity and error (to the extent that rests on contradiction), but also to recognize truth.

3.2 For if the judgment is analytical, be it either denying or affirming, its truth must always be able to be sufficiently recognized according to the proposition of contradiction.

3.3 For the contrary is properly denied of what already lies in the concept and is thought in the recognition of the object, but the concept itself must be affirmed of it necessarily, because its opposite would contradict the object.

4.1 Accordingly we must allow the proposition of contradiction to hold as the universal and entirely sufficient principle of all analytical recognitions. But
then also its esteem and utility do not go further than a sufficient criterion of truth.

4.2 For that no recognition at all can oppose it without destroying itself, that makes this proposition the *conditio sine qua non* indeed, but not the determination basis of the truth of our recognition.

4.3 Since presently we actually have to deal only with the synthetical part of our recognition, we will indeed always be mindful never to act in opposition to this inviolable principle, but we can never expect a disclosure from it with respect of the truth of the same sort of recognition.

5.1 But there is still a formulation of this famous proposition, though merely formal and deprived of all content, which contains a synthesis which is mixed in it from a lack of care and in an entirely unnecessary way.

5.2 It goes so: “it is impossible for something to be and not be simultaneously.”

5.3 Aside from having affixed here the indubitable certainty (through the word “impossible”) superfluously, which still must permit of understanding of itself from the proposition, it is still affected by the condition of time and says, as it were, “a thing = A, which is something = B, cannot be not-B at the same time, but it can very well be both (B as well as not-B) in succession.”

5.4 E.g., a person who is young, cannot simultaneously be old, but just this same person can very well be young at one time and not young, i.e., old, at another

5.5 Now the proposition of contradiction, as a merely logical principle, must not at all restrict its utterances to time relationships, thus such a formulation (as above) is quite contrary to the intention of this.

5.6 The misunderstanding comes merely in this way: we first isolate a predicate of a thing from its concept and afterwards connect its opposite with this predicate, which never renders a contradiction with the object, but rather only with its predicate which is synthetically joined with it, and indeed only then, if the first and second predicate are granted at the same time.
5.7 If I say, “a person who is ignorant, is not learned,” then the condition “simultaneously” must stand with it, for he who is ignorant at one time can very well be learned at another.

5.8 But if I say, “no ignorant person is learned,” then the proposition is analytical because the mark (of uneducated) then comes along in making up the concept of the subject, and then the denying proposition appears directly from the proposition of contradiction without the condition, “simultaneously” having to be appended.

5.9 This then is also the reason why I have so altered the formulation of it above, that the nature of an analytical proposition is distinctly expressed in that way.
The System of the Principles of Pure Understanding

2nd Section. Supreme Principles of All Synthetical Judgments

1.1 The explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgments is a task with which general logic has nothing whatsoever to do. In fact it is not even permitted to be familiar with the name.

1.2 But in a transcendental logic it is the most important business of all and, in fact, the only one if the discussion is of the possibility of synthetical judgments a priori as well as of the conditions and the scope of their validity.

1.3 For after the accomplishment of such judgments, it can be perfectly adequate for its goal, namely to determine the scope and limits of pure understanding.

2.1 In the analytical judgment I remain with the given concept in order to make something out of it.

2.2 If it is supposed to be affirming, then I attribute to the concept only that which was already thought in it. If it is supposed to be denying, then I only exclude from it its opposite.

2.3 But in synthetical judgments I am supposed to go from the given concept in order to consider it in relationship with something entirely different than was thought in it, which accordingly is never either a relationship of identity or of contradiction and where neither truth nor error can be viewed in the judgment on its own.

3.1 Granted therefore that we would have to go out from a given concept to compare it with another synthetically, then a third something is necessary by means of which alone the synthesis of both concepts can arise.

3.2 But now what is this third something as the medium of all synthetical judgments?

3.3 It is only an embodiment [Inbegriff] in which all our representations are contained, namely the inward sense and its a priori form, time.
3.4 The synthesis of representations is based on the capacity of imagination, but the synthetical unity of the representations (which is required for the judgment) is based on the unity of the apperception.

3.5 In this therefore we are to seek the possibility of synthetical judgments and, since all three contain the sources of representations a priori, also the possibility of pure synthetical judgments. Indeed, from these foundations they will even be necessary if a recognition of objects is suppose to arise which is based entirely on the synthesis of the representations.

4.1 If a recognition is supposed to have objective reality, i.e., refer to an object, and to have meaning and sense in that, then there must be some way for the object to be given.

4.2 Without that the concepts are empty and we have thought by means of them, of course, but in fact have recognized nothing through this thinking, and have rather merely played with representations.

4.3 The provision of an object, if this in turn is not supposed to have meant immediately, but rather to present an object immediately in perspective, is nothing other than the referral of its representations to experience (be it actual or still possible).

4.4 Even space and time, as pure as these concepts are from everything empirical and as certain as it also is that they are represented completely a priori in the mind, would be without objective validity and even sense and meaning if their necessary use on objects of experience were not shown. Indeed their representation is a mere schema which refers always to the reproductive imagination which calls up the objects of experience without which they would have no meaning; and it is the same with all concepts without distinction.

5.1 It is therefore the possibility of experience that provides all our recognitions a priori with objective reality.

5.2 Now experience rests on the synthetical unity of the appearances, i.e., on a synthesis according to concepts of objects of experience in general, without
which it would not even be a recognition but only a rhapsody of perceptions. These would not fit together in any context according to rules of a thoroughly connected (possible) consciousness, thus also not for the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception.139

5.3 Experience therefore has principles of its form lying a priori as the basis, namely universal rules of the unity of the synthesis of appearances, whose objective reality, as necessary conditions, and indeed even their possibility can always be shown in experience.

5.4 But apart from this referral, synthetical propositions a priori are entirely impossible, because they don’t have that third something, namely an object, on which the synthetical unity of its concepts could demonstrate objective reality.

6.1 Thus even though we recognize so much a priori in synthetical judgments of space in general, or of the shapes which the productive imagination registers in it, and while in addition to this actuality we have need of no experience at all; nevertheless this recognition would be nothing at all, but rather an occupation with a mere figment of our imagination if space were not to be viewed as the condition of appearances which make up the material for external experience. Accordingly the pure synthetical judgments refer to possible experience, though indeed only mediately, or far rather to this even with respect to its possibility, and upon this alone the objective validity of their synthesis is based.

7.1 Since experience therefore and as an empirical synthesis, is in its possibility the only recognitional manner which gives reality to every other synthesis; even so, as recognition a priori, this also only has truth (agreement with the object) by containing nothing further than what is necessary for the synthetical unity of experience in general.

8.1 Therefore the highest principle of every synthetical judgment is this: each and every object stands under the necessary conditions of the synthetical unity of the manifold of the perspective in a possible experience.

139 This harkens back to TDA, 2nd Section, 4. (see Appendix I.2, beginning on or near page 715) and how the perceptions must all cohere in a single experience. See also this blog on perceptions and the affinity.
9.1 In such way synthetical judgments a priori are possible if we refer the formal conditions of the perspective a priori, the synthesis of the imagination and the necessary unity of that in a transcendental apperception to a possible experiential recognition in general and say that the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are simultaneously conditions of the possibility of objects of experience and therefore have objective validity in a synthetical judgment a priori.
The System of the Principles of Pure Understanding

3rd Section. Systematic Representation of All Synthetical Principles of the Pure Understanding

1.1 That principles even occur at all is to be ascribed solely to the pure understanding. For this is not only the capacity of rules with respect to what happens, but even the source of principles according to which everything (which can only come forth to us as an object) stands necessarily under rules, because without that a recognition of an object corresponding to appearances could never befit them.

1.2 Even laws of nature, if they are considered as principles of the usage of the empirical understanding, entail simultaneously an expression of necessity, thus at least the presumption of a determination from foundations which are valid a priori and before all experience.

1.3 But all laws of nature, without distinction, stand under higher principles of the understanding, in that these principles apply the former to the particular cases of the appearance.

1.4 These alone therefore render the concept which contains the condition and the exponent, as it were, to a rule in general, but experience gives the case which stands under the rule.

2.1 There can actually be no danger at all of considering merely empirical principles as principles of pure understanding or also vice-verse, for the necessity according to concepts, which denotes the latter, and the lack of which being easily perceived in every empirical proposition, even as universally as it may be, can easily prevent this confusion.

2.2 But there are pure principles a priori which, nevertheless, I still do not want to actually attribute to the pure understanding because they are not drawn from pure concepts, but rather from pure perspectives (though by means of the understanding); but understanding is the capacity for concepts.

2.3 Mathematics has such, but then its application to experience, thus its objective validity, indeed the very possibility of such synthetical recognitions a priori (their deduction), still always depends upon the pure understanding.
3.1 Accordingly I will not count among my principles those of mathematics, though indeed those on which mathematics bases a priori its possibility and objective validity. Hence they are to be considered as the principle of these principles, and they issue from concepts to perspectives, but not from perspectives to concepts.\(^{140}\)

4.1 In the application of the pure understanding concepts to possible experience, the use of their synthesis is either mathematical or dynamical. For the synthesis goes partly just to the perspective, and partly to the existence of an appearance in general.

4.2 But the conditions a priori of the perspective with respect to a possible experience are thoroughly necessary, while those of the existence of objects of a possible empirical perspective on their own are only contingent.

4.3 Accordingly the principles of mathematical usage will sound unconditionally necessary, i.e., apodictical. And those of the dynamical usage will also entail the character of a necessity a priori, but only under the condition of the empirical thinking in an experience, thus only mediately and indirectly, consequently they will not contain that immediate evidence which is peculiar to mathematics (though their certitude referred universally to experience remains unimpaired).

4.4 But this can be better evaluated at the conclusion of this system of principles.

5.1 The table of the categories gives us the quite natural direction to the table of the principles because these latter are still nothing other than rules for the objective usage of the former.

5.2 Accordingly all principles of the pure understanding are:

\(^{140}\) These principles might be considered as instructions to the imagination for the implementation or application of the categories.
6.1 These denominations I have chosen very carefully in order not to overlook the differences with respect to the evidence and execution of these principles.

6.2 But it will soon be seen that, concerning the evidence as well as the a priori determination of appearances with respect to the categories of magnitude and quality (if we attend merely to the form of the latter), the principles of these are considerably distinguished from the two remaining ones in that the former are capable of an intuitive, but the later merely of a discursive, though in both case of a complete, certitude.

6.3 Hence the former I will term the mathematical principles and the latter the dynamical.*

6.4 It is to be noted here that I have in mind no more the principles of mathematics in the one case than the principles of the general (physical) dynamics in the other, but rather only those of the pure understanding in relationship to inner sense (without distinction of the representations given in that) through which then the former altogether obtain their possibility.

6.5 Accordingly I name them more in consideration of their application than their content. We go now to their consideration in the order of their representation in the table.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 All conjunction (conjunctio) is either assemblage (compositio) or connection (nexus).

1.2 The first is the synthesis of the manifold which does not belong necessarily together where, e.g., the two triangles arising when a rectangle is divided by
the diagonal do not belong to one another necessarily on their own, and of this sort is the synthesis of the homogeneous in everything which can be considered mathematically (which synthesis can in turn be divided into the aggregation and the collation, whereof the first is directed to extensive, the other to intensive, magnitudes).

1.3 The second, connection [Verbindung] (nexus), is the synthesis of the manifold to the extent it belongs necessarily together, as where, e.g., the accident to some sort of substance, or the effect to the cause—thus also even though non-homogeneous, it is still represented as joined a priori, which connection, because it is not arbitrary, I call dynamical, because it concerns the connection of the existence of the manifold (which in turn can be divided into the physical connection of the appearances among one another and the metaphysical connection in the recognition capacity a priori).
1. Axioms of Perspective

1.1 Their principle is this: all perspectives are extensive magnitudes.

Proof

2.1 With respect to form, all appearances contain a perspective in space and time which lies a priori to them all together as their foundation.\\(^{141}\)

2.2 Therefore they cannot be apprehended, i.e., taken up into an empirical consciousness, in any other way except through the synthesis of the manifold whereby representations of a determined space or time are generated,\\(^{142}\) i.e., through the assemblage of the homogeneous and the consciousness of the synthetical unity of this manifold (homogeneous).

2.3 Now the consciousness of the manifold homogeneous in the perspective in general, to the extent the representation of an object is first possible in that way, is the concept of magnitude (\textit{quantit}i).

2.4 Thus even the perception of an object as appearance is possible only through the same synthetical unity of the manifold of the given sensitive perspective whereby the unity of the assemblage of the manifold homogeneous is thought in the concept of a magnitude, i.e., because as perspectives in space or time they must be represented through the same synthesis whereby space and time in general are determined.

3.1 I call a magnitude extensive where the representation of the parts makes possible the representation of the whole (and therefore necessarily precedes this).\\(^{143}\)

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\\(^{141}\) Form as opposed to content or material (= sensation) which is treated in the next section. Thus I see the manifold as a contingent unity in the unity of space, i.e., there is a uniform filling of contiguous space.

\\(^{142}\) If I am going to perceive these shapes, then I must do so successively precisely as I do any pure pantomimic, e.g., a circle or triangle traced out in midair. Here we do not need to think that Kant is speaking of time and space as objects on their own, as rather more the objects which can be traced out in that space and time.

\\(^{143}\) It is impossible for the parts to make possible the representation of the whole of an infinite given, as space and time are described in the Aesthetic: 1st Section 2., par 5, and 2nd Section 4, par 5, for the parts of both are only limitations of the wholes.
3.2 I can represent no line to myself, no matter how small, without drawing it in thought, i.e., gradually generating all parts from one point, and in this way first recording this perspective.

3.3 It is the same with every time, even the smallest.

3.4 With this I think to myself only the successive advance from one instance to the other whereby, through all time parts and their accumulation, a determined time magnitude is finally generated.

3.5 Since the mere perspective with all appearances is either space or time, every appearance, as perspective, is an extensive magnitude in that it can be recognized in the apprehension only through a successive synthesis (from part to part).

3.6 Accordingly all appearances are already looked upon as aggregates (groups of parts given in advance),\textsuperscript{144} which is not the case with just every kind of magnitude, but rather only with what is represented and apprehended extensively as such.\textsuperscript{145}

4.1 Upon this successive synthesis of the productive imagination in the generation of shapes, the mathematics of extension (geometry) is based, along with its axioms which express the conditions of sensitive perspective a priori under which alone the schema of a pure concept of outward appearances can arise, e.g., between two points only one straight line is possible; two straight lines encompass no space, etc.

4.2 These are axioms which actually concern only quantities (\textit{quanta}) as such.

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\textsuperscript{144} Here we are speaking merely of the prompt to an investigation, and not to the recognition itself, although, of course, any recognition will be dependent upon this prompt and the ensuring perception (of an appearance) or pure sighting (of a pantomimic)

\textsuperscript{145} Here “already looked upon” suggests the apprehension which precedes perception and makes it possible, i.e., the presupposition (affinity of all appearances) of some sort of connection. And so, when we go out to undertake the careful, perceptive look to discern the object, we do so under the presupposition of extensive magnitude. This is interesting, this “already looked upon as aggregates”, for it implies that this is not a determination which is made but only an advance assumption. I find this interesting with regard to the forthcoming Anticipations and First Analogy, that they are also so understood, respectively.
5.1 But concerning magnitude (*quantitas*), i.e., the answer to the question as to how big something is, and even though several of these propositions are synthetical and immediately certain (*indemonstrabilia*), still with respect to this there are accordingly no axioms in the actual understanding.

5.2 For that equals added to equals or subtracted from equals, renders an equality, are analytical propositions, in that I am immediately aware of the identity of the generation of the one magnitude with that of the other; but axioms are supposed to be synthetical propositions a priori.

5.3 On the other hand the evident propositions of number relationship are certainly synthetical indeed, but not universal as those of geometry and for precisely that reason are not termed axioms, but rather number formula.

5.4 \(7 + 5 = 12\) is not an analytical proposition.

5.5 For I think the number 12 neither in the representation of 7 nor of 5 nor in the representation of the assemblage of both (that I am supposed to think it in the addition of both is not the point here, for the question with analytical propositions is only whether I actually think the predicate in the representation of the subject).

5.6 But even though it is synthetical, still it is only a singular proposition.

5.7 To the extent we look merely to the synthesis of the homogeneous (of units), the synthesis here can only occur in a single manner, although the use of these numbers afterwards is general.

5.8 If I say, “with three lines, each two of which together are greater than the third, a triangle can be drawn,” I have in mind the mere function of the productive imagination which can draw the lines greater and smaller and likewise allow abutment according to all sorts of arbitrary angles.

5.9 On the other hand the number 7 is possible only in a single way, and also with the number 12 which is generated through the synthesis of the 7 with 5.

5.10 Therefore we must not call such propositions axioms (for then they would be infinite, but rather number formulae.
6.1 This transcendental principle of the mathematics of appearances gives great extension to our recognition a priori.

6.2 For it is this alone which makes pure mathematics in its entire precision applicable to objects of experience which, without this foundational principle, might not be so evident of itself; indeed has even occasioned some contradiction.\footnote{One contradiction, for example, might arise when we consider the sum of two spaces, one of which happens to be contained within the other, e.g., my condo is 600 square feet and the kitchen is 100 SF, so together they are 700 SF (except that the 100 SF of my kitchen is already part of the 600 SF of the condo).}

6.3 Appearances are not things on their own.

6.4 The empirical perspective is only possible through the pure one (of space and time). What geometry says of the pure perspective therefore holds also unquestionably for the empirical, and the excuse that objects of the senses might not be conformable to the rules of construction in space (e.g., the infinite divisibility of lines or angles) must come to naught.\footnote{When I look out I see objects about me in space. This space I can “see” without any empirical thing present in it, e.g., pure imagination as the plane on which I trace out a pantomimic circle or triangle. Hence this space precedes the empirical filling of space with objects.}

6.5 For in that way we would deny objective validity to space and with it simultaneously to all mathematics and would no longer know why and how far they are applicable to appearances.

6.6 The synthesis of spaces and times as the essential form of every perspective is that which simultaneously makes possible the apprehension of appearances, thus every external experience, consequently also every recognition of objects of experience, and also what mathematics in its pure usage proves of the former holds necessarily for the latter.\footnote{It occurs to me here again that when Kant speaks in the plural of spaces and times he is not speaking of space and time as the infinite givens of the Aesthetic.}

6.7 All objections against this are merely shenanigans of a falsely instructed reason which erroneously plans to liberate the objects of the senses from the formal conditions of our sensitivity and, although they are mere appearances, represents them as objects given to the understanding on their own, in which case, of course, nothing at all a priori could be recognized syntheti-
cally of them, thus not even through pure concepts of space, and the science which determines this, namely geometry, would not even be possible.
2. Anticipations of Perception

1.1 Their principle is: In all appearances the real, which is an object of sensation, has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree.

Proof

2.1 Perception is the empirical consciousness, i.e., a consciousness in which simultaneously there is sensation.

2.2 As objects of perception, appearances are not pure (merely formal) perspectives like space and time (for these cannot be perceived as such at all).\textsuperscript{149}

2.3 For beyond the perspective the appearances contain within themselves the material for some sort of object in general (whereby something existing is represented in space or time), i.e., the real of the sensation, as a merely subjective representation, whereby we can be aware only that the subject is affected and which we refer to an object in general.

2.4 Now a gradual alteration is possible from the empirical consciousness to the pure one as the real of the former disappears entirely and a mere formal consciousness (a priori) of the manifold in space and time remains, therefore then also a synthesis of the generation of the magnitude of a sensation from its beginning, where the pure perspective = 0, on up to an arbitrary magnitude.\textsuperscript{150}

2.5 Now since sensation on its own is not an objective representation at all and neither the perspective of space nor of time is encountered in it, then certainly no extensive magnitude will befit it. But it still possesses a magnitude (and indeed through the apprehension of the sensation in which the empirical consciousness can grow in a certain time from nothing = 0 to its given measure), therefore an intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree of the influence on

\textsuperscript{149} While we can certainly see things in space in time, we cannot perceive either as such. Look around at a forest and you will see plenty of trees, but you won’t perceive space. Space is how we see the trees because that’s the way we look at trees (or any external object).

\textsuperscript{150} I.e., in the same way that I can gradually reduce a sensation until it fades away and leaves only the pure perspective in space and time, I can also gradually increase a sensation from a given magnitude up to a higher one.
sense corresponding to which to all objects of perception, to the extent this contains sensation, must be attributed.\textsuperscript{151}

3.1 Every recognition, whereby I can a priori recognize and determine what belongs to empirical recognition, we can term an anticipation, and this is most certainly the meaning in which Epicurus used his expression ποληψις.

3.2 But since there is something about the appearances which is never recognized a priori, and thus which also makes up the actual difference between the empirical and the a priori recognition, namely the sensation (as the material of perception), it follows that sensation is actually what cannot be anticipated at all.

3.3 For otherwise we would be able to say that the pure determinations in space and time were anticipations of appearances, both with respect to shape and to magnitude, because they represent a priori that which may always be given a posteriori in experience.\textsuperscript{152}

3.4 But suppose there were still something which could be a priori recognized of every sensation as sensation in general (without a particular sensation being given), then this would deserve to be termed an anticipation in an exceptional sense, because it does seem strange to anticipate experience precisely in what concerns the material of it, which we can only draw out of.\textsuperscript{153}

3.5 And this is actually the case here.

4.1 Apprehension merely by means of sensation fills only one instant (that is to say: if I do not draw into consideration the succession of many sensations).

\textsuperscript{151} Accordingly when we sense some sensation in the appearance we can already imagine it as more or less intense, e.g., a louder and softer sound.

\textsuperscript{152} If we said we could anticipate the sensations themselves (3.2), then we might as well say that we could anticipate the shapes themselves and not have to conduct a synthesis as laid out in the preceding section on axioms.

\textsuperscript{153} While we cannot imagine a priori what a sensation would be, e.g., a color or sound, once given a sensation we can imagine it being more or less intense.
4.2 As something in the appearance, the apprehension of which is not a successive synthesis which proceeds from parts to the whole representation, it has no extensive magnitude. The lack of sensation in the same instant would represent this as empty, thus = 0.

4.3 Now what corresponds to sensation in the empirical perspective is reality (realitas phaenomenon); what answers to the absence of it, negation = 0.

4.4 But now every sensation is capable of diminution so that it can reduce and thus gradually vanish.

4.5 Hence between reality in the appearance and negation there is a continuing coherence of many possible intermediate sensations, whose difference from one another is always smaller than the difference between the given one and zero or the complete negation.

4.6 In other words: the real in the appearance always has magnitude, but this magnitude is not encountered in the apprehension, in that this occurs by means of the mere sensation in a single moment and not through the successive synthesis of several sensations and therefore does not go from the parts to the whole. Therefore it has indeed a magnitude, but not an extensive one.\textsuperscript{154}

5.1 Now that magnitude which is apprehended only as a unity and in which plurality can only be represented through approximation to negation = 0, I call an intensive magnitude.

5.2 Every reality in the appearance therefore has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree.

5.3 If we consider this reality as cause (be it of sensation or of another reality in the appearance, e.g., an alteration), we call the degree of reality, as cause, a moment, e.g., the moment of heaviness, and precisely because degree only indicates a magnitude, the apprehension of which is not successive but rather instantaneous.

\textsuperscript{154} I think now that the idea here is that we spy some appearance and notice the sensation, e.g., the taste of a pudding, and we can then immediately imagine less of that taste (less vanilla in the pudding, let us say) down to the point of vanishing. Thus we see from the very first impression that sensations have a degree, i.e., per the anticipations.
5.4 But I touch on this here only parenthetically since I am not concerned with causality at this point.

6.1 So accordingly, every sensation, hence also every reality in the appearance, as small as it may be, has a degree, i.e., an intensive magnitude, which can be yet always reduced, and between reality and negation is a continuous cohesion of possible realities and possible smaller perceptions.

6.2 Every color, e.g., red, has a degree which, as small as it may be, is never the smallest, and it is everywhere akin with warmth, the moment of heaviness, etc.\textsuperscript{155}

7.1 The property of magnitudes, according to which no part of them is the smallest (no part simple), is called their continuity.

7.2 Space and time are \textit{quanta continua} because no part of either can be given without enclosing it between limits (points and instances), hence only so that this part itself is in turn a space or a time.

7.3 Space therefore consists only of spaces, and time of times.

7.4 Points and instances are only limits, i.e., mere positions of their restrictions. But positions always presuppose those perspectives which are supposed to confine or determine them, and out of mere positions, as from component parts which could be given yet before space or time, neither space nor time is assembled.\textsuperscript{156}

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\textsuperscript{155} We are to assume this degree a priori (per these Anticipations) upon the very first exposure to some single sensation. For example, upon hearing a loud playing of the note G, Kant will have us imagining at first the absence of this tone = silence, and then realizing that the G does not need to completely vanish all at once, for we can imagine how it could become softer in pitch without needing to be given an example of that, and how reduction in volume could continue down to complete negation, or how via an increase in volume we could have a louder tone.

\textsuperscript{156} We assemble a table (mentally) out of legs and a top; but we do not so assemble space and time (although I think Locke may have thought we did so). Rather each space and time is given as already enclosed in a greater space and time. However space and time as objects are assembled, but then seen as respective singularities which contain divisions (and not parts, but simply limitations). See Kant’s footnote to Par 3.2 of #26 of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories on or near page 149.
7.5 Such magnitudes we can also call fluid because the synthesis (of the productive imagination) in general is an advance in time, the continuity of which we endeavor in particular to designate by the expression of flowing (blending).

8.1 Consequently all appearances in general are continuous magnitudes both extensively with respect to the perspective, and intensively with regard to the mere perception (sensation and thus reality).

8.2 If the synthesis of the manifold aspects of the appearances is interrupted, then this is an aggregate of many appearances, and not actually appearance as a quantum, for a quantum is not generated through the mere continuation of the productive synthesis of a certain type, but rather through the repetition of an always ceasing synthesis.

8.3 If I call 13 talers a monetary quantum, then to the extent I mean the ingredients of a mark of fine silver I am correct. But in any case it is a continuous magnitude in which no part is the smallest, but rather every part could make up a coin which would always contain material for yet smaller ones.

8.4 But if with the denomination of 13 round talers I mean so many coins (regardless of their silver content), then I am incorrect in calling it a quantum of talers and should rather call it an aggregate, i.e., a count of pieces of money.

8.5 Now since with all numbers unity must still lie as a foundation, the appearance as unity is a quantum and as such always a continuum.

9.1 Now if all appearances, considered extensively as well as intensively, are continuous magnitudes, then the proposition that also every alteration (transition of a thing out of one state into another) is continuous, would be proven here and with mathematical evidence, if causality of an alteration in general did not lie entirely outside of the limits of transcendental philosophy and presuppose empirical principles.

9.2 For that a cause which alters the state of things, i.e., determines them to the opposite of a certain, given state, be possible, of this the understanding gives us a priori no insight at all, not merely for the reason that it does not see the possibility of this at all (for this insight is lacking with us in several recogni-
tions a priori), but rather because mutability touches only certain determinations of appearances, which experience alone can teach, while its cause is to be encountered in the immutable.

9.3 But since we have nothing here whereof we can avail ourselves as the pure foundational concept of all possible experience, under which there must be absolutely nothing empirical, we cannot, without injury to the unity of the system, anticipate the universal science of nature which is built on certain foundational experiences.

10.1 Nonetheless we are not lacking in proof indicators of the entire influence which this has on our principle of anticipating perceptions, and thus even to make up for its deficiency to the extent that it prohibits the rule to all false conclusions which might be derived from that.

11.1 If every reality in the perception has a degree, between which and negation an infinite gradation of always smaller degrees takes place, and if nonetheless every sense must have a determined degree of receptivity of sensations, then no perception, thus also no experience, is possible which proves a total lack of all real in the appearance, be it immediate or mediate (through whatever outright digression in inference one might wish), i.e., a proof of an empty space or an empty time can never be drawn from experience.

11.2 For, in the first place, the entire lack of the real in the sensitive perspective cannot itself be perceived. Secondly, it can be inferred from no single appearance and the difference of the degree of its reality, nor ever even assumed for the explanation of that.

11.3 For even if the entire perspective of a determined space or time is thoroughly real, i.e., no part of the same empty, still, because every reality has its degree, which with unaltered extensive magnitudes of the appearances can decrease down to nothing (to emptiness) through infinite steps, there must be infinitely diverse degrees with which space and time are filled and the intensive magnitude in different appearances must be able to be smaller and larger although the extensive magnitude of the perspective remains the same.

12.1 We want to given an example of this.
12.2 Almost all researchers of nature, since they perceive a great difference in the quantity of material of diverse types among equal volumes (partly through the moment of heaviness or of weight, partly through the moment of resistance against other moved bodies), conclude unanimously from this that this volume (extensive magnitude of this appearance) would have to be empty in all matter, though indeed in diverse measure.

12.3 But to whom of all these for the most part mathematical and mechanical investigators of nature would it ever have occurred that they had based their inference solely upon a metaphysical presupposition, which they still allege so much to avoid, by assuming that the real in space (I may not term it here impenetrability or weight, for those are empirical concepts) is always the same and only the extensive magnitude can differentiate itself, i.e., according to the amount.

12.4 Against this presupposition, for which they could have no basis in experience and which therefore is metaphysical, I position a transcendental proof which indeed is not supposed to explain the distinction in the occupancy of space, but still fully invalidates the supposed necessity of that presupposition of not being able to explain the cited distinction otherwise than by presuming empty space. And this transcendental proof at least has the merit of placing the understanding at liberty to think this diversity also in another manner, if the explanation of that per nature were supposed to make some sort of hypothesis necessary.

12.5 For here we see that although equal spaces may be fully occupied with diverse materials so that in none of them is a there a point in which its presence were not to be encountered, still every real with the same quantity would have its degree (of resistance or of weight) which, without reduction of the extensive magnitude or amount, can be infinitely smaller before passing over into emptiness and disappearing.

12.6 Thus an expansion which occupies a space, e.g., warmth, and likewise every other reality (in the appearance), without leaving even the smallest part of this space empty, can reduce infinitely in its degrees while still occupying the space with this smaller degree just as well as another appearance does with greater degrees.
12.7 It is in no way my intention here to assert that this is the case with the diversity of materials with respect to their specific weights, but rather only to demonstrate from a principle of pure understanding that the nature of our perceptions makes such an explanation manner possible, and that we falsely assume the real of the appearance as equal according to degree and as diverse only according to the aggregation and its extensive magnitude and can even assert this, i.e., alleged degrees, through a principle of understanding.

13.1 Nonetheless this anticipation of the perception has something conspicuous on its own for a researcher accustomed to transcendental reflection and having become more careful by that, and raises simultaneously some consideration about the understanding being able to anticipate such a synthetical proposition as that of the degree of all real in the appearances and thus of the possibility of the internal distinction of the sensation itself, if we abstract from its empirical quality. And therefore there is still a question which is not unworthy of solution, i.e., how the understanding here can pronounce a priori concerning appearances, and indeed doing this in what is actually and merely empirical, namely with respect to sensation.

14.1 The quality of sensation is always merely empirical and cannot be represented a priori at all (e.g., color, taste).

14.2 But the real, which corresponds to sensations in general in opposition to negation = 0, only represents something, the concept of which on its own contains an existence and means nothing other than the synthesis in an empirical consciousness in general.

14.3 Namely: in the inward sense the empirical consciousness can be raised from 0 up to every larger degree so that precisely this extensive magnitude of the perspective (e.g., illuminated surfaces) excites as great a sensation as an aggregate of many other (less illuminated) surfaces together.

14.4 Accordingly we can completely abstract from the extensive quantity of appearances and still, by the mere sensation in a moment, represent to ourselves a synthesis of the uniform ascension from 0 up to the given empirical conscious.
14.5 Hence while all sensations as such are given indeed only a posteriori, the property of them, that they have a degree, can be recognized a priori.

14.6 It is noteworthy that we can recognize a priori of quantities in general only a single quality, namely the continuity, but of all qualities (the real of appearances), nothing further than the intensive quantity of it, namely that it has a degree, and with all else being left to experience.
3. Analogies of Experience

1.1 The principle with these is that experience is only possible through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions.

Proof

2.1 Experience is an empirical recognition, i.e., one which determines an object through perceptions.

2.2 It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions which is not itself contained in the perception, but rather contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of the perception in a consciousness which constitutes the essential aspect of a recognition of an object of the senses, i.e., of an experience (not merely of the perspective or sensation of the senses).

2.3 Now it is quite true that in experience the perceptions only come together in a coincidental way, and so no necessity of their connection is evident from the perceptions themselves, nor can there be, because apprehension is only an assemblage of the manifold of the empirical perspective, and in the assemblage no representation of the necessity of the linked existence of the appearances, which it puts together in space and time, is encountered.

2.4 But since experience is a recognition of objects through perceptions, and since the relationship in the existence of the manifold is supposed to be represented in it, but not the way it happens to be assembled in time, but rather how it is objectively in time, but then since time itself cannot be perceived, it follows that the determination of the existence of the objects can occur only through their connection in time in general, thus only through a priori concepts of linkage.

2.5 Now since this always simultaneously entails necessity, experience is possible only through a representation of the necessary linkage of perceptions.

3.1 The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity.

3.2 Therefore three rules of all time relationships of the appearances, according to which the existence of each can be determined with respect to the unity of all time, will precede before any experience and will first make it possible.
4.1 The universal foundational principle of all three analogies rests upon the necessary unity of the apperception with respect to every possible, empirical consciousness (of the perception) at every time, and consequently, since that unity of the apperception lies a priori as a foundation, upon the synthetical unity of all appearances with respect to their relationships in time.

4.2 For the original apperception refers to the internal sense (the embodiment of all representations) and indeed a priori to its form, i.e., to the relationship of the manifold, empirical consciousness in time.

4.3 Now in the original apperception all this manifold, with respect to its time relationship, is supposed to be united; for this relationship denotes the transcendental unity of that apperception a priori under which everything stands which is supposed to belong to my, i.e., my very own, recognition, thus can become an object for me.

4.4 Accordingly this synthetical unity in the time relationship of all perceptions, which is determined a priori, is the law that all empirical time determinations must stand under rules of the universal time determination. And the analogies of experience, with which we now want to deal, must be such rules.

5.1 These foundational principles have this peculiarity: they do not consider the appearances and the synthesis of their empirical perspective, but rather merely their existence and their relationship among one another with respect to this their existence.

5.2 Now the manner in which something is apprehended in the appearance can be determined a priori such that the rules of its synthesis can simultaneously give this perspective a priori in every empirical example under discussion, i.e., bring it forth out of it.

5.3 But the existence of appearances cannot be recognized a priori, and even though in this way we could achieve so far as to conclude to some kind of existence, we would still not be able to recognize this as determined, i.e., be

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157 The synthesis of the empirical perspective was covered in the previous two principles: the Axioms and Anticipations.
able to anticipate that by means of which its empirical perspective is distin-
guished from others.

6.1 The previous two principles, which I termed the mathematical in considera-
tion of their justification of the application of mathematics to appearances, 
grew to appearances according to their mere possibility and taught how they 
could be generated with respect to their perspective as well as the real of 
their perception according to rules of a mathematical synthesis. Hence the 
numerical quantities and with them the determination of the appearance as 
quantity could be used with the one as well as with the other.

6.2 So, e.g., I will be able to assemble and give determined a priori, i.e., con-
struct, the degree of the sensation of the sunlight out of, let us say, 200,000 
illuminations through the moon.\footnote{Here I think Kant means that we can be conscious of the comparison of the moon light and the sun-
light and that the two can be related by means of some factor, e.g., 200,000.}

6.3 Hence we can term the first principles constitutive.

7.1 It will have to be a quite different matter with those principles which are 
supposed to bring a priori the existence of appearances under rules.

7.2 For since this does not permit of construction, they will go only to the rela-
tionship of the existence and can render up none other than merely regula-
tive principles.

7.3 Here therefore we are not thinking either of an axiom or an anticipation, but 
rather, if a perception is given to us in a time relationship vis-à-vis others 
(though undetermined), we would not be able to say a priori which other and 
how large the perception, but rather how it is necessarily joined with that 
other according to the existence in this mode of time.

7.4 In philosophy analogies mean something quite different from what they rep-
resent in mathematics.

7.5 In the latter they are formulas which express the equality between two quan-
titative relationships, and always constitutively such that if three members of 
the proportion are given, the fourth is also given, i.e., can be constructed.
7.6 But in philosophy, the analogy is not the equality between two quantitative, but rather between two qualitative relationships; where out of three given members I can recognize and a priori give only the relationship to a fourth one, but not this fourth one itself. But I will still have a rule to seek it in experience and an indicator for discovering it there.

7.7 An analogy of experience therefore will only be a rule according to which a unity of experience is to arise from perceptions (not as perception itself, as an empirical perspective in general) and does not hold as a principle of the objects (the appearances) constitutively, but rather merely in a regulative way.

7.8 But the same will also hold for the postulates of the empirical thinking in general, which together concern the synthesis of the mere perspective (the form of the appearance), the perception (its material) and of experience (the relationship of these perceptions), namely that they are only regulative foundational principles, and are distinguished from the mathematical which are constitutive. This distinction is not regarding certitude, which stands firmly in both cases a priori, but still regarding the manner of evidence, i.e., in the intuitiveness of them (thus also in the demonstration).

8.1 But what is to be remembered with all synthetical principles and what must be especially noted here is this: these analogies have their sole meaning and validity not as principles of the transcendental but rather merely of the empirical usage of the understanding, thus also can be proven as such, and that consequently the appearances must be subsumed not directly under the categories but rather only under schemata.

8.2 For if the objects, to which these principles are to be referred, were things on their own, it would be quite impossible to recognize anything synthetically about them a priori.

8.3 But they are nothing but appearances, whose complete recognition, in which simultaneously all principle always have to aim, is solely the possible experience. Consequently these have as a goal nothing except merely the conditions of the unity of the empirical recognition in the synthesis of the appearances. But these are only thought alone in the schema of the pure concept of
the understanding, of whose unity, as a synthesis in general, the category contains the function restricted by no sensitive condition.

8.4 Through these principles therefore we are justified in putting the appearances together only according to an analogy with the logical and universal unity of concepts, and thus in the principle itself to indeed avail ourselves of the category, but in the execution (of the application to the appearances) to place the schema of it as the key of its usage in place of the category, or rather to place the category, as restricting condition under the name of a formula of the first, to the side.
A. First Analogy. Principle of the Endurance of Substance

1.1 With all alteration of the appearances, substance endures and the quantum of the substance in nature is neither increased nor reduced.

Proof

2.1 All appearances are in time. It is in time alone as substrata (as the enduring form of the internal perspective) that simultaneity as well as succession can be represented.

2.2 Time therefore in which every alternation of appearances is to be thought, remains and does not alternate, because it is that in which the succession or simultaneity can be represented only as determinations of that time.\(^{159}\)

2.3 Now in itself time cannot be perceived.\(^{160}\)

2.4 Consequently, in the objects of perception, i.e., in the appearances, the substrata must be encountered which time in general represents and on which all alternation or simultaneity can be perceived through the relationship of the appearances to that in the apprehension.

2.5 But the substrata of all reality, i.e., what belongs to the existence of things, is substance, on which everything which belongs to existence can be thought only as a determination.

2.6 Consequently, endurance, in relationship to which alone all time relationships of appearances can be determined, is the substance in the appearance, i.e., the reality of that, which as substrata of all alternations always remains the same.

2.7 Therefore since this cannot alternate in existence, its quantum in nature can also be neither increased nor reduced.

3.1 Our apprehension of the manifold of the appearance is always successive

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\(^{159}\) Since time is a constant, it would no more be subject to perception than a buzzing or ringing in one's ear which were unceasing since birth (as also would be the case with space).

\(^{160}\) Not because of any omnipresence, but because it is a non-thing on its own, i.e., merely the form of our perspective.
and therefore always alternating.

3.2 But then for that very reason we can never determine in that way alone whether this manifold, as an object of experience, be simultaneous or follow upon one another unless something which always exists were to lie as a foundation to it, i.e., something remaining and abiding, with respect to which all alternation and simultaneity would be nothing except so many ways (modes of time) for that endurance to exist.

3.3 Only in the durable therefore are time relationships possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relationships in time), i.e., the durable is the substratum of the empirical representation of time itself on which every time determination is possible.

3.4 Endurance in general expresses time as the constant correlate of all existence of the appearances, of all alternation and all accompaniment.

3.5 For alternation does not concern time itself, but rather only the appearances in time (even as simultaneity is not a mode of time itself, for with time no parts whatsoever are simultaneous, but rather all are successive).

3.6 If we wanted to attribute to time a sequence following one another, we would have to think up another time in which this sequence were possible.\textsuperscript{161}

3.7 Through the durable alone does the existence in diverse parts of the time series after one another achieve a magnitude which we call duration.

3.8 For in the mere sequel alone, existence is always vanishing and commencing and never has the least magnitude.

3.9 Without this durable therefore there is no time relationship.

3.10 Now on its own time cannot be perceived.\textsuperscript{162} Hence this enduring with the appearance is the substratum of all time determination, consequently also the condition of the possibility of every synthetical unity of perceptions, i.e., experience, and on this endurance all existence and all alternation in time can

\textsuperscript{161} An earlier and a later time, as such, would require a time in which they would appear as earlier and later.

\textsuperscript{162} Time is not a something which could be looked at, but merely a form of looking in general.
be viewed only as a modus of the existence of that which abides and endures.

3.11 In all appearances therefore that durable is the object itself, i.e., the substance (*phenomenon*), but everything which changes or can change belongs only to the way in which this substance or substances exist, thus to their determinations.

4.1 I find that at all times not merely the philosopher, but even the common understanding, has presupposed this endurance as a substratum of all change in the appearances and also every time will accept it as undoubted, only that the philosopher expresses himself about it in a somewhat more determined manner in that he says, “with all changes in the world, substance abides and only the accidents alternate.”

4.2 But of this very synthetic proposition I never meet with so much as even an attempt at a proof. Indeed it also stands only very seldom, as is its birthright, at the summit of the pure and completely a priori existing laws of nature.

4.3 In fact the proposition that substance be enduring is tautological.

4.4 For merely it is merely due to this endurance that we apply the category of substance to the appearance, and we would have had to prove that in all appearances there is an enduring something, concerning which the mutable is nothing but a determination of its existence.

4.5 But since such a proof can never be conducted dogmatically, i.e., from concepts, because it concerns a synthetical proposition a priori, and no one ever thought that such propositions are valid only in referral to possible experience, and thus also can be proven only through a deduction of the possibility of such propositions, it is no wonder that it has indeed been placed as the foundation to all experience (because we feel its need with the empirical recognition), but never proven.

5.1 A philosopher was asked, “how much does smoke weigh?”

5.2 He answered, “subtract from the weight of the wood that was burned the weight of the remaining ashes, and you have the weight of the smoke.”
5.3 Therefore he presupposed as incontestable that even in fire the material (sub-stance) does not perish, but rather only the form of that material sustains a change.

5.4 Even so was the proposition “from nothing comes nothing” only another corollary of the principle of endurance or, much more, of the ever abiding existence of the actual subject with the appearances.

5.5 For if that with the appearance, which we want to call substance, is supposed to be the actual substratum of all time determinations, then all existence in the past as well as that of the future must be able to be determined by that alone.

5.6 Thus we are able to give the name of substance to the appearance only for the reason because we presuppose its existence in all time, which is not expressed even once by the word “endurance” in that this goes more to future times.

5.7 Nevertheless the internal necessity to endure is still inseparably connected with the necessity to have always been and therefore the expression may remain.

5.8 “Gigni de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti”\(^\text{163}\) were two propositions which the ancients connected inseparably; but which some today frequently separate due to a misunderstanding, because they imagine that they concern things on their own, and the first might be opposed to the dependence of the world upon a supreme cause (in fact even with regard to its substance). But this concern is unnecessary for here the discussion is only of the appearances in the field of experience, whose unity would never be possible if we wanted to allow new things (with respect to substance) to come into being.

5.9 For then that which alone can represent the unity of time, namely the identity of the substratum, upon which alone all change has thorough unity, would be eliminated.

5.10 Nonetheless this endurance is still nothing more than the way of representing to ourselves the existence of things (in the appearance).

\(^{163}\) “Out of nothing is nothing produced, into nothing can nothing return.”
6.1 The determinations of a substance, which are nothing other than particular ways of that substance to exist, are called accidents.

6.2 They are always real because they concern the existence of substance (negations are only determinations which express the not-being of something with the substance).

6.3 Now if we attribute a particular existence to this reality with the substance (e.g., to motion as an accident of matter), then we term this existence the inherence in contrast to the existence of substance, which we call subsistence.

6.4 Nonetheless many misinterpretations arise from this, and it is more properly and correctly described if we designated the accidents only through the way in which the existence of a substance is determined positively.

6.5 However, due to the conditions of the logical usage of our understanding, it is still unavoidable to isolate, as it were, that which can change in the existence of a substance while the substance abides, and to consider it in relationship to the actual durable and radical aspect. Hence also then this category stands under the title of the relationships more as the condition of the relationships than containing itself a relationship.

7.1 Now upon this endurance the rectification of the concept of alteration is also based.

7.2 Commencing and perishing are not alterations of what commences and perishes.

7.3 Alteration is a way which succeeds upon another way of existing by precisely the same object.

7.4 Hence everything which alters is abiding and only its state changes.

7.5 Since this change therefore touches only the determinations which can cease or also arise, we can say in a somewhat paradoxical way that only the enduring (the substance) is altered, for the changeable suffers no alteration, but rather a change, since some determinations cease and other arise.
8.1 Thus alteration can be perceived only with substances, and the commence-
ment and perishing, without concerning merely a determination of the en-
durance, can simply be no possible perception at all, because this very du-
rableness makes possible the representation of the transition out of one state
into another and from non-being into being which therefore can be empiri-
cally recognized only as changing determinations of that which abides.

8.2 Assume that something simply begins to be; then you would have to have a
point of time in which it was not.

8.3 On what do you want to fasten this time, if not on that which is already
there?

8.4 For an empty time which preceded is no object of perception. If you tie this
commencement to things which previously were and continue up to that
which comes into being, then the latter was only a determination of the first,
as of the endurance.

8.5 Just so is it also with the perishing, for this presupposes the empirical repre-
sentation of a time where an appearance is no more.

9.1 Substances (in the appearance) are the substrata of all time determinations.

9.2 The commencement of some and the perishing of others of that would elimi-
nate even the single condition of the empirical unity of time, and the appear-
ances would then be referred to two times in which, next to one another, the
existence would elapse, which is absurd.

9.3 For there is only a single time, in which all diverse times must be placed, not
simultaneously, but rather successively.

10.1 So accordingly endurance is a necessary condition under which alone ap-
pearances as things or objects are determinable in a possible experience.

10.2 But what the empirical criterion of this necessary endurance is, of this the
following provides an occasion to note what is needful.
B. Second Analogy. Principle of the Time Series According to the Law of Causality

1.1 All alterations occur according to the law of the linkage of cause and effect.

Proof

2.1 (That all appearances of the temporal succession are altogether alterations, i.e., a successive being and not being of the determinations of an enduring substance, hence that the existence of the substance itself, which follows upon its non-existence, does not take place, nor the non-existence of that substance following upon its existence, nor (in brief) the coming into, and the passing out of, existence of the substance itself, all this the previous principle has already established.

2.2 (This could also have been expressed in this way: every change (succession) of the appearances is only alteration. For the coming into, and passing out of, existence of substance is not an alteration of the substance, because the concept of alteration presupposes the existence and, hence, the preservation of precisely the same subject with two contrary determinations.--

2.3 (Now following this reminder, the proof commences.)

3.1 I perceive that appearances succeed upon one another, i.e., that there is one state of things at one time, the opposite of which was in the preceding state.\(^{164}\)

3.2 Therefore I actually link two perceptions in time.\(^{165}\)

3.3 Now linkage is not a result of the mere sense and perspective (\textit{Anschauung}), but rather is the product of a synthetical capacity of the imagination which determines the inner sense with regard to relations of time.\(^{166}\)

\(^{164}\) For example I notice that I am now drinking a cup of hot punch while earlier the cup was empty.

\(^{165}\) The empty cup and the full cup.

\(^{166}\) For I do not see in the perception that the full cup follows upon the empty, rather I think merely two cups: an empty cup and a full one.
3.4 But these two states can be combined in two different ways such that either the one or the other precedes in time; for time cannot be perceived as such whereby then in reference to which a determination can be made empirically, as it were, as to which precedes and which follows in the object.\textsuperscript{167}

3.5 Therefore I am only aware that my imagination places one before and the other after, but not that one state precedes before the other in the object. In other words, by means of the perception alone the objective relationship of the successive appearances is not determined.\textsuperscript{168}

3.6 Now in order for this relationship to be recognized as determined, the relationship between the two states must be so thought that it is necessarily determined which of these would have to be placed before and which afterwards, and not vice versa.\textsuperscript{169}

3.7 But that concept which denotes a necessity of synthetical unity can only be an understanding concept, and this does not lie in the perception. And here that is the concept of the relationship of cause and effect, such that the first determines the latter in time as its consequence and not as something which would merely precede in the imagination (or not be perceived at all).\textsuperscript{170}

3.8 Therefore it is only by subjecting the succession of the appearances, hence every alteration, to the law of causality that even experience, i.e., empirical

\textsuperscript{167} And thus I can just as easily think: full is followed by empty; as also: empty follows full. I cannot perceive time itself in order to determine which precedes and which follows objectively. That one happened to precede in my perception is entirely contingent. It may be a fact that the full preceded the empty, but it is also feasible that the empty could precede the full, and I can easily imagine both cases.

\textsuperscript{168} There is no necessity at all in the series, and I can even imagine the two representations alternating like the red and green lights of a traffic signal.

\textsuperscript{169} Now we are speaking of going out beyond the mere imagination, where everything is permissible, and to a connection such that the imagination is not permitted such play.

\textsuperscript{170} The expression for a determined series is that of cause and effect, where cause means that which necessarily precedes and effect that which necessarily follows. If I speak of A having preceded B, that is one thing, like my sneeze preceded the sighting on the TV screen of a flying bird; but if I speak of my sneeze as preceding necessarily, i.e., in every time, as would be the case with, e.g., the sound of the sneeze, then we are speaking of a determined relationship which is independent of the time in which the elements actually appear; and which then, of course, is not (nor can it ever be) contained in the empirical perspective of the specific series. And when we speak of not being perceived at all, we are speaking of the recognition of an event and where we do not yet recognize the cause but must look for it. Generally speaking, we will assume: event and effect are synonyms per our understanding.
recognition, is possible of them. Hence they themselves, as objects of experience, are only possible according to this very law.\textsuperscript{171}

4.1 The apprehension of the manifold of the appearance is always successive.

4.2 The representations of the parts follow one another.\textsuperscript{172}

4.3 But whether they follow one another in the object is a second point of reflection which is not contained in the first.\textsuperscript{173}

4.4 Now everything, and indeed every representation to the extent we are aware of it, can be termed an object. But what this word is to mean with appearances, not to the extent that they (as representations) are objects, but rather that they refer to an object, this requires a deeper investigation.

4.5 Simply as representations they are simultaneously objects of the consciousness and to that extent are not at all distinguished from the apprehension, i.e., from the reception into the synthesis of the imagination, and we would have to say that the manifold of the appearances is always successively generated in the mind.\textsuperscript{174}

4.6 If appearances were things on their own, then no one would be able to tell from the succession of the representations how the manifold were connected in the object.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{171} For experience means a determined relationship which is independent of the perceiver, and the very expression of this requires an objective series such that the subjective apprehension might be derived from it.

\textsuperscript{172} This harkens back to the TDA (Appendix I.2) where we are accumulating a manifold, starting at one end and going to the other and keeping track of the elements, i.e., requiring the pure apperception to keep the elements in mind.

\textsuperscript{173} It is not immediately nor always clear whether the object exists according to the way the manifold of the two representations was successively apprehended.

\textsuperscript{174} It is one thing to accumulate A B and C and another to recognize that they \textit{must} be apprehended in this order. The former is subjective and the latter objective.

\textsuperscript{175} And so, per the previous footnote, if A B and C were things on their own, then we might expect also B A and C or any other arrangement. We could never say anything definitively about things on their own.
4.7 For we are still dealing only with our representations. How things on their own might be (without regard to representations whereby they affect us) is entirely beyond the sphere of our recognitions.

4.8 Now even though the appearances are not things on their own, and yet are the only thing which can be given to us for recognition, I need to indicate what sort of temporal connection befits the manifold of the appearances themselves while the representation always remains successive in the apprehension.\(^{176}\)

4.9 For example, the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house which stands before me is successive.

4.10 The question arises now as to whether the manifold of this house itself also be successive, which of course no one will admit.\(^{177}\)

4.11 But as soon as I elevate my concept of an object to a transcendental meaning, the house is not a thing on its own at all, but rather only an appearance, i.e., a representation whose transcendental object is unknown. Then what do I mean with the question about how the manifold might be connected in the appearance itself (which still is nothing on its own at all)?\(^{178}\)

4.12 What lies here in the successive apprehension is considered as a representation, but the appearance which is given to me, even though it is nothing more than a complex of these representations, is considered as the object to which my concept, which I derive from the representations of the apprehension, is to correspond.\(^{179}\)

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\(^{176}\) With “representation” here we are referring to how we consider the appearance (in the brainarium), namely that there will be two ways of considering this.

\(^{177}\) An argument is developing here, for while no one will admit that the parts of the house are successive, it is not at all clear and given in advance that the manifold of the house is different from the manifold of a temporal series, e.g., the lip movements and the sound of voice (emanating through those lips), for that is a successive existence, for the sound travels slower than does the light, which is particularly noticeable at some distance.

\(^{178}\) Which is the same as the question of the rain and the rainbow, once we look at the two spectrally as appearances, without the knowledge that we eventually develop.

\(^{179}\) The distinction we make is between subjective (representations) and objective (appearance) even though the appearance (the objective) is nothing more than a complex of these representations (the subjective). And it will be quite a trick to come to knowledge of the objective state of things when all that we have given to us is the subjective.
4.13 We see very quickly that since truth is the correspondence of the recognition with the object, we are concerned here merely with the formal conditions of truth. And appearance, in contrast to the representations of the apprehension, can only be represented as the object which is distinct from all these representations when it stands under a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension and makes some sort of connection of the manifold necessary.\textsuperscript{180}

4.14 Whatever about the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of the apprehension is the object.\textsuperscript{181}

5.1 Now let us proceed to our task.

5.2 That something happens, i.e., something or a state arises which did not exist earlier, cannot be perceived empirically unless an appearance precedes which does not contain this state within itself; for a reality which follows an empty time, hence a coming into being preceding which no state of the thing exists, cannot be apprehended any more than empty time itself.\textsuperscript{182}

5.3 Every apprehension of an event therefore is a perception which follows upon another.\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{180} In order for the appearance to be more than a complex of representations, in order then that it be something which could correspond to the object [the object being that which is apart from us in contrast to the internal location of the appearance (on the retina or, more generally, in the sense organ) speaking here of sight], it is necessary that the appearances be subjected to a rule. The appearance then will become the object on the sense organ to which the object (as a thing) itself can correspond. In this way the appearance is reduced to an image or look of the object.

\textsuperscript{181} Something about the appearance will be that whereof we can assert that it is a look and image, i.e., of an object.

\textsuperscript{182} There must be a state where we are able to notice the lack of the state in question. For example we must see that the noise (of a sneeze) did not occur before the visual impression of the sneeze, i.e., the visual sneeze must be devoid of the noise. Likewise I must notice that the noise “of my hand” striking the table is not present in order that I can see that it arises upon the strike, and for that reason is the noise of my striking hand (and like the voice of a person). How we are able to notice this in advance has not yet been established in Kant’s discourse here, which is progressive.

\textsuperscript{183} That should be clear. Since there must be the absence of the state (the noise, for example) and then the state itself, there must always be at least two perceptions: the one without and the one with [but where the one without is seen (perceived) as exactly that, i.e., a negation or absence].
5.4 But because this is so constituted with every synthesis of the apprehension (as I indicated above with the appearance of a house), this does not yet distinguish itself by this from others.\textsuperscript{184}

5.5 But I also notice that if with an appearance which contains an occurrence I term the preceding state of the perception, A, and the following one, B, then B can only follow A in the apprehension, and the perception of A cannot follow B, but only precede it.\textsuperscript{185}

5.6 For example, I see a ship drifting downstream.\textsuperscript{186}

5.7 My perception of its position lower in the course of the river follows the perception of its position upstream, and it is impossible in the apprehension of this appearance that the ship be perceived first lower in the stream and then later higher.\textsuperscript{187}

5.8 Thus here the order in the succession of the perceptions in the apprehension is determined and the apprehension is tied to this order.

5.9 In the preceding example of a house my perceptions in the apprehension could begin at its gable and end at the foundation, but also begin from below and end above, and likewise I could apprehend the manifold of the empirical perspective from the right or from the left.

5.10 In the series of these perceptions therefore there was no determined object which necessitated where I would have to begin the apprehension in order to bind the manifold empirically.

\textsuperscript{184} For even the apprehension of the sneeze and the TV bird fly-by (cited in an earlier footnote) involve a series of perceptions, and so this apprehension on its own does not give us the objective state we seek.

\textsuperscript{185} Thus I am making a further distinction among the perceptions, i.e., not merely that there must be two or more, but there must be an order to them which is not assumed generally and therefore which constitutes a distinction.

\textsuperscript{186} The emphasis here is on the “downstream,” i.e., there is a direction to movement of the ship, and not merely that it is steaming.

\textsuperscript{187} Given the emphasis of the preceding statement, namely that the ship is moving downstream.
5.11 But this rule is always encountered upon the perception of something which happens, and makes the order of the successive perceptions upon one another necessary (in the apprehension of this appearance).\footnote{The rule of directed series, or ordered series. This rule will become important later when we find the exceptions to this rule. For example, I hear a noise of a sneeze and turn and see someone beginning to sneeze. But the noise did not precede the forthcoming sneeze, as Hume would have had to assume (per the apprehension), but rather what I am seeing now is the beginning of a second sneeze in succession.}

6.1 In this case therefore I will have to derive the subjective succession of the apprehension from the objective succession of the appearances because otherwise the former is entirely undetermined and distinguishes no appearance from another.

6.2 But the subjective succession proves nothing with regard to the linkage of the manifold with the object, because it is entirely contingent.

6.3 The objective succession therefore will consist in the order of the manifold of the appearance, according to which the apprehension of one thing (that which takes place) follows upon the apprehension of another (the one preceding) according to a rule.\footnote{The rule then enables me to explain the subjective perceptions and how it is that I happened to spy the series the way I did, e.g., I was looking the other way when the person first sneezed and therefore I only heard the noise and did not see the actual sneeze. In other words, it is by means of the rule that the deviation in the perception can be explained, i.e., in the actual apprehension of the appearance.}

6.4 Only in this way can I be justified in saying of the appearance itself, and not merely of my apprehension, that a succession is to be encountered in the appearance. And this means that I am unable to engage the apprehension otherwise than precisely in this succession.\footnote{It is the rule that will distinguish the objective apprehension from the subjective.}

7.1 According to such a rule therefore we must find in what in general precedes an event the condition for a rule according to which this event follows uni-

\footnote{Here the trick is to derive the subjective apprehension from the objective succession of the appearances, but the former is all that is ever given, and in it there is nothing which suggests the latter. Thus a rule must be conceived and implemented such that the objective is understood and grasped, and wherefrom then the subjective apprehension can be derived under subjective perspective conditions.}
versally and necessarily. But I cannot turn this matter around and go backward from the event and determine (via apprehension) what precedes.\textsuperscript{192}

7.2 For from the subsequent point of time, no appearance goes back to the previous point, though it does refer to something previous. In contrast the advance from a given time to the determined subsequent time is necessary.

7.3 Hence, because there is, of course, something which follows, I must refer it necessarily to something else which precedes and upon which it follows according of a rule, i.e., in a necessary way, so that the event, as the conditioned, securely indicates some sort of a condition, but this latter condition determines the event.\textsuperscript{193}

8.1 Let us assume that nothing preceded some event upon which it had to follow according to a rule, then every succession of the perception would be solely in the apprehension, i.e., arise merely subjectively. But then in that way there would be no objective determination at all as to which would have to be the predecessor and which the successor of the perceptions.\textsuperscript{194}

8.2 In this way we could simply have a play of the representations which would not refer to any object at all, i.e., no appearance whatsoever would be distinguishable from another through our perception with regard to the time relationships, because the succession in the apprehension is always unidirectional and therefore nothing is in the appearance which determines it in such a way that a certain succession is made to be objective.

8.3 Therefore I would not say that two states follow one another in the appearance; but rather only that one apprehension follows upon the other, which is merely something subjective and determines no object, and thus can in no

\begin{footnotes}
\item[192] Once the noise (of the sneeze) has occurred (per earlier footnotes), I cannot then determine by means of some apprehension what had preceded this noise, for that is already past.

\item[193] We must observe a state, and then, without being able to go back in the apprehension, we must still somehow grasp that there is a preceding state upon which what happen followed necessarily (for otherwise I am in the situation of hearing a radio play music, for example, and not being able to determine whether it just started, or whether it was on all the time and I simply did not hear it due to some preoccupation {a very common situation}).

\item[194] If nothing had to precede a perception, then there would be no order to the perceptions, and a large fire engine could roar out of a clothes closet without us ever having to wonder as to how it got in there in the first place.
\end{footnotes}
way hold as a recognition of any sort of any object (not even in the appearance).

9.1 Therefore when we come to know that something happens, then with that we always presuppose that some sort of something precedes upon which it follows according to a rule.\(^\text{195}\)

9.2 For without this, I would not be able to say of the object that it follows, because the mere succession in my apprehension, if it is not determined through a rule in reference to a predecessor, warrants no succession in the object.\(^\text{196}\)

9.3 Therefore it always happens with regard to a rule according to which the appearances are determined in their succession, i.e., as they occur, through the preceding state. It is by means of such a rule that I make my subjective synthesis (of the apprehension) objective, and solely under this presupposition is the experience of something which happens even possible.\(^\text{197}\)

10.1 It certainly does seem as though this would contradict every commentary ever made about the process of the usage of our understanding, according to which we are first led by the perception and comparison of the uniform succession of many events to earlier appearances to discover a rule in conformity to which certain events always follow upon certain appearances, and in that way are first occasioned to fashion for ourselves the concept of cause.\(^\text{198}\)

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\(^{195}\) Now we make a differentiation from the situation described in the previous paragraph, where nothing is assumed to precede necessarily. This means that assuming a precedent state is a synthetical move (of the mind). Essentially: an event is also and always an effect. This is a presupposition of our categorical understanding. This is where the understanding intervenes in the march of the apprehensions.

\(^{196}\) At most I could speak of my own representations in this sort of wise: ... D E F G H ... etc., where nothing were related to anything else. In this sense each representation begins from scratch, as it were, and is not related to the preceding nor to the following, any more than hearing a sneeze at the same time that an airplane is sighted flying between two distant buildings or noticing that two telephone wires form a right angle, or whatever.

\(^{197}\) Now we come to the point. There is no experience unless I am able to notice that two states follow one another in the object, i.e., objectively, for in the apprehension there is only contingency. Upon this insistence upon a rule for the apprehension that the perception of an occurrence depends. And that insistence is a function of the categorical connective understanding and thus is a priori and first makes experience possible.

\(^{198}\) This is the case made by David Hume.
10.2 Upon such a footing this concept would be merely empirical, and the rule which it provides, that everything which happens has a cause, would be just as contingent as the experience itself. Its universality and necessity would only be fabricated and would have no truly universal validity, because it would not be a priori, but rather based only on induction.

10.3 Here it is the same as with other pure representations a priori (e.g., space and time) which we are only able to derive from experience as a clear concept because we ourselves have introduced them into experience and in that way have first brought about experience through them.\textsuperscript{199}

10.4 It is true, of course, that the logical clarity of this representation, i.e., a rule determining the series of events, is only possible as a concept of cause if we have made a usage of it in experience, but a reference to it as a condition of the synthetical unity of the appearances in time was still the basis of the experience itself and therefore preceded it a priori.\textsuperscript{200}

11.1 It is now incumbent upon us to show through an example that we never, even in experience, attribute succession (of an event, where something, which was not previous, happens) to the object and distinguish it from the subjectivity of our apprehension except when there is a rule as a basis which requires us to observe this order of the perceptions rather than another. Indeed it is actually this necessitation which makes the representation of a succession in the object first possible.

12.1 We have representations within us of which we can also be conscious.

\textsuperscript{199} I see a bush in front of a tree. But this only possible by space being the form of my external perspective. For if I had only the bush and the tree in my perception without this form of my perspective, there would be nothing in either or both of them that would suggest "in front of" or "behind." All I would ever see would be the bush and the tree, and never the spatial relationship. Likewise I can notice that the cold has caused the water to freeze only because I myself introduce causation into the perception, for a consideration merely of the water and the cold and the ice would never tell me that the order would have to be such that the cold had to precede the ice.

\textsuperscript{200} It seems that the exposition of the concept of cause and its clear (logical) recognition only arises through experience, but still the preceding concept is necessary in order that any such experience can first arise, or even that a search is possible. It is like the preceding need for the apperception in order to have any connection, but that some connection is necessary in order to be able to recognize this apperception and identify its role in making the connection possible. There must be some possible application in order for a concept such as cause or effect to first arise to consciousness.
12.2 But regardless of how far this consciousness may extend or how precise and detailed it may be, the representations still always remain just representations, i.e., internal determinations of our mind in this or that time relationship.

12.3 Now how do we come to the idea of positing an object to these representations or of going out beyond their subjective reality as modifications and ascribing an objective one to them, whatever that might mean?\(^{201}\)

12.4 Objective meaning cannot consist in the referral to another representation (of that which we would want to call an object) because then the same question arises again: how does this representation in turn go out beyond itself and obtain objective meaning beyond the subjective meaning which is inherent to it as a determination of the state of mind?

12.5 When we examine what sort of new property the referral to an object gives to our representations, and what the dignity be which it obtains through that, we find that it does nothing further than to make the connection of the representations necessary in a certain way and subjects them to a rule; so that conversely only by having a certain order necessary in the time relations of our representations is objective meaning conveyed to them.\(^{202}\)

13.1 In the synthesis of the appearances the manifold representations also follow one another.

13.2 Now in this manner no object whatsoever is represented, because in this succession, common as it is to every apprehension, nothing is distinguished from anything else.

13.3 But as soon as I perceive or go ahead and assume in advance that in this succession there is a referral to a preceding state from which the representation follows according to a rule, then something is represented as an event or an occurrence, i.e., I recognize an object which I must place in time at a certain,  

\(^{201}\) In other words, no matter how certain I am that I have many times noticed the visuals of a sneeze (of some person at a distance) and then heard a sound (of the sneeze), what would lead me to think that this series had to be in that order, i.e., first the sneeze and then the sound?

\(^{202}\) That rule-based lock, if you will, is the only difference between noticing the subjective play of representations, no matter how regular they might be, and recognizing an object.
determined position which cannot be otherwise conveyed to it with respect to the preceding state.\textsuperscript{203}

13.4 Therefore when I perceive that something happens, then this representation indicates first that something preceded; because it is just in reference to this that the appearance obtains its temporal relationship, namely to exist after a preceding time in which it did not exist.\textsuperscript{204}

13.5 But it can obtain its determined temporal position in this relationship only by something being presupposed in a preceding time according to which it always follows, i.e., according to a rule; and in this wise resulting first in an inability on my part to reverse the series and to place what occurs in advance of that upon which it follows; and resulting secondly in the unavoidable and necessary occurrence of that event if the preceding state is granted.\textsuperscript{205}

13.6 In that way it occurs that an order arises among our representations such that the present representation (to the extent it arises) indicates a preceding one as an (as yet) undetermined correlate of this occurrence which is given, but which refers to this present representation as its consequence in a determined way and connects it necessarily with itself in time.

14.1 Now if it is a necessary law of our sensitivity, hence a formal condition of all perceptions, that the previous time necessarily determines the subsequent

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\textsuperscript{203} There is nothing which would make me go back to a preceding state in order to associate that preceding state with some current state. Empirically speaking it is inane to say, “funny thing, but every time that noise occurs I see these lips moving;” for the representation of moving lips and noise (the voice) are as different as ketchup and the sounds of a symphony. So for us to begin to notice this series, as a pattern, is already an interruption of the “normal” flow of consciousness, and a linking of two perceptions objectively, i.e., regardless of the happenstance of any given apprehension. Once we do this, however, we have experience and are able then to explain the deviations from the object, e.g., the reason I heard his voice before seeing the lips move is because I was not looking at him when he began to speak.

\textsuperscript{204} The actual perception of an event is not a subjective turn of the mind, like the salivation of Pavlov’s dogs upon hearing the bell ring, or the watering of my own mouth upon a subconscious smell of some desired dish, but rather is entirely founded upon the imposition of a rule to the many representations which crowd the mind such that a certain order arises, in this case (of the second analogy) a temporal series. Such necessity calling for an explanation (of a deviation, e.g., first hearing a siren and then seeing a fire engine) would simply never arise from empirical data alone.

\textsuperscript{205} It is then only in this way that \textit{variations} of the representations can be transformed into \textit{deviations} of the object, i.e., something which calls for an explanation, e.g., that I first hear the noise of the fire engine and then afterwards saw the fire engine. Explanation? because I was inside a building and had to wait for the fire engine to pass by a window to spy it.
\end{flushright}
time (in that I cannot achieve to the following otherwise than by means of
the preceding) then it is also an indispensable law of the empirical represen-
tation of the time series that the appearances of the preceding time determine
that existence in the subsequent, and that these appearances, as events, do
not take place except to the extent the former (preceding appearances) de-
determine the existence in time of the subsequent, i.e., secure them according
to a rule.

14.2 For it is only with the appearances that can we empirically recognize this
continuity in cohesion with time.

15.1 Understanding belongs to every experience and its possibility, and its first
accomplishment there is not to make the representation of objects distinct,
but rather to make the representation of an object in general possible.

15.2 Now this occurs by the understanding transferring the time order to the ap-
pearances and to their existence by awarding to each of these, as a sequence
(Folge), one a priori determined position with respect to the preceding ap-
pearances, without which (position) the series would not accord with time
itself which determines a priori the position to all of its parts.

15.3 Now this determination of the position cannot be borrowed from the rela-
tionship of the appearances vis-à-vis absolute time (for time is not an object
of perception), but rather it is the other way around: the appearances must
even determine their position in time to each other, and make the position
necessary in the time order, i.e., that which follows or happens must follow
according to a universal rule, upon which that which was contained in the
previous state, from which a series of the appearances is developed which,
by means of the understanding, produces and makes necessary precisely the
order and perpetual cohesion in the series of possible perceptions as it is en-
countered a priori in the form of the inner perspective (of time) in which all
perceptions would have to have their position.

16.1 That something happens therefore is a perception which belongs to a possi-
ble experience which becomes actual by looking at the appearance with re-
spect to its position as determined in time, thus as an object which can be found every time in the cohesion of the perceptions according to a rule.  

16.2 But the rule for determining something in accordance with the time series is this: in what precedes is found the condition under which the event follows every time, i.e., necessarily.

16.3 The proposition of sufficient reason therefore is the basis of possible experience, namely of the objective recognition of the appearances with respect to their relationship in the series of time.

17.1 But the basis of the proof of this proposition rests solely on the following moments:

17.2 to every empirical recognition there belongs the synthesis of the manifold through the imagination which is always successive, i.e., the representations always succeed each other in it.

17.3 But in the imagination the series is not at all determined with respect to order (regarding which would have to precede and which to follow), and the series of the representations succeeding one another can be taken just as well backwards as forwards.

17.4 But if this synthesis is a synthesis of the apprehension (of the manifold of a given appearance), the order in the object is determined or, to speak more precisely, it is an order to the successive synthesis which determines an object and, if this is granted, the other necessarily to follow.

17.5 If my perception therefore is supposed to contain the recognition of an event, since namely something actually does happen, it must be an empirical judgment in which we think to ourselves that the series is determined, i.e., that it presupposes another appearance with respect to time whereupon it follows necessarily or according to a rule. 

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206 When I discern an event, this is a possible experience. Once I am able to determine the cause of this event, then I have an actual experience.

207 Again this means that the word “event” is essentially a synonym for “effect.”
17.6 In the contrary case, if I grant the preceding and the event did not follow upon that necessarily, I would have to consider it only as a subjective play of my imagination and, if I still represented something objective with that, to term it a mere dream.

17.7 Therefore the relationship of the appearances (as possible perceptions), according to which the succeeding one (what happens) is determined through something preceding with respect to its existence necessarily and according to a rule in time, i.e., the relationship of cause to effect, is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments with respect to the series of perceptions, thus of the empirical truth of that series and therefore of experience.

17.8 Hence the principle of causal relationships in the series of the appearances is valid also before all objects of experience (under the conditions of succession) because it is itself the basis of the possibility of such an experience.

18.1 And yet a concern arises here which must be settled.

18.2 In our formula the proposition of the causal connection among the appearances is restricted to the series of the appearances, but there is still found with the usage of that, that it also fits their simultaneous accompaniment and can be cause and effect simultaneously.

18.3 There is, for example, warmth in the room which is not encountered in the open air.

18.4 I look about for the cause and find a heated oven.

18.5 Now as cause this heated oven is simultaneous with its effect, the warmth of the room. Hence there is no series here with respect to time, and still the law holds.

18.6 Most of the effecting causes in nature are simultaneous with their effects, and the time series of these effects is occasioned only by the cause being unable to discharge its entire effect in one instant.
18.7 But in the instant of the effect first arising, it is always simultaneous with the causality of its cause, because if the cause had ceased to be one instant previously, then the effect would not have arisen.

18.8 Here we must adequately note that if notice is taken of the order of time and not its passage, the relationship remains even if no time has elapsed.

18.9 The time between the causality of the cause and its immediate effect can disappear into insignificance (thus it can be simultaneous), but the relationship of the one to the other with respect to time still always remains determinable.

18.10 If I consider a ball which sits upon a feather cushion and makes a depression there as a cause, it is simultaneous with the effect.

18.11 However I still distinguish both through the time relationship of the dynamic connection of both.

18.12 For if I lay the ball on the cushion, the depression follows upon its previously smooth surface; but if the cushion has a depression (be it from how it will), there does not follow a lead ball upon it.

19.1 Accordingly in every case the time series is the single, empirical criterion of effect with reference to the causality of the cause which precedes.

19.2 The glass is the cause of the rising of the water above its horizontal surface, although both appearances are simultaneous.

19.3 For as soon as I scoop this water out of a larger container and into the glass, something follows, namely the change in the horizontal state, which it had in the larger container, into a concave one, which it takes on in the glass.

20.1 This causality leads to the concept of action, this to the concept of power, and in that way to the concept of substance.

20.2 Since I do not want to mix my critical intention (which goes solely to the source of the synthetical recognition a priori) with the dissections which concern merely the exposition (and not the expansion) of concepts, I leave
the detailed discussion of them to a future system of pure reason, although we already encounter such an analysis in rich measure in the thus far known text books of this type.

20.3 However the empirical criterion of a substance, to the extent it seems to reveal itself not through the persistence of the appearances, but rather better and more easily through action, I cannot leave untouched.

21.1 Where an action is, thus activity and force, there is also substance, and in this alone must the seat of that fruitful source of the appearances be sought.

21.2 That is well said, but if we are called to explain what we mean with that and want to avoid a vicious circle, it is not so easy to answer.

21.3 How will we immediately conclude from the act to the endurance of the actor, which is still such an essential and peculiar indicator of substance (phaenomenon)?

21.4 But according to the above, the solution of the problem has no such difficulty, even though with respect to the usual manner (of proceeding merely analytically and with concepts) it would be entirely insolvable.

21.5 Action already means the relationship of the subject of the causality to the effect.

21.6 Now because all effect consists in that which happens, thus in the mutable which time describes according to the succession, the final subject of that is the enduring as the substratum of all alternation, i.e., substance.

21.7 For according to the principle of causality, actions are always the first basis of all changes of the appearances and therefore cannot lie in a subject which itself changes, because otherwise other actions and another subject which determined this changing would be required.

21.8 Now the action of force, as a sufficient empirical criterion, proves substantiability without my having to first seek the persistence of it through compared perceptions, which also in this way could not happen with the precision which is requisite for the magnitude and rigorous generality of the concepts.
21.9 For that the first subject of the causality of all commencement and perishing
is not able itself to commence and perish (in the field of appearances) is a
sure conclusion, which turns any endurance in existence into empirical ne-
cessity, thus to the concept of a substance as appearance.

22.1 When something happens, then the sheer coming into being is already an ob-
ject of investigation of itself, without regard to what comes into being.

22.2 The transition from not-being of a state into that state, assuming that this
also does not contain any quality in the appearance, already alone requires
an investigation.

22.3 This coming into existence, as was indicated in the first analogy, does not
concern substance (for that does not come into being), but rather its state.

22.4 It is therefore merely alteration and not origination out of nothing.

22.5 If this origin is considered as an effect of an alien cause, then it is called
creation, which cannot be admitted as an event among the appearances, for
its possibility alone would of itself obliterate the unity of experience. How-
ever, if I consider all things not as phenomena but rather as things on their
own and as objects of the sheer understanding, they, although substances,
could still be considered as dependent on a foreign cause with regard to their
existence. But this would then entail entirely different meanings to words
and would not be suitable for appearances as objects of experience.

23.1 Now how in general something could be altered, how it could be possible
that upon one state in one point of time a contrary state could follow in an-
other, of this we have a priori not the least concept.

23.2 For this some knowledge with actual forces is required, which can only be
given empirically, e.g., motive forces or, which is the same thing, certain
successive appearances (as motion) which indicate such forces.

23.3 But the form of every alteration, the condition by which it alone can proceed
as a coming into being of another state (letting the content of this, i.e., the
state which is changed, be what it will), hence the succession of the states
itself (that which happens) can still be pondered a priori according to the law of causality and the conditions of time.*

* Kant’s annotation.

2.1 We need to note well that I am not speaking of the alteration of certain relationships in general, but rather of the alteration of the state.

2.2 Hence, if a body moves uniformly, it does not change its state (of motion) at all; but will do so if its motion slows or accelerates.

24.1 If a substance transits from one state A into another B, then the time point of the second is distinguished from the time point of the first state and follows it.

24.2 Likewise the second state as reality (in the appearance) is distinguished from the first, in which the second did not exist, as B is distinguished from zero; i.e., if state B were distinguished from state A only with regard to the quantity, then the alteration would be a coming into being of B-A which was not in the previous state and with regard to which it equals 0.

25.1 A question arises therefore concerning how a thing can transit from one state = A into another one = B.

25.2 Between two moments there is always a time, and between two states there is always a difference which has a size (for all parts of the appearances are always in turn quantities).

25.3 Every transition from one state into another therefore takes place in a time which is contained between two moments, of which the first determines the state from which the thing leaves, the second the state to which it achieves.

25.4 Both are the limits of the time of an alteration, thus of the intermediate state between both states, and as such belong with the entire alteration.

25.5 Now every alteration has a cause, which proves its causality in the entire time in which that precedes.
25.6 This cause therefore does not produce its alteration suddenly (at once or in one moment), but rather in a time, so that as the time grows from the beginning moment A up to its completion in B, the size of the reality (B-A) is generated through all smaller degrees which are contained between the first and the last.

25.7 Every alteration therefore is only possible through a continuous action of the causality which, to the extent it is uniform, is called a moment.

25.8 The alteration does not consist of these moments, but rather is generated by them as their effect.

26.1 Now that is the law of the continuation of all alteration, the basis of which is this: that neither the time nor also the appearance in time consists of parts which are the smallest, and that the state of the thing upon its alteration still transits through all these parts, as elements, to its second state.

26.2 There is no difference of the real in the appearance that is the smallest just as there is no difference in the size of the times that is the smallest, and so the new state of the reality grows from the first one, in which this was not, through all infinitesimal degrees of that, and where the differences between one another are in every case smaller than between 0 and A.

27.1 Now the utility that this proposition might have in the study of nature does not concern us.

27.2 But how such a proposition, which seems to expand our knowledge of nature so much, is possible completely a priori, very much requires our investigation, even if the first glance proves that it is actual and proper and we therefore might believe ourselves relieved from the question of how it might be possible.

27.3 For there are so many unfounded presumptions for the expansion of our recognition on the part of pure reason that it must be assumed as a universal principle to be distrustful for that very reason and, without documentation which can provide a thorough deduction, to believe and assume nothing of the sort, even with the clearest, dogmatic proof.
28.1 Every increase of empirical knowledge and every advance of the perception is nothing except an expansion of the determination of the inner sense, i.e., an advance in time, letting the objects be what they will, appearances or perspectives.

28.2 This advance in time determines everything and on its own is determined by nothing further, i.e., its parts are only given in time and through the synthesis of time, but not before it.

28.3 For that reason every transition in the perception to something which follows in time is a determination of time through the generation of this perception, and where that is always and in all its parts a quantity, the generation of a perception as a quantity through all degrees, of which none is the smallest, from zero on up to its determined degree.

28.4 Now from this the possibility of recognizing a law of alteration with respect to its form becomes clear.

28.5 We anticipate only our own apprehension, whose formal condition, since it resides with us before any given appearance, must in any case be capable of a priori recognition.

29.1 Accordingly just as time continues the sensitive condition a priori of the possibility of a continuous advance of that which exists to the subsequent existence, even so the understanding, by means of the unity of apperception, makes the condition a priori of the possibility of a continuous determination of all positions for the appearances in this time valid through the series of causes and effects, of which the first inevitably draws the existence of the latter along with itself, and in that way makes the empirical recognition of the temporal relationships for every time (universally) valid, and hence objectively so.
C. Third Analogy. Principle of Simultaneity
According to the Law of Reciprocation, or Communality

1.1 All substances, to the extent they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thorough reciprocation.

Proof

2.1 Things are simultaneous if the perception of the one in the empirical perspective (*Anschauung*) can follow upon the perception of the other in an alternating way (which cannot happen in the time sequence of the appearances, as was shown with the second principle).

2.2 Thus I can employ my perception first on the moon and then on the earth, or also vice versa, first on the earth and then on the moon, and because the perceptions of these objects can follow each other in an alternating way, I say they exist simultaneously.\textsuperscript{208}

2.3 Now simultaneity is the existence of the manifold in the same time.

2.4 But we cannot perceive time itself in order to infer from the fact that things are situated in the same time, that their perceptions can follow one another in an alternating manner.\textsuperscript{209}

2.5 The synthesis of the imagination in the apprehension therefore would only indicate that each of these perceptions is such which is there in the subject if the other is not, and in an alternating way, but not that the objects are simultaneous, i.e., if the one is, the other is also in the same time, and that this is necessary in order for the perceptions to be able to follow in an alternating way upon one another.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{208} Here it is given that we can do this and actually do it; now the question arises: how is this possible?

\textsuperscript{209} It would be one thing if we could look at any thing and tell the time of its existence in order then to compare this with the time of another thing and in that way to see that the two things exist in the same time; but we cannot do this.

\textsuperscript{210} Therefore since we cannot perceive time directly and discern the existence of things in that time and come in that way to recognize their simultaneity, the composition of the imagination on the apprehension would only tell us that when A is present, B is not, and vice-verse, but not that the objects are simultaneous.
2.6 Consequently an understanding concept of the reciprocating sequence of the determination of those things existing simultaneously apart from one another is required in order to say that the alternating sequence of perceptions is based in the object and in that way to represent the simultaneity as objective.

2.7 But now the relationship of the substances, in which one contains determinations whereof the basis is contained in the other, is the relationship of influence, and if in an alternating way, i.e., each containing the basis of the determinations in the other, it is the relationship of communality or reciprocal action.

2.8 The simultaneity of the substances in space therefore cannot be recognized in experience otherwise than under the presupposition of a reciprocating effect of the substances among one another. This then is also the condition of the possibility of the things themselves as objects of experience.

3.1 Things are simultaneous to the extent they exist in one and the same time.

3.2 But in what way do we recognize them as being in one and the same time?

3.3 By the order in the synthesis of the apprehension of this manifold being indifferent, i.e., can go from A through B, C, D, to E, or also vice versa from E to A.

3.4 For if it were in time successively (in the order which starts with A and ends with E), then it would be impossible to start the apprehension in the perception from E and advance backwards to A, because A would belong to the past time and therefore could no longer be an object of the apprehension.\textsuperscript{211}

4.1 Suppose now that each element of a manifold of substances as appearances were fully isolated, i.e., none acted on the other nor received influences in an alternating manner from the other, then I say that the simultaneity of the appearances would not be an object of a possible perception and that by no means of the empirical synthesis could the existence of the one lead to the existence of the other.

\textsuperscript{211} This suggests an experiment whereby the subject consciously notices the reverse of a former sequence.
4.2 For, when you think about it, if they were separated by a fully empty space, then the perception which advances in a time from one to the other would determine indeed their existence by means of a subsequent perception, but would not be able to distinguish whether that appearance followed objectively upon the first or far rather were simultaneous with it.

5.1 Apart from the mere existence therefore there must yet be something whereby A determines the position to B in time and also in turn B the position to A, because only under this condition can the conceived substances be empirically represented as existing simultaneously.\textsuperscript{212}

5.2 Now only that which is the cause of the other or its determination can determine the position to the other in time.

5.3 Therefore every substance (since it can be sequence only with respect to its determinations\textsuperscript{213}) must contain the causality of certain determinations in the other, and at the same time the effects of the causality of the other in itself, i.e., they must stand in dynamic communality (immediately or mediately) if the simultaneity is supposed to be recognized in any sort of a possible experience.

5.4 But now all of that is necessary with respect to the objects of experience, without which the experience of these objects themselves would be impossible.\textsuperscript{214}

5.5 It is necessary therefore for all substances in the appearance, to the extent they are simultaneous, to stand in thorough communality of a reciprocating effect among one other.

6.1 The word communality is equivocal in our language and can mean as much as communio, but also commercium.

\textsuperscript{212} I am thinking of an experiment where I see the sun rise and then look away and notice the changing hue of the landscape and then look back again at the sun to notice that it is also redder than it usually is later in the day.

\textsuperscript{213} It was established in the 1st Analogy that the substance continues unchanged in its quantity; and so all that could be in question now is the state of that substance, i.e., its determinations or accidents.

\textsuperscript{214} It would not occur to anyone to think that the state of the one continued unchanged when out of sight; there would be no reason to think that, and nothing would suggest that.
6.2 We make use here of the word in the latter sense, a dynamic communality, without which even the local (*communion spatii*) could never be empirically recognized.

6.3 It is easy to notice in our experiences that only the continuous influences in all portions of space can lead our sense from one object to the other, that the light which plays between our eyes and the bodies of the world effects mediate communality between us and them and proves thereby the simultaneity of the latter, that we can empirically alter no position (perceive this alteration) without the material in every case making the perception of our position possible to us and this can demonstrate its simultaneity only by virtue of its reciprocating influence and thereby out to the most remote objects, the coexistence of those objects (through only mediately).\(^\text{215}\)

6.4 Without communality every perception (of the appearance in space) is interrupted from the other and the chain of empirical representations, i.e., experience, would begin entirely anew with a new object without the previous one being able to adhere with it in the slightest or to stand in time relationships.\(^\text{216}\)

6.5 Empty space I will not refute in this way at all, for such space may always be where perceptions do not reach at all and therefore no empirical recognition of the simultaneity takes place; but then it is still no object at all for our possible experience.

7.1 In discussion the following can serve.

7.2 In our minds all appearances contained in a possible experience must stand in communality (*communio*) of the apperception and to this extent the objects are supposed to be represented as simultaneously linked existences,

\(^{\text{215}}\) Is this the reason that Kant says that we know the moon exists in a certain state when looking at the earth, for we see the effect of the light of the moon on the earth? And that we, on the earth, are reflecting also out to the moon, and then even back again, in a continuous play?

\(^{\text{216}}\) There is nothing at all in a perception that would ever suggest in any way the notion that its state continues when it is no longer a perception, and so that is a connection provided by the understanding where we can determine the simultaneity, which would be utterly impossible otherwise since the perceptions are always successive. Thus as I would look back and forth at two members of a conversation, I would keep saying, ‘Oh, Hi! How are you?’ and never come to the notion of a unified time, of my perception, at all.
Thus they must determine their positions in time reciprocally and in that way to make up a whole.\textsuperscript{217}

7.3 If this subjective communality is supposed to rest upon an objective basis or be referred to appearances as substances, then the perception of the one must, as foundation, make the perception of the other possible, and vice-versa, so that the succession, which is in the perceptions every time as apprehension, not be attributed to the objects, but rather so that these can be represented as simultaneously existing.\textsuperscript{218}

7.4 But this is an alternating influence, i.e., a real communality (\textit{commercium}) of the substances, without which therefore the empirical relationship of simultaneity could not take place in experience.

7.5 Through this \textit{commercium}, the appearances, to the extent they stand apart from one another and are still linked, make up an assemblage (\textit{compositum reale}), and similar \textit{composita} are possible in many ways.

7.6 Hence the three dynamical relationships, out of which all others arise, are those of inherence, consequence, and composition.

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8.1 These then are the three analogies of experience.

8.2 They are nothing other than the principles of the determination of the existence of appearances in time according to all three modi of time: the relationship to time itself as a magnitude (the magnitude of existence, i.e., duration), the relationship in time as a series (following one another), finally also in it as a sum total of all existence (simultaneity).

\textsuperscript{217} Thus as I turn from one to the other (in the previous footnote), I keep the one in mind (and vice-versa), and am able to see the two as in a single perception. But that means, if this is to be objective, i.e., viewable by anyone, that the one affects the other as common, reciprocal positions in a single time, that of the perception.

\textsuperscript{218} If I thought that the one came into existence or changed its state in the way that it appears, then I would not see them as simultaneous. The only way that the thought of simultaneity might arise is to see the two as mutually affecting each other, so that the one is there and influencing the other as I look at the other. I think it may somehow be related to our capacity to notice other objects (people, animals) looking at other objects.
8.3 This unity of time determination is thoroughly dynamic, i.e., time is not viewed as that in which experience determines immediately the position to every existence, which is impossible because absolute time is no object of perception by means of which appearances could be held together, but rather the rule of understanding, by which alone the existence of the appearances can obtain synthetical unity in accordance with time relationships, determines to each of them their position in time, thus a priori and with validity for each and every time.

9.1 With nature (in the empirical understanding) we mean the cohesion of the appearances with respect to their existence in accordance with necessary rules, i.e., according to laws.

9.2 There are therefore certain laws, and indeed a priori, which first make a nature possible. The empirical laws can take place and be found only by virtue of experience and indeed as a result of those original laws, according to which even experience itself first becomes possible.

9.3 Our analogies therefore actually present the unity of nature in the cohesion of all appearances under certain exponents which express nothing other than the relationship of time (to the extent it comprehends all existence in itself) to the unity of the apperception, which can take place only in the synthesis according to rules.

9.4 All together then they say: all appearances lie in a nature and must lie in that nature because without this unity a priori no unity of experience would be possible, thus also no determination of the objects of experience.

10.1 But concerning the manner of proof which we have utilized with these transcendental laws of nature and their peculiarity, a remark is to be made which must likewise be very important as a proscription for every other attempt to prove intellectual, and likewise synthetical, propositions a priori.

10.2 Had we wanted to prove these analogies dogmatically, i.e., out of concepts, i.e., everything which exists is only encountered in that which is persistent; every event presupposes something in the preceding states upon which it follows according to a rule; finally in the manifold which is simultaneous, the states are in relationship to one another simultaneously according to a rule.
(stand in communality), then all such effort would have been entirely in vain.

10.3 For we cannot at all go from one object and its existence to the existence of another or its manner of existing through mere concepts of these things, dissect them as we will.

10.4 Now what remains for us?

10.5 The possibility of experience, as a recognition, in which all objects must finally be able to be given to us if their representation is to have objective reality for us.

10.6 Now in this third thing, the essential form of which consists in the synthetical unity of apperception of all appearances, we found conditions a priori of the thorough and necessary time determination of all existence in the appearance, without which even the empirical time determination would be impossible; and we found rules of the synthetical unity a priori by means of which we could anticipate experience.

10.7 In the absence of this method and with the folly of wanting to prove dogmatically those synthetical propositions, which the experiential usage of understanding recommended as its principles, a proof of the proposition of the sufficient foundation has consequently been attempted so often, but always in vain.

10.8 No one had thought of the two other analogies, even though we always implicitly availed ourselves of such,* because the guidance of the categories was lacking, which alone, in concepts as well as in principles, uncover and disclose each omission of the understanding.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 The unity of the world whole, in which all appearances are to be linked, is obviously a mere consequence of the secretly assumed principle of all substances, which are simultaneous: for, were they isolated, then they would not have the makeup as parts of a whole, and were their connection (reciprocity of the manifold) not already necessary for the sake of simultaneity, then we would not be able to conclude from the former, as a merely ideal relationship, to the latter as a real relationship.
1.2 Nevertheless we have indicated at its position: that the communality be actually the basis of the possibility of an empirical recognition, that of coexistence, and that we therefore actually infer from the latter back to the former as its condition.
4. Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General

1.1 What agrees with the formal conditions of experience (with respect to perspective and concepts) is possible.

2.1 What coheres with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is actual.

3.1 That which coheres with the actual, as determined according to the universal conditions of experience, is necessary, i.e., exists necessarily

Exposition

4.1 The categories of modality have a certain peculiarity on their own, in that they are not determinations of the object and do not in any way augment the concept to which they are attributed as predicates, but rather only express the relationship to the recognition capacity.

4.2 If the concept of a thing is already entirely complete, I can still ask of this object whether it be merely possible or also actual or, if the latter, whether it in fact also be necessary.

4.3 In this no additional determinations are thought in the object itself, but rather merely a question arises with regard as to how it relates (together with all its determinations) to the understanding and its empirical usage and to the empirical judgmental power and to reason (in application to experience).

5.1 For that very reason the principles of modality are nothing further than explanations of the concepts of possibility, reality and necessity in their empirical usage and simultaneously providing in that way restrictions of all categories to the merely empirical usage without admitting or allowing the transcendental usage.

5.2 For if these are not to have a merely logical meaning and express the form of thinking analytically, but rather are to concern things and their possibility, actuality or necessity, then they must go to possible experience and to its synthetical unity in which alone objects of the recognition can be given.
6.1 The postulate of the possibility of things therefore requires that the concept of those things accord with the formal conditions of an experience in general.

6.2 But this, namely the objective form of experience in general, contains the very synthesis which is requisite for the recognition of the object.

6.3 A concept which encompasses within itself a synthesis is to be held as empty and referring to no object if this synthesis does not belong to experience either as borrowed from it, and then it is called an empirical concept, or as being one on which, as condition a priori, experience in general (the form of the experience) is based, in which case it is a pure concept which nonetheless belongs to experience because its object can only be encountered in experience.

6.4 For where will we obtain the character of the possibility of an object which was thought a priori through a synthetical concept if it did not arise from the synthesis which makes up the form of the empirical recognition of the object?

6.5 That no contradiction could be contained in such a concept is indeed a necessary, logical condition, but not sufficient by far for the objective reality of the concept, i.e., of the possibility of such an object as is thought through the concept.

6.6 Thus there is no contradiction in the concept of a figure which is encompassed by two straight lines, for the concept of two straight lines and their junction contains no negation of a figure. Rather the impossibility does not rest on the concept by itself, but rather on the construction of the concept in space, i.e., on the conditions of space and the determination of space. But these in turn have their objective reality, i.e., they go to possible things, because they contain a priori on their own the form of experience in general.

7.1 And now we want to set forth clearly the expanded usefulness and influence of the postulates of possibility.

7.2 If I imagine something which is persistent so that everything which alternates there belongs merely to its state, I can never recognize from such a
concept alone that such a thing be possible.

7.3 Or if I imagine something which is supposed to be so constituted that if it is assumed, something else follows it every time and unavoidably, then by all means this may be able to be so thought without contradiction. But whether such a property (as causality) is encountered with any kind of possible thing cannot be judged by this alone.

7.4 Finally, I can imagine diverse things (substances) which are so constituted that the state of the one draws a consequence in the state of the other and vice-versa. But whether such a relationship is able to befit some sort of thing cannot at all be derived from these concepts, which contain a mere arbitrary synthesis.

7.5 Therefore only by these concept expressing a priori the relationship of the perceptions in every experience do we recognize their objective reality, i.e., their transcendental truth, and indeed, of course, independently of experience, but still not independently of all reference to the form of an experience in general and to the synthetical unity in which alone objects can be empirically recognized.

8.1 But if we wanted to make entirely new concepts of substances, forces or reciprocities from the material which perception offers to us without borrowing from experience itself the example of its connection, then we would come upon sheer imaginary phantoms whose possibility has no discerning mark for itself whatsoever, because with them we do not assume experience as a teacher nor borrow these concepts from it.

8.2 Such fancied concepts cannot obtain the character of their possibility like the categories, a priori, as conditions on which every experience depends, but rather only a posteriori as such which are given through the experience itself. And their possibility must either be recognized a posteriori and empirically or it cannot be recognized at all.

8.3 A substance which were persistently present in space, but still without filling it (like that supposed something between material and thinking entities which some have wanted to introduce), or a special, fundamental power of our minds to see the future in advance (not per chance merely to infer it), or finally a mental capacity to stand with other humans in communality of
thoughts (even as remote as they may be), these are concepts whose possibility is entirely without foundation, because it cannot be based on experience and its known laws and, without that, it is an arbitrary connection of thought which, even though it contains no contradiction, can still make no claim to objective reality, thus to the possibility of such an object as we wish here to think to ourselves.

8.4 Concerning reality, it obviously cannot be thought as such in concreto without the aid of experience; because such as this can only go to the sensation as material of experience, and does not concern the form of the relationship, with which in any case we would be playing with fantasies.

9.1 But I ignore everything where the possibility can only be deduced from actuality in experience, and consider here only the possibility of things through concepts a priori. And concerning such things I continue to assert that they can never arise from such concepts of themselves alone, but rather always only as formal and objective conditions of an experience in general.

10.1 Indeed it would seem as though the possibility of a triangle could be recognized on its own from its concept (it is certainly independent of experience), for we can in fact present an object entirely a priori, i.e., construct it.\textsuperscript{219}

10.2 But because this is only the form of an object, it would still always remain a product of imagination, and the possibility of an actual object would remain yet doubtful regarding whether something more is yet required, namely that such a figure be thought under sheer conditions upon which all objects of experience rest.\textsuperscript{220}

10.3 Now that space is a formal condition a priori of all experience, that this very same fashioning synthesis, whereby we construct a triangle in the imagination, be exactly the same as that which we exercise in the apprehension of an appearance in order to make an experiential concept of it, it is that alone which connects the representation of the possibility of such a thing with this

\textsuperscript{219} This and the following sentence support my use of the pantomimic circle drawn in mid air.

\textsuperscript{220} So the pantomimic circle is not a real thing, which we always knew, but it will also not be an appearance, but simply a pure perspective, i.e., an imagined object thrust out into the space before us. Or it could be drawn on a piece of paper. It is the form that a real object could take (but we don’t want to get into “anticipations” of the forms of things).
concept.

10.4 And so the possibility of continuous magnitudes, indeed of magnitudes in general, since these concepts are all together synthetical, is never clear from the concept themselves, but rather first from them as formal conditions of the determination of objects in experience in general. Furthermore, where were we supposed to seek objects which corresponded to the concepts, were it not in experience through which alone objects are given to us?

Although without just premising experience itself, and merely in referral to the formal conditions under which in general something is determined as an object in it, thus completely a priori, but still only in the referral to it and within its boundaries, we can recognize and characterize the possibility of things.

11.1 The postulate for recognizing the reality of things requires perception, thus sensation, whereby we are indeed not immediately aware of the object itself whose existence is supposed to be recognized, but still of the cohesion of that with some kind of an actual perception according to the analogies of experience which establish all real connection in an experience in general.

12.1 In the mere concept of a thing no character of its existence can be encountered at all.

12.2 For even though such be yet so complete that not the least be lacking for thinking a thing with all its inner determinations, still existence has nothing at all to do with all that, but rather only with the question of whether such a thing is given to us so that the perception of it can precede before the concept in every case.

12.3 For the fact that the concept precedes before the perception means its mere possibility; but the perception, which provides the material for the concept, is the single character of actuality.

12.4 But even before the perception of the thing and therefore comparatively a priori, we can recognize the existence of that thing if it at least coheres with some perceptions according to the principle of empirical connection of those perceptions (the analogies).
12.5 For then the existence of things still coheres with our perceptions in a possible experience, and from our actual perception, in accordance with the guide of those analogies, we can attain to the thing in the series of possible perceptions.

12.6 Thus we recognize the existence of a magnetic material permeating all bodies from the perception of the affected iron filings, although an immediate perception of this material is impossible according to the constitution of our sense organs.

12.7 For in general, according to the laws of sensitivity and the context of our perceptions, we would also come upon the immediate, empirical perspective of that in an experience if our sense were finer, nothing of which imprecision concerns the form of possible experience in general.

12.8 Where perception and its succession reaches according to empirical laws therefore that far also reaches our recognition of the existence of things.

12.9 If we do not start out from experience or if we do not advance according to laws of the empirical cohesion of the appearances, we make vain pomp of wanting to solve or fathom the existence of any sort of thing.

12.10 But against these rules for proving existence mediately, idealism makes a mighty challenge, whose refutation is here in its proper place

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Refutation of Idealism

1.1 Idealism (I am speaking of material idealism) is the theory according to which the existence of objects in space apart from us are thought to be either merely doubtful and indemonstrable, or false and impossible, the former being the problematic idealism of Descartes, who proclaimed only one empirical assertion as indubitable, namely “I am.” The second is the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley who declared space (together with all the things to which it appends as inseparable condition) to be something which would be impossible on its own, and for that reason he also declared the things in space to be mere imagination.

1.2 Dogmatic idealism is unavoidable if we consider space as a property which is to befit things on their own; for then it is a non-thing along with all to which it serves as condition.

1.3 But the basis for this idealism has been eliminated in the transcendental aesthetic.

1.4 The probabilistic idealism, which asserts nothing about this but rather only alleges the incapacity of proving an existence apart from our own through immediate experience, is reasonable and consistent with a thorough, philosophical way of thinking, namely to permit no decisive judgment before a sufficient proof is found.

1.5 The required proof therefore must demonstrate that we also have experience of outward things and not merely imagination. This proof cannot occur otherwise than by proving that even our internal experience, undoubted by Descartes, is only possible under the presupposition of outward experience.

Theorem

2.1 The mere (though empirically determined) consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space apart from me.\(^{221}\)

Proof

\(^{221}\) For an elaboration of the proof of this see “Concise Refutation” section of Recognizing Dreams.
3.1 I am aware of my existence as determined in time.  

3.2 Every time determination presupposes something enduring in perception.  

3.3 But this enduring cannot be a perspective within me.  

3.4 For all determination foundations of my existence which can be encountered within me are representations and, as such, are in need of something enduring distinguishable from them, with reference to which their own alternations, thus my own existence in the time in which they alternate, can be determined.  

3.5 The perception of this persistence therefore is possible only through a thing apart from me and not through the mere representation of a thing apart from me.  

3.6 Consequently the determination of my existence in time is only possible through the existence of actual things which I perceive apart from me.

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222 I am not just aware of my existence, but also that I exist in time and in a now which has arisen, i.e., was preceded with an earlier now, which is now before.

223 This should be clear with the experience of going to sleep, i.e., having awaken and noticing that time has passed based on the continuation andalteration of things about me, e.g., the illumination of the room.

224 In a dream there is no suggestion of anything existing apart from my dream.

225 This sentence and the preceding one, in accordance with the Preface to the B edition of the CPR (beginning on or around page 20), replace the following original one: “But this persisting cannot be something in me precisely because my existence can first be determined in time through this persistence.”

226 This means that a representation of persistence is itself only another representation, and so we could not utilize that to see ourselves in time, for that would still need to be positioned in an array that we call time. In other words, the perceptions follow one after the other, namely I must first have the persistent, external object in order to realize that my own perceptions are in my own subjective time, e.g., that things happen between perceptions, e.g., that I open my eyes after having not only shut them, but dreamed, all of which, as perceptions, are indistinguishable as representations. I can’t just dream this and that as having taken place and then wake up and know that I was just dreaming. To know that I was dreaming I have to contrast the dreams with some persisting object, e.g., the bed or bedroom, and note that time has passed from when I first lay down in the bed, e.g., the sun is shining while earlier it was dark.

227 While space is a sheer representation, the things seen in space are in space and therefore as actually apart from me. This, I gather, is different from seeing the things in space as mere representations. The little Necker Cube I draw in my doodle is a representation of something in space, but it is not the perception of something in space. A landscape painting is seen apart from me and on the wall, and hence as in space; but the objects represented in the painting are not seen in space but as representations of things in space. We obviously can make this distinction.
3.7 Now consciousness in time is necessarily joined with the consciousness of the possibility of this time determination.\textsuperscript{228}

3.8 Therefore it is also necessarily joined with the existence of things apart from me, as a condition of time determination, i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is simultaneously an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things apart from me.

4.1 Remark 1.

4.2 In the preceding proof, we see the play which idealism prompted rebounding against itself, and indeed rightly so.

4.3 Idealism assumed that the only immediate experience was the inward, and that only an inference were made from that to outer things, but, as always when inferring from given effects to determined causes, only in an undependable way because the cause of the representations can also lie within us ourselves, which we then perhaps falsely ascribe to outer things.

4.4 But here it is proven that outer experience is actually immediate,* that indeed not the consciousness of our own existence, but still the determination of that existence in time, i.e., inner experience, is possible only by means of it.\textsuperscript{229}

4.5 The representation, “I am,” which expresses that consciousness which can accompany all thinking, does, of course, immediately embrace the existence of a subject within itself, but is not yet a recognition of that subject, thus also not an empirical recognition, i.e., experience. The reason for this is because in addition to the thought of something existent, empirical recognition calls for perspective and here internal perspective, with respect to which, i.e., to

\textsuperscript{228} How else could I represent time to myself if not through a determination of that time, that there be an orderly positioning of events and states according to time, e.g., this and then that. Otherwise diverse representations can arise to mind (which I now call ordered in time), but without the least reference to their order of original appearance, and in which case the notion of time would be meaningless. I can therefore only be conscious of myself in time to the extent I am conscious of my capacity to order things in time.

\textsuperscript{229} Suppose I had no outer experience, but merely representations of outer things; then that would be like a dream, and in that dream I would not be able to make any determination of my own existence because there would be nothing against which or in comparison to which I could relate my representations. I think it would be like trying to discern motion without any fixed backdrop or background on which to notice that motion.
time, the subject must be determined, and for such determination external objects are unquestionably required, and so internal experience itself is possible only mediately and only by means of external experience.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 The immediate consciousness of the existence of outer things is not presupposed in this theorem, but rather proven, whether we can grasp the possibility of this consciousness or not.

1.2 The question with regard to the latter would be whether we had only an internal sense, but not an outer one, but merely outer imagination.

1.3 But it is clear that in order even to imagine something as external, i.e., to exhibit it to the sense in the perspective, we already have an outer sense and must distinguish immediately thereby the mere receptivity of an outer perspective from the spontaneity which characterizes every imagination.

1.4 For merely even to imagine an outer sense would destroy the perspective capacity which is supposed to be determined through the imagination.²³⁰

5.1 Remark 2.

5.2 Now every experiential usage of our recognitive capacity in the determination of time completely accords with this.

5.3 Not only that we cannot perceive any time determination except by means of the change in our relationship (movement) in referral to the persistent in space (e.g., the movement of the sun with respect to the objects of earth), but also because we have nothing persistent at all by which, as perspective, we could support the concept of a substance, except merely the material and even this persistence is not drawn from external experience, but rather is presupposed a priori as the necessary condition of every time determination,²³¹ thus also as the condition of the internal sense with respect to our own existence through the existence of external things.

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²³⁰ Here Kant will not say that external experience is more reliable than the internal (which would be quite a twist indeed), but merely that the external experience precedes in time necessarily in order for the internal experience to become recognized as real.

²³¹ This will likely refer to the First Analogy where we recognize substance as that which continues and where all changes are simple alterations (which in turn would refer to Second or Third Analogy)
5.4 The consciousness of my own self in the representation “I” is not a perspective at all, but rather a mere intellectual representation of the self activity of a thinking subject.

5.5 Accordingly this “I” also does not have the least predicate of perspective which, as persistent, could serve as a correlate to the time determination in the internal sense; somewhat as impenetrability does with the material as empirical perspective.\(^{232}\)

6.1 Remark 3.

6.2 But simply because the existence of external objects is required for the possibility of a determined consciousness of ourselves, it does not follow that every viewable representation of external things simultaneously encompasses their existence, for the former can very well be the mere workings of the imagination (in dreams as well as in hallucination). But it is this merely through the reproduction of earlier external perceptions which, as was shown, are possible only through the actuality of external objects.\(^{233}\)

6.3 All we wanted to do here was to show that internal experience in general is only possible through external experience in general.

6.4 Whether this or that alleged experience not be mere imagination, must be worked out according to the particular determination of that, and through cohesion with the categories of all actual experience.

* * *

\(^{232}\) The analysis of “I” says nothing whatsoever about duration, but merely that it is.

\(^{233}\) I am able to appreciate the illusion of dreams only by first having conceived of an existing, external world, such that some representation might subsequently be shown as dreams, e.g., the representations between going to bed and getting out of bed. This is accomplished, by the way, by finding the smoothness and fit between representations in the so-called awake state and the contrasting jaggedness of the representations in the sleep state (between going to bed and getting out of bed), i.e., while these sleep perceptions might be smooth between them, e.g., standing before the King of Egypt and then smashing a pyramid with your fist, they are jagged with regard to the representations in the awake state, and for this reason are called dreams and reality respectively. This, I think, also refers to the Fourth Paralogism of the A version (Appendix 1.3, beginning on or near page 755). Also it is, perhaps, only by virtue of the external experience that we would ever be surprised to have an hallucination. See also Wesley and Rudisill on Discerning Dreams.
7.1 Concerning finally the third postulate, this goes to the material necessity in existence and not to the mere formal and logical in the coupling of the concepts.

7.2 Now since no existence of the objects of the senses can be recognized completely a priori, but still comparatively a priori, relative to another existence already given, but also nonetheless we can then come only upon that existence which must be contained somewhere in the context of the experience of which the given perception is a part, it follows that the necessity of the existence can never be recognized from concepts, but rather always only from the connection with that which is perceived according to universals laws of experience.

7.3 Now there is no existence which, under the condition of other given appearances, could be recognized as necessary except the existence of the effects from given causes according to laws of causality.

7.4 Therefore it is not the existence of things (substances), but rather their state, whereof alone we can recognize the necessity and indeed from other states which are given in perception.

7.5 From this it follows that the criterion of necessity lies solely in the law of the possible experience, that everything which occurs is determined a priori in the appearance through its cause.

7.6 Hence we recognize only the necessity of the effects in nature whose causes are given to us, and the feature of necessity in existence does not reach further than the field of possible experience, and even in this it does not hold for the existence of things as substances because these, as empirical effects of something which occurs and comes about, can never be viewed.

7.7 Necessity therefore concerns only the relationship of appearances with respect to the dynamic laws of causality and the possibility based thereon of concluding a priori from some sort of given existence (of a cause) to another existence (effect).

7.8 Everything which happens is hypothetically necessary. That is a principle which subjects the alteration in the world to a law, i.e., to a rule of necessary existence, without which nature would not even once take place.
7.9 Thus the proposition that nothing happens through blind chance (in mundo non datur casus), is a law of nature a priori; likewise: no necessity in nature is chance, but rather conditioned, thus understandable necessity (non datur factum).

7.10 Both are such laws, through which the play of alterations is subject to a nature of the things, or, and which is the same thing, to the unity of the understanding, in which alone they can belong to an experience as the synthetical unity of the appearances.

7.11 Both of these principles belong to the dynamic ones.

7.12 The first is actually a sequence of the principle of causality (under the analogies of experience).

7.13 The second belongs to the principle of modality which adds to the causal determination yet the concept of necessity, but which stands under a rule of understanding.

7.14 The principle of continuity forbade any leap in the series of the appearances (alterations) (in mundo non datur saltus), and also every breech or gap between two appearances in the sum total of all empirical perspectives in space (non datur hiatus). For we can express the proposition so: that into experience, nothing can enter which would prove a vacuum or even allow only a part of the empirical synthesis.

7.15 For concerning emptiness, which we may think to ourselves outside of the field of possible experience (of the world), such does not belong to the jurisdiction of the mere understanding, which decides only about questions which concern the utility of given appearances to the empirical recognition and which is a task for idealistic reason which goes out beyond the sphere of a possible experience and wants to judge of that which encircles and delimits this, hence must be weighed in the transcendental dialectic.

7.16 These four propositions (in mundo non datur hiatus, non datur saltus, non datur casus, non datur factum), even as every principle of a transcendental origin, we can easily make representable according to their order conformable to the categories and prove to each its place, but the already practice reader will do this for himself or easily discover the guides thereto.
7.17 But they all finally reconcile themselves by admitting nothing in the empiri-
cal synthesis which could do damage or infringement to the understanding and to the continuous cohesion of all appearances, i.e., to the unity of its con-
cepts.

7.18 For it is that alone in which the unity of experience, in which all perceptions must have their position, becomes possible.

8.1 Whether the field of possibility be greater than the field which contains eve-
rything actual, but whether this in turn be greater than the number of what is necessary, those are pleasant questions and indeed capable of synthetical so-
lution, but which also only come under the jurisdiction of reason, for they al-
lege to say about as much as whether all things as appearances belong all to-
gether in the sum total and the context of a single experience of which each given perception is a part which therefore could be joined with no other ap-
pearances, or whether my perceptions can belong to more than one possible experience (in its universal context).

8.2 In general understanding gives to experience a priori only the rule according to the subjective and formal conditions of sensitivity as well as of the apper-
ception which alone makes it possible.

8.3 Other forms of perspective (than space and time), likewise other forms of un-
derstanding (other than the discursive one of thinking, or recognition through concepts), even if they were possible, we can in no way whatsoever devise and make comprehensible to ourselves. But even if we could, they still would not belong to the experience, as the single recognition wherein objects are given to us.

8.4 Whether other perceptions than those in general belonging to our entire, pos-
sible experience and therefore whether an entirely different field of material could yet take place, the understanding cannot decide--it only deals with the synthesis of the what is given.

8.5 Otherwise the pitifulness of our usual conclusions whereby we bring forth a great realm of possibility, of which all actuality (every object of experience) is only a small part, is quite obvious.

8.6 From “all actuality is possible” there follows in a natural way in accordance
with the logical rule of conversion the merely particular proposition, “some possible is actual”, which then seems to mean as much as “there is much possible which is not actual.”

8.7 Indeed it would seem that we could also directly place the count of the possible above that of the actual, because to the former something must be yet added in order to make up the latter, the actual.

8.8 But I am not familiar with this addition to the possible.

8.9 For what was supposed to be yet contributed beyond that were impossible.

8.10 To my understanding can only be added something beyond the agreement with the formal conditions of experience, namely the linkage with some kind of perception, but what is connected with these according to the empirical laws is actual, even though it is not immediately perceived.

8.11 But that there be in the thorough cohesion with that, which is given to me in perception, another series of appearances that therefore more than a single all encompassing experience be possible, does not permit of inference from that which is given, and yet much less without some kind of something being given, because without material nothing allows of being thought anywhere.

8.12 What is possible only under conditions, which themselves are merely possible, is not so in every intention.

8.13 But the question is taken in this latter way, if we wish to know whether the possibility of things stretches further than experience can reach.

9.1 I have only mentioned these questions in order to leave no deficiencies in what, according to common opinion, belongs to concepts of the understanding.

9.2 But in fact the absolute possibility (which holds in every intention) is not a concept of understanding and can in no way be of empirical usage, but rather pertains solely to reason which goes out beyond all possible, empirical, understanding usage.

9.3 Thus we have had to be content here with a merely critical remark, but for the
rest have left the matter in obscurity until a further, future treatment.

10.1 Since I want only to finish this fourth number and simultaneously the system of all foundational principles of pure understanding, I must yet indicate the reason why I have named the principles of modality precisely postulates.

10.2 Here I will not take this expression in the meaning which some recent, philosophical authors have given it, contrary to the sense of the mathematicians to whom it still actually belongs, namely that postulating is supposed to mean as much as issuing a proposition as immediately certain without justification or proof. For if we were supposed to admit such with synthetical propositions, even as evident as they may be, that we might note them down at the appearance of their own expression with the unconditioned acclaim and no deduction, then all critique of the understanding is lost. And since there is no lack of haughty presumptions which even the common belief does not deny (but which is no credit), our understanding will stand open to every fancy without being able to refuse its approval to the pronouncements which, although improper, still demand to be admitted in just the same tone of conviction as actual axioms.

10.3 If therefore a determination is attached synthetically and a priori to the concept of a thing, then, if not a proof, at least a deduction of the legitimacy of such an assertion must be unavoidably attached to such a statement.

11.1 But principles of modality are not objectively synthetical, because the predicates of possibility, actuality and necessity do not at all increase the concept of which they are spoken by adding something yet to the representation of the object.

11.2 But since they nonetheless are still always synthetical, they are so only subjectively, i.e., to the concept of a thing (real) of which they otherwise say nothing, they add the power of recognition, wherein it originates and has its place so that if it is in connection with the formal conditions of experience merely in the understanding, its objects is called possible; if in cohesion with perception (sensation as material of the senses) and determined through this by means of the understanding, then the object is actual; if determined through the cohesion of the perceptions according to concepts, the object is called necessary.
11.3 The principle of the modality therefore says nothing else of such a concept than the action of the recognitional capacity, whereby it is generated.

11.4 Now a postulate in mathematics is called a practical proposition which contain nothing except the synthesis whereby we first give ourselves an object and generate its concept, e.g., to describe a circle on a surface with a given line from a given point and therefore cannot be proven because the procedure which it requires is exactly that by which we first generate the concept of such a figure.

11.5 So accordingly we can postulate the principles of modality with exactly the same right because they do not increase the concept of things in general* but rather only indicate the manner in which in general it is joined with the capacity of recognition.

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 Through the actuality of a thing I indeed assume more, of course, than the possibility, but not in the thing, for that can never contain more in the actuality than what was contained in its complete possibility.234

1.2 On the contrary, since the possibility was merely a position of things in referral to the understanding (its empirical usage), the actuality is likewise a linkage of the that with the perception.

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234 This will come up again in the dialectical consideration of God.
General Remarks To The System Of Principles

1.1 It is quite remarkable that we can penetrate the possibility of no single thing according to the mere categories, but rather must always have a perspective at hand to establish the objective reality of the pure understanding concept.

1.2 Take for example the categories of relation.

1.3 How 1. something can exist only as subject, and not as the mere determination of other things, i.e., be substance; or 2. how it can be that because something is, that something else would have to be, thus how something in general can be cause; or 3. how, if several things exist, out of what in one of them is present something must follow upon the remainder and so in an alternating way, and in this manner a communality of substances can take place. None of this can be penetrated at all from mere concepts.

1.4 Precisely the same holds also of the remaining categories, e.g., how one can be the same with many together, i.e., a magnitude, etc.

1.5 Therefore as long as a perspective is lacking, we do not know whether we think an object through the categories or even whether anywhere any sort of object at all is able to befit them. And so we certify in this way that they are not recognitions at all of themselves, but rather mere thought forms for making recognitions out of given perspectives.—

1.6 Just for that reason it also comes about that no synthetical proposition can be made out of the categories alone.

1.7 E.g., in every existence there is substance, i.e., something which can exist only as subject and not as mere predicate. Or everything is a quantity, etc., where there is nothing at all which could serve us in going out beyond a given concept and connecting with it another one.

1.8 Hence there has never been any success in proving a synthetical proposition from mere pure understanding concepts, e.g., the propositions that everything existing contingently has a cause.

1.9 No one could ever come further than proving that without this referral we could not at all comprehend the existence of the contingent, i.e., could not recognize a priori the existence of such a thing through the understanding.
But it does not follow from that, that just this is also the condition of the possibility of matters on their own.

1.10 Hence if we will look back according to our proof of the principle of causality, we will soon become aware that we could prove that only with regard to objects of a possible experience: everything that happens (every event) presupposes a cause, and indeed so by being able to prove it also only as a principle of the possibility of experience, thus of the recognition of an object given in the empirical perspective and not out of mere concepts.

1.11 That nevertheless the proposition, “every contingent would have to have a cause” is clearly evident to everyone from mere concepts is not to be denied. But still the concept of the contingent is already so comprehended that it does not contain the category of modality (as something, the not-being of which allows of being thought), but rather that of relation (as something which can exist only as sequent of another) and, of course, there it is an identical proposition, “what can exist only as consequence has its cause.”

1.12 In fact if we are supposed to give examples of continent existence we always appeal to alterations and merely to the possibility of the thought of the opposite.*

1.13 But alteration is an event which as such is possible only through a cause, the not-being of which therefore is possible for itself. And so we recognize the contingency in this way, that something can exist only as the effect of a cause. Hence if a thing is assumed as contingent, it is an analytical proposition to say, “it has a cause.”

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 We can easily think to ourselves the not-being of matter, but the ancients still did not conclude from that to its contingency.

1.2 However even the alternation of being and not-being of a given state of something, in which all alteration consists, does not at all prove the contingency of this state from the actuality of its opposite, as it were, e.g., the rest of a body which follows upon the motion, still does not prove the contingency of the motion of that from the fact that the first is the opposite of the latter.

1.3 For this opposite here is only logical and not really in contrary opposition to the other.
1.4 We would have to prove that instead of the motion in the preceding time point, it was possible that the body had rested then in order to prove the contingency of its motion, not that it rested later. For there both opposites could consist very well with each other.

2.1 But even more remarkable is this: in order to understand the possibility of things as a consequence of the categories and therefore to demonstrate the objective reality of the categories, we do not have need simply of perspectives, but rather always in fact of external perspectives.

2.2 If we take, e.g., the pure concept of relation, we find that 1. in order to give something persisting in the perspective corresponding to the concept of substance (and demonstrate in that way the objective reality of this concept), we have need of a perspective in space (of material) because space alone is persistently determined while time, thus everything which is the internal sense, flows constantly.

2.3 2. In order to describe alteration as the perspective corresponding to the concept of causality, we must take motion as alteration in space as an example. Indeed it is only in that way that we can in fact make alterations viewable, the possibility of which no pure understanding can comprehend.

2.4 Alteration is the connection of contradictorily opposed determinations in the existence of one and the same thing.

2.5 Now how it is possible that from a given state, a state contrary to it of the very same thing would follow, cannot only no reason make comprehensible without an example, but not even understandable without perspective. And this perspective is that of movement of a point in space, whose existence in diverse location (as a consequence of contrarily opposed determinations) makes alteration viewable to us. For in order afterwards to make even inner change thinkable to us, we must take time, as the form of inner sense, figuratively through a line and the inner alteration through the drawing of this line (movement), thus the successive existence of ourselves in diverse states com-

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235 I wonder if there is a time when we look at something and close our eyes and then open them again and notice that the same scene returns? Or that we verify the real object by touching it and matching touch and sight?
prehensible through outer perspective; whereof the actual basis of this is that every alteration presupposes something enduring in the perspective in order even to be perceived only as alteration, but in the inner sense no enduring perspective at all is encountered.—

2.6 Finally the category of communality, with respect to its possibility, is not at all to be comprehended through mere reason and therefore it is not possible to penetrate the objective reality of this concept without perspective and indeed outer perspective in space.

2.7 For how will we think to ourselves the possibility that if several substances exist, something (as effect) is able to follow in an alternating manner from the existence of the one to the existence of the other and therefore because something is in the former, something would have to be also in the latter, which cannot be understood from the existence of the latter alone? For this is what is required for communality, but it is not comprehensible at all among things which completely isolate themselves through their respective subsistence.

2.8 Hence Leibniz, by attributing a communality to the substances of the world only as understanding alone thinks them, needed a divinity for the agency, for from their existence alone it quite properly seemed incomprehensible to him.

2.9 But we can indeed make the possibility of communality apprehensible (of substances as appearances) if we represent them in space, hence in outer perspective.

2.10 For this already contains within itself a priori formal, outer relationships as conditions of the possibility of the real (in action and reaction, thus communality).—

2.11 Just so it can be easily established that the possibility of things as magnitude and therefore the objective reality of the category of magnitudes, can also be demonstrated only in outer perspective, and only by means of it then afterwards to be applied to the inner sense.

2.12 But in order to avoid digression I must leave the examples of this to the reflection of the reader.

3.1 This entire remark is of great importance, not only in order to certify our pre-
ceding refutation of idealism, but yet far more, if the discussion is of self rec-
ognition out of the mere inner consciousness and the determination of our na-
ture without assistance of our empirical perspective, to indicate the limits of
the possibility of such a recognition.

4.1 Therefore the final inference of this entire section is that all principles of pure
understanding are nothing further than principles a priori of the possibility of
experience. And it is to the latter alone that all synthetic propositions a priori
also refer, indeed their possibility entirely depends upon this referral.
1.1 We have now not only traversed the land of the pure understanding and taken each part of it carefully into consideration, but have also surveyed it and determined the location of each element in it.

1.2 But this land is an island and enclosed by nature itself within unalterable boundaries.

1.3 It is a land of truth (an enticing name), surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the actual seat of semblance, where many fog banks and much rapidly melting ice belie new lands and constantly deceive the seafarer roving about in search of discoveries with empty hopes, and entangling him in adventures which he cannot resist and still also can never bring to an end.\footnote{It is a “land of truth” because it is a land where there is a correspondence of object and recognition. This will not be the case when we leave this shore and go into the sea of metaphysics.}

1.4 But before we venture out upon this sea to explore it thoroughly in all latitudes and ascertain whether there be something hopeful in them, it will be useful to cast yet a glance over the map of the land which we want to leave and to ask first whether we could not in any case be satisfied with what it contains within itself, or even necessarily have to be satisfied if there is no soil anywhere else which we could cultivate. Secondly, with what title do we posses even this land and can hold ourselves secured against all hostile claims?

1.5 Even though we have already sufficiently answered these questions in the course of the analytic, still a summary review of its solutions can strengthen the conviction by uniting its moments at a single point.

2.1 Accordingly we have seen that everything which the understanding creates of itself without borrowing from experience, it still has for no other purpose than solely for the use for experience.
2.2 The principles of pure understanding, be they a priori constitutive (as the mathematical) or merely regulative (as the dynamic), contain nothing but the pure schema, as it were, to possible experience. For experience has its unity only from the synthetical unity which the understanding imparts originally and of itself to the synthesis of the imagination in reference to the apperception, and upon which the appearances, as data to a possible recognition, must already stand a priori in referral and unanimity.  

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237 So there is unity in the understanding via a schema (the principles of experience), and this provides guide to the productive imagination, and this unity, upon the successful function of this imagination, is reflected in the unified apperception, i.e., there arises a single consciousness (composed of many individual representations) via a unification (just described) which includes the immediate perception and, along with it, all other perceptions, they having been attained earlier (or will be later) with respect to this same set of categories and then judged of things in time and space. So then and in so many words: the senses give us a synopsis (or overview of a manifold) which is intriguing, expressing as it does a pattern or affinity, and we apprehend this and play with it in our imagination, and come up with something we call an object, and the form of this object in the understanding is the same as the form of the steps entailed in combining two perceptions of this object (individually different and distinguishable) into a single consciousness called an experience). So we come back, I think, to the Transcendental Object = X = nature which authorizes our presumption for dealing with the appearances (Erscheinungen) before us, and by applying an original unity (a set of laws called nature) are able to perceive an object in an objective way (a recognition of an object which also means a continuing substance) and then perceive this object objectively in time and space, affected by causes (in different times per the 2nd Analogy) and affecting and being affected simultaneously by other objects (in one and the same time per the 3rd Analogy). So, Kant has told us, the conditions for the experience with the object (after Hume) are also the conditions for the perception of the object. The most general rule is that all things, i.e., (here for us) appearances, are subject to a single set of laws, such that all things are connected. That's what the understanding brings to the table: the notion of connection and the assumption in utilizing these connections in dealing with appearances. We don't originally realize that our entire perceivable universe is a projection within the brainarium in the brain, and so we just assume that all things are connected and then justify that assumption by the fact of human experience, e.g., that tables don't get smaller as Hume draws further away from them. We judge that things do not diminish or increase, or vanish and originate. And so once we recognize an object in time and space, e.g., recognize a table as an object, we judge of it that it abides and only its state changes. Thus we can identify a chair when blue and when red by noting that the object is not blue chair or red chair, but chair and that blue and red are colors, i.e., they represent the make up or material that composes the object. They are not the object, but only attributes of the object. We do not recognize red as the form of an object such that red could be an apple sometimes and a fire engine sometimes, rather we recognize that the apple is red and that the fire engine is red. This is a judgment of the perception, or rather an anticipation of the object, namely it will be different from the material and the material can vary. And so immediately we judge at first glance that the color of the object can vary, and justify this later by pointing to the color of chairs and not the chairs of color, as though the color could be a table or chair. And so, using this as an example, we judge of real objects, e.g., the table (as opposed to the appearance of a table in a painting, for example) is here now (a perception) and abides. We continue to judge, e.g., that things which occur had to have been preceded by something which can account for the earlier absence, i.e., the fact that something was definitely absent, and that is given in the recognition of the cause. Thereupon the perception is made objective, I didn't just happen to see that B existed before I thought about A, I know I did (or could have) because that is why B is now here before me. It is indeed something new that arose in a time, and upon a time in which it did not exist, a time represented by A (as cause). See Perceptions and Affinity.
2.3 But now even though these understanding rules are not only true a priori, but rather in fact are the source of all truth (i.e., the agreement of our recognition with objects by containing within themselves the basis of the possibility of experience as the summary of all recognitions in which objects may be given to us), still it does not seem sufficient simply to allow what is true to come forth, but rather to render what we desire to know.

2.4 Therefore if we learn nothing more through this critical examination than what we would have easily come upon anyway on our own in the merely empirical usage of understanding even without such subtle inquiries, then it would seem that the advantage to be drawn from all this were not worth our expense and preparation.

2.5 Now we can answer indeed that no impertinence is more disadvantageous to the expansion of our recognition than that of always wanting to know the utility in advance before we engage in researches and before we could make the least concept of its use, even if that were placed before our eyes.

2.6 However there is still an advantage which can be made comprehensible and, at the same time, consequential to the most rebellious and disenchanted apprentice of such transcendental inquiries, namely that the understanding, which is occupied merely with its empirical usage and does not yearn for the sources of its own recognition, is able to advance very well indeed as such. But there is one thing it cannot perform at all, i.e., it cannot determine the limits of its usage and to know what may lie within or without its entire sphere. For it is precisely the deep explorations which we have employed that are required for knowing that.

2.7 And if it cannot discern whether certain questions lie within its purview or not, then it can never be sure of its claims and possessions, and may expect

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238 Here Kant must be talking about metaphysics. He wants to show how it is that metaphysics is fruitless and to do this he needs to contrast it with the sciences and find out where that jump takes place from the certitude of science to the indecisiveness of metaphysics. And so the whole point of the Aesthetic and the Analytical is to open the door to understanding how it is that pure reason seems so indecisive. It does not need to be undertaken in order to justify the mathematical and empirical sciences, for they stand firm without such an inquiry. The great task before Kant is to end the strife of metaphysics. That's the point of the CPR.

239 I remember the story of Euclid having a slave give a student a penny for, as he put it, that student will not learn unless he is paid.
many embarrassing reprimands as it unceasingly oversteps the limits of its territory (as is unavoidable) and gets lost in mania and deceptions.\textsuperscript{240}

3.1 That the understanding therefore is able to make no transcendental, but only an empirical, use of all its foundational principles a priori and even of all of its concepts, is a proposition which, if it can be recognized with conviction, has important implications.\textsuperscript{241}

3.2 The transcendental usage of a concept in any sort of principle is this: it is referred to things in general and on their own, while the empirical usage is restricted merely to appearances, i.e., objects of a possible experience.

3.3 But that everywhere only the latter is able to occur, we see from the following.

3.4 For every concept there will be required first the logical form of a concept (of the thinking) and then secondly also the possibility of giving it an object to which it refers.

\textsuperscript{240} For the very sake of professors of rational speculation we need to be able to tell which question is suitable for metaphysics and which is not. And this can only be accomplished via a thorough critique of theoretical rationality itself. Exactly what is it that we can expect from rationality? Musing now I wonder if a big part of the problem of pure reasoning is that we take the certified objects of experience and presume to extend our knowledge of those objects far beyond the possibility of any experience, as, for example, when we say the soul is a substance and thus does not arise or perish, but endures. Since this cannot be based on any perception, it is impossible to recognize a soul in any experience. But pure reason, as will be seen, undertakes to pontificate rationally upon the idea of a soul and comes, or thinks, to recognize it as a real object. It dreams of this rational concoction called soul and presumes that it not only is a concept, but a real object, a substance. This arises by virtue of taking the grammatical “I” of all our sentences and the consciousness accompanying those sentences and recognizing that they are an identity grammatically and taking that grammatical identity for the recognition of the existence of an identical soul through all time (like a substance, like the material of a table).

\textsuperscript{241} So the understanding reaches out to all things, but is able to validate this seemingly impertinent presumption in the field of experience because it is able to judge of things with regard to time and space. But since time and space are nothing more than the take/perspective we have of the panorama unfolding in our brainarium (within the physical confines of the brain), and since they have nothing to do with things on their own which are apart from the brainarium (where only appearances appear, our own productions [fashioned by the brain into projections inside the brain]), the understanding can say nothing definitive about this assumed realm of things on their own which we must presuppose for the sake of experience, but which we can never even think except negatively with regard to the brainarium, e.g., they are not in time or in space, they are not caused with respect to time, they do not interact on their own as such with other things, etc.
3.5 Without this latter, it has no sense and is completely void of content, even though it may still contain the logical function for making a concept from subsequent data.

3.6 Now the object cannot be given to a concept otherwise than in the perspective, and even if a pure perspective is yet a priori possible before the object, still this can only receive its object, thus objective validity, through the empirical perspective of which that pure perspective is the mere form.\(^{242}\)

3.7 All concepts therefore and with them all principles, regardless of how a priori possible they may be, still refer to empirical perspectives, i.e., to data for possible experience.

3.8 Without this they have no objective validity at all, but are a mere play of the imagination or the understanding with their respective representations.

3.9 Consider the concepts of mathematics, for example, and indeed first in their pure perspectives, e.g.,

3.10 space has three dimensions, between two points there can be only one straight line, etc.

3.11 Although all of these principles and the representation of the object with which that science is occupied are generated entirely a priori in the mind, they still would mean nothing at all if we could not always establish their meaning with appearances (empirical objects).

3.12 Therefore we also require that an isolated concept be made sensible, i.e., the object corresponding to it be described in the perspective, because otherwise the concept (as we say) would remain without sense, i.e., without meaning.

\(^{242}\) Without this empirical element there can be no objectivity, for while I can draw a circle or other figure in mid air, it is not objective in that I cannot require of all people that they can see it and locate it in space (and indeed it is only imaginary, though still to be located in space as aspects are pointed out). This is the mere form of a possible appearance. It is only when encased in sensation that it is possibly a real object in space (unlike the rainbow), and which might then be required of all people, i.e., objectively. This is a reminder that we are able to distinguish between the mere shape of an object as a drawing and the ability of that object to exist. Kant mentions this restriction on the objects of pure mathematics in TDB 22 (beginning on or near page 138).
3.13 Mathematics fulfills this requirement through the construction of the shape which is an appearance present to the senses (even though produced a priori).

3.14 The concept of magnitude in this very science seeks its support and sense in the number, but this in turn on the fingers, the beads of the abacus or in tick marks and points which we can have before our eyes.

3.15 The concept always remains generated a priori, together with the synthetical principle or formulas from such concepts. But the use of these and their referral to alleged objects can still finally be sought nowhere else than in experience, the possibility of which (according to form) these contain a priori.¹²⁴³

4.1 But that this also be the case with all categories and the principles spun out of them becomes also clear from our inability in fact really to define any of them, i.e., to make the possibility of their object understandable, without descending immediately to conditions of sensitivity, thus to the form of appearances to which, as their single objects, they consequently must be restricted. And the reason for this is that if we remove this condition, all meaning, i.e., referral to the object, vanishes and we can make understandable through no example, even to ourselves, what sort of thing is then meant with such concepts.

5.1 The concept of magnitude in general no one can explain otherwise than it is the determination of a thing by which it can be thought how many times a one is placed in it.

5.2 But this how-many-times is based upon successive repetition, thus upon time, and the synthesis here is of the homogeneous in a span of time.

¹²⁴³ In a word: we can dream up all sorts of objects, e.g., things on their own, and spirits and gods, etc., but these can never be recognized because they do not appear in space and time, for it is only in space and time that we can make a proper judgment about things (but which for us are always only appearances). And the only reason that the categories are useful is because we have by means of them a schema of how objects will look in space and time, a means of recognizing the image of an object. So, again, we can dream up a thing on its own (and indeed for the sake of experience must do this, calling it the Transcendental Object = X = a nature), but can never know any more of this thing than its spectral effect on us (appearing in the brainarium). That is the condition of the human with regard to the possibility of recognizing any real thing, i.e., we can only recognize its appearance and know further only that this appearance is not the thing on its own, but only its appearance.
5.3 Reality we can explain in contrast to negation only by proposing a time (as the summary of all being) which is either filled with something or empty.

5.4 If I eliminate the persistence (which is an existence in every time), nothing remains for the concept of substance except the logical representation of the subject which I allege to recognize by representing something to myself which can take place merely as subject (without being a predicate of anything).  

5.5 But not that I know any conditions at all under which this logical privilege will be inherent in any sort of thing. Consequently, nothing further at all is to be made of it nor any inference whatsoever drawn from it, because no object at all of the use of this concept is determined by it and therefore we do not even know whether this means any sort of something anywhere.

5.6 From the concept of cause, if I remove time in which something follows upon something else according to a rule, I would find nothing further in the pure category except that it be a something, from which it is allowed to infer the existence of another something. And not only would this mean that cause and effect could not be distinguished from each other in any way, but furthermore, because this inferential ability still soon requires conditions of which I know nothing, the concept would have no determination at all as to how it is to befit any sort object.

5.7 The alleged principle “every contingent has a cause” arises rather ceremoniously as if it had a personal dignity on its own.

5.8 But I ask, “what do you understand with contingent?” and you answer, “the not-being of which is possible.” And then I would like very much to know how you want to recognize this possibility of a not-being, if you do not imagine a succession in the series of the appearances and in this (succession) an existence which follows upon the not-being (or vice-versa), thus an change. For that the not-being of a thing itself not contradict itself is a lame appeal to a logical condition which indeed is necessary for the concept, but not sufficient by far for the real possibility. For then I can remove in thought every existing substance without contradicting myself, but cannot conclude

244 This may be important in the B version of Paralogism, paragraph 20.1 (beginning on or near page 344). I find this notion intriguing, that we are able a priori to know when to utilize a notion as a predicate and when as a subject.
at all from that to its objective contingency in its existence, i.e., the possibility of its not-being on its own.

5.9 Concerning the concept of communality, this is easy to evaluate. Since the pure categories of substance as well as of causality admit of no explanation determining the object, the alternating causality in the referral of substances to one another (*commercium*) is just as little subject to explanation.

5.10 No one has yet been able to explain possibility, existence and necessity otherwise than through obvious tautologies, if he wanted to create their definition solely out of the pure understanding.

5.11 For the sham of foisting the logical possibility of the concept (since it does not contradict itself) on the transcendental possibilities of things (since an object corresponds to the concepts) only gets by and satisfies the novice.*

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 In a word, all these concepts permit of verification in no way and thus of no demonstration of their real possibility if all sensitive perspective (the only perspective we possess) is eliminated. For then only the logical possibility yet remains, i.e., that the (thought) concept be possible. But we are not discussing this, but only whether it refers to an object and therefore means any sort of something.

6.1 From this there now flows incontestably that the pure understanding concepts can never be of transcendental, but rather always only of empirical, usage, and that the principles of pure understanding can only be referred to the universal conditions of a possible experience, to objects of the sense, but never to things in general (without taking into account the manner in which we may look at them).

7.1 Accordingly the transcendental analytic has this important result: the understanding is never able a priori to accomplish more than to anticipate the form of a possible experience in general. And since what is not appearance can be no object of experience, the understanding can never overstep the limits of sensitivity within which alone objects are given to us.
7.2 Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of appearances, and the proud name of an ontology, whereby it presumes to give synthetical recognitions a priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g., the principle of causality) must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of pure understanding.

8.1 Thinking is the action of referring given perspectives to an object.

8.2 If the manner of this perspective is not given in any way, the object is merely transcendental and the understanding concept has no other use except transcendental, namely expressing the unity of the thinking of a manifold in general.

8.3 Now through a pure category, in which there is abstraction from every condition of the sensitive perspective as the only one which is possible to us, no object is thus determined. Rather only the thinking of an object in general is expressed according to diverse modi.

8.4 In order for a concept to be used, we require a function of judgmental power, by means of which an object is subsumed under it, thus the at least formal condition under which something can be given in the perspective.

8.5 If this condition of judgmental power (schema) is lacking, all subsumption is omitted, for nothing is given which can be subsumed under the concept.

8.6 The mere transcendental usage of the category therefore is in fact no use at all and has no determined or, even according to form, determinable object.

8.7 From this it follows that the pure category also achieves to no synthetical principle a priori, and that the principles of pure understanding are only of empirical, but never of transcendental usage, and everywhere out beyond the field of possible experience there can be no synthetical principle a priori.

9.1 Accordingly it may be advisable to express this as follows: without formal conditions of sensitivity, the pure categories have merely transcendental meaning, but are of no transcendental use. The reason for this is because no use on its own is possible in that all conditions of any sort of use (in judg-
ments) are missing to them, namely the formal conditions of the subsumption of any kind of an alleged object under these concepts.

9.2 Since they (as merely pure categories) therefore are not supposed to be of empirical use and cannot be of transcendental use, they are of no use whatsoever if we isolate them from all sensitivity, i.e., they can be applied to no alleged object at all. Furthermore, they are merely the pure form of the use of the understanding with respect to objects in general and of the thinking, still without us being able to think determinedly any kind of an object through them alone.\textsuperscript{245}

10.1 Meanwhile there lies here as basis a deception which is hardly to be avoided.

10.2 With respect to their origin, the categories are not based upon sensitivity as are the forms of perspective, space and time, and thus seem to permit an application extending beyond all objects of the senses.

10.3 For their part, however, they are in turn nothing except thought-forms which contain merely the logical capacity for uniting a priori the manifold given in the perspective into one consciousness, and where, if we remove from them the only possible perspective for us, they can have even less meaning than those pure sensitive forms through which still at least an object is given, in place of which a connection manner of the manifold, a manner peculiar to our understanding, means nothing at all if that perspective, in which alone this can be given, is not added to it.—

10.4 Nonetheless, if we term certain objects, as appearances, sense entities (\textit{phaenomena}) by distinguishing the manner by which we look at them from their constitution on their own, there still already lies in our concept that we place either just these objects according to this latter constitution, even if we do not look at them in that way, or also other possible things which are not at all objects of our senses, as objects thought merely through the understanding, in opposition to those sense entities, as it were, and term them understanding entities (\textit{noumena}).

\textsuperscript{245} So the categories are not of any use except via a schema which is sensitive and, for us, in the form of time and space. And otherwise these categories are not of any use whatsoever, because they don’t represent any objects but are the pure form of understanding and thinking about objects.
10.5 Now the question arises whether our pure understanding concepts do have meaning with respect to these latter, and could be a manner of recognizing them.

11.1 But here at the very beginning an equivocation is revealed which can occasion great misunderstanding. Since the understanding, if it terms an object in a referral merely phaenomenon, simultaneously makes yet a representation of an object on its own apart from this referral and thus imagines that it can also make concepts of the same object and since the understanding supplies nothing other than the categories, the object in the latter meaning would have to be able to be at least thought through these pure understanding concepts. In this way the understanding is to hold the entirely undetermined concept of an understanding entity, as a something in general apart from our sensitivity, to be a determined concept of an entity which we could recognize through the understanding in some manner.

12.1 If we understand with noumenon a thing to the extent it is not an object of our sensitive engagement by abstracting from our manner of its perspective, then this is noumenon in the negative meaning.

12.2 But if we understand with that term an object of a non-sensitive perspective, then we assume a particular manner of perspective, namely the intellectual, but which is not our own, the possibility of which also we cannot penetrate, and that would be noumenon in a positive meaning.

13.1 Now the teaching of sensitivity is simultaneously the teaching of noumenon in the negative sense, i.e., of things, which the understanding must think without this referral to our manner of perspective, thus not merely as appearances, but rather as things on their own, but of which it comprehends in this isolation that in considering them in this way it is able to make no use of its categories because, since these have meaning only in referral to the unity of the perspective in space and time, they can a priori determine precisely this unity also only by virtue of the mere ideality of space and time through universal, connectional concepts.

13.2 Where this unity of time cannot be encountered, thus with noumenon, the entire use, indeed even all meaning, of the categories ceases completely. For
even the possibility of things, which are supposed to match the categories, does not permit of any insight at all. In defense of this I need appeal only to that which I cited just at the beginning in the general remark to the preceding section.

13.3 But now the possibility of a thing can never be proven merely from the non-contradiction of its concept, but rather only by our verifying it through a perspective corresponding to it.

13.4 Therefore if we wanted to apply the categories to objects which are not considered as appearances, we would have to place a perspective other than the sensitive as a basis, and then the object would be noumenon in the positive sense.

13.5 Now since such a one, namely the intellectual perspective, lies utterly apart from our capacity for recognitions, the use of the categories can also in no way reach out beyond the limits of objects of experience. Of course, understanding entities correspond indeed to the sense entities, and also there may be understanding entities to which our sensitive perspective capacity has no referral at all, but our understanding concepts, as mere thought-forms for our sensitive perspective, do not reach out to these in the least. What we term noumenon therefore must be understood as such only in the negative sense.

14.1 If all thinking (through categories) is eliminated from an empirical recognition, no recognition at all remains of any sort of object. For through the mere perspective nothing at all is thought, and the fact that this affection of sensitivity is within me constitutes no reference at all of such a representation to any sort of an object.

14.2 But on the other hand, if I remove all perspective, still the form of thinking remains i.e., the manner of determining an object to the manifold of a possible perspective.

14.3 To this extent then the categories reach further than the sensitive perspective because they think objects in general without considering the particular manner (of sensitivity) in which they may be given.

14.4 But in this way they do not determine a greater sphere of objects, because we cannot assume that these can be given without presupposing a manner of
perspective other than the sensitive, but we are in no way justified to such a manner of perspective.

15.1 Problematic is what I call a concept which contains no contradiction, and which also coheres with other recognitions as a demarcation of given concepts, but the objective reality of which can be recognized in no way.

15.2 The concept of a noumenon, i.e., a thing which is not at all to be thought as an object of the senses, but rather only as a thing on its own (solely through a pure understanding), is not at all contradictory, for we still cannot assert of the sensitivity that it be the single, possible manner of perspective.

15.3 Furthermore, this concept is necessary in order not to expand the sensitive perspective out to things on their own. Thus this is necessary in order to restrict the objective validity of the sensitive recognition (for the remainder [the things on their own], to which the former does not reach, are called noumena for precisely that reason to indicate in that way that those recognitions cannot extend their jurisdiction over everything which the understanding thinks).

15.4 But still, in the end, the possibility of such noumenon is not at all to be penetrated, and the scope, apart from the sphere of the appearances, is empty (for us), i.e., we have an understanding which reaches further problematically than these, but no perspective. Indeed we don’t even have the concept of a possible perspective, by means of which objects would be given to us apart from the field of sensitivity and where the understanding would be used assertively out beyond that sensitivity.

15.5 The concept of noumena therefore is merely a limiting concept in order to restrict the presumptions of sensitivity. Hence the concept is only of negative use.

15.6 But it is nonetheless not arbitrarily conjured up, but rather coheres with the restriction of sensitivity. But it is still unable to place something possible apart from the scope of that restriction.

16.1 Hence the classification of the objects into Phenomena and Noumena and of the world into a sensitive and understanding world cannot be admitted at all
in the positive meaning. Although in any case concepts admit of a differentiation into the sensitive and intellectual. But still we can determine no object to the latter and therefore also not proclaim them as objectively valid.

16.2 If we depart from the senses, how will we make comprehensible that our categories (which would be the only remaining concepts for noumena) still mean something anywhere, since for their reference to any kind of object something more than merely the unity of thinking must be given, namely a possible perspective beyond that, to which those concepts can be applied?

16.3 The concept of noumeni, taken merely problematically, remains nonetheless not only admissible but even unavoidable as a concept in order to place sensitivity into limits.

16.4 But then that is not a particular, intelligible object for our understanding. Indeed an understanding to which it would belong is itself a problem, namely to recognize its object not discursively through categories but rather intuitively via a non-sensitive perspective, concerning which we do not have the slightest notion of its possibility.

16.5 Now in this way our understanding obtains a negative expansion, i.e., it is not restricted through the sensitivity, but rather far more restricts the sensitivity by terming things on their own noumena (not considered as appearance).

16.6 But it itself also immediately places boundaries to itself in recognizing them through no category, thus in thinking them only under the name of an unknown something.

17.1 From time to time in the writings of the moderns I find an entirely different use of the expression mundi sensibilis and intelligibilis,* which deviates entirely from the sense of the ancients, and which is not a problem, of course, but which also entails nothing but verbal mincing.

17.2 According to this, it pleased some to term the complex of the appearances, to the extent it is viewed, the sense world; but to the extent the coherence of that sense world is thought according to universal laws of understanding, the understanding world.
17.3 Theoretical astronomy, which denotes the mere observation of the starry heaven, would represent the first of these, while the contemplative in contrast (explained somewhat by the copernican world system or even according to Newton’s laws of gravity) would represent the second, namely an intelligible world.

17.4 But such a contortion of words is merely a sophistic excuse to evade a difficult question by twisting their meaning as convenient to one’s ease.

17.5 Understanding and reasoning can be used in any case. But the question arises as to whether these also have some usage if the object is not an appearance (but rather is noumenon), and we take it in this sense if it is thought on its own as mere intelligible, i.e., given to the understanding alone and not to the senses.

17.6 The question remains therefore as to whether apart from that empirical use of understanding (even in the Newtonian representation of the world edifice) a transcendental one be yet possible, one that would refer to noumenon as an object, which we have already answered in the negative.

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 In place of this expression, we must not use that of an intellectual world, as we are wont to do in the German discourse, for only the recognitions are intellectual or sensitive.

1.2 But what can only be an object of the one or the other manner of perspective must therefore be called intelligible or sensible (despite the severity of the tone).

18.1 If we then say therefore that “the senses represent objects to us as they appear, but the understanding as they are,” then the latter is to be taken not in a transcendental, but rather in an empirical, meaning, namely how they must be represented as objects of experience in thorough coherence of the appearances, and not according to what they may be apart from the referral to pos-
sible experience and, consequently, to sense in general, thus as objects of the pure understanding.  

18.2 For this (an object of the pure understanding) will always remain unknown to us. In fact it also remains unknown as to whether such a transcendental (extraordinary) recognition be possible anywhere, at least such as would stand under our usual categories.

18.3 Understanding and sensitivity can determine objects for us only in tandem.

18.4 If we separate them, then we have perspectives without concepts, or concepts without perspective, but in both cases representations which we can refer to no determined object.

19.1 If someone still harbors reservations about these expositions for renouncing all merely transcendental usage of the categories, then let him make a trial of them in any sort of a synthetical assertion.

19.2 For an analytical assertion does not bring the understanding further, and since the doubter here is occupied only with what is already thought in the concept, he leaves it undecided whether this has referral to objects by themselves, or only means the unity of the thinking in general (which completely abstracts the manner in which an object may be given). For him it is enough to know what lies in his concept. What the concept itself may aim at is a matter of indifference to him.

19.3 Accordingly let him try it with some kind of a synthetical and allegedly transcendental principle such as, “everything which is, exists as substance or a

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246 This harkens back to the General Remark to the Aesthetic where we learn that the rainbow is called an appearance while the rain is called a thing on its own. This distinction holds only for ordinary and scientific talk. Transcendently speaking both the rain and the rainbow are appearances. I think a confusion then arises with this understanding of the way things are on their own. We speak of the thing on its own here, but we mean the object of experience which is simply the transcendental object = x as unifying certain appearances. We then speak of this object of experience as though it were a thing on its own, and it is the only thing that can ever be recognized by us, limited as we are by the senses. But if we remove the senses in thought then there is no application for the categories, which are merely logical relations, e.g., X is something which if granted, Y can be concluded (as is the case with causation). As far as the thing on its own with regard to another way of looking at things besides time and space and without sensitivity, that can be thought but only negatively, i.e., not this and not that, which means not thought at all except as a something necessary for the sake of experience.
determination attaching to substance; every contingency exists as effect of another thing, namely of its cause, etc.”

19.4 Now I ask from whence does he wish to obtain these synthetical propositions, since the concept is not supposed to hold in reference to possible experience but rather to things on their own (noumena).

19.5 Where does he obtain that something, which is always required over time for a synthetical proposition in order to connect together in the same concept something which has no logical (analytical) kinship at all.

19.6 He will never prove his proposition. Moreover, he will never be able to justify himself in regard to the possibility of such a pure assertion without considering the empirical understanding usage, and in that way to renounce the pure and sense-free judgment.

19.7 So then the concept of a pure, merely intelligible object is entirely devoid of any foundational principles for their application. The reason being that we can conceive of no way in which they should be given, and the problematical thought, which still leaves a place for them, only serves as an empty space for restricting the empirical principles, still without containing and exhibiting in it any sort of object of recognition apart from the sphere of those empirical principles.
Appendix. Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection Through a Confusion of of the Empirical Usage with the Transcendental Usages of the Understanding

1.1 Reflection (*reflexio*) has nothing to do with the objects themselves with respect to obtaining concepts from them directly, but rather is the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves for that endeavor, in order to seek out the subjective conditions under which we can achieve to concepts.

1.2 It is the consciousness of the relationships of given representations to our diverse sources of recognition, through which alone their relationship among one another can be properly determined.

1.3 The first question preceding all further treatment of our representations is this: “in which recognitional capacity do they belong together?”

1.4 “Is it the understanding, or is it the senses, where they are joined or compared?”

1.5 Many judgments are accepted through custom or attached together through inclination, but because no reflection precedes, or at least follows critically upon that, these judgments hold for such that have their origin in the understanding.

1.6 Not all concepts have need of an examination, i.e., attention to the foundations of truth, for if they are immediately certain, e.g., between two points there can only be one straight line, there is no indication of a yet closer mark of truth than that which they themselves express.

1.7 But all judgments, indeed all comparisons, have need of a reflection, i.e., a differentiation of the recognitional capacity to which the given concepts belong.\(^{247}\)

1.8 The action, whereby I hold together the comparison of the representations in general with the recognitional capacity in which they are employed and by which I distinguish whether they are compared with one another as belonging to pure understanding or sensitive perspective, I call the transcendental reflection.

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\(^{247}\) Am I considering the appearance of things or am I just considering their concepts? Is it looking or is it thinking?
1.9 But the relationship in which the concepts can belong to one another in a mental state, is that of identity and diversity, agreement and conflict, internality and externality, and finally determinable and determination (material and form).

1.10 The proper determination of this relationship depends upon which recognition power they subjectively belong to one another, whether in sensitivity or understanding.

1.11 For the distinction of the understanding makes a significant difference in the manner in which we are supposed to think the sensitivity.

2.1 Before all objective judgments, we compare the concepts in order to come upon the identity (of many representations under a concept) in aid of universal judgments, or upon their diversity for the generation of particular judgments; and for both types in order to come upon the agreement out of which affirming judgments can develop, and upon the conflict from which denying judgment can develop, etc.

2.2 For this reason it would seem that we should term the cited concepts comparison concepts (*conceptus compartionis*).

2.3 But because, if it does not matter about the logical form, but rather about the content of the concepts, i.e., whether the things themselves are the same or diverse, in accord or conflict, etc., the things can have a two-fold relationship to our capacity for recognition, namely to the sensitivity or to the understanding. But upon this position to which they belong depends the way of how they are supposed to belong to one another. Then the transcendental reflection, i.e., the relationship of given representations to the one or the other manner of recognition, will alone be able to determine their relationship to one another; and then whether the things are the same or different, in accord or conflict, etc., will not be able to be immediately made out from the concepts themselves through mere comparison (*comparatio*), but rather first through the differentiation of the manner of recognition to which they belong, by means of a transcendental reflection (*reflexio*).

2.4 Hence we could indeed say that the logical reflection were a mere comparison, for with it there is a complete abstraction of the capacity of recognitions to which the given representations belong, and thus, to this extent, they are
to be treated as homogeneous, according to their place in the mind. But the transcendental reflection (which goes to the objects themselves) contains the basis of the possibility of objective comparison of the representations among one another and therefore is quite different indeed from the logical reflexion, because the recognitional capacity to which they belong is simply not the same.

2.5 This transcendental reflection is a duty from which no one can excuse himself if he wants to judge something a priori about things.

2.6 We want now to consider them and will draw considerable light from this for the determination of the actual occupation of the understanding.

3.1 1. Identity and diversity.

3.2 If an object is described to us several times, but each time with just the same, internal determinations (*qualitas et quantitas*), then, if it goes as an object of the pure understanding, it is always precisely the same and not plural, but entirely a single thing (*numeric identitas*). But if it is an appearance, then it does not matter at all about the comparison of the concepts, but rather, even as much as all aspects may be identical with respect to them, still the diversity of the locations of this appearance is at the same time a sufficient basis for the numeral diversity of the object (of the senses) itself.

3.3 So with two drops of water we can completely abstract from all internal diversity (of quality and quantity), and it is sufficient that they are seen simultaneously in different places in order to consider them as numerically diverse.\(^ {248} \)

3.4 Leibniz took the appearances as things on their own, thus as *intelligibilia*, i.e., objects of understanding (even though, due to the confusion of their representations, he still decked them with the name of *phaenomenan*), and there his proposition of the not-to-be-distinguished (*principium identitatis indiscernibilium*) could not in any case be contested. But since they are objects of sensitivity and with respect to them the understanding is not of a pure, but

\(^ {248} \) And it would seem that if we were just talking about water in general, it would make no difference and all water would be consider the same conceptually. But then next we consider them as two different drops in different locations. So according to the understanding they would be identical, but then diverse regarding the appearance.
rather a merely empirical usage, the plurality and the numerical diversity is already assigned through space itself as the condition of outer appearances.

3.5 For one part of space, though it may indeed be completely similar and equal to another, is still apart from it and just in that way a part diverse from the first which is added to the first in order to constitute a greater space, and accordingly this must hold of everything which is simultaneously in the various positions of space, even as much as it otherwise may be similar and equal.


4.2 If reality is represented only through the pure understanding (realitas noumenon), no conflict between the realities can be thought, i.e., such a relationship where, joined in one subject, they neutralize the consequences of each other and are as $3 - 3 = 0$.

4.3 On the other hand, the real in the appearance (realitas phaenomenon) can in any case be in conflict with one real and, united in the same subject, the one can destroy entirely or in part the consequence of the other, as two moving forces in the same straight line to the extent they either draw or force one point in contrary directions, or also a pleasure which holds balance to a pain.

5.1 3. The internal and external.

5.2 With an object of pure understanding, only that, which has no reference at all (according to existence) to any kind of something diverse from it, is internal.

5.3 On the other hand, the inner determinations of a substantial phaenomenon in space are nothing except relationships, and it itself is entirely a sum-total of sheer relationships.

5.4 A substance in space we are familiar with through forces which are operative in that space either to impel others to it (attraction) or to hinder infiltration (repulsion and impenetrability). We are not familiar with other properties which make up the concept of substance which appears in space and which we term matter.
5.5 On the other hand, as an object of pure understanding, every substance must have inward determinations and forces, which go to the inward reality.

5.6 But what kind of internal accidents can I think of except those which my internal sense offers me, namely that which either itself is a thought or analogous with that.

5.7 Hence, out of all substances, because he represented them as noumena, even out of the component parts of material after he had taken in thought everything to them which may mean outer relationships, thus also the assemblage, Leibniz made simple subjects endowed with representational powers, in a word: monads.


6.2 These are two concepts which are placed as the basis to every other reflection, so inseparably joined are they with every use of the understanding.

6.3 The first means the determinable in general, the second its determination (both of these in a transcendental meaning, since we abstract from all difference of what is given and the manner in which it is determined).

6.4 The logicians used to call the universal the material, but the specific difference the form.

6.5 In every judgment we can term the given concepts the logical material (to the judgment), the relationship of that (by means of the copula) the form of the judgment.

6.6 In every entity the constituent parts (*essentilia*) are the material; the manner in which they are joined in a thing, the essential form.

6.7 Also with respect to things in general, unlimited reality is viewed as the material of all possibility, but restriction of that (the negation) as that form whereby a thing is differentiated from others according to transcendental concepts.

6.8 Namely the understanding first requires that something be given (at least in concept) in order to be able to determine it in a certain manner.
6.9 Hence the material precedes before the form in the concept of the pure understanding, and because of that Leibniz first assumed things (monads) and inwardly a representational capacity of them in order afterwards to base on that their outward relationship and the communality of their states (namely the representations).

6.10 Hence space and time were possible as basis and consequence, the former only through the relationship of substances, the latter through the connection of the determinations of those substances among one another.

6.11 And so indeed it would also have to be if the pure understanding could be referred immediately to objects, and if space and time were determinations of things on their own.

6.12 But time and space are only sensitive perspectives in which we determine all objects solely as appearances. Accordingly the form of the perspective (as a subjective constitution of the sensitivity) precedes before all material (the sensations), thus space and time before all appearances and all data of experience, and indeed first makes these possible.

6.13 The intellectual philosopher cannot tolerate the form preceding before the things themselves and determining for them their possibility. This would be an entirely proper censure if he assumed that we see the things as they are (though with confused representations).

6.14 But since the sensitive perspective is an entirely particular, subjective condition which lies a priori as basis to all perspectives and whose form is original, the form is given for itself alone. And far from the material (or the things themselves which appear) lying as basis (as we would have to judge according to mere concepts), the possibility of the material far rather presupposes a formal perspective (time and space) as given.

Remark to the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection

1.1 Permit me to term the position which we allot to a concept, be it either in sensitivity or in pure understanding, the transcendental location.
Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection

1.2 In this way the evaluation of this position, which befits every concept according to the diversity of its usage and the instruction for determining the location for all concepts according to rules, would be the transcendental topic, an instruction which would thoroughly guard against surreptitious thinking of pure understanding and the illusions arising from that by always distinguishing to which capacity of recognition the concepts actually belong.

1.3 We can term each concept, each title under which many recognitions belong, a logical location.

1.4 On this the logical topic of Aristotle is based, of which school teachers and speakers could avail themselves in searching under certain titles of thinking to see what accommodates itself best to their current material and to rationally ruminate or chatter verbosely about that with an air of thoroughness.

2.1 The transcendental topic, on the other hand, does not contain more than the cited four titles of all comparison and differentiation which are distinguished from the categories in that through the former it was not the object that was presented according to what makes up its concept (magnitude, reality), but rather only the comparison of the representations, which precedes before the concept of things in all its manifold.249

2.2 But this comparison first needs a reflection, i.e., a determination of the location where the representation of the things, which are compared, belong, whether they are thought in the pure understanding or given by sensitivity in the appearance.

3.1 The concepts can be compared logically without for that reason our having to be concerned about where their objects belong, whether as *noumena* or as *phaenomena* for the sensitivity.

249 This supports my recent thinking that the categories of quantity and quality are the basis for the recognition of the object (the perception), while those of experience form the basis for the connection of the perceptions into an experience. Now I see the mathematical principles serve for the identification of the object in the accumulation of the expanse of the perspective and also the intensity of the material of the perception. Then the object is a recognition of the categories. Then there arise the judgments concerning the existence of this recognized object, e.g., that it endures in all time, etc. And all this per the Principles of Experience.
3.2 But if we want to go to the objects with these concepts, a transcendental reflection is first necessary for making out the capacity of recognition to which they are supposed to be objects, whether for the pure understanding or sensibility.

3.3 Without this reflection I make a very uncertain use of these concepts, and alleged synthetical principles arise which critical reason cannot acknowledge and which are based solely on a transcendental amphiboly, i.e., a confusion of the pure understanding with the appearance.

4.1 Lacking such a transcendental topic, and thus deceived by the ambiguity of the reflection concepts, the celebrated Leibniz erected an intellectual system for the world, or far rather believed to recognize the internal constitution of things, by comparing all objects only with the understanding and the abstracted, formal concepts of its thinking.

4.2 Our table of the concepts of reflection supplies us with the unexpected advantage of opening up the distinguishing aspect of his system in all its parts and simultaneously the leading basis of this peculiar manner of thinking which rested on nothing except a misunderstanding.

4.3 He compared all things with one another merely through concepts and found, naturally enough, no other diversity except that through which the understanding differentiates its pure concepts from one another.

4.4 The conditions of sensitive perspective, which include their inherent distinction, he would not consider as original, for to him the sensitivity was only a confused, representational manner and not a particular source of representations. The appearance was for him the representation of things on their own, though distinguished from the recognition through the understanding according to the logical form, since namely the former, with its customary deficiency of dissection, draws a certain admixture of side representations into the concept of the thing which the understanding knows to be isolated from it.

4.5 In a word then, Leibniz intellectualized the appearances, even as Locke altogether sensitized the concepts of understanding according to his system of noogony (if I may avail myself of this expression), i.e., he had declared them to be nothing but empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection.
4.6 Instead of seeking two entirely diverse sources of representations in the understanding and the sensitivity, but which could only judge with objective validity of things in connection, each of these great men held to only one of these two, which in their opinion referred immediately to things on their own, while the other source for them did nothing except to confuse or order the representations of the former.

5.1 Accordingly, Leibniz compared the objects of the senses with one another merely in the understanding as things in general.

5.2 And first to the extent they are supposed to be judged of this as the same or diverse.

5.3 Since therefore he had solely their concepts in consideration and not their position in the perspective, in which alone the objects can be given, and had left completely out of consideration the transcendental place of the concepts (whether the object is to be counted among appearances or among things on their own), it could not turn out otherwise that he also expanded his principle of the not-to-be-differentiated, which holds merely of the concepts of things in general, to the objects of the senses (*mundus phaenomenon*) and believed in that way to have procured no little expansion to the recognition of nature.

5.4 Without question, if I am familiar with a drop of water as a thing on its own according to all its internal determinations, then I cannot allow one of them to hold as diverse from the other if the entire concept of that is identical with that of the other.  

5.5 But if it is an appearance in space, then it has its place not merely in the understanding (under concepts), but also in the sensitive, outer perspective (in space). And here the physical places, with respect to the inner determinations of things, are entirely indifferent and one place = b can conjoin a thing which is completely similar and equal to another one in place = a just as though it were yet greatly diverse internally from this.

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250 I think Leibniz would consider two drops of water as necessarily different internally because otherwise they could not be two. And I think this difference ended up being the monad, which varied via its representation.
5.6 The diversity of places already makes the plurality and distinction of objects, as appearances, not only possible for themselves alone without further conditions, but rather even necessary.

5.7 Therefore the apparent law is not a law of nature.

5.8 It is solely an analytical rule for the comparison of things through mere concepts.

6.1 Secondly the principle: “realities (as mere affirmations) never conflict with one another logically” is an entirely true proposition about the relationship of the concepts, but does not have the least meaning with respect to nature nor anywhere with respect to any sort of thing on its own (of which we have no concept).

6.2 For real conflict takes place in any case where \( A - B = 0 \), i.e., where each reality, joined in a subject with another one, eliminates the effect of the other, which lays all impediments and reactions in nature incessantly before our eyes, which nonetheless, since they are based on forces, must be termed realitates phaenomena.

6.3 General mechanics can even assign a priori the empirical condition of this conflict in a rule by looking to the opposition of the directions, a condition, of which the transcendental concept of reality knows nothing at all.

6.4 Although Herr von Leibniz did not exactly announce this proposition with the pomp of a new principle, he still availed himself of it for new assertions, and his disciples registered it expressly in the Leibniz-Wolfian instructional structure.

6.5 According to this principle, for example, all evils are nothing except consequences of the limitations of creation, i.e., negations, because they are the sole conflicting aspect of reality (this is also actually the case in the mere concept of a thing in general, but not in the things as appearances).\(^{251}\)

6.6 Likewise his adherents find it not only possible, but also natural, to unite all reality in one entity without any kind of a feared conflict, because they are

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\(^{251}\) Maybe this means that conceptually speaking no reality could limit another and so the limitations are merely negations and not conflicts. But this doesn’t hold for appearances.
familiar with no other conflict than that of contradiction (through which the concept of a thing itself is eliminated), but not that of alternating termination, since a real basis removes the effect of the other and regarding which we encounter the conditions for representing such to ourselves only in the sensitivity.

7.1 Thirdly the Leibniz monadology has no other basis at all except the introduction by this philosopher of the distinction between the internal and external merely in relationship to the understanding.

7.2 Substances in general must have some internality which therefore is free of all external relationships, consequently also of assemblage.

7.3 The simple therefore is the foundation of the internal aspect of things on their own.

7.4 But the internality of their state can also not consist in place, shape, contact or motion (which determinations are all external relationships). Accordingly we can attribute to the substances no other internal state except that whereby we determine our sense itself inwardly, namely the state of the representations.

7.5 Accordingly then the monads were finished, and were supposed to make up the basic fiber of the entire universe. But the active force of these monads consists only in representations whereby they are actually operational only within themselves.

8.1 But also for this very reason his principle of the possible communality of substances among one another had to be a harmony determined in advance and not a physical influence.

8.2 For since everything is occupied only inwardly, i.e., with its own representations, the state of the representations of one substance could stand in no effective connection at all with that of another. Instead some kind of a third cause inflowing into everything together had to make their states correspond to each other and indeed not just through occasional assistance and produced particularly in every single case (*systema assistentiae*), but rather through the unity of the idea of a cause valid for all in which they must obtain alto-
gether their existence and persistence, thus also reciprocal correspondence among one another according to universal laws.

9.1 Fourthly the celebrated instructional system of time and space, where he intellectualized these forms of sensitivity, had arisen solely out of just the same deception of the transcendental reflections.

9.2 If I want to represent to myself outer relationships of things through the mere understanding, then this can happen only by means of a concept of their alternating effect, and if I am supposed to join one state with another state in precisely the same thing, this can only happen in the order of base and consequence.

9.3 So therefore Leibniz thought of space as a certain order in the communality of substances and of time as the dynamical sequence of their states.

9.4 But the peculiarity and independence from things, which both seem to have on their own, he ascribed to the confusion of these concepts, which confusion resulted in a mere form of dynamical relationships being held as an inherent perspective existing of itself and preceding even before the things.²⁵²

9.5 Space and time therefore were the intelligible form of the connection of things (substances and their states) on their own.

9.6 But the things were intelligible substances (*substantiae noumena*).

9.7 Nevertheless he wanted to have these concepts hold for appearances because he granted no inherent type of perspective to sensitivity, but rather sought all, even the empirical representations of objects, in the understanding and left to the senses nothing but the ignoble occupation of confusing and misshaping the representations of the former.

10.1 But even if we were able to say something synthetically of things on their own through the pure understanding (which nevertheless is impossible), this

²⁵² And so according to Leibniz we would become confused about space and time and come to think of them as though they were an inherent perspective, although actually they then would be an expression of relationships, internal and external, which were a function of the things themselves.
could still not be applied to appearances at all, which do not represent things on their own.

10.2 In this latter case therefore I will always have to compare my concepts in the transcendental reflection only under the conditions of sensitivity, and so space and time will not be determinations of things on their own, but rather of appearances. As to what the things on their own might be I do not know and also do not need to know, because a thing still cannot come forth to me otherwise than in the appearance.

11.1 Likewise now I proceed with the remaining reflection concepts.

11.2 The material is *substantia phaenomenon*.

11.3 What befits it inwardly, I seek in all parts of the space which it occupies and in all effects which it exerts and which, of course, can always only be appearances of outer sense.

11.4 Therefore I have indeed nothing utterly internal, but rather only sheer, comparative internality which itself in turn consists of external relationships.

11.5 But the sheer internality of the material, according to the understanding, is also only a mere whim, for this is no object anywhere for the pure understanding. And the transcendental object which may be the basis of this appearance which we call material, is a mere something whereof we would not once understand what it were even if someone could tell us.

11.6 For we can understand nothing except what entails a correspondence to our words in the perspective.\(^{253}\)

11.7 If lamentations that we do not penetrate at all into the internality of things are supposed to mean as much as our not comprehending through the pure understanding what the things which appear to us may be on their own, then they are entirely unfair and unreasonable. For they wish for someone with-

\(^{253}\) There was an article several years ago (4/16/07) in *The New Yorker* about a Christian missionary working with some tribe in the Amazon and gave up his faith when he realized that these people would never be able to understand the bible. It seems that this tribe was unable to grasp the difference between right and left and referred everything always to a relationship with a river, e.g., toward the river or away from the river. See [http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/04/16/070416fa_fact_colapinto](http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/04/16/070416fa_fact_colapinto)
out sense organs to be able to recognize, thus to look. Consequently they want us to have a power of recognition entirely distinct from the human, thus not merely with respect to the degree but even to the perspective and type. Therefore we are not supposed to be humans, but rather beings of which we cannot even assert whether they be possible, much less how they are constituted.

11.8 Into the internal aspect of nature, observations and dissection of the appearances press on and we cannot tell how far this will go with time.

11.9 But those transcendental questions which go out beyond nature we would still never be able to answer with all that, even if all of nature were unfolded to us, since it is not once given to us to observe our own mind with another perspective than that of our internal sense.

11.10 For in that lies the secret of the origin of our sensitivity.

11.11 Its referral to an object and what the transcendental basis of this unity be without doubt lies too deeply concealed that we, with whom we are familiar even to ourselves only through inner sense, thus as appearances, could need such an unhandy tool of our explorations for discovering something other than what is always in turn appearance, the non-sensitive cause of which we still would gladly investigate.

12.1 What makes this critique of the conclusions from the mere actions of reflection useful at all is that it clearly establishes the inanity of all conclusions about objects which we compare with one another solely in the understanding, and simultaneously certifies that which we primarily have enjoined, namely that although appearances are not comprehended as things on their own among the objects of pure understanding, they are still the only things with which our recognition can have objective reality, namely where perspective corresponds to the concepts.

13.1 If we reflect merely logically, we compare our concepts with one another solely in the understanding as to whether both contain just the same, or whether they contradict each other or not, or whether something is contained in the concept inwardly or comes additively to it, and which of both is sup-
posed to hold as given and which is supposed to hold only as a way of thinking the given.

13.2 But if I apply the concepts to an object in general (in the transcendental understanding) without determining further whether this be an object of the sensitive or intellectual perspective, then restrictions immediately emerge (not to go out from this concept) which invert all empirical usage of that and, precisely in that way, prove that the representation of an object as a thing in general is not just merely insufficient, but rather, without sensitive determination of that and independent of an empirical condition, contradictory in itself; such that we therefore would either have to abstract from all objects (in logic) or, if we assume an object, to think it under conditions of sensitive perspective. Accordingly the intelligible would require a particular perspective, which we do not have, and at the deficiency of which, is nothing to us. But on the other hand the appearances cannot also be objects on their own.

13.3 For if I merely think of things in general then, of course, the diversity of outer relationships cannot make up a diversity of things themselves, but rather much more presuppose these, and if the concept of the one inwardly is not at all distinct from that of the other, then I place only one and the same thing in diverse relationships.

13.4 Furthermore, through additions of a mere affirmation (reality) to another one, the positive is increased indeed and nothing is taken away from it or eliminated. Thus the real in things in general cannot conflict with one another, etc.

* * *

14.1 The concepts of reflection, as we have indicated, have such an influence on the usage of understanding through a certain misinterpretation, that they were actually capable of misleading one of the most acute of all philosophers into an imagined system of intellectual recognition which undertook to determine its objects without the intervention of the senses.

14.2 Just for that reason the development of the deceiving causes of the amphiboly of these concepts in the occasioning of false principles is of great utility in confidently determining and securing the limits of understanding.
15.1 It is true enough that what befits or contradicts a concept generally also befits or contradicts all particularity contained under that concept (*dictum de omni et nullo*), but it would be absurd to alter this logical principle so that it would read: “what is not contained in a universal concept is also not contained in the particular which stands under that,” for these are particular concepts just for that reason that they contain more in themselves than is thought in the universal ones.

15.2 Now nonetheless, it is upon this latter principle that the entire intellectual system of Leibniz is actually erected. Hence this system falls simultaneously with it, together with all the rational contriving in the understanding usage arising from it.

16.1 The proposition of the not-to-be-distinguished was actually based on the presupposition that if a certain differentiation is not encountered in the concept of a thing in general, it is also not encountered in the things themselves. Consequently all things which are not already differentiated from one another in their concept (according to quality or quantity) are completely identical (*numero eadem*).

16.2 But since with the mere concept of any sort of thing, many necessary conditions of a perspective are abstracted, so through a special reflection that, from which is abstracted, is taken for such which is not to be encountered anywhere, and nothing is admitted of the thing except what is contained in the concept.

17.1 The concept of a cubic foot of space, think it where and how often you will, is completely identical on its own.

17.2 But two cubic feet are still distinguishable in space merely through their locations (*numero diverso*)—these are conditions of the perspective in which the object of this concept is given, and which do not belong to the concept, but still to the entire sensitivity.

17.3 Likewise no conflict at all is in the concept of a thing if nothing denying is joined with an affirmation, and merely affiriming concepts in the connection can effect no annulment at all.
17.4 But in the sensitive perspective in which reality (e.g., motion) is given, conditions are found (opposed directions) from which there is an abstraction in the concept of the motion in general, which makes a conflict possible, which, of course, is not a logical conflict, namely from a sheer positive to make a zero = 0, and we could not say that all reality is in accord simply because no conflict is encountered among their concepts.*

17.5 With respect to mere concepts, the inward is the substratum of every relationship--or external determinations.

17.6 Therefore if I abstract from all conditions of the perspective and hold solely to the concept of a thing in general, I can abstract from all outer relationships and still a concept of that must remain, a concept which means no relationship at all but rather merely inner determinations.

17.7 Now here it seems that it would follow from that that there would be something in every thing (substance) which is simply internal and precedes all external determinations by first making them possible, thus that this substratum would be such a something which contains in itself no external relationships, thus would be simple (for the bodily things are still always only relationships, at least of the parts apart from each other), and because we are familiar with no utterly internal determinations except those through our internal sense, this substratum would not only be simple, but rather also (according to the analogy with our internal sense) determined through representations, i.e., all things would actually be monads, or simple entities endowed with representations.

17.8 This would also be quite in order, did not something more than the concept of a thing in general belong to the conditions under which alone objects of outer perspective can be given to us and from which the pure concept abstracts.

17.9 For there it is revealed that an enduring appearance in space (an impenetrable extension) is able to contain sheer relationships and nothing utterly internal at all, and accordingly be the first substratum of all outer perceptions.

17.10 Through mere concepts, of course, I can think nothing external without something internal and precisely because relational concepts still presuppose utterly given things and are not possible without these.
17.11 But since something is contained in the perspective which does not lie at all in the mere concept of a thing in general, and this gives us the substratum which would not be recognized through mere concepts at all, namely a space which, with everything that it contains, consists of sheer formal or also real relationships, I cannot say that because without simple internality no thing can be represented through mere concepts, there would also be nothing external in the things themselves which are contained under these concepts and in their perspective, to which something utterly internal would not lie as base.

17.12 For if we have abstracted from all conditions of the perspective, then of course nothing remains in the mere concept except the internality in general and the relationship of that internality among one another, by which alone the externality is possible.

17.13 But this necessity, which is based on abstraction alone, does not occur with the things to the extent they are given in the perspective with such conditions which express mere relationships without having something internal as base, because they are not things on their own, but solely appearances.

17.14 What we also are familiar with, and restricted just to the material, are sheer relationships (what we term their inner determinations is only comparatively internal); but among them are independent and enduring ones, through which a determined object is given to us.

17.15 That I have nothing at all further to think, if I abstract from these relationships, does not remove the concept of a thing as appearance, also not the concept of an object in \textit{abstracto}, though indeed all possibility of such a one which is determinable according to mere concepts, i.e., a noumenon.

17.16 It is truly perplexing to hear that a thing is supposed to consist throughout of relationships, but further that such a thing is also a mere appearance and cannot be thought at all through pure categories. It consists in the mere relationship of something in general to the senses.

17.17 Just so we can hardly think the relationships of things in \textit{abstracto} otherwise than the one being the cause of the determination in the other; for that is our understanding concept of relationship themselves.
17.18 However, since we then abstract from all perspective, there ceases an entire manner in which the manifold can determine to each another its location, namely the form of sensitivity (space), which still precedes before all empirical causality.

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 If someone wanted to avail himself of the usual refuge that at least realities noumena cannot work against one another, then he would still have to cite an example of such a pure and sense-free reality so that we would understanding whether in general such a reality represent something or nothing at all.

1.2 But no example can be taken from anywhere else than experience, which never offers more than phaenomena, and so this proposition means nothing further than that a concept, which contains sheer affirmation, contains nothing negative, a proposition which we have never doubted.

18.1 If we understand with mere intelligible objects those things which are thought through the pure categories without any schema of sensitivity, then such are impossible

18.2 For the condition of the objective usage of all our understanding concepts is merely the manner of our sensitive perspective whereby objects are given to us, and if we abstract from this perspective, then these concepts have no reference at all to any kind of object.

18.3 Indeed, even if we wanted to assume another type of perspective than our sensitive one, still our functions of thinking with respect to that would have no meaning whatsoever.

18.4 If we understand with that only objects of a non-sensitive perspective, of which our categories indeed, of course, do not hold and of which we therefore can never have any recognition at all (neither perspective nor concept), then noumena in this merely negative meaning must be admitted in any case, for in that case they say nothing other than our manner of perspective does not go to all things, but merely to objects of our senses, consequently its objective validity is limited, and thus a place remains for some other sort of perspective and therefore also for things as objects of that different perspective.
18.5 But then the concept of a noumenon is problematic, i.e., it is the representation of a thing of which we can say neither that it be possible nor that it be impossible. For we are familiar with no type of perspective whatsoever except our sensitive perspective, and no manner of concepts except the categories, but neither of these two is commensurate to a super-sensitive object.

18.6 Hence we cannot yet for that reason expand the field of objects of our thinking positively beyond the conditions of our sensitivity, nor apart from the appearance assume yet objects of the pure thinking, i.e., noumena, because such objects have no positive meaning to be assigned.

18.7 For we must grant of the categories that they alone do not yet reach to the recognition of things on their own and, without the data of sensitivity, would be merely subjective forms of the understanding, but without objects.

18.8 Thinking is indeed on its own no product of the senses and to this extent is not restricted by them, but is not for that reason immediately of inherent and pure use without accession of the sensitivity, because then it is without any object.

18.9 We can also not term the noumenon such an object, for this means precisely the problematic concept of an object for an entirely different perspective and an entirely different understanding than ours, which thus itself is a problem.

18.10 The concept of noumenon is therefore not the concept of an object, but rather the unavoidable task related to the restriction of our sensitivity, whether there might not be objects entirely freed from their perspective. But this question can be answered only indeterminably, namely that since the sensitive perspective does not go to all things without distinction, room remains for more and other objects, and so they cannot be utterly denied, but at the lack of a determined concept (since no category is suitable to that), they can also not be asserted as objects for our understanding.

19.1 Accordingly the understanding restricts the sensitivity without for that reason expanding its own field; and by warning the understanding not to presume to itself to go to things on their own, but rather solely to appearances, it thinks of an object on its own, but only as a transcendental object, which is the cause of the appearance (thus not itself appearance) and which can be
thought neither as magnitude nor as reality nor as substance, etc., (because these concepts always require sensitive forms in which they determine an object). With respect to this therefore it is completely unknown whether it would be encountered within us or also apart from us, whether it would be removed simultaneously with sensitivity or, if we eliminate that sensitivity, would yet remain.

19.2 If we want to term this object noumenon because the representation of it is not sensitive, we are free to do so.

19.3 But since we are able to apply none of our understanding concepts to that, this representation still remains empty for us and serves no purpose except to indicate the boundaries of our sensitive recognition and to leave a space which we can encompass neither through possible experience nor through the pure understanding.

20.1 The critique of this pure understanding therefore cannot create for itself a new field of objects apart from those which can come forth to it as appearance, and then roam about in intelligible worlds, in fact not even in their concept.

20.2 The error, which leads to this in the most obvious way and can in any case be excused, although not justified, lies in the use of the understanding in a transcendental mode contrary to its determination, and the objects, i.e., possible perspectives, having to be ordered according to concepts, but not the concepts according to possible perspective (upon which alone its objective validity can be based).

20.3 But the cause of this in turn is that the apperception, and with it the thinking, precedes before all possible determined ordering of the representations.

20.4 Accordingly we think something in general and determine it on one side sensitively, but still differentiate the general object represented in abstract from this manner of looking at it. There remains to us now a way of determining it merely through thinking, which indeed is a mere logical form without content, but nonetheless seems to us to be a way in which the object exists on its own (noumenon), and without regard to the perspective which is restricted to our senses.
21.1 Before we leave the transcendental analytic, we must yet add something which, though not of particular consequence on its own, still might seem requisite for the completeness of the system.

21.2 The highest concept, from which a person endeavors to begin a transcendental philosophy, is usually the division into the possible and impossible.

21.3 But since every division presupposes a divided concept, a higher one must yet be accounted for, and this is the concept of an object in general (taken problematically and not made out whether it be something or nothing).

21.4 Because the categories are the only concepts which refer to objects in general, the differentiation of an object, whether it be something or nothing, will advance according to the order and direction of the categories.

22.1 1. To the concepts of all, many and one is contrasted that of eliminating everything, i.e., none, and thus is the object of a concept, to which no specified perspective corresponds = nothing, i.e., a concept without object, like the noumena which cannot be counted among the possibilities, although must also not for that reason be proclaimed as impossible (ens rationis). Or perhaps there could be a concept of certain new, basic forces which some people dream up, indeed without contradiction, but which are also thought without example from experience and therefore must not be counted among the possibilities.

23.1 2. Reality is something, negation is nothing, namely a concept of the lack of an object, like the shadow, the cold (nihil privativum).

24.1 3. The mere form of perspective, without substance, is no object on its own, but rather the merely formal condition to an object (as appearance), like pure space and time, which indeed are something, as forms for viewing, but are themselves not objects which are viewed (ens imaginarium).
25.1 4. The object of a concept, which contradicts itself, is nothing, because the concept is nothing, the impossible, like per chance the linear figure of two sides (nihil negativum).

26.1 The table of this division of concepts of nothing (for the division of something paralleling this follows of itself) would have to be set forth so:

Nothing as

1. Empty concept without objects, ens rationis

2. Empty object of a concept, Nihil privatium

3. Empty perspective without object, ens imaginarius

4. Empty object without concept, nihil negativum

27.1 We see that the thought thing (No. 1) is differentiated from the non-thing (No. 4) in that the former may not be counted among the possibilities because it is merely a fabrication (though not a contradiction), while the latter is opposed to the possibility by the concept in fact even eliminating itself.

27.2 But both are empty concepts.

27.3 On the other hand, the nihil privatium (No. 2) and ens imaginarius (No. 3) are empty data to concepts.

27.4 If light were not given to the senses, we can also imagine no darkness, and if extended beings were not perceived, no space.

27.5 The negation and the mere form of perspective as well, without something real, are not objects.
The Transcendental Logic

Second Division. Transcendental Dialectic

Introduction

I. Transcendental Semblance

1.1 Earlier we spoke of the dialectic generally as a logic of semblance.

1.2 That does not mean it is an instruction of probability. For probability is truth, though recognized through insufficient foundations, whose recognition therefore is indeed deficient, but still not for that reason deceptive. Thus it must not be separated from the analytical part of the logic.

1.3 There is even less reason to hold appearance and semblance as equivalent.\(^{254}\)

1.4 For neither truth nor semblance is in the object to the extent it is looked at, but rather in the judgment about the object to the extent it is thought.

1.5 Accordingly we may say quite properly that the senses do not err; but not because they always judge rightly, but because they do not judge at all.

1.6 Hence truth as well as error, thus also semblance as the inducement to error, are only to be encountered in the judgment, i.e., only in the relationship of the object to our understanding.

1.7 There is no error in a recognition which thoroughly accords with laws of the understanding.

1.8 Likewise there is no error in a representation of the senses (because it contains no judgment at all).

1.9 But no force of nature can deviate from its own laws of itself.

1.10 Hence neither the understanding for itself alone (without the influence of another cause) or the senses for themselves would err. The first because, if it

\(^{254}\) In the General Remarks of the Aesthetic (beginning on or near page 69), Kant indicates that an illusion would only arise regarding the appearances if we were to take an appearance to be a thing on its own, e.g., where things would get physically smaller at a distance or where shadows are real things on their own independently of any light source (à la Peter Pan).
acts merely according to its laws, the effect (the judgment) must necessarily agree with these laws.

1.11 But the formal aspect of all truth consists in the correspondence with the laws of the understanding.

1.12 In the senses there is no judgment at all, neither a true one nor a false one.

1.13 Now because we have no other sources of recognition apart from these two, it follows that error is effected only through the unnoticed influence of the sensitivity on the understanding whereby it occurs that the subjective foundations of the judgment flow together with the objective ones and make these diverge from their determinations,* even as a body in motion would indeed always hold to the straight line in the same direction for itself, but which, if another force simultaneously flows into it from another direction, parries off into a non-linear movement.255

1.14 Hence in order to differentiate the peculiar action of the understanding from the force which intrudes, it will be necessary to treat the erring judgment as the diagonal between two forces which determine the judgment according to two diverse directions which include, as it were, an angle, and to dissolve that assembled effect into the simple ones of the understanding and the sensitivity, and this effect must occur in pure judgments a priori through a transcendental reflection whereby (as was already shown) the position for every representation is indicated in the power of recognition commensurate to it, and in this way the influence of the sensitivity upon the understanding is also distinguished.

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 The sensitivity, underlaid to the understanding as the object to which the understanding applies its function, is the source of real recognitions.

1.2 But precisely this sensitivity, to the extent it intrudes upon the understanding itself and determines it in its judgement, is the basis of error

2.1 Our occupation here is not to deal with empirical semblance (e.g., optical illusion), which otherwise meets with proper rules of understanding with the

255 The moon, as I understand, is both falling down to the earth and flying past the earth, resulting in a loop around the earth, a function of two straight line movements.
empirical use and through which the judgment, via the influence of the imagination, is misled. Rather we are concerned only with the transcendental semblance which creeps in upon principles whose use is not even applicable to experience--in which case we would at least have a touchstone of their propriety--but rather which carry us ourselves, against all warnings of the critique, entirely beyond the empirical usage of the categories and tantalizes us with the deception of an expansion of the pure understanding.

2.2 Those principles, the application of which remains thoroughly within the limits of possible experience, we want to call immanent. But those which are supposed to soar out beyond these limits we will call transcendent principles.

2.3 But with this I do not mean the transcendental use or misuse of the categories, which is a mere mistake of the judgment not properly bridled through critique and which does not sufficiently attend to the boundaries of the area on which alone play is allowed to the pure understanding. Rather these are actual principles which encourage us to tear down all the markers of those boundaries and to claim for ourselves an entirely new area, one which recognizes no demarcation anywhere.

2.4 Hence transcendental and transcendent are not identical.

2.5 The principles of the pure understanding, which we presented above, are supposed to be merely of empirical, and not of transcendental, usage, i.e., a usage which does not reach out beyond the boundaries of experience.

2.6 But a principle which removes those limits and even calls for an infringement of those limits is called transcendent.

2.7 If our critique can succeed in uncovering the semblance of these presumptions, then those principles of the merely empirical usage, in contrast to the transcendental usage, can be termed immanent principles of the pure understanding.

3.1 The logical semblance, which consists in the mere imitation of the rational form (the semblance of deceptive inferences), arises solely from a lack of attention to the rules of logic.
3.2 As soon as attention is given in a specific case, this logical semblance vanishes entirely.

3.3 The transcendental semblance, on the other hand, does not cease in this way; not even after we have already uncovered it and distinctly penetrated its imanity through the transcendental critique.

3.4 (e.g., the semblance in the proposition: “the world must have a beginning according to time”).

3.5 The cause of this is that in our rationality (considered subjectively as a human power of recognition) lie basic rules and maxims of its use which thoroughly come across as though they were objective principles and whereby it occurs that the subjective necessity of a certain articulation of our concepts on behalf of the understanding is held to be an objective necessity of the determination of things on their own.²⁵⁶

3.6 This is a semblance which cannot be avoided any more than we can avoid seeing that portion of the ocean, which is further from us, as though it were higher than that portion near the shore, because we see the more remote part through higher light rays than that near the shore; or better yet: any more than the astronomer can avoid the moon appearing larger at its rising, even though he is not deceived by this semblance.

4.1 The transcendental dialectic therefore has the purpose both of uncovering the semblance of the transcendental judgments and preventing it from deceiving us. But it can never manage that in such a way that it also (unlike the case with the logical semblance) disappears and ceases to be a semblance.

4.2 For we are concerned with a natural and unavoidable illusion, which itself rests on subjective principles and foists them on us as objective, unlike the logical dialectic in the solution of the fallacious inference which has only to do with a mistake in compliance with the principle, or with a contrived semblance which imitates that.

²⁵⁶ This tells me, for example, that I am subjectively necessitated in looking for a beginning in time of any condition, and then take that to mean that I am authorized to look for the beginning in time of all conditions, i.e., a world, and that there is such a beginning objectively speaking.
4.3 There is therefore a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason, and not one in which per chance an amateur stumbles into through lack of information or which some sophist has artificially devised in order to confuse rational people, but rather one which unavoidably attaches to human rationality and, even after we have uncovered its illusion, will still not cease to lead that rationality astray and thrust it unceasingly into momentary errors which always have to be removed.
II. Pure Reason as the Seat of the Transcendental Semblance

A. Reason in General

1.1 Each of our recognitions commences with the senses, then goes to the understanding and culminates with reason. Beyond this latter nothing higher is encountered within us for treating the fabric of the perspective and for bringing it under the highest unity of thinking.

1.2 Since I am now supposed to give an explanation of this supreme capacity of recognition I find myself in some embarrassment.

1.3 There is with reason, as with the understanding, a merely formal, i.e., logical, usage where reason abstracts from all content of the recognition. But there is also a real usage, where reason itself contains the origin of certain concepts and principles which it procure neither from the senses nor from the understanding.

1.4 For a long time now logicians have explained the logical capacity as the power of inferring mediatelly (in contrast to immediate conclusions, consequentis immediatis). But the second usage, i.e., the real usage, the usage which generates concepts itself, is not covered by that explanation.

1.5 Now since a division of reason into a logical and a transcendental capacity arises here, a higher concept of this source of recognitions must be sought which comprehends both. According to an analogy with the concepts of the understanding, we can expect the logical concept of reason to simultaneously provide the key to the transcendental concept, and the table of functions of the understanding to simultaneously provide the original registry of the concepts of reason.

2.1 In the first part of our transcendental logic we explained the understanding as the capacity of rules. Here we distinguish reason from that capacity of rules by terming reason the capacity for principles.

3.1 The expression of a principle is equivocal and usually means only a recognition which can be used as a principle, even though it is not a principle on its own and according to its own origin.
3.2 Every universal proposition, be it even taken from experience (through in-
duction), can serve as the premise in a syllogism. But it is not for that reason
itself a principle.

3.3 The mathematical axioms (e.g., between two points there can only be a sin-
gle straight line) are in fact universal recognitions a priori and hence are
properly termed principles relative to the cases which can be subsumed un-
der them.

3.4 But I cannot for that reason say that I recognize this property of straight lines
in general and on its own out of principles, but rather only via the pure per-
spective.

4.1 Hence I would term “recognition from principles” those recognitions where
I recognize the particular in the universal through concepts.

4.2 And so then every syllogism is a form of the derivation of a recognition from
a principle.

4.3 For the major premise always renders a concept, according to which every-
thing which is subsumed under it as a condition is recognized from that con-
cept according to a principle.257

4.4 Now since every universal recognition can serve as a premise in a syllogism,
and since the understanding offers such universal propositions a priori, these
propositions, with respect to their possible use, can also be termed prin-
ciples.

5.1 But if we consider these principles of pure understanding on their own with
respect to their origin, they are nothing other than recognitions from con-
cepts.

5.2 For they would not even be a priori possible if we did not also incorporate
the pure perspective (in mathematics) or conditions of a possible experience
in general.

257 For example: All trees are plants. All oaks are trees. Hence all oaks are plants.
5.3 That everything which happens has a cause cannot at all be inferred from the concept of something which happens in general. Far rather the principle indicates how we can first obtain a determined, experiential concept of that which happens.

6.1 Hence in no way can the understanding provide synthetical recognitions from concepts. And these latter are actually what I term principles absolutely, while all universal propositions in general can be called comparative principles.

7.1 It is an old wish, which perhaps some day (who knows when?) will come into fulfillment, that instead of the endless multitude of civil laws, we may finally seek out their principle. For in that alone can the secret consist for simplifying legislation, as one is wont to say.

7.2 But those laws are also only restrictions of our freedom to conditions under which freedom is in thorough accord with itself. Thus they go to something which is entirely our own work and concerning which we ourselves can be the cause through those concepts.

7.3 But how the objects on their own, how the nature of things stand under principles and should be determined according to mere concepts, this, if not something impossible, is at least very nonsensical in its demand.

7.4 But let it be related with that as it may (for that examination still awaits us), it is at least evident from this that a recognition out of principles (on their own) is something entirely different from a mere understanding recognition, which indeed can also precede other recognitions in the form of a principle, but yet on its own (to the extent it is synthetical) does not rest merely on thinking, nor contain within itself a universality according to concepts.

8.1 The understanding may be a capacity for the unity of the appearances by means of rules, and then reason will be the capacity for the unity of rules of understanding under principles.
8.2 Accordingly reason never goes immediately to experience or to any object, but rather to the understanding in order to give unity a priori through concepts to the manifold recognitions of the understanding, which accordingly may be called rational unity and which is a different type entirely from what can be accomplished by the understanding.

9.1 This is the general concept of the rational capacity, to the extent it has been able to be made comprehensible at the complete lack of examples (which will be given later).
B. The Logical Use of Reason

1.1 We make a distinction between what is recognized immediately and what is only inferred.

1.2 That a figure, which is bound by three straight lines, has three angles, is recognized immediately. But that these angles together equal two right angles is only inferred.

1.3 Because we constantly have need of inference and finally become entirely used to it, we eventually do not notice this distinction any more and, as with the so-called deceptions of the senses, often hold something as immediately perceived which we actually have only inferred.

1.4 With every inference there is a proposition which lies as the basis and another, namely the deduction, which is drawn out of that, and finally the conclusion (Konsequenz), according to which the truth of the deduction is unmistakably joined with the truth of the basis.

1.5 If the inferred judgment already lies in the first, such that it can be derived without mediation of a third representation, then the inference is called immediate (consequential immediate). I prefer to call it an inference of the understanding.

1.6 But if apart from the recognition laid as foundation, yet another judgment is necessary in order to effect the sequence, then the inference is called an inference of reason.

1.7 In the proposition, “all men are mortal,” the propositions, “some men are mortal,” “some mortals are men,” and “nothing which is not mortal is a man,” are already contained, and these are therefore immediate deductions out of the first proposition.

1.8 On the other hand, the proposition, “all savants are mortal,” does not lie in the underlying judgment (for the concept of savant does not arise in it at all), and it can only be deduced by means of a mediating judgment.258

258 For example: all persons are mortal; all savants are persons; thus all savants are mortal.
2.1 In every syllogism I first think a rule (the major) through the understanding.

2.2 Next I subsume a recognition under the condition of the rule (the minor) by means of the capacity for judgment.

2.3 Finally I determine my recognition through the predication of the rule (*conclusio*), thus a priori through reason.

2.4 The relationship therefore which represents the premise as the rule between a recognition and its condition, makes up the diverse sorts of syllogism.

2.5 Hence they are precisely three-fold, even as all judgments in general, to the extent they differ in the way in which they express the relationship of the recognition in the understanding, namely: categorical, hypothetical or disjunctive syllogisms.

3.1 If, as very often happens, the conclusion were given as a judgment in order to see whether it did not already flow out of given judgments, through which namely an entirely different object is thought, then I seek out in the understanding the assertion of this inferential proposition, whether this assertion not already be found in that proposition under certain conditions according to a universal rule.

3.2 Now if I find such a condition and allow the object of the inferential proposition to be subsumed under the given condition, then this is deduced out of the rule which also holds for other objects of the recognition.

3.3 We see from this that in inferences reason seeks to bring the great manifold of the recognitions of the understanding to the smallest number of principles (universal conditions) and in this way to effect the highest unity of those recognitions.
C. The Pure Employment of Reason

1.1 Can we isolate reason, and is it then still an appropriate source of concepts and judgments which arise solely from itself, and which refers to objects in that way? Or is it merely a servile capacity for giving a certain form to given recognitions, a form which is called logical and through which the recognitions of the understanding are subordinated to one other, and lower rules to other, higher ones (the condition of which embraces the condition of the former in its sphere) as much as can be managed through their comparison?

1.2 This is the question that we now want to consider, though only provisionally.

1.3 As a matter of fact a manifold of rules and unity of principles is a requirement of reason in order to bring the understanding into thorough cohesion with itself, just as the understanding brings the manifold of the perspective under concepts and in that way connects the perspective.

1.4 But such a principle prescribes no law to the objects, nor does it contain the basis of the possibility for recognizing and determining them as such in general. Rather it is merely a subjective law for the management of the inventory of our understanding through comparison of its concepts, to bring their universal usage to the smallest possible count of principles without our being justified for that reason in requiring of the objects themselves such a unanimity--which furthers the convenience and expansion of our understanding--nor simultaneously in giving objective validity to those maxims.

1.5 In short the question is whether reason on its own, i.e., pure reason a priori, contains synthetical principles and what the makeup of these principles might be.

2.1 The formal and logical procedure of this in syllogisms already gives us sufficient instruction about this. And it is on this basis that the transcendental principle of that in the synthetical recognition through pure reason will depend.
3.1 First the syllogism does not apply to perspectives, in order to bring them under rules (as the understanding does with its categories), but rather it applies to concepts and judgments.

3.2 If pure reason therefore also applies to objects, it still has no immediate reference to these and their perspective, but rather only to the understanding and its judgments, which are devoted in the first instance to the senses and their perspective in order to determine to these their object.

3.3 Rational unity therefore is not unity of a possible experience, but rather is essentially differentiated from this understanding unity.

3.4 That everything that happens have a cause is not a principle recognized and prescribed through reason.

3.5 This principle of causation makes the unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason which, without this reference to possible experience, could have commanded no such synthetic unity out of mere concepts.

4.1 Secondly in its logical usage reason seeks the universal condition of its judgment (of the conclusion), and the syllogism itself is nothing other than a judgment by means of the subsumption of its condition under a universal rule (the premise).

4.2 Now since this rule in turn is exposed to precisely the same attempt of reason, and since the condition of the condition (by means of a prosyllogismus) must be sought in that way as often as possible, we easily see that the principle of reason in general (in the logical use) is finding the unconditioned for the conditioned recognitions of understanding by means of which the unity of that is completed.

5.1 But this logical maxim cannot be a principle of pure reason except by our assuming that if the conditioned is given then the entire series of conditions subordinated to each other, which hence itself is unconditioned, is also given (i.e., contained in the object and its linkage).
6.1 But such a base proposition of pure reason is obviously synthetical, for the conditioned refers analytically indeed to some sort of a condition, but not to the unconditioned.

6.2 Also various synthetic propositions must arise out of that, concerning which pure understanding knows nothing, for it has only to do with objects of a possible experience, the recognition and synthesis of which is always conditioned.

6.3 But the unconditioned, if it actually takes place, can be particularly weighed according to all the determinations which distinguish it from every condition, and in that way must give a priori a material for several synthetic proposition.

7.1 But the proposition arising out of this supreme principle of pure reason will be transcendent with respect to all appearances, i.e., no adequate, empirical usage of that can ever be made.

7.2 It is entirely different therefore from all principles of the understanding (the use of which is completely immanent in that they have only the possibility of experience as their subject).

7.3 Now whether that principle, i.e., the series of the conditioned (in the synthesis of the appearances or even of the thinking of things in general) reaches the unconditioned, have its objective propriety or not; and which deductions flow from that to the usage of the empirical understanding, or whether there be far rather everywhere no such objectively valid, rational proposition, but rather a merely logical proscription, i.e., in the ascension to always higher conditions, to approach the completion of that and in that way to bring into our recognition the highest rational unity possible to us; whether, I say, through a misunderstanding this need of reason is held as a transcendental principle of pure reason, which all too hastily postulates such an unrestricted completion of the series of the condition in the objects, but also in this case what sort of misinterpretations and semblances may infiltrate the syllogism, the premise of which is taken from pure reason (and which is perhaps more petition than postulate), and which ascend up from experience to its conditions; all this will be our occupation in the transcendental dialectic, which we now wish to develop from its sources lying deeply concealed in human reason.
7.4 We will divide it into two sections, the first of which is to deal with the transcendental concepts of pure reason, and the second with the transcendental and dialectic syllogisms of that.
The Transcendental Dialectic

First Book - The Concepts of Pure Reason

1.1 Regardless of the kinship which the possibility of the concepts out of pure reason may have, still they are not merely reflected, but rather inferred, concepts. 259

1.2 Understanding concepts are also so thought a priori before experience and in aid of experience, but they contain nothing further than the unity of the reflection about the appearances to the extent they are supposed to belong necessarily to a possible, empirical consciousness.

1.3 Through them alone do the recognition and the determination of an object become possible.

1.4 Therefore they first give the material for inferring and before them no concepts a priori of an object precedes out of which they could be inferred.

1.5 On the other hand, because they make up the intellectual form of every experience, their application has to be able to be shown in experience each time.

2.1 But the denomination of a concept of reason already indicates in advance that it will not permit of restriction within experience, because it concerns a recognition, of which each empirical recognition is only a part (perhaps the whole of possible experience or its empirical synthesis), indeed up to a point where no actual experience ever completely reaches, but still every time belongs to that.

2.2 Concepts of reason serve for the comprehending as concepts of the understanding do for the understanding (of the perceptions).

2.3 If they contain the unconditioned, they touch something under which all experience belongs, but which itself is never an object of experience; something to which reason leads in its inferences out of experience and, according

259 See Appendix concerning The Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection Through a Confusion of of the Empirical Usage with the Transcendental Usages of the Understanding on or near page 275.
to which, it estimates and measures the degree of its empirical usage, but never makes up a member of the empirical synthesis.

2.4 If despite this such concepts have objective validity, they can be called *conceptus ratiocinati* (correctly inferred concepts). If not, then at least they are surreptitious through an illusion of the inferring, and might be termed *conceptus ratiocinantes* (rationally contrived concepts).

2.5 But since this can first be made out in the main part of the dialectical inferences of pure reason, we cannot take heed of that yet, but rather for now we will apply a new name to the concepts of pure reason and call them “transcendental Ideas” and at this point will only explain and justify this denomination.
1.1 With the great treasure of our languages the thinker still frequently finds himself embarrassed due to the expression which precisely fits his concept, and in the absence of which he cannot be properly understood by others, indeed not even by himself.

1.2 To forge new words is a pretension to legislation in languages which seldom succeeds, and before someone turns to this doubtful means, it is advisable to look about in a dead and erudite language to see whether this concept might be found there along with its commensurate expression, and even if the old usage of that had become somewhat vague through the carelessness of its originator, it is still better to fortify the meaning, which was particularly its own (even if it should remain doubtful whether at that time he had precisely this in mind), than to spoil his occupation solely by making himself incomprehensible.

2.1 Because of this, if per chance only a single word were found for a certain concept which fitted this concept precisely in meaning already introduced, whose differentiation from other kindred concepts is of the greatest importance, it is advisable not to go about prodigally with that or to use it merely as a synonymous alternative in place of another, but rather carefully to preserve its peculiar meaning; because otherwise it easily happens that after the expression does not particularly occupy one’s attention, but rather is lost under a heap of other greatly divergent meanings, the thought, which it alone had been able to preserve, also gets lost.

3.1 Plato availed himself of the expression “Idea” such that we will see he understood something with that which not only is never borrowed from the senses, but rather in fact widely surpassed the concepts of understanding with which Aristotle was occupied, in that nothing corresponding to it is encountered in experience.

3.2 With him the Ideas are prototypes of the things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experience as are the categories.
3.3 In his opinion they emanated from supreme reason, from whence they became a part of human rationality, but which no longer finds itself in its pristine state and rather must recall with effort the old, now very obscured Ideas through recollection (which was called philosophy).

3.4 I do not want to involve myself here with a literary examination to make out the sense which this sublime philosopher joined to his expression.

3.5 I only note that it is nothing unusual at all, in common speech as well as in writings, that by comparing the thoughts which the author expresses about his object, we come to understand the author better than he did himself, in that he did not sufficiently determine his concept and in that way occasionally spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention.

4.1 Plato noted very well that our capacity of recognition should feel a much higher need than merely spelling out appearances according to a synthetical unity in order to be able to read them as merely experience, and that reason naturally soars to recognitions which go much further than some object provided via experience could ever correspond to, but which nevertheless have reality and are in no way simply pipe dreams.

5.1 Plato found his Ideas especially in everything which is practical,* i.e., based upon freedom, which for its part stands under recognitions which are a peculiar product of reason.

5.2 Whoever wanted to create the concept of virtue out of experience or whoever wanted to make what can only serve in any case as an example for an uncompleted exposition into a pattern for the source of recognition (as many have actually done), such a person would turn virtue into an equivocal nothing, changeable according to time and circumstances and not useful for any rule.

5.3 On the other hand, we all become aware that if someone is represented as a pattern of virtue, we still always have the true original merely in our own head with which we compare this alleged pattern, and merely appraise it accordingly.
5.4 But this is the Idea of virtue with respect to which all possible objects of experience serve indeed as examples (proofs, in a certain degree, of the feasibility of what the concept of reason requires), but not as a prototype.

5.5 That a person will never act adequately to what the pure Idea of virtue contains, does not at all prove something chimerical in these thoughts.

5.6 For nonetheless every judgment about moral worthiness or unworthiness is possible only by means of this Idea. Thus it lies necessarily as the foundation to every approximation to moral perfection, even though the obstacles in the human nature, indeterminable with respect to their degree, may keep us far from that.

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 In fact he also expanded his concept to speculative recognitions if they were pure and given entirely a priori, indeed even to the mathematical, even though these latter did not have any objects beyond those given in a possible experience.

1.2 Now in this regard I cannot follow him, just as little as in the mystical deduction of these Ideas or the exaggerations where he even hypostatized them, as it were. And yet the exalted language he utilized in this field can easily be given a milder interpretation, and one more commensurate to the nature of the things.

6.1 The platonic republic, as an allegedly striking example of the imagined perfection which can have its seat only in the brain of the idle thinker, has become proverbial and Brucker finds it ridiculous that the philosopher asserted that a prince would never rule well if he were not participant to the Ideas.

6.2 However we would do better to pursue this thought further and to illuminate it (where the admirable man leaves us without help) through new efforts, rather than to place it unused to the side under the very pitiful and injurious pretext of unfeasibility.

6.3 A governmental system of the greatest human freedom according to laws which make the freedom of each able to exist together with that of the others (not the greatest happiness, for this will follow of itself) is still at least a necessary Idea which we must not merely lay as basis in the first design of a state constitution, but rather also for all laws, and where at first we must abstract from the present hindrances which may perhaps arise not so much un-
avoidably out of human nature as much more from the neglect of the genuine Ideas in the legislating.

6.4 For nothing can be found more damaging and unworthy of a philosopher than the rabble-rousing appeal to supposedly conflicting experience, which still would not exist at all if those institutions had been made at the right time according to the Ideas, and if raw concepts in their stead, just because they were created from experience, had not frustrated every good intention.

6.5 The more the legislation and government were arranged in accordance with this Idea, the less often would penalties arise, and then it is entirely reasonable (as Plato maintains) that at a perfect arrangement of these, no such penalties would be necessary at all.

6.6 Now even though a perfect arrangement may never take place, the Idea, which effects this maximum as a prototype, is still quite proper in order to bring the legal constitution of humans, in accordance with that maximum, always nearer to the greatest, possible perfection.

6.7 For what may be the highest degree to which humanity could attain and therefore how great the gap may be which necessarily remains between the Idea and its execution, no one can, nor is supposed to, determine, and for the very reason that it is freedom, and freedom can exceed every alleged boundary.

7.1 But not merely in that where human reason shows true causality and where Ideas become effecting causes (of actions and their objects), namely in morals, but rather also with respect to nature itself, Plato rightly sees clear proof of its origin out of Ideas.

7.2 A plant, an animal, the orderly arrangement of the world edifice (supposedly therefore also the entire natural order) plainly show that they are only possible according to Ideas; that indeed no single creature under the singular conditions of its existence is congruent with the Idea of the perfection of its kind (as little as is the human with the Idea of humanity, which he in fact even carries in his soul as the prototype of his actions), that nonetheless those Ideas in the highest understanding are singular, unchanging, completely determined and the original cause of things, and only the whole of their articulation in the world total be solely and alone completely adequate to that Idea.
7.3 If we remove the excess of the expression, the spiritual gusto of the philosophe, ascending from the corpuscular consideration of the physical aspect of the world order to the architectonical connection of that according to purposes, i.e., according to Ideas, is an endeavor which deserves respect and imitation. But with respect to what concerns the principles of morality, of legislation and of religion, where the Ideas make the experience itself (of the good) first possible, although never able to be completely expressed in that, which is an entirely peculiar merit, which some do not recognize only because they evaluate it through just those empirical rules, the validity of which as principles is precisely supposed to have been eliminated by them.

7.4 For in consideration of nature, experience gives us the rule and is the source of truth. But with respect to the moral laws experience (unfortunately) is the mother of illusion, and it is most reprehensible to take, or to want to limit in that way, the laws about what I am supposed to do from that which is done.

8.1 Instead of all these considerations, the pertinent working out of which in fact makes up the specific dignity of philosophy, we now occupy ourselves with a less glittering work, but also a work not without merit, namely to make the site for that majestic, moral structure level and serviceable, in which are present all sorts of mole tunnels of a reason vainly digging for treasure (albeit with good assurance) and which make that edifice unsound.

8.2 The transcendental usage of pure reason with its principles and Ideas are therefore what we are now obligated to be familiar with precisely in order to be able to determine them appropriately, and to estimate the influence of pure reason and its value.

8.3 Yet before I lay this preliminary introduction aside, I implore those to whom philosophy lies at heart (which is more than is commonly encountered)—if they should find themselves convinced through this and what follows—to protect the expression “Idea” according to its original meaning so that it does not slip further under the other expressions, with which usually all sorts of representational manners are indicted in careless disorder, and where as a result science is the loser.

8.4 There is still no lack of terms which are appropriately suitable for every type of representation, without our needing to reach into the belongings of others.
8.5 Here is a gradation of these.

8.6 The genus is representation in general (*repraesentatio*).

8.7 Beneath it stands the representation with consciousness (*perceptio*).

8.8 A perception which refers solely to the subject, as the modification of its state, is sensation (*sensatio*). An objective perception is recognition (*cognitio*).

8.9 This is either perspective or concept (*intuitus vel conceptus*).

8.10 The former refers immediately to the object and is singular. The latter refers mediately by means of a characteristic which can be common to several things.

8.11 The concept is either an empirical or a pure concept. And the pure concept, to the extent it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in the pure image of sensitivity) is called notion (*notio*).

8.12 A concept out of notions, which oversteps the possibility of experience, is the Idea or the concept of reason.

8.13 To one who has once become accustomed to this distinction, it is insufferable to hear the representation of the color red called an Idea.

8.14 It is not even to be termed a notion (understanding concept).
The First Book of the Transcendental Dialectic

2nd Section - The Transcendental Ideas

1.1 The transcendental analytic gave us an example of how the mere form of our recognition is able to contain a priori the origin of pure concepts, which represent objects before all experience or, even more, indicate the synthetical unity which alone makes an empirical recognition of objects possible.

1.2 The form of the judgments (transformed from the synthesis of the perspective into a concept) brought forth categories which guide all understanding usage in experience.

1.3 In a like manner we can expect that the form of inferences of reason, if we apply it to the synthetical unity of the perspectives in accordance with the authority of the categories, will contain a priori the origin of particular concepts, which we can term pure, rational concepts or transcendental Ideas, and which will determine the understanding usage in the whole of all experience in accordance with principles.

2.1 The function of reason with its inferences consisted in the universality of the recognition according to concepts, and the syllogism itself is a judgment which is determined a priori in the entire scope of its condition.

2.2 The proposition, “Caius is mortal,” I would also draw out of experience merely through the understanding.

2.3 However I seek a concept which contains the condition under which the predicate (assertion in general) of this judgment is given (i.e., here the concept of the human). And after I have subsumed under this condition, taken in its entire scope (all humans are mortal), I determine accordingly the recognition of my object (Caius is mortal).

3.1 In the conclusion of an inference of reason therefore we restrict a predicate to a certain object after we have thought it previously in the premise in its entire scope under a certain condition.
3.2 This complete magnitude of the scope, with reference to such a condition, is called universality (*universalitas*).

3.3 To this corresponds in the synthesis of the perspectives the allness (*universalitas*) or totality of the conditions.

3.4 The transcendental syllogism therefore is none other than that of the conditions to a given conditioned.

3.5 Now since the unconditioned alone makes possible the totality of the conditions, and turned about the totality of the conditions itself is always unconditioned, a pure concept of reason in general can be explained through a foundation of the synthesis of the conditioned.

4.1 Now as many kinds of relationship as there are which the understanding represents to itself by means of the categories, there will be just as many pure concepts of reason and therefore in a system we will first seek an unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a subject, second that of the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series, and third that of the disjunction synthesis of the parts.

5.1 There are, namely, just as many types of rational inferences, each of which progresses through prosyllogism to the conditioned, the first to the subject which itself is not a predicate; the next to the presupposition which presupposes nothing further, and the third to an aggregate of the members of the division to which nothing further is required in order to complete the division of a concept.

5.2 Hence the pure concept of reason of the totality in the synthesis of conditions, at least as problems, in order, where possible, to advance the unity of understanding up to the unconditioned, are necessary and based on the nature of human reason. By the way there may also be lacking to these transcendental concepts a use commensurate to them in concreto, and thus they will have no other utility than that of bringing the understanding in the direction, in which its use, by being expanded to the extreme, is simultaneously make thoroughly harmonious with itself.
6.1 But while we speak here of the totality of the conditions and of the unconditioned as the common title of all concepts of reason, we come in turn upon an expression which we are not able to dispense with and, nonetheless, with respect to an equivocation clinging to it through long misuse, cannot safely utilize.

6.2 The word “absolute” is one of the few words which was commensurate in its original meaning to a concept, to which accordingly no other word at all of just the same language is suited, and hence the loss of which or, which is the same thing, its vague utilization, must also entail the loss of the concept itself, and indeed of a concept which, because it occupies reason a great deal, cannot be dispensed with without great disadvantage to all transcendental evaluations.

6.3 This word is frequently used now to indicate merely that something is considered as a matter on its own and therefore holds inwardly.

6.4 In this sense, absolutely possible would mean that which is possible on its own (internally), which in fact is the least that we can say of an object.

6.5 On the other hand, it also is used sometimes to indicate that something is valid in every regard (without restriction, e.g. the absolute monarchy), and in this sense, absolutely possible would mean that which is possible in every intention and in every respect, which in turn is the most that I can say about the possibility of a thing.

6.6 Now indeed we meet these meanings oft together.

6.7 Thus, e.g., what is internally impossible, is also impossible in every respect, thus absolutely.

6.8 But in most cases they are infinitely apart from each other, and in no way can I infer that because something is possible on its own, it is therefore also possible in every respect, thus absolutely.

6.9 Indeed from the absolute necessity I will show in what follows that in no way does it depend in all cases on the inner necessity, and for that reason would have to be viewed as not synonymous with this.
6.10 That, the opposite of which is internally impossible, is also that the opposite of which, of course, is also impossible in every regard, thus itself is absolutely necessary. But I cannot turn about and infer that what is absolutely necessary refers to an opposite which is internally impossible, i.e., that the absolute necessity of things be an internal necessity. For this internal necessity is in certain cases an entirely empty expression, which we cannot join with the least concept. On the other hand that of the necessity of a thing in every regard (to everything possible) entails entirely particular determinations.

6.11 Now because the loss of a concept of great application in the wisdom of the speculative world can never be of indifference to the philosopher, I hope he will also not be indifferent to the determination and careful preservation of the expression on which the concept depends.

7.1 I will avail myself of the word “absolute” in this expanded sense and oppose it to that which is valid merely comparatively or in a particular respect. For this latter is restricted to conditions, while the former holds without restriction.

8.1 Now the transcendental concept of reason goes each time only to the absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions and never ends except with the utterly unconditioned, i.e., in every respect.

8.2 For pure reason leaves to the understanding everything which refers first to the objects of the perspective, or far rather to their synthesis in the imagination.

8.3 To pure reason alone is reserved the absolute totality in usage of the concepts of understanding and it seeks to lead the synthetic unity, which is thought in the category, up to the utterly unconditioned.

8.4 Hence this latter, the synthesis of the objects of perspective, we can term the rational unity of the appearances, even as the former, which the category expresses, is called unity of the understanding.

8.5 Accordingly then reason refers only to the understanding usage and indeed not to the extent this contains the basis of possible experience (for the abso-
lute totality of the conditions is not a concept usable in an experience, be-
cause no experience is unconditioned), but rather in order to prescribe to it
the direction to a certain unity, of which the understanding has no concept
and which goes out beyond that to grasp together all understanding actions,
with respect to each and every object, into an absolute whole.

8.6 Hence the objective usage of pure concepts of reason is transcendent each
time, while that of the pure understanding concept, according to its nature,
must always be immanent in that it restricts itself merely to possible experi-
ence.

9.1 I understand with Idea a necessary concept of reason, to which no congruent
object can be given in the senses.

9.2 Therefore our now developed pure concepts of reason are transcendental
Ideas.

9.3 They are concepts of pure reason; for they consider all recognitions of expe-
rience as determined through an absolute totality of the conditions.

9.4 They are not arbitrarily fabricated, but rather arise through the nature of rea-
son itself, and accordingly refer to the entire understanding usage in a neces-
sary manner.

9.5 Finally they are transcendent and overstep the boundaries of all experience,
in which therefore an object can never come forth which were adequate to
the transcendental Idea.

9.6 If we speak of an Idea, then we say very much with respect to the object (as
an object of pure understanding), but with respect to the subject (i.e., with
respect to its actuality under an empirical condition) very little and precisely
because it, as the concept of a maximum, can never be given congruently in
concreto.

9.7 Now because the latter is actually the entire intention in the merely specula-
tive usage of reason, and since the approximation to a concept, but which is
still never reached in practice, is just as much as though the concept were
thoroughly missing, it is said of such a concept: “it is only an Idea.”
9.8 Thus we would be able to say, “the absolute whole of all appearance is only an Idea,” for since we can never frame such in an image, it remains a problem without any solution.

9.9 On the other hand, because in the practical usage of reason we deal entirely with execution according to rules, the Idea of the practical reason can actually be given each time in concreto, though only partly. Indeed it is the indispensable condition of every practical use of reason.

9.10 Its practice is always limited and deficient, but not under assignable limits, and therefore always under the influence of a concept of an absolute completion.

9.11 Accordingly the practical Idea is quite fruitful every time and, with respect to actual actions, unavoidably necessary.

9.12 In it pure reason even has the causality to actually produce what its concept contains. Hence we cannot say of wisdom depreciatingly, as it were: “It is only an Idea,” but rather just for that reason, because it is the Idea of the necessary unity of all possible purposes, it must serve as the original, at least restricting, condition of the rule to everything practical.

10.1 Now even though we must say of the transcendental, rational concepts, “they are only an Idea,” we will still in no way have to consider them as superfluous and inane.

10.2 For even if in that way no object can be determined, still basically and without being noticed they can serve the understanding as the canon of its expanded and unanimous usage, whereby indeed it recognizes no more objects than it would recognize according to its concepts, but still is better and further led in this recognition.

10.3 And this is not to mention that perhaps these concepts make possible a transition from the concepts of nature to the practical, and in this way can supply stance to the moral Ideas themselves and cohesion with the speculative recognitions of reason.

10.4 Of all this we must expect development later.
11.1 But commensurate to our intention, we set the practical Ideas to the side here and hence consider reason in its speculative usage, and in this even more narrowly, only in the transcendental usage.

11.2 Now here we must strike out on the same road which we took above at the deduction of the categories, namely to ponder the logical form of recognitions of reason, and see whether or not perchance reason is also in that way a source of concepts for considering objects on their own as determined synthetically a priori with respect to any one of the functions of reason.

12.1 Reason, considered as a capacity for a certain, logical form of recognitions, is the ability to infer, i.e., to judge mediately (through the subsumption of the condition of a possible judgment under the condition of a given one).

12.2 The given judgment is the universal rule (premise, major).

12.3 The subsumption of the condition of another possible judgment under the condition of the rule is the sub-proposition (minor).

12.4 The actual judgment, which expresses the assertion of the rule in the subsumed case, is the conclusion (conclusio).

12.5 Namely, the rule says something universally under a certain condition.

12.6 Now in a specific case, the condition of the rule takes place.

12.7 Therefore that which holds universally under the condition, is viewed also as valid in the specific case (which entails this condition).

12.8 We easily see that reason achieves to a recognition through actions of understanding which make up a series of conditions.

12.9 If I achieve to the position “all bodies are alterable” only by beginning from the more remote recognition (in which the concepts of body does not yet come forth, but which still contains the condition of that), “every assemblage is alterable,” and from this go to a closer one which stands under the condition of the first, “bodies are assemblages,” and only then from this to a third one which joins the remove recognition (alterable) with the present one
“consequently bodies are alterable,” then I have arrived through a series of conditions (premises) to a recognition (conclusion).

12.10 Now each and every series, the exponent of which (the categorical or hypothetical judgment) is given, permits of advancement, thus leads just the same rational action to *ratiocinatio polysyllogistica*, which is a series of inference which can be advanced either on the side of the conditions (*per proosyllogismos*) or of the conditioned (*per episyllogismos*) to an undetermined extent.

13.1 But we become aware very soon that the chain or series of the prosyllogism, i.e., the inferred recognitions on the side of the foundations or the conditions to a given recognition, in other words, the ascending series of rational inferences, would still have to relate to the rational capacity in a different way from the descending series, i.e., the advance of reason on the side of the conditioned through epi-syllogism.

13.2 For since in the first case the recognition (*conclusio*) is only given as conditioned, we cannot achieve to that by means of reason otherwise than at least under the presupposition that all members of the series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series of the premises) because only under this presupposition is the present judgment a priori possible. On the other hand, on the side of the conditioned or of the consequences, only a becoming and not an already entirely presupposed or given series, thus only a potential advance is thought.

13.3 Hence if a recognition is considered as conditioned, then reason is necessitated to treat the series of conditions as completed in an ascending line and given with respect to its totality.

13.4 But if just the same recognition were viewed simultaneously as a condition of other recognitions which make up among one another a series of conclusions in the descending line, then reason can be entirely indifferent as to how far this advance might reach *a parte posteriori* and whether a totality of this series even be possible, because it has no need of such a series to the conclusions lying before it in that this is already sufficiently determined and secured through its foundations *a parte priori*.

13.5 Now it may be that the series of the premises on the side of the conditions have a first supreme condition, or it may be they do not and therefore be
without boundaries *a parte priori*; in either case they must contain the total-
ity of the condition, supposing that we could never achieve so far as to reach
it, and the entire series must be unconditionally true if the conditioned,
which is viewed as a consequence arising from that, is supposed to hold true.

13.6 This is a requirement of reason which announces its finding as a priori de-
termined and as necessary either on its own, and then it has need of no foun-
dation or, if it is derived, as a member of a series of foundations which itself
is unconditionally true.
The First Book of the Transcendental Dialectic

3rd Section - System Of The Transcendental Ideas

1.1 We are not presently concerned with logical dialectic, which abstracts from all the content of knowledge and confines itself to exposing the fallacies concealed in the form of syllogisms, but rather with a transcendental dialectic which has to contain completely \textit{a priori} the origin of certain recognitions derived from pure reason as well as certain inferred concepts, the object of which can never be given empirically and which therefore lie entirely outside the faculty of pure understanding.

1.2 From the natural relation which the transcendental employment of our recognition, alike in inferences and in judgments, must bear to its logical employment, we have gleaned that there can be only three kinds of dialectical inference, corresponding to the three kinds of inference through which reason can arrive at recognitions by means of principles, and that in all of these its business is to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, to which understanding always remains restricted, to the unconditioned, which understanding can never reach.

2.1 The relations which are to be universally found in all our representations are (1) relation to the subject; (2) relation to objects, either as appearances or as objects of thought in general.

2.2 If we combine the subdivision with the main division, all relations of representations, of which we can form either a concept or an Idea, are then threefold: (1) the relation to the subject; (2) the relation to the manifold of the object in the field of appearances; (3) the relation to all things in general.

3.1 Now all pure concepts in general are concerned with the synthetical unity of representations, but those of them which are concepts of pure reason (transcendental Ideas) are concerned with the unconditioned synthetical unity of all conditions in general.

3.2 All transcendental Ideas can therefore be arranged in three classes, the first containing the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the
second the absolute unity of the series of conditions of appearances, and the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general.

4.1 The thinking subject is the object of psychology, the sum total of all appearances (the world) is the object of cosmology, and the thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the being of all beings) the object of theology.

4.2 Pure reason thus furnishes the Idea for a transcendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia rationalis), for a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis), and, finally, for a transcendental knowledge of God (theologia transzendentalis).

4.3 The understanding is not in a position to render even the mere design of any one of these sciences, not even though it be supported by the highest logical employment of reason, that is, by all the conceivable inferences through which we seek to advance from one of its objects (appearance) to all others, up to the most remote members of the empirical synthesis. Each of these sciences is an altogether pure and genuine product, or problem, of pure reason.

5.1 In what precise modes the pure concepts of reason stand under these three headings of all transcendental Ideas will be fully explained in the next chapter.

5.2 They follow the guiding thread of the categories.

5.3 For pure reason never relates directly to objects, but to the concepts which understanding frames in regard to objects.

5.4 In a like way it is only by the process of completing our argument that it can be shown how reason, simply by the synthetic employment of that very function of which it makes use in categorical syllogisms, is necessarily brought to the concept of the absolute unity of the thinking subject; how the logical procedure used in hypothetical syllogisms leads to the Idea of the completely unconditioned in a series of given conditions; and finally how the mere form of the disjunctive syllogism must necessarily involve the highest concept of reason, that of a being of all beings--a thought which, at first consideration, seems utterly paradoxical.
6.1 No *objective deduction*, such as we have been able to give of the categories, is, strictly speaking, possible in the case of these transcendental Ideas.

6.2 Just because they are only Ideas they have, in fact, no relation to any object that could be given as coinciding with them.

6.3 We can, indeed, undertake a subjective derivation of them from the nature of our reason; and this has been provided in the present chapter.

7.1 As is easily seen, what pure reason has as its sole intention is the absolute totality of the synthesis *on the side of the conditions* (whether of inherence, of dependence, or of concurrence). It is not concerned with absolute completeness *on the side of the conditioned*.

7.2 For only the former is required in order to presuppose the whole series of the conditions, and to present it *a priori* to the understanding.

7.3 Once we are given a complete (and unconditioned) condition, no concept of reason is required for the continuation of the series; for every step in the forward direction from the condition to the *conditioned* is carried through by the understanding itself.

7.4 Thus the transcendental Ideas serve only for *ascending*, in the series of conditions, to the unconditioned, that is, to principles.

7.5 As regards the *descending* to the conditioned, reason does, indeed, make a very extensive, logical employment of the laws of understanding, but no kind of transcendental employment. If we form an Idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis (of the *progressus*), as, for instance, of the whole series of all *future* alterations in the world, this is a creation of the mind (*ens rationis*) which is only arbitrarily conceived, and it is not a necessary presupposition of reason.

7.6 For the possibility of the conditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions, but not of its consequences.
7.7 Such a concept is not therefore one of the transcendental Ideas; and it is with these alone that we have to deal here.

8.1 Finally, we also discern that a certain connection and unity is evident among the transcendental Ideas themselves, and that by means of them pure reason combines all its modes of knowledge into a system.

8.2 The advance from the knowledge of oneself (the soul) to the knowledge of the world, and by means of this to the original being is so natural that it seems to resemble the logical advance of reason from premises to conclusion.*

8.3 Whether this is actually due to a concealed relationship of the same kind as subsists between the logical and the transcendental procedure is one of the questions that await answer in the course of these inquiries.

8.4 Indeed, we have already, in a preliminary manner, obtained an answer to this question, since in treating of the transcendental concepts of reason which, in philosophical theory, are commonly confused with others and not properly distinguished even from concepts of understanding, we have been able to rescue them from their ambiguous position, to determine their origin and at the same time, in so doing, to fix their precise number (to which we can never add), presenting them in a systematic connection, and so marking out and enclosing a special field for pure reason.

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 Metaphysics has as the proper object of its inquiries three Ideas only: God, freedom, and immortality--so related that the second concept, when combined with the first, should lead to the third as a necessary conclusion.

1.2 Any other matters with which this science may deal serve merely as a means of arriving at these Ideas and of establishing their reality.

1.3 It does not need the Ideas for the purposes of natural science, but in order to pass beyond nature.

1.4 Insight into them would render theology and morals and, through the union of these two, likewise religion, and in this way the highest ends of our existence entirely and exclusively dependent on the faculty of speculative reason.
1.5 In a systematic representation of the Ideas, the order cited, the synthetical, would be the most suitable. But in the investigation which must necessarily precede it the analytical, or reverse order, is better adapted to the purpose of completing our great project, by enabling us to start from what is immediately given to us in experience—advancing from the doctrine of the soul, to the doctrine of the world, and thence to the knowledge of God.
1.1 We can say that the object of a mere transcendental Idea is something for which we have no concept, even though this Idea was necessarily generated by reason according to its original laws.

1.2 It is actually not possible for any understanding concept of an object to be adequate to a demand of reason, i.e., such an object which can be exhibited in a possible experience and be made discernible.

1.3 It would be better expressed, and with less danger of misunderstanding, if we were to say of such an object, to which an Idea corresponds, that we have no knowledge, though still a problematic concept.

2.1 Now at least the transcendental (subjective) reality of the concept of pure reason depends upon us being able to bring a necessary inference of reason to such an Idea.

2.2 Hence there will be conclusions of reason which contain no empirical premises, and by means of which we can conclude from something we know to something else, concerning which we have no concept and to which, nevertheless, we grant objective reality through an unavoidable illusion.

2.3 Such conclusions therefore with respect to their results, are rather to be termed pseudo-rational, rather than rational, conclusions; although, due to their origin, they may very well bear the latter terminology, for they are not invented fictionally nor have they arisen accidentally; rather they have arisen from the nature of reason.

2.4 They are sophistications, but not of humans, rather of pure reason itself, which even the wisest human cannot avoid. After much effort he can indeed prevent the error, but never entirely prevent the illusion, which incessantly mocks and torments him.

3.1 Accordingly there are only three sorts of dialectical conclusions of reason, the same number as the Ideas to which its conclusions lead.
3.2 In the first class of rational conclusions I proceed from the transcendental concept of the subject, which contains no manifold, to the absolute unity of the subject itself, and concerning which in this way I have no concept at all.

3.3 This dialectical conclusion I shall call the transcendental paralogism.

3.4 The second class of pseudo-rational conclusions is applied to the transcendental concept of the absolute totality of the series of conditions to a given appearance in general. And given that I always have on the one side the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series, a concept which contradicts itself, I conclude from that to the correctness of the contrary unity, concerning which I likewise have no concept.

3.5 This state of reason, with these dialectical conclusions, I will term the antinomy of pure reason.

3.6 Finally, and in accordance with the third sort of pseudo-rational inference, I conclude from the totality of the conditions to think objects in general, to the extent they can be given to me, to the absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general, i.e., I conclude from things, with which I am not familiar according to sheer transcendental concept, to the being of all beings which I know even less through a transcendental concept, and from whose unconditioned necessity I can formulate no concept

3.7 This dialectical inference I shall call the Ideal of pure reason.
The logical paralogism consists in the falseness of a syllogism according to the form, be the content what it will.

But a transcendental paralogism has a transcendental basis for inferring falsely with respect to the form.

In this way one such fallacious inference will have its basis in the nature of human reason and will entail an unavoidable, though not insoluble, illusion.

We now come upon a concept which was not recorded above in the universal list of the transcendental concepts and which nevertheless must be counted with them, still without for that reason altering that table in the least, or declaring it deficient.

This is the concept or, if you will, the judgment, “I think.”

But we easily see that this is the vehicle for all concepts in general and thus also of the transcendental ones and therefore is always comprehended under these, and thus is transcendental just as well. But it is able to have no particular title because it only serves to present all thinking as belonging to the consciousness.

Nevertheless, as pure as this also is from empirical input (from the impressions of the senses) it still serves in distinguishing two objects out of the nature of our representational capacity.

I, as thinking, am an object of the inner sense and am called soul.

That which is an object of outer sense is called body.
2.7 Accordingly the expression “I” as thinking being, already means the object of psychology. And this can be called the rational doctrine of soul if I have need of nothing further concerning the soul than what can be inferred out of this concept “I” to the extent it arises with all thinking and thus independently of all experience (which determines me more closely and in concreto).

3.1 Now the rational doctrine of soul is actually a venture of this sort, for if the least empirical input of my thinking, or any kind of a particular perception of my inner state, were mixed in among the recognitional foundations of this science, then it would no longer be a rational, but rather an empirical, doctrine of soul.

3.2 Therefore we already have before us an avowed science which was erected upon the single proposition, “I think,” and whose foundation, or absence of which, we can examine here quite properly and as commensurate to the nature of a transcendental philosophy.

3.3. We must not stumble on the fact that I still have an internal experience with this proposition, one which expresses the perception of one’s self, and thus the rational doctrine of soul which is erected upon it never being pure, but rather based partly upon an empirical principle.

3.4 For this inner perception is nothing further than the mere apperception “I think” which in fact makes all transcendental concepts possible in “I think substance, cause, etc.”

3.5 For inner experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general and its relationship to other perceptions, without there being given empirically any particular distinction and determination of that, cannot be viewed as an empirical recognition, but rather as a recognition of the empirical in general. Accordingly it belongs to the investigation of the possibility of each and every experience, and such an investigation is always transcendental.

3.6 The least object of perception (e.g., even pleasure or displeasure), which were added to the universal representation of the self consciousness, would at once convert rational psychology into an empirical psychology.
4.1 Therefore “I think” is the solitary text of rational psychology, from which it is to develop its entire wisdom.

4.2 We easily see that this thought, if it is supposed to refer to an object (myself), is not able to contain anything beyond transcendental predicates of that object, because the least empirical predicate would contaminate the rational purity and independence of the science from all experience.

5.1 But here we merely have to follow the guidelines of the categories. However since here first a thing “I”, as thinking being, was given, we will indeed not change the order of the categories among one another as they are represented in their table, but we will begin from the category of substance, and thus follow their series backwards.

5.2 Accordingly the topic of the rational doctrine of soul, from which all else which it may contain must be derived, is as follows:

1. The soul is substance,

2. simple with respect to its quality,

3. numerically identical, i.e., unity (not plurality), with respect to the different times in which it is present, and

4. in relationship to possible objects in space.*

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 The reader, who will not so easily guess from these expressions, in their transcendental abstraction, the psychological sense they have and why the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of existence, will find them sufficiently explained and justified in what follows.

1.2 Furthermore, due to the Latin expressions which, contrary to good form in writing, have entered in place of the synonymous German ones, as well as with respect to the entire work, I have to cite as excuse that I have wanted rather to reduce somewhat the elegance of the language than to impede the scholastic usage through the least misunderstanding.
6.1 Out of these elements spring all concepts of the pure instruction of soul, solely through assemblage, and there is not the least need to recognize another principle.

6.2 This substance, merely as object of the inner sense, renders the concept of the immateriality; as simple substance, that of incorruptibility; the identity of it, as intellectual substance, renders the personality; all these three pieces together, that of spirituality; and the relationship to the objects in space gives the *commercium* with bodies. Accordingly the doctrine represents the thinking substance as the principle of the life in matter, i.e., it as soul (*anima*) and as the basis of animality; and this restricted by the spirituality, i.e., immortality.

7.1 Now to each of these four there refers a paralogism of a transcendental doctrine of soul, which was held falsely as a science of pure reason from the nature of our thinking being.

7.2 But as the basis of this thinking being we can assign nothing other than the simple representation “I” and which, of itself, is entirely empty of content, concerning which we cannot even say that it be a concept as rather a mere consciousness which accompanies all concepts.  

7.3 Now through this “I” or “he” or “it” (that thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X, which is recognized only through the thoughts which are its predicates and about which, in isolation, we can never have the least concept. Hence concerning this we must turn about in a continuous circle, since in order to judge any sort of something at all about it we must already and always avail ourselves of its representation. This inconvenience is inseparable from our judging because the consciousness by itself is not so much a representation distinguishing a particular object, as rather a form of a representation in general to the extent it is supposed to be termed recognition. It is of that alone that can I say that I think any sort of something at all by means of it.

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260 The “I” represents the apperception.
8.1 But it must seem strange at the very beginning that the condition, under which I think in general and which therefore is merely a constitution of my subject, is simultaneously supposed to be valid for everything which thinks and that we can presume to base an apodictic and universal judgment on a seemingly empirical proposition, namely that everything which thinks is so constituted as the verdict of the self consciousness testifies about me.

8.2 But the cause of this lies in the necessity of our having to attribute a priori to things all the properties which make up the conditions under which alone we think them.

8.3 Now I cannot have the least representation of a thinking being through any outer experience, for this arises only through the self consciousness.

8.4 Such objects therefore are nothing more than the transference of my consciousness to other things, and it is only in this way that these objects can be represented as thinking beings.261

8.5 But here the proposition “I think” is taken only problematically; not to the extent it may contain a perception of an existence (the Cartesian, “cogito, ergo sum”262), but rather with respect to its mere possibility in order to see which properties may flow out of this very simple proposition to the subject of the “I think” (whether existing or not).263

9.1 If more than the cogito were placed as the basis to our pure rational recognition of thinking beings in general, we would also take recourse to the observation about the play of our thoughts and the natural laws of the thinking self to be drawn from that. And then an empirical psychology would arise, which would be a sort of physiology of the inner sense, perhaps to explain the appearances of that inner sense, but which could never serve in revealing such properties which do not at all belong to possible experience (like that of the simple), nor to teach something apodictically of thinking beings in general which concerns their nature. And so it would not be rational psychology.

261 In order then to think about a thinking being in general we have to use ourselves as a representative of a thinker in general.

262 “I think; therefore I am.”

263 So this will be very abstract and we will consider only the rational meaning of the “I.”
10.1 Now since the proposition “I think” (taken problematically) contains the form of each and every understanding judgment in general and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is clear that the inferences from this proposition can contain a merely transcendental usage of understanding. This wards off all admixture of experience and of whose advance, according to what we have shown above, we are unable to fashion any advantageous concept in advance.

10.2 We want to pursue it therefore through all predicates of the pure doctrine of soul with a critical eye, though, for the sake of brevity, allowing the test to proceed in uninterrupted cohesion.

11.1 First of all the following, a universal comment can sharpen our attentiveness to this inferential manner.

11.2 I do not recognize an object merely by thinking. Rather I can recognize any sort of object only by determining a given perspective with an intention towards the unity of the consciousness in which all thinking consists.  

11.3 Therefore I do not recognize myself by being conscious of myself as thinking, but rather by being conscious to myself of my own perspective as determined with respect to the function of that thinking.

11.4 Hence on their own all modi of the self consciousness in thinking are not yet understanding concepts of objects (categories), but rather merely logical functions which render no object at all to the thinking to be recognized, thus not even myself as object.

11.5 It is not the consciousness of the determining that is the object, but rather only that of the determinable self, i.e., of my inner perspective (to the extent its manifold can be combined commensurate to the universal condition of the unity of the apperception in the thinking).

12.1 1. Now in all judgments, I am always the determining subject of that relationship which makes up the judgment.

264 See the 2nd (B) version of the Transcendental Deduction, #25, beginning on or about page 146.
12.2 But that the “I” which thinks “I” would always have to hold in the thinking as subject and as something which cannot merely be considered adhering as predicate to the thinking, is an apodictic and even identical proposition, but it does not mean that I, as an object, be a, for myself, self-existing being or substance.265

12.3 The latter goes very far, and hence also requires data which are not encountered in the thinking at all; perhaps (to the extent I merely consider the thinking being as such) more than I will ever encounter anywhere in it.

13.1 2. Hence that the “I” of the apperception in every thinking is a singularity which cannot be dissolved into a plurality of subjects, thus indicating a logically simple subject, already lies in the concept of the thinking and is, consequently, an analytical proposition, but this does not mean that the thinking “I” is a simple substance, for that would be a synthetical proposition.

13.2 The concept of substance refers always to perspectives, which with me cannot be otherwise than sensitive, thus lying entirely outside the field of the understanding and its thinking, and concerning which here we only say that the I in thinking is simple.

13.3 And consider what requires so much preparation in order to distinguish what be substance in what the perspective presents, and even more, whether this can also be simple (as with the particles of material)! Would it not be amazing if such as that were given to me here so directly in the poorest representation of all, as though through a revelation?

14.1 3. The proposition of the identity of my own self with all manifold, of which I am aware, is a proposition lying just as well in the concepts themselves, thus is an analytical proposition. But this identity of the subject, of which I can become aware in all its representations, does not concern the perspective of that “I” whereby it is given as object. Accordingly it also cannot mean the identity of the person through which the consciousness of the identity of its

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265 I suppose it might be thought possible to imagine some thoughts where there were no I doing the thinking, but that is actually impossible. We cannot say that this thought has an I and that thought has an I, as though some might not have an I, and so where the I were a predicate, e.g., this particular thinking includes an “I think.”
own substance, as thinking being, is understood in all alternations of the states. The proof of that is not accomplished via the mere analysis of the proposition “I think,” but rather would require diverse, synthetical judgments, which are based on the given perspective.

15.1 4. That I distinguish my own existence, as a thinking being, from other things apart from me (to which even my own body belongs) is just as well an analytical proposition, for other things are such which I think as distinguished from me.

15.2 But whether this consciousness of myself be possible without things outside of me, by means of which representations are given to me, and whether I therefore am able to exist merely as thinking being (without being human), this I do not know in that way at all.

16.1 Therefore through the analysis of the consciousness of my own self in the thinking in general not the least is won with respect to the recognition of my own self as object.

16.2 The logical exposition of the thinking in general is falsely held as a metaphysical determination of the object.\(^{266}\)

17.1 A great, indeed the only, stumbling block against our entire critique would be if there were a possibility of proving a priori that all thinking beings are substances on their own and therefore as such (which is a consequence of the very foundation of proof) inseparably entail personality and are conscious of their existence abstracted from all matter.

17.2 For in this manner we still would have taken a step out beyond the sensitive world, and accordingly no one could deny us the authority to expand further in this, to add to it and, each favored by his lucky star, to take possession of it

\(^{266}\) In summary we conceive of a rational doctrine of the soul which is based on the consciousness of self in all recognitions and which is then considered transcendentally and where, as a result, nothing is actually learned except tautologies and identities. We must necessarily examine the soul as object always from the standpoint of the soul as subject, and so nothing is won. It seems as though the logical here means about the same as the grammatical, as if we are taking a grammatical aspect and trying to make it a real thing.
17.3 For the proposition “every thinking being, as such, is a simple substance” is a synthetical proposition a priori because first it goes out beyond the concept laid to it as foundation and adds the manner of existence to the thinking in general, and secondly contributes a predicate (of simplicity) to that concept, which can be given in no experience whatsoever.

17.4 Accordingly then synthetical propositions a priori would not be, as we have asserted, feasible and admissible merely with reference to objects of possible experience and indeed as principles of the possibility of this experience itself, but rather they would also be able to go to things in general and on their own, which consequence would make an end to this entire critique and would command an acquiescence to the old approach.

17.5 However the danger of this is not so great if we step closer to the matter.

18.1 In the procedure of rational psychology there rules a paralogism which is presented through the following rational inference.

19.1 What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject, also does not exist otherwise than as subject and so therefore is substance.

20.1 Now a thinking being, merely considered as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject.

21.1 Therefore it also only exists as such, i.e., as substance.

22.1 In the main premise a being is spoken of which can be thought in general in every intention, consequently also as it may be given in the perspective.

22.2 But in the minor, the discussion is only of that being to the extent it considers itself as subject only relative to the thinking and to the unity of the con-
sciousness, but not simultaneously with reference to the perspective whereby it is given as object to the thinking.\textsuperscript{267}

22.3 The conclusion therefore is induced \textit{per sophisma figurae dictonis},\textsuperscript{268} thus through a fallacious inference.*

* Kant’s annotation.

1. The thinking in both premises is taken in entirely different meanings; in the major as it goes to an object in general (thus as it may be given in the perspective); but in the minor only as it consists in the reference to the self consciousness, where thusly no object at all is thought of, but rather here only the reference to itself as subject (as the form of thinking) is represented.

2. In the first premise, things are discussed which cannot be thought otherwise than as subjects, but in the second, not things but rather the thinking (in that we abstract from all objects), in which the “I” always serves as the subject of the consciousness. Accordingly the concluding proposition “I cannot exist otherwise than as subject” cannot follow, but rather only “in the thinking of my existence, I can use myself only as the subject of the judgment” which is an identical proposition, which reveals utterly nothing about the manner of my existence.

23.1 That this solution of the famous argument in one paralogism be so entirely correct becomes clear if we will attend here to the general remark to the systematical representation of the principles and the section on the \textit{noumena}, where it was proven that the concept of a thing which can exist for itself as subject, but not as mere predicate, entails yet no objective reality at all, i.e., we are not able to know whether anywhere an object befit it, in that we do not penetrate the possibility of such a manner of recognition.\textsuperscript{269}

23.2 If therefore it is supposed to indicate an object under the denomination of a substance which can be given, i.e., if it is supposed to be a recognition, then an enduring perspective, as the indispensable condition of the objective real-

\textsuperscript{267} So in the minor the “I” has a more specific meaning. By the “I” we mean the subject of our thinking and the unity of consciousness, but not as though it were an object of that thinking as might be viewed.

\textsuperscript{268} “by a figure of speech” or “play on words.”

\textsuperscript{269} See the section on Noumena beginning on or near page 258.
ity of a concept, namely that whereby alone the object is given, must be laid as basis.270

23.3 But now we have nothing enduring at all in the inner perspective, for the “I” is only the consciousness of my thinking. If we remain merely with the thinking therefore the necessary condition is lacking for us to apply the concept of substance, i.e., a subject existing for itself, to itself as thinking being. And the simplicity of the substance combined with that falls entirely away with the objective reality of this concept and is changed into a merely logical, quantitative unity of the self consciousness in the thinking in general, be the subject assembled or not.

270 I need to get clearly in my mind how it is that we are able to utilize the category of substance with regard to external appearances, and how it is that this does not hold with regard to the inner appearances.
Refutation of the Mendelssohn Proof of the Persistence of the Soul

1.1 In the usual argument by which it is to be proven that the soul (if admitted that it be a simple being) is not able to cease to exist through dissection, this acute philosopher soon noted an inadequacy to the intention of securing to it the necessary continuation because we could still assume a cessation of its existence by vanishing.

1.2 Now this ephemerality, which would be a true destruction, he sought to keep from the soul in his *Phaedon* by venturing to prove a simple being is not able to cease to be at all because, since it is not able to be reduced at all and therefore to lose something little by little of its existence and so gradually to be transformed into nothing (in that it has no parts and therefore also no plurality in itself), no time at all would be encountered between an instance in which it is, and another in which it is no longer, which is impossible.--

1.3 But he did not consider that even if we admit this simple nature to the soul, since namely it contains no manifold apart from each other, thus no extensive magnitude, we still are able to deny to it, as much as to any sort of existing something, an intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree of reality with respect to all of its capacities, indeed in general of all that makes up the existence, which intensive magnitude is able to diminish through infinitely many smaller degrees. And so the alleged substance (the thing, whose persistence does not otherwise already stand fast) is able to be changed into nothing, not through dissection, but still through gradual dissipation (*remission*) of its powers (thus through elanguescence, if I am permitted to avail myself of this expression).

1.4 For even the consciousness always has a degree which can yet always be reduced, * consequently also the capacity for being consciousness of one’s self, and thus all other capacities.--*

1.5 The persistence of the soul therefore as mere object of the inner sense, remains unproven and even indemonstrable through its persistence in life. That the thinking being (as human) is simultaneously an object of outer sense to itself is clear of itself, but which is entirely insufficient for the rational psychologist who undertakes to prove from mere concepts the absolute persistence of that being, even out beyond life.**

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271 The gradual loss by the soul of its powers.
1.1 Clarity is not, as the logicians say, the consciousness of a representation; for a certain degree of the consciousness, but which is insufficient for recollection, must be present in even many obscure representations, because without any consciousness, we would make no distinction in the combination of the obscure representations, which we are still empowered to do with the identification marks of many concepts (like those of right and fairness, and of the musical artist when he grasps together many notes in his fantasy).

1.2 Quite the contrary, a representation is clear where the consciousness achieves to the consciousness of the distinctiveness of that representation from others.

1.3 If this achieved indeed to a consciousness, but not to the consciousness of the distinctiveness, then the representation would still have to be termed obscure.

1.4 Therefore there are infinitely many degrees of consciousness down to a vanishing.

** Kant’s annotation:

1.1 There are some who, in order to bring onto line a new possibility, believe to have already done enough if they rely on no one being able to show them a contradiction in the presupposition (as all those are who believe to penetrate the possibility of the thinking even after its cessation, whereof they have an example only with the empirical perspectives in human life). These can be brought into great embarrassment through other possibilities, which are not in the least more audacious.

1.2 Of such is the possibility of the division of a simple substance into several substances and, vice-versa, the blending (coalition) of several into one simple one.

1.3 For although the divisibility presupposes an assemblage of substances, it still does not necessarily require an assemblage of substances, but rather merely of degrees (of the various capacities) of one and the same substance.

1.4 Now just as we can think of all forces and capacities of the soul, even that of the consciousness, as dwindled in half, but so that the substance still always remain, we can also imagine without contradiction that this extinguished half is preserved, but not in it, but rather apart from it, and that since here everything which is in it at all is real, consequently has a degree, thus the entire existence of that so that nothing is lacking, were halved, then a particular substance would arise apart from it.

1.5 For the plurality which was already previous thought not as plurality of the substance, but rather of every reality as quantum of existence in it, and the unity of the substance was only a way of existing which were converted through this division alone into a manifold of substances.

272 I wonder if driving on "auto pilot" is a case in point?
1.6 But also many substances could likewise in turn congregate, whereby nothing would be lost except merely the manifold of the subsistence, in that the one would contain the degree of the reality of all previous ones together within itself, and perhaps the simple substances, which the appearance of a material gives us (indeed not, of course, through a mechanical or chemical influence upon one another, but still through one unknown to us, of which the former would only be the appearance) might produce the souls of children through such dynamical division of the parents’ souls, as intensive magnitude, while the latter supplement their departure in turn through coalition with the new matter of the same type.

1.7 I am far from admitting the least value or validity to this chimera, and the above principles of the analytic have sufficiently enjoined us from making any other usage of the categories except experiential.

1.8 But if out of the mere thinking capacity, without any kind of continuing perspective through which an object were given, the rationalist is bold enough to make a being existent for itself merely because the unity of apperception in thinking allows him no explanation from assemblage, instead of doing better in insisting that he does not know how to explain the possibility of a thinking nature, why is the materialist, even though he can cite experience just as little in aid of his possibilities, not justified with equal boldness in availing himself of his principles, with retention of the formal unity of the first, to a contrarily opposed usage.

2.1 Now let us take our above propositions in synthetic cohesion as they also, allegedly being valid for all thinking beings, must be taken in rational psychology as a system, and from the category of relationship with the proposition “all thinking beings, as such, are substances,” let us go backwards through the series until the circle is closed where we finally come upon the existence of thinking beings, of which they are not only aware in this system independently of outer things, but rather also which they can determine out of themselves (with respect to the persistence, which necessarily belongs to the character of substance).

2.2 But it follows from this that Idealism is unavoidably in precisely the same rationalist system, at least the problematical Idealism; and if the existence of outer things is not at all required for the determination of our own existence

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273 Here we start with substance, go to reality and number and end with relationship with outer things, which then can be determined rationally and without recourse to experience.
in time, the existence of outer things is also assumed quite in vain without ever being able to give a proof of it.\textsuperscript{274}

3.1 On the other hand, since the “I think” lies as foundation as a proposition which already comprehends an existence within itself, thus the modality as given, if we comply with the analytical procedure and dismember this proposition in order to recognize its content, namely whether and how merely this “I” determines its existence in space or time, the propositions of the rational doctrine of soul would begin from an actuality, and from the way in which this is thought after everything which is empirical with it were isolated, that which befits a thinking being in general would be deduced as the following table shows:

\begin{tabular}{ll}
1. & I think \\
2. & as subject \\
3. & as simple subject \\
4. & as identical subject \\
 & in every state of my thinking.\textsuperscript{275}
\end{tabular}

4.1 Now because it is not determined here in the second proposition whether I am to exist and be thought only as subject and not also as predicate of another, the concept of a subject is taken here merely logically and it remains undetermined whether substance is supposed to be understood with that or not.

4.2 But in the third proposition, the absolute unity of the apperception, the simple “I” in the representation to which all combination or separation, which makes up the thinking, is referred, becomes important also for itself even if I

\textsuperscript{274} And so this rational psychology is unable to render any certain knowledge of the existence of outer things. And so here there is no way out of the problematic Idealism of Descartes.

\textsuperscript{275} So we start with the existence (mode) and go to relationship (subject) and then reality (simple) and then the quantity (identical). And No. 1 is to be understood as “I exist thinking.”
have not yet made out anything about the subject’s constitution or subsistence.

4.3 The apperception is something real and its simplicity already lies in its possibility.

4.4 Now in space there is no real which would be simple; for points (which make up the single simplicity in space) are merely limits and not themselves something which serves to make up space as a part.

4.5 From this follows therefore the impossibility of an explanation of my, a merely thinking subject’s, constitution from foundations of materialism.

4.6 But because my existence in the first proposition is considered as given, in that it is not said “each and every thinking being exists” (which would simultaneously pronounce absolute necessity to them and therefore too much), but rather only: “I exist thinking,” it is empirical and contains the determinability of my existence merely with respect to my representations in time.

4.7 But since I in turn first have need of some persistence to that, which, to the extent I think myself, is not given to me at all in the inner perspective, the way in which I exist, whether as substance or as accident, cannot possibly be determined at all through this simple self-consciousness.

4.8 Therefore if materialism is unfitted for the explanatory manner of my existence, spiritualism is just as inadequate and the concluding consequence is that in no way, be what it will, can we recognize any sort of anything about the constitution of our soul concerning the possibility of its isolated existence in general.

5.1 And also how was it supposed to be possible through the unity of the consciousness, which we ourselves are familiar with only by our indispensable need of it for the possibility of experience, to come beyond experience (our existence in life) and even to expand our recognition to the nature of all thinking beings in general through the empirical, though with respect to all manner of perspective, undetermined proposition, “I think”?
6.1 There is therefore no rational psychology as doctrine, which would supply us with an addition to our recognition of self, but rather only as discipline, which places inviolable boundaries to speculative reason in this field, not to fling itself into the lap of soulless materialism on the one side and not to lose itself raving about spiritualism, baseless for us in life, on the other. Far rather this reminds us to consider this refusal of our reason to give a satisfactory answer to the curious questions reaching out beyond this life as its hint to apply our recognition of self not on fruitless, extravagant speculation but on the fruitful, practical use which, even if it is directed always only to objects of experience, nevertheless obtains its principles higher, and in this way determines our conduct as though our determination reached infinitely far beyond experience, and thus beyond life.

7.1 We see from all this that a mere misunderstanding gives rational psychology its origin.

7.2 The unity of the consciousness, which lies as foundation to the categories, is taken here as a perspective of the subject as object and the category of substance applied to it.

7.3 But it is only the unity in thinking, whereby alone no object is given. Accordingly the category of substance, as the always given perspective presupposes, cannot be applied, and thus this subject not recognized at all.

7.4 Therefore the subject of the categories cannot obtain a concept of itself as an object of the categories by thinking these, for in order to think these, it must lay a pure self consciousness as the basis which still should have been explained.

7.5 Just so the subject, in which the representation of time originally has its foundation, cannot in that way determine its existence in time, and if that latter cannot be, then the first can also not take place as a determination of itself (as a thinking being in general) through the categories.*

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* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 The “I think”, as we already indicated, is an empirical proposition and holds the position “I exist” within itself.

1.2 But I cannot say “everything which thinks, exists”, for then the property of thinking would make all beings which possess it, necessary beings.
1.3 Accordingly my existence can also not be viewed as deduced from the proposition “I think” as Cartesius held (because otherwise the higher proposition, “everything which thinks, exists” would have to precede), but rather it is identical with it.

1.4 It expresses an undetermined, empirical perspective, i.e., perception (thus it still proves that sensation, which consequently belongs to sensitivity, already lies as the foundation to this existential proposition), but precedes the experience, which is supposed to determine the object of perception through the category with respect to time, and here the existence is still no category, which has no referral to an undetermined, given object but rather only to such an object, of which we have a concept and concerning which we wish to know whether or not it also be granted apart from this concept.

1.5 Here an undetermined perception signifies only something real that we are given and indeed only to the thinking in general and therefore not as an appearance, also not as a thing on its own (noumenon), but rather as something which exists in fact and is indicated in the proposition “I think” as such a one.

1.6 For let it be noted that if I have termed the proposition “I think” an empirical proposition, I will not say with that that the “I” in this proposition is an empirical representation. Far rather it is purely intellectual because it belongs to the thinking in general.

1.7 But without some kind of an empirical representation, which renders the material for the thinking, the act “I think” would still not take place, and the empirical aspect is only the condition of the application or of the usage of the purely intellectual capacity.

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Transcendental Dialectic

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1.1 In this way then a recognition attempted out beyond the boundaries of possible experience disappears into disappointed expectations. And yet it still belongs to the highest interest of humanity, as far as it is supposed to be indebted to speculative philosophy; by which nonetheless the rigor of the critique simultaneously proving the impossibility of determining something of an object of experience out beyond the boundaries of experience, reason performs the service, not unimportant to it with this its interest, of placing it in safety just as well against all possible assertions to the contrary. And this cannot happen otherwise than so: either we prove our proposition apodictically, or, if this does not succeed, we seek out the sources of this incapacity, which, if they lie in the necessary restriction of our reason, must then subject every opponent to just the same laws of renunciation of all claims to dogmatic assertion.

2.1 Nevertheless not the least is lost by this for the authority, and indeed even for the necessity, for assuming a future life according to principles of practical, rational usage combined with the speculative. And in any case the merely speculative proof has never been able to have any influence on common, human reason.276

2.2 It is so poised on the point of a pin that even the schools can keep it there only by unceasingly turning it like a top. Accordingly it renders in their own eyes no persistent foundational structure on which something could be built.

2.3 The proofs, which are usable for the world, all remain in their undiminished worth, and far rather win in clarity and unadorned conviction through the removal of those dogmatic presumptions by placing reason in its own territory, namely the order of purposes. This order is still simultaneously an order of nature, but which then simultaneously, as a practical capacity on its own, without being restricted to the conditions of that order of nature, is authorized to expand the order of purposes and, with it, our own existence out beyond the boundaries of experience and life.

2.4 According to the analogy with the nature of living beings in this world, in which reason must assume it necessarily as a principle to judge that no organ, no capacity or motive, thus nothing dispensable or disproportionate for the usage, thus no lack of purpose, is to be encountered, but rather every-

276 See the Critique of Practical Reason on the soul, beginning on or near page 158.
thing is exactly commensurate to its determination in life. And it would be the human, who still alone can contain within himself the final purpose of all this, who would have to be the only creature which would be excluded from it.

2.5 For his natural dispositions, not merely with respect to the talents and motives for making a use of them, but rather especially the moral law within him, go so far beyond all advantage and utility which he could draw from them in this life that the latter even teaches him to estimate the mere consciousness of the integrity of the disposition above all, to the exclusion of all advantages, even of the shadowy works of posthumous fame. And he feels himself inwardly called to make himself fitted through his conduct in this world, including renunciation of many advantages, to be a citizen of a better one which he has in an Idea.

2.6 This more powerful basis of proof, never to be refuted, accompanied by an unceasingly increasing recognition of the purposefulness in all which we see before us and through a prospect into the immeasurable aspect of the creation, thus also through the consciousness of a certain unlimitedness in the possible expansion of our information, together with a drive commensurate to these, still always remains even if we must give up the penetration of the necessary continuation of our existence out of the merely theoretical recognition of ourselves.
Conclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism

1.1 The dialectic illusion in rational psychology rests on the confusion of an Idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with the concept, undetermined in all parts, of a thinking being in general.

1.2 I think myself in aid of a possible experience, in that I abstract from all real experience and infer from that that I am able to be conscious of my existence also apart from experience and from the empirical conditions of that.

1.3 Consequently I confuse the possible abstraction of my empirically determined existence with the alleged consciousness of an isolated, possible existence of my thinking self and believe to recognize the substantiality in me as the transcendental subject by having in thought merely the unity of the consciousness which lies as basis to all determining as the mere form of the recognition.

2.1 The task of explaining the communality of the soul with the body does not actually belong to the psychology which we are discussing here, because that task has the intention of proving the personality of the soul also apart from this communality (after death) and therefore it is transcendent in the actual meaning even though it is occupied with an object of experience, but only to the extent that it ceases to be an object of experience.

2.2 Nonetheless a sufficient answer can also be given here according to our doctrinal concept.

2.3 The difficulty which this task has occasioned consists, as is known, in the presupposed dissimilarity between the object of the inner sense (of the soul) and the objects of outer sense, since to the former only time, to the latter also space, adheres as the formal condition of their perspective.

2.4 But if we reflect that both types of objects are differentiated from each other here not internally, but rather only to the extent that one appears externally to the other, thus that which lies as foundation to the appearance of material, as a thing on its own, might perhaps not be so dissimilar, then this difficulty disappears and none other remains except how a communality of substances be possible in general, the solution of which lies entirely apart from the field of psychology and without doubt, as the reader will easily judge after what
was said in the analytic of foundational powers and capabilities, even apart from the field of all human recognition.
General Remark Concerning the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology.

1.1 The proposition “I think” or “I exist thinking” is an empirical proposition.

1.2 But the foundation to such a proposition is empirical perspective, consequently also then the thought object as appearance, and so it seems as if the soul, according to our theory, were transformed entirely, even in the thinking, into appearance, and in such a way our consciousness itself, as a mere illusion, would in fact have to vanish into nothing.

2.1 The thinking, taken for itself, is merely the logical function, thus the sheer spontaneity of the combination of the manifold of a merely possible perspective, and in no way describes the subject of the consciousness as appearance merely because it does not in any way regard the manner of the perspective, whether it be sensitive or intellectual.

2.2 In this way I represent myself to myself neither as I am nor as I appear to myself, but rather I think myself only as I do each and every object in general, abstracting from the manner of the perspective.

2.3 If I represent myself here as the subject of thoughts or even as the foundation of the thinking, these representational manners do not mean the categories of substance or cause, for they are those functions of thinking (judging) already applied to our sensitive perspective which, of course, would be required if I wanted to recognize myself.

2.4 But now I want to be aware of myself only as thinking. How my own self is given in the perspective I set aside, and to me that could be merely appearance, to which I think, but not to the extent that I think. In the consciousness of myself at the mere thinking I am the being itself, but of which in this way, of course, nothing yet is given me for thinking.

3.1 But the proposition “I think,” to the extent it says as much as “I exist thinking” is not merely a logical function. Rather it determines the subject (which then simultaneously is object) with respect to existence, and cannot take place without the inner sense, the perspective of which always gives us the object, but not as a thing on its own, but rather merely as appearance.
3.2 In the object already therefore there is no longer mere spontaneity of the thinking, but rather also receptivity of the perspective, i.e., the thinking of me myself applied to the empirical perspective of precisely the same subject.

3.3 Now in this empirical perspective then, the thinking subject would have to seek the conditions of the usage of its logical function in categories of substance, cause, etc., in order to indicate itself as an object on its own not merely through the “I,” but rather also to determine the manner of its existence, i.e., recognize itself as noumenon. But this is impossible, for the inner, empirical perspective is sensitive and gives us nothing except data of the appearance, and this can supply nothing to the object of the pure consciousness as information of its isolated existence, but rather can serve merely in aid of the experience.

4.1 But granted that occasion were found in the series, not in experience, but rather in certain (not merely logical rules, but rather) a priori steadfast laws of the pure rational usage concerning our existence, for presupposing in a determined way ourselves completely a priori with respect to our own existence as legislating and even this existence itself, then a spontaneity would be uncovered whereby our actuality were determinable without having need for that of the conditions of empirical perspective, and here we would become aware that something were contained a priori in the consciousness of our existence, which can serve to determine our existence which is completely determinable only sensitively, though still with respect to a certain inner capacity in reference to an intelligible (though, of course, only thought) world.

5.1 But, nonetheless, this would not in the least further any attempts in the rational psychology.

5.2 For through that wondrous capacity, which first reveals to me the consciousness of the moral law, I would indeed have a principle of the determination of my existence which is purely intellectual . . . but through which predicate? Through none other than what must be given to me in the sensitive perspective, and so I would again end up where I was in the rational psychology, namely in need of sensitive perspective in order to supply meaning to my understanding concepts of substance, cause, etc., whereby alone I can
have recognition of myself; but those perspectives can never help me get out beyond the field of experience.

5.3 Meanwhile I would still be authorized to apply these concepts with respect to the practical usage, which is still always directed to objects of the experience, conformable to the analogical meaning in the theoretical use, to freedom and to the subject of that by understanding with that merely the logical functions of subject and predicate, foundation and sequel, conformable to which the actions of the effects conformable to those laws are so determined that they can simultaneously be explained. commensurate always with the natural laws, the categories of substance and of cause, even though they simultaneously arise from entirely different principles.

5.4 This was to be said only to prevent the misunderstanding, to which the instruction of our self perspective as appearance, is easily exposed.

5.5 In what follows we will have the opportunity of making use of this.
Concerning The Antinomy Of Pure Reason
Second Book

2nd Chapter - The Antinomy of Pure Reason

1.1 In the introduction to this part of our work, we have shown that every transcendental semblance of pure reason rests upon dialectical inferences, the schema of which is presented by logic in the three formal types of syllogism in general, somewhat as the categories encounter their logical schema in the four functions of all judgments.

1.2 The first type of these pseudo-rational inferences went to the unconditioned unity of the subjective conditions of all representations in general (of the subject or soul) and corresponds to the categorical syllogism whose premise, as principle, expresses the reference of a predicate to a subject.

1.3 The second type of dialectical argument therefore and according to the analogy with the hypothetical syllogism, will take as its content the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the appearance; even as the third type, which will arise in the final chapter, has the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility of the objects in general as its theme.

2.1 But it is noteworthy that the transcendental paralogism effected merely a one-sided semblance with respect to the Idea of the subject of our thinking, and not the least semblance will arise from the rational concepts for the assertion of the contrary.

2.2 The advantage is entirely on the side of the pneumatism, although this cannot disclaim the arch-error of dissolving, along with all semblance favorable to it, into sheer haze in the crucible of the critique.

3.1 It comes out quite differently when we apply reason to the objective synthesis of the appearances, where it thinks to make its principle of the unconditioned unity valid indeed with much semblance, but quickly envelopes itself in such contradictions that it becomes necessary, in the cosmological intention, to step back from its claim.
4.1 Now here a new phenomenon of human reason is revealed, namely an entirely natural antithetic about which no one need brood about or make artificial traps, but rather into which reason stumbles of itself, and indeed unavoidably so, and actually is secured in that way against the slumber of an imagined conviction which a merely one-sided semblance produces. But then at the same time reason is tempted either to abandon itself to a skeptical hopelessness, or to assume a dogmatic defiance and to stand resolutely upon certain assertions without allowing any hearing or justification of the thinking of contrary assertions to take place.

4.2 Both are the death of a healthy philosophy, although the former might more easily be understood as the euthanasia of pure reason.

5.1 Before we consider the entrance of the schism and derangement which this conflict of the laws (antinomy) of pure reason occasions, we want to give certain expositions which can elucidate and justify the method which we are using in the treatment of our object.

5.2 To the extent they concern the absolute totality in the synthesis of the appearances, I term all transcendental Ideas “concepts of world,” partly due to precisely this unconditioned totality upon which also the concept of the world whole rests, which itself is only an Idea; partly because these Ideas go solely to the synthesis of the appearances, thus the empirical synthesis, since on the other hand the absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions of all possible things in general will occasion an Ideal of pure reason which is entirely differentiated from the concept of world, even though it still stands in referral to that.

5.3 Hence as the paralogism of pure reason established the basis for a dialectic psychology, the antinomy of pure reason will present the transcendental principles of an alleged pure (rational) cosmology, not in order to find them valid and to appropriate them for itself, but rather--since it also already indicates the designation of a conflict of reasoning--in order to present them in their dazzling, albeit false, semblance as an Idea which does not permit of reconciliation with the appearances.
1.1 Now in order to be able to enumerate these Ideas with systematic precision according to a principle, we must first note that it is only from the understanding that pure and transcendental concepts can arise, for reason actually generates no concepts at all, but rather in every case only makes the understanding concept free of the unavoidable limitations of a possible experience and therefore seeks to expand it beyond the limits of the empirical, though still in connection with it.

1.2 This process occurs by reason requiring absolute totality on the side of the conditions (by means of which it subjects all appearances to the synthetical unity for a given conditioned), and in that way making the category into the transcendental Idea in order to give absolute completeness to the empirical synthesis through the advancement of that synthesis up to the unconditioned (which is never encountered in experience, but always entirely in the Idea).

1.3 Reason requires this according to the principle: “if the conditioned is given, then the entire sum of the conditions, hence then also the utterly unconditioned, by means of which alone the conditioned was possible, is also given.”

1.4 Accordingly then and first of all, the transcendental Ideas are actually nothing other than categories expanded to the unconditioned, and these can be brought into a table which is arranged according to the titles of those categories.

1.5 But, secondly, not all categories are even suitable for this, but rather only those in which the synthesis constitutes a series, and indeed of the conditions to a conditioned, which are subordinated (and not coordinated) to one another.

1.6 The absolute totality is required only as far as we are concerned with the ascending series of conditions to a given conditioned, thus not if the discussion is of the descending line of the consequences, nor also of the aggregate of coordinated conditions to these consequences.
1.7 For with regard to the given condition, conditions are already presupposed and are to be considered also as given with this given condition, while since the consequences do not make their conditions possible, but rather presuppose them, in the advance toward the consequences (or in the descent from the given conditions to the conditioned) we can be unconcerned about whether the series might cease or not, and generally speaking the question about the totality of this advancing series is no presupposition of reason at all.

2.1 Thus we think of a time completely elapsed up to a given instant as also given (even if it cannot determined by us).

2.2 But concerning the future series, since it is not the condition for achieving to the present instant, it is a matter of indifference in comprehending this as to how we want to consider it with respect to future time, whether we will let it cease somewhere or run into infinity.

2.3 Let the series be: m, n, o, where n is given as conditioned with respect to m, but simultaneously is the condition of o, and let the series go upward from the condition n to m (l, k, i, etc.) and likewise downward from the condition n to the conditioned o (p, q, r, etc.), then I must presuppose the first series in order to consider n as given. Now according to reason the n (the totality of the conditions) is possible only by means of this series, but its possibility does not depend upon the subsequent series: o, p, q, r, which hence also could not be considered as given, but rather only as alleged (\textit{dabilis}).

3.1 The synthesis of a series on the side of the conditions, from what is the next one preceding the given appearance and likewise on to the more remote conditions, I will call the regressive synthesis, while that which advances on the side of the conditioned from the next one following on to the more remote one, will be termed the progressive synthesis.

3.2 The first goes in \textit{antecedentia}, the second in \textit{consequentia}.

3.3 The cosmological Ideas therefore are occupied with the totality of the regressive synthesis and go in \textit{antecedentia} and not in \textit{consequentia}. 

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3.4 If this latter happens, it is discretionary and not a necessary problem of pure reason, because for the complete comprehensibility of what is given in the appearance we do have need of the grounds for what is given, but not of the consequences ensuing from that.

4.1 Now in order to arrange the table of the Ideas according to the table of the categories, we first consider the two original quantities of all our perspective, i.e., time and space.

4.2 On its own time is a series (and the formal condition of all series), and hence in it, with respect to a given, present moment, the antecedents as conditions, i.e., the past, are a priori to be distinguished from the consequences (of the future).

4.3 Accordingly the transcendental Idea of the absolute totality of the series of the conditions to a given conditioned goes only to all past time.

4.4 The entire transpired time as condition of the given instant is necessarily thought as given according to the Idea of reason.

4.5 But with respect to space there is no distinction of the progressive from the regressive, because space constitutes an aggregate, but not a series, for its parts are all together simultaneous.

4.6 With respect to the past time, I could only consider the present time point as conditioned, but never as a condition of that past time, because this present instant first arises only through the elapsed time (or far rather through the passage of the preceding time).

4.7 But since the parts of space are not subordinated to one another, but rather coordinated, one part is the condition of the possibility of the other, and it does not make up a series on its own as does time.

4.8 But still the synthesis of the multiple sections of space, by means of which we apprehend space, is successive, and so occurs in time and contains a series.

4.9 And since in this series of the aggregated spaces from a given one to the further ones thought to it, e.g., of the feet in a rod, these aggregated spaces are
always the condition of the limit of the more remote ones, the measurement of a space is also to be considered as a synthesis of the series of the conditions to a given conditioned, only that the series of the conditions from the side with respect to which the conditioned lies, is not differentiated on its own, consequently in space regressive and progressive seem to be the same.

4.10 But because one part of space is not given through the other part, but rather only limited by it, to this extent we must also consider each limited space as conditioned, which presupposes another space as the condition of its limits and so forth.

4.11 With respect to the limitation therefore the advance in space is also a regression, and the transcendental Idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in the series of the conditions also concerns space, and I can ask just as well about the absolute totality of the appearances in space as I do about that in the elapsed time.

4.12 But then whether anywhere an answer to this be possible will be determined later.

5.1 Secondly, the reality in space, i.e., the material, is a conditioned, the inner conditions of which are its parts, and the parts of the parts are the remote conditions, so that here a regressive synthesis takes place, the absolute totality of which reason demands and which cannot take place otherwise than through a completed division, by means of which the reality of the material disappears either into nothing, or still into what is no longer material, namely the simple.

5.2 Consequently there is also here a series of conditions and an advance to the unconditioned.

6.1 Thirdly, concerning the categories of the real relationships among the appearances, the category of substance with its accidents is not suited as a transcendental Idea, i.e., reason has no basis with respect to it for going regressively to conditions.

6.2 For accidents (to the extent they inhere in one single substance) are coordinated, the one to the other, and do not make up a series.
6.3 But with respect to substance, the accidents are not actually subordinated to that, but rather are the way the substance itself exists.

6.4 What could yet seem to be an Idea of the transcendental reason with this would be the concept of substantial.

6.5 But since this means nothing other than the concept of the object in general, which subsists to the extent we think regarding it merely the transcendental subject without any predicates, and since the discussion here is of the un-conditioned in the series of the appearances, it is clear that the substantial could make up no member in that.

6.6 Exactly the same holds also for substances in communality, which are merely aggregates and have no exponents of a series, for they are not subordinate to one another as conditions of their possibility, thus unlike what we can easily say of spaces, the limit of which was never determined on its own, but rather always through another space.

6.7 Only the category of causality remains therefore which describes a series of the causes for a given effect, in which we can ascend from the latter, as conditioned, to the former as conditions, and answer the question of reason.

7.1 Fourthly, the concepts of the possible, the actual and the necessary lead to no series other than to the extent the adventitious in existence must always be considered as conditioned and which, according to the rule of the understanding, points to a condition, whereby it is necessary to point this further to a higher condition until reason encounters the unconditioned necessity only in the totality of this series.

8.1 Hence there are no more than four cosmological Ideas, according to those four titles of the categories which necessarily entail a series in the synthesis of the manifold.

1. The absolute completeness of the assemblage of the given whole of all appearances.
2. The absolute completeness of the division of a given whole in the appearance.

3. The absolute completeness of the origination of an appearance in general.

4. The absolute completeness of the dependency of the existence of the mutable in the appearance.

9.1 The first to be noted with this is that the Idea of the absolute totality concerns nothing other than the exposition of appearances, thus not the pure understanding concept of a whole of things in general.

9.2 Appearances therefore are considered here as given, and reason demands the absolute completeness of the conditions of their possibility to the extent these make up a series, thus an absolutely complete synthesis, such that the appearance is able to be exposed according to laws of understanding.

10.1 Secondly, it is actually only the unconditioned which reason seeks in this serially, and indeed regressively, advanced synthesis of the conditions, i.e., the completeness, as it were, in the series in the premises, which together presuppose no other.

10.2 Now this unconditioned is always contained in the absolute totality of the series if we represent it in our imagination.

10.3 However this utterly completed synthesis in turn is only an Idea, for we cannot know, at least not in advance, whether such a synthesis is even possible with appearances.

10.4 If we represent everything through mere pure understanding concepts without conditions of the sensitive perspective, then we can say without hesitation that to a given conditioned the entire series of conditions subordinated to each other is also given, for the given conditioned is given through the entire series of conditions alone.

10.5 With appearances, however, a particular restriction of the way in which conditions are given is to be encountered, namely through the successive syn-
thesis of the manifold of the perspective, which is supposed to be complete in the regression.

10.6 Now whether this completeness is possible sensitively is yet a problem.

10.7 But the Idea of this completeness still lies in reason, regardless of the possibility or impossibility of connecting adequate, empirical concepts to it.

10.8 Therefore since the unconditioned is necessarily contained in the absolute totality of the regressive synthesis of the manifold in the appearance (in accordance with the guidance of the categories, which represent it as a series of conditions to a given conditioned), then even leaving indeterminate whether and how this totality is to be brought about, reason here takes the course of going out from the Idea of the totality, even though it has as the final intention the unconditioned, be it of the entire series or of a part of that.

11.1 Now this unconditioned we can think of in two ways: either consisting merely in the entire series, in which therefore every member without exception would be conditioned and only the whole of the series would be utterly unconditioned, and in which case the regression is called infinite. Or the absolute unconditioned is only a part of the series, to which the remaining members of the series are subordinated, but which itself stands among no other condition.*

11.2 In the first case the series is a parte priori without limits (without beginning), i.e., infinite, and nonetheless entirely given, but the regression in it is never completed and can only be termed potentially infinite.

11.3 In the second case there is a first of the series, which, with respect to the elapsed time, is called the world beginning; with respect to space, the world limit; with respect to the parts of a whole given in its limits, the simple; with respect to causes, the absolute self-activity (freedom); and with respect to the existence of alterable things, the absolute natural necessity.

* Kant’s annotation:

1. The absolute whole of the series of conditions to a given conditioned is always unconditioned because there are no more conditions apart from it, with respect to which it could be conditioned.
2. However this absolute whole of such a series is only an Idea, or rather a problematic concept, the possibility of which must be examined and indeed in reference to the way in which the unconditioned, as the actual transcendental Idea on which it depends, may be continued in that.

12.1 We have two expressions, world and nature, which occasionally combine.

12.2 The first means the mathematical whole of all appearances and the totality of their synthesis in the large as well as in the small, i.e., in the advance of the synthesis through assemblage as well as division.

12.3 But precisely the same whole is termed nature* to the extent it is considered as a dynamic whole and we do not look to the aggregation in space or time in order to bring it about as a magnitude, but rather to the unity in the existence of the appearances.

12.4 Now here the condition of what happens is called the cause, and the unconditioned causality of the cause in the appearance, freedom, but the conditioned, on the other hand, is called natural cause in a more narrow sense.

12.5 The conditioned in existence in general is called contingent, and the unconditioned, necessary.

12.6 The unconditioned necessity of appearances can be called natural necessity.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Nature, taken adjectivally (formally), means the cohesion of the determinations of a thing according to an internal principle of causality.

1.2 On the other hand with nature taken substantively (materially) we understand the sum-total of appearances to the extent these cohere thoroughly by means of an internal principle of causality.

1.3 In the first sense we speak of the nature of flowing material, of fire, etc., and avail ourselves of this word only adjectivally. On the other hand, if we speak of the things of nature, we have in mind an existing whole.

13.1 The Ideas with which we are now occupied I have earlier termed “cosmological Ideas” partly because with “world” the sum total of all appearances is
understood, and our Ideas are also only directed to the unconditioned among the appearances; and partly also because the word “world” in the transcendental meaning denotes the absolute totality of the sum total of existing things, and where we direct our attention to the completeness of the synthesis alone (although actually only in the regression to the conditions).

13.2 In consideration of these Ideas being moreover all together transcendental, and although they do not overstep the object, namely appearances, with respect to the type, but rather have to do solely with the sense world (not with noumenis), but still driving the synthesis up to a degree which oversteps all possible experience, we can, in my opinion, quite properly term them all together “concepts of world.”

13.3 With respect to the distinction of the mathematical and the dynamic unconditioned, to which the regressive aims, I would still term the first two in a more narrow meaning, “world concepts,” (of the world in large and in small), but the remaining two transcendental, “nature concepts.”

13.4 This distinction is not of particular importance presently, but it can become more important as we proceed.
The Antinomy Of Pure Reason

2nd Section. Antithetic of Pure Reason

1.1 If thetic is every sum total of dogmatic instruction, then with antithetic I understand not dogmatic assertions to the contrary, but rather the conflict of apparently dogmatic recognitions (thesis cum antithesi), but without anyone attributing a superior claim of approval to either of them over the other.

1.2 The antithetic therefore is not at all occupied with one sided assertions, but rather considers universal recognitions of reason only according to their conflict with each other, and the cause of this conflict.

1.3 The transcendental antithetic is an examination about the antinomy of pure reason, its causes and the result.

1.4 If we utilize our reason not merely in the usage of understanding principles upon objects of experience, but rather venture to expand that usage out beyond the limits of experience, then pseudo-rational tenets arise, which may neither hope for certification, nor fear refutation, in experience, and of which each on its own is without contradiction, and indeed even encounters conditions of its necessity in the nature of reason, only that unfortunately the counter proposition has just as valid and necessary grounds for the assertions on its side.

2.1 The question therefore which naturally arise with such a dialectic of pure reason are:

1. with which propositions is pure reason actually unavoidably subjected to an antinomy?

2.2 2. Upon which causes does this antinomy rest?

2.3 3. Given this contradiction, does a way remain open to reason for certitude and in what manner?

3.1 Accordingly a dialectic tenet of pure reason, in order to distinguish it from all sophistical propositions, must have the following on its own: that it does
not concern an arbitrary question which we pose only in a certain discretion-
ary intention, but rather such a question, upon which the reasoning of every
human must necessarily alight in its advance; and secondly, that it, with its
counter proposition, not entail merely an artificial semblance which, if we
penetrate it, immediately vanishes, but rather a natural and unavoidable
semblance, which itself, even if we are no longer imposed upon by it, still
always misleads, although does not deceive and therefore indeed can be
made harmless, but never eradicated.

4.1 Such a dialectic doctrine will not refer to the understanding unity in concepts
of experience, but rather to the rational unity in sheer Ideas, the conditions of
which--since the doctrine first, as a synthesis according to rules, is supposed
to fit with the understanding and still simultaneously, as absolute unity of the
synthesis, with reason--if the Ideas are adequate to the rational unity, will be
too large for the understanding and, if commensurate to the understanding,
will be too small for reason; where then a conflict must arise which cannot
be avoided, try as one might.

5.1 These pseudo-rational assertions therefore open up a dialectic battle arena
where every party, which has permission to attack, keeps the upper hand,
and the one, who is necessitated to proceed merely defensively, most cer-
tainly succumbs.

5.2 Hence also hardy knights, championing the good or the bad side, are sure to
wear the victory wreath if they only can have the privilege of leading the last
attack and are not obligated to ward off a new assault by the opponent.

5.3 We can easily imagine that this playground was often enough treaded upon
for who knows how long, that many victories were won on both sides, but
for the last one, the one who decided the matter, it was always so provided
that the combatant for the good side alone held his place by his opponent be-
ing forbidden to take up further arms against him.

5.4 As impartial umpires we must put aside entirely whether it be the good or
the bad side, concerning which the disputants parry, and allow them first to
settle the matter among themselves.
5.5 Perhaps after having worn each other out more than injured each other, they will themselves grasp the inanity of the dispute and part from one another as good friends.

6.1 This method of observing a dispute of the assertions, or far rather even to occasion it, not in order to finally decide it to the advantage of the one or the other, but rather in order to examine whether its object not be perhaps a mere deception, for which each grapples and with which he can win nothing, even if he were not resisted at all: this procedure, I say, we can term the skeptical method.

6.2 It is entirely different from skepticism from a principle of an artificial and scientific ignorance which buries the foundations of all recognition in order, where possible, to leave no dependability and security of those foundations anywhere.

6.3 For the skeptical method goes to certitude by seeking to discover the point of the misunderstanding in such a dispute, honestly meant on both sides and conducted with understanding, in order, as wise legislators do, to draw from the embarrassment of the judges at legal procedures instruction for themselves concerning the deficiencies and imprecise determinations in their laws.

6.4 The antinomy, which is revealed in the application of these laws, is the best investigative attempt with our limited wisdom of universal laws (nomothetic) to make reason attentive by that to the moments in the determination of its principles, for reason is not easily aware of its false steps in abstract speculation,

7.1 But this skeptical method is essentially appropriate only for transcendental philosophy, and can be dispensed with in every other field of examination.

7.2 In mathematics its use would be absurd, because here no false assertions can be buried and made invisible. For the proofs always have to advance on the threads of the pure perspective, and indeed every time by an obvious synthesis.
7.3 In experimental philosophy indeed a delaying doubt may be useful. But here at least no misunderstanding is possible except which could be easily removed, and the last remedy of the decision of the dispute must still finally lie in experience, where it will be discovered sooner or later.

7.4 The moral also can give its principles entirely in concreto—together with any practical consequences—at least in possible experience, and in this way avoid the misunderstanding of abstraction.

7.5 The transcendental assertions, on the other hand, which even presume to expand insight out beyond the field of all possible experiences, are neither such that their abstract synthesis could be given in some kind of a perspective a priori, nor so composed that the misunderstanding might be discovered by means of some sort of experience.

7.6 Transcendental reason therefore permits no other touchstone except the attempt to unify its assertions among themselves, and thus in consideration of a free and unhindered contest between them, and this we now want to begin.*

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 The antinomies below follow each other according to the order of the transcendental Ideas presented above.
The Antinomy Of Pure Reason

1st Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas

Thesis

1.1 The world has a beginning in time and, with respect to space, it is also enclosed within boundaries.

Proof

2.1 Assume the world had no beginning with respect to time: then at every given point of time an eternity will have passed and hence an infinite series of states of the things in the world, succeeding each other, will have elapsed.

2.2 But now the infinitude of a series consists precisely in this: that it can never be completed through a successive synthesis.

2.3 Therefore an infinitely elapsed world series is impossible, hence a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence; which was first to be proven.

3.1 With respect to the space, let us assume in turn the opposite: then the world will be an infinite given whole of simultane-

Antithesis

1.1 The world has no beginning, and no boundaries in space, but rather is infinite with respect to both time and space.

Proof

2.1 For suppose it had a beginning.

2.2 Since the beginning is an existence, before which a time precedes in which the thing is not, a time must have preceded in which the world was not, i.e., an empty time.

2.3 But now in an empty time no origination of any sort of thing is possible; because no part of such a time on its own, any more than another part, has any sort of distinguishing condition of existence in preference to that of non-existence (let it originate of itself, or through another cause).

2.4 Therefore indeed, many series of things can begin in the world, but the world itself cannot have a beginning, and Therefore with respect to the past time, is infinite.
3.1 Concerning the second, assume in advance the opposite, that namely the world is finite and limited with respect to space; then it is situated in an empty space which is not limited.

3.2 Therefore not only would a relationship of things in space be encountered, but rather also of things to space.

3.3 Now since the world is an absolute whole, apart from which no object of the perspective, and thus no correlate of the world, is encountered by means of which the world would stand in relationship, the relationship of the world to empty space would be a relationship of the world to no object.

3.4 But such a relationship, hence also the limitation of the world through empty space, is nothing; Therefore with respect to space, the world is not limited at all, i.e., with respect to its expanse it is infinite.*

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Space is merely the form of the outer perspective (formal perspective), but not an actual object which can be outwardly looked at.

1.2 Space, more than all things which determine it (by filling or limiting it) or far rather which give an empirical perspective commensurate to its
First Antinomy

sis of its parts.

1.2 For the boundaries already determine the completion, in that they eliminate anything further.

** Kant’s annotation:

1.1 The concept of the totality in this case is nothing other than the representation of the completed synthesis of its parts because, since we cannot derive the concept from the perspective of the whole (which in this case is impossible), we can grasp this only through the synthesis of the parts up to the completion of the infinite, at least in Idea.

1.3 The empirical perspective therefore is not assembled out of appearances and space (of the perception and the empty perspective).

1.4 The one is not the correlate of the synthesis of the other, but rather only joined in one and the same empirical perspective as the material and form of the perspective.

1.5 If we wanted to place one of these two pieces apart from the other (space outside of all appearances), then from that originates all sorts of empty determinations,

1.6 e.g., a movement or immobility of the world in unending empty space, a determination of the relationships of both to each other, which can never be perceived and therefore is also the predicate of a merely thought thing.

Remarks To The First Antinomy

I. To the Thesis

4.1 With these mutually conflicting arguments, I have not sought illusions in order per chance (as one might say) to conduct an advocacy proof, which avails itself of the unwariness of the opponent and gladly allows that opponent’s appeal to be consid-

form, is, under the name of absolute space, nothing other than the mere possibility of outer appearances to the extent they can either exists on their own or yet be added to given appearances.

II. To the Antithesis

4.1 The proof for the infinity of the given world series and of the world summation rests upon an empty time, likewise an empty space, having to make up the boundaries of the world in the contrary case.
erected on a misunderstood law in order to build his own improper claims for the refutation of those claims.

4.2 Each of these proofs has been drawn from the nature of the matter and I have set aside the advantage which the fallacious inferences of the dogmatists could give of both parts.

5.1 I could also have proven the thesis with respect to the appearance by premising a faulty concept of the infinity of a given magnitude according to the custom of the dogmatists.

5.2 A magnitude, beyond which no greater is possible, i.e., beyond the amount of a given unity contained in it, is the infinite.

5.3 Now no amount is the greatest, because one or more units could still always be added.

5.4 Therefore an infinite given magnitude, thus also an infinite world (with respect to the elapsed series as well as the extension) is impossible: Therefore it is limited in both ways.

5.5 I could have conducted my proof in this way, but this concept does not accord with what we mean with an infinite

4.2 Now I am quite aware that refuge is sought against this consequence by alleging that a boundary of the world, with respect to space and time, is quite possible without our having to assume precisely an absolute time before the world beginning, or an absolute space expanded apart from the actual world; which is impossible.

4.3 I am quite satisfied with the latter part of this opinion of the philosophers from the Leibnizan school.

4.4 Space is merely the form of external perspective, but not an actual object which can be looked at outwardly, and is not a *correlatum* of the appearances, but rather the form of the appearances themselves.

4.5 Accordingly space cannot come forth absolutely (for itself alone) as something determining in the existence of things, because it is no object at all, but rather only the form of possible objects.

4.6 Things therefore as appearances, determine space indeed, i.e., among all possible predicates of space (magnitude and relationship) they make this or that belong to actuality; but vice-versa, space, as something
whole.

5.6 In this way we do not represent how large it be, thus its concept is also not a concept of a maximum, but rather there is thought only its relationship to a unit to be assumed arbitrarily, with respect to which this unit is greater than any count.

5.7 Accordingly as the unit is now greater or smaller, the infinite would be greater or smaller; but the infinite, since it consists merely in the relationship to this given unit, would always remain the same, although, of course, the absolute magnitude of the whole would not be recognized in that way at all, and with this we are not here concerned.

6.1 The true (transcendental) concept of infinity is this: that the successive synthesis of the unity in the transversal of a quantum can never be completed.*

6.2 From this it follows quite surely that an eternity of actual states following upon one another up to a given point of time (the present) cannot have elapsed and therefore the world would have had to have a beginning.

which exists for itself, cannot determine the actuality of the things with respect to the magnitude or shape, because it is nothing actual on its own.

4.7 Therefore indeed, space (be it full or empty)* can be bounded through appearances, but appearances cannot be bounded through an empty space apart from the same.

4.8 Precisely the same also holds of time.

4.9 Now admitting all this, it is nonetheless indisputable that we would most definitely have to assume these two non-things, empty space apart from the world and empty time preceding the world, if we assume a world boundary, be it with respect to space or time.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 We easily note that with this it is said that empty space, to the extent it is bounded through appearances, hence by space within the world, at least does not contradict the transcendental principles and therefore can be admitted with respect to this (although not for that reason immediately asserted).

5.1 For concerning the remedy, by which we seek to elude the
Transcendental Dialectic

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Accordingly this contains a multitude (of a given unit), which is greater than any number, which is the mathematical concept of the infinite.

7.1 With respect to the second part of the thesis, the difficulty of an infinite and still elapsed series ceases indeed; for the manifold of a world which is infinite with respect to extension, is given simultaneously.

7.2 But in order to think the totality of such a multitude, since we cannot appeal to the boundaries which of themselves make up this totality in the perspective, we must give an account of our concept which, in such a case, cannot go from the whole to the determined boundary of the parts, but rather must present the possibility of a whole through the successive synthesis of the parts.

7.3 Now since this synthesis would have to make up a series, which were never to be completed, we cannot think of a totality preceding it, and thus also not through it.

7.4 For in this case the concept of the totality itself is the representation of a completed synthesis of the parts, and this consequence, according to which we say that if the world (with respect to time and space) has boundaries, the infinite void would have to determine the existence of actual things according to their magnitude, this remedy consists secretly only by our thinking in the place of a sense world an, who knows what, intelligible world, and instead of the first beginning (as existence, before which a time of the not-being precedes) we think in general of an existence which presupposes no other condition in the world, and instead of the boundaries of the expanse, limits of the world whole, and in this way get out of the way of time and space.

5.2 But here the discussion is only of the mundus phaenomenon and the magnitude of which, with which we can in no way abstract from the thought conditions of the sensitivity without eliminating the being of the same.

5.3 The sense world, if it is bounded, lies necessarily in the infinite void.

5.4 If we remove this, and thus space in general, as the condition of the possibility of appearances, then the entire sense world ceases.
completion, thus also the concept of that, is impossible.

5.5 In our task this alone is given to us.

5.6 The *mundus intelligible* is nothing but the general concept of a world in general, in which we abstract from all conditions of the perspective, and with respect to which, consequently, no synthetic proposition at all, neither affirming nor denying, is possible.
# The Antinomy Of Pure Reason

## 2nd Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thesis</th>
<th>Antithesis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Every assembled substance in the world consists of simple parts, and nothing exists anywhere except the simple or that which is assembled from it.</td>
<td>1.1 No assembled thing in the world consists of simple parts, and nothing simple exists anywhere in the world.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Proof</th>
<th>Proof</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 For suppose the assembled substances did not consist of simple parts, then if every assemblage were eliminated in thought, no assembled part, and also (since there is no simple part) no simple part, thus nothing at all, would remain, consequently no substance would have been given.</td>
<td>2.1 Suppose that an assembled thing (as substance) consisted of simple parts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 Therefore it is either impossible to eliminate all assemblage in thought, or, after its elimination, some existing something without any assemblage, i.e., the simple, must remain.</td>
<td>2.2 Because every outer relationship, hence also every assemblage of substances, is only possible in space, the assemblage will consist of a certain number of parts, and the space occupied by the assemblage must also consist of just the same number of parts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.3 But in the first case the assemblage would not in turn consist of substances (because with these the assemblage is only a contingent relationship of substances, without which these, as beings persisting of themselves,</td>
<td>2.3 Now space does not consist of simple parts, but of spaces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4 Therefore every part of the assemblage must occupy a space.</td>
<td>2.4 Therefore the simple occupies a space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 But the utterly first parts of every assemblage is simple.</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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</table>
must consist).

2.4 Now since this case contradicts the presupposition, only the second one remains, namely that the substantial assemblage in the world would consist of simple parts.

3.1 From this it follows immediately that the things of the world are all together simple beings, that the assemblage is only an outer state of these things, and that, even if we can never fully isolate and place the elementary substances out of this state of composition, still reason would have to think them as the first subjects of all composition and thus as simple beings in advance of the composition.

2.7 Now since every real which occupies a space grasps within itself a manifold situated externally to one another, thus is assembled, and indeed as a real assemblage, not of accidents (for they cannot be apart from one another without substance), thus of substances, the simple would be a substantial assemblage, which is self contradictory.

3.1 The second proposition of the antithesis, that nothing simple exists in the world at all, is supposed to mean here only so much as the existence of the utterly simple is able to be demonstrated through no experience or perception, neither outward nor inward, and therefore the utterly simple is a mere Idea, the objective reality of which can never be demonstrated in any sort of a possible experience, and thus is without any application and object in the exposition of the appearances.

3.2 For let us assume an object of experience could be found for this transcendental Idea: then the empirical perspective of some sort of object would have to be recognized as such which contained no manifold external to one another and joined to unity.
3.3 Now since no conclusion from the not-consciousness of such a manifold to the entire impossibility of that in any sort of perspective of an object is valid, and since this manifold is thoroughly necessary for absolute simplicity, it follows that this cannot be inferred from any perception, be it what it will.

3.4 Since therefore something, as an utterly simply object, can never be given in any sort of possible experience, and since the sense world must be viewed as the total of all possible experiences, it follows that nothing simple is given anywhere in it.

4.1 This second proposition of the antithesis goes much further than the first, which bans the simple only from the perspective of the assemblage, since on the other hand this second one eliminates it for all of nature; hence it has also been able to be proven in general, not from the concept of a given object of perspective (of the assembled), but rather from the relationship of that to a possible experience.

Remarks To The Second Antinomy

I. To The Thesis

4.1 If I speak of a whole which

II To The Antithesis

5.1 Against this proposition of an
Second Antinomy

consists necessarily out of simple parts, I understand with that only a substantial whole as the actual composition, i.e., the fortuitous unity of the manifold, which, given isolated (at least in thought), is placed in an reciprocal combination, and in that way makes up a one.

4.2 We were not supposed to term space a composition, but rather a totality, because the parts of space are only possible in the whole and not the whole through the parts.

4.3 In any case it could be called composition ideal but not real.

4.4 But this is only subtlety.

4.5 Since space is not an assemblage out of substances (not even out of real accidents), if I then eliminate all assemblage in it, nothing, not even the point, must remain; for a point is possible only as the limit of a space (thus of an assemblage).

4.6 Space and time therefore do not exist out of simple parts.

4.7 What belongs only to the state of a substance, even though that state has a magnitude (e.g., change), also does not consist of the simple, i.e., a certain degree of the change does not infinite partition of matter, the proof basis of which is merely mathematical, challenges are brought forth from the monadists, which already makes them suspicious by their refusal to allow the clearest mathematical proofs to hold for insights into the constitution of space to the extent it is in fact the formal condition of the possibility of all matter, but rather to consider them only as inferences out of abstracted, but arbitrary, concepts which could not be referred to actual things.

5.2 Just as if it were possible to think up another manner of perspective than that given in the original perspective of space, and the determinations of that did not simultaneously concern all that a priori which is alone possible by filling up this space.

5.3 If we heed them, then apart from the mathematical point, which is simple, but not a part but rather merely the limit of a space, we would have to think up yet physical points which indeed are also simple but have the advantage, as parts of the space, of filling up the same through their mere aggregation.

5.4 Now without repeating here the usual and clear refutation of
arise through a growth of many simple changes.

4.8 Our inference from the assemblage to the simple holds only of things consisting of themselves.

4.9 But accidents of the state do not consist of themselves.

4.10 Therefore we can easily spoil the proof for the necessity of the simple as the component parts of all substantial assemblage, and thereby also in general this matter, if we expand it too far and want to make it hold for all assemblage without distinction, as it has actually already happened more than once.

5.1 Incidentally I speak here only of the simple to the extent it is necessarily given in the assemblage, in that this can be dissolved in that as in its component parts.

5.2 The actual meaning of the word monas (according to Leibnizian usage) was indeed only supposed to go to the simple which is given immediately as simple substance (e.g., in the self-consciousness) and not as an element of the assemblage, which we could better term as the atomus.

5.5 But here it is not enough to find the concept of the simple for the pure understanding concept of the assemblage, but rather the perspective of the simple for the perspective of the assemblage (of matter), and this is entirely impossible with respect to laws of sensitivity, thus also with objects of sense.

5.6 Therefore it may always be valid of a whole out of substances, which is thought merely through the pure understanding, that before all assemblage of the substances, we must have the simple, still this does not hold of totum substantiale phaenomenon, which as empirical perspective in space, entails the necessary property that no part of that assemblage is simple because no part of space is simple.

5.7 Meanwhile the monadists have
5.3 And since I only want to prove the simple substances, with respect to the assemblage, as their elements, I could term the thesis of the second antinomy the “transcendental atomistic.”

5.4 But because this word has been already used for a long time as the description of a particular, explanatory manner of bodily appearance (molecularm) and therefore presupposes empirical concepts, it may be called the dialectic principle of the monadology.

5.8 Now we have a concept of bodies only as appearances, but as such they necessarily presuppose space as the condition of the possibility of all outer appearances and therefore the refuge is in vain, as it then also has been sufficiently truncated in the transcendental aesthetic earlier.

5.9 If they were things on their own, then the proof of the monadists would hold in any case.

6.1 The second dialectic assertion has that particularity on its own that it has a dogmatic assertion against itself, which is the single one among all pseudorationalizations which undertakes to visibly prove on an object of experience the actuality of that which we above reckoned merely to the transcendental Ideas, namely the absolute simplicity of substance, namely that the object of the inner
sense, the “I” which thinks there, be an utterly simple substance.

6.2 Without now engaging myself in this (since above it was treated in more detail) I only note that if something is thought merely as object without placing to it some sort of a synthetic determination of its perspective (as this then happens through the entirely bare representation “I”), then of course nothing multiple and no assemblage is able to be perceived in such a representation.

6.3 Since moreover the predicates, by means of which I think this object, are mere perspectives of the inner sense, also nothing can come further with that which would prove a manifold apart from one another, thus a real assembl.

6.4 Therefore only the self consciousness entails it so, that because the subject which thinks is simultaneously its own object, it cannot divide itself (through the determination inhering to it); for with respect to its self, every object is absolute unity.

6.5 No less, if this subject is considered outwardly, as an object of perspective, it would still on
its own easily reveal assemblage in the appearance.

6.6 But so must it always be considered if we want to know whether there is in it a manifold apart from one another, or not.
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3rd Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas277

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<th>Antithesis</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.1 The causality according to laws of nature is not the only one from which the appearances of the world can all together be derived.</td>
<td>1.1 There is no freedom, but rather everything in the world happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 For there is a causality through freedom to be assumed necessarily for their explanation.</td>
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<th>Proof</th>
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<tr>
<td>2.1 Suppose there were no other causality apart from the laws of nature. In that case everything which happens presupposes a preceding state, upon which it unavoidably follows according to a rule.</td>
<td>2.1 Suppose there were a freedom in the transcendental understanding as a particular manner of causality, according to which the events of the world could follow, namely a capacity for utterly beginning a state, hence also a series of sequels of that, then not only will a series begin through this spontaneity, but rather the determination of this spontaneity itself for the production of the series, i.e., the causality, will begin utterly, so that nothing precedes whereby this occurring action were determined according to enduring laws.</td>
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<td>2.2 But now the preceding state itself must be something which has happened (has arisen in time, since it previously did not exist), because if it had always existed, its sequel would not ever have first originated, but rather would always have been.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2.3 Therefore the causality of the cause through which something</td>
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277 See especially Translator’s Comments in Appendix II.4 and also III. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas, beginning on or around pages 819 and 456, respectively.

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happens is itself some occurrence which, according to the laws of nature, presupposes in turn an earlier state and its causality, but precisely this also yet an older one, etc.

2.4 If therefore everything happens according to mere laws of nature, there is always only a subaltern, but never a first, beginning and therefore in general no completion of the series on the side of the causes descending from one another.

2.5 But now it is precisely in that that the laws of nature consists, i.e., that nothing happens without a sufficient, a priori determined cause.

2.6 The proposition therefore that all causality is only possible according to laws of nature is self contradictory in its unrestricted universality, and therefore this cannot be assumed as the only causality.

3.1 Accordingly then a causality must be assumed through which something happens without the cause of that being determined yet further through another preceding cause according to necessary laws, i.e., an absolute spontaneity of the causes to begin a series of ap-

2.2 But every beginning to an action presupposes a state of the not yet acting cause, and a dynamical first beginning of the action has a state, which has no cohesion of the causality at all with just the same cause preceding it, i.e., in no way follows from that.

2.3 Transcendental freedom therefore is opposed to causality, and hence such a combination of the successive states of effecting causes according to which no unity of experience is possible, which therefore is also encountered in no experience, is an empty figment of thought.

3.2 Freedom (independence) from laws of nature is indeed a release from compulsion, but also from the guides of all rules.

3.3 For we cannot say that instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom enter into the causality of the course of the world, because if these were determined according to laws, it would not be freedom but rather itself nothing other than nature.
pearances of itself which then continues according to laws of nature, thus transcendental freedom, without which the succession of the appearances is never complete on the side of the causes, even in the course of nature.

3.4 Therefore nature and transcendental freedom distinguish themselves as lawfulness and anarchy. The former indeed burdens the understanding with the difficulty of seeking the derivation of the events in the series of the causes higher, because the causality is conditioned upon them each time. But in recompense nature promises thorough and lawful unity of the experience, since on the other hand the illusion of freedom indeed pledges rest to an investigative understanding in the chain of causes by leading to an unconditioned causality which commences acting of itself, but which, since it is itself blind, demolishes the guides of the rules on which alone a thoroughly cohering experience is possible.

Remarks To The Third Antinomy

I. To the Thesis

4.1 The transcendental Idea of freedom does not by any means make up the entire content of the psychological concept of this name--which is empirical for the most part--but rather only that of the absolute spontaneity of the action as the actual basis for the imputation of that freedom. But it is still the

II. To the Antithesis

4.1 The defender of the all-encompassing nature (transcendental physiocracy), in opposition to the promoter of freedom, would assert his proposition against the latter’s pseudorational inferences in the following manner.

4.2 If you don’t assume any
actual stumbling block for philosophy, which finds insurmountable difficulties in admitting this type of unconditioned causality.

4.2 That in the question about the freedom of will therefore which has placed speculative reason in such great embarrassment for who knows how long, is actually only transcendental and is concerned solely about whether a capacity would have to be assumed for beginning a series of successive things or states of itself.

4.3 It is not so necessary to answer how this be possible, since with that we must be equally content with the causality according to natural laws in recognizing a priori that such would have to be presupposed, even though we can in no way comprehend the possibility of how through a certain existence the existence of something else is given and must hold ourselves in this case to experience.

4.4 Indeed we have now actually established the necessity of a first beginning of a series of appearances from freedom only to the extent as is requisite for the comprehensibility of an origin of the world, and we can mathematical first with respect to time in the world, then you would also not need to seek a dynamic first with respect to causality.

4.3 Who has called you to dream up an utterly first state of the world, and thus an absolute beginning of the gradually unfolding series of the appearances, so that you might procure a resting point for your imagination, to set limits to an unrestricted nature?

4.4 Since the substances in the world have always been, at least the unity of experience makes such a presupposition necessary, there is no difficulty in likewise assuming that the transition of its states, i.e., a series of alterations, has always been. Thus there would be no need to seek out any first beginning, neither mathematic nor dynamic.

4.5 The possibility of such an infinite derivation without a first member, with respect to which every remaining member is merely subsequent, cannot be made comprehensible with respect to its possibility.

4.6 But if for that reason you wanted to discard this riddle of
take all succeeding states as a succession according to mere laws of nature.

4.5 But nevertheless since the capacity for beginning a series in time entirely of itself is proven in this way (although not penetrated), from this point on we are allowed to have diverse series begin of themselves midway in the course of the world with respect to the causality, and to attribute to the substances of the world a capacity for acting out of freedom.

4.6 But let us not be detained here by a misunderstanding, namely that since a successive series in the world can have only a comparative first beginning, in that still a state of things always precedes in the world, perhaps no absolute first beginning of the series during the course of the world be possible.

4.7 For we are not speaking here of the absolute first beginning according to time, but rather according to causality.

4.8 Let me now (for example) stand up from my chair completely free and without the necessarily determining influence of natural causes. In this incident then a new series is utterly begun along with its natural sequels nature, then you will see yourself necessitated to discard many synthetic foundational constitutions (base forces), which you could comprehend just as little, and even the possibility of an alteration in general must become offensive to you.

4.7 For if you did not find through experience that it actually is, then you would never be able a priori to think how such an unending sequel of being and not being were possible.

5.1 And in any case if a transcendental capacity of freedom were conceded in order to begin the alterations in the world, this capacity would have to be at least only outside of the world (though it always remains a bold presumption to assume yet an object outside of the summation of all possible perspectives, which therefore can be given in no possible perception).

5.2 However to impute such a capacity to the substances in the world itself can never be allowed because then the cohesion according to universal laws of appearances determining one another necessarily, which we term nature, would
into infinity. However with respect to time this incident is only the continuation of a preceding series.

4.9 For this resolution and deed does not at all lie in the sequence of merely natural effects, and is not just a continuation of those. Instead the determining natural causes cease entirely here, with respect to this event, which indeed follows upon those natural effects, but does not arise from them. Hence it must be termed an utterly first beginning of a series of appearances; not according to time, of course, but still with respect to causality.

5.1 The certification of the need of reason to appeal in the series of the natural causes to a first beginning out of freedom, makes quite clear that all philosophies of ancient times (the school of Epicurus excepted) saw themselves compelled to assume a first mover for the explanation of the movements of the world, i.e., a freely acting cause which first began this series of states of itself.

5.2 For from nature alone they did not presume to make a first beginning comprehensible.

5.3 For next to such a lawless capacity of freedom, nature would lose all meaning, for through the influence of that freedom the laws of nature would be unceasingly transformed and the play of the appearances, which are regular and uniform according to a nature, would be made confused and without cohesion.
The Antinomy Of Pure Reason

4th Conflict of the Transcendental Ideas

Thesis

1.1 Something belongs to the world which, either as its part or its cause, is an utterly necessary being.

Proof

2.1 The sense world, as the whole of all appearances, simultaneously contains a series of alterations.

2.2 For without these even the representation of the time series, as a condition of the possibility of the sense world, would not be given to us.*

2.3 But each and every alteration stands under its condition which precedes according to time and under which it is necessary.

2.4 Now each and every conditioned which is given, presupposes, with respect to its existence, a completed series of conditions leading back to the utterly unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary.

2.5 Therefore some absolutely nec-

Antithesis

1.1 Nowhere does any utterly necessary being exist, neither in the world, nor apart from it as its cause.

Proof

2.1 Suppose the world itself, or in it, were a necessary being, then in the series of its alterations either a beginning would be, which were unconditionally necessary, thus without cause, which is in opposition to the dynamical law of the determination of all appearances in time; or the series itself would be without any beginning and, although contingent and conditioned in all its parts, yet utterly necessary and unconditioned in the whole, which is contradictory because the existence of a multitude cannot be necessary if no single part of that possesses an existence necessary on its own.

3.1 On the other hand suppose there were an utterly necessary world cause apart from the world, then that cause, as the
necessary something must exist if a change exists as its sequence.

2.6 But this necessary something itself belongs to the world of sense.

2.7 For suppose it were apart from that world, then the series of the world alterations would derive its beginning from it, but without this necessary cause itself belonging to the sense world.

2.8 Now this is impossible.

2.9 For since the beginning of a time series can only be determined through what precedes with respect to time, the supreme condition of the beginning of a series of alterations must exist in time, since this beginning was not yet (for the beginning is an existence before which there precedes a time in which the thing, which begins, did not yet exist).

2.10 Therefore the causality of the necessary cause of the alterations, thus also the cause itself, belongs to time, thus to the appearances (on which time alone is possible as its form), consequently it cannot be thought in isolation from the sense world as the sum-total of all appearances.

supreme member in the series of the causes of the world alterations, would first begin the existence of that member and its series.*

3.2 But now it would still then also have to begin to act and its causality would belong in time, but just for that reason in the sum-total of the appearances, i.e., in the world, consequently, it itself, i.e., the cause, would not be apart from the world, which contradicts the presupposition.

3.3 Therefore neither in the world nor apart from it (though in causal combination with it) is there any kind of utterly necessary being.

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 The word “beginning” is taken in a dual meaning.

1.2 The first is active, since the cause begins a series of states as its effect (infit).

1.3 The second is passive, since the causality itself arises in the cause (fit).

1.4 I infer there from the first to the latter.
2.11 Therefore in the world itself something utterly necessary is contained (be it the whole world series, or a part of that).

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 The time precedes indeed objectively before this, as the formal condition of the possibility of the alterations, but subjectively and in the actuality of the consciousness this representation, as every other, is still only given though the occasion of the perceptions.

Remark to the Fourth Antinomy

I. To the Thesis

3.1 In order to prove the existence of a necessary being, it is incumbent upon me to use no other argument than cosmological, i.e., which ascends from the conditioned in the appearance to the unconditioned in the concept, in that we consider this unconditioned as the necessary condition for the absolute totality of the series.

3.2 To attempt the proof out of the mere Idea of a supreme of all beings in general, belongs to another principle of reason, and hence will have to be presented separately.

II. To the Antithesis

4.1 If at the ascension in the series of the appearances we allege to encounter difficulties against the existence of an utterly necessary supreme cause, these must also not be based merely on concepts of the necessary existence of a thing in general, and thus not be ontological, but rather must be found in advance from the causality combination with a series of appearances in order to assume a condition to that which itself is unconditioned, consequently be deduced cosmologically and according to empirical laws.

4.2 It must show namely that the ascension in the series of the
4.1 Now the pure cosmological proof cannot establish the existence of a necessary being otherwise than by simultaneously leaving it undetermined whether this being be in the world itself, or be a thing distinguished from it.

4.2 For in order to ascertain the latter, principles are required which are no longer cosmological and do not advance in the series of the appearances, but rather are concepts of contingent beings in general (to the extent they are considered as objects of the understanding) and this entails a principle for connecting such with a necessary being through mere concepts, all of which belongs to a transcendental philosophy, but which is out of place here.

5.1 But if we once begin the proof cosmologically by laying the series of appearances as a foundation, along with the regression in that series according to empirical laws of causality, we cannot afterwards digress from that and go over to something which does not belong at all in the series as a member.

5.2 For in just the same meaning something must be considered as condition in which the relation of causes (in the sense world) is never able to end with an empirically unconditioned condition and that the cosmological argument from the contingency of the world states, by virtue of their alterations, inveighs against the assumption of a first cause and one commencing the series utterly first.

5.1 But in this antinomy a rare contrast is revealed, namely that out of just the same proof basis, from which the existence of an original being was inferred in the thesis, the not-being of that being is inferred in the antithesis, and indeed with the same edge.

5.2 It went first: there is a necessary being because the entire past time embraces in itself the series of all conditions and with this therefore also the unconditioned (the necessary).

5.3 Then it went: there is no necessary being precisely for the reason that the entire elapsed time embraces within itself the series of all conditions (which thus are all together in turn conditioned).

5.4 The cause for this is as follows.

5.5 The first argument looks only
tionship of the conditioned is taken to its condition in the series, which was supposed to lead in continuous advance to this highest condition.

5.3 Now if this relationship is sensitive and belongs to the possible employment of the empirical understanding, then the supreme condition or cause can resolve the regression only according to laws of sensitivity, thus only as belonging to the time series, and the necessary being must be considered as the supreme member of the world series.

6.1 Nonetheless, some have taken upon themselves the liberty of such a leap (μετάβασις εἰς ἀπόλλονεν). They inferred, namely, from the alterations in the world to the empirical contingency, i.e., to the dependence of the alterations upon empirically determined causes, and obtained an ascending series of empirical conditions, which was also entirely proper.

6.2 But since they could find no first beginnings and no supreme member in this, they suddenly diverged from the empirical concept of contingency and to the absolute totality of the series of the conditions, in which the one determines the other in time, and in that way obtains an unconditioned and necessary aspect.

5.6 On the other hand, the second draws the contingency into consideration, because everything which is determined in the time series (because a time precedes before each, in which the condition must in turn itself be determined as condition), in which way then everything conditioned and all absolute necessity, is entirely eliminated.

5.7 Meanwhile the inferential manner in both is entirely commensurate even to common human reason which often runs into a situation of quarreling with itself after considering its object from two different standpoints.

5.8 Herr von Mairan held the conflict of two famous astronomers, which arose out of a similar difficulty about the choice of the observational standpoint, to be a sufficiently notable phenomenon, to justify the composition of a particular essay about it.

5.9 One reasoned in this wise: the moon rotates about its axis because it continually shows the
took the pure category, which occasioned then a mere intelligible series, the completion of which rested upon the existence of an utterly necessary cause, which moreover, since it was bound to no sensitive conditions, was also freed from the time condition of beginning its causality itself.

6.4 But this procedure is entirely inappropriate as can be inferred from the following.

7.1 Contingent, in the pure sense of the category, is that, the contradictory opposite of which is possible.

7.2 Now we cannot at all infer from the empirical contingency to the intelligible contingency.

7.3 Whatever is altered, its opposite (of its state) is actual at another time, hence also possible; hence this is not the contradictory opposite of the previous state. This latter requires that in the same time when the previous state existed, its opposite could have been able to be in the position of that, which cannot be at all inferred from the alteration.

7.4 A body, which is in movement = A, comes to rest = non-A.

5.10 Both inferences were correct, considering the standpoint from which the moon’s movement was observed.
7.5 Now from a state contrarily opposed to state A following upon this, it cannot at all be inferred that the contradictory opposite of A be possible, thus A being contingent; for to do that it would be required that in the same time when the movement was, rest could have been instead of that movement.

7.6 Now we know nothing further than that the rest in the following time was actual, thus also possible.

7.7 But movement at one time and rest at another time are not contradictorily opposed to one another.

7.8 Therefore the succession of contradictorily opposed determinations, i.e., change, in no way proves the contingency with respect to concepts of the pure understanding and therefore can also not lead to the existence of a necessary being with respect to pure understanding concepts.

7.9 The change proves only the empirical contingency, i.e., that the new state could not have taken place for itself at all without a cause which belongs to the preceding time, and consequently to the law of causality.

7.10 This cause, and even if it is accepted as utterly necessary, must still be encountered in time in this manner and belong to the series of the appearances.
The Antinomies of Pure Reason

3rd Section - Concerning The Interest of Reason In This Its Conflict

1.1 Now here we have the entire dialectic play of the cosmological Ideas, which do not at all permit an object congruent to them to be given in any sort of a possible experience, indeed not even a reason for thinking of them as harmonious with universal laws of experience. But nevertheless these are not thought up arbitrarily, but rather are such to which reason is necessarily led in the continuous advance of the empirical synthesis if it wants to liberate what can always be determined only conditionally, according to rules of experience, from every condition and embrace it in its unconditioned totality.

1.2 These pseudo-rational assertions are so many attempts at solving four natural and unavoidable problems of reason, of which therefore there can be just this many problems, and neither more nor less, because there are no more series of synthetic presuppositions which can a priori limit the empirical synthesis.

2.1 We have represented these brilliant presumptions of reason, expanding its territory beyond all boundaries of experience, only in dry formulations which contain merely the foundation of its claims and, as becomes a transcendental philosophy, strips them of all empirical aspects, although the entire pomp of rational assertions can shine forth only in combination with those aspects.

2.2 But in the application and advancing expansion of rational usage, by rising from the field of experiences and gradually winging its way up to these sublime Ideas, philosophy shows a worth which, if it could assert its presumptions, would leave the value of all other sciences far behind, in that it promises the fundamental foundation to our greatest expectations and prospects of the final purposes, in which all rational strivings must finally unite.

2.3 The questions of whether the world have a beginning and some sort of a boundary of its extension in space; whether there be anywhere, and perhaps in my thinking self, an indivisible and indestructible unity, or nothing except divisibility and transience; whether I be free in my dealings or, as other beings, be led by the threads of nature and fate; and finally whether there be a supreme world cause or whether the things of nature and their order make up
the last object with which we halt in all our considerations; these are ques-
tions for whose solution the mathematician would gladly give up his entire
science; for mathematics can still procure no satisfaction with respect to the
highest and most inspiring purposes of humanity.

2.4 Even the actual dignity of mathematics (the pride of human reason), since it
gives the direction to reason for penetrating nature in the large as well as in
the small in its arrangement and regularity, and also in the admirable unity of
moving forces far beyond all expectation of a philosophy building upon
common experience, depends upon it giving occasion and encouragement in
that way for the usage of reason expanding beyond all experience, likewise
providing the wisdom of the world, occupied in that with the most splendid
materials for supporting its examinations, as much of its constitution admits,
through commensurate perspectives.

3.1 Unfortunately for speculation (but perhaps fortunately for the practical de-
termination of the human) reason sees itself so caught up in a swarm of
foundations and counter-foundations midway among its greatest expecta-
tions, that since its honor as well as its security is in fact at stake, it is not
feasible to withdraw and consider this dissension nonchalantly as a mere
mock battle, much less to command utter peace; and since the object of the
dispute is itself very interesting, nothing further remains for reason but to
reflect with itself about the origin of its disunity, whether perhaps a mere
misunderstanding might not be guilty here, after the exposition of which
perhaps indeed proud claims would fall on both sides, but in place of which
an enduring, peaceful regimentation of reason over understanding and the
senses would have its beginning.

4.1 In advance we want to interrupt this basic exposition to a certain extent and
first draw into consideration on which side we might most want to take our
stand if we were forced to choose a side.

4.2 Since in this case we do not involve the logical touchstone of truth, but
rather merely our interests, such an investigation, even though it reveals
nothing with respect to the contesting rights of both sides, will still have the
benefit of making comprehensible why the participants in this strife have
taken a stand on the one side rather than on the other without a superior in-
sight of the object being the cause of that choice, while still explaining cer-
tain secondary matters, e.g., the zealous heat of the one side and the cold assertion of the other, and why they gladly cheer with joyful acclaim the one side and are irreconcilably predisposed in advance against the other.

5.1 But there is something which determines the viewpoint with this tentative evaluation, and out of which it alone can be employed with appropriate thoroughness, and this is the comparison of the principles from which both sides proceed.

5.2 Among the assertions of the antithesis, we note a perfect uniformity of the manner of thinking and complete unity of the maxims, namely a principle of pure empiricism, not only in the explanation of the appearances in the world, but rather also, in the resolution of the transcendental Ideas, of the universe itself.

5.3 In opposition to this the assertions of the thesis, apart from the empirical manner of explanation within the series of the appearances, lays yet intellectual beginnings as the foundation, and to this extent the maxim is not simple.

5.4 But from its essential distinguishing mark, I will term it the dogmatism of pure reason.

6.1 On the side of dogmatism, or of the thesis therefore and in the determination for the cosmological rational Ideas, there is seen:

7.1 First: a certain practical interest, on which every well disposed person, if he understanding his true advantage, heartily takes part.

7.2 That the world have a beginning, that my thinking self be of a simple and, hence, incorruptible nature, that this simultaneously be free in its discretionary actions and exalted above the compulsion of nature, and finally that the entire order of things, which make up the world, arises from an original being, from whom everything borrows its unity and purposeful connection: these are so many cornerstones of morality and religion.

7.3 The antithesis robs us of all these supports, or at least seems to do so.
8.1 Second: a speculative interest of reason is also expressed on this, the thesis side of the arguments.

8.2 For if we assume and use the transcendental Ideas in such a way, then we can grasp the entire chain of the conditions completely a priori, and comprehend the derivation of the conditioned by beginning from the unconditioned. This the antithesis cannot perform, commending itself in that way very badly; for, owing to the conditions of its synthesis, it can give no answer to the question which would not always leave a remainder to be questioned without end.

8.3 According to the antithesis, we must ascend from a given beginning to a yet higher one, every part leading to a yet smaller part, every event always having yet another event as cause beyond it, and the conditions of existence in general supporting themselves always in turn upon other ones without ever obtaining an unconditioned stance and support in a self-sustaining thing as original cause.

9.1 Third: this side (the thesis) has also the advantage of popularity, which certainly does not make up the smallest part of its commendation.

9.2 The common understanding does not find the least difficulty in the Ideas of the unconditioned beginning of every synthesis, since it is more used to going forward to the sequels than to ascend up to the foundations, and in the concept of the absolute first (upon the possibility of which the common understanding does not dwell) it has a convenience and simultaneously a definite point for tying the guideline of these steps to it, since otherwise no satisfaction at all can be found in the restless ascension from the conditioned to the condition, always with one foot in mid air.

10.1 On the other side, that of empiricism in the determination for the cosmological Ideas, i.e., the antithesis, first of all no such practical interest, as morality and religion entail, is discovered from pure principles of reason.

10.2 Far rather mere empiricism seems to take away all force and influence from both.
10.3 If there is no being distinct from the world, if the world is without beginning and therefore also without an originator, if our will is not free, and with the soul having the same divisibility and decomposition as matter, then the moral Ideas and principle lose all validity and collapse with the transcendental Ideas which make up their theoretical support.

11.1 But on the other hand, empiricism offers advantages to the speculative interest which are very alluring and step far beyond what the dogmatic instructor of the rational Ideas may promise.

11.2 According to empiricism, the understanding is always on its own ground, namely the field of obviously possible experience, the laws of which it can track down and by means of which it can expand its sure and comprehensible recognition without end.

11.3 Here it not only can, but even is supposed to, present the object to the perspective on its own as well as in its relations, or else in concepts, the image of which can be laid forth clearly and distinctly in given, similar perspectives.

11.4 Not only that he has no need to abandon this chain for natural order in order to rely on Ideas, the objects of which he is not familiar with because they, as thought-things, can never be given; but rather he is not even allowed to abandon his occupation and, on the pretext of having now brought it to an end, to go over into the territory of the Idealizing reason and transcendental concepts, where he has no need to observe and research in a commensurate fashion with natural laws, but rather only to think and fantasize while being certain that he cannot be refuted through factual matters of nature because he is simply not bound to their witness, but rather may pass them by, or in fact subordinate them to higher considerations, namely that of pure reason.

12.1 Hence the empiricist will not allow any sort of epoch of nature to be assumed as the utterly first, nor any sort of limit of his vista in the scope of nature to be seen as the most removed; nor leave the objects of nature, which he can unravel through observation and mathematics and synthetically determine in the perspective, in order to pass over to those which neither sense nor imagination can ever present in concreto (the simple); nor grant us to lay as the foundation, even in nature, a capacity of working independently of
laws of nature (freedom) and in that way to diminish the occupation of understanding in tracking down, per the guides of necessary rules, the origination of the appearances; nor finally to permit seeking the cause anywhere at all apart from nature (original being), because we are familiar with nothing further than this nature, and it is this alone which can offer us objects and instruct us concerning their laws.

13.1 Indeed if the empirical philosopher has no other intention with his antithesis than to quell the impertinence and the audacity of reason in misconstruing its true determination, and where reason brags about insight and knowledge where insight and knowledge actually cease, and will issue what we are allowed to hold with respect to the practical interest as a promotion of the speculative interest in order, where it is conducive to its convenience, to tear up the threads of physical examination and, by asserting the expansion of the recognition, to couple it to a transcendental Idea through which we actually only recognize that we know nothing; if, I say, the empiricist is content with this, his principle would be a maxim of restraint in claims, of modesty in assertions and simultaneously of the greatest possible expansion of our understanding through the instructor actually appointed to us, namely experience.

13.2 For in such a case, intellectual presuppositions and beliefs in aid of our practical affairs would not be taken from us; only we could not let them step forth under the title and pomp of science and rational insight because the actually speculative knowledge can meet no other object anywhere than that of experience, and if we step beyond its limit, the synthesis, which attempts new recognitions independently of experience, has no substratum of the perspective on which it could be exercised.

14.1 But if empiricism itself becomes dogmatic with respect to the Ideas (as happens more than once) and audaciously negates what is beyond the sphere of its perspective recognitions, it falls into the error of immodesty itself, which here is even more blameworthy, because an irredeemable disadvantage is inflicted in that way on the practical interest of reason.

15.1 This is the opposition of Epicurism* against Platonism.

* Kant’s annotation:
1.1 Meanwhile there is still the question as to whether Epicurus ever presented these principles as objective assertions.

1.2 If they were per chance nothing further than maxims of the speculative use of reason, then in that way he showed a more genuine philosophical spirit than any of the sophisticates of antiquity.

1.3 That in the explanation of the appearances we would have to go to work as though the field of the examination were cut off through no boundary or beginning of the world; to assume the material of the world such as it must be, if we want to be instructed by it through experience; that no other generation of events, except as they are determined through unalterable natural laws; and, finally, no cause distinguished from the world would be used: these are still very proper, but little observed, principles for expanding speculative philosophy, even for discovering also the principles of morality, independently of foreign sources of aid, without for that reason he, who demands to ignore those dogmatic propositions as long as we are occupied with mere speculation, having to be accused of wanting to deny them.

16.1 Each of these two says more than he knows; the first encouraging and promoting knowledge, although to the detriment of the practical; the second indeed giving splendid principles to the practical, but in just that way, with respect to all in which alone a speculative knowledge is granted us, allowing reason to surrender to Ideal explanations of the natural appearances and to neglect the physical research about them.

17.1 Finally, concerning the third moment, where we can watch the provisional choice between both conflicting portions, it is exceedingly strange that empiricism is entirely opposed to all popularity, even though we were supposed to believe that the common understanding would eagerly hold to a scheme which promises satisfaction through nothing but experiential recognition and its rationally conforming cohesion, instead of the transcendental dogmatic which necessitates him to ascend up to concepts which step far beyond the insight and the rational capacity of the most practiced mind in thinking.

17.2 But precisely this latter is the motive of the common understanding.

17.3 For it finds itself then in a state, in which also the most educated person can extract nothing beyond it.
17.4 If he understands little or nothing of this, still no one can boast of understanding much more of it, and even though he cannot speak so scholastically about it as others, he still can rationalize infinitely more about it because he rambles about with sheer Ideas, about which he is most glib, because no one knows anything about them, and he does not have to be entirely quiet about the investigation of nature and admit his ignorance.

17.5 Convenience and vanity therefore are already a strong commendation of these principles.

17.6 Beyond this, even though it is very difficult for a philosopher to assume something as a principle without being able to give an account for that, or for the philosopher to introduce concepts whose objective reality cannot be penetrated, there is still nothing more usual for the common understanding.

17.7 That understanding will have something with which he is able to confidently start.

17.8 The difficulty of comprehending such a presupposition does not disturb him, because it never occurs to him (who does not know what comprehension is anyway) and he considers what he is fluent with through frequent use to be known.

17.9 But then, finally, with him all speculative interest vanishes with respect to the practical, and he imagines himself able to penetrate and know what his anxiety or hopes impel him to accept or to believe.

17.10 So empiricism of the transcendently-idealizing rationality is entirely robbed of all popularity, and even as many disadvantages as it may contain against supreme practical principles, it is still not to be feared that it will ever overstep the limits of the school and acquire even a middling esteem with the common people and favor with the crowd.

18.1 With respect to its nature human reason is architectonic, i.e., it considers all recognitions as belonging to a possible system, and hence also admits only such principles which at least do not make a ventured recognition incapable of standing together in some sort of system with others.
18.2 But the propositions of the antithesis are such that they make the completion of an edifice of recognitions entirely impossible.

18.3 According to these propositions, beyond any state of the world there is always a yet older one, in each part always yet in turn other divisible parts, before every event another which in turn was generated earlier, and in existence in general everything always only conditioned without any sort of an unconditioned and first existence being acknowledged.

18.4 Since therefore the antithesis never admits any first, and no beginning which could serve utterly as the foundation of the structure, a complete edifice of the recognition is entirely impossible with such presuppositions.

18.5 Hence the architectonic interest of reason which does not require empirical, but rather pure rational, unity a priori, entails a natural commendation for the assertions of the thesis.

19.1 But if a person could rid himself of all interest and draw into consideration the assertions of reason without regard to all of the consequences, i.e., merely according to the content of its foundations, then such a person, given that he knew of no exit to the dilemma except that he embrace one or the other of the conflicting doctrines, would be in an unceasingly vacillating state.

19.2 Today it would appear convincing that the will be free; tomorrow, if he took into consideration the indissoluble natural chain, he would hold instead that freedom were nothing but self deception, and everything would be merely nature.

19.3 But then if it came to doing and acting, this play of mere speculative reason would vanish like the shadowy images of a dream, and he would choose his principles merely according to practical interest.

19.4 But because it is still proper for a reflective and investigative being to dedicate certain times solely to testing his own reasoning, but at the same time to remove entirely all partiality and so to communicate his observation only to others for evaluation, no one can be blamed for, and even less prohibited from, letting the propositions and counter-propositions come forth as their
own defense before jurors of his own state (namely the state of fallible humans) and be deterred by no threat.
Concerning The Antinomy Of Pure Reason

4th Section - The Transcendental Task of Pure Reason
to the Extent it must utterly be Subject to Solution

1.1 An assertion of solving all problems and of answering all questions would be a shameful boast and such an excessive self conceit that in such a way one would lose claim to any confidence.

1.2 Nevertheless there are sciences, the nature of which is so constituted that every question arising within them must be answerable utterly out of what one knows, because the answer must arise out of the same sources from whence the question arises, and where it is in no way permitted to plead unavoidable ignorance, but rather where the solution can be demanded.

1.3 What is right or wrong in all possible cases we must be able to know with respect to a rule, because it concerns our obligation and we have no obligation about what we cannot know.

1.4 Much must remain uncertain in the explanation of the appearances of nature, and many questions must remain inextricable because what we know of nature is not sufficient by far in all cases for what we are supposed to explain.

1.5 Now the question arises: “whether any sort of question in the transcendental philosophy, concerning an object submitted to reason, is unanswerable by precisely this pure reason, and whether anyone can properly evade its decisive answer by counting it as utterly uncertain (from all that we can recognize), concerning which we indeed have a sufficient concept for posing a question, but are completely lacking in means or capability of ever answering it.”

2.1 Now I assert that among all speculative recognitions, the transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity: that no question at all concerning an object given to pure reason is inextricable for that same human reason, and that no pleading of an unavoidable ignorance and unfathomable depth of the task can absolve us of the obligation to thoroughly and completely answer it; because the very same concept which places us in the position of asking the question, must also make us thoroughly qualified to answer it, the object not being encountered at all apart from the concept (and which is the case concerning right and wrong).
3.1 But in the transcendental philosophy there are no other questions except the cosmological ones for which we can quite properly require an adequate answer concerning the composition of the object without allowing the philosopher to evade the question by pleading impenetrable obscurity; and these questions can only concern cosmological Ideas.

3.2 For the object must be given empirically and the question concerns only the commensurability of that object with an Idea.

3.3 If the object is transcendental and therefore itself unknown, e.g., whether that something, the appearance of which (in us ourselves) is the thinking (the soul), be a simple being on its own, or whether there be a cause of all things as a whole which is absolutely necessary, etc., then for our Idea we are supposed to seek an object, concerning which we can confess that it be unknown to us, but still not for that reason impossible.*

3.4 The cosmological Ideas alone have the peculiarity of presupposing as given both their object and the empirical synthesis requisite to its concept, and the question which arises out of them concerns only the advance of this synthesis to the extent it is supposed to contain absolute totality, which is no longer empirical, for such totality can be given in no experience.

3.5 Now since the discussion here is solely of a thing as an object of a possible experience and not as a something on its own, the answer of the transcendental cosmological question can in no wise lie apart from the Idea, for it concerns no object on its own and, with respect to possible experience, no question is raised about it which can be given in concreto in any sort of an experience, but rather only about what lies in the Idea, to which the empirical synthesis is merely to approximate. Accordingly then it must be subject to a solution out of the Idea alone; for this is a mere creature of reason which therefore cannot refuse the responsibility and thrust it onto the unknown object.

* Kant’s annotation:
1.1 We can indeed give no answer to the question of what kind of constitution a transcendental object has, namely what it be, though we can easily assert that the question itself be nothing because no object was given.
1.2 Accordingly all questions of the transcendental doctrine of soul are also answerable and actually answered; for they concern the transcendental subject of all inner appearances, which itself is not appearance and therefore is not given as an object and whereupon none of the categories (upon which still the question is positioned) concern conditions of the application of these categories.

1.3 Therefore here is the case where the common expression holds, that no answer is also an answer, namely that a question about the constitution of that something which can be thought through no determined predicate, because it is placed entirely apart from the sphere of the objects which can be given to us, is entirely inane and empty.

4.1 It is not so extraordinary, as it first seems, that a science is able to require and expect clear and certain solutions with respect to all questions belonging to its epitome (quœstiones domesticae), even though they are perhaps not yet found at the time.

4.2 Apart from the transcendental philosophy there are yet two pure, rational sciences, one of merely speculative, the other of practical, content, namely: pure mathematics and pure morals.

4.3 Has anyone perhaps ever heard that due, as it were, to a necessary ignorance of the conditions, it has been pronounced as uncertain which relationship, in precise rational or irrational numbers, the diameter have to the circle?

4.4 Since it cannot be given at all congruently through the first, but has not yet been found through the second, some scholars might judge that at least the impossibility of such solution can be recognized with certitude, and Lambert gave a proof of this.

4.5 In the universal principles of morality nothing can be uncertain, because the propositions are either altogether inane and senseless, or must flow merely from our rational concept.

4.6 On the other hand, with studies of nature there is an infinity of presuppositions with respect to which certitude can never be expected. And here the reason is that appearances of nature are objects which are given to us independently of our concepts, to which therefore the key does not lie in us and our pure thinking, but rather apart from us and for precisely that reason cannot in many cases be discovered, thus no sure insight can be expected.
4.7 Among these I do not count the questions of the transcendental analytic, which concern the deduction of our pure recognitions, because we are now dealing only with the certitude of the judgments with respect to the objects and not with respect to the origin of our concepts.

5.1 Therefore we will not be able to shirk the obligation of an, at least, critical solution of the submitted rational questions by making complaints about the narrow bounds of our reason and professing with the appearance of a humble self-recognition that it is beyond our reason to make out whether the world be from eternity or have a beginning; whether the world space be infinitely filled with beings or be enclosed within certain boundaries; whether any sort of something in the world be simple or whether everything would have to be infinitely divided; whether there be a generation and production out of freedom or whether everything depends upon the chain of natural order, and finally whether there be any kind of a being, entirely unconditioned and necessary on its own, or whether everything be conditioned with respect to its existence and thus outwardly dependent and contingent on its own.

5.2 For all these questions concern an object which can be given nowhere else than in our thoughts, namely the utterly unconditioned totality of the synthesis of the appearances.

5.3 If we are able to say and make out nothing certain about these from our own concepts, then we may not place the fault on the matter which conceals itself from us, for such a matter (because it is encountered nowhere apart from our Ideas) cannot be given to us at all. Rather we must seek the cause in our Idea itself, which is a problem which permits of no solution and where we still obstinately assume that an actual object corresponds to the Idea.

5.4 A clear presentation of the dialectic, which lies in our concept itself, would soon bring us to the complete certitude of what we have to judge with respect to such a question.

6.1 We can counter your plea of uncertainty with respect to these problems with this question, which you at least would have to clearly answer: “from whence do the Ideas arise to you, the solution of which involves here such difficulty?
6.2 “Do they perhaps arise from appearances, whose explanation you are in need of and concerning which, as a consequence of these Ideas, you have to seek only the principles of the rule of their exposition?”

6.3 Assume nature were entirely disclosed before you, nothing concealed from your senses and from the consciousness of all that is submitted to your perspective, still you will not be able to recognize the object of your Ideas in *concreto* through a single experience (for apart from this complete perspective, it will require yet a completed synthesis along with the consciousness of its absolute totality. But this is not possible through any empirical recognition at all). Thus your question can in no way be propounded necessarily for the explanation of any sort of occurring appearance and therefore through the object, as it were.

6.4 For the object can never come forth to you because it cannot be given through any possible experience.

6.5 With all possible perceptions you remain always constrained under conditions, be it in space or in time, and come upon nothing unconditioned in order to make out whether this unconditioned is to be placed in an absolute beginning of the synthesis, or an absolute totality of the series without any beginning.

6.6 But the all in the empirical meaning is always only comparative.

6.7 The absolute all of the magnitude (the universe), of the division, of the origin, or the condition of existence in general, with all questions, whether it is to be brought forth through a synthesis progressing finitely or infinitely, concerns no possible experience.

6.8 You would not, e.g., be able to better explain the appearances of a body in the least, or even differently, whether you assume that it consisted of simple parts or always out of assembled parts; for no simple appearance can ever come forth to you any more than can an infinite assemblage.

6.9 The appearances require only to be explained as far as their explanatory conditions are given in the perception, but everything which may ever be given by them, taken together in one absolute whole, is itself no perception.
6.10 But all this is actually that, the explanation of which is required in the transcendental rational tasks.

7.1 Therefore since even the solution of these tasks can never arise in experience, you cannot say that what is to be attributed to the object on this account is uncertain.

7.2 For your object is merely in your brain and cannot be given at all apart from that. Accordingly you only have to take care about being consistent with yourself and in preventing the amphibole which makes your Idea into an alleged representation of an empirical given and therefore also of an object to be recognized according to experiential laws.

7.3 The dogmatic solution therefore is not so much uncertain as rather impossible.

7.4 But the critical solution, which can be completely certain, does not consider the question objectively at all, but rather according to the foundation of the recognitions upon which it is based.
Concerning The Antinomy Of Pure Reason

5th Section - Skeptical Representation of the Cosmological Questions through all four Transcendental Ideas

1.1 We would gladly refrain from any requirement to have our questions answered dogmatically, if we already comprehended in advance that the answer, be what it will, would still only increase our ignorance and plunge us from one incomprehensibility into another, from one obscurity into a yet greater one, and perhaps even into contradictions.

1.2 If our question is posed merely for affirmation or denial, it is prudent to leave the alleged basis of the answer in hand undecided, and first to draw into consideration what we would then gain if the answer turned out on the one side, and then on the opposite side.

1.3 Now if it happens that in both cases sheer senselessness (nonsense) results, then we have an established summons for critically examining our question ourselves and seeing whether it does not itself rest on a presupposition which is without foundation, and that we are playing with an Idea which betrays its falsehood better in the application and through its consequences than in the isolated representation.

1.4 That is the great utility which the skeptical manner has in treating the questions which pure reason poses to itself, and whereby we can be relieved of a great dogmatic fallow at little expense in order to place in its stead a sober critique which, as a true catharsis, will happily purge away illusion together with its entourage of smatterings of knowledge.

2.1 Accordingly then, if regarding a cosmological Idea, I could penetrate in advance that regardless of which side of the unconditioned of the synthesis of the appearances the Idea took, it would still be either too large or too small for each and every concept of understanding, then I would comprehend that since this Idea still has to do only with an object of experience, which is supposed to be commensurate with a possible understanding concept, it would have to be entirely empty and without meaning, because the object would not conform to the Idea, no matter how convenient I wish to make it.
2.2 And this is actually the case with all concepts of the world which, for that very reason, also involve reason in an unavoidable antinomy as long as it adheres to them.

2.3 For let us assume:

3.1 First that the world have no beginning: then it is too large for your concept; for this, which consists in a successive regression, can never reach the entire elapsed eternity.

3.2 But then let it have a beginning: now it is too small for your understanding concept in the necessary empirical regression.

3.3 For because the beginning still always presupposes a time which precedes, it is not yet unconditioned, and the law of the empirical usage of the understanding imposes upon you to ask for a still higher time condition and therefore here the world is obviously too small for this law.

4.1 It is quite similar with the two-prong answer to the question about the world magnitude with respect to space.

4.2 For if it is infinite and unbounded, then it is too large for every possible concept.

4.3 If it is finite and bounded, you would rightly still ask: “what determines this limit?”

4.4 Empty space is not a correlate (correlatum) of things existing for itself, and can be no condition with which you could remain, even less an empirical condition which makes up a part of a possible experience.

4.5 (For who can have an experience of the utterly empty?)

4.6 But to every absolute totality of the empirical synthesis there is always the requirement that the unconditioned be a concept of experience.

4.7 Accordingly then a limited world is too small for your concept.
5.1 If secondly every appearance (material) in space consists of infinitely many parts, then the regression of the partition is always too large for your concept. And if the partition of space is supposed to cease with any portion of that space (the simple), then it is too small for the Idea of the unconditioned.

5.2 For this portion always leaves yet remaining a regression to more parts contained in it.

6.1 Thirdly, suppose in everything which happens in the world there were nothing except succession according to laws of nature, then the causality of these causes is always in turn something which occurs and makes a regression to even higher causes necessary and thus endless, and thus the lengthening of the series of conditions infinitely into the past.

6.2 Therefore the merely effecting nature is too large for your entire concept in the synthesis of the world events.

7.1 Do you occasionally choose events effected of themselves, thus generated out of freedom? Then the “why” pursues you according to an unavoidable natural law, and necessitates you to go out beyond this point according to the causal law of experience, and then you find that the same totality for the connection is too small for your necessarily empirical concept.

8.1 Fourth. If you assume an utterly necessary being (be it the world itself, or something in the world, or the cause of the world), you place it in a time infinitely removed from every given point of time, because otherwise it would be dependent upon another and older existence.

8.2 But this existence is inaccessible and too large for your empirical concept such that you could never achieve to it through any continued regression.

9.1 But if in your opinion everything which belongs to the world (be it as conditioned or as condition) is contingent, then each existence given to you is too small for your concept.
9.2 For it always necessitates you to look yet around for another existence upon which it is dependent.

10.1 In all these cases we have said that the world Idea is either too large for the empirical regression, thus for every possible concept of understanding, or else too small for that same regression.

10.2 But why have we expressed ourselves in this fashion and not rather said in the first case the empirical concept is always too small for the Idea, but too large in the second, and thus, as it were, the fault adhered to the empirical regression, instead of accusing the cosmological Idea of digressing too much or too little from its purpose, namely the possible experience?

10.3 The reason is this.

10.4 Possible experience is that which alone can give reality to our concepts. Without that, every concept is only an Idea without truth and reference to an object.

10.5 Accordingly the possible empirical concept was the standard by which the Idea had to be evaluated, whether it were a mere Idea and thing of sheer thinking, or whether it encountered its object in the world.

10.6 For we say that something is too large or too small relative to something else only with respect to what is assumed solely for the sake of this latter, and must be adapted accordingly.

10.7 This question also belongs to the toys of the ancient dialectic schools: if a ball does not go through a hole, what are we supposed to ask? “is the ball too large, or the hole too small?”

10.8 In this case it is all the same how we wish to express ourselves, for we do not know which of the two is there for the sake of the other.

10.9 On the other hand, we will not say that the man is too large for his clothes, but rather that the clothes are too small for the man.
11.1 We are therefore at least brought to the reasonable suspicion that the cosmological Ideas, and with them all rational assertions set in conflict with one another, have as a foundation perhaps an empty and merely fanciful concept according to the manner in which the object of these Ideas is given to us, and this suspicion can already lead us to the correct clue for uncovering the illusion which has erroneously led us so long.
Concerning The Antinomy Of Pure Reason

6th Section - Concerning Transcendental Idealism, as the Key for the Solution of the Cosmological Dialectic

1.1 We have sufficiently proven in the transcendental aesthetic that everything which is looked at in space or time, hence all objects of any experience possible to us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., sheer representations which, as they are represented as extended beings or as series of alterations, have no established existence on their own apart from our thoughts.

1.2 This theorem I term transcendental Idealism.*

1.3 Out of this modification of our sensitivity the realist, in the transcendental sense, has things subsisting on their own, and hence turns mere representations into things on their own.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 I have also frequently termed it formal Idealism to distinguish it from the material Idealism, i.e., the commonly understood Idealism which doubts or denies the existence of external things themselves.

1.2 In several cases it seems to be advisable to avail ourselves of this term, formal Idealism, rather than transcendental Idealism in order to avoid all misinterpretation.

2.1 It would be an injustice to us if someone wanted to impose upon us the empirical Idealism already decried for such a long time which, by assuming the inherent actuality of space, denies, or at least finds doubtful, the existence of extended beings in that space, and admits of no adequately proven distinction between dream and truth.

2.2 Concerning the appearances of the inner sense in time, such a person finds no difficulty with these appearances as actual things, indeed even asserts that this inner experience uniquely and sufficiently proves the actual existence of its object (on its own, with all this determination of time).

3.1 On the other hand, our transcendental Idealism grants that the objects of outer perspective, just as they are perspectives in space, are also actual, even as all changes in time are just as actual the inner sense represents them.
3.2 For since space is already a form of that perspective which we term outer, and without objects in that perspective there would be no empirical representation at all, we can and must assume extended beings in that as actual, and just so also it is with time.

3.3 But this space itself and also time and all appearances along with them are still not things on their own, but rather nothing other than representations and cannot exist at all apart from our mind. Even the inner and sensitive perspective of our mind (as object of the consciousness), the determination of which is represented through the succession of diverse states in time, is also not the actual self as its exists on its own nor the transcendental subject, but rather only an appearance which is given to the sensitivity of this being, which is unknown to us.

3.4 The existence of this inner appearance as a thing existing in this way on its own cannot be admitted, because its condition is time, which can be no determination of any sort of thing on its own.

3.5 But in space and time the empirical truth of the appearance is sufficiently secured and adequately distinguished from kinship with a dream, if both cohere properly and thoroughly together according to empirical laws in an experience.

4.1 Accordingly the objects of experience are never given on their own, but rather only in experience, and apart from that do not even exist.

4.2 That there could be inhabitants on the moon, even though no human has ever perceived them, must in any case be admitted, but it means no more than this: that we could come upon them in the possible advance of experience; for everything is actual which stands in a context with a perception according to laws of the empirical advance.

4.3 They are therefore actual if they stand in an empirical association with our actual consciousness, even though they are not for that reason actual on their own, i.e., apart from the advance of experience.
5.1 Nothing is actually given to us except the perception and the empirical advance from this to other possible perceptions.

5.2 For on their own the appearances, as mere representations, are actual only in the perception, which in fact is nothing other than the actuality of an empirical representation, i.e., appearance.

5.3 To term an appearance an actual thing in advance of the perception means either that we would have to come upon such a perception in the advance of experience, or it has no meaning at all.

5.4 For that it exists on its own, without reference to our senses and possible experience, would be said in every case if the discussion were of a thing on its own.

5.5 But the discussion is merely of an appearance in space and time, neither of which is a determination of things on their own, but rather only of our sensitivity. Hence that, which is in them (appearances), are not something on their own, but rather mere representations which, if they are not given in us (in the perception), are not encountered anywhere at all.

6.1 The sensitive perspective capacity is actually only a receptivity to be affected in a certain way with representations, the relationship of which to each other is a pure perspective of space and time (which are nothing other than forms of our sensitivity) and which, to the extent they are connected and determinable in this relationship (in space and time) according to laws of the unity of experience, are called objects.

6.2 The non-sensitive cause of these representations is entirely unknown to us. Hence we cannot look at this as an object; for such an object would not be represented in either space or time (as mere conditions of the sensitive representation), without which condition we can think no perspective at all.

6.3 Nevertheless we can term the merely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, in order that we have a something which corresponds to the sensitivity as a receptivity.

6.4 To this transcendental object we can ascribe all scope and cohesion of our possible perceptions and say that it is given on its own before all experience.
6.5 But the appearances conformable to that transcendental object are not given on their own, but rather only in this experience, because they are merely representations which indicate an actual object only as perceptions, if namely this perception coheres with all others according to the rules of the unity of experience.

6.6 So we can say that the actual things of the past time are given in the transcendental object of experience, but they are for me only objects and actual in the past time to the extent I represent to myself that a regressive series of possible perceptions (be it on the guides of history or per the course of cause and effect) leads according to empirical laws. In brief: the world course runs to an elapsed time series as condition of the present time, which then still is represented as actual only in the coherence of a possible experience and not on its own, such that all events elapsed since the unthinkable time before my existence to now still mean nothing else than the possibility of the extension of the chain of experience from the present perception backwards to the conditions which determine this according to time.

7.1 Accordingly if I represent to myself all existing objects of the senses all together in all times and all spaces, I do not place such objects into both (i.e., times and spaces) before the experience, but rather this representation is nothing other than the thought of a possible experience in its absolute completion.

7.2 In it alone are those objects given (which are nothing but representations).

7.3 But when we say “they exist before all my experience,” this only means that they are to be encountered in that part of the experience, to which I, commencing with the perception, must first advance.

7.4 The cause of the empirical conditions of this advance, thus to which members or even how far I am to meet with such in the regression, is transcendental and hence necessarily unknown to me.

7.5 But there is also no concern about this cause, but rather only about the rule of the advance of the experience in which the objects, namely appearances, are given.
7.6 In the end it is also all the same whether I say: “I am able to come upon stars in the empirical advance which are a hundred times more remote than the most extreme which I see;” or whether I say: “there are perhaps such to be encountered in the world space even if a human has never perceived them or ever will;” for even if they were given in general, as things on their own without reference to possible experience, they are still nothing for me, thus not objects, except to the extent they are contained in the series of the empirical regression.

7.7 Only in a referral in another way, if just these appearances are supposed to be used for the cosmological Idea of an absolute whole, and if it therefore is concerned about a question which goes back beyond the limits of a possible experience, is the distinction of the way in which we take the actuality of thought objects of the senses of importance in order to prevent a deceptive illusion which must unavoidably arise out of the misinterpretation of our own experience concepts.
Concerning The Antinomy Of Pure Reason

7th Section - Critical Resolution of the Cosmological Conflict of Reason with Itself

1.1 The entire antinomy of pure reason rests upon the dialectic argument that if the conditioned is given, then the entire series of all conditions of that conditioned is also given; and since objects of the senses are given to us as conditioned, it follows, etc.

1.2 Through this syllogism, the premise of which seems so natural and illuminating, just as many cosmological Ideas, with respect to the diversity of the conditions (in the synthesis of the appearance), to the extent they make up a series, are introduced, which Ideas postulate the absolute totality of these series and precisely in that way puts reason unavoidably into conflict with itself.

1.3 But before we uncover the deception of this pseudo-rational argument, we must through correction and determination position to it certain concepts arising from that.

2.1 First the following proposition is clear and indubitably certain: “if the conditioned is given, a regression in the series of all conditions to that is for that very reason set up in that way.” For this concept of the conditioned always entails that, in this way, something is referred to a condition and, if this in turn is conditioned, to a more remote condition and so through all members of the series.

2.2 This proposition therefore is analytical and elevated beyond all fear of a transcendental critique.

2.3 It is a logical postulate of reason: “to pursue through the understanding and to advance as far as possible that connection of a concept with its conditions, which connection adheres already to the concept itself.”

3.1 Furthermore: “if the conditioned as well as its condition are things on their own, then if the first is given, not only is the regression set up to the second, but this is actually already given along with the conditioned.” And because this holds for all members of the series, the complete series of the condi-
tions, thus also the unconditioned, is simultaneously given in that; or far rather it is presupposed that the conditioned, which was possible only through that series, is given.

3.2 Here the synthesis of the conditioned with its condition is a synthesis of the mere understanding, which represents the things as they are, without attending to whether and how we can achieve to knowledge with them.

3.3 On the other hand, if I am dealing with appearances which, as mere representations, are not given at all except I become familiar with them (i.e., with them themselves, for they are nothing apart from empirical knowledge), then I cannot say in just this meaning that “if the conditioned is given, then also are all conditions (as appearances) given to that,” and thus in no way can I infer to the absolute totality of that series.

3.4 For the appearances in the apprehension are themselves nothing other than an empirical synthesis (in space and time) and therefore are given only in this synthesis.

3.5 Now it does not follow at all that if the conditioned (in the appearance) is given, then also the synthesis, which makes up its empirical condition, is given along and is presupposed by that, but rather this first takes place in the regression and never without it.

3.6 But we can surely say in such a case that a regression to the conditions, i.e., an advanced empirical synthesis, is offered or conceded on this side, and that it cannot be lacking in conditions which are given through this regression.

4.1 From this it becomes clear that the premise of the cosmological, rational inference takes the conditioned in the transcendental meaning of a pure category, but the minor proposition in the empirical meaning of an understanding concept applied to mere appearances, consequently that a dialectic deception is encountered here which we term *sophisma figurae dictonis* (a play on words).

4.2 But this deception is not feigned, but rather is an entirely natural illusion of common reason.
4.3 For through that, unexamined as it were, we presuppose (in the premise) the conditions and their series if something is given as conditioned, because this is nothing other than the logical requirement to assume complete premises to a given conclusion, and in the connection of the conditioned with its condition no time order is to be encountered; they are presupposed on their own as simultaneously given.

4.4 Furthermore it is just as natural (in the minor proposition) to consider appearances as things on their own, and objects given just as well to the mere understanding as happened in the premise. This is natural because I abstract from all conditions of the perspective, under which alone objects can be given.

4.5 But now with this we have overlooked a notable distinction between the concepts.

4.6 The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition, and the entire series of the latter (in the premise) entails nothing at all of limitation through time and no concept of succession.

4.7 On the other hand, the empirical synthesis and the series of conditions in the appearance (which is subsumed in the minor proposition) is given necessarily successively and only in time after one another. As a result I could not here presuppose the absolute totality of the synthesis and the series represented by that as I can do with the premise, because with the premise all members of the series are given on their own (without any condition of time), but here in the minor proposition they are possible only through the successive regression which is given only by our actually completing it.

5.1 After the conviction of such a false step of the argument laid communally as basis (the cosmological assertions), both conflicting parties, as such which base their requirement on no established title, can be rightly rejected.

5.2 But in doing this their dissension is not yet ended to the extent that they were convinced that they, or one of the two, were incorrect in the matter itself, which he (one of the two) asserts (in the conclusion), even if he did not know to build on sound foundations of proof.
5.3 Still nothing seems clearer than that of the two--one asserting that the world has a beginning and the other that the world has no beginning but rather has been for eternity--one would still have to be correct.

5.4 But if this is so, still, because the clarity is equal on both sides, it is still impossible to ever work out which side is the correct one, and the dispute continues unabatedly as before, even if the parties are directed to silence at the courthouse of reason.

5.5 There remains no means therefore to thoroughly end the dispute and to the satisfaction of both parties except by them becoming finally convinced, since they can still refute each other so very well, that they dispute about nothing, and that a certain transcendental illusion has given them the impression here of an actuality where none is to be encountered.

5.6 This way of settlement of an inherently indecisive dispute, we now want to take.

*     *     *

6.1 The eleatic Zeno, a subtle master of the dialectic, was already blamed by Plato as a mischievous sophist because, in order to show his art, he sought first to prove the identical proposition through apparent arguments and then to topple it through others just as strong.

6.2 He asserted that God (probably this was with him nothing except the world) is neither finite nor infinite, neither in motion nor at rest, neither similar nor dissimilar to something else.

6.3 It seemed to those who judged about this, that he wanted to deny entirely two self-contradicting propositions, which is absurd.

6.4 But I do not find that this charge can properly be laid to him.

6.5 The first of these propositions I will soon examine closer.

6.6 Concerning the others, if with “God” he meant the universe, then he had to say in any case that this is neither continuously present in its place (at rest), nor alters the place (moves) because all places are in the universe, therefore this itself, is in no place.
6.7 If the universe encompasses within itself everything which exists, then it is also to this extent neither similar nor dissimilar to any other thing, because apart from it there is no other thing with which it could be compared.

6.8 If two judgments, set contrarily opposed to one another, presuppose a prohibited condition, then notwithstanding their conflict (which in any case is no actual contradiction), both together come to nothing because the condition, under which alone each of these propositions was supposed to hold, comes to naught.

7.1 If someone said of any body that “it either smells good or it smells bad,” a third position takes place, namely that “it does not smell at all” (is without odor) and so both conflicting propositions can be false.

7.2 If I say of that body that “it is either fragrant or it is not fragrant” (vel suaveolens vel non suaveolens), then both judgments are contradictorily opposed to one another and only the first is false, but its contradictory opposite, namely “some bodies are not fragrant,” embraces also bodies which do not smell at all.

7.3 In the former opposition (per disparata) the contingent condition of the concept of the body (of the smell) still remained with the conflicting judgment and therefore was not eliminated by this, hence the latter (smells bad) was not the contradictory opposite of the former (smells good).

8.1 If accordingly I say “the world, with respect to space, is either infinite or it is not infinite” (non est infinitus), then if the first proposition is false, its contradictory opposite, i.e., “the world is not infinite,” must be true.

8.2 In this way I would eliminate only an infinite world without assuming the other, namely a finite one.

8.3 But if it read that “the world is either infinite or finite (non-infinite),” then both could be false.

8.4 For then I look upon the world on its own, determined with respect to its magnitude, in that I do not merely eliminate the infinity in the opposite as-
sertion, and with it perhaps its entire isolated existence, but rather I add a
determination to the world as a thing actual on its own, which can just as
well be false, namely if the world were not supposed to be given at all as a
thing on its own, thus also not according to its magnitude, neither as infinite
nor as finite.

8.5 Allow me to term such opposition the dialectical opposition, but that of the
contradiction, the analytical opposition.

8.6 Of two judgments dialectically opposed to one another therefore both to-
gether can be false because the one does not merely contradict the other, but
rather says something more than is required for contradiction.

9.1 If we consider the two propositions: “the world is infinite with respect to its
magnitude,” and: “the world is finite with respect to its magnitude,” as con-
tradictorily opposed to one another, then we assume that the world (the en-
tire series of the appearance) is a thing on its own.

9.2 For it remains even though I may eliminate the infinite or finite regression in
the series of its appearances.

9.3 But if I remove this presupposition, or this transcendental semblance, and
deny it to be a thing on its own, then the contradictory conflict of both asser-
tions changes into a merely dialectic one, and because the world does not ex-
ist on its own at all (independently of the regressive series of my representa-
tions), it exists neither as an on-its-own infinite, nor as an on-its-own finite
whole.

9.4 It is to be encountered only in the empirical regression of the series of the
appearances, and not at all of itself.

9.5 Hence if this is always conditioned, then it is never entirely given and there-
fore the world is not an unconditioned whole and therefore does not exist as
such with either infinite nor finite magnitude.

10.1 What was said here of the first cosmological Idea, namely of the absolute
totality of the magnitude in the appearances, holds also for the remaining
ones.
10.2 The series of the conditions is to be encountered only in the regressive synthesis itself, but not on its own in the appearance as an inherent thing given before all regression.

10.3 Hence I will also have to say that “the multitude of the parts in a given appearance is on its own neither finite nor infinite,” because an appearance is nothing existing on its own, and the parts are first given through the regression of the composing synthesis and in that where a regression is never given utterly whole, neither as infinite nor as finite.

10.4 Precisely the same holds of the series of the causes arranged among one another, or of the conditioned existence up to the unconditionally necessary existence, which, with respect to its totality, can never be considered as finite nor as infinite, because as a series of subordinated representations it exists only in the dynamic regression, but cannot exist on its own at all before that regression and as a for-itself-existing series of things.

11.1 So accordingly the antinomy of pure reason is removed by its cosmological Ideas showing that the antinomy is merely dialectic and a conflict of a semblance, which arises by our having applied the Idea of an absolute totality, which holds only as a condition of the things on their own, to appearances, which exist only in the representation and, if they make up a series, then in the successive regression, but otherwise not at all.

11.2 But turned about we can also draw out of this antinomy a true, though indeed not a dogmatic, but still a critical and doctrinal utility, namely to prove indirectly the transcendental Ideality of the appearances in this way even if we might not have accomplished enough with the direct proof in the Transcendental Aesthetic.

11.3 The proof would consist in this dilemma.

11.4 If the world is a whole existing on its own, then it is either finite or infinite.

11.5 Now the first as well as the second is false (per the above cited proof of the antithesis on the one side, and of the thesis on the other).
11.6 Therefore it is also false that the world (the sum-total of all appearances) is a whole existing on its own.

11.7 From this then it follows that all appearances in general are nothing apart from our representations, which is precisely what we wanted to say through the transcendental Ideality of the appearances.

12.1 The remark is of importance.

12.2 We see from this that the above proofs of the fourfold antinomy were not illusions, but thoroughly sound, namely under the presupposition that appearances of a sense world, which comprehends them all together within itself, were things on their own.

12.3 But the conflict of the propositions drawn from that uncovers a falsehood lying in the presupposition and brings us in that way to a discovery of the true composition of things as objects of the senses.

12.4 In no way therefore does the transcendental dialect promote skepticism, though indeed it furthers the skeptical method, which can exhibit with it an example of its great utility if we let the arguments of reason appear against one another in their greatest freedom, which, although they ultimately will not supply that which was sought, still always will supply something useful and serviceable to the rectification of our judgment.
Concerning The Antinomy Of Pure Reason

8th Section - Regulative Principle of Pure Reason
with respect to the Cosmological Ideas

1.1 Since through the cosmological principle of the totality no maximum of the series of conditions is given in a sense world as a thing on its own, but rather can be proposed merely in the regression of that series, the cited proposition of pure reason, rectified in its meaning in this way, retains yet its good validity, not indeed as an axiom for thinking the totality in the object as actual, but rather as a problem for the understanding, and therefore for the subject, in employing and ordering the regression in the series of the conditions to a given conditioned commensurate with the completion in the Idea.

1.2 For in the sensitivity, i.e., in space and time, every condition to which we can attain in the exposition of given appearances, is conditioned in turn because these are not objects on their own, on which in every case the utterly unconditioned could take place, but rather merely empirical representations which must always find their condition in the perspective which determines them with respect to space or time.

1.3 The principle of reason therefore is really only a rule which commands a regression in the series of the conditions of given appearances, to which it is never allowed to stop at an utterly unconditioned.

1.4 Therefore it is not a principle of the possibility of experience and of the empirical recognition of the objects of the senses, thus not a principle of the understanding, for every experience is enclosed within its limits (commensurate to the given perspective). It is also not a constitutive principle of reason for expanding the concept of the sense world out beyond all possible experience, but rather a principle of the greatest possible advance and expansion of experience, according to which no empirical limit must hold for an absolute limit. It is therefore a principle of reason which, as a rule, postulates what is supposed to happen by us in the regression and does not anticipate what is given in the object on its own before every regression.

1.5 Hence I term it a regulative principle since, on the other hand, the principle of the absolute totality of the series of the conditions, as given in the object (the appearance) on its own, would be a constitutive cosmological principle, whose inanity I have wanted to indicate and prevent through just this distinc-
tion by our not imputing objective reality to an Idea which serves merely as a rule as otherwise unavoidably occurs (through transcendental subreption).

2.1 Now in order to properly determine the sense of this rule of pure reason, we are to note first that it is not able to say what the object is, but rather how the empirical regression is to be employed in order to achieve to the most complete concept of the object.

2.2 For if the former took place, it would be a constitutive principle, the likes of which is never possible from pure reason.

2.3 In no way therefore can we have the intention of saying with this that the series of the conditions to a given conditioned be finite or infinite on its own; for in that way a mere Idea of the absolute totality, which is created solely within itself, would think an object which can be given in no experience, in that an objective reality, independent of the empirical synthesis, would be imparted to a series of appearances.

2.4 Accordingly then the rational Idea will also prescribe a rule only for the regressive synthesis in the series of the conditions, according to which, by means of conditions all subordinated to one another, it advances from the conditioned to the unconditioned, even though this unconditioned is never reached.

2.5 For the utterly unconditioned is not encountered in experience at all.

3.1 Now to this end, the synthesis of a series, to the extent it is never complete, is first to be determined precisely.

3.2 In this intention we usually avail ourselves of two expressions which are supposed to distinguish something in that, but still without us knowing how to properly render the basis of this distinction.

3.3 The mathematicians speak solely of a progression *in infinitum*.

3.4 In place of that expression examiners of the concept (philosophers) want to allow only the expression of a progression *in indefinitum* to hold.
3.5 Without pausing with an examination of the consideration which has commended such a distinction to these, and their good or fruitless usage, I will seek to determine these concepts precisely in reference to my intention.

4.1 We can properly say of a straight line, “it can be lengthened infinitely” and here the distinction of the infinite and the undeterminable vast advance (*progressus in indefinitum*) would be an empty subtlety.

4.2 For although, if we said, “produce a line,” it of course sounds more correct if we add to that, “*in indefinitum*” instead of “*in infinitum*”; because the first means nothing more than “lengthen it as far as you wish” while the second means “you are never to cease lengthening it” (which is simply not the intention with this), so still, if the discussion is only of ability, the first expression is entirely proper; for you could always make it greater to infinity.

4.3 And so it also stands in all cases where we speak only of the progression, i.e., the advance from the condition to the conditioned. For this possible advance in the series of the appearances goes to infinity.

4.4 From a set of parents you could advance the generation in a descending line without end, and also easily think to yourself that it actually so advances in the world.

4.5 For here reason never has need of absolute totality of the series because it does not presuppose such as a condition and as a given (datum), but rather only as something conditioned, which is only supposed (*dabile*) and is added without end.

5.1 There is an entirely different kinship with the task of how far the regression reaches which ascends from the given conditioned to the conditions in a series, whether I am able to say, “it is a regression into infinity” or only “a regression reaching indeterminably far (*in indefinitum*)” and therefore whether I am able to climb upwards from the now living people in the series of their forbearers into infinity, or whether it can only be said that as far as I also have gone back, an empirical basis is never encountered for stopping the series anywhere as though it were limited, so that I am justified, and simultaneously bound, to seek yet further the ancestors for every forefather, although not at all to presuppose them.
6.1 I say accordingly, “if the whole is given in the empirical perspective, then the regression in the series of its inner conditions goes to infinity.”

6.2 However, if only a member of the series is given, from which the regression is first supposed to advance to the absolute totality, then only a regression to an undermined extent takes place (in indefinitum).

6.3 So must it be said of the division of a material given between its limits (of a body), “it goes to infinity.”

6.4 For this material is entirely given in the empirical perspective, consequently with all its possible parts.

6.5 Now since the condition of this whole is its part, and the condition of this part the part of the part, etc., and in this regression of the decomposition an unconditioned (indivisible) member of this series of conditions is never encountered, so not only is nowhere an empirical basis given for cessation in the division, but rather the further members of the advancing division are empirically given even before this continuing division, i.e., the division goes into infinity.

6.6 On the other hand, the series of the forebears of a given person in its absolute totality is given in no possible experience, but the regression still goes from each member of this generation to a higher one, such that no empirical limit is to be encountered which presents a member as utterly unconditioned.

6.7 But since nonetheless also the members which could render the condition for this do not already lie in the empirical perspective of the whole before the regression, this does not go into infinity (of the division of the given), but rather to an undeterminable extent, to the quest for members to the given ones, which in turn are always given only conditioned.

7.1 In neither of the two cases, the regression in infinitum as well as that in indefinitum, is the series of the conditions viewed as given infinitely in the object.
7.2 They are not things which are given on their own, but rather only appearances which, as conditions of one another, are given only in the regression itself.

7.3 The question therefore no longer concerns how large this series of the conditions is on its own, whether finite or infinite, for it is nothing on its own. Rather the question is how are we to employ the empirical regression and how far are we supposed to advance it.

7.4 And here then is a noteworthy distinction with respect to the rule of this advance.

7.5 If the whole is empirically given, it is possible to go back infinitely in the series of its inner conditions.

7.6 But if that is not given, but rather is supposed to be given first through an empirical regression, then I can only say that it is infinitely possible to go up to yet higher conditions of the series.

7.7 In the first case I was able to say: “there are always more members which are empirically given than I reach through the regression (of the decomposition);” but in the second: “I can go yet always further in the regression because no member is empirically given as utterly unconditioned and therefore there is always permitted yet a higher member as possible and thus a demand for such is necessary.”

7.8 In the first case it was necessary to encounter more members of the series, but in the second it is always necessary to ask for more, because no experience is limiting absolutely.

7.9 For you have either no perception which utterly limits your empirical regression, and then you would have to hold your regression as not completed; or you have such a perception limiting your series, and so this cannot be a part of your traversed series (because that, which limits, must be distinguished from that, which is limited by the former) and therefore you would have to advance your regression further also to this condition, and so forth.

8.1 The following section will place this remark in an appropriate light through its application.
Concerning The Antinomy Of Pure Reason

9th Section - The Empirical Usage of the Regulative Principle of Reason with Respect to all Cosmological Ideas.

1.1 Since, as we have frequently shown, there is no transcendental use of pure understanding concepts any more than of concepts of reason, because the absolute totality of the series of the conditions in the sense world stands solely upon a transcendental usage of reason which requires this unconditioned completion of what it is presupposing as a thing on its own; and yet since the sense world does not contain any such thing, it follows that the discussion can never again be of the absolute magnitude of the series in that, as to whether it may be limited or unlimited on its own, but rather only of how far we are supposed to go back in the empirical regression for the reduction of the experience to its conditions in order, in accordance with the rule of reason, to stop with no other answer to the question of that series than one commensurate with the object.

2.1 Therefore it is only the validity of the rational principle, as a rule of the advancement and magnitude of a possible experience, which alone remains for us after its invalidity, as a constitutive principle of the appearances on their own, was adequately presented.

2.2 Also, if that can be established beyond doubt, the conflict of reason with itself will completely cease, in that not only will the semblance, which splits it in two, be canceled through a critical solution, but rather in the place of that the sense, in which it accords with itself and the misinterpretation of which alone occasions the conflict, is exposed and an otherwise dialectical principle is changed into a doctrinal one.

2.3 In fact, if this, according to its subjective meaning, can be preserved for determining the greatest possible understanding usage in experience commensurate to the object of the series, then it is just the same as though it, like an axiom (which is impossible from pure reason), determined a priori the objects on their own, for this also, with respect to the objects of experience, could have no greater influence on the expansion and rectification of our recognition than proving itself active in the most expanded, experiential usage of our understanding.
I. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas of the Totality of the Assemblage of the Appearances into a World Whole

1.1 Here, as well as with the remaining cosmological questions, lies the basis of the regulative principle of reason, that in the empirical regression no experience of an absolute limit, thus of no condition except one which is utterly unconditioned empirically, can be encountered.

1.2 But the basis of that is this: such an experience would have to contain within itself a limitation of the appearances through nothing, i.e., the void, against which the advanced regression could touch by means of a perception, which is impossible.

2.1 Now this proposition, which says just as much as: “in the empirical regression I always achieve only to a condition which itself in turn must be viewed as empirically conditioned,” contains the rule in terminus that even as far as I may have come with that in the ascending series, I would have to ask every time about a higher member of the series, be this known to me through experience or not.

3.1 Nothing further is necessary for the solution of the first cosmological task than to determine whether in the regression to the unconditioned magnitude of the world whole (with respect to space and time) this never limited ascension is able to be called a regression to infinity, or only an undeterminably advanced regression (in indefinitum).

4.1 The mere universal representation of the series of all elapsed world states, likewise of the things which are in the world space simultaneously, is itself nothing other than a possible empirical regression which I think to myself, although as yet undetermined, and by means of which the concept of such a series of conditions to the given perception alone can originate.*

4.2 Now I have the world whole every time only in the concept, and by no means (as a whole) in the perspective.
4.3 Accordingly I cannot infer from its magnitude to the magnitude of the regression and determine this commensurate to that, but rather I must first make myself a concept of the world magnitude through the magnitude of the empirical regression.

4.4 But of this I never know anything more than I would always have to advance empirically from that given member of the series of conditions to a yet higher (more remote) member.

4.5 The magnitude of the whole of the appearances therefore is not utterly determined in that way at all. Thus also we cannot say that this regression goes to infinity, because this would anticipate the members to which the regression has not yet achieved, and would represent their count as so great that no empirical synthesis could achieve to that, and consequently would determine the world magnitude before the regression (even if only negatively), which is impossible.

4.6 For this is given to me through no perspective at all (with respect to its totality), thus also not its magnitude before the regression.

4.7 Accordingly we can say nothing at all of the world magnitude on its own, also not even that the regression takes place in it \textit{in infinitum}, but rather must seek the concept of its magnitude only according to the rule which determines the empirical regression in it.

4.8 But this rule says nothing more than “we are never to assume an absolute limit, no matter how far we may have come in the series of the empirical conditions.” Instead we must subordinate every appearance, as conditioned, to another, as its condition, and so we must advance further to this latter, which is the regression \textit{in indefinitum} which, because it determines no magnitude in the object, is to be distinguished clearly enough from that \textit{in infinitum}.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 This world series therefore can also be neither greater nor smaller than the possible empirical regression on which alone its concept rests.

1.2 And since this can provide no determined infinite, but also just as little a determined finite (utterly limited), it is clear from this that we can assume the world magnitude neither as finite nor as infinite, because the regression (by which that is represented) allows neither of the two.
5.1 Accordingly I cannot say, “the world is infinite with respect to the elapsed time or space.”

5.2 For such a concept of magnitude, as a given infinity, is empirical, thus also utterly impossible with respect to the world as an object of the senses.

5.3 I will also not say “the regression from a given perception to all that, which limits this in space as well as in the elapsed time in a series, goes to the infinite,” for this presupposes the infinite world magnitude; also not, “it is finite,” for the absolute limit is likewise empirically impossible.

5.4 Accordingly I will be able to say nothing of the whole object of experience (of the sense world), but rather only of the rule according to which experience, commensurate to its object, is supposed to be employed and advanced.

6.1 Therefore the first and negative answer to the cosmological question about the magnitude of the universe is this: the world has no first beginning with respect to time and no extreme boundary with respect to space.

7.1 For in the contrarily opposed case, it would be bounded through empty time on one side, and through empty space on the other.

7.2 Now since it, as appearance, can be neither of the two on its own, for appearance is nothing on its own, a perception of the bounds would have to be possible through utterly empty time or empty space, through which these world ends were given in a possible experience.

7.3 But such an experience, as completely empty in content, is impossible.

7.4 Therefore an absolute world limit is empirical, thus also utterly impossible.*

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 We may note that here the proof is conducted in an entirely different manner from the dogmatic one above in the antithesis of the first antinomy.
1.2 There we had allowed the sense world, according to the common and dogmatic representational manner, to hold for a thing which was given on its own with respect to its totality before any regression, and had denied to it, if it did not occupy every time and all spaces, any sort of a determined position in both of these whatsoever.

1.3 Hence the conclusion was also otherwise than here, namely it was inferred to the actual infinity of that.

8.1 From here there follows simultaneously the affirming answer: “the regression in the series of the world appearances, as a determination for the world magnitude, goes on in indefinitum,” which says just as much as: “the sense world has no absolute magnitude, but rather the empirical regression (whereby alone it can be given on the side of its conditions) has its rule, namely from each and every member of the series, as a conditioned, to progress every time to a yet more remote one (be it through personal experience, or the guides of history, or the chain of the effects and their causes), and never to exempt ourselves from the extension of the possible empirical usage of our understanding, which then also is the proper and single occupation of reason with its principles.”

9.1 A determined empirical regression, which unceasingly advanced in a certain manner from appearances, is not in this way proscribed, that, e.g., from a living person we would always have to ascend upwards in a series of the ancestors without expecting a first couple, or in the series of world bodies without admitting an extreme sun. In contrast here only the advance from appearance to appearance is commanded, even should these render no actual perception (if it is too weak with respect to degree for our consciousness, in order to become experience), because it, regardless of that, still belongs to possible experience.

10.1 Every beginning is in time, and every boundary of extension is in space.

10.2 But space and time are only in the sense world.

10.3 Thus only appearances are in the world conditionally speaking, but in the world itself are neither conditions nor bounds in an unconditioned manner.
11.1 Just for that reason, and since the world, and likewise even the series of the conditions to a given conditioned, as a world series, can never be given entirely, the concept of the world magnitude is given only through the regression, and not before that in a collective perspective.

11.2 But the series of the conditions consists always only in the determining of the size, and therefore gives no determined concept, therefore also no concept of a magnitude which were infinite with respect to a certain measure, therefore does not go to infinity (given, as it were), but rather in an undetermined expansion in order to give a magnitude (of experience) which first is actual through this regression.
II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division of a Given Whole in the perspective

1.1 If I divide a whole, which is given in the perspective, I go from a conditioned to the conditions of its possibility.

1.2 The division of the parts (subdiviso or decompositio) is a regression in the series of these conditions.

1.3 The absolute totality of this series would then be given only if the regression could achieve to simple parts.

1.4 But all parts in a continuously advancing decomposition are always in turn divisible, so the division, i.e., the regression, goes from the conditioned to its conditions in infinitum because the conditions (the parts) are contained in the conditioned itself and, since this conditioned is given entirely in a perspective included between its boundaries, they are also given all together at the same time.

1.5 The regression therefore may not be termed merely a regression in indefinitum as the previous cosmological Idea alone allowed, since there I was supposed to advance from the conditioned to its conditions, which were apart from that, hence were not given simultaneously with that, but which first came additively in the empirical regression.

1.6 Disregarding this, it is still not allowed to say of such a whole, which is infinitely divisible, “it consists of infinitely many parts.”

1.7 For although all parts are contained in the perspective of the whole, still the entire division is not contained in that, which consists only in the advancing decomposition or the regression itself which first makes the series actual.

1.8 Now since this regression is infinite, all members (parts), to which it reaches, are indeed contained in the given whole as an aggregate, but not the entire series of the division, which is successively infinite and never whole, consequently can present no infinite multitude and no composition of that in a whole.

2.1 This universal reminder permits first of a very easy application to space.
2.2 Each and every space viewed within its boundaries is such a whole, the parts of which are always in turn spaces with every decomposition, and hence is infinitely divisible.

3.1 From this there also follows quite naturally the second application to an outer appearance enclosed within its boundaries (bodies).

3.2 The divisibility of this is based upon the divisibility of space, which makes up the possibility of a body as an extended whole.

3.3 This is therefore infinitely divisible without for that reason consisting of infinitely many parts.

4.1 It seems indeed that since a body must be represented in space as substance, then, concerning the law of the divisibility of space, the body will in this way be distinguished from space; for we can in any case easily admit that the decomposition in space is never able to remove all assemblage, because then even every space, which otherwise has nothing self-sustaining, would cease (which is impossible). But the notion that the elimination of all assemblage of the material in thought, such that nothing at all were to remain, seems incompatible with the concept of a substance, which actually was supposed to be the subject of all assemblage and which would have to remain in its elements even if the connection of the substance in space, whereby it makes up a body, were eliminated.

4.2 However with that, which in the appearance is called substance, it is not so related as some would likely think of a thing on its own through pure concepts of understanding.

4.3 The substance is not an absolute subject, but rather an enduring picture of the sensitivity and nothing except perspective, in which everywhere nothing unconditioned is encountered.

5.1 But although this rule of the infinite advance doubtlessly takes place with the subdivision of an appearance, as a mere filling of space, still it cannot hold if we also want to stretch it to the quantity of the parts already isolated
in a certain way in the given whole, by means of which this makes up a *quantum discretum* (discrete quantity).

5.2 Assuming that every part in each segmented (organized) whole were segmented in turn, and that in such a way, with the infinite dissection of the parts, we always encountered new articulations, in a word, that the whole were infinitely segmented, this would not at all permit of being thought, although indeed we could think that the parts of the material, with its infinite decomposition, could be segmented.

5.3 For the infinity of this division of a given appearance in space is based solely on this, that by means of this merely the divisibility, i.e., a quantity of parts and utterly undetermined on their own, is given, being given through this, but the parts themselves are given and determined only through the subdivision, in short, the whole is not already divided on its own.

5.4 Hence the division can determine a multitude in the whole, which goes as far as we wish to advance in the regression of the division.

5.5 On the other hand, with an organized and infinitely segmented body, the whole is already represented through this very concept as divided, and a multitude of the parts, determined on its own but infinite, is encountered in the multitude before all regression of the division, whereby we contradict ourselves in that this infinite development is viewed as a never-to-be-completed series (infinite) and still nonetheless as completed in a collection.

5.6 The infinite division indicates only the appearance as *quantum continuum* and is inseparable from the filling of space, because it is precisely in space that the basis of the infinite divisibility lies.

5.7 But as soon as something is assumed as *quantum discretum*, the multitude of the units is determined in that, hence also always equal to a number.

5.8 How far then the organization may go in a segmented body, only experience can make out, and even if it achieved with certitude to no unorganized part, still such must at least lie in the possible experience.

5.9 But how far the transcendental division of an appearance in general would reach, is not a matter of experience at all, but rather a principle of reason.
never to hold the empirical regression in the decomposition of the extended, conformable to the nature of the appearances, as utterly completed.

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Concluding Remark to the Solution of the Mathematical Transcendental Ideas and Preceding Reminder to the Solution of the Dynamic Transcendental Ideas.

1.1 When we represented the antinomy of pure reason through all transcendental Ideas in a table, since we indicated the basis of this conflict and the single means of settling it, consisting of both contrarily opposed assertions being explained as false, we represented in every case the conditions as belonging to their conditioned according to relationships of space and time, which is the usual presupposition of common human understanding, and it was upon that presupposition that the conflict was entirely based.

1.2 In this regard, all dialectic representations of the totality in the series of the conditions to a given conditioned were entirely of the same type.

1.3 It was always a series, in which, as members of the series, the condition was connected to the conditioned, and in that way the condition was homogeneous with the conditioned, as then the regression would have to be thought as never completed or, if this should happen, a conditioned member on its own would have to be falsely assumed as a first one, thus as unconditioned.

1.4 Therefore the object, i.e., the conditioned, was indeed not considered everywhere, but still the series of the conditions to that conditioned was considered merely according to its magnitude, and there the difficulty, which could be settled through no comparison, but rather alone through the entire removal of the knot, consisted in reason making it either too long or too short for the understanding such that the understanding could never be equal to the Idea of reason.

2.1 But with this we have overlooked an essential distinction which rules among the objects, i.e., the understanding concepts, which reason strives to elevate to Ideas, since namely, according to our above table of the categories, two of these signify a mathematical, but the remaining two a dynamic, synthesis of the appearances.

2.2 Until now, remaining as we always have under conditions in the appearance alone in the universal representation of all transcendental Ideas, this could also quite easily happen as we had no other object in the two mathematical transcendental Ideas except the object in the appearance.
2.3 But now, since we advance to dynamic concepts of the understanding, to the extent they are supposed to be adaptable to the rational Idea, that distinction becomes important and opens up an entirely new prospect with respect to the conflicting action in which reason is entailed and which, since it was dismissed in advance as built upon false presuppositions on both sides, now, since perhaps in the dynamic antinomy such a presupposition takes place which from this viewpoint can exist together with the pretension of reason, and since the judge supplements the lack of legal foundations, which one has mistaken on both sides, satisfaction to both sides can be compared, which was not permitted with the conflict in the mathematical antinomy.

3.1 The series of the conditions are all homogeneous, of course, to the extent that we look solely to the prolongation of the series: whether they are commensurate to the Idea or whether they are too large or too small for that.

3.2 But the understanding concept, which lies as foundation to these Ideas, contains either solely a synthesis of the homogeneous (which is presupposed with every magnitude in the assemblage of as well as in the division of that homogeneous) or also of the non-homogeneous, which at least can be admitted in the dynamic synthesis of the causal combination as well as that of the necessary with the contingent.

4.1 Hence it comes about that in the mathematical connection of the series of the appearances no other condition can enter except a sensitive one, i.e., such which itself is a part of the series; for on the other hand, the dynamic series of sensitive conditions still admits yet a non-homogeneous condition which is not a part of the series. Rather, as merely intelligible, it lies apart from the series, whereby then a satisfaction is accomplished for reason, and the un-conditioned is presupposed to the appearances, without confusing the series, which is always conditioned, nor to truncate it which would be contrary to the foundations of the understanding.

5.1 In that way, by the dynamic Ideas admitting a condition of the appearances apart from the series of those appearances, i.e., such a condition which itself is not an appearance, something happens which is entirely distinguished from the success of the antinomy.
5.2 This condition (of the first two antinomies) occasioned, namely, that both dialectic and contrary assertions had to be declared as false.

5.3 In contrast to that the thoroughly conditioned of the dynamic series, which is inseparable from them as appearances, connected with the indeed empirically unconditioned, but still not sensitive, condition, affords satisfaction to the understanding on one side and reason on the other side,* and by the cessation of the dialectic arguments, which sought unconditioned totality in mere appearances in one manner or another, here in contrast both rational propositions, in a meaning rectified in such a way, could be true; which can never take place with the cosmological Ideas concerning the merely mathematically unconditioned unity, because no condition of the series of the appearances was encountered with them except which also itself is appearance and as such makes up a member of the series.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 For among the appearances the understanding admits no condition which itself would be empirically unconditioned.

1.2 But if to a conditioned (in the appearance) an intelligible condition, which did not belong as a member, could be mentioned along in the series of the appearances, but still without in that way occasioning the least interruption to the series of empirical conditions, then such could be admitted as empirically unconditioned, so that no injury would ever happen in that way to the empirically continuous regression.
III. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas of the
Totality of the Derivation of the World Events from their Causes

1.1 Only two types of causality can be conceived with respect to something
which occurs, namely: nature or freedom.

1.2 The first of these involves the connection in the sense world alone of one
state with a preceding one, upon the occurrence of which the subsequent one
takes place in accordance with a rule.

1.3 Now since the causality of appearances depends upon conditions of time, and
since the preceding state, if it had always existed, would not have suddenly
produced an effect commencing in time, it follows that the causality of any-
thing which occurs or comes into being has itself come into being and there-
fore according to principles of understanding, also has need of a cause.

2.1 With freedom in a cosmological sense, on the other hand, I think of a capac-
ity for initiating a state of itself, the causality of which therefore is not in
turn subordinated by the laws of nature to another cause by means of which
it would be determined with respect to time.

2.2 In this sense freedom is a purely transcendental Idea which, in the first place,
contains nothing borrowed from experience and, secondly, the object of
which cannot be given in a determined manner in any experience. For ac-
cording to the universal law of even the possibility of an experience, where
everything that happens would also have to have a cause, the causality of a
cause would also have to happen or arise, and in which way then the entire

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278 See Translator’s Comments in Appendix II.4 beginning on or near page 819.

279 And reason (in the antithesis) will conclude that this chain of causes and effects must extend back in
time without end.

280 Here then we are speaking of a capacity of initiating a thoroughly spontaneous action which is there-
fore entirely independent of any natural cause; and this is the case with the thesis. This is contrary to the
laws of natural causality where every event is an effect of a cause which arises in the previous time. For
according to the antithesis this spontaneous action would have to have a cause, and thus be part of the
chain of causes in nature.
field of experience, reaching out as far as it may, is transformed into a complex of sheer nature.\footnote{This is based on the rule of association with regard to causes where we must seek a cause for every event in order even to recognize and express an event. And this cause itself had to come into being in order for it to be that difference to which the event can be associated and can have arisen. If the cause of the freezing of water, for example, is the cold air, then this coldness must have arisen, for if it had always been, then the water would always have been frozen and would not suddenly have arisen. And since the recognition of any event depends upon this rule of association, it is impossible to find any suggestion of freedom. Accordingly then this Idea of freedom is a pure invention of reason and does not belong to the understanding.}

2.3 But since in this way no absolute totality of the conditions is to be obtained in the causal relationship, reason conceives the Idea of a spontaneity which could begin action on its own without first needing another cause to determine it with respect to the law of the causal connection to action.\footnote{Without this spontaneous and free causality, the chain of causal conditions would regress into infinity. And according to the thesis of this third antinomy, there must be a limit to any such chain, and accordingly there must be an original, spontaneous event which is a cause but which itself has no cause with respect to time in accordance with laws of nature. This then denotes a condition which itself is unconditioned.}

3.1 It is worth noting that the practical concept of freedom depends upon this transcendental Idea of freedom, and it is the latter which constitutes the particular difficulties which questions about the possibility of the former have always entailed.\footnote{This will be made clear in this and the subsequent paragraph.}

3.2 From a practical standpoint freedom denotes an independence of the discretionary choice (\textit{Willkür}) from any necessity through the drives of sensitivity.

3.3 For discretionary choice is sensitive to the extent it is affected pathologically (through motivational causes of the sensitivity). It is termed animal (\textit{arbitrium brutum}) if it can be pathologically necessitated.

3.4 Human discretionary choice is indeed an \textit{arbitrium sensitivum}, though not \textit{brutum}, but rather \textit{liberum}, because sensitivity does not make human actions
necessary, for there is a capacity in the human whereby one is determined of oneself independently of necessitation through sensitive drives.\textsuperscript{284}

4.1 It is easy to see that if all causality in the world of sense were merely nature, then every event would be determined through another event in time and in accordance with necessary laws. In this case then, since appearances, to the extent they determine the discretionary choice, would have to necessitate every action as their natural consequence, it follows that the elimination of transcendental freedom would simultaneously eradicate all practical freedom.\textsuperscript{285}

4.2 For the latter presupposes that even though something did not happen, it still should have happened, and so its cause in the appearance was not so determining that a causality could not exist in our discretionary choice to produce something which were completely independent of that natural cause and even in opposition to its power and influence and hence (there is the assumption that) it could begin a series of events completely of itself.\textsuperscript{286}

5.1 Something occurs here therefore which is encountered generally in the internal conflict of a rationality which dares to go out beyond the limits of possible experience, i.e., the task is not actually physiological, but rather transcendental.\textsuperscript{287}

5.2 Hence while the question about the possibility of freedom is indeed at odds with psychology, its solution is under the purview of the transcendental phi-

\textsuperscript{284} Practical freedom is the capacity of being directed by reason as opposed to the immediate excitement of the senses. For example while I may be hungry and food is available, but unlike the animals I am able to restrain my appetite for a longer range goal, e.g., waiting for a more desirable food later or in order to reduce my weight. Thus reasoning is utilized here to provide a choice between different desires. Transcendental freedom is the capacity of reason to determine the will which excludes all personal desires. It is a function of pure reason, and thus is independent from all empirical considerations.

\textsuperscript{285} If transcendental freedom were impossible, then every event would follow naturally from a preceding cause in the appearances; but then practical freedom would be impossible, for it implies a capacity to disregard the natural causes in the appearances, which is an expression of transcendental freedom.

\textsuperscript{286} If we did not have the capacity to act with absolute spontaneity, i.e., transcendental freedom, then it would hardly be expected that we could act not only independently of the sensitive drives, but even in opposition to them. And so if there is no transcendental freedom, there is no practical freedom.

\textsuperscript{287} So the question is whether it is possible for an action to occur as an event which were spontaneous and thus independent of the laws of nature and of the sequence of the appearances through time.
losophy alone because such a question is based upon dialectic arguments of a pure reason alone.\footnote{The question here is whether a person might ignore all the causation of nature and act entirely independently of that and even in opposition to that, i.e., spontaneously.}

5.3 Now in order to properly orient the transcendental philosophy (which cannot decline a satisfactory answer with regard to this matter), I must first try to determine more closely its procedure with regard to the task by means of a remark.

6.1 If appearances were things on their own, and thus if space and time were forms of the existence of things on their own, then the conditions would always belong with the conditioned as members of one and the same series, and from that situation the antinomy common to all transcendental Ideas would also arise in the present case, namely that this series would inevitably be too large or too small for the understanding.\footnote{It is the general assumption of science that appearances (as objects) are subject to conditions of time (as well as of space), and it is for that reason that science will not be able to brook any freedom whatsoever. And this is the very reason that the dialectic exists, for appearances (summarized and unified in the concept of an object of experience) are thought to be things on their own and therefore subject to conditions of time. And if the series of causal events were without beginning (antithesis), this would be too large for our understanding; but then if the series of these events had a beginning (thesis), this would be too small for the understanding (for then we wonder how this beginning suddenly arose).}

6.2 The dynamic concepts of reason, however, with which we are occupied in this and the following section, are peculiar to the extent that since they are not concerned with an object considered as a quantity, but rather only with its existence, we can also abstract from the size of the series of the conditions and be concerned solely with the dynamic relationship of the condition to the conditioned. In this way the question about nature and freedom addresses the difficulty of whether freedom in general is even possible and, if so, whether it could coexist with the universality of the causal law of nature. Hence the question is whether it is a proper disjunctive proposition that every effect in the world would have to arise either from nature \textit{or} from freedom; or whether both might not take place simultaneously in quite different referrals to the same event.\footnote{So we don't have to be concerned with the formal argument, i.e., whether a series of causes is limited or unlimited, but instead can take up the question more generally, i.e., whether any action whatsoever and at any time is possible which is free and independent of the laws of nature. And since experience requires natural causes, we will wonder if a single event can arise via both natural cause and also freedom.}
6.3 Since the correctness of the basic principle of the thorough cohesion of all events of the sense world according to invariable laws of nature is already firmly established as a principle of the transcendental analytic and admits of no exception,

6.4 the only question remaining is whether in spite of that, freedom might also occur with regard to an effect which is already determined according to nature, or whether this freedom is totally excluded by that inviolable rule.\textsuperscript{291}

6.5 And here the very common, but illusory, assumption of the absolute reality of appearances demonstrates its disadvantageous influence in confusing our reason,

6.6 for if appearances were things on their own, then freedom could not be salvaged;

6.7 for in that case nature would be the complete and all-sufficient determining cause of every event, and the condition of each event would always be contained solely in the series of the appearances which, along with their effects, would necessarily be subject to the laws of nature.\textsuperscript{292}

6.8 If, on the other hand, appearances were not thought to be anything other than what they in fact are, i.e., not things on their own, but rather sheer represen-

\textsuperscript{291} We know from the conditions of experience that every event has a cause. Therefore the question is not either nature or freedom, but only whether freedom could also exist with regard to any event in time, i.e., is it possible that an effect of natural causation could \textit{at the same time} also be an effect of freedom? At first glance this seems contradictory, and it is to a consideration of this question that Kant now turns his attention.

\textsuperscript{292} When Kant speaks of appearances as though they were things on their own, he is referring to the object of experience, which is recognized via a concept by means of which various appearances are unified. This means that the object of experience is itself only a summary of these various appearances, e.g., the tree seen close up and then also far away, and with leaf and also bare, are unified as appearances of one and the same object (the tree) at different times. Essentially then he is saying that if what is revealed in the brainarium, i.e., via the various senses, e.g., touch, sight, smell, warmths, etc., is all there is to reality then indeed the laws of nature would encompass and include all things and there would be no place for anything else, e.g., freedom. See also: the discussion concerning the Possibility of the Combination of Causality through Freedom with Universal Laws of the Necessity of Nature, 3.2, which is presented in the following section.
tations which cohere together according to empirical laws, then they would require foundations which would not be appearances.\textsuperscript{293}

6.9 But such an intelligible cause would not be determined through appearances with respect to its causality, even though its effects would be visible and therefore could be determined by means of other appearances.\textsuperscript{294}

6.10 Hence such an intelligible cause, along with its causality, would be apart from the series of empirical conditions, even though its effects would still be encountered in the series.\textsuperscript{295}

6.11 The effect therefore with respect to its intelligible cause, could be considered as free and yet simultaneously, with respect to the appearances, it would be considered as a consequence of the appearances and as adhering to the necessity of nature; a distinction which, if presented generally and abstractly, must seem extremely subtle and obtuse, but which will become clear in the application.\textsuperscript{296}

6.12 All I wanted to do here was to note that since the thorough cohesion of all appearances in a context of nature is an inviolable law, this would necessar-

\textsuperscript{293} All we know of the thing from the appearances is what can appear within our brainarium and in terms of our senses, e.g., color, warmth. In order to recognize an appearance as such and to distinguish it from real and enduring things, we must conceive of a something which would be the foundation and cause of the appearances, something with which we can contrast the appearances, e.g., Hume’s real table which did not change size and shape as did its image in his eye.

\textsuperscript{294} This intelligible cause would act according to its own principles and could be only occasioned by relevant circumstances. And thus it would be independent of appearances. These principles would be timeless, e.g., tell a lie if and only if it is advantageous, thus not now and then, but at anytime. The effects of this intelligible cause would arise then according to the appearances of the circumstance, e.g., an opportunity to lie with profit, and so as would events in the appearances such that they would be attributed to the circumstances by the sciences. A consideration of the “dark matter” of contemporary physics might be helpful. We cannot discern this dark matter in any way, but we can discern its effects in the world. And it might likewise be that what is seen as a natural event might also be the effect of a capacity, e.g., freedom, which we are not able to discern at all in the brainarium world of sense.

\textsuperscript{295} Here we might consider the earlier example of a tree which acted with spontaneity and only seemed to be a product of nature; it was a coincidence. (This is closely akin to the Leibnizian hypothesis of pre-established harmony amongst freely acting monads.) Suppose the tree just decided, based on some principle or even just “out of the blue”, to put forth leaves in the spring and then to reject them in the fall. Still from the standpoint of nature we would be certain that the tree had to conform to laws of natural causality. And so with one and the same event we would be considering two different causes, one intelligible and the other empirical; the one free and the other natural.

\textsuperscript{296} How can a single event be the effect of two different causes, e.g., natural necessity and also freedom?
ily have to topple all freedom if we wanted to hold unyieldingly to the reality of the appearances.\(^{297}\)

6.13 And this is the reason why those holding that opinion have never succeeded in reconciling nature and freedom.\(^{298}\)

### Possibility of the Combination of Causality through Freedom with Universal Laws of the Necessity of Nature

1.1 Any aspect of an object of the senses which is not appearance, I call intelligible.\(^{299}\)

1.2 Accordingly if that which must be viewed in the sense world as appearance should also have a capacity of its own which were not an object of sensitive perspective but which could still be the cause of appearances, we could consider the causality of this being in two ways.\(^{300}\) On the one hand, with respect to its action as a thing on its own, it would be intelligible; and on the

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\(^{297}\) This echoes the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, A version, Part 2. Sec. 4. Par 6 (See Appendix I.2, beginning on or near page 721) where a transcendental affinity among all appearances is necessarily assumed for the sake of having experience, and so where all appearances are considered as connected, directly or indirectly, via laws of nature. Accordingly if the object of experience (which is a summation and cohesion of the relevant appearances via the concept of the object) were a thing on its own, then it would be impossible to think in terms of two diverse causalities, and in which case natural necessity would always exclude freedom. But since we realize that the appearances are not things on their own, there is a possibility for freedom along with natural necessity.

\(^{298}\) If the object of experience were not simply a summation of the appearances of that object, but were rather a thing on its own, then there would be no place for any intelligible character as a causation of freedom and accordingly no place for any freedom. Or if we wanted to have freedom, we could not assume any universal system of laws of nature, but only occasional laws. The solution here will only be possible by considering the objects of experience as appearances (which is also the fact) and not things on their own, which as things on their own is the traditional (and non-transcendental) consideration, and for which reason it has been previously impossible to reconcile freedom and nature.

\(^{299}\) The color and shape of an object can be sensed and looked at and so are appearance. If there were such a property as freedom, which cannot be sensed or sighted, that would be counted as intelligible. So I can spy the location and shape and color of an object, but not its freedom (assuming there were such a property). And so even if a person were free, I could look at that person forever and still not sense such a property in that person. In a like manner I might assume a property of reading the thoughts of others, but there would be no way for me as a human to sense that, but only to infer it from some appearances.

\(^{300}\) As mentioned in an earlier note, we might take the “dark matter” of current theoretical physics as an analogy of sorts. This dark matter is something which cannot be seen or sensed, but the effects of which are discernible in the appearances, i.e., in the gravitational effect on the visible galaxies. The difference here is that the effects of freedom, if there be such, would fit in with the effects of natural causes and so would not be prominent as the effects of dark matter.
other hand, with respect to the effects of that being as an appearance in the sense world, it would be sensitive.\textsuperscript{301}

1.3 In so doing, we would be making two concepts of the causality of this being, one empirical and one intellectual, both of which would be occurring with the identical effect.\textsuperscript{302}

1.4 Conceiving the capacity of an object of the senses in this dual way does not contradict any of the concepts which we must make about appearances and a possible experience;

1.5 for since appearances are not things on their own, and hence since a transcendental object which determines them (the appearances being mere representations) must undergird them as a foundation, nothing keeps us from attributing to this transcendental object not only the property whereby it appears, but also a causality which is not appearance, even though its effect is still encountered in the appearance.\textsuperscript{303}

1.6 Now every effecting cause must have a character, i.e., a law of its causality, without which it would not be a cause.

1.7 In the first place an empirical character would have to be assigned to some subject of the sense world so that its actions as appearances would be thoroughly integrated with other appearances in accordance with enduring laws of nature and where these other appearances would be the conditions of

\textsuperscript{301} And so far in this treatment this intelligible property is merely something that Kant is dreaming up to see if freedom might at least be compatible with natural necessity. Assuming there were such a property as freedom, a causality which could not appear in any human looking/perspective, the task before us is to determine how such a property could exist simultaneously with those properties of an object which can be sensed and which are always elements of a nature and subject always to the laws of that nature.

\textsuperscript{302} To use the earlier example, a tree might have the property of freedom and would spontaneously decide to produce leaves and then to discard them, and from that standpoint it would only look like it were a function of nature. So far such an assertion would be senseless with regard to trees. But it shows that two causalities could be in play with one and the same event as an effect, and it could be meaningful with regard to rational creatures.

\textsuperscript{303} We must assume a something, the TO=X, in order to derive our perspectives (the appearances) from it so that the appearances are considered as representations and not as things on their own nor existing as they appear to us, e.g., getting smaller at a distance. And when we ascribe these properties of our looking and sensitivity to the object of experience (which is a composite of appearances), that does not mean that we can deny other properties to the thing on its own which simply don’t appear to our senses, e.g., freedom. Again, we are merely fantasizing at this point regarding a property which cannot be discerned through our organs of sense.
these actions such that they (the actions) could be derived from them and which, in connection with them, would make up members of a single series of the natural order.\textsuperscript{304}

1.8 Secondly, we would still have to grant this subject an intelligible character whereby it would be the cause of those actions as appearances, but which did not stand under any condition of sensitivity and would not itself be appearance.\textsuperscript{305}

1.9 The former of these two might also be called the character of such an object in the appearance, and the latter the character of the thing on its own.\textsuperscript{306}

2.1 Now with respect to its intelligible character, this active subject would not be subject to conditions of time, for time is the condition of appearances alone and not of things on their own.\textsuperscript{307}

\textsuperscript{304} We look at the actions as effects and from them we are able to discern the empirical character as the natural causality of the object of experience. In the case of some animal, e.g., a dog, we would understand and recognize its empirical character in its desire for food when hungry and of exerting itself to acquire food by killing some smaller prey. With the human we can take account also of rationality as the human would use rationality in determining his will and ensuing actions.

\textsuperscript{305} We can think of the human as having an intelligible character and endowed with freedom such that the actions as appearances were a free effect and not subject to any preceding appearances. Or thinking of the dog in the previous note, we could just arbitrarily assert that the dog were free (intelligible character) and were not driven to react to its hunger as indicated by its empirical character, and instead followed some principle in eating and so could have refused to eat when hungry, i.e., it acted freely; a rather pointless, but perhaps enlightening, assumption in this case.

\textsuperscript{306} In the first case we are speaking of the object of experience which is subject to laws of nature, and is looked at in the time and space of the brainarium. In the second case we are speaking of the thing on its own with its (alleged) freedom, whereof the object of experience (itself summarizing the various appearances of that object) is an appearance and only represents the thing on its own in the realm of experience, i.e., one and the same event as effects of two different causalities, one freedom of the thing on its own and the other natural of the object of experience (as the appearance of the thing on its own).

\textsuperscript{307} If I have a principle of helping people in need, then that is a principle which is independent of the conditions of time. Now I spy someone in need and act in accordance with my principle. It would seem that the need of that person were the cause of my action; but it is not, rather I am already determined to my actions and utilize the need merely as the opportunity for the application of my predetermined will. A free tree, to use an arbitrary example, might devise a rational principle for action, or just act with absolute spontaneity, in both case independently of the conditions of the appearances. And so the effect of putting forth leaves would arise in time, but would not be caused by the appearances, but only occasioned by them. Thus the effect would not be conditioned by time.
2.2 In it no action would commence or cease. Hence then also it would not be subject to laws of the time determination of everything that is alterable, i.e., where everything which happens encounters its cause in the appearance (of the preceding state).\footnote{The most that would take place would be merely the recognition of a situation to which the principle of action of the intelligible character is applicable. I might have a principle to help someone in trouble, and then go to rescue a drowning person. But the state of drowning would not cause the action, but merely its occasion in time, i.e., occasion it as calling the free principle into play. And so the occasion would arise in time, and would be a function of the appearance, and so the appearance would seem to be the cause in terms of natural laws, but the act would remain free for it would be a determination of the will which is independent of time.}

2.3 In brief then, to the extent this subject were intellectual, its causality would have no place at all in the series of empirical conditions which necessitates events in the sense world.\footnote{While the use of our understanding and reason may be prompted by appearances, the determination and functioning of them are free and not in any way dependent upon them and so there is no conditioning by time.}

2.4 Now this intelligible character could not of course be known immediately (because we can perceive nothing except to the extent it appears), but it would still have to be thought in conformity with the empirical character in just the same way that we must universally ascribe a transcendental object to the appearances in thought, even though, of course, we know nothing at all about what that object might be on its own.\footnote{In a word, while this intelligible character would be free, the effects would still be the same as expected by the empirical character in accordance with laws of nature. We do the same thing in s pying the appearances of a tree, e.g., winter and summer, and unify them via the object of experience based on the assumption of the thing on its own.}

3.1 According to its empirical character therefore this subject, as appearance, would be subject to the causal connection with respect to all laws of determination, and to this extent would be nothing other than a part of the sense world, and its effects would arise without exception from nature just like every other appearance.

3.2 Just as external appearances would influence this subject according to the way its empirical character, i.e., the law of its causality, were recognized through experience, even so all of its actions would have to permit of explanation by means of laws of nature, and all requirements for their complete
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and necessary determination would have to be encountered in a possible experience.311

4.1 But according to the intelligible character of this subject, however (and even though we are able to know nothing more about it, of course, than its general concept), this very same subject would still have to be free of all influences of sensitivity and of every determination by appearances, and since nothing can happen in it to the extent it is noumenon (i.e., no alteration will be encountered, hence no dynamic determination of time and therefore no connection with appearances as causes), it follows that in its actions this acting being would be independent and free of all necessity of nature (which is solely encountered in the world of sense).312

4.2 Hence we would say quite properly of this subject that it initiated its effects in the sense world of itself without the action having begun within itself. Furthermore this assertion would be valid without us having to say that the effects had to begin of themselves in the sense world, because there they are always previously determined through empirical conditions of the preceding time, but still only by means of the empirical character (which would be

311 Let us say that my supreme principle of action is to pursue my own self interest. Then when the safe opportunity to steal is perceived, that principle becomes the cause of my action, in the same way that the sufficiently cooled air is the cause of the freezing of water. From an empirical standpoint we would say that the theft and the freezing would both be caused by the preceding opportunity to steal and the conditions of the weather, respectively.

312 An example would be that of a person who follows a certain principle, and Therefore while his actions are prompted by perceived opportunities for implementation of this principle, these actions, intelligibly speaking, are not caused by the appearances, but solely by the idea itself, e.g., helping people, or taking advantage of safe opportunities to steal, etc. Here then the principle is ruling and the appearances provide merely the opportunity for implementation of the principle. We need to remember that we are merely conceiving of this intelligible character and defining it in ways that cannot be contradicted, e.g., that it is free of all empirical influence and so no cause arises in it in time, but can only exist timelessly much as a principle of action would be constant and not itself subject to the appearances. And very importantly its decisions would never contradict the effects of natural causality.
merely the appearance of the intelligible character\textsuperscript{313}, and are possible only as a continuation of the series of natural causes.

4.3 So then freedom and nature both, and each in its actual meaning, would be encountered simultaneously and without conflict with regard to precisely the same actions, and accordingly as we might consider them with reference to their intelligible cause or their sensible cause.\textsuperscript{314}

\textbf{Explication Of The Cosmological Idea Of A Freedom In Conjunction With Universal Necessity In Nature}

1.1 I have thought it advantageous first merely to sketch the solution to our transcendental problem in order to better convey an overview of the procedure of reason with respect to its solution.\textsuperscript{315}

1.2 Now we shall separate the moments of its conclusion, on which it actually depends, and consider the problem in its particulars.

2.1 The law of nature that everything which happens has a cause, that the causality of this cause, i.e., the action, since it precedes in time and in consideration, would be seen as the appearance of this intelligible character, the way this intelligible character has chosen to reveal itself. With the empirical character everything fits in with the laws of nature, and so by introducing the intelligible character we are asserting freedom and this means that whatever appearance arose as an effect by virtue of the empirical character was actually a free effect of the intelligible character. We have no basis for asserting this intelligible character, for experience would give us only appearances and the assumption in experience is that these appearances arise necessarily from the empirical character. In a word, everything is determined by the empirical character according to laws of nature, and at the same time this empirical character is merely the appearance of the intelligible character, and so is an act of a free choosing.

\textsuperscript{313} So we have the empirical character such that from it we can derived all the actions as appearances. But then we have the intelligible character which we would hold as totally and transcendently free, and so the empirical character would be seen as the appearance of this intelligible character, the way this intelligible character has chosen to reveal itself. With the empirical character everything fits in with the laws of nature, and so by introducing the intelligible character we are asserting freedom and this means that whatever appearance arose as an effect by virtue of the empirical character was actually a free effect of the intelligible character. We have no basis for asserting this intelligible character, for experience would give us only appearances and the assumption in experience is that these appearances arise necessarily from the empirical character. In a word, everything is determined by the empirical character according to laws of nature, and at the same time this empirical character is merely the appearance of the intelligible character, and so is an act of a free choosing.

\textsuperscript{314} Let’s not forget (and Kant reminds us of this) that here we are merely dreaming up the intelligible character via speculation and have no basis whatsoever to recognize such a character as actual. We have defined it as something which remains with the transcendental object = X after all that belongs to appearance has been removed, i.e., we must think that something remains and we are then free to think about this something whatever we wish as long as we do not contradict science and the laws of nature (or our own thinking). Again: the empirical character is the object of experience and encompasses all the appearances (actions) of the subject. And then considering the subject as a thing on its own, we conceive of an intelligible character such that the empirical character (the object of experience) is merely the appearance of this subject as a thing on its own, and which is beyond the purview of our sensitivity.

\textsuperscript{315} We have tried to set the framework for a solution and have considered some terms, especially the empirical and intelligible characters. Now we are ready to solve the antinomy and show its illusion.
tion of an effect which arose there, cannot always have been, but rather must have arisen, also has its causes among the appearances by which it is determined, and that consequently all events are empirically determined in a natural order; this law, I say, through which appearances can originally make up a nature and render objects of an experience, is a law of the understanding which brooks no exception whatsoever, nor exempts any appearance (because otherwise we would place them outside of every possible experience and, in so doing, would differentiate them from all objects of a possible experience and convert them into sheer thought things and phantoms of the brain). \(^{316}\)

3.1 But even though we have in mind here solely a chain of causes which renders no absolute total at all with respect to the conditions in their regression, we are not at all inhibited by this consideration; for it has been already lifted in the general evaluation of the antinomy of reason if, in the series of appearances, reason goes out to the unconditioned. \(^{317}\)

3.2 (For if we wished to yield to the illusion of transcendental realism, then neither nature nor freedom would remain.) \(^{318}\)

3.3 It is here that the question now arises: “if only natural necessity is recognized in the entire series of all events, is it still possible to consider what is a merely natural effect from one standpoint, as an effect of freedom from an-

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\(^{316}\) This is based on the Second Analogy of the Transcendental Analytic (beginning on or near page 207) where we see that every event has a cause and further that that cause must itself be an event of an earlier cause, and so on back in the chain of causes without any exception.

\(^{317}\) We need to keep in mind that we are not dealing with things on their own, but only with the appearances of things. Accordingly we are required to continue to look for a cause for every event and to treat every cause itself also as an event, i.e., calling for a cause. If we were dealing with things on their own, then the entire series would be considered as given; but since we are dealing with only appearances we cannot assume the entire series to be given and thus we must continually look for the elements of the series.

\(^{318}\) This illusion means that the object of experience (which is merely a concept by means of which we unify the relevant appearances) would be a thing on its own. For no law could be applicable to something considered as a thing on its own. If the table I spy gets smaller physically at a distance, then there is nothing which could be said definitively about such a thing. It might instead suddenly get larger or remain the same or even go out of existence or turn into a head of lettuce. And this would have nothing to do with freedom either, and just be a “monster” reality, i.e., totally inexplicable something which just appears.
other standpoint, or do these two sorts of causality directly contract one another?"  

4.1 Among the causes in the appearance there certainly can be nothing which could begin a series utterly and of itself.

4.2 Every action as appearance, to the extent it produces an event, is itself an event or occurrence which presupposes another state wherein its cause is encountered. Hence everything which happens is only a continuation of the series and in it no beginning initiated of itself is possible.

4.3 All actions of natural causes in the temporal series therefore are in turn effects which presuppose their own causes in the time series.

4.4 An original action, through which something occurs which did not exist previously, is not to be expected from the causal connection of the appearances.

5.1 But even if the effects are appearances, is it necessary that the causality of their causes (which are also appearances) would have to be solely empirical? Is it not rather possible that, even though a connection with its cause is unquestionably required for every effect in the appearance, this empirical causality itself, without interrupting its cohesion with the causes of nature in the least, might still itself be an effect of a non-empirical, intelligible causality. In other words, with respect to the appearances might there be an original action of a cause which therefore is to this extent not an appearance but

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319 We know that all the appearances must be connected through time according to laws of natural necessity. And so the question concerns merely whether there could also be a freedom which coincides with this necessity of nature, or would it be totally excluded.

320 Things don’t just happen on their own and are not to be considered as things on their own, but only as appearances of things. Accordingly they are always functions of the laws of nature which we must assume in order first to have the object of experience and then to have experience with that object. There is no place for any freedom or spontaneity in the natural series of causes. Such a notion would be absurd in experience and would destroy the necessity of nature which makes experience even possible.
rather, with regard to this capacity, intelligible, even though, as a link in the chain of nature, it must still be counted entirely with the world of sense?\footnote{321}

6.1 We have need of the proposition of the causality of the appearances among one another in order to seek, and be able to infer, natural conditions from natural events, i.e., causes in the appearances.\footnote{322}

6.2 If this is admitted and asserted without exception, then the understanding, which in its empirical usage looks for nothing except nature in all occurrences and is also justified in doing so, has everything that it can require, and the physical explanation continues without interruption.\footnote{323}

6.3 In such a case there would be no disruption at all, given also that it were a mere fiction,\footnote{324} if someone were to assume that among the natural causes there were some that had a capacity which were only intelligible in the sense that the determination of that capacity would never be a function of empirical conditions, but rather merely of foundations of the understanding, but

\footnote{321}{We can imagine someone with such a temperament that he would want to take advantage of all safe opportunities for personal gain. Then when such opportunities were perceived by him he would act accordingly. This would be an aspect of his empirical character. But then at the same time, thinking of him as a thing on its own and not as an appearance, we can conceive of him as freely formulating this maxim independently of his temperament such that the empirical character is just a freely chosen appearance of his intelligible character. And thus there would be two causalities with regard to the same event, one empirical and one intelligible, the former necessary according to laws of nature and with the latter entirely free.}

\footnote{322}{Without the presupposition of causation (which is presented in the Second Analogy of the Analytic of the \textit{CPR}) it would not occur to us to look for a cause for any given condition or state among the appearances. It is one thing to recognize a given state; and it is a different thing entirely to look for the \textit{beginning} of that state, and that beginning can only be expressed in terms of the cause of that state, such that that state is an event and not just a condition. The only way to express the beginning of an event is in terms of its cause, e.g., state B occurred because its cause, A, arose first.}

\footnote{323}{For example, the human is assumed by science to seek his own advantage above all else. Now his background and temperament go into the make up of the empirical character. When an action is undertaken, the occasion for expression of this character is said to be in the perceived opportunity, and without that the action would not have taken place, which is correct from the scientific standpoint. And thus we are dealing with a chain of appearances as causes regarding the empirical character.}

\footnote{324}{Here again Kant points out that we are merely playing with our speculations. For our purposes here we can consider this notion of freedom as a fiction devised even as a plaything. The objective of this will not be to establish the fact or even the possibility of freedom, but solely to show that natural causality and freedom can be compatible with each other, and therefore there is no actual antinomy at all, but only the semblance of such. This fiction is well expressed as such by our reference above to the freely acting tree.}

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still such that the action by this cause were conformable to all laws of empirical causality in the appearance.\textsuperscript{325}

6.4 For in this way, the acting subject, as \textit{causa phaenomenon}, would be linked to nature in inseparable dependence with regard to all its actions, and only the phenomenon of this subject (with all causality of that subject in the appearance) would contain certain determinations which, if one wanted to ascend from the empirical object to the transcendental, would have to be viewed as merely intelligible.\textsuperscript{326}

6.5 For if we follow the rule of nature regarding what may be the cause among the appearances, then we can be unconcerned about what sort of foundation and cohesion is thought to these appearances in the transcendental subject which is empirically unknown to us.\textsuperscript{327}

6.6 This intelligible foundation does not conflict at all with the empirical questions, for it actually only touches the thinking in the pure understanding, and even though the effects of this thinking and action of the pure understanding are encountered in the appearances, these effects must still be completely explicable by their causes in the appearance according to laws of nature\textsuperscript{328} by adherence to the empirical character alone as the supreme explanatory basis, and by completely ignoring the intelligible character which is the transcendental cause of that empirical character, except to the extent that this in-

\textsuperscript{325} If all of my actions are explicable by the empirical character (which is a function of my upbringing and temperament) then we can say anything else in addition to that that we might want to, and it would have no bearing or meaning to science. Regarding the same event we might speak of a \textit{reaction} on the part of the empirical character and an \textit{action} on the part of the intelligible character.

\textsuperscript{326} The empirical character can explain all of a person’s actions. And yet at the same time we are able to conceive of this empirical character as merely the appearance of a free, intelligible character, if we choose to do so. It would like asserting that the earth is not bound to the sun by gravity but rather because the earth has freely chosen to maintain that relationship we call gravitational.

\textsuperscript{327} Once we have expressed the empirical character, then we have what science needs for the prediction of all actions of the subject. And any intelligible character is extraneous, gratis and useless for science.

\textsuperscript{328} And so it really does not matter whether the human were actually free or not, for all his behavior is explicable via laws of nature (given merely that he is a representational being, i.e., is able to function and behave in accordance with a mental world of representations, e.g., seek satisfaction of his desires). Science might express this freedom in this wise: he thinks that he is free, but actually everything about him is determined according to laws of nature.
telligible character can be specified only through the empirical as its sensitive indicator.\textsuperscript{329}

6.7 Let’s now apply this thinking to experience.

6.8 The human is one of the appearances of the sense world and to this extent also one of the natural causes, whose causality must stand under empirical laws.

6.9 Accordingly he must have an empirical character even as all other things of nature.

6.10 We observe this through powers and capacities which he expresses in his effects.\textsuperscript{330}

6.11 With inanimate things or with things which are motivated in an animal-like way, we find no reason for thinking of any capacity other than the merely sensitive.

6.12 But the human, who knows all nature solely through his senses, nevertheless recognizes himself also through sheer apperception\textsuperscript{331} and indeed in actions and internal determinations which he cannot in any way count as impressions of the senses, and is himself indeed partly phenomenon and partly, with regard to certain capacities, a merely intelligible object, because the action of these capacities can in no way be counted to the receptivity of the sensitivity.\textsuperscript{332}

\textsuperscript{329} Even though the intelligible character can be free, still it can only be signified through the empirical character and which is always taken as a function of the makeup, temperament and background of the subject, and so always as determined according to laws of nature. There is no place in the equations of science for such speculative properties as something called freedom.

\textsuperscript{330} Which is exactly the way Hume put it in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in the section (VIII) Of Liberty and Necessity. We notice a person’s actions and gestures and speech and can infer the empirical character and then confidently predict all his actions, past and future.

\textsuperscript{331} The pure apperception is the self-conscious capacity for paying attention to something, i.e., appre-hending some manifold with the intention and expectation of coming to a recognition. See \textit{Circles in the Air}.

\textsuperscript{332} Thinking does not arise by virtue of sensation, but is a spontaneous undertaking of the mind. Kant touches on this in the \textit{GMM}.III where we come to the Idea of something which could be free by reference to our ability to think and to reason.
6.13 This capacity we call understanding and reason, where the latter especially is particularly and preeminently distinguished from all empirically conditioned powers, for it ponders its objects merely according to Ideas and determines the understanding regarding them, which then makes an empirical usage of its (indeed still pure) concepts.\(^{333}\)

7.1 That this reason is causal, or that we can at least imagine it to be so,\(^{334}\) is clear from the imperatives which we proclaim in every practical situation as rules for actual implementation.

7.2 The "ought" expresses a type of necessity and connection with grounds which do not otherwise arise in all of nature.

7.3 From nature the understanding can only recognize what is, or was, or will be.

7.4 It is impossible that anything in nature be supposed to be in any other way than what actually is in these relationships of times. Indeed if we have the course of nature in mind, the “ought” does not even make any sense.\(^{335}\)

7.5 We cannot at all ask what ought to take place in nature, any more than we can ask what sort of properties a circle ought to have, but rather only what actually does take place, and what the properties actually are.\(^{336}\)

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333 So then, for example, I can dream up a world in my Idea which is called the kingdom of God and then seek to live as a citizen of that kingdom and am able to judge of things in light of that Idea, e.g., that this is wrong and that is right; and then make an application of this in the empirical world. For example: I see that it is wrong to lie (a violation of the principles of this kingdom), and so in that way I am able to understand that lying is prohibited even when it is clear that it is favorable to me; and accordingly refuse to lie. Nonetheless this ability to act in accordance with Ideas is merely part of the empirical character, like acting in accordance with the Idea of the existence of a country called America or Germany, etc., which are only Ideas. Essential it is a fact that we can reason and use reason to determine our actions.

334 We are still speculating concerning the compatibility of freedom and nature, and have not established the factual existence of freedom at all, nor will we in this treatment of the Third Antinomy.

335 Conceivably a being might exist who could understand and reason about things, but for whom the moral law and the “is supposed to” would be as meaningless as the “uhh” sound with which we so liberally sprinkle our speech. Hitler, possibly, considered Jews and gypsies to be such who merely aped moral thinking and conduct in order to impress the “gullible Germans” in order then more safely to fleece them.

336 There could then be no basis for extracting the “ought” from any presentation of the appearances whatsoever. Thus the expression is a sheer Idea of human reasoning.
8.1 Now this "ought" expresses a possible action, the basis of which is nothing other than a mere concept. In contrast the basis of a merely natural action must always be an appearance.

8.2 Now the action must, of course, be possible under conditions of nature if it is directed to the “ought.” But these conditions of nature do not affect the determination of the discretionary choice itself, but rather merely the effect and result of the determination in the appearance.

8.3 There may be ever so many natural reasons, and ever so many stimuli, driving me toward a wanting, still they cannot produce the “ought,” and never a necessary, but always only a conditioned, wanting in contrast to which the “ought”, which reason pronounces, provides the measure and goal, even command and esteem in opposition to all that.

8.4 That wanting may be an object of the sheer sensitivity (the pleasurable) or even of pure reason (the good). This does not matter, for reason does not surrender to any empirically given foundation nor does it follow the order of things as they are presented in the appearance, but rather in complete spontaneity and in accordance with Ideas, makes its own order, into which it positions the empirical conditions, and according to which it even declares actions to be necessary which have not occurred and perhaps will not occur. Indeed reason presupposes of all these actions without distinction that it can have causality with respect to them; for without that, reason would not expect effects from its Ideas in experience.

9.1 Let us pause here for a moment and assume it to be at least possible that reason were actually causal with respect to the appearances. Now in that case, regardless of the fact that it is reason, it would still have to manifest an empirical character because every cause presupposes a rule according to which certain appearances ensue as effects. And such a rule requires uni-

337 I cannot believe that I ought to walk on air and reach out and seize the moon. But I can believe that I ought to tell the truth, or that I ought to work and save while young in order to be prepared for old age.

338 This presupposition of freedom is reflected in the GMM.III.2. The “ought” can only arise by reason (since it is not expressed in any appearance) and it is an imperative for action.

339 We are assuming here that we could be ruled by reason to the extent of determining our actions which would be appearances, i.e., actions as events.
formity of effects as the basis of the concept of cause (as a capacity), which we, to the extent it must appear from sheer appearances, can call its empirical character and which is also enduring, while the effects occur diversely, depending, as they do, upon the diversity of the attendant and partially limiting conditions.  

10.1 In this way there is an empirical character to the discretionary choice of every human, which is nothing other than a certain causality of his reason to the extent this indicates a rule with the effects in the appearance. And according to this rule we can derive the rational foundations and the actions from those according to their type and degree, and assess the subjective principles of his discretionary choice.  

10.2 Because this empirical character must itself be derived from the appearances considered as its effect and from their rule which experience renders, it follows that all actions of the human in the appearance are determined from his empirical character along with other, participatory causes according to the order of nature. Hence if we could examine all appearances of his discretionary choice down to their foundation, there would not be a single action which we could not have predicated with certainty and recognized as necessary from its preceding conditions.  

10.3 With respect to this empirical character therefore there is no freedom and it is in accordance with this alone that we consider the human when we simply

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340 So even if reason can have an effect in the appearances, it would have to express this via an empirical character which would call for uniformity in experience. Here the assumption is that reasoning is used in the empirical character for the procurement of desired effects. Here Hume would assert that reason is used solely for the achievement of desires.

341 Thus is the typical behavior of someone, his characteristic behavior, and where we will find a rule which holds, given the circumstances. Such a rule would be a principle of acting, e.g., take advantage of safe enrichment.

342 From someone’s behavior we infer the empirical character and then find the basis for this particular character in the past and are able to predict all future behavior in conformity to this character, given the particular empirical circumstance and conditions.
observe him and, as in anthropology, want to examine the motivating causes of his actions physiologically.  

11.1 But if we consider the same actions with respect to reason, and indeed not to speculative reason in order to explain them with regard to their origin, but rather entirely to the extent that reason is the cause in generating them; in other words: if we compare them with reason from a practical standpoint, we find an entirely different rule and order than that of nature.

11.2 For perhaps not everything which happened according to the course of nature should have happened nor inevitably had to happen according to its empirical foundations.

11.3 But occasionally we find, or at least believe to find, that the Ideas of reason have actually proven causality with regard to the actions of the human as appearances, and that these actions have by no means occurred because they were determined through empirical causes, but rather because they were determined through foundations of reason.

12.1 Suppose now that we could say of reason that it were causal with respect to the appearance. In that case its action could be called free even though entirely determined and necessary in its empirical character (the temperament).

This is the way that science will consider the human, i.e., as necessitated by his empirical character such that all his actions would be expected based merely on contingent and occasioning circumstances. And so even though reason is ruling, it expresses itself in the empirical character which denotes uniformity and consistency. This means reason is determined (utilized) by the make up and background and temperament. As Hume would put it: reason is the slave of passion.

Another reminder that we are in a hypothetical mode of thinking here, and are not asserting any reality to freedom at all.

If a person can be guided by pure reason, i.e., independently of his desires, then we can understand how that person can be free of the laws of nature and able to act with spontaneity and according to principles of reason.

If reason were free, it would function according to principles, and these principles then would determine the actions in accordance with the occasioning appearances and these actions in turn could be considered as being caused by these appearances rather than by the principle. We might say regarding some person’s action, “oh! that’s his temperament” and mean with that “his empirical character.”
12.2 This empirical character in turn is determined by the intelligible character (the mode of thinking).

12.3 But the intelligible character we do not know, but rather infer through appearances which actually immediately reveal only the temperament (the empirical character).  

12.4 But the action, to the extent it is to be ascribed to the thinking mode as the cause of the action, still does not at all ensue from that mode according to empirical laws, i.e., not such that the conditions, but rather only that the effects, of pure reason precede in the appearance of the inner sense.

12.5 Pure reason, as a merely intelligible capacity, is not subject to the time form and hence also not to the conditions of the temporal series.

12.6 The causality of reason in the intelligible character does not arise nor commence per chance at a particular time in order to produce an effect in that way.

12.7 For otherwise it would itself be subject to the natural laws of the appearances to the extent it determines the causal series according to time, and then the causality would be nature and not freedom.

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347 There is a jump here, for we guess the intelligible character through the appearances, but these really give us only the empirical character. We will eventually come to assert that the empirical character is actually a function of the intelligible character. And so while all actions can be explained by natural laws we are able to see these actions has having arisen by choice by the intelligible character.

348 Thus pure reason is assumed to always be ruling, and only to be awakened and called into play upon some occasion. Accordingly only its effect arises in time, but not its condition or its presence and existence in reason. And in this vein we can see that no matter how necessary the person’s conduct is according to laws of nature, the person is conscious of his own freedom at the time of determining the will.

349 Pure reason deals with principles and conclusions and is entirely independent of the conditions of time.

350 Far rather it is always present (after a certain age) and merely commences its effects upon some appearance, but not that it itself arises upon some appearance, which would make it subject to the empirical laws of nature, just as Kant says next.
12.8 We can say, therefore: if reason can have causality with respect to the appearances, then it is a capacity, by means of which the sensitive condition of an empirical series of effects first begins.\footnote{For while the effects follow in a natural way from the preceding appearances, we would be looking at them as dependent upon an independent reason. I may decide never to tell a lie, and when the occasion arises where a lie would be profitable, my behavior in not telling a lie would be a result of the principles I have established via reasoning, and the opportunity is then merely the occasion for the exemplification of this principle.}

12.9 For the condition which lies in reason is not sensitive and therefore does not itself commence.

12.10 Accordingly then something takes place which was missing in all empirical series, i.e., the condition of a successive series of events could itself be empirically unconditioned.

12.11 For here the condition is apart from the series of appearances (in the intelligible) and hence not subject to any sensitive condition nor to any determination of time through preceding causes.\footnote{An occasion for advantageous lying can arise in the series of the appearances, but if reason rules, then a principle will be at hand to determine the specific action without any regard to these appearances. The appearances would merely present the occasion for the execution of the principle (and which is a product of reason alone).}

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Hence the actual morality of actions (merit and guilt), even that of our own conduct, remains entirely hidden from us.

1.2 Our accountability can be attributed only to the empirical character.

1.3 But how much of that is to be attributed to the pure effect of freedom, and how much to our nature and the blameless fault of temperament, or its advantageous constitution (merito fortunae), no one can fathom nor hence also evaluate with complete justice.

13.1 Nonetheless this very same cause in another referral still belongs to the series of appearances.

13.2 The human is himself an appearance.
13.3 His discretionary choosing has an empirical character which is the (empiri-
cal) cause of all his actions.

13.4 There are no conditions determining him relative to this character which
would not be contained in the series of the effects of nature or which would
not comply with its laws, according to which no empirically conditioned
causality whatsoever of anything occurring in time were encountered.

13.5 Hence no given action (because it can be perceived only as appearance) can
begin utterly of itself.\footnote{I think this is usually the way those who are against pure practical reason would make the case. It is
true that no action can begin utterly of itself (but this does not mean that pure reason could not utterly be-
gen a series per 12 above). Reason is free, even if it is utilized for some personal interest.}

13.6 But we cannot say of reason that before the state wherein it determines the
discretionary choice another one preceded wherein this state itself was
determined.\footnote{Let me try this: I am in a situation and think of the moral law and realize that this law requires me to act
in mode A. Now the fact is that this law was prompted to me by some mental association. But be that as it
may, since I freely assented to eliminate all considerations of happiness and inclination by virtue of this
law, I cannot say that my decision was caused by the mental association and its prompt. For I am con-
scious, in that moment of decisioning, of making a free decision in light of the law, and regardless of how
this law happened to come to mind. And yet the scientist would say: “Oh yes! the association brought the
law to mind and then the individual applied his utility weights to it and to his other inclinations and came to
the conclusion that he did.”:}

13.7 For since reason itself is neither appearance nor in any way subject to condi-
tions in the sensitivity, no temporal succession takes place in it, not even
with regard to its causality, and therefore the dynamic law of nature deter-
mning temporal succession according to rules cannot be applied to it.\footnote{Temporal conditions may occasion the use of reasoning, but reason itself is not conditioned in any
way. I may decide to use my reasoning for some personal and immoral purpose, but that is not to say that
reason itself called for this purpose. I may know that something is wrong and decide to do it anyway, and
even base my decision on a reasoning that suggests that this wrong would be profitable and safe.}

14.1 Reason therefore is the enduring condition of all discretionary actions under
which the human appears.
14.2 Each of these actions is previously determined in the empirical character of the human before it occurs.\footnote{356}{Given the empirical character we can predict with certitude all actions that will ensue, given the diversity of circumstances.}

14.3 With respect to the intelligible character, whereof the empirical is only the sensitive schema, no previous and no subsequent is valid, and every action, regardless of the relationship of time in which it stands with other appearances, is the immediate effect of the intelligible character of pure reason which therefore acts freely without being determined dynamically in the chain of the causes of nature through temporally preceding grounds, either internally or externally. This freedom may not only be considered negatively as independence from empirical conditions (for otherwise the rational capacity for being a cause of appearances would cease), but may also be characterized positively as a capacity for beginning a series of events of itself such that in it nothing begins, but rather it, as the unconditioned condition of every discretionary action, allows no temporally preceding condition to be superior to it, while still its effect begins in the series of the appearances but can never constitute an utterly first beginning in it.\footnote{357}{Regardless of the make up and thrust of the empirical character, since we are dealing with reason we know that we able to act with complete spontaneity and to forgo what the empirical character calls for. Hence when we act in accordance with the empirical character we are acting freely and could have chosen differently.}

15.1 In order to discourse on the regulative principle of reason by means of an example from empirical usage, though not to confirm it (for such proofs are unsuited for transcendental assertions), we take a discretionary action, e.g., a malevolent lie, by means of which a person introduces a certain confusion into society, and where the motivations whereby it arose are examined and afterwards a judgment made as to whether it might be chargeable to him together with all its consequences.

15.2 In the first regard, the man’s empirical character is probed down to its sources and is ascribed to his bad upbringing and evil company, and partly also to the malevolence of a nature which is insensitive to shame, and partly
to thoughtlessness and recklessness; and then consideration is also given to the occasioning causes of the opportunity.\footnote{358}

15.3 The procedure here is generally the same as with the investigation of the series of determining causes to a given effect in nature.

15.4 Now even though the action is thought to have been determined in this way, the culprit is still blamed; not however because of his unfortunate nature, nor because of the circumstances overwhelming him, and certainly not because of the course of his life up to that point, for it is assumed that these could all be entirely set aside as they are constituted, and the transpired series of conditions could be considered as not having occurred. Accordingly this act is viewed as entirely unconditioned with respect to the previous state as though the perpetrator commenced a series of effects entirely of himself.

15.5 This blame is based upon a law of reason whereby reason is seen as a cause which could and should have determined the conduct of the human otherwise and regardless of all of these empirical conditions.\footnote{359}

15.6 And indeed the causality of reason is not seen merely in competition, but rather as complete of itself, even if the sensitive motives do not at all promote it, or indeed even if they are all arrayed against it. The action is attributed to his intelligible character, and in the moment in which he lied, he bears the entire guilt. Hence reason, regardless of all empirical conditions of the deed, was completely free and all this is attributed entirely to its neglect.\footnote{360}

\footnote{358} This, we might say, were the tendency of the man to take advantage of a situation for his own benefit. This tendency would abide, and would be merely manifested in the effects which would then be "caused" by the appearances as circumstances, as when we say that the opportunity caused him to act the way he did, much as we say that the cold caused the water to freeze. The circumstances were the occasioning causes for the empirical character to manifest itself. Thus it is entirely understandable that the person will have acted the way he did in telling this lie.

\footnote{359} Reason was able to determine the action based on universal principles, even though it was used merely to accomplish safely and rationally some personal goal. But this means that the person could have acted differently and therefore would have been conscious then, and conscious now, that he acted wrongly.

\footnote{360} Thus we are back to the transcendental consideration of being able to spontaneously ignore the empirical character as constituted and instead to act in accordance with principles of right conduct. And so the liar acted freely and is responsible for his lie and all of its evil effects.
16.1 With this determination of responsibility, it is easy to see that we are cognizant that reason is not affected in any way through all this sensitivity, that it does not alter (even if its appearances change, i.e., the way in which it manifests itself in its effects), that in it no state precedes which would determine the subsequent state, hence that it does not belong at all in the series of the sensitive conditions which necessitate the appearances according to laws of nature.\textsuperscript{361}

16.2 Reason is present and identical regarding all actions of the human in all temporal circumstances, but is itself not in time and does not stumble, as it were, into a new state in which it was previously absent. It determines, but is not determinable by, that state.\textsuperscript{362}

16.3 Hence we cannot ask why reason was not determined differently;\textsuperscript{363} but only why it did not determine the appearances differently through its causality?\textsuperscript{364}

16.4 But to this no answer is possible.

16.5 For another intelligible character would have rendered another empirical one, and to say that regardless of the entire course of his life up to that point the perpetrator of the lie could still have exercised restraint, only means that it is subject to no conditions of the appearance nor of the course of time, and while the distinction of time can constitute a fundamental distinction of the appearances among one another, still, since on their own they are not things and hence not even causes, the differentiation of time can constitute no distinction of actions with reference to reason.

\textsuperscript{361} This says as much that the perpetrator of the lie was fully aware that it was wrong, but decided to commit it anyway; and so reason is not under any control of influence of sensitive factors, but worked independently of conditions of time, i.e., purely. Thus the liar was conscious of the wrongness of the lie at the time and could have acted differently just as he knows that he ought to have done.

\textsuperscript{362} Reason is independent of the sensitivity and desires, and while it may be utilized for personal desires, it itself is free of all conditions of sensitivity and even time.

\textsuperscript{363} Reason is free of the compulsion of the empirical and sensitive needs, and always speaks independently of these needs and conditions.

\textsuperscript{364} This will be a reference to the intelligible character and transcendental freedom via reason, pointing out again that reason is free of empirical and temporal conditions. And so the liar could have acted differently.
17.1 Regarding the estimation of free actions with respect to their causality therefore we can go up to, but not out beyond, the intelligible cause. We can recognize that it freely determines, i.e., independently of the sensitivity, and, in this way, can be the sensitively unconditioned condition of the appearances.

17.2 But why the intelligible character renders just these appearances and this empirical character, given existing circumstances, this question transcends every capacity of our reason to answer, indeed even its very authority to ask; as though we wanted to know why the transcendental object of our external sensitive perspective rendered only a perspective in space and not in some other way.\footnote{365 It is impossible to explain why it is that someone freely chose to utilize his reasoning capacity as he did.}

17.3 The task which was ours to solve, however, did not obligate us in this regard at all, for it was merely whether there is a conflict between freedom and the necessity of nature in one and the same action. And this we have sufficiently answered by showing that since a referral is possible with each of these two, which is based on entirely different types of conditions, the law of nature does not affect freedom, and so both can take place independently of the other, and without either disturbing the other.

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18.1 It is important to note here that we have not tried to establish the actuality of freedom as a capacity containing the cause of appearances of our world of sense.

18.2 For, quite aside from the fact that such is not at all a transcendental consideration (which has to do with concepts), it could not have succeeded anyway since we would have had to infer something which is not at all to be thought according to laws of experience.

18.3 Indeed we have not even proven the possibility of freedom; for this also would not have succeeded. And the reason for this is because we cannot in general recognize the possibility of any real foundation nor causality from sheer concepts a priori.

18.4 Freedom here is treated only as a transcendental Idea by means of which reason thinks to commence utterly a series of conditions in the appearance
through the sensitively unconditioned, but whereby it becomes involved in an antinomy with its own laws, which it prescribes for the empirical usage of the understanding.\footnote{Reason considers itself free, and yet this comes into conflict with the empirical laws of nature necessity. Hence the antinomy.}

18.5 That this antinomy is based on a mere semblance and that nature at least does not conflict with a causality of freedom, was all that we were able to accomplish, but also all that concerned us here.\footnote{The solution is based on this: the thesis speaks of the intelligible character, the thing on its own; while the antithesis speaks of the empirical character, the object of experience. So the solution is transcendental and we see that there is no conflict because while we are using the same term, we are speaking of two different things.}
IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependency of the Appearances with Respect to Existence in General

1.1 In the previous section we considered the alterations of the sense world in their dynamical series where, without exception, each stands under another as its cause.

1.2 Presently this series of the states serves us only as the guide for achieving to an existence which is able to be the highest condition of all that is alterable, namely to the necessary being.

1.3 Here we are not dealing with the unconditioned causality, but rather with the unconditioned existence of substance itself.

1.4 The series, which we have before us therefore is actually only that of concepts, and not of perspectives, to the extent the one is the condition of the other.

2.1 But we easily see that since everything in the sum total of the appearances is alterable, thus conditioned in existence, there cannot be anywhere an unconditioned member, the existence of which would be utterly necessary, and that therefore if appearances were things on their own, but precisely for that reason, their conditioned would belong every time with the conditioned to one and the same series of perspectives, it follows that a necessary being, as condition of the existence of the appearances of the sense world, could never take place.

3.1 But the dynamical regression on its own has this peculiarity and distinctiveness from the mathematical: since the latter has to do only with the assemblage of the parts to a whole, or with the decomposition of the whole into its parts, the conditions of this series, the mathematical regression, must always be viewed as parts of that, thus as homogeneous, consequently as appearances, unlike the former regression where it has to do not with the possibility of an unconditioned whole, but rather with the derivation of a state from its cause, or of the contingent existence of the substance itself from the necessary one, and here the condition may not necessarily make up an empirical series with the conditioned.
4.1 With the apparent antinomy lying before us therefore there remains yet a way out, since namely both propositions conflicting with one another could be true simultaneously in diverse referrals such that all things of the sense world are thoroughly contingent, thus also always have only empirically conditioned existence while, nonetheless, also a non-empirical condition of the entire series, i.e., an unconditioned necessary being, takes place.

4.2 For as an intelligible condition, this would not belong at all to the series as a member of that series (not even as the highest member), nor also constitute a member of the empirically unconditioned series, but rather would leave the entire sense world in its empirically conditioned existence going through all members.

4.3 This manner of laying here an unconditioned existence as basis to the appearances therefore would distinguish itself from the empirically unconditioned causality (of freedom) in the previous section, in that with freedom the thing itself, as cause (substantis phaenomenon), belonged yet in the series of the conditions, and only its causality was thought as intelligible. But here the necessary being would have to be thought entirely apart from the series of the sense world (as ens extramundanum) and merely intelligibly thought, whereby alone it can be prevented from being itself subject to the law of the contingency and dependency of all appearances.

5.1 With respect to this our task therefore the regulative principle of reason is that everything in the sense world would have empirically conditioned existence and that with respect to every attribute there would be no unconditioned necessity anywhere; and there would be no member of the series of conditions, whereof we would not always have to expect and, as far as we can, to seek the empirical condition to a possible experience, and nothing would justify us in deriving any sort of an existence from a condition outside of the empirical existence, or even to hold it as utterly independent and self-supporting in the series, but nonetheless not at all in that way to deny that the entire series cannot be based in any sort of an intelligible being (which for that reason is free of every empirical condition and, far more, contains the basis of the possibility of all these appearances).
6.1 But it is not at all our intention in this way to prove the unconditioned necessary existence of a being, nor even to base the possibility of a merely intelligible condition of the existence of the appearances of the sense world upon this being, but rather only just so, as we restrict reason not to abandon the fiber of the empirical conditions and stray into transcendent explanatory reasons, capable of no presentation *in concreto*, therefore also, on the other side, to restrict the law of the merely empirical understanding usage to the extent that it not decide about the possibility of things in general nor declare the intelligible for that reason to be impossible, even though it is not to be used by us as an explanation of the appearances.

6.2 In this way therefore it is only shown that the thorough contingency of all natural things, and of all their (empirical) conditions, is able to consist quite well together with the discretionary presupposition of a necessary, though indeed merely intelligible, condition. Hence no true contradiction is encountered between these assertions, thus they can be true on both sides.

6.3 Such an utterly necessary understanding being may always be impossible on its own, still this can in no way be inferred from the universal contingency and dependency of all that belongs to the sense world, nor from the principle of ceasing with no member of the world, to the extent it is contingent, and relying on a cause apart from the world.

6.4 Reason goes its way in the empirical usage and its particular way in the transcendental usage.

7.1 The sense world contains nothing but appearances, but these are merely representations, which are always in turn sensitively conditioned, and since we never have here things on their own as our objects, it is no wonder that we are never justified in making a leap from a member of the empirical series, regardless of what it may be, away from the cohesion of the sensitivity, just as if they were things on their own which existed apart from their transcendental basis and which we could abandon in order to seek the cause of their existence apart from them; which in any case would finally have to happen with contingent things, but not with mere representations of things, the contingency of which itself is only phenomenon and can lead to no other regression except that which determines the phenomena, i.e., which is empirical.
7.2 But to think of an intelligible basis of the appearances, i.e., of the sense world, and to think of that as being free of the contingency of the sense world is not contrary to either the unrestricted empirical regression in the series of the appearances, nor to the thorough contingency of that series.

7.3 But that is also the only thing which we had to do for the lifting of the apparent antinomy, and which only allows of being done in this way.

7.4 For if each time the condition to each conditioned (with respect to the existence) is sensitive and just for that reason pertinent to the series, it is itself in turn conditioned (as the antithesis of the fourth antinomy proves).

7.5 Therefore either a conflict with reason, which requires the unconditioned, had to remain, or this unconditioned had to be placed apart from the series in the intelligible, the necessity of which neither requires nor permits any empirical condition and therefore with respect to appearances, is necessary in an unconditioned way.

8.1 The empirical usage of reason (with respect to the conditions of existence in the sense world) is not affected by the admission of a merely intelligible being, but rather, according to the principle of thorough contingency, goes from empirical conditions to higher ones, which are always empirical just as well.

8.2 But also just as little does this regulative principle exclude the assumption of an intelligible cause which is not in the series, if this has to do with the pure usage of reason (with respect to the purposes).

8.3 For there the intelligible cause means only the foundation--for us merely transcendental and unknown--of the possibility of the sensitive series in general, the existence of which, independent of all conditions of the intelligible cause and unconditionally necessary with respect to this, is not contrary at all to the unlimited contingency of the sensitive series and also, for that reason, to the never ended regression in the series of the empirical conditions.
Concluding Remark to the Entire Antinomy of Pure Reason

1.1 As long as we have as objects with our rational concepts merely the totality of the conditions in the sense world and what can happen with respect to them in the service of reason, our Ideas are indeed transcendental, but still cosmological.

1.2 But as soon as we place the unconditioned (about which it is still actually concerned) into what is entirely apart from the sense world, thus apart from all possible experience, the Ideas become transcendent. Accordingly they do not serve merely for the completion of the empirical rational usage (which always remains an Idea, never to be fulfilled, but still to be complied with), but rather they separate themselves entirely from that and make objects for themselves, the material of which is not taken from experience, and the objective reality of which also does not rest upon the completion of the empirical series, but rather upon pure concepts a priori.

1.3 Such transcendent Ideas have a merely intelligible object, which to admit as a transcendental object, about which by the way no one knows anything, is in any case allowed. But concerning this, in order to think it as a thing determinable through its distinguishing and inner predicates, we have on our side neither foundations of the possibility (independent of all concepts of experience) nor the least justification for assuming such an object, and which for that reason is a mere thought thing.

1.4 Nonetheless, among all cosmological Ideas, the one occasioned by the fourth antinomy, compels us to venture this step.

1.5 For the existence of the appearances, based not at all in itself, but constantly conditioned, summons us to look about for something distinctive from all appearances, thus an intelligible object with which this contingency ceases.

1.6 But if we have once permitted ourselves to assume an actuality existing for itself apart from the field of the entire sensitivity, appearances are to be viewed only as contingent representational ways of intelligible objects, of such beings which are themselves intelligences, then nothing remains for us except the analogy, according to which we use the concepts of experience to still make some sort of concept of intelligible things, of which we have not the least knowledge.
1.7  Because we become familiar with the contingent not otherwise than through experience, but here the discussion is of things which are not at all supposed to be objects of experience, we will have to derive their knowledge from what is necessary on its own, out of pure concepts of things in general.

1.8  Hence the first step which we make apart from the sense world, necessitates us to begin our new knowledge from the examination of the utterly necessary being and to derive from its concept the concepts of all things, to the extent they are merely intelligible, and this attempt we want to employ in the following chapter.
Second Book of the Transcendental Dialectic  
Third Part  

3rd Chapter. The Ideal of Pure Reason  

1st Section. Concerning the Ideal in General  

1.1 We saw above that through pure understanding concepts, without any condition of sensitivity, no object at all can be represented because the conditions of their objective reality are lacking, and nothing but the mere form of the thinking is encountered in them.

1.2 Nevertheless they can be presented in concreto if we apply them to appearances. For with appearances they actually have the material of the experiential concept, which is nothing but an understanding concept in concreto.

1.3 But Ideas are yet more remote from objective reality than are the categories. For no appearance can be found by which Ideas permit of representation in concreto.

1.4 They contain a certain completion to which no possible empirical recognition suffices, and with which reason has only a systematic unity in mind, to which it seeks to have the empirical, possible unity approach, but without ever completely reaching it.

2.1 But even more remote from objective reality than the Idea seems to be what I term the “Ideal”, and by which I understand the Idea, not merely in concreto, but rather in individuo, i.e., as a single thing, determinable or even determined, through the Idea alone. 368

3.1 Humanity, in its entire perfection, does not contain merely the expansion of all properties essentially pertaining to this nature, and which constitute our concept of that nature up to the complete congruence with its purposes, and which would be our Idea of the perfect humanity. It also contains everything which, apart from this concept, belongs to the complete determination of the

368 There might be several objects represented by an Idea (although none can be recognized due to the inability to supply an object of sense to them), but if there can be only a single object or thing for an Idea, then that Idea is called the Ideal.
Idea, for of all contrarily opposed predicates still only a single one can befit the Idea of the most perfect human.

3.2 What to us is an Ideal was to Plato an Idea of the divine understanding, a single object in the pure perspective of that understanding, the most perfect of every manner of possible being and the original source of all imitation in the appearance.

4.1 But without aspiring so far, we must admit that human reason not only contains Ideas, but also Ideals. Now these do not have creative power, as is the case with the platonic Ideas, but they do possess practical power (as regulative principles) and lie as the foundation to the possibility of the perfection of certain actions.

4.2 Moral concepts are not entirely pure rational concepts, because some empirical aspect (pleasure and displeasure) lies as basis to them.

4.3 Nonetheless, with respect to the principle by means of which reason restricts lawless freedom (attending therefore merely to its form), they can serve quite well as examples of pure rational concepts.

4.4 Virtue and with it human wisdom in its entire purity, are Ideas.

4.5 But the sage (of the Stoic) is an Ideal, i.e., a human who exists merely in thought, but who is completely congruent with the Idea of wisdom.

4.6 The Idea renders the rule, while the Ideal in such a case serves as the prototype of the complete determination of the imitation. And we have no other guide for our actions than the conduct of this divine human within us, by means of which we can compare, estimate and thereby improve ourselves, though never reaching this height.

4.7 These Ideals, even if we might not admit objective reality (existence) to them, are not for that reason to be viewed as fanciful. Indeed they provide an indispensable guide of reason, which has need of the concept of what is entirely complete in its kind in order to completely estimate and gauge the degree and deficiency of the imperfection.
4.8 But it is unfeasible to want to attain to the Ideal in an example, i.e., in the appearance, somewhat as the sage in a novel. Moreover it involves something nonsensical and unedifying by the natural restrictions which do continuous injury to the completeness in the Idea, making all illusion in such attempts impossible and also in this way even making the good, which lies in the Idea, suspect and like a mere fiction.\textsuperscript{369}

5.1 It is the same with the Ideal of reason which must always rest upon certain concepts and serve as the rule and prototype, be it of compliance or of evaluation.

5.2 It is entirely different regarding the creatures of imagination, about which no one can clearly explain or give an understanding concept. These are monograms, as it were, which are only singular traits, determined according to no ostensible rule, and which constitute more an indication, hovering, as it were, in the midst of diverse experiences, than a determined picture. This is what painters and adherents of physiognomy pretend to have in their head and which are supposed to be an incommunicable silhouette of their products or also evaluations.

5.3 Speaking figuratively, they can be termed Ideals of sensitivity because they are supposed to be unattainable patterns of possible perspectives, and nonetheless render no rule adequate for explanation and testing.

6.1 The intention of reason with its Ideals, on the other hand, is the complete determination according to rules a priori. Accordingly it thinks of an object which is to be completely determinable according to principles, even though the sufficing conditions to it are lacking in experience, and the concept itself therefore is transcendent.\textsuperscript{370}

\textsuperscript{369} So the natural restrictions of the human make it impossible to think that we are attaining to such perfection and the attempt makes the good itself seem like a fiction,

\textsuperscript{370} And again the Idea is that we need this icon of perfection, not in order to recognize it as factual, as rather to serve to show the degree of imperfection of actual things by comparison.
2nd Section - Transcendental Ideal (Transcendental Prototype)

1.1 Every concept is undetermined with respect to what is not contained within it, and stands under the principle of determinability, i.e., of every two predicates in contradictory opposition to each other, only one is able to belong to it. This rests upon the proposition of contradiction and hence is a merely logical principle which abstracts from all content of the recognition and has nothing to consider but its logical form.

2.1 But every thing, with respect to its possibility, still stands under the principle of the complete determination. According to this, one of all possible predicates of things, to the extent they are compared with their opposites, must belong to it.\textsuperscript{371}

2.2 This does not rest merely upon the proposition of contradiction; for, apart from every relationship of two predicates conflicting with one another, it considers everything yet in the relationship to the entire possibility as the epitome of all predicates of things in general and, by presupposing such as conditions a priori, it represents each and every thing accordingly as it derives its own possibility from the share which it has of that total possibility.\textsuperscript{372}

2.3 The principle of the complete determination therefore concerns the content and not merely the logical form.

2.4 It is the principle of the synthesis of all predicates which are supposed to make the complete concept of a thing, and not merely of the analytical representation through one of two opposed predicates. And it contains a transcendental presupposition, namely that of the material to all possibility which is supposed to contain a priori the data to the particular possibility of each thing.

* Kant’s annotation:

\textsuperscript{371} This seems to tie in with the function of the Ideal in showing us the degree of imperfection of all other things.

\textsuperscript{372} The Ideal then would indicate the total possibility, and so we will be comparing actual things which is total possibility which will be the Idea, and again to show the degree of imperfection of the actual things.
1.1 Through this principle therefore each thing is referred to a *communal correlatum*, namely the entire possibility which, if it (i.e., the material to all possible predicates) were encountered in the Idea of a single thing, would prove an affinity of everything possible through the identity of the foundations of the complete determination of that.

1.2 The determinability of each and every concept is subordinated to the universality (*universalitas*) of the principle of the exclusion of a middle between the two opposed predicates, but the determination of a thing is subordinated to the totality (*universitas*) or the epitome of all possible predicates.

3.1 The proposition “every existing thing is completely determined” does not only mean that of each pair of given predicates in opposition to one another, but rather also of all possible ones, always one befits it. Through this proposition not merely are predicates compared with one another logically, but rather the thing itself with the epitome of all possible predicates transcendentally.

3.2 It will say as much as “in order to recognize a thing completely, we must recognize everything possible and determine the thing in that way, be it affirming or denying.”

3.3 Consequently the complete determination is a concept which we can never present *in concreto* with respect to its totality, and which therefore is based on an Idea, which has its seat solely in reason, which prescribes to the understanding the rules of its complete employment.

4.1 Now this Idea of the epitome of all possibility--to the extent the epitome, as the condition of the complete determination of each and every thing, lies as the foundation--is itself, with respect to the predicates which may constitute it, yet undetermined, and by it we think nothing further than an epitome of all possible predicates in general. Nevertheless with a closer examination we still find that this Idea, as proto-concept, eliminates a multitude of predicates which, as derived, are already given through others, or cannot stand next to one another, and accordingly it is purified up to a thoroughly a priori determined concept. In this way there arises the concept of a single object, which

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373 And this “everything possible” will be represented by the Ideal.
is completely determined through the mere Idea. And this single object must be termed an Ideal of pure reason.

5.1 If we consider all possible predicates not merely logically, but rather transcendental, i.e., with respect to their content which is thought a priori with them, we find that through some of these a being, through others a mere not-being, is represented.

5.2 The logical negation, which is indicated solely through the little word “not,” never actually adheres to a concept but rather only to its relationship to another one in a judgment and therefore cannot be sufficient by far for describing a concept with respect to its content.

5.3 The expression “not-mortal” cannot at all give for recognition in that way that a mere not-being is represented with the object, but rather leaves all content untouched.

5.4 A transcendental negation, on the other hand, signifies not-being on its own, to which the transcendental affirmation is opposed. This affirmation is a something, the concept of which on its own already expresses a being, and hence is termed reality (factuality), because through it alone, and as far as it reaches, objects are something (things), while the opposing negation means a mere deficiency. And where this is thought alone, the cancellation of all things is represented.

6.1 Now negation we can never think determined to ourselves without having the opposing affirmation lying as foundation.

6.2 Who is born blind can never make the least representation of darkness, because he has none of light; nor the savage of poverty, because he is not familiar with prosperity.*

6.3 The ignorant has no concept of his ignorance, because he has none of science, etc.

6.4 All concepts of negation therefore are also derived, and the realities contain the data and, as it were, the matter or the transcendental content to the possibility and complete determination of all things.
* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 The observation and calculations of the astronomers have taught us much which is admirable, but the most important is easily that they have uncovered for us the abyss of the ignorance which, without this information, human reason would never have been able to represent as so great, and concerning which the contemplation must produce a great alteration in the determination of the final intention of our rational usage.

7.1 If therefore to the complete determination in our reason a transcendental substratum is laid as foundation, which contains, as it were, the entire stock of the material from which all possible predicates of things can be taken, then this substratum is nothing other than the Idea of an all of reality (*omnitudo realitas*).

7.2 All true denials then are nothing but restrictions, which they could not be termed if the unlimited (the all) did not lie as foundation.

8.1 But through this total possession of reality the concept of a thing on its own, as completely determined, is also represented, and the concept of an *entis realissimi* is the concept of a single being, because of all possible opposed predicates one, namely that which belongs to being utterly, is encountered in its determination.

8.2 It is therefore a transcendental Ideal which lies as foundation to the complete determination, which is encountered necessarily with everything which exists, and makes up the highest and most complete material condition of its possibility, to which all thinking of any object in general must be ascribed with respect to its content.

8.3 But it is also the single actual Ideal to which human reason is capable, because only in this single case is a concept--universal in itself--of a thing completely determined through itself, and recognized as the representation of an individual.

9.1 The logical determination of a concept through reason rests upon a disjunctive rational inference, in which the premise contains a logical division (the
partitioning of the sphere of a universal concept), the minor proposition restricts this sphere to one part, and the concluding proposition determines the concept through this.

9.2 The universal concept of a reality in general cannot be divided a priori, because without experience we are not familiar with any determined manner of reality which would be contained under the species.

9.3 The transcendental premise of the complete determination of all things therefore is nothing other than the representation of the epitome of all reality. It is not merely a concept which comprehends under itself all predicates with respect to their transcendental content, but rather comprehends them within itself, and the complete determination of each and every thing rests upon the restriction of this all of realities, in that some of this all are attributed to the thing, but the remainder excluded, which agrees with the “either” and “or” of the disjunctive major premise and of the determination of the object through one of the members of this partition in the minor premise.

9.4 Accordingly the use of reason, through which it places the transcendental Ideal as foundation of its determination of all possible things, is analogous to its procedure in disjunctive syllogisms. And that was the proposition, which I laid above as foundation to the systematic division of all transcendental Ideas, according to which they are generated parallel to, and corresponding to, the three types of rational inference.

10.1 It is obvious that for its intention of representing to itself solely the necessary and complete determination of things, reason does not presuppose the existence of such a being which were commensurate to the Ideal, but rather only the Idea of that in order to derive the conditioned from an unconditioned totality of the complete determination, i.e., that of the restricted.

10.2 The Ideal therefore is to the Idea the original (prototypon) of all things, which things all together, as deficient copies (ectypal), take from it the material for their possibility and by more or less approaching that Ideal still always fail infinitely far in reaching it.

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374 This then, to this extent, is like space as described in the Aesthetic, where it encompasses all shapes within itself as limitations; in contrast to most concepts, for example a table, which encompasses all tables under its concept.
11.1 So then all possibility of things (of the synthesis of the manifold with respect to their content) is considered as derived and only that of this all possibility, which encloses all reality within itself, as original.\textsuperscript{375}

11.2 For all denials (which are still the only predicates, whereby every other being allows of being distinguished from the most real being) are merely restrictions of a greater, and finally then the highest, reality. Thus they presuppose this, and with respect to the content are merely derived from it.

11.3 All manifold of things is just a plural manner for restricting the concept of the highest reality, which concept is its common substratum, as all figures are possible only as diverse ways of restricting infinite space.

11.4 Hence the object of its Ideal, situated merely in reason, is also termed the original being (\textit{ens originarium}), and to the extent it has none above itself, the highest being (\textit{ens summum}), and to the extent everything, as conditioned, stands under it, the being of all beings (\textit{ens entium}).

11.5 But all this does not signify the objective relationship of an actual object to other things, but rather of the Idea to concepts, and, concerning the existence of a being of such exceptional superiority, leaves us in complete ignorance.

12.1 Because we also cannot say, “an original being consists of derived beings,” in that each of these presupposes the former, and hence cannot constitute it, even so the Ideal of the original being will also have to be thought of as simple.

13.1 Hence the derivation of every other possibility of this original being, to speak precisely, will also not be able to be considered as a restriction of its highest reality and, as it were, its partition. For in that case the original being would be considered as a mere aggregate of derived beings, which is impossible according to the preceding, even if we represented it as such at the beginning in the first rough outline.

\textsuperscript{375} This may be like saying that there is a degree of reality.
13.2 Far rather, the highest reality would lie as foundation to the possibility of all things and not as an epitome to the foundation. And the manifold of the former would not rest upon the restriction of the original being itself, but rather upon its complete succession, to which then also our entire sensitivity, together with all reality in the appearance, would belong, which cannot belong to the Idea of the highest being as an ingredient.

14.1 Now if we then pursue this Idea further by hypostatizing it, we will be able to determine the original being through the mere concept of the highest reality as single, simple, totally sufficient, eternal, etc., in one word: determine it in its unconditioned completion through all predicaments.

14.2 The concept of such a being is that of God, albeit in the transcendental understanding. And so the Ideal of pure reason is the object of a transcendental theology, just as I indicated above.

15.1 Meanwhile this use of the transcendental Idea would still already overstep the limits of its determination and admissibility.

15.2 For, being the concept of all reality, it was positioned by reason as the foundation to the complete determination of things in general without requiring that all this reality be objectively given and make up a thing.

15.3 This latter is a mere fiction, with which we grasp together and realize [realisieren] the manifold of our Idea in an Ideal as a particular being, whereto we have no authority even to assume the possibility of such an hypothesis. Then also all consequences which flow out of such an Ideal, the complete determination of things in general, in aid of which the Idea alone was necessary, concern nothing and have not the least influence upon it.

16.1 It is not enough to describe the procedure of our reason and its dialectic. We must also seek to discover the sources of this in order to be able to explain this semblance, like a phenomenon of the understanding. For the Ideal, of which we are speaking, is based on a natural and not a merely arbitrary Idea.

16.2 Hence I ask, “how is it that reason comes to consider all possibility of things as derived from a single one, which lies as the basis, i.e., that of the highest
reality? And how is it then that reason presupposes this as contained in a special original being?"

17.1 The answer is presented of itself from the deliberations of the transcendental analytic.

17.2 The possibility of the objects of the senses is their relationship to our thinking, wherein something (namely the empirical form) can be a priori thought. But that which makes up the matter, the reality in the appearance (which corresponds to sensation), must be given, and without this it could not even be thought, and thus its possibility could not be represented.376

17.3 Now an object of the sense can only be completely determined if it is compared with all predicates of the appearance, and represented through them as affirming or denying.

17.4 But because that in what makes up the thing itself (in the appearance), namely the real, must be given, without which it could not even be thought at all,

and since that, in which the real of all appearances is given, is the united all-encompassing experience,

it follows that the material to the possibility of all objects of the sense, as given in an epitome (Inbegriff), must be presupposed, upon whose restriction alone all possibility of empirical objects, their distinction from one another and their complete determination can be based.

17.5 Now in fact no other objects can be given to us except those of the senses, and nowhere except in the context of a possible experience. Consequently nothing is an object for us if it does not presuppose the epitome of all empirical reality as a condition of its possibility.

17.6 According to a natural illusion we now look upon that as a principle, which would have to hold of things in general, which actually holds only of those which are given as objects of our senses.

376 And so it seems that “possibility” refers here to something transcendental and not merely logical.
17.7 Consequently we will hold the empirical principle of our concept of the possibility of things, as appearances, through the omission of this restriction, as a transcendental principle of the possibility of things in general.

18.1 But that we afterwards hypostatize this Idea of the epitome of all reality, arises because we dialectically transform the distributive unity of the experience employment of the understanding into the collective unity of an experience whole, and think to ourselves with this whole of the appearance a single thing which contains all empirical reality within itself, which then, by means of the previously mentioned transcendental subreption, is confused with the concept of a thing which stands at the peak of the reality of all things, to the complete determination of which it renders up the real conditions.*

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Therefore this Idea of the most real being, although it is a mere representation, is first effected, i.e., made into the object, then hypostatized, and finally, through a natural advance of reason for the completion of the unity, even personified, as we will soon adduce. This is so because the regulative unity of experiences rests not upon the appearances themselves (of the sensitivity alone), but rather upon the connection of its manifold through the understanding (in an apperception), thus the unity of the highest reality and the thorough determinability (possibility) of all things seem to lie in a supreme understanding, thus in an intelligence.
The Third Part

3rd Section - The Foundations of Proof of Speculative Reason for Inferring the Existence of a Supreme Being.

1.1 Regardless of this compelling need for reason to presuppose something which is able to lie completely as foundation to the entire determination of its concepts, it still notices far too easily the idyllic and merely poetic aspects of such a presupposition, and will not be convinced in that way alone to immediately assume a mere self-creation of its thinking as an actual being. At least it would not do this if it were not compelled from elsewhere to seek somewhere its rest in the regression from the conditioned, which is given, to the unconditioned, which indeed on its own and with respect to its mere concept is not given as actual, but which alone can complete the series of the conditions conducted to its foundations.

1.2 Now this is the natural path which every human reason takes, even the most common, although not everyone endures in this.

1.3 It does not start from concepts, but rather from common experience, and therefore places something existing as the foundation.

1.4 But this floor sinks if it does not rest upon the immovable boulders of the absolute necessity.

1.5 But even this sways without support if yet apart from, and under, it there is empty space, and it does not itself fill up everything and in that way leave no more place for the “why,” i.e., is infinite with respect to reality.

2.1 If something exists, be what it may, it must also be admitted that some kind of something exists necessarily.

2.2 For the contingent exists only under the condition of another condition as its cause, and of this the conclusion holds further to a cause which is not contingent and precisely for that reason is necessarily present without conditions.

2.3 That is the argument on which reason bases its advance to the ultimate being.
3.1 Now reason looks about for the concept of a being which befits such a superiority of existence as the unconditioned necessity. It does this not so much in order then to infer from its concept a priori to its existence (for, if it dared to do this, it would only have to examine among mere concepts in general and would have no necessity for laying a given existence as foundation), but rather only in order to find among all concepts of possible things that which has nothing of absolute necessity conflicting within itself.

3.2 For that still some sort of something would have to utterly necessarily exist, it holds according to the first conclusion as already decided.

3.3 Now if it can remove everything which is not compatible with this necessity, apart from one, then this is that utterly necessary being, regardless of whether we are able to comprehend its necessity, i.e., derive it solely out of its concept, or not.

4.1 Now that, the concept of which continues to aim within itself the “because” to every “why,” which is defective in no piece and in no intention, and which in any case suffices as condition, seems precisely for that reason to be that being suitable to the absolute necessity, because, with the self possession of all conditions to everything possible, it itself has need of no condition. Indeed it is not once capable of that. Consequently it satisfies, at least in one piece, the concept of the unconditioned necessity, in which no other concept can imitate, which (other concept), because it is deficient and in need of supplementation, shows no such mark on its own of the independence from all further conditions.

4.2 It is true that from this it is not yet able to be securely inferred that what does not contain within itself the condition, which is supreme and complete in every intention, would for that reason itself have to be conditioned with respect to its existence. But then it still does not have the single identifying mark of the unconditioned existence on its own, of which reason is empowered, in order to recognize through a concept a priori some kind of being as unconditioned.
5.1 The concept of a being of the highest reality therefore would lend itself best among all concepts of possible things to the concept of an unconditioned, necessary being, and, even if it did not completely satisfy this latter, we still have no choice, but rather see ourselves necessitated to hold to it, because we may not ignore the existence of a necessary being, but still admit our inability to find anything in the entire field of possibility which could make a founded claim to such superiority in existence.

6.1 The natural path of human reason therefore is constituted in this wise.

6.2 First it convinces itself of the existence of some kind of a necessary being.

6.3 In this, it recognizes an unconditioned existence.

6.4 Next it seeks the concept of the independence from all conditions and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient condition for all others, i.e., in that which contains all reality.

6.5 But the all without restriction is absolute unity, and entails the concept of a single being, namely the highest being, and so it concludes that the highest being, as ultimate foundation of all things, exists in an utterly necessary way.\(^{377}\)

7.1 To this concept a certain rudimentary aspect cannot be contested, if the discussion is of decisions, namely if the existence of some sort of a necessary being is once admitted, and one agrees with that that we would have to take our part, in which we would want to place that. For then we cannot choose more appropriately, or far rather, we have no choice but rather are necessitated into giving our voice to the absolute unity of the complete reality as the ultimate source of the possibility.

7.2 But if nothing compels us to resolve ourselves and we would rather leave this entire matter there until we were driven through the complete weight of the proof rudiments to the acclaim, i.e., if it is concerned merely with the estimation of how much we know of this task, and what we only flatter our-

\(^{377}\) There is a necessary being. But what else fits the bill but the being of all realities, and which must be a unity and thus the highest being, and so this being exists in a necessary way. And so this is our “best bet.” That’s the extent of the “proof.”
selves to know, then the above conclusion does not appear by far to be in such advantageous light and has need of some favor to supplement the lack of its legal claim.

8.1 For if we let everything be as good as it lies here before us, that namely first a proper conclusion occurs from some kind of a given existence (in any case also merely my own) to the existence of an unconditionally necessary being:

that secondly I would have to consider a being which contains all reality, thus also every condition, as utterly unconditioned, that consequently the concept of the thing which lends itself to the absolute necessity is found with this,

still it cannot at all be concluded from that that the concept of a restricted being, which does not have the highest reality, contradict for that reason the absolute necessity.

8.2 For even though I do not encounter in its concept the unconditioned, which the totality of the conditions already entails, so still it is not at all inferred from that, that its existence would just for that reason have to be conditioned; even as I cannot say in a hypothetical syllogism: where a certain condition (namely here the completeness with respect to concepts) is not, there the conditioned is also not.

8.3 We will far rather remain free to let all remaining restricted beings hold just as well of unconditionally necessary, even though we cannot conclude their necessity from the universal concept which we have of them.

8.4 But in this way this argument would have not procured for us the least concept of the properties of a necessary being, and would have accomplished nothing at all.

9.1 Nonetheless, to this argument there remains a certain importance and an esteem which, despite this objective insufficiency, cannot yet immediately be taken from it.
9.2 For suppose there were obligations which quite properly would be in the Idea of reason, but without any reality of the application upon us ourselves, i.e., without incentives [Triebfedern], if a highest being were not presupposed which could give effect and emphasis to the practical laws. In that case we would also have an obligation to follow the concepts which, even if they might not be objectively sufficient, still predominate with respect to the measure of our reason, and in comparison with them we still realize nothing better and more convincing.

9.3 The duty to choose would bring here the inconclusiveness of speculations out of equilibrium through a practical *appendium*. Indeed reason, as with the most attentive judge, would find no justification with itself, if under compelling motivational causes, although with only defective insight, it did not follow these rudiments of its judgment, about which we still at least are familiar with none better.

10.1 This argument, even if in fact it is transcendental (resting as it does upon the inner insufficiency of the contingent), is still so simple and natural that it is suitable to the most common human sense as soon as it is once led to it.

10.2 We see things altering, arising and passing away. They therefore or at least their state, must have a cause.

10.3 About each cause, however, which may ever be given in experience, we may in turn inquire.

10.4 Now where are we reasonably supposed to locate the supreme causality, except where also the highest causality is, i.e., in that being, which originally contains within itself the sufficiency to each possible effect, the concept of which also very easily comes into play through the single move to an all encompassing perfection.

10.5 This highest cause we move to an all encompassing perfection because we find it absolutely necessary to ascend up to it, and no reason for going out further beyond it.

10.6 Hence with all people we see with their most blind polytheism still some bits of monotheism glowing through, to which contemplation and deep specula-
tion have not led, but rather only a natural bent of the common understand-
ing becoming gradually understandable.

11.1 There are only three possible sorts of proof for the existence of God from speculative reason.

12.1 All ways which we may take in this intention start either from the deter-
mined experience and the particular constitution of our sense world recog-
nized by that and ascend, according to laws of causality, up to the highest cause apart from the world; or empirically it places as foundation only unde-
termined experience, i.e., any sort of existence; or finally it abstracts from all experience and concludes entirely a priori out of mere concepts to the exis-
tence of a highest cause.

12.2 The first proof is the physico-theological, the second the cosmological and the third the ontological proof.

12.3 More of these there are not, and more there cannot be.

13.1 I will show that reason accomplishes just as little the one way (the empirical) as the other (the transcendental) and that it spreads its wings in vain to come out beyond the sense world through the mere power of speculation.

13.2 But concerning the order in which these ways of proof must be tested, it will be precisely the reverse of the order that gradually expanding reason takes, and in which we also have first positioned them.

13.3 For it will show that although experience gives the first impetus to that, still merely the transcendental concepts leads reason in this its striving and carves out the goal in all such attempts, which it has set for itself.

13.4 I will start with the assessment of the transcendental proof therefore and afterwards see what the addition of the empirical can do for the enlargement of its power of proof.
Third Main Part

4th Section - Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God

1.1 From what has preceded it is clear that the concept of an absolutely necessary being is a pure, rational concept. This makes it a mere Idea, the objective reality of which is not at all proven by reason having need of it. It also gives instructions concerning a certain, albeit unreachable, completion. Indeed this actually serves more in limiting the understanding than in expanding it to new objects. 378

1.2 Now here we have something that is strange and counter-intuitive. The conclusion from a given existence in general to some sort of an utterly necessary being seems to be compelling and proper. And yet in this we have arrayed rigidly against us all the conditions of the understanding in making a concept of such a necessity. 379

2.1 People have always spoken of the absolutely necessary being. And they have been more concerned with whether and how someone were able even to think a thing of this sort than with proving its existence.

2.2 Now a nominal explanation of this concept is quite easy. It is something, the non-existence of which is impossible. But with this we do not gain at all in insight regarding the conditions which make it possible to consider the non-existence of something as absolutely unthinkable. Nor do we gain with regard to what we actually want to know, i.e., whether or not we actually think anything through this concept.

2.3 Indeed the employment of the word “unconditional,” discarding all conditions which the understanding always has need of in order to consider something as necessary, does not at all make understandable to me whether I think something through a concept of an unconditionally necessary thing, or perhaps whether I think nothing whatsoever.

378 The understanding is stymied anytime there is a limit to the regress of the conditions.

379 Understanding always looks for another, earlier cause for any given cause.
3.1 Moreover some have believed to announce this concept, which is ventured haphazardly and finally becoming quite familiar, through a multitude of examples such that all further demands about its comprehension arose entirely unnecessarily.

3.2 Every proposition of geometry, e.g., that a triangle have three angles, is utterly necessary, and so we spoke of an object which lies entirely outside the sphere of our understanding as though we would understand entirely well what we wanted to say about it with the concept.\textsuperscript{380}

4.1 Without exception all proffered examples are taken only from judgments, and not from things and their existence.

4.2 But the unconditioned necessity of the judgments is not an absolute necessity of things.

4.3 For the absolute necessity of the judgments is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the predicates in the judgment.

4.4 The previous proposition did not say that three angles were utterly necessary, but only that under the condition that a triangle exists (is given), three angles exist also in a necessary way (in it).

4.5 Nonetheless this logical necessity has proven so great a power of its illusion that by having made a concept a priori of a thing, which concept was so arranged that in the opinion of some it comprehended the existence simultaneously in its scope, some believed themselves able safely to conclude from this: that because this concept of the existence necessarily befitted the object, i.e., under the condition of my granting this thing as given (as existing), its existence was also granted necessarily (according to the rule of identity), and hence this being itself were utterly necessary, because its existence is thought simultaneously in a concept assumed at will and under the condition of my granting its object.

\textsuperscript{380} And so we assume we can speak also of the necessary being.
5.1 If I remove the predicate in an identical judgment and retain the subject, then a contradiction arises and hence I say this befits the subject in a necessary way.

5.2 But if I remove the subject together with the predicate, then no contradiction arises; for there is nothing remaining which could be contradicted.

5.3 To grant a triangle and yet eliminate the three angles, is contradictory. But if we eliminate the triangle together with its three angles, there is no contradiction.

5.4 It is exactly the same with the concept of an absolutely necessary being.

5.5 If you remove the existence of that, you remove the thing itself with all its predicates. From whence then is the contradiction supposed to arise?

5.6 Outwardly there is nothing which would be contradicted, for the thing is not supposed to be outwardly necessary. Inwardly there is also nothing, for by eliminating the thing itself, you have simultaneously eliminated all internal-ity.

5.7 God is all power. That is a necessary judgment.

5.8 The omnipotence cannot be eliminated if you grant a divinity, i.e., an infinite being, with the concept of which this is identical.

5.9 But if you say that there is no God, then neither the omnipotence or any other of its predicates is given; for they are all together eliminated with the subject, and not the least contradiction is indicated in this thought.

6.1 You see therefore that if I eliminate the predicate of a judgment together with the subject, an inner contradiction can never arise, let the predicate be what it will.

6.2 Now no refuge remains to you other than saying that there are subjects which cannot be eliminated at all, which therefore must remain.
6.3 But that would be saying that there are utterly necessary subjects, a presupposition, the correctness of which I have just doubted and the possibility of which you wanted to show me.

6.4 For I cannot make the least concept of a thing which, if it were eliminated with all its predicates, would leave behind a contradiction. And without the contradiction, I have, through mere, pure concepts a priori, no identifying mark of the impossibility.

7.1 Against all these universal conclusions (which no person can deny) you present a case, which you in fact set up as a proof, that there is still one concept, and indeed only this one, where the not-being or the elimination of its object is contradictory in itself. This is the concept of the most real being.

7.2 It has, you say, all reality, and you are justified in assuming such a being as possible (which I concede for the moment, although the concept not contradicting itself does not in any way prove the possibility of the object).*

7.3 Now together with all reality, existence is also comprehended. Therefore the existence lies in the concept of the possible.

7.4 Accordingly if this thing is eliminated, then the inner possibility of the thing is removed, and this is contradictory.

* Kant’s annotation.

1. The concept is always possible if it does not entail a contradiction.

2. That is the logical characteristic of possibility, and by means of this the object is distinguished from nihil negativum.

3. But it can still be an empty concept if the objective reality of the synthesis, whereby the concept is generated, is not specifically demonstrated. But, as was shown above, this always rests upon the principle of a possible experience and upon the principle of analysis (the propositions of contradiction).

4. This is a warning not to conclude immediately from the possibility of concepts (logical) to the possibility of things (real).

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381 Reality and existence are synonyms.
8.1 I reply, “you have already encountered a contradiction if you have already included the concept of existence in the concept of a thing which you wanted to think solely according to its possibility, have it whatever concealed name you wish.”

8.2 If we concede this, you have the day according to the semblance, but in fact you say nothing. For you have encountered a mere tautology.

8.3 Consider this proposition: “this or that thing (which I concede to you as possible, be what it will) exists.” Is this proposition an analytical or a synthetic proposition?

8.4 If the first, then through the existence of the thing you add nothing to your thought of the thing. But then in that case either the thought, which is in you, would have to be the thing itself, or else you have presupposed an existence as belonging to the possibility. But then you have concluded the existence according to the assertion out of the inner possibility. But that is nothing but a pitiful tautology.

8.5 The word “reality,” which sounds differently in the concept of a thing than “existence” in the concept of a predicate, does not make up for it.

8.6 For even if you term all positing “reality” (regardless of what you posit), then you have already posited and assumed as actual the thing with all its predicates in the concept of the subject, and you only repeat it in the predicate.

8.7 On the other hand if you admit, as every rational person must certainly do, that every existential proposition is synthetical, how do you want to assert that the predicate of existence does not permit of elimination without contradiction? For this advantage actually befits only the analytical, the character of which rests precisely in that.

9.1 I would indeed hope to destroy this broody subtlety without any digression concerning an exact determination of the concept of existence. But I have discovered that the illusion, in the confusion of a logical predicate with a real one (i.e., of the determination of a thing), overcomes almost all instructions.
9.2 Everything we wish can serve as a logical predicate. In fact the subject can be predicated of itself, for logic abstracts from all content.

9.3 But the determination is a predicate which enters additively beyond the concept of the subject and enlarges it.

9.4 Therefore it must not already be contained in it.\(^{382}\)

10.1 Being is obviously no real predicate, i.e., a concept of some sort of something which is able to come additively to the concept of a thing.

10.2 It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations on their own.

10.3 In the logical use it is solely the coupula of a judgment.

10.4 The proposition “God is omnipotent” contains two concepts which have their objects, “God” and “omnipotent.” The little word “is” is not yet a predicate over and beyond this, but rather only that which admits the predicate in reference to the subject.

10.5 If I now take the subject (God) together with all its predicates (among which also omnipotence belongs) and say “God is” or “there is a God” then I provide no new predicate to the concept of God but rather only [assert] the subject on its own with all its predicates, and indeed the object in reference to my concept.

10.6 Both must contain precisely the same (predicates) and hence nothing further can come additively to the concept, which expresses merely the possibility. And this for the very reason that I think its object as absolutely given (through the expression, “it is”).

10.7 And so the actual contains nothing more than the mere possible.\(^{383}\)

10.8 One hundred actual dollars do not contain the least bit more than one hundred possible dollars.

\(^{382}\) And so if you assume it already contained, you wouldn’t or couldn’t use it as a predicate (except in analysis). The ball is red versus the ball is is.

\(^{383}\) Here it seems that if you admit the possibility of this object, then you must also admit its necessity.
10.9 For since this (latter) signifies the concept, but the former the object and its position on its own, if this object contained more than the concept, my concept would not express the entire object, and therefore also not be the suitable concept of it.

10.10 But in my financial state there is more with one hundred actual dollars than with their mere concept (i.e., their possibility).

10.11 For the object, with the actuality, is not merely contained analytically in my concept, but rather adds synthetically to my concept (which is a determination of my state) without this hundred dollars of my thinking becoming itself increased in the least through this existence, which is apart from my concept.

11.1 Hence if I think a thing through whatever and however many predicates I wish (even in a complete determination), then by additionally granting that this thing is, nothing at all comes additively to the thing.

11.2 For otherwise, not just the same thing, but rather more would exist than I had thought in the concept, and I would not say that precisely the object of my concept exists.

11.3 If I also even think to myself all reality apart from one in a thing, then by saying “such a defective thing exists” the lacking reality does not come additively, but rather it exists precisely burdened with the same deficiency as I thought it. Otherwise something else than I thought would exist.

11.4 If I now think of a being as the highest reality (without deficiency), there remains yet always the question as to whether or not it exists.

11.5 For although nothing of the possible real content of any thing in general is lacking in my concept, still something is lacking in the relationship to the entire state of my thinking, namely that the recognition of that object also be a posteriori possible.

11.6 And here also the cause of the difficulties prevailing with this is indicated.

11.7 Were the discussion of an object of the senses, I would not be able to confuse the existence of the thing with the mere concept of the thing.
11.8 For through the concept the object is thought as harmonious only with the universal conditions of a possible empirical recognition in general. But through the existence it is thought as contained in the context of the entire experience. For since through the connection with the content of the entire experience the concept of the object is not increased in the least, but our thinking obtains one more possible perception through that.\textsuperscript{384}

11.9 On the other hand, if we want to think the existence alone through the pure category, then it is no marvel that we can render no identifying mark for distinguishing it from the mere possibility.

12.1 Our concept of an object therefore may contain what and how much it will, still we must go out from it in order to ascribe existence to that object.

12.2 With objects of the senses this happens through the cohesion with any one of my perceptions according to empirical laws. But for objects of pure thinking, there is no means at all for recognizing their existence, because it would have to be recognized entirely a priori. But our consciousness of all existence (be it immediate through perception, or through conclusions, which connect something with the perception) belongs entirely to the unity of experience, and an existence apart from this field cannot indeed be declared utterly as impossible, but it is a presupposition which we can in no way justify.

13.1 The concept of a highest being is an Idea which is very useful for several purposes. But precisely because it is a mere Idea, it is entirely incapable of expanding our recognition by means of it alone with regard to what exists.

13.2 It does not even empower enough to teach us with regard to the possibility of a multiplicity (\textit{Mehreren}).

13.3 The analytical, identifying mark of the possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in the mere positing (of realities), can indeed not be contested with it. But since the connection of all real properties in one thing is a synthesis, concerning the possibility of which we cannot a priori judge because the realities are not given to us specifically; and even if they were,

\textsuperscript{384} This harkens back to the first two Postulates of Empirical Thinking.
no judgment at all takes place anywhere in that because the identifying mark of the possibility of synthetic recognitions must always be counted only in experience, but to which the object of an Idea cannot belong. Hence the renowned Leibniz did not by far perform that of his own self flattery, namely the penetration a priori of the possibility of such a sublime, Ideal being.

14.1 Therefore all exertion and work are lost on that famous, ontological (cartesian) proof of the existence of a highest being out of concepts, and a human might just as easily become richer in insight out of mere Ideas as a merchant in assets if, in order to improve his state, he wanted to add some zeros to his checkbook balance.
The Third Part

5th Section - Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God

1.1 Claiming to contrive out of an arbitrarily fabricated Idea the existence of the object itself corresponding to it was something entirely unnatural and a mere novelty of the scholastic wit.

1.2 In fact, no one would ever have attempted it in this way if the need of our reason for assuming some sort of necessity for existence in general did not precede (by means of which necessity one could stop in the ascension), and since this necessity must be unconditioned and a priori certain, were reason not compelled to seek a concept which, where possible, satisfied such a demand, and gave an existence to be recognized completely a priori.\(^{385}\)

1.3 Now some believed to find this in the Idea of a most all real being, and so this was used only for the more determined information about that concerning which they were already convinced or persuaded elsewhere that it would have to exist, namely the necessary being.

1.4 Still they concealed this natural path of reason and, instead of ending with this concept, attempted to begin with it in order to derive the necessity of the existence out of it, which it still was only determined to supplement.

1.5 Now from this arose the miscarried ontological proof, which entails nothing sufficient for the natural and healthy understanding, nor for the scholastically proper test.

2.1 The cosmological proof, which we want to examine now, retains the connection of the absolute necessity with the highest reality, but instead of concluding from the highest reality to the necessity in existence as the previous proof sought to do, it far rather concludes from the unconditioned necessity, given previously, of some sort of a being to its unlimited reality and in this way brings everything to the track of, I do not know whether rational or ra-

\(^{385}\) In other words we would never have even cared about an ontological proof, for it would seem so futile and contrived. What was needed was a necessary existence, and then it might be worthwhile to consider the ontological proof, albeit only in disguise.
tionally contrived, but at least a manner of conclusion which entails the greatest persuasion not only for the common, but even also for the speculative understanding. In this way then it obviously draws the first base lines for all proofs of the natural theology, to which we have always followed, and furthermore will follow, we may decorate and camouflage it through as much ornamentation and flourish as we wish.

2.2 The proof, which Leibniz also termed the a *contingentia mundi*, we now want to place before our eyes and subject to test.\(^{386}\)

3.1 It goes like this: “if something exist, then an utterly necessary being must also exist.

3.2 “Now I at least exist myself: Therefore an utterly necessary being exists.”

3.3 The minor proposition contains an experience, the major proposition the conclusion from an experience in general to the existence of the necessary.*

3.4 The proof therefore actually commences from experience, thus it is not conducted entirely a priori or ontologically, and because the object of all possible experience is called “world,” it is termed “cosmological proof.”

3.5 Since it abstracts from every particular property of the objects of experience, whereby this world may be distinguished from every possible world, it is already distinguished in its terminology also from the physico-theological proof, which needs observations of the particular constitution of our sense world as foundations for its proof.

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 This conclusion is too well known for us to need to present it here in detail.

1.2 It depends upon the alleged transcendental natural law of causality, that everything contingent has its cause which, if in turn it is contingent, must have its cause just as well, until the series of the causes subordinated to one another must end with an utterly necessary cause, without which it would have no completion.

4.1 Now the proof concludes further:

“The necessary being can be determined only in a single manner, i.e., with respect to all possible, opposed predicates, only through one of each of them; consequently it must be completely determined through its concept.

4.2 “Now only a single concept of a thing is possible which completely determines this a priori, namely that of the entis realissimi. Therefore the concept of the most all real being is the only one, through which a necessary being can be thought, i.e., a highest being exists in a necessary way.”

5.1 In this cosmological argument so many rational principles come together that speculative reason seems to have called into play here its entire dialectical art in order to produce the greatest possible transcendental semblance.

5.2 However we want to place its examination to the side for the moment in order only to reveal a list of the these, by means of which it advances an old argument in a disguised shape for a new one, and appeals to the agreement of two witnesses, namely a pure rational witness and another from an empirical certification, since it is still only the first one which changes its clothes and voice in order to be held as a second one.

5.3 In order to very securely lay its foundation, this proof is footed upon experience and in this way gives itself the appearance as though it were distinguished from the ontological proof which places its entire trust on obviously pure concepts a priori.

5.4 But the cosmological proof avails itself of this experience only in order to make a single step, namely to the existence of a necessary being in general.

5.5 What kind of properties this have, the empirical proof foundation cannot teach but rather reason departs there entirely from it and researches behind sheer concepts: namely what kind of properties any absolutely necessary being in general would have to have, i.e., among all possible things, which contains in itself the requisite conditions (requista) for an absolute necessity.

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387 And since a necessary being must be thought, and this all real is the only one that can be thought, it follows, etc.
5.6 Now it believes to encounter singularly and alone this requisite in the concept of an all real being and then concludes: that that is the utterly necessary being.

5.7 But it is clear that we presuppose here that the concept of a being of the highest reality completely suffices for the concept of the absolute necessity in the existence, i.e., it can be concluded from the latter to the former, a proposition which the ontological proof asserted, which we therefore assume in the cosmological proof and lay as foundation, where we still had wanted to avoid it.

5.8 For the absolute necessity is an existence from mere concepts.

5.9 Now if I say that the concept of the entis realissimi is such a concept, and indeed the only one which is fit for the necessary existence and adequate to it, then I must also admit that the latter can be inferred from it.

5.10 Therefore there is actually only the ontological proof from sheer concepts which contains all force of proof in the so-called cosmological one, and the alleged experience is entirely idle, perhaps in order to lead us only to the concept of the absolute necessity, but not in order to establish this on some sort of a determined thing.

5.11 For as soon as we have this as our intention, we must immediately leave all experience and seek among pure concepts, which of them would contain the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely necessary being.

5.12 But if only the possibility of such a being is penetrated in such a way, then its existence is also established; for it says as much as: among all possibility there is one which entails absolute necessity, i.e., this being exists utterly necessarily.

6.1 All illusions in inference are revealed most easily if we place them before us in a scholastically proper manner.

6.2 Here is such a presentation.
7.1 If the proposition “every utterly necessary being is simultaneously the most all real being” (which is the nervus probandi of the cosmological proof) is proper, then it, as all affirming judgments, must at least permit of reversal per accidens. Therefore some most all real beings are simultaneously utterly necessary beings.

7.2 But now an ens realissimum is distinguished from another in no piece and therefore what holds for some contained under this concept, holds also for all.

7.3 Thus I will also be able (in this case) to utterly reverse it, i.e., every most all real being is a necessary being.

7.4 Now because this proposition is a priori determined merely out of its concepts, the mere concept of the most real being must also entail its absolute necessity; which is precisely what the ontological proof asserted and the cosmological did not want to acknowledge, but nonetheless underlay to its conclusions, though in a concealed way.

8.1 So then the second way, which speculative reason takes in order to prove the existence of the highest being, is not only equally deceptive with the first, but even has this fault on its own, that it commits an ignoratio elenchi by promising to conduct us on a new path, but, after a little digression, brings us back in turn to the old way which we had abandoned for the sake of this one.388

9.1 Previously and briefly I had stated that in this cosmological argument, an entire haunt of dialectic presumptions are concealed, which the transcendental critique can easily discover and destroy.

9.2 At this point I will only mention them and leave it to the already practiced reader to further research the deceptive principles and to eliminate them.

10.1 There is found, for example, 1. the principle for concluding from the contingent to a cause, which is only of significance in the sense world, and which makes no sense whatsoever apart from that.

10.2 For the mere intellectual concept of the contingent cannot at all produce any synthetic proposition such as that of causality. Indeed the principle of causality has no meaning and no identifying mark of its employment at all except in the sense world; but it is precisely here that it was supposed to serve in order to go out beyond the sense world.

10.3 2. The principle for concluding from the impossibility of an infinite series of given causes beyond each other in the sense world to a first cause, which the principles of rational usage even in experience cannot justify to us, and certainly not expand this principle beyond that (to which this chain cannot be lengthened at all).

10.4 3. The false satisfaction of reason, with respect to the completion of this series, whereby we finally remove all conditions, without which still no concept of a necessity can take place, and then, since we can comprehend no further, assume this to be a completion of our concept.

10.5 4. The confusion of the logical possibility of a concept of an all-unified reality (without internal contradiction) with the transcendental one, which has need of a principle of the feasibility of such a synthesis, but which in turn can only go to the field of possible experience, etc.

11.1 The artifact of the cosmological proof aims at merely eluding the proof of the existence of a necessary being a priori through mere concepts, which would have to be conducted ontologically, but where we feel ourselves entirely incapacitated.

11.2 In this intention we conclude from an actual existence (of an experience in general) which is laid as a foundation as well as it allows of doing, to any sort of an utterly necessary condition of that.

11.3 We then are not necessitated to explain this its possibility.

11.4 For if it is proven that it exists, then the question on behalf of its possibility is entirely unnecessary.

11.5 Now if we want to determine this necessary being closer with respect to its constitution, we do not seek what is sufficient to comprehend the necessity
of the existence from its concept. If we could do that then we would have no need of an empirical presupposition. Here we seek only the negative condition (\textit{conditio sine qua non}), without which a being would not be absolutely necessary.

11.6 Now that would apply indeed with any other manner of inference, from a given sequel to its foundation. But here, unfortunately, it concerns the condition (which we require for the absolute necessity) being able to be encountered in only a single being, which thusly would have to contain in its concept everything which is requisite to the absolute necessity and therefore makes a conclusion a priori to the same possible, i.e., I would also have to be able to conclude to what sort of thing this concept (the highest reality) would pertain to, that is absolutely necessary, and if I cannot so conclude (as I then must admit, if I want to avoid the ontological proof), then I am also frustrated on my new way and find myself in turn back from where I had started.

11.7 The concept of the highest being does indeed satisfy all questions a priori which can be raised about the inner determination of a thing, and for that reason is also an Ideal without equal because the universal concept simultaneously points this out as an individual among all possible things.

11.8 But it does not at all satisfy the question concerning its own existence, and for the sake of which alone it was undertaken. And to the inquiry of him who assumed the existence of a necessary being and who then only wanted to know which among all things would have to be viewed as such a one, we could not reply: “this is the necessary being here.”

12.1 It may indeed be allowed to assume the existence of a being of the highest sufficiency as the cause to all possible effects in order to facilitate for reason the unity of the explanatory foundations which it seeks.

12.2 However to take out so much that we can ever say “such a being exists necessarily” is no longer the modest expression of an allowed hypothesis but rather the impudent presumption of an apodictic certitude. For the recognition of what we allege to recognize as utterly necessary must also entail absolute necessity.
13.1 The entire task of the transcendental Ideal depends upon finding either a concept for the absolute necessity, or the absolute necessity for the concept of some sort of a thing.

13.2 If we can do the one, then we must also be able to do the other; for reason recognizes as utterly necessary only that which is necessary from its concept.

13.3 But both step entirely beyond all extreme endeavors for satisfying our understanding about this point, but beyond also all attempts to soothe it concerning its incapacity.

14.1 The unconditioned necessity which we so indispensably need as the last bearer of all things, is the true abyss for human reason.

14.2 Even eternity, as terribly sublime as Haller may portray it, does not by far make the staggering impression upon the mind; for it only measures the duration of things, but does not sustain them.

14.3 We cannot resist the thought, but also not endure it, that a being, which we also represent to ourselves as the highest among all possible beings, says to itself, as it were, “I am from eternity to eternity, apart from me is nothing, without that, which is something merely through my will; but from whence do I come?”

14.4 Here everything gives way beneath us and the greatest perfection, as the least, sways without support merely before speculative reason, which it costs nothing to let the one as well as the other vanish without the least resistance.

15.1 Many forces of nature, which express their existence through certain effects, remain unfathomable for us, for we cannot trace them back far enough through observation.

15.2 The transcendental object, lying as foundation to the appearances, and the foundation with that as to why our sensitivity has these rather than other supreme conditions, are and remain unfathomable for us, although, by the way, the matter itself is given, but not penetrated.
15.3 But an Idea of pure reason cannot be called unfathomable, because it has no certification of its reality to indicate further than the need of reason to complete every synthetic unity by means of that.

15.4 Therefore since it is not once given as a thinkable object, it is also not unfathomable as such. Far rather it, as mere Idea, must find its seat and its solution in the nature of reason and therefore must be able to be fathomed; for precisely in that consists reason, that we can give justification of all our concepts, opinions and assertions, be it out of objective foundations or, if they are a mere semblance, out of subjective ones.
Discovery and Explanation of the Dialectic Semblance in All Transcendental Proofs of the Existence of a Necessary Being

1.1 Both previously conducted proofs were attempted transcendentally, i.e., independently of empirical principles.

1.2 For although the cosmological proof places an experience in general as the foundation, the proof is still not conducted from any sort of a particular constitution of that experience, but rather out of pure rational principles in reference to an existence given through an empirical consciousness in general, and in fact abandons this introduction in order to support itself on sheer, pure concepts.

1.3 Now what in these transcendental proofs is the cause of the dialectical, though natural, semblance, which connects the concepts of necessity and highest reality, and recognizes and hypostatizes what still can only be an Idea?

1.4 What is the cause of the unavoidability of assuming something among existing things as necessary on its own, and still simultaneously of shuddering before the existence of such a being as before an abyss? And how do we begin so that reason even understands itself about this and achieves to a tranquil insight out of the swaying state of a timid and ever retracted acclaim?

2.1 It is something quite noteworthy that if we presuppose that something exists, we cannot avoid the consequence that some sort of something also exists in a necessary way.

2.2 Upon this entirely natural (albeit not for that reason secure) conclusion the cosmological argument is based.

2.3 On the other hand, I may assume a concept of a thing as I will; still I find that its existence can never be represented by me as utterly necessary, and that nothing hinders me, exist what will, from thinking the not-being of that same thing. Thus I would have to assume indeed some necessity to the existing in general, but be unable to think a single thing itself as necessary on its own.

2.4 That means I can never complete the return to the conditions of the existing
without assuming a necessary being, but I can never begin with that.

3.1 If I must think some necessity to existing things, but am authorized to think no thing as necessary on its own, it follows unavoidable from this that that necessity and contingency would have to concern and touch not things themselves, because otherwise a contradiction would take place, thus neither of these two principles are objective. Instead they can only be subjective principles of reason in every case, namely on the one hand to seek something which is necessary for everything which is given as existing, i.e., never to cease anywhere other than with an a priori completed explanation; but then on the other hand also never to hope for this completion, i.e., to assume nothing empirical as unconditioned, and to presume thereby a more remote derivation.

3.2 In such meaning both principles, which provide nothing except the formal interest of reason, can exist quite well with one another merely as in an heuristical and regulative manner.

3.3 For the one says, “you should so philosophize about nature as though there were a necessary first foundation to everything which belongs to existence, solely in order to bring systematic unity into your recognition by following such an Idea, namely: an imagined supreme foundation.” But the other warns you to “assume no single condition which concerns the existence of things as such a foundation, i.e., as absolutely necessary, but rather to hold yourselves always yet open to further derivation and hence to treat them always as yet conditioned.”

3.4 But if everything which is perceived on things must be considered by us as conditionally necessary, then also no thing (which may be empirically given) can be viewed as absolutely necessary.

4.1 But it follows from this that you would have to assume the absolutely necessary apart from the world; because it is supposed to serve only as a principle of the greatest possible unity of the appearances as their supreme foundation, and you could never achieve so far in the world, because the second rule commands you to consider all empirical causes of unity as derived every time.
5.1 The philosophers of old viewed every form of nature as contingent. But the material, according to the judgment of common reason, they held as original and necessary.

5.2 But if they had considered the material not as substratum of the appearances respectively, but rather on its own with respect to its existence, the Idea of the absolute necessity would have immediately vanished.

5.3 For there is nothing which utterly binds reason to this existence, but rather it can without conflict always eliminate such in thought. But it was also in thought alone that the absolute necessity lay.

5.4 With this persuasion therefore a certain regulative principle would have to lie as the foundation.

5.5 In fact extension and impenetrability (which together make up the concept of material) are also the supreme, empirical principle of the unity of the appearances and, to the extent it is empirically unconditioned, has on its own a property of the regulative principle.

5.6 Nonetheless, since every determination of matter, which makes up the real of that, thus also impenetrability, is an effect (action) which must have its cause, and hence is always yet derived, matter still does not lend itself to the Idea of a necessary being as a principle of all derived unity, because each of its real properties, as derived, is only conditionally necessary and therefore by itself can be canceled. But in this way the entire existence of the matter would be canceled. But if this did not happen, we would have reached empirically the highest basis of the unity which is forbidden through the second regulative principle, and so it follows that the material and, in general, what pertains to the world, is not suitable for the Idea of a necessary, original being as a mere principle of the greatest empirical unity, but rather that it would have to be placed outside of the world, since we then can always confidently derive the appearances of the world and their existence from others, as though there were no necessary being, and still can strive unceasingly to the completion.

6.1 The Ideal of the highest being according to this consideration, is nothing other than a regulative principle of reason to consider all connection in the
world as though it arose out of an all-sufficient, necessary cause in order systematically to base the rule of a unity on that and, with respect to universal laws, necessarily in the explanation of them, and is not an assertion of an existence necessary on its own.

6.2 But it is simultaneously unavoidable to represent this formal principle to one’s self by means of a transcendental subreption as constitutive and to think this unity hypostatically.

6.3 For, as with space, because it originally makes possible all shapes which are solely diverse limitations of that, even though it is only a principle of sensitivity, still just for that reason is held for a something existing utterly necessarily for itself and an object given a priori on its own. And it also happens quite naturally that since the systematic unity of nature can in no way be set up as a principle of the empirical usage of our reason, except to the extent we place as foundation the Idea of the most all real being as the highest cause, this Idea is represented in this way as an actual object, and in turn this as necessary because it is the supreme condition. Accordingly a regulative principle is converted into a constitutive one. This interpolation reveals in that way that if I now consider this supreme being, which with respect to the world was utterly (unconditionally) necessary as a thing for itself, this necessity is competent of no concept, and therefore would have to have been encountered in my reason as a formal condition of the thinking, but not as a material and hypostatical condition of the existence.
1.1 If then neither the concept of things in general nor the experience of any sort of an existence in general can perform what is required, there remains yet a means of seeking whether a determined experience, thus that of things in the present world along with their composition and arrangement, might not provide a basis of proof which could securely procure for us the conviction of the existence of a highest being.

1.2 Such a proof we would term the physico-theological.

1.3 Should this also be impossible, then there is no sufficient proof possible anywhere out of mere speculative reason for the existence of a being which corresponds to our transcendental Ideal.

2.1 After all the above remarks we will soon realize that the reply to this demand can be expected quite easily and concisely.

2.2 For how can an experience ever be given which were supposed to be adequate to an Idea?

2.3 The peculiarity of an Idea consists precisely in no sort of an experience ever being able to comport with it.

2.4 The transcendental Idea of a necessary, all-sufficient, original-being is so exorbitantly large, so highly sublime above all empirical data, which is always conditioned, that we to some extent can never rummage up enough material in experience to fill such a concept, and to some extent we grope about among the conditioned, and will continually seek in vain for the unconditioned, concerning which no law of any sort of an empirical synthesis gives us an example or guidance.

3.1 If the highest being were to stand in this chain of the conditions, then it would itself be a member of that series and, just like the lower members to which it is prefixed, would require still further examination concerning its yet higher foundation.
3.2 On the other hand, if we want to separate it from this chain and, as a mere intelligible being, not incorporate it into the series of the natural causes, then which bridge can reason take to achieve to such?

3.3 For all laws of the transition of effects to causes, indeed all synthesis and expansion of our recognition in general are positioned on nothing other than possible experience, thus merely on objects of the sense world, and can have a meaning only with regard to them.

4.1 The present world unfolds to us such an immeasurable display of diversity, order, purposefulness and beauty, pursuing it either in the infinity of space or in the infinite division of this world, that even with regard to the information which our weak understanding has been able to muster about it, all languages miss their impact about so many and unmistakable wonders, all numbers their power to measure and even our thoughts all limits, so that our judgment of the whole must disintegrate into a speechless, but still eloquent, astonishment.

4.2 In every case we see a chain of effects and causes, of purpose and means, regularity in commencing and ceasing, and since nothing has entered of itself into the state in which it is found, it always divides further to something as its cause, which makes just the same further inquiry necessary. And so in such a way the entire totality would have to sink into an abyss of nothingness if we did not assume something which, existing originally and independently of itself outside of this infinite contingency, held all this and, as the cause of its origin, secured to it simultaneously its continuation.

4.3 This highest cause (with regard to all things of the world), how large are we suppose to think it?

4.4 We are not familiar with the world with regard to its entire contents, even less do we know how to estimate its magnitude through comparison with everything which is possible.

4.5 But once we have need of an extreme and supreme being for the intentions of causality, what hinders us from placing it simultaneously with regard to the degree of perfection above all other possiblity, which we can easily
effect--though, of course, only through the frail outline of an abstract concept--if we imagine all possible perfection united in it as a single substance. For this (concept) is favorable to the requirement of our reason in the conservation of principles, and is subject to no contradiction in itself and is even conducive to the expansion of the rational employment in the midst of experience through the guidance which such an Idea gives to order and purposefulness, and is never decisively contrary to any experience.

5.1 This proof always deserved to be cited with respect.

5.2 It is the oldest, clearest, and most commensurate to common human reason.

5.3 It enlivens the study of nature, even as it has its existence from that, and always obtains new force by that.

5.4 It brings in purposes and intentions, where our observation would not have discovered them of itself, and expands our information about nature through the clue of a particular unity, the principle of which is apart from nature.

5.5 But this information works back again upon their causes, namely the occasioning Idea, and increases the belief in an highest originator up to an irresistible conviction.

6.1 Hence it would be not only discomforting, but rather also entirely to no avail, to want to withdraw something from the esteem of this proof.

6.2 Reason, which is unremittingly exalted through such mighty foundations of proof and, in its hands, always growing, though only empirically, cannot be so overwhelmed by any doubt of a subtlety derived speculation that it should not be torn out of that broody indecisiveness, just as from a dream, by a glance which it casts upon the wonders of nature and the majesty of the structure of the world in order to raise itself from magnitude to magnitude up to the supreme and unconditioned originator.

7.1 But even though we have nothing against the rational moderation and utility of this procedure, indeed have to commend and encourage it, we still cannot for that reason sanction the claims which might put this type of proof upon
indubitable certitude and upon an acclaim needful of no favor at all or foreign support, and it can in no way injure the good affair to tone down the dogmatic speech of a disdainful rational contriver to the tone of moderation and modesty, a belief sufficient for reassurance, although not precisely a commanding unconditioned subjection.

7.2 I assert, accordingly, that the physico-theological proof alone can never establish the existence of a highest being, but rather must always leave it up to the ontological proof (to which it only serves as an introduction) to supplement this deficiency. Thus this latter, the ontological proof, always contains yet the single possible basis of proof (to the extent only a speculative proof takes place at all) which no human reason can ignore.

8.1 The primary moments of the cited physical-theological proof are as follows:

1. Everywhere in the world are found clear indicators of an order according to a determined intention, executed with great wisdom, and in a whole of indescribable manifold of contents as well also as unlimited magnitude of scope.

8.2 2. To the things of the world, this purposeful order is entirely foreign and adheres only contingently to them, i.e., the nature of diverse things could not accord together of their own to the determined final intention through such diverse means, uniting themselves, if they had not been quite especially chosen and applied to that through an arranging, rational principle.

8.3 3. There exists therefore a sublime and wise cause (or several), which must be the cause of the world, not merely as a blindly effecting, all-empowered nature through fertility, but rather, as intelligence, through freedom.389

8.4 4. The unity of such allows of conclusion from the unity of a reciprocal reference of the parts of the world, as members of an artificial construction, to where our observation reaches, with certitude, but further, with regard to all basic propositions of analogy, with probability.

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389 This would seem to contrast current thinking regarding natural evolution with intentionality.
9.1 Let us not vex natural reason here about its conclusion, for it concludes from the analogy of some natural products with that which human art brings forth if it disrupts nature and necessitates it not to proceed according to its purposes, but rather to nestle up into that of ours (the similarity of that with houses, ships, clocks), that there be just a causality, namely understanding and will, lying as the foundation with it, if it derives the inner possibility of the freely effecting nature (which first makes possible all art and perhaps even in fact reason itself) from yet another, though superhuman, art, which manner of conclusion perhaps the most acute transcendental critique would not be able to withstand. Nevertheless we must still admit that if we simply were supposed to name a cause, we cannot proceed here more securely than according to the analogy with such purposeful generations which are the only ones whereof the cause and effect manner are completely known to us.

9.2 Reason would not be able to answer it by itself if it wanted to pass over from the causality, with which it is familiar, to obscure and indemonstrable foundations of explanation, with which it is not familiar.

10.1 According to this conclusion, the purposefulness and the synchronization of so many natural institutions would have to prove merely the contingency of the form, but not of the material, i.e., the substance, in the world. For to the latter would be yet required that it could be proven that the things of the world were unsuitable on their own to such order and accord, according to universal laws, if they, even with respect to their substance, were not the product of a highest wisdom. But for this conclusion entirely different foundations of proof than those of the analogy with human art would be required.

10.2 The proof therefore could at most establish a master world builder, who would always be very much limited by the fitness of the material which he worked. But it would not be sufficient by far to the great intention which we have in mind, namely to prove an all-sufficient originator. 390

10.3 If we want to prove the contingency of the material itself, then we would have to take refuge with a transcendental argument, but which is precisely what was to be avoided here.

390 This suggests to me the Muslim notion of Allah who is able to construct a sky dome which shames the best work of all humans, a dome without any visible supports; what we call the sky.
11.1 The conclusion therefore goes from the order and arrangement, so thoroughly to be observed in the world, as from a thoroughly contingent arrangement, to the existence of a cause proportionate to it.

11.2 But the concept of this cause must give us something entirely determined to be recognized of it and therefore it can be none other than that of a being which possess all power, wisdom, etc., in a word: a perfection, as an all sufficient being.

11.3 For the predicates of very great, astonishing, or immeasurable power and excellence give no determined concept at all, and actually do not say what that thing be on its own, but rather are only relational representations of the magnitude of the object which the observer (of the world) compares with himself and with his mental capacity and which comes out equally laudatory, both by enlarging the object, or, relative to that, making the observing subject smaller.

11.4 Where it concerns the magnitude (of perfection) of a thing in general, there is no determined concept except that which comprehends the entire possible perfection, and only the totality (omnitudo) of reality is completely determined in the concept.

12.1 Now I will not hope for someone to bring himself to penetrate the relationship of the world magnitude, observed by him (as regards the scope as well as the content), to the all-power; or of the world order to the highest wisdom; or from the world unity to the absolute unity of the originator, etc.391

12.2 Therefore the physico-theology can give no determined concept of the supreme world cause, and thus cannot be sufficient as a principle of theology, which in turn is supposed to make up the basic foundation of religion.

13.1 The step to the absolute totality is thoroughly impossible on the empirical path.

13.2 But now we still do that in the physical-theological proof.

391 This suggest the inability to recognize empirically the characteristics of the infinite supreme being that Kant speaks of in Religion.
13.3 With what means therefore do we then avail ourselves in coming beyond such a wide gulf?

14.1 After we have achieved to the admiration of the magnitude of the wisdom, power, etc., of the world originator and cannot come further, then we suddenly abandon this argument, conducted through empirical bases of proof, and go to the contingency of all that, concluded right at the beginning from the order and purposefulness of the world.

14.2 Now from this contingency alone we go, solely through transcendental concepts, to the existence of an utterly necessary something and from the concept of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the completely determined or determining concept of that, namely to an all encompassing reality.

14.3 The physical-theological proof therefore remaining stuck in its undertaking, suddenly jumped in this embarrassment to the cosmological proof, and since this is only a camouflaged ontological proof, it completed its intention actually merely through pure reason, even though at first it had denied all kinship with this, and had staked everything upon an illuminating proof from experience.

15.1 The physico-theologians therefore have no cause at all to be so coy about the transcendental manner of proof and to look down upon it, with the conceit of a clear sighted connoisseur of nature, as the webs of dark brooders.

15.2 For if they were only willing to test themselves, they would find that after they have gone a good ways along the floor of nature and experience and nonetheless still see themselves just as far from the object, which seems contrary to their reason, they suddenly abandon this floor and go over to the realm of mere possibilities where with the wings of Ideas they hope to come closer to that which had evaded all of their empirical exploration.

15.3 Finally, after they deem to have made a sturdy footing through such a mighty jump, they widen the henceforth determined concept (in the possession of which they have come and without knowing how) beyond the entire field of creation and expound the Ideal, which was solely a product of pure reason, although flimsy enough and far beneath the dignity of its object, through experience, still without wanting to admit that they have achieved to
this information or presupposition through any other footstep than that of experience.

16.1 Accordingly the cosmological proof lies as the basis to the physico-theological proof, but then the ontological proof to the cosmological, from the existence of a single, original being as highest being. And since apart from these three ways there is nothing else available to speculative reason, the ontological proof, out of sheer, pure, rational concepts, is the sole possible one if anywhere a proof of such a sublime proposition, widely beyond all empirical understanding, is possible.
The Third Part

7th Section - Critique of Every Theology per Speculative Principles of Reason

1.1 If I understand with theology the recognition of the original being, it is either that from mere reason (theology rationalis) or by revelation (revelata).

1.2 Now the first thinks its object either merely through pure reason by means of sheer, transcendental concepts (ens originarium, realissimum, ens entium) and is called transcendental theology. Or else the object is thought through a concept which has been borrowed from nature (of our souls) as the highest intelligence, and would have to be termed natural theology.

1.3 He who admits solely a transcendental theology, is termed a deist; he who also assumes a natural theology, a theist.

1.4 The first admits that in every case we can recognize the existence of an original being through mere reason; but our concept of that being is merely transcendental, namely only of a concept which has all reality, but which we cannot determine more closely.

1.5 The second asserts that reason is in a position to more closely determine the object according to the analogy with nature, namely as a being which contains within itself the original foundation to all other things through understanding and freedom.

1.6 Therefore the former conceives merely of a world cause with the term (it remaining undecided whether through the necessity of his nature, or through freedom), the latter a world originator.

2.1 The transcendental theology is either that which intends to derive the existence of the original being from an experience in general (without determining anything more closely about the world to which it belongs) and is called cosmo-theology. Or it believes to recognize its existence through mere concepts without aid of the least experience, and is termed onto-theology.

3.1 Natural theology concludes to the properties and the existence of a world originator from the constitution and the order and unity, which are encoun-
tered in this world, in which two causalities and their rules must be assumed, namely nature and freedom.

3.2 Hence it ascends from this world to the highest intelligence, either as the principle of all natural, or all moral, order and perfection.

3.3 In the first case it is called physico-theology, in the second case, moral theology.*

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 Not theological moral; for that contains moral laws which presuppose the existence of a highest world governor, since on the other hand the moral theology is a conviction of the existence of a highest being, a conviction based on moral laws.

4.1 Since with the concept of God, we are not used to understanding merely a blindly effecting, eternal nature as the root of things, but rather a highest being, which is supposed to be the originator of things through understanding and freedom, and since also this concept alone interests us, it follows that in strictness we could deny all belief in God to the deist, and leave for him solely the assertion of an original being or supreme cause.

4.2 However since no one need be blamed for wanting to deny something simply because he does not trust himself to assert it, it is milder and more fair to say “the deist believes in God, but the theist in a living God (summam intelligentiam).”

4.3 We want now to seek out the possible sources of all these attempts of reason.

5.1 Here I am content in explaining the theoretical recognition as such whereby I recognize what exists, but the practical recognition, where I represent to myself what is supposed to happen.

5.2 According to this, the theoretical usage of reason is that through which I recognize a priori (as necessary) that something be. Through the practical, however, we recognize a priori what is supposed to happen.

5.3 Now if either something is or is supposed to happen is undoubtedly certain, but still only conditioned, then still either a certain, determined condition can
be utterly necessary for it, or it can only be presupposed as arbitrary and contingent.

5.4 In the first case the condition is postulated (per thesin), in the second supposed [supponiert] (per hypothesin).

5.5 Since there are practical laws which are utterly necessary (the moral ones), if these necessarily presuppose some sort of existence as the condition of the possibility of their obligatory power, then this existence must be postulated because the conditioned, from which the conclusion goes to this determined condition, is recognized itself a priori as utterly necessary.

5.6 We will shortly show of the moral laws that they do not merely presuppose the existence of a highest being, but rather also, since they are utterly necessary in other considerations, postulate it properly, but of course only practically. For the present we set this type of inference to the side.

6.1 If the discussion is merely of what is (and not of what is supposed to be), then since the conditioned, which is given to us in experience, is also thought every time as contingent, the condition belonging to it cannot be recognized from this as utterly necessary, but rather serves only as a respectively necessary or, far rather, a needful, but on its own and a priori still, arbitrary presupposition for the rational recognition of the conditioned.

6.2 If therefore the absolute necessity of a thing is supposed to be recognized in the theoretical recognition, this could happen solely out of concepts a priori, but never as a cause in reference to an existence which is given through experience.

7.1 A theoretical recognition is speculative if it goes to an object or such concepts of an object to which we can achieve in no experience.

7.2 It is contrasted to the recognition of nature, which goes to no other object or predicates of that object except as can be given in a possible experience.

8.1 The principle for concluding from what happens (the empirically contingent) as effect to a cause, is a principle of the recognition of nature, but not of the
speculative.

8.2 For if we abstract from it, as a principle which contains the condition of possible experience in general and, omitting everything empirical, want to affirm it of the contingents in general, then not the least justification of such a synthetic proposition remains for noticing from that how I can go over from something which is present to something entirely diverse from it (termed cause). Indeed just as the concept of the contingent, the concept of a cause in such merely speculative employment loses all meaning, the objective reality of which allows of being made comprehendible in concreto.

9.1 Now if we conclude from the existence of the things in the world to their cause, this does not belong to the natural usage of reason, but rather to the speculative. And the reason for this is that the former does not refer the things themselves (substances) to some sort of cause, but rather refers only that which happens, therefore their states, as empirically contingent. That the substance itself (the material) were contingent relative to its existence would have to be a merely speculative recognition of reason.

9.2 But if the discussion were only of the form of the world, the manner of its connection and its alternation, I would want to conclude from that to a cause which were entirely differentiated from the world. In that case this would be a judgment of merely speculative reason, because the object here is not at all an object of a possible experience.

9.3 But then the foundation of the causality--which is valid only within the field of experience, and apart from that is of no use at all, indeed not even of any meaning--would be entirely disassociated from its determination.

10.1 Now I assert that all attempts of a merely speculative employment of reason with respect to theology are entirely fruitless and null and inane with respect to their internal constitution. Furthermore I assert that the principles of its employment regarding nature lead to no theology whatsoever. Consequently, unless we do lay moral laws as foundation or use them as guides, there can be no theology of reason at all.

10.2 For all synthetic principles of the understanding are of immanent employ-
ment. But to the recognition of a highest being a transcendent use of those is required, to which end our understanding is not equipped at all.

10.3 If the empirically valid law of causality is supposed to lead to the original being, then this being would have to belong simultaneously in the chain of the objects of experience. But then it, as all appearances, would itself in turn be conditioned.

10.4 But if we also permitted the jump out beyond the limit of experience by means of the dynamic law of the reference of the effects to their causes, what concept can this procedure provide us?

10.5 Certainly not with the concept of a highest being, because experience never offers us the greatest of all possible effects (except which is supposed to bear witness of its cause).

10.6 In order to leave nothing empty remaining in our reason, are we to be allowed to fill up this deficiency of the complete determination through a mere Idea of the highest perfection and original necessity? Then indeed this can be admitted as a favor, but not required from the propriety of an irresistible proof.

10.7 Therefore the physico-theological proof could perhaps provide emphasis very well to other proofs (if such are to be had) by connecting speculation with the perspective; but for itself, it prepares the understanding more for the theoretical recognition, giving it in that way a straight and natural direction, that being able alone to complete the transaction.

11.1 Therefore we easily see from this that transcendental questions permit only transcendental answers, i.e., out of sheer concepts a priori without the least empirical admixture.

11.2 But the question here is obviously synthetic and demands an expansion of our recognition out beyond all limits of experience, namely to the existence of a being which is supposed to correspond to our mere Idea, which can never be equivalent to any sort of an experience.

11.3 Now according to our above proofs, every synthetic recognition a priori is only possibly by expressing the formal conditions of a possible experience,
and all foundations therefore are only of immanent validity, i.e., they refer solely to objects of empirical reality, i.e., appearances.

11.4 Therefore also, through transcendental procure with an intention to the theology of a merely speculative reason nothing is provided.

12.1 But if someone wanted to draw all of the above proofs of the analytic into question rather than permitting himself to be robbed of the persuasion of the weight of the proof foundation used so long, then that person can still not refrain from satisfying the requirements, if I demand that he should at least justify to himself the winging beyond all possible experience through the power of mere Ideas.

12.2 With new proofs or with improved work of old ones, I would request him to excuse me.

12.3 For even though we have here very little choice, in that finally all merely speculative proofs still amount to a single one, namely the ontological, and therefore I need not fear becoming importuned particularly through the fruitfulness of the dogmatic knight of that sense-free reason. Although beyond that also, without fancying myself for that reason very disputatious, I will not give up the challenge of discovering the erroneous conclusion in every attempt of this manner and in that way of frustrating its presumption. Consequently the hope of better fortune with those, who are once used to dogmatic persuasion, still is never completely eliminated, and hence I hold myself to the single, reasonable requirement that he justify himself universally and out of the nature of the human understanding together with all remaining recognition sources about how he wants to begin expanding his recognition thoroughly a priori and stretching it up to where no possible experience and thus no means suffices for securing objective reality to any sort of a concept thought up by ourselves.

12.4 Regardless of how the understanding may have achieved to this concept, still the existence of its object cannot be found in that analytically, because the realization of the existence of the object consists just in this, that this is granted apart from the thought on its own.

12.5 But it is entirely impossible to go out on your own from a concept and, without following the empirical connection (whereby, however, every time
only appearances are given), to achieve to the discovery of new objects and extravagant beings.

13.1 Even though reason in its merely speculative employment is by far not adequate to this great intention, namely to achieve to the existence of a supreme being, it still has in this its very great utility for rectifying the recognition of that, in case it could be created somewhere else, to make it harmonious with itself and with every intelligible intention and to cleanse it from everything which might work against the concept of a source being and from all admixture of empirical limitations.

14.1 Hence despite all its inadequacies, the transcendental theology still remains of important negative employment and is a continuing censor of our reason if it has to do merely with pure Ideas, which, for that very reason, admit no other standard except a transcendental one.

14.2 For if once in another, perhaps practical, referral, the presupposition of a highest and all sufficient being, as supreme intelligence, asserted its validity without contradiction, then it would be of the greatest importance to precisely determine this concept on its transcendental side as the concept of a necessary and most-all-real being, and to remove what is counter to the highest reality, what belongs to the mere appearance (to the anthropomorphism in the wider understanding), and simultaneously to clear out of the way all contrary assertions, be they theistic or deistic or anthropomorphic. And this is very easy in such a critical treatment, in that to the same foundations, through which the incapacity of human reason, with respect to the assertion of the existence of such a being, is plainly set out, also necessarily suffices in proving the unsuitability of every counter assertion.

14.3 For where through pure speculation of reason will someone obtain the insight that there is no highest being, as the course foundation of everything, or that to it none of the properties belong, which we, with respect to their succession, imagine as analogical with the dynamic realities of a thinking being, or that in the latter case they would also have to be subjected to all limitations which the sensitivity unavoidably imposes upon the intelligence, with which we are familiar through experience?
15.1 For the merely speculative employment of reason therefore the highest being remains a mere, though still infallible, Idea; a concept which concludes and crowns the entire human recognition, whose objective reality can indeed not be proven in this way, but also not refuted. And if there were supposed to be a moral theology which can supplement this deficiency, then the previously, only problematic, transcendental theology proves its indispensability through determination of its concept and unceasing censure of a reason, often enough disappointed through sensitivity and not always accordant with its own Ideas.

15.2 The necessity, the infinity, the unity, the existence apart from the world (not as world soul), the eternity without conditions of time, the omnipresence without conditions of space, the omnipotence, etc., are sheer transcendental predicates, and hence its purified concept, which every theology has so very much need of, can be drawn merely out of the transcendental one.
Addendum to the Transcendental Dialectic

Concerning The Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason

1.1 The culmination of all dialectic attempts of pure reason not only confirms what we had already proven in the transcendental analytic, namely that all our conclusions which claim to lead us out beyond the field of possible experience are deceptive and without foundation, but also simultaneously teaches us in particular that human reason has a natural tendency to reach beyond this limit, that transcendental Ideas are just as natural to it as the categories are to the understanding. But there is this distinction: as the latter lead to truth, i.e., the correspondence of our concepts with the object, the former effect a mere, though irresistible, semblance, the delusion of which we can hardly check through the most acute critique.

2.1 Everything which is based on the nature of our powers must be purposeful and harmonious with their proper employment, if we can only prevent a certain misunderstanding and can discover the actual direction of that.

2.2 The transcendental Ideas therefore according to all supposition, will have their good and therefore immanent employment, although, if their meaning is mistaken and they are held for concepts of actual things, they can become transcendent in their application and for that reason deceptive.

2.3 For not the Idea on its own but rather merely its employment can be either excessive (transcendent) with respect to the entire, possible experience, or indigenous (immanent) after we aim it directly to an object allegedly corresponding to it or only to the understanding employment in general, with respect to the object with which it has to do. And all errors of subreption are always attributable to a deficiency of the power of judgment, but never to the understanding or to reason.

3.1 Reason never refers immediately to an object, but rather solely to the understanding and, by means of that, to its own empirical employment. Thus it procures no concept (of objects) but rather only orders them and gives them a unity which they can have in the greatest possible expansion, i.e., in the reference to the totality of the series. The understanding does not look at all
to this totality, but rather only to the connection through which, in all cases, series of the conditions come forth according to concepts.

3.2 Therefore reason has as its object actually only the understanding and its purposeful employment, and as the understanding unites the manifold in the object through concepts, reason for its part unites the manifold of the concepts through Ideas, in that it assumes a certain collective unity as the goal of the understanding activities, which otherwise are occupied only with the distributive unity.

4.1 I maintain accordingly that the transcendental Ideas are never of a constitutive employment such that concepts of certain objects were given by that, and in case that we so understand them, they are merely rationally contrived (dialectical) concepts.

4.2 But on the other hand they have an excellent, indispensable and necessary regulative use, namely to direct the understanding to a certain goal, with respect to which the directional lines of all its rules converge into one point which, even though it is indeed only an Idea (*focus imaginarius*), i.e., a point out of which the understanding concepts actually do not proceed in that that point lies entirely apart from the limits of possible experience, [that Idea] still serves there for procuring to them the greatest unity next to the greatest expansion.

4.3 Now from this indeed arises the delusion to us as though these directional lines sprouted forth from an object itself which lay apart from the field of empirically possible recognitions (even as the objects are seen behind the mirror surface), but this illusion (which we still can keep from deceiving) is nonetheless indispensably necessary if, apart from the objects which are before our eyes, we also simultaneously want to see what lie far to the rear from them, i.e., if we, in our case, want to fit the understanding beyond each given experience (a part of the total, possible experience), thus also for the greatest possible and most extreme expansion.

5.1 If we look over our understanding recognitions in their entire scope, we find that what reason arranges of that entirely in its own peculiar manner and seeks to produce, is the systematic of the recognition, i.e., their cohesion from a principle.
5.2 This rational unity always presupposes an Idea, namely that of the form of a whole of the recognition, which precedes before the determined recognition of the parts and contains the conditions for determining a priori the position and relationship of each part to the remaining ones.

5.3 This Idea postulates accordingly complete unity of the understanding recognition whereby this becomes not merely a contingent aggregate but rather a system cohering according to necessary laws.

5.4 Actually we cannot say that this Idea is a concept of an object, but rather of the thorough unity of this concept, to the extent it serves the understanding as a rule.

5.5 Such rational concepts are not procured from nature, but rather we inquire of nature in accordance with this Idea and hold our recognition as deficient as long as it is not adequate to that.

5.6 We admit that pure earth, pure water, pure air, etc., are hardly to be found.

5.7 Nonetheless we still need the concepts of them (which Therefore concerning the complete purity, have their origin only in reason) in order to determine pertinently the contribution which each of these natural causes makes on the appearance, and so we bring all material to the earths (the sheer burden, as it were), salts and ignitable nitrates (as the form), finally to water and air as vehicles (as machines, as it were, by means of which the former are effective) in order to explain, according to the Idea of a machine, the chemical workings of the materials among one another.

5.8 For although we do not actually so express ourselves, still such an influence of reason upon the partitioning of the explorer of nature is very easy to discover.

6.1 If reason is a capacity for deriving the particular out of the universal, then the universal is either already certain and given on its own, and then requires only judgmental power for the subsumption, and the particular is necessarily determined by that

6.2 (and this I want to term the apodictical employment of reason),
6.3 or the universal is assumed only problematically and is a mere Idea, the particular being certain, but the universality of the rules to this consequence yet a problem. Here several particular cases, which are certain all together, are tried on the rule to see whether they flow from it and, in this case, if it has the appearance that all particular, assignable cases succeed from it, we conclude to the universality of the rules, but from these afterwards to all cases which also are not given on their own.

6.4 This I will term the hypothetical employment of reason.

7.1 The hypothetical usage of reason from Ideas laid as the foundation, as problematical concepts, is actually not constitutive, namely not so composed that if we want to judge with all rigor, the truth of the universal rule, which is assumed as hypothesis, follows. For how will we know all possible consequences which, by following from that would assume principle, proves its universality?

7.2 On the contrary, it is only regulative in order to bring unity into the particular recognitions as far as possible, and to have the rule approach universality by means of that.

8.1 The hypothetical rational usage therefore goes to the systematic unity of the understanding recognitions, but this is the touchstone of the truth of rules.

8.2 Turned about, the systematical unity (as mere Idea) is solely only projective unity, which we must consider not as given on its own, but rather only as a problem. However it does serve in finding a principle for the multiple and particular understanding usage, and leading this and making it coherent also on cases which are not given.

9.1 But from this we see only that the systematic or rational unity of the manifold recognitions of the understanding is a logical principle in order, where the understanding alone does not achieve to rules, to help it further through Ideas and simultaneously to procure to the diversity of its rules unanimity under a principle (systematically) and hereby cohesion, as far as it allows of doing.
9.2 But whether the composition of the objects, or the nature of the understanding, which recognizes it as such, is determined to systematic unity on their own and whether we are able to postulate these a priori in certain measure even without regard to such an interest of reason and therefore say: “all possible understanding recognitions (including the empirical) have rational unity and stand under communal principles, from which they, in spite of their diversity, can be derived,” that would be a transcendental principle of reason which would make the systematic unity not merely subjective and logical as method, but rather objectively necessary.

10.1 We want to illustrate this through a case of the rational usage.

10.2 Among the diverse sorts of unity with respect to concepts of the understanding there belongs also those of the causality of a substance, which are termed “force.”

10.3 The diverse appearances of just the same substance indicates at first glance so much dissimilarity that we accordingly and in advance must almost assume as many diverse forces of that as the effects distinguishing themselves, like sensation, consciousness, imagination, memory, discernment, pleasure, appetite, etc., in the human mind.

10.4 At first a logical maxim commands the reduction of this apparent diversity as much as possible by discovering through comparison the concealed identity, and investigating whether or not imagination be combined with consciousness, memory, discernment, perhaps even understanding and reason.

10.5 The Idea of a basic force, of which, however, logic does not ascertain at all whether there be any such, is at least the problem of a systematic representation for the manifold of forces.

10.6 The logical, rational principle requires the production of this unity as far as possible, and the more the appearances of the one and other force are found identical among one another, the more probable it becomes that they are nothing except diverse expressions of one and the same force, which comparatively) can be called their base force.

10.7 Just so do we proceed with the others.
11.1 The comparative basic forces, in turn, must be compared among one another in order, by discovering their unanimity, to bring them closer to a single radical, i.e., absolute base force.

11.2 But this rational unity is merely hypothetical.

11.3 We do not maintain that such a one would have to be encountered in fact, but rather that we would have to seek them to the advantage of reason, namely for the erection of certain principles for the numerous rules, which experience may give to hand and, where it allows of accomplishment, in such way to bring systematical unity into the realization.

12.1 But if we attend to the transcendental usage of the understanding, it shows that this Idea of a foundational force in general is not determined merely as a problem for the hypothetical usage, but rather would allege objective reality whereby the systematic unity of the numerous forces of a substance are postulated and an apodictic rational principle erected.

12.2 For without ever having tested the unanimity of the numerous forces, indeed, even if it miscarries after all attempts to discover them, we still presuppose such a one could be encountered and this not only, as in the case mentioned, due to the unity of the substance, but rather where in fact many, although in certain degree similar ones, are encountered, as on the material in general, reason presupposes systematic unity of multiple forces, since particular nature laws stand under more universal ones and the conservation of principles is not merely an economical principle of reason, but rather an inner law of nature.

13.1 In fact and not to be overlooked is how a logical principle of the rational unity of the rules were able to take place if a transcendental one were not presupposed through which such a systematic unity, as attaching to the objects themselves, is assumed as necessary.

13.2 For by what authority can reason in the logical usage demand to treat the manifold of the forces which nature gives us to be recognized as a merely concealed unity, and to derive them out of some sort of a basic force, as
much as is in it, if it be freely admitted that it be just as well possible that all forces were dissimilar and the systematic unity of its derivation not conformable to nature? For then it would proceed directly counter to its determination, that it assumes for itself an Idea as goal which entirely contradicts the natural order.

13.3 We can also not say that it has previously taken up this unity from the contingent composition of nature according to principles of reason.

13.4 For the law of reason to seek them out is necessary. For without this we would have no reason at all, and without that we would have no cohering, understanding usage and in its absence no adequate identification mark of empirical truth and Therefore with respect to the latter, we must presuppose the systematic unity of nature thoroughly as objectively valid and necessary.

14.1 We also find this transcendental presupposition concealed in a marvelous way in the principles of the philosophers, even though they have not always recognized such in that or even admitted it to themselves.

14.2 That all manifolds of single things not exclude the identity of the type, that the numerous types must be treated only as diverse determinations of a few classes, but these of yet higher genus, etc., that accordingly a certain systematic unity of all possible empirical concepts, to the extent they can be derived from higher and more universal ones, would have to be sought: this is an academic rule or logical principle, without which no use of reason would take place, because we can conclude from the universal to the particular only to the extent that the universal properties of things are laid as the foundation, under which the particular stand.

15.1 But that also in nature such a unanimity is encountered, the philosophers presuppose in the renown academic rule: that one not multiply the beginnings (principles) without need (entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda).

15.2 By this we mean that the nature of things themselves presents material even for the rational unity, and the seemingly infinite diversity may not stop us from suspecting unity of the foundation properties behind them, of which the manifold can be derived only through multiple determinations.
15.3 This unity, even though it is a mere Idea, we have sought after so eagerly in all times that we rather found cause to mitigate the desire for it than to encourage it.

15.4 It was much already that the analysts could conduct all salts back to the two primary genus, acid and alkali, they even attempted to treat this distinction merely as a variety or diverse expression of one and the same basic material.

15.5 The numerous types of earths (the material of the stones and even of metals) they sought to gradually bring to three, finally to two; however, not yet satisfied with that, they could not remove from their thoughts a supposition that behind these varieties were yet a single genus, nor indeed avoid suspecting a communal principle to this and to the salts.

15.6 We might perhaps believe that this were a mere economic handle of reason to spare itself as much effort as possible, and a hypothetical attempt which, if it succeeds, gives the presupposed explanatory foundations probability just through this unity.

15.7 But such an egotistical intention is easily to be distinguished from the Idea, according to which everyone presupposes this rational unity is commensurable to nature itself, and that here reason does not beg, but rather commands, even though without being able to determine the limits of this unity.

16.1 If among the appearances which offer themselves to us there were so great a diversity, I will not say according to the form (for in that they may be similar to each other), but rather to the content, i.e., the manifold of existing beings, that even the most acute human understanding could not make discoverable the least similarity through comparison of the one with the other (a case, which can be easily thought), neither the logical law of the classification, nor any sort of a universal concept, not even an understanding would take place, as that is concerned solely with such.

16.2 The logical principle of classification therefore presupposes a transcendental one if it is supposed to be applied to nature (and I mean here objects which are given to us).
16.3 According to this, similarity in the manifold of a possible experience is presupposed (even if we cannot a priori determine its degree), because without this no empirical concepts, thus no experience, would be possible.\textsuperscript{392}

17.1 To the logical principle of genus which postulates identity, another one stands in opposition, namely that of the types, which has need of manifold and diversity of things regardless of their agreement under the same genus, and it gives the understanding the proscription to be equally attentive to both.

17.2 This principle (of the acuteness, or of the discernment capacity) severely restricts the rashness of the former (the unity), and reason indicates here a double interest, conflicting with each another. On one side there is that interest of the scope (the universality) with respect to the genus, and on the other, of the content (the definiteness) with intention to the manifold of the types; because the understanding in the first case thinks such indeed under its concept, but in the second, so much the more in the same.

17.3 This is also expressed in the very diverse thinking manner of the natural researcher, of whom some, hostile as it were to dissimilarity (especially who are speculative), look out always to the unity of the genus, the others (especially empirically inclined heads) seek uneasily to split nature into so much manifold that we would almost have to give up hope of judging their appearances with respect to universal principles.

18.1 To this latter way of thinking lies obviously also a logical principle as foundation, which has the systematic completion of all recognitions as intention, if I, commencing from the class, descend to the manifold, which may be contained under it, and in such way seek expansion to the system, as in the first case, since I ascend to the genus to supply simplicity.

18.2 For out of the sphere of the concept which describes a class, it is just as little to be seen how far the partition of that is to go as it is to grasp from the concept of space how material can occupy it.

\textsuperscript{392} This needs to be reconciled with the presupposition (of the Deduction of the Categories), necessary for experience, that all appearances are connected in a single nature.
18.3 Hence each genus requires different types, but these in turn different subtypes, and since none of the latter take place, which did not always have in turn a sphere (scope as conceptus communis), reason demands in its entire expansion that no type be viewed as the lowest on its own because, since it is still always a concept which only contains in itself that which is common to diverse things, this cannot be completely determined, thus not even once referred to an individual, consequently would always have to contain other concepts, i.e., subtypes, under itself.

18.4 This law of the specification could be expressed so: entium varietates non temere esse minuendas.\textsuperscript{393}

19.1 But we easily see that even this logical law would be without sense and application if a transcendental law of the specification did not lie as basis, which, of course, does not require of the things, which can be our objects, an actual infinity with respect to the diversities. For the logical principles, except that which solely asserts the indeterminacy of the logical sphere with respect to the possible division, gives no occasion to that. But it still enjoins the understanding to seek subtypes under every type which comes forth to us, and smaller diversities to every diversity.

19.2 For were there no lower concepts, then there would be no higher ones.

19.3 Now the understanding recognizes everything only through concepts; consequently, as far as it reaches in the division, never through mere perspective but rather always in turn through lower concepts.

19.4 The recognition of the appearances in their complete determination (which is possible only through understanding) requires an unceasingly advancing specification of its concepts, and an advance to yet always remaining diversities, whereof in the concept of the type, and yet more in the class, is abstracted.

20.1 Also a law of specification cannot be borrowed from experience, for this can give no disclosure going so far.

\textsuperscript{393} The variety of beings should not be rashly diminished.
20.2 The empirical specification soon comes to a halt in the distinction of the manifold if it has not been led through the already preceding transcendental law of the specification, as a principle of reason, to seek such and still always to suppose them even if they do not reveal themselves to the senses.

20.3 That absorbing earths are of various types (chalk and muriate earths) had need of an anticipation rule of reason for the discovery which makes it a task of the understanding to seek the diversity, by assuming nature so richly endowed to suppose them.

20.4 For we have understanding only under the presupposition of the diversity in nature, just as well as under the condition that their objects have similarity on their own, because just the manifold of that which can be embraced together under a concept, makes up the use of this concept and the occupation of the understanding.

21.1 Reason therefore prepares the field for the understanding
   1. through a principle of the homogeneity of the manifold under higher genus,
   2. through a principle of the variety of homogeneous under lower types;
   and, in order to complete the systematic unity, yet
   3. a law of affinity of all concepts, which commands a continuous transition of each and every type to every other one through a step wise growth of the diversity.

21.2 We can term them the principles of homogeneity, of specification, and of the continuity of the forms.

21.3 The latter arises by uniting the first two, after we have completed the systematic cohesion in the Idea both in the ascension to higher classes, and in descent to lower types. Then all manifolds are related to one another, because they originated all together through degrees of the expanded determination of a single supreme genus.

22.1 We can make the systematic unity under the three logical principles perceptible to ourselves in the following manner.
22.2 We can consider each and every concept as a point, which, as the standpoint of the observer, has its horizon, i.e., a number of things, which can be represented out of that and surveyed, as it were.

22.3 Within this horizon a number of points into infinity must be admissible, of which each in turn has its own more narrow range, i.e., every type contains subtypes, according to the principle of specification, and the logical horizon consists only out of smaller horizons (subtypes), but not out of points which have no scope (individuals).

22.4 But to diverse horizons, i.e., classes, which are determined out of just so many concepts, a communal horizon can be thought as drawn, out of which we survey them all together as out of a middle point, which is the higher class, until finally the highest class is the universal and true horizon, which is determined from the standpoint of the highest concept and embraces under itself all manifold, as genus, types and subtypes.

23.1 The law of homogeneity leads me to this highest standpoint, the law of specification to all lower ones and to their greatest variety.

23.2 But since in such way there is nothing empty in the entire scope of all possible concepts and since, apart from that, nothing can be encountered, it follows that out of the presupposition of that universal range and of the thorough division of that arises the principle non datur vaccum formarum, i.e., there are not diverse, original and first classes, which likewise were isolated and separated from one another (through an empty, separating space), but rather all multiple classes are only compartments of a single supreme and universal class. And out of this principle arises its immediate consequence datur continuum formarum, i.e., all diversity of the types border on one another and allow no transition to one another through a jump, but rather only through all lesser degrees of the distinction whereby we can achieve from one to the other. In brief there are no types or subtypes which (in the concept of reason) were next to each other, but rather there are yet always in-between types possible, the distinction of which from the first and the second is smaller than their distinction from one another.
24.1 The first law therefore prevents the digression into the manifold of diverse, original classes and commends the similarity. The second law in turn and on the other hand restricts this inclination to unanimity, and commands distinction of the subtypes, before one resorts with his universal concept to the individual one.

24.2 The third law unites those two by still prescribing the similarity with the highest manifold through the stepwise transition from one species to the others, which indicates a type of kinship of the diverse branches, to the extent that they all together are sprung from one trunk.

25.1 But this logical law of the *continui specierum (formarum logicarum)* presupposes a transcendental one (*lex continui in natura*), without which the use of the understanding would only be erroneously conducted through the prescription by perhaps taking a way diametrically opposed to nature.

25.2 This law therefore must rest upon purely transcendental and not upon empirical foundations.

25.3 For in the latter case it would come later than the system; but it has actually first brought forth the systematic aspect of the recognition of nature.

25.4 Behind these laws are also not concealed per chance intentions to a test, to be placed with them as mere attempts, although truly this cohesion, of course, where it applies, renders up a mighty basis for holding the hypothetically thought out unity as founded and therefore they also have their uses in this intention. Rather we see clearly with them that they judge the economy of the foundational causes, the manifold of the effects, and hence a resting kinship of the members of nature on their own as rational and conformable to nature, and these principles therefore entail their commendation directly and not merely as handles of the method.

26.1 But we easily see that this continuity of the forms is a mere Idea, to which a congruent object cannot at all be sighted in experience. This is true not only because the species are actually compartmentalized in nature and hence on their own must make up a *quantum discretum* and, if the stepwise advance in the kinship of that were continuous, it would also have to contain a true infinity of the between-members, which would lie within two given types,
which is impossible; but rather also because we can make of this law no de-
termined empirical usage at all, in that not the least identification of the af-
finity is indicated in that way, according to which and how far we have to
seek the degree-series of the diversity, but rather nothing further than a uni-
versal indicator, that we have to seek it.

27.1 If we transpose the order of the principles just introduced in order to place
them in conformity with the experience usage, then the principles of the sys-
tematic unity would stand about so: manifold, kinship and unity, but each of
these taken as Ideas in the highest degree of their completion.

27.2 Reason presupposes the understanding recognition, which is first applied to
experience, and seeks its unity according to Ideas, which go much further
than experience can reach.

27.3 The kinship of the manifold under a principle of unity, without detriment to
its diversity, does not touch merely things, but rather far more the properties
and forces of things.

27.4 Hence if, e.g., through a (not yet completely rectified) experience the course
of the planets is given to us as circular, and we find diversity, then we sup-
pose of them that which can alter the circle, according to a steady law
through all infinite between-degrees, to one of these deviating revolutions.
In other words the movement of the planets, which are not circular, will ap-
proximate more or less its properties and devolve to the ellipse.

27.5 The comets indicate a yet higher diversity of their trajectories, since they (as
far as observation reaches) do not even return in orbit; but we guess a para-
bolic course which is still kin to the ellipse and, if the long axis of the latter
is extended very far, cannot be distinguished from it in all our observations.

27.6 So according to the guidance of the principle, we come to unity of the class
of this trajectory in its shape, but thereby further to the unity of the cause of
all laws of the movement (gravity), from whence we afterwards expand our
conquests and also seek to explain all variety and apparent deviations from
those rules out of the same principle, and finally add even more than experi-
ence can ever certify, namely, to think up even hyperbolic comet trajectories
according to the rules of the kinship, in which these bodies entirely forsake
our sun world and, by going from sun to sun, unite in their course the more
remote portions of a world system, unlimited for us, which coheres through one and the same moving force.

28.1 What is remarkable with these principles and also alone occupies us is this: that they seem to be transcendental, even though they contain merely Ideas for compliance with the empirical usage of reason, to which the latter can follow only asymptotically, as it were. Nevertheless, as synthetic propositions a priori, they have objective, though undetermined, validity and serve as the rule of possible experience. They are also actually used as heuristic principles with good results in the treatment of that, still without our being able to bring forth a transcendental deduction of the same, which, as was proven earlier, is always impossible with respect to the Ideas.

29.1 Among the principles of the understanding in the analytic we have distinguished the dynamic, as merely regulative principles of the perspective, from the mathematical, which are constitutive with respect to the perspective.

29.2 Regardless of this, the cited dynamic laws are in every case constitutive with respect to experience by making possible a priori the concepts, without which no experience takes place.

29.3 In contrast to this, principles of pure reason cannot even be constitutive with respect to the empirical concepts because no corresponding schema of the sensitivity can be given to them and therefore they can have no object \textit{in concreto}.

29.4 Now if I depart from such an empirical usage of them, as constitutive principles, how will I yet secure to them a regulative usage and some objective validity with them, and what kind of meaning can they have?

30.1 The understanding constitutes an object for reason, just as the sensitivity constitutes an object for the understanding.

30.2 To make this unity of all possible empirical understanding actions systematic is an occupation of reason, even as the understanding connects the manifold of the appearances through concepts and brings it under empirical laws.
30.3 But the actions of the understanding, without the schemata of the sensitivity, are undetermined. Even so is the rational unity undetermined on its own also with respect to the conditions under which, and to the degree of how far, the understanding is supposed to systematically bind its concepts.

30.4 But although no schema can be made out in the perspective for the thoroughly systematic unity of all understanding concepts, still an analogy of such a schema can and must be given. And this is the Idea of the maximum for the compartmentalization and the union of the recognition of the understanding in a principle.

30.5 For the greatest and absolutely complete permits of determined thinking because all restricting conditions, which render an undetermined manifold, are removed.

30.6 Accordingly, the Idea of reason is an analog of a schema of sensitivity, but with the distinction that the application of the understanding concepts upon the schema of reason is not so much a recognition of the object itself (as with the application of the categories to their sensitive schema), but rather only a rule or principle of the systematic unity of all understanding usage.

30.7 Now since every principle, which a priori stipulates to the understanding the thorough unity of its employment, also holds of the objects of experience, though only indirectly, even so the principles of pure reason also have objective reality with respect to these objects. But this is not in order to determine something about them, but rather only to indicate the procedure according to which the empirical and determined experiential employment of the understanding can be thoroughly harmonized with itself by being brought into cohesion with the principle of the thorough unity as far as possible, and being derived from that.

31.1 All subjective principles, which are not taken from the composition of the object, but rather from the interest of reason with respect to a certain, possible perfection of the recognition of this object, I term maxims of reason.

31.2 So then there are maxims of speculative reason which rest solely upon its speculative interest even though it may seem that they were objective principles.
32.1 If merely regulative principles are considered as constitutive, they can be conflicting as objective principles. But if we consider them merely as maxims, then there is no true conflict but rather merely a diverse interest of reason which produces the severance in the manner of thinking.

32.2 In fact reason has only a single interest, and the clash of its maxims is only a diversity and mutual restriction of the method of satisfying this interest.

33.1 In such way, with the one rational contriver there prevails more the interest of the manifold (with respect to the principle of the specification), but with the other the interest of the unity (with respect to the principle of aggregation).

33.2 Each of these believes to have his judgment from insight into the object, and still bases it solely upon the greater or lesser attachment to one of the two principles, of which neither rests upon objective foundations but rather only upon the rational interest, and hence which could better termed “maxims” than “principles.”

33.3 If I see insightful men in dispute with one another about the characteristics of the human, the animals or plants, or indeed even of the bodies of the mineral realm, where some assume, e.g., particular characters of peoples massed in their origin, or also decided and faded distinctions of the families, races, etc., and others, in contrast, place their sense upon nature having made entirely identical lay-outs in this, and all distinction resting only on outer contingencies, then I need only to draw the composition of the object into consideration in order to comprehend that it lies much too deeply concealed from both for them to be able to speak from insight into the nature of the object.

33.4 It is nothing other than the two-fold interest of reason, where the former affects or takes the one interest to heart, but the latter the other, thus the diversity of the maxims of the manifold of nature or of the unity of nature, which allow of uniting easily enough, but as long as they are held as objective insights, not only occasion disputes but rather even obstacles which long delays the truth until a means is found for uniting the clashing interest and satisfying reason with that.
34.1 It is similarly composed with the assertion or attack of the much discussed law of the continuous gradation of the creatures, brought into play by Leibniz and especially supported by Bonet, which is nothing but a compliance with the principles of affinity, resting upon the interest of reason. For observation and insight into the arrangement of nature could not at all render it as an objective assertion.

34.2 The rungs of such a ladder, even as they can render us experience, stand much too far apart from one another, and our alleged little distinctions are usually in nature itself such wide gulfs, that nothing at all is to be accounted as intentions of nature to such observations (especially with such a great manifold of things, since it must always be easy to find certain similarities and approximations).

34.3 In contrast, the method of seeking out order in nature according to such a principle, and the maxim for considering such a one as founded in a nature, though undetermined where or how wide, is in any case a justified and pertinent regulative principle of reason. But this, as such, goes much further than experience or observation could accommodate, still without determining something, but rather only previously indicating to it the way to systematic unity.
**The Final Intention of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason**

1.1 The Ideas of pure reason can never again be dialectical on their own, but rather their mere misuse alone must make a deceptive semblance arise from them. For they are issued to us through the nature of our reason, and this supreme court of all rights and claims of our speculation cannot possibly itself contain original deceptions and illusions.

1.2 Presumably therefore they will have their good and purposeful determination in the natural makeup of our reason.

1.3 But the mob of rational contrivers cries as usual about absurdity and contradictions, and inveighs against the government, into the most intimate sphere of which he is not empowered to pierce, to whose beneficial influence he should also thank even for his maintenance and, in fact, for the culture which places him in a position to blame and condemn it.

2.1 We can avail ourselves of a concept a priori with no security, without having brought forth its transcendental deduction.

2.2 The Ideas of pure reason permit indeed no deduction of the type as with the categories; but if they are supposed to have at least some, even if only undetermined, objective validity, and not represent merely empty thought-things (*entia rationis ratiocinantis*), then their deduction must also be thoroughly possible, even if it also deviates widely from that which we can undertake with the categories.

2.3 That is the completion of the critical occupation of pure reason and this we now want to undertake.

3.1 There is a great distinction between something being given to my reason as an object utterly, or only as an object in Idea.

3.2 In the first case my concept goes to determine the object. In the second it is actually only a schema, to which no object is directly admitted, not even hypothetically, but rather which only serves in representing other objects to us by means of the reference to this Idea, according to its systematical unity, thus indirectly.
Accordingly I say “the concept of a highest Intelligence is a mere Idea, i.e., its objective reality is not supposed to consist in it referring directly to an object (for in such meaning we would not be able to justify its objective validity). Instead it is only a schema, ordered according to conditions of the greatest rational unity in the empirical usage of our reason, by our deriving the object of experience, as it were, from the imagined object of the Idea as its foundation or cause.”

Then we say, e.g., that “the things of the world must be so considered as though they had their existence from a highest intelligence.”

In such a way the Idea is actually only an heuristic and not ostensive concept, and announces not how an object is constituted, but rather how we, under its guidance, are supposed to seek the composition and connection of the objects of experience in general.

If we can only indicate that although the three-fold transcendental Ideas (psychological, cosmological and theological) were not directly referred to any object corresponding to them and their determination, nonetheless all rules of the empirical employment of reason lead to systematical unity and always expand the recognition of experience, but never can be counter to that; then it is a necessary maxim of reason to proceed according to such Ideas.

As this is the transcendental deduction of all Ideas of speculative reason, not as constitutive principles of the expansion of our recognition beyond more objects than experience can give, but rather as regulative principles of the systematical unity of the manifold of the empirical recognition in general, which are more added to and rectified within their own limits by that than could happen without such Idea through the mere usage of the understanding propositions.

I want to make this clearer.

In consequence of the cited Ideas as principles we want first to connect (in psychology) all appearances, actions and receptivity of our minds to the conduit of the inner experience as though that conduit were a simple substance which, with personal identity, exists durably (at least in life) while its
states, to which those of the body only belong as outer conditions, continuously alters.

4.3 Secondly (in the cosmology) we must follow the conditions of the inner as well as the outer appearances of nature in a never-to-be-completed investigation, as though that were itself infinite and without a first or highest member, even though for that reason, apart from all appearances, we do not deny the merely intelligible first foundations of that, but still need never bring them into the cohesion of the explanations of nature, because we are not familiar with them at all.

4.4 Finally and thirdly (with respect to theology), everything which may always belong only to the cohesion of the possible experience, we must so consider as though this makes up an absolute unity, though thoroughly dependent and always yet conditioned within the sense world, but still simultaneously as though the sum-total of all appearances (the sense world itself) had a single supreme and all sufficient foundation apart from its scope, namely an, as it were, independent, original and creative reason, in reference to which we so direct all empirical usage of our reason in its greatest expansion as though the objects themselves had arisen out of that original picture of every reason. This is not said to derive the inner appearances of the soul from a simple, thinking substance, but rather the former from one another according to the Idea of a simple being, nor to derive the world order and systematic unity of that from a highest intelligence, but rather from the Idea of a supremely wise cause, according to which reason at the connection of the causes and effects in the world, be best used to its own satisfaction.

5.1 Nothing at all keeps us from also assuming these Ideas as objective and hypostatical, apart alone from the cosmological ones where reason stumbles upon an antinomy if it will bring such forth (the psychological and theological do not contain such antinomies at all).

5.2 For no contradiction is in them. How then was anyone supposed to be able to contest their objective reality to us, since he knows just as little of their possibility in order to deny them, as we in order to affirm them?

5.3 Nevertheless, in order to assume something, it is not yet enough that no positive obstacle is opposed to it, and we cannot be allowed to introduce as actual and determined objects what are thought-beings which step beyond all
our concepts, though contradicting none, and do this upon the mere credit of its occupation of gladly completing speculative reason.

5.4 On their own therefore they are not supposed to be assumed, but rather only their reality holds as a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all recognition of nature, thus they are supposed to be placed as the foundation only as an analogy to actual things, but not as such on their own.

5.5 From the objects of the Idea we conceal the conditions which restrict our understanding concept, but also which alone make it possible for us to be able to have a determined concept of any sort of thing.

5.6 And now we think something to ourselves, concerning which we have no concept at all as to what it be on its own, but of which we still think to ourselves a relationship to the sum total of the appearances, which is analogous to that which have the appearances under one another.

6.1 If accordingly we assume such Idealistic beings, we do not actually expand our recognition beyond the objects of possible experience, but rather only the empirical unity of that experience through the systematic unity, to which the Idea gives us the schema, which thus holds not as a constitutive, but merely as a regulative principle.

6.2 For that we grant a thing corresponding to the Idea, a something or actual being, we have not said that we wanted to expand our recognition of things with transcendental concepts. For this being is laid as foundation only in the Idea and not on its own, thus only in order to express the systematic unity which is supposed to serve as the precept of the empirical employment of reason, still without making out something about it, what the foundation of this unity of the inner property of such a being be, on which it rests as cause.

7.1 So the transcendental and single determined concept which the merely speculative reason gives us of God, is deistical in the most precise understanding, i.e., reason does not once give us the objective validity of such a concept, but rather only the Idea of something, on which all empirical reality bases its highest and necessary unity. And we cannot think this to ourselves otherwise than according to the analogy of an actual substance which is the cause of all things according to rational laws, as far as our truly undertaking
to think it everywhere as a particular object, and not rather, satisfied with the
Idea of the regulative principle of reason, wanting to set aside the comple-
tion of all conditions of the thinking as exuberant for human understanding,
but which cannot exist together with the intention of a perfect, systematic
unity in our recognition, to which at least reason places no restrictions.

8.1 Hence now it happens that if I assume a divine being, I have indeed neither
the least concept of the inner possibility of its highest perfection nor of the
necessity of its existence. But still I can satisfy all other questions which
concern the contingent, and can supply to reason the most perfect satisfac-
tion with respect to the greatest unity, subject to investigation in its empirical
employment, but not with respect to this presupposition itself. And this
proves that its speculative interest, and not its insight, justifies it to go out
from a point which lies so far beyond its sphere, in order to consider its ob-
jects in a complete whole from that.

9.1 Now here we see a distinction in the thinking manner with one and the same
presupposition which is rather subtle, but nonetheless of great importance in
the transcendental philosophy.

9.2 I can have a sufficient foundation for assuming something relatively (**suppo-
sitio relativo**), but still without being authorized in assuming it utterly (**sup-
positio absoluta**).

9.3 This distinction proves true if it has to do merely with a regulative principle,
concerning which indeed we recognize the necessity on its own, but not its
source, and to which we assume a supreme foundation merely for the pur-
pose of thinking the universality of the principle all the more determinedly,
as, e.g., if I think to myself a being as existing, which corresponds to a mere,
and indeed transcendental, Idea.

9.4 For there I can never assume the existence of this thing on its own, because
no concept, through which I can think any sort of an object determined to
myself, reaches to that, and the conditions for the objective validity of my
concepts are excluded through the Idea itself.

9.5 The concepts of reality, of substance, of causality, even that of the necessity
in existence, apart from the employment where they make possible the em-
pirical recognition of an object, have no meaning at all which would determine any sort of object.

9.6 Therefore they can be used indeed for the explanation of the possibility of things in the sense world, but not of the possibility of a world whole itself, because this explanatory basis would have to be apart from the world and thus no object of a possible experience.

9.7 Now I can nonetheless assume such an incomprehensible being, the object of a mere Idea, relative to the sense world, although not on its own.

9.8 For if to the greatest possible empirical usage of my reason, an Idea (of the systematic, complete unity, of which I will shortly speak more determinedly) lies as foundation, which on its own can never be adequately presented in experience, even though it is unavoidably necessary in order to approach the empirical unity to the highest possible degree, I will not only be authorized, but even necessitated, to realize this Idea, i.e., to posit an actual object to it, but only as a something in general with which I am not at all acquainted on its own, and to which I give such properties as a foundation of that systematic unity in reference to this latter, as are analogous to the understanding concepts in the empirical employment.

9.9 Therefore according to the analogy of the realities in the world, the substances, the causality and the necessity, I will think of a being which possesses all this in the highest perfection and, by this Idea resting merely on my reason, can think this being as independent reason which through the Ideas of a greatest harmony and unity is cause of the world whole, so that I remove all conditions limiting the Idea solely in order, under the protection of such a source foundation, to make possible systematic unity of the manifold in the world whole, and by means of that the greatest possible empirical rational employment, in that I consider all connections so, as though they were arrangements of a supreme rationality, of which that of ours is a weak imitation.

9.10 I then think to myself this highest being through sheer concepts, which actually have their application only in the sense world. But since I also have that transcendental presupposition for no other use except relative, namely: that it be supposed to render the substratum of the greatest possible unity, I may think a being which I distinguish from the world very well through properties which belong solely to the world of sense.
9.11 For I by no means demand, and am not even warranted to demand, to recognize this object of my Idea according to what it may be on its own; for to that I have no concepts, and even the concepts of reality, substance, causality, indeed even of necessity in existence, lose all meaning and are empty titles for concepts without any content if I venture out apart from the field of the senses.

9.12 I think to myself only the relationship of a being, entirely unknown to myself, to the greatest systematic unity of the world whole, solely in order to make it into the schema of the regulative principle of the greatest possible empirical employment of my reasoning.

10.1 If we now glance at the transcendental object of our Ideas, we see that we cannot presuppose its actuality on its own with respect to the concepts of reality, substance, causality, etc., because these concepts do not have the least application to anything which is entirely distinguished from the sense world.

10.2 Therefore the supposition of reason of a highest being, as supreme cause, is thought merely relatively in aid of the systematical unity of the sense world and is a mere something in the Idea, whereof we have no concept of what it is on its own.

10.3 Thereby we also explained how we indeed have need of the Idea of a source being, necessary on its own, in reference to what is given existing to the senses, but never can have the least concept of this and its absolute necessity.

11.1 Furthermore we can clearly place the result of the entire transcendental dialectic before our eyes and precisely determine the final intention of the Ideas of pure reason, which become dialectic only through misunderstanding and carelessness.

11.2 In fact pure reason is occupied with nothing except itself, and also can have no other occupation, because to it is given not the objects for the unity of the experience concept, but rather the recognitions of the understanding for the unity of the rational concept, i.e., of the cohesion in a principle.
11.3 Rational unity is the unity of the system, and this systematic unity does not serve reason objectively as a principle in order to expand it beyond the objects, but rather subjectively as maxim in order to explain it beyond all possible, empirical recognition of the objects.

11.4 Nonetheless the systematical cohesion which reason can give to the employment of the empirical understanding promotes not only its expansion, but rather even simultaneously preserves the propriety of that understanding, and the principle of such a systematical unity is also objective, but in an indeterminate manner (*principium vagum*), not as a constitutive principle in order to determine something with respect to its direct object, but rather in order, as a mere regulative principle and maxim, to promote and secure into infinity (undetermined) the empirical employment of reason through the opening of new ways, with which the understanding is not familiar, without ever thereby being contrary in the least to the laws of the empirical employment.

12.1 But reason cannot think this systematic unity otherwise than by simultaneously giving its Idea an object, but one which can be given through no experience; for experience never gives an example of complete, systematic unity.

12.2 Now this rational being (*ens rationis ratiocinatate*) is indeed a mere Idea, and therefore is not assumed necessarily as the foundation (because we can reach it through no concept of understanding in order to so treat all connection of things in the sense world as though they had their foundation in this rational being), but solely with the intention of basing the systematic unity upon it, which can be indispensable to reason, but promoting in all cases the recognition of the empirical understanding and likewise never obstructing it.

13.1 We immediately mistake the meaning of this Idea if we consider it an assertion or even only the presupposition of an actual thing, to which we proposed to attribute the foundation of the systematic world condition; far rather we leave it entirely unmade out as to what sort of character the foundation of that condition, evading our concepts, has on its own and posit only an Idea as a viewpoint, from which singularly and alone we can expand that unity which is so essential to reason and so salutary to the understanding: in short: this transcendental thing is merely the schema of that regulative principle by
means of which reason, as much as is in it, expands systematical unity beyond all experience.

14.1 The first object of such an Idea is the I myself, considered merely as a thinking nature (soul).

14.2 If I want to seek out the properties with which a thinking being exists on its own, then I must inquire of experience, and I cannot even apply any of the categories to this object except to the extent its schema is given in the sensitive perspective.

14.3 But with this I never achieve to a systematic unity of all appearances of the inner sense.

14.4 Therefore instead of the experiential concepts (of what the soul actual is), which cannot lead us far, reason takes the concept of the empirical unity of all thinking, and by thinking this unity unconditionally and originally, makes out of that a rational concept (Idea) of a simple substance, which stands unchangeable on its own (personally identical) in community with other actual things apart from it; in short: a simple, independent intelligence.

14.5 But with this it has nothing else in mind than principles of the systematic unity in the explanation of the appearances of the soul, namely to consider all determinations as in a single subject, all powers, as much as possible, as derived from a single base power, all alternation as belonging to the states of one and the same enduring being, and to represent all appearances in space as entirely distinguished from the actions of the thinking.

14.6 That simplicity of the substances, etc., was only supposed to be the schema for this regulative principle, and is not presupposed as though it were the actual basis of the properties of the soul.

14.7 For these can also rest upon entirely different foundations, with which we are not at all familiar, as we then could also not actually recognize the soul on its own through these assumed predicates even if we wanted to allow them to hold utterly of the soul, in that they make up a mere Idea which cannot be represented in concreto at all.
14.8 Now out of such a psychological Idea nothing else except advantage can arise if we only guard against allowing it to hold as something more than a mere Idea, i.e., merely relative, to the systematic usage of reason with respect to the appearances of our soul.

14.9 For there no empirical laws of bodily appearances, which are of entirely different type, mingle themselves into the explanation of what belongs merely to the inner sense; here no windy hypotheses of generation, destruction and palingesia of the soul, etc., are admitted. Therefore the consideration of this object of the inner sense is employed entirely pure and unmixed with dissimilar properties, about which the rational examination is directed toward leading the explanation basis in this subject as far as possible out to a single principle; all of which is effected best through such a schema as though it were an actual being, indeed even singularly and alone.

14.10 The psychological Idea can also indicate nothing else than the schema of a regulative concept.

14.11 For even if I only wanted to ask whether the soul on its own not be of spiritual nature, then this question had no sense at all.

14.12 For through such a concept, I do not remove merely the bodily nature, but rather in general all nature, i.e., all predicates of any sort of a possible experience, thus all conditions for thinking an object to such a concept, except still which alone and singularly makes us say, “it has a sense.”

15.1 The second regulative Idea of the merely speculative reason is the concept of a world in general.

15.2 For nature is actually only the single, given object, with respect to which reason has need of regulative principles.

15.3 This nature is two-fold, either the thinking, or the corporeal nature.

15.4 However to the latter, in order to think it according to its inner possibility, i.e., to determine the application of the categories to that, we have need of no Idea, i.e., of a representation overstepping experience. None is also possible with respect to this because we are led in that merely through sensitive per-
spective, and not as in the psychological foundation concept (the I) which a priori contains a certain form of thinking, namely the unity of that.

15.5 Nothing remains therefore for pure reason except nature in general and the completion of the conditions in that according to some sort of principle.

15.6 The absolute totality of the series of these conditions, in the derivation of its members, is an Idea which indeed can never completely come forth in the empirical employment of reason, but still serves as the rule of how we are supposed to proceed with respect to that, namely in the explanation of given appearances (in descending or ascending order) such as though the series were infinite on its own, i.e., *in indefinitum*, but where reason itself is considered as a determining cause (in freedom) therefore with practical principles, as though we did not have an object of the senses before us but rather of the pure understanding where the conditions can be placed no longer in the series of the appearances but rather apart from them, and the series of the states can be viewed as though they were utterly begun (through an intelligible cause); all of which proves that the cosmological Ideas are nothing except regulative principles, and far removed, as it were, from being constitutive, or positing an actual totality of such series.

15.7 The remainder one can seek in its place under the antinomy of pure reason.

16.1 The third Idea of pure reason, which contains a merely relative supposition of a being as the single and all-sufficient cause of all cosmological series, is the rational concept of God.

16.2 We do not have the least basis for utterly assuming the object of this Idea (to suppose it on its own); for what could empower or even only justify us in believing or asserting a being of the highest perfection and as utterly necessary according to his nature out of the concept of which on its own, were it not the world, in referral to which this supposition can alone be necessary. And there it is clearly seen that the Idea of this highest being, even as all speculative Ideas, will say nothing further than reason commands us to consider all connection of the world according to principles of a systematic unity, thus as though they had arisen all together out of a single, all-embracing being,

16.3 From this it is clear that reason could have as its intention with this nothing
except its own formal rules in expansion of its empirical usage, but never an expansion beyond all limits of the empirical employment. Consequently there lies buried under this Idea no constitutive principle of its employment directed to possible experience.

17.1 The highest formal unity, which rests alone upon rational concepts, is the purposeful unity of things, and the speculative interest of reason makes it necessary to so consider all arrangement in the world as though it had arisen out of the intention of an supreme rationality.

17.2 Such a principle, namely, opens entirely new vistas to our reason, applied to the field of experience, to connect the things of the world according to teleological laws, and in that way to achieve to the greatest systematic unity of the same.

17.3 The presupposition of a supreme intelligence as the solitary cause of the world whole, but, of course, merely in the Idea, can always be useful to reason and still never cause any harm in that way.

17.4 For if we, with respect to the figure of the earth (a round one, though somewhat flattened),* the mountains, oceans, etc., we assume in advance utterly wise intentions of an original constructionist, and so in this way we can make a number of discoveries.

17.5 If we remain only with this presupposition, as a merely regulative principle, then even the error cannot harm.

17.6 For in any case, nothing further can follow from that except that where we expected a teleological cohesion (nexus finalis), a merely mechanical or physical (nexus effectivus) is encountered, whereby we, in such case, only miss an additional unity but do not spoil the rational unity in its empirical employment.

17.7 But if fact this disappointment cannot concern the law itself in a universal and teleological intention in general.

17.8 For although a dissector can be convinced of an error if he refers some kind of limb of an animal body to a purpose, concerning which we can clearly indicate that it does not follow from that, it is still entirely impossible to prove
in such case that a natural arrangement, be it what it will, has no purpose whatsoever.

17.9 Hence also does physiology (of the physicians) expand its very restricted empirical knowledge with the purposes of the structure of an organic body so far through a principle, which merely pure reason inserted, that we assume agreement in that quite boldly and simultaneously with all understanding agreement that everything with the animal has its uses and good intention, which presupposition, if it were supposed to be constitutive, goes much further than observation thus far can justify. From this we can see that it is nothing but a regulative principle of reason, to achieve to the highest, systematic unity by means of the Idea of the purposeful causality of the supreme world cause and as though this, as highest intelligence, were the cause of everything according to the wisest intention.

* Kant’s annotation

1.1 The advantage which a spherical shape of the earth provides is familiar enough; but few know that its flatting, as a spheroid, alone prevents the promontories of the continents or even smaller mountains, thrown up perhaps by earthquakes, from continually and, in not just a long time, conspicuously shifting, if the swelling of the earth beneath the lines were not such a mighty mountain which the pressure of each other mountain can never noticeably move from its position with regard to the axis.

1.2 And still we explain this wise layout without thought to the equilibrium of the earlier liquid mass of earth.

18.1 But if we depart from the restriction of the Idea upon the merely regulative use, then reason is led into error in so many ways by abandoning the footing of experience, which still must contain the identification marks of its passage, and ventures out beyond that footing to the incomprehensible and to what cannot be examined, above the heights of which it becomes necessarily giddy because it sees itself from the standpoint of those heights entirely cut off from all use according with experience.

19.1 The first error which arises from that, where we use the Idea of a highest being not merely regulatively but (which is counter to the nature of an Idea) constitutively, is slothful reason (ignaua ratio*).
19.2 We can so term every principle which makes us consider its investigation of
nature, regardless of where it be, as utterly completed; and therefore reason
pauses for rest as though it had completely accomplished its business.

19.3 Hence even the psychological Idea, if it is used as a constitutive principle for
the explanation of the appearances of our souls and accordingly, for the ex-
pansion of our recognition of this subject out beyond all experience (its state
after death), even makes reason very comfortable indeed, but also entirely
spoils and drives to ruin all nature use of that according to the clues of expe-
rience.

19.4 So does the dogmatic spiritualist explain the unity of the person, existing un-
altered through all changes of the states, from the unity of the thinking sub-
stance, which he believes to immediately perceive in the “I,” the interest
which we take in things which are supposed to take place only after our
death, out of the consciousness of an immaterial nature of our thinking sub-
ject, etc., and relieves himself of all natural explanation of the cause of these
our inner appearances out of physical explanatory foundations by passing by,
as it were, through the fiat of a transcendental rationality, the immanent re-
alization courses of experiments, in aid of his convenience, but with loss of
all insight.

19.5 Even plainer does this disadvantageous sequence come to light with the
dogmatism of our Idea of a highest intelligence and the theological system
of nature (physico-thelogy), falsely based on that.

19.6 For since all purposes, revealing themselves in nature, often only made up
by us ourselves, serve to make us quite comfortable in the investigation of
the causes. For instead of seeking them in the universal laws of the mecha-
nism of matter, we appeal straightway to the unfathomable decree of the
highest wisdom and then consider the rational efforts as completed, if one
relives himself of its use, which still finds nowhere a clue except where the
order of nature and the series of the alterations gives it to hand according to
their inner and universal laws.

19.7 This error can be avoided if we do not consider some parts of nature in that,
as, e.g., the distribution of the continents, their structure, and the composi-
tion of the mountains, or even indeed only the organization in the vegetable
and animal realms, from the viewpoint of purposes, but rather to make this
systematic unity of nature, with reference to the Idea of a highest intelligence, entirely universal.

19.8 For then we lay as a foundation a purposefulness according to universal laws of nature, from which no particular arrangement is excepted, but rather marked out only more or less discernible for us, and have a regulative principle of the systematic unity of a teleological connection, but which we need not determine in advance, but rather pursue the physical-mechanical foundation according to universal laws only in expectation of that connection.

19.9 For in this way alone the principle of the purposeful unity can expand the employment of reason with respect to experience every time without interrupting it in any sort of case.

* Kant’s annotation

1.1 Thusly did the ancient dialecticians call a fallacy which went so: if your fate entails your recovery from this illness, then it will happen whether or not you use a physician.

1.2 Cicero says that this type of inference has this name because, if someone adheres to it, there remains no use of reason in life at all.

1.3 This is the cause of my adoption of the same name for the sophistical arguments of pure reason.

20.1 The second error, which arises out of the misinterpretation of the cited principle of the systematic unity, is that of perverted reason (*perversa ration*, *noteron protejon, rationis*).

20.2 The Idea of the systematic unity was only supposed to serve as a regulative principle in order to seek it in the connection of things according to universal laws of nature and, to the extent something allows of being encountered of that on the empirical way, in order to even believe so much that we have approached the completion of its use, though we will, of course, never achieve to that.

20.3 Instead of that we turn the matter around and start by laying as foundation the actuality of a principle of the purposeful unity as hypostatic, determining anthropomorphically the concept of such an highest intelligence because it is entirely unfathomable on its own, and then by violently and dictatorially compelling purposes to nature, instead of seeking them, as is reasonable,
upon the path of the physical investigation, so that not only teleology, which was merely supposed to serve in supplementing the unity of nature according to universal laws, now much rather works to remove them, but reason destroys even its purpose, namely to prove the existence of such an intelligent supreme cause, according to this, out of nature.

20.4 For if we cannot a priori presuppose the highest purposefulness in nature, i.e., as belonging to the being of that, how will we then be instructed to seek it and, upon the stepladder of that, to approach the highest perfection of an original constructionist, as an utterly necessary, thus a priori realizable, completion?

20.5 The negative principle demands utterly the presupposition of the systematic unity of nature which is realized not merely empirically, but rather is a priori presupposed though yet undetermined, thus as following out of the being of things.

20.6 But if I lay previously as foundation a highest ordering being, then in fact the nature unity is cancelled.

20.7 For it is entirely foreign and contingent to the nature of things, and cannot even be realized out of universal laws of that.

20.8 Hence a defective circle arises in the proof, since we presuppose what actually was supposed to have been proven.

21.1 To take the regulative principle of the systematic unity of nature for a constitutive one and to presuppose hypostatically as cause what is placed only in the Idea as foundation for the clarifying employment of reason, is called confusing reason.

21.2 The exploration of nature goes its course entirely alone upon the chain of natural causes according to its universal laws, indeed according to the Idea of an original constructionist, but not in order to derive the purposefulness from that, of which it is always in pursuit, but rather to recognize its existence out of this purposefulness, which is sought in the being of the things of nature, also where possible in the beings of all things in general, thus as utterly necessary.
21.3 Now the latter may succeed or not, but the Idea remains always proper and just as well also its use, if restricted to the conditions of a merely regulative principle.

22.1 Complete, purposeful unity, is perfection (utterly considered).

22.2 If we do not find this in the being of things, which make up the entire object of experience, i.e., all our objectively valid recognitions, thus in universal and necessary laws of nature, how do we want to conclude from that directly to the Idea of a highest and utterly necessary perfection of a source being which is the source of all causality?

22.3 The greatest systematic, consequently also purposeful, unity is the school and even the foundation of the possibility of the greatest use of human reason.

22.4 The Idea of that is therefore inseparably connected with the being of our reason.

22.5 Precisely this Idea therefore is legislative for us, and so it is quite natural to assume legislating reason corresponding to it (*intellectus archetypus*), from which every systematic unity of nature is derivable, as of the object of our reason.

23.1 At the occasion of the antinomy of pure reason we said that all questions which pure reason poses must be utterly answerable, and the excuse about the limits of our recognition, which in many questions of nature is just as unavoidable as reasonable, cannot be allowed here because here the question is laid out to us not from the nature of things but rather through the nature of reason alone and solely about its inner provision.

23.2 We can now certify this assertion, so bold at first appearance, with respect to the two questions with which pure reason has its greatest interest, and in this way bring our consideration about its dialectic to an entire completion.

24.1 If we then ask, therefore (with respect to a transcendental theology),* first whether there is something distinct from the world which contains the basis
of the world order and its cohesion according to universal laws, then the answer is: without doubt.

24.2 For the world is a sum-total of appearances and therefore there must be some sort of a transcendental basis, i.e., one thinkable merely according to the understanding.

24.3 Secondly if the question is ether this being be substance, of the greatest reality, necessity, etc., I answer that this question has no meaning at all.

24.4 For all categories through which I try to make up a concept of such an object are of no other use than empirical and have no sense at all if they are not applied to objects of possible experience, i.e., to the sense world.

24.5 Apart from this field they are merely titles to concepts which we can admit, but whereby we also can understand nothing.

24.6 Finally the third question is this: whether we cannot at least think this entirely distinguished from the world according to an analogy with the objects of experience; and the answer is: certainly! But only as an object in the Idea and not in the reality, namely only to the extent it is a substratum, unknown to us, of the systematical unity, order and purposefulness of the world arrangement, which reason must make as the regulative principle of its investigation of nature.

24.7 Yet more, we can unabashedly and without blame allow in this Idea certain anthropomorphism which promote the cited regulative principle.

24.8 For it is always only an Idea, which is not at all referred directly to a being distinguished from the world, but rather to the regulative principle of the systematical unity of the world, but only by means of a schema of that, namely of a supreme intelligence, which is an original constructionist of the world according to wise intentions.

24.9 What this non-basis of the unity of the world be on its own has thereby not supposed to be thought, but rather how we are supposed to use it, or much more its Idea, relative to the systematical use of reasoning with respect to the things of the world.

* Kant’s annotation:
1.1 That which I said earlier of the psychological Ideas and their actual determination, as principles for merely regulative usage of reason, saves me the prolixity in mentioning in particular the transcendental illusion, according to which that synthetic unity of all manifold of the inner sense is hypostatically represented.

1.2 The procedure with this is quite similar to that which the critique observed in regard to the theological Ideal.

25.1 But in such way can we still (some will continue to ask) assume a single wise and all powerful world constructionist?

25.2 Without any doubt, and not only this, but rather we must even presuppose such.

25.3 But then do we still not expand our recognition beyond the field of possible experience?

25.4 By no means.

25.5 For we have only presupposed a something whereby we have no concept at all of what it is on its own (a mere transcendental object) but with reference to the systematical and purposeful arrangement of the world structure, which, if we study nature, we must presuppose, we have thought that being, unknown to us, only according to the analogy with an intelligence (an empirical concept), i.e., with respect to the purposes and the perfection which are based on the same, gifted directly with those properties which can contain the basis of such a systematical unity according to the conditions of our reason.

25.6 This Idea therefore is respectively based entirely upon the world usage of our reason.

25.7 But if we wanted to bestow utterly objective validity to it, then we would forget that it is a being solely in the Idea which we think and, by starting then from a basis not at all determinable through the world consideration, we would no longer be placed in a position to apply this principle to the empirical use of reason.
26.1 But (someone will ask further) in such way can I still make use of the concept and the presupposition of a highest being in the rational world consideration?

26.2 Yes, it was this Idea also actually laid as basis by reason.

26.3 However, may I now consider purpose-resembling arrangements as intentional by deriving them from the divine will, although by means of layouts placed, thereupon, in the world especially for that?

26.4 Yes, even that you could do, but so that it must also equally hold for you whether someone says: the divine wisdom has so ordered everything to its supreme purpose, or: the Idea of the highest wisdom is regulator in the investigation of nature and a principle of the systematical and purposeful unity even there where we do not perceive it, i.e., it must be all the same to you, where you perceive it, to say: God willed it wisely so or: nature has therefore wisely arranged it.

26.5 For the greatest systematic and purposeful unity which your reason demanded to lay as basis to all investigations of nature as a regulative principle, was precisely that which justified you to lay as basis the Idea of a highest intelligence as a schema of the regulative principle and, as much purposefulness in your world as you now encounter, according to that, so far do you have certification of the legitimacy of your Idea; but since the cited principle has as intention nothing except to seek the necessary and greatest possible unity of nature, we will owe this indeed, as far as we reach, to the Idea of a highest being, but cannot overlook the universal laws of nature without stumbling into contradictions in order to consider this purposefulness of nature as contingent and hyperphysical with respect to its origin, because we were not justified in assuming a being above the nature of the cited properties, but rather only to lay the Idea of that as basis in order to consider appearances, according to the analogy of a causal determination, as systematically connected among each other.

27.1 Just for that reason also we are justified in thinking the world cause in the Idea not solely according to a more subtle anthropomorphism (without which nothing at all would allow itself of being thought), namely as a being which has understanding, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, likewise a desire commensurate to the same, and a will, etc., but rather to attribute unending
perfection to that being which therefore steps widely beyond that to which we can be justified through empirical knowledge with the world order.

27.2 For the regulative law of the systematical unity wants us to study nature as though systematical and purposeful unity would be encountered everywhere to infinity with the greatest possible manifold.

27.3 For no matter how little we will only spy or reach of this world perfection, it still belongs to the legislation of our reason always to suppose and seek it, and it must be advantageous to us every time, and can never be disadvantageous, to employ the observation of nature according to this principle.

27.4 But under the representation of the Idea of a highest engineer laid as basis, it is also clear that I do not lay the existence of, and knowledge with, such a being as foundation, but rather only the Idea of that and therefore actually derive nothing from this being, but rather merely from the Idea of it, i.e., from the nature of the things of the world according to such an Idea.

27.5 Also a certain, though undeveloped, consciousness of the genuine use of this our rational concept, seems to have occasioned the modest and reasonable language of the philosophers of all time, since they speak of the wisdom and providence of nature and the divine wisdom as equivalent expressions, indeed preferring the first expression as long as it has to do with merely speculative reason, because it holds back the presumption of an assertion greater than that is whereto we are warranted, and simultaneously sends reason back to its proper field, i.e., nature.

28.1 So pure reason, which at the beginning seemed to promise nothing less than expansion of knowledge beyond all boundaries of experience, contains, if we properly understand it, nothing except regulative principles which offer indeed greater unity than the use of the empirical understanding can reach, but in very way they push the goal of the approximation of that so far back, bring the agreement of that with itself through systematical unity to the highest degree, but if we misunderstand it and hold them for constitutive principles of transcendental recognitions, through an indeed brilliant, but deceptive semblance, persuasion and imaged knowledge, then with this we bring about eternal contradictions and conflicts.
29.1 Thus every human recognition begins with perspective, from there goes to concepts and ends with Ideas.

29.2 Even though, with respect to all three elements, it has recognition sources which seem at first glance to reject the limits of all experience, a completed critique convinces us that all reasoning for speculative uses is never able to go out beyond the field of possible experience with these elements, and that the actual determination of this supreme recognition capacity is to avail ourselves of all methods and their principles only in order to investigate nature to its more innermost parts, according to all possible principles of unity, among which that of purpose is the most noble, but never to overstep its boundaries, outside of which is nothing for us but empty space.

29.3 Indeed the critical investigation of all propositions which can expand our recognition out beyond actual experience has sufficiently convinced us that they can never lead to anything more than possible experience, and if we were not mistrustful of even the clearest abstract and universal instructional propositions, if seductive and apparent vistas did not entice us to discard the compulsion of the former, then in any case we could have been relieved of the tiresome testimony of all dialectical witnesses which permits a transcendent reason to step forward in aid of its presumptions, for we already know in advance with complete certitude that indeed every one of its assertion, perhaps honestly meant, would have to be utterly inane because it has need of information which no human can ever obtain.

29.4 But because there is still no end of the discussion, if we do not go behind the true causes of the façade whereby even the most rational person can be imposed upon, and because the solution of all our transcendental recognitions into its elements (as a study of our inner nature) has no little value, but is in fact a duty to the philosopher, it was not only necessary to track down in detail this entire, though vain, treatment of speculative reason in its first sources, but rather, since the dialectical semblance is not only deceptive here with respect to the judgment, but rather also seductive with respect to the interest which we take here in the judgment, and always natural, and will remain so forever, it was advisable to formulate the acts of this process, as it were, and to deposit them in the archives of human reason for the prevention of future errors of a similar type.
II Transcendental Methodology

1.1 If I consider the summation of all recognitions of pure and speculative reason as a building, of which we at least have the Idea within us, then I can say that in the teaching of the elements we have roughly estimated and determined the construction material for what sort of building and of what height and stability it suffices.

1.2 We found, of course, that even though we had a tower in mind which should have touched the sky, the supply of the materials reached only to a residence, one that was just spacious enough and tall enough for our occupations upon the plane of experience in surveying that plane. But this bold undertaking had to fall short due to the lack of material, without once taking into account the confusion of language which unavoidably had to divide the workers and scatter them throughout the world in order for each to build individually, each according to his own design.

1.3 Now at this point we are concerned not so much about the materials as rather about the plan and, being warned not to venture upon an arbitrary and dazzling design, which perhaps could overstep our entire capacity, still nonetheless not being able to easily refrain from the erection of a sound residence, we are concerned about making the calculation for a building in relation to the supply which is given to us and simultaneously is commensurate to our need.

2.1 With the transcendental methodology therefore I understand the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason.

2.2 In this intention we will be concerned with a discipline, a canon, an architectural and finally with a history of pure reason. And in an transcendental intention we will perform that which, under the name of a practical logic, is sought in the schools with respect to the use of the understanding in general, but is hardly performed. The reason for this failure is this: since the universal logic is limited to no particular type of understanding recognition (e.g., not to the pure), not even to certain objects, it, without borrowing information from other sciences, can do nothing more than to present the title for possible methods and technical expressions, of which we avail ourselves with respect to the systematical aspect in all sciences. This makes the ap-
prentice knowledgeable in advance of names, with whose meaning and use he first is suppose to become familiar with later.
The Transcendental Methodology

1st Chapter - The Discipline of Pure Reason

1.1 The negative judgments, which are such not merely with respect to the logical form, but rather also to the content, stand in no special esteem with the desire of human curiosity. In fact we even consider them as jealous enemies of our recognitional compulsion to strive incessantly to expansion, and there is almost a need of an apology for procuring them even indulgence, not even to speak of favor and high estimation.

2.1 We can indeed logically express all propositions we wish negatively. But with respect to the content of our recognition in general, whether they are expanded through a judgment or restricted, the negating ones have the peculiar occupation of solely preventing error.

2.2 It follows also that negative propositions, which are supposed to prevent a false recognition, though where an error is never possible, are indeed very true, but still empty, e.g., not at all commensurate to their purpose, and for that very reason are very often ridiculous.

2.3 As an example we have the proposition of a scholastic: that without an army Alexander could not have conquered any countries.

3.1 But where the limits of our possible recognition are very narrow and the enticement for judgments large, and the semblance, which offers itself, is very deceptive, and the disadvantage from error removable, then the negative of the instruction, which serves merely to protect us from error, has yet more importance than many a positive teaching through which our recognition could obtain increase.

3.2 The particular compulsion, by means of which the enduring propensity to diverge from certain rules is restricted and finally eradicated, we term discipline.

3.3 It is distinguished from cultivation, which is only supposed to supply an accomplishment, without, on the other hand, canceling another one already present.
3.4 To the development of a talent, which already has before itself a motive for 
expression, the discipline therefore will supply a negative* contribution, but 
the cultivation and doctrine a positive one.

*Kant’s annotation.

1.1 I know very well that in academic speech, we endeavor to use the term of 
discipline synonymously with that of instruction.

1.2 But here, on the other hand, there are so many other cases where the first 
expression, as training, is carefully distinguished from the second, as in-
struction, and the nature of things themselves even required the conservation 
of the only suitable expression for this distinction, that I would wish us 
rather never to permit the use of that term in any other way apart from the 
negative meaning.

4.1 That the temperament, likewise those talents which gladly indulge in a free 
and unrestricted urge (as imagination and wit), have need of a discipline in 
many respects, everyone will easily admit.

4.2 But to think that reason, which is actually obligated to prescribe the disci-
pline to all other endeavors, would itself need such, may certainly seem 
strange in any case, and indeed until now has also avoided such a mortifica-
tion for precisely the reason because, with the ceremony and the thorough 
decorum with which it presents itself, no one could easily come upon the 
suspicion of a careless play with imagination instead of concepts, and with 
words instead of materials.

5.1 Reason has no need of any critique in the empirical usage, because its prin-
ciples are subjected to a continuing test at the touchstone of experience. It is 
the same with mathematics, where the concepts must be presented immediately in concreto with the pure perspective, and all baseless and whimsical 
assertions are immediately revealed.

5.2 But where neither empirical nor pure perspective holds reason in a visible 
track, namely in its transcendental use according to mere concepts, there it is 
very much in need of a discipline which restrains its propensity for expan-
sion beyond the narrow limits of possible experience, and keeps it from ab-
erration and error, so much so that even the entire philosophy of pure reason has to do merely with this negative utility.

5.3 Individual mistakes can be remedied through censor and their cause through critique.

5.4 But where, as in pure reason, an entire system of deceptions and illusions is encountered which are united via connected and communal principles, an entirely peculiar and indeed negative legislation seems to be requisite, which, under the name of a discipline, erects out of the nature of reason and the objects of its pure usage a system of caution and self testing, against which no false pseudo-rational semblance can exist, but rather must immediately betray itself in spite of all cosmetic efforts.

6.1 But it is well to note that in this second part of the transcendental critique, I do not direct the discipline of pure reason to the content, but rather merely to the method of the recognition from pure reason.

6.2 The first has already happened in the instruction of the elements.

6.3 But there is so much similarity with rational usage, regardless to which object it may also be applied, and still, to the extent it is supposed to be transcendental, is simultaneously so essentially distinguished from all others that, without the warning of the negative instruction of a discipline particularly positioned to it, there is no prevention of the errors which must necessarily arise out of an unsuitable compliance of such methods, which indeed otherwise are suited to reason; but not here.
1st Section. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Dogmatic Usage

1.1 Mathematics gives the most brilliant example of a pure reason successfully expanding itself without aid of experience.

1.2 Examples are infectious, especially for that same capacity which naturally flatters itself to have just the same fortune in other cases, which come to it partly in one case.

1.3 Hence pure reason hopes to be able to expand itself just as successfully and thoroughly in the transcendental usage as it has with mathematics, especially if it uses the same method in the transcendental which has been of such obvious use in mathematics.

1.4 There is much at stake therefore in knowing whether the method for achieving to apodictic certitude, which we term mathematical in the latter science, is the same where we seek that same certitude in philosophy, and where it would have to be termed dogmatic.

2.1 Philosophical recognition is the rational recognition from concepts, the mathematical from the construction of concepts.

2.2 But to construct a concept means to present a priori the perspective corresponding to it.

2.3 For the construction of a concept therefore a non-empirical perspective is required which consequently, as perspective, is a single object. But nevertheless the construction of a concept (of a universal representation) must express the universality in the representation for all possible perspectives which belong under the same concept.

2.4 Hence I construct a triangle by presenting the object corresponding to the concept either through mere imagination in the pure or, in accordance with that on paper, in the empirical perspective, but in both cases completely a priori, without having borrowed the pattern for it from any experience.
2.5 The single drawn figure is empirical and serves nonetheless to express the concept with no injury to its universality because we always look only to the action of the construction of the concepts with this empirical perspective, to which many determinations, e.g., size, sides, angles, are entirely indifferent, and it is abstracted therefore from these diversities which do not alter the concept of a triangle.

3.1 The philosophical recognition therefore considers the particular only in the universal, the mathematical considers the universal in the particular, and indeed even in the singular, but still a priori and by means of reason so that as this singularity is determined under certain universal conditions of the construction, so must also the object of the concept, to which this singularity corresponds only as its schema, be thought as universally determined.

4.1 The essential distinction between these two types of rational recognitions therefore consists in this form and does not rest on the distinction of their material or object.

4.2 Those who wanted to distinguish philosophy from mathematics by saying of philosophy that it has as its object merely the quality, but that of mathematics only the quantity, have taken the effect for the cause.

4.3 The form of the mathematical recognition is the cause of why this can go solely to quanta.

4.4 For only the concept of magnitude allows of construction, i.e., exposition a priori in the perspective.

4.5 But qualities allow of presentation in no other way than via empirical perspective.

4.6 Hence a rational recognition of that can only be possible through concepts.

4.7 Accordingly no one can take a perspective corresponding to the concept of reality from anywhere except experience, and never a priori out of himself nor become participant before the empirical consciousness of that.
4.8 The conical shape we will be able to make visible without any empirical assistance, merely according to the concept, but the color of this cone will have to have been given earlier in one experience or another.

4.9 The concept of a cause in general I can in no way present in the perspective except in an example which experience gives me, etc.

4.10 Incidentally philosophy deals with magnitude just as well as mathematics, e.g., of the totality, or infinity, etc.

4.11 Mathematics is also occupied with the distinction between the line and surface as spaces of diverse quality, with the continuity of expansion as a quality of that.

4.12 But although they have in such cases a communal object, the way of treating it through reason is still entirely different in the philosophical consideration than in the mathematical.

4.13 The former holds merely to universal concepts, the latter can arrange nothing with the mere concept but rather rushes immediately to perspective in which it considers the concept in concreto, but still not empirically but rather merely as such which it has presented a priori, i.e., constructed, and in which what follows from the universal conditions of construction, must also hold universally for the object of the constructed concept.

5.1 Give a philosopher the concept of a triangle and let him find out in his way how the sum of its angles may relate to the right angle.

5.2 Now he has nothing but the concept of a figure which is enclosed in three straight lines, and in it the concept of just so many angles.

5.3 Now let him consider this concept as long as he wishes, he will bring forth nothing new.

5.4 He can dismember and clarify the concept of a straight line or of an angle or the number three, but not come to other properties which do not lie at all in these concepts.

5.5 But let the geometer take up this question.
5.6 He starts immediately by constructing a triangle.

5.7 Because he knows that two right angles distribute just as much as all contiguous angles together which can be drawn out of a single point on a straight line, he lengthens one side of this triangle, and obtains two contiguous angles which are together equal to two right angles.

5.8 Then he partitions the extreme of these angles by drawing a line parallel to the opposite side of the triangle and sees a more extreme contiguous angle arises here which is the same as the inner one, etc.

5.9 In such way, through a chain of conclusions, always led by the perspective, he achieves to the completely illuminating and simultaneously universal solution of the question.

6.1 But mathematics does not construct merely magnitudes (*quanta*) as in geometry, but rather also merely magnitude (*quantitatem*) as in algebra, where it abstracts entirely from the constitution of the object, which is supposed to be thought according to such a concept of magnitude.

6.2 It chooses then a certain indication of all constructions of magnitudes in general (number) as addition, subtraction, etc., extraction of the root. Now after it has also indicated the universal concept of magnitudes according to their diverse relationships, it presents every treatment, which is generated and altered through the magnitude according to certain universal rules in the perspective. And where one magnitude is supposed to be divided by the other, it sets both of their characters together according to the indicated form of division, etc., and achieves therefore by means of a symbolic construction just as well as the geometer according to an ostensible or geometric construction (of the objects themselves), to which the discursive could never achieve by means of mere concepts.

7.1 What may be the cause of such a diverse situation in which two rational virtuosos find themselves, where one makes his way according to concepts, the other according to perspectives which he presents a priori conformable to the concept?
7.2 According to the transcendental foundations doctrine presented above this cause is clear.

7.3 Here it depends not upon analytical propositions, which can be generated through mere dismemberment of the concepts (in which the philosopher would have the advantage over his rival without doubt), but rather synthetic ones and indeed such which are supposed to be recognized a priori.

7.4 For I am not supposed to look to what I actually think in my concept of triangle (this is nothing further than the mere definition). Far rather I am supposed to go out beyond it to properties which do not lie in this concept, but which still belong to it.

7.5 Now this is not possible otherwise than by determining my object according to the conditions of either the empirical or the pure perspective.

7.6 The first would render only an empirical proposition (by measuring its angles) which would contain no universality, much less necessity, and this is not what we are discussing.

7.7 But the second procedure is the mathematical and indeed here the geometrical construction, by means of which in a pure perspective, just as in the empirical one, I add the manifold which belongs to the schema of a triangle in general, thus to its concept, whereby in any case universal, synthetic propositions must be constructed.

8.1 Therefore I would philosophize in vain about the triangle, i.e., reflect discursively, without coming further in the least in that way except to the mere definition, from which however I would have properly started.

8.2 There is indeed a transcendental synthesis out of sheer concepts, which in turn the philosopher alone manages, but which never concerns more than a thing in general and under which conditions its perception is able to belong to possible experience.

8.3 But such as that and of existence in general is not at all the question with mathematical tasks, but rather of the properties of the objects on their own, solely to the extent these are connected with the concept of that.
9.1 We have only sought to make plain in the example introduced what great distinction is encountered between the discursive use of reason according to concepts and the intuitive through the construction of concepts.

9.2 Now the question arises in a natural way, what is the case which makes such a two-fold use of reason necessary, and by what conditions can we recognize whether only the first or also the second takes place?

10.1 All our recognitions still finally refer to possible perspectives; for through these alone is an object given.

10.2 Now a concept (a non-empirical concept) already contains a priori within itself either a pure perspective, and then it can be constructed, or nothing except the synthesis of possible perspectives which are not given a priori, and then we can indeed judge synthetically and a priori through it, but only discursively according to concepts and never intuitively through the construction of the concept.

11.1 Now of every perspective none is a priori given except the mere form of the appearances, space and time, and a concept of these, as quantity, allows of presentation either simultaneously with the quality of the same (their shape), or also merely their quantity (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous manifolds) through number and a priori in the perspective, i.e., construction.

11.2 But the material of the appearances, whereby things in space and time are given to us, can only be represented in the perception, thus a posteriori.

11.3 The single concept which a priori represents this empirical ingredient of the appearances is the concept of a thing in general, and the synthetical recognition of this can supply nothing further a priori than the mere rule for the synthesis of what the perception may give a posteriori, but never the perspective of the real object, because this must necessarily be empirical.

12.1 Synthetical propositions which go to things in general, the perspective of which does not permit of being given a priori at all, are transcendental.
12.2 Accordingly, transcendental propositions never permit of being given a priori through construction of concepts, but rather only according to concepts.

12.3 They contain merely the rule, according to which a certain synthetical unity of what cannot be represented visibly a priori (the perceptions) is supposed to be sought empirically.

12.4 But they can present not a single one of their concepts a priori in any case, but rather do this only a posteriori by means of experience, which is first possible according to those synthetic base propositions.

13.1 If we are supposed to judge synthetically of a concept, we must go out beyond this concept and indeed to the perspective in which it is given.

13.2 For if we remained with what is contained in the concept, then the judgment would be merely analytical and an explanation of the thought according to what is actually contained in that concept.

13.3 But I can go from the concept to the pure or empirical perspective corresponding to it in order to ponder it in concreto in that perspective and to recognize a priori or a posteriori what befits the object of the perspective.

13.4 The first (the pure perspective) is the rational and mathematical recognition through the construction of the concept, the second (empirical perspective) the mere empirical (mechanical) recognition, which can never render necessary and apodictic propositions.

13.5 Hence I could dismember my empirical concept of gold without winning in that way anything further than the ability of enumerating everything which I actually think with this word, whereby indeed in my recognition a logical improvement proceeds, but no increase or supplementation generated.

13.6 But I take the material which comes forth under this name and employ with it perceptions which diverse synthetical, though empirical, propositions will give me.

13.7 The mathematical concept of a triangle I would construct, i.e., give a priori in the perspective, and in this way obtain a synthetical, though rational, recognition.
13.8 But if the transcendental concept of a reality, substance, force, etc., is given to me, then it indicates neither an empirical nor a pure perspective, but rather solely the synthesis of the empirical perspectives (which therefore cannot be given a priori) and therefore because the synthesis cannot go out a priori to the perspective which corresponds to it, also no determining synthetical proposition can arise out of it, but rather only a principle of the synthesis* of possible empirical perspectives.

13.9 A transcendental proposition therefore is a synthetical rational recognition with respect to mere concepts, and thus discursive via every synthetical unity of the empirical realization first becoming possible by means of it, but no perspective is given a priori by that.

*Kant’s annotation.

1.1 By means of the concept of cause I actually go out from the empirical concept of an event (where something happens), but not to the perspective, which presents the concept of cause in concreto, but rather to the time conditions in general which might be found conformable to the concept of cause in the experience.

1.2 I proceed therefore merely according to concepts and cannot proceed through the construction of the concepts because the concept is a rule of the synthesis of the perceptions which are not pure perspectives and therefore cannot be given a priori.

14.1 There is then a two-fold rational use, which despite the universality of the recognition and its generation a priori, which they have in common, is yet very diverse in the advancement, and indeed for that reason because in the appearance, through which all objects are given to us, there are two pieces: the form of the perspective (space and time), which can be recognized and determined completely a priori, and the material (the physical) or the ingredients, which means a something which is encountered in that space and time, and thus contains an existence and which corresponds to the sensation.

14.2 With respect to the latter, which can never be given in a determined way otherwise than empirically, we can have nothing a priori except undetermined concepts of the synthesis of possible sensations to the extent they belong to the unity of the apperception (in a possible experience).
14.3 With respect to the form, we can determine our concepts a priori in the perspective, in that we create for ourselves in space and time the objects themselves through uniform synthesis by considering them merely as quanta.

14.4 The former are called a rational use according to concepts, in that we can do nothing further than to bring appearances under concepts according to the real content, which can be determined in that way not otherwise than empirically, i.e., a posteriori (but conformable to those concepts as rules of an empirical synthesis). The latter (the form) is the rational use through construction of the concepts, in that these, since they already go a priori to the perspective, also just for that reason can be given determined a priori and without any data in the pure perspective.

14.5 To consider everything which is (a thing in space or time), whether and how far it is a quantum or not, that an existence or deficiency of that would have to be represented, how far this something (which fills space and time) be a first substratum or mere determination, have a referral of its existence to something else as cause or effect, and finally stand isolated in reciprocal dependency with others with respect to existence, to ponder the possibility of this existence, the actuality and necessity or the opposite of these: all this belongs to rational recognition from concepts, which is termed philosophical.

14.6 But to determine a priori a perspective in space (shape), to partition time (duration), or to recognize merely the universal of the synthesis of one and the same in time and space, and the quantity of a perspective in general (number) arising from that; all this is a rational occupation through construction of the concepts, and is called mathematical.

15.1 The great fortune which rationality makes by means of mathematics, effects quite naturally the supposition that it will succeed even apart from the field of magnitudes, where not to it itself, still to its method, by bringing all its concepts to perspectives, which it can give a priori and whereby it becomes master over nature, so to speak; since on the other hand, pure philosophy dabbles about a priori in nature with discursive concepts without being able to make the reality of those concepts viewable a priori and in that way also believable.

15.2 Also there seems to be no lack at all for the masters in this art of such confidence in themselves and for the commonweal of great expectations of their
skill, if they should only engage themselves with this.

15.3 For since they have hardly ever philosophized about their mathematics (a difficult occupation indeed), the specific distinction of the one rational usage from the other does not arise to them in sense and thought. For them transient and empirically used rules, which they borrow from common reasoning, hold in the place of axioms.

15.4 They do not bother themselves at all with the origin of the concepts of space and time, with which they are occupied (as the single original magnitude), and it likewise appears useless to them to investigate the origin of the pure understanding concepts and with that also with the scope of their validity, but rather only to avail themselves of them.

15.5 In all this they act quite properly, if only they do not overstep their appointed boundary, namely that of nature.

15.6 But in this way they stumble unnoticed from the field of sensitivity into the uncertain floor of pure and even transcendental concepts where the foundation (in stabilis tellus, unnabilis unda) allows them neither to stand nor swim, and lets them make only furtive steps, about which time does not retain the least trace, for, on the other hand, their way in mathematics makes a royal highway which the most remote posterity can yet treat with confidence.

16.1 Since we have taken upon ourselves the duty of determining exactly the boundaries of pure reason in the transcendental use and with certitude, but this manner of endeavor has that particular aspect on its own, despite the most emphatic and clearest warnings, of holding out yet always through the hope, before one entirely gives up the fight, of succeeding out beyond experience into the enticing areas of the intellectual, it is necessary yet to remove, as it were, the last anchor of a fantastic hope and to show that the adherence to the mathematical method in this manner of recognition is not able to supply the least advantage except for uncovering even more plainly the bareness of it itself, that surveying and philosophy are two entirely diverse things, even though they indeed offer one another the hand in the science of nature, thus the proceeding of the one is never able to be imitated by the other.
17.1 The thoroughness of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms and demonstrations.

17.2 I will be content with this in showing that none of these elements, in the sense in which the mathematician takes them, is able to be performed or imitated by the philosopher.

17.3 That the surveyor, according to his method, would produce nothing in philosophy except houses of cards, the philosopher, according to his method, would be able to excite only a babble in the participation of mathematics, even though philosophy consists precisely in being acquainted with its boundaries, and even the mathematician, if the talent is not per chance already limited by nature and restricted to its specialty, cannot ward off the warnings of philosophy, nor remove himself beyond them.

18.1 1. Concerning Definitions.

18.2 Defining, as the expression itself suggests, is supposed to mean only as much as presenting the detailed concept of a thing within its boundaries.*

18.3 According to such a requirement, an empirical concept cannot be defined at all, but rather only expounded.

18.4 For since we have in it only some identifying marks of a certain sort of objects of the senses, it is never certain whether with the word, which indicates the same object, we not think of more identifying marks of the object at one time and less at another time.

18.5 So one person can think in the concept of gold, apart from the weight, color, malleability, yet the property that it will not rust, about which some other person perhaps knows nothing.

18.6 We avail ourselves of certain identifying marks only so long as they are sufficient for differentiation. New observations, on the other hand, take some identifying marks away and add some to it, therefore the concept never stands between sure boundaries.

18.7 And for what purpose was it also supposed to serve in defining such a concept since, if, e.g., the discussion is of water and its properties, we do not
want to dwell with what we think with the word “water,” but rather to proceed to trials, and the word, with the few identification marks which append to it, is only supposed to make up an indication and not a concept of the matter, thus the alleged definition is nothing else than word determination.

18.8 Also secondly, and to speak precisely, no a priori given concept can be defined, e.g., substance, cause, right, fairness, etc.

18.9 For I can never be sure that the clear representation of a (yet confused) given concept was developed in a detailed way except by knowing that it be adequate to the object.

18.10 But since the concept of the object, as it is given, can contain many obscure representations which we pass over in the dismemberment, even though we need them every time in the application, the detailedness of the dismemberment of my concept is always doubtful, and only through manifold, pertinent examples can it be made probable, but never apodictically certain.

18.11 Instead of the expression “definition” I would rather use that of “exposition,” which always remains yet cautious and with which the critic can allow them to hold to a certain degree and still, due to the detailedness, yet have misgivings.

18.12 Since therefore neither empirically nor a priori given concepts can be defined, no other meanings remain except ones thought via whim, on which we can try this artifice.

18.13 In such case I can always define my concept; for I must still know what I have wanted to think, since I have made it deliberately myself, and it was given to me neither through the nature of understanding, nor through experience, but I cannot say that I have defined a true object by means of that.

18.14 For if the concept rests upon empirical conditions, e.g., a ships clock, the object and its possibility are not yet given through this arbitrary concept. From this I do not even know whether it have anywhere an object, and my explanation can better be called a declaration (of my project) than a definition of an object.
18.15 No other concepts remain therefore which answer to the definition except such which contain a synthesis at whim, which can be constructed a priori, and thus only mathematics has definitions.

18.16 For the object which it thinks, it also presents a priori in the perspective and this can certainly contain neither more nor less than the concept does, because the concept of the object was given originally through the explanation, i.e., without deriving the explanation from anywhere.

18.17 For the expressions of “exposition,” “explication,” “declaration” and “definition,” the German language has nothing more than the one word, “explanation” and hence we must already deduce something from the rigor of the requirement since namely we refuse the honored name of definition to the philosophical explanation and want to restrict this entire comment to the following: that philosophical definitions can be produced only as expositions of given concepts, but mathematical definitions as constructions of originally made ones, the former only analytically through dissection (whose completion is not apodictically certain), the latter synthetically and therefore constitutes the concept itself, opposed to which the philosophical can only explain it.

18.18 From this if follows:

* Kant’s footnote

1.1 Here detail means the clarity and adequacy of the characteristics; boundaries, the precision that there are no more of them than belong to the detailed concept, but originally that this boundary determination is not derived from somewhere and therefore has no need of a proof which the alleged explanation would make incapable of standing at the pinnacle of all judgments about an object.

19.1 a. that in philosophy we would not be able to imitate mathematics in assuming definitions except perhaps merely as trials.

19.2 For since they are dissections of given concepts, those concepts precede, although still only confusedly, and the incomplete exposition goes before the complete exposition such that we can previously conclude some things out of some identifying marks which we have drawn out of a yet incomplete dissection, and before we have achieved to the complete exposition, i.e., to the
definition. In short: in philosophy the definition would better conclude the
work, as precise clarity, than begin it.*

19.3 In mathematics, on the other hand, we have no concept at all before the defi-
nition which is how the concept is first given, therefore it must begin with
that and also can begin with that every time.

* Kant’s footnote

1.1 Philosophy swims in faulty definitions, especially such which contain actual
elements for a definition, but are not yet complete.

1.2 Now if we would be able to begin nothing at all with a concept until we had
defined it, it would be quite bad for all philosophy.

1.3 But since, as far as the elements (of the dissection) reach, a good and secure
use can always be made of it, even so deficient definitions, i.e., propositions
which are not yet definitions, but are still true and therefore are approxima-
tions to them, can also be used quite advantageously.

1.4 In mathematics the definition belongs _ad esse_, in philosophy _ad melius
esse_.

1.5 It is nice, but often very difficult, to achieve to such.

1.6 The jurists are still seeking a definition for their concept of right.

20.1 b. Mathematical definitions can never err.

20.2 For since the concept is first given through the definition, it straightway con-
tains only what the definition will have thought through it.

20.3 But although nothing improper with respect to the contents can come forth
in it, still occasionally, although only rarely, there can be errors in the form
(of the wording), namely with respect to the precision.

20.4 Thus the common explanation of the circle, that it is a curved line, all of the
points of which stand equally removed from a single one (the center), con-
tains the error that the determination “curved” has crept in unnecessarily.

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394 These mean, perhaps, “as existence” and “as better existence”, respectively.
20.5 For there must be a particular theorem which is deduced from the definition and can be easily proven that every line, all of the points of which stand equally removed from a single one, is curved (no part of it straight).

20.6 Analytical definitions, on the other hand, can err in multiple ways, either by ushering in identification marks which actually did not lie in the concept, or by being deficient in the degree of detail which makes up the essential aspect of its definition, because we cannot be totally certain of the completeness of our dissection.

20.7 For that reason the method of mathematics in defining does not allow of imitation in philosophy.


21.2 These are synthetical base propositions a priori to the extent they are immediately certain.

21.3 Now one concept does not permit of connecting with any other synthetically and still immediately because, in order that we can go out beyond a concept, a third mediating recognition is necessary.

21.4 Now since philosophy is merely the rational recognition according to concepts, no principle will be encountered in it which deserves the name of axiom.

21.5 Mathematics, on the other hand, is capable of axioms because, by means of the construction of the concepts in the perspective of the object, it can connect the predicate of the object a priori and immediately, e.g., that three points always lie in a plane.

21.6 On the other hand, a synthetic principle can never be immediately certain merely from concepts, e.g., the proposition: “everything which happens has its cause,” for I must look about for a third, namely the conditions of the time determination in an experience and could not recognize such a proposition directly and immediately from the concepts alone.

21.7 Discursive principles therefore are something else entirely from intuitive ones, i.e., axioms.
21.8 Discursive principles still always require a deduction which the axioms can dispense with entirely, and since axioms are evident precisely because of the same basis which the philosophical principle, with all its certitude, still can never present, infinitely much is lacking with them that any sort of a synthetic proposition of pure and transcendental reason could be so obvious (as some endeavor to express it in a disdainful way) as the proposition that two times two makes four.

21.9 Indeed, in the analytic, with the table for the principles of pure understanding, I have thought certain axioms of the perspective, but the principle cited there was itself no axiom, but rather only served for issuing the principle of the possibility of axioms in general, and itself was only a principle out of concepts.

21.10 For even the possibility of mathematics must be indicated in the transcendental philosophy.

21.11 Philosophy therefore has no axioms and may never offer its principles a priori in such an immediate manner, but rather must be content with justifying its authority concerning the principles through deduction.

22.1 3. Concerning demonstrations.

22.2 Only an apodictic proof, to the extent it is intuitive, can be called demonstration.

22.3 Experience teaches us indeed what exists, but not at all that it cannot be otherwise.

22.4 Hence empirical foundations of proof can supply no apodictic proof.

22.5 But from concepts a priori (in the discursive recognition) no perspectual certainty, i.e., evidence, can ever arise despite how apodictically certain the judgment may be otherwise.

22.6 Hence only mathematics contains demonstrations because it does not derive its relation out of concepts but rather out of the construction of those con-
cepts, i.e., out of the perspective which can be a priori given conformable to
the concept.

22.7 Even the procedure of the algebraist with his equalities, from which he
brings forth the truth together with the proof through reduction, is indeed no
gerometric construction, but still a characteristic one, in which we display
with the symbol the concept in the perspective, especially concerning the re-
lationship of magnitudes. And without once looking to the heuristic aspect,
we secure all conclusions from error by placing each of them before our
eyes.

22.8 Because, on the other hand, the philosophical recognition must dispense
with this advantage by always having to consider the universal in abstracto
(through concepts), while mathematics can ponder the universal in concreto
(in the single perspective) and still a priori through pure representation in
which every false step becomes visible.

22.9 Hence I would term the first acromatic (discursive) proofs, because they
can be conducted only through sheer words (the object in thought), rather
than demonstrations which, as the expression already indicates, advances in
the perspective of the object.

23.1 Now from all of this follows that it is not at all fitting for the nature of phi-
losophy, especially in the field of pure reason, to swell up in a dogmatic way
and to adorn itself with the titles and ribbons of mathematics, in whose or-
ders it still does not belong, although indeed it has every cause to hope for a
sisterly union with that.

23.2 Those are vain pretensions which can never succeed. Far rather they must
make its intention regressive, to lead the conceit of speculation back to that
modest, but thorough, self-recognition.

23.3 Reason therefore in its transcendental attempts, will not be able to look out
so confidently as though the way, which it has covered, led so entirely
straightway to the goal and cannot so courageously reckon on its premises,
laid as foundation, that it were not necessary to look back frequently and at-
tend to whether or not perchance errors are found in the advance toward the
conclusion, errors which were overlooked in the principles, and make it nec-
essary either to determine them better or to change them entirely.
24.1 I divide all apodictical propositions (be they provable or even immediately certain) into dogmata and mathemata.

24.2 A direct synthetical proposition from concepts is a dogma; on the other hand, such a proposition, through construction of the concept, is a mathema.

24.3 Analytical judgments actually teach us nothing more of the object than what the concept, which we have of it, already contains within itself, because they do not expand the recognition beyond the concept of the subject, but rather only expound this.

24.4 Hence, and properly speaking, they cannot be called dogmas (which word we perhaps could translate with the instructional dictum).

24.5 But among the two cited types of synthetical propositions a priori, according to the common way of speaking, only what belongs to the philosophical recognition can bear this name, and the propositions of arithmetic or geometry we would hardly term dogmata.

24.6 This use therefore certifies the explanation which we gave, that only judgments out of concepts can be called dogmatical, and not those out of the construction of the concept.

25.1 Now in all of pure reason, with respect to merely its speculative use, there is not a single directly synthetical judgment out of concepts.

25.2 For through Ideas, as we have indicated, reason is not competent of any synthetical judgment at all which would have objective validity. But through concepts of the understanding, it erects indeed secure principles, but not directly out of concepts, but rather always only indirectly through referral of these concepts to something entirely contingent, namely possible experience; since then, if this (something as an object of possible experiences) is presupposed, the judgments are apodictically certain in every case, but on their own (directly) cannot even be recognized a priori at all.

25.3 Hence the proposition, “everything, which happens, has its cause,” cannot be totally penetrated from these given concepts alone.
25.4 Hence it is not a dogma, even though from another point of view, namely the single field of its possible use, i.e., experience, it can be proven as such quite easily and indubitably.

25.5 But it is called a principle and not instructional proposition, even though it must be proven, because it has the particular property of making its basis of its proof, namely experience, itself first possible, and must always be presupposed with this.

26.1 Now if in the speculative use of pure reason, also with respect to the contents, there is no dogmata at all, then every dogmatical method, be it borrowed from the mathematical, or assumed to be of a peculiar type, is inappropriate in itself.

26.2 For it only buries the mistakes and errors and deceives philosophy, the actual intention of which is to allow all steps of reason to be seen in the clearest of light.

26.3 Nonetheless the method can always be systematic.

26.4 For our reasoning (subjectively speaking) is itself a system, but its pure usage, by means of mere concepts, is only a system of inquiry per principles of unity, to which alone experience can prove the material.

26.5 But of the peculiar method of a transcendental philosophy nothing can be said here, since we have only to do with a critique of our capacities' circumstances as to whether we build anywhere, and how high we can likely erect our building or regarding the material which we have (the pure concepts a priori).
The First Chapter

2nd Section. The Discipline of Pure Reason with Respect to the Polemical Use

1.1 In all its undertakings, reason must subject itself to critique, and through no command can it interrupt the freedom of this without harming itself and drawing upon itself a suspicion which is disadvantageous to it.

1.2 Now there is nothing so important with respect to the utility nor anything so holy that it may excuse itself from this testing and inspection examination, an examination which is acquainted with no consideration of the person.

1.3 On this freedom in fact rests the existence of reason, which has no dictatorial regard, and rather whose dictum is always nothing except the agreement of free citizens, to which each must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, without hesitation.

2.1 But now even though reason can never refuse critique, it still does not always have cause to fear it.

2.2 But pure reason in its dogmatical (not mathematical) use is not particularly aware of the most exact observation of its supreme laws that it would not have to appear with bashfulness, indeed with the entire rejection of all presumptuous dogmatical regard, before the critical eye of a higher and more proper reason.

3.1 It is quite a different matter if it has to do not with the censure of the judge but rather with the claim of its fellow citizens, and is merely supposed to defend itself against them.

3.2 For since these latter want to be dogmatical, though in the denial, just as well as the former do in the affirmation, a justification κατ’ ἀνθρωπον\textsuperscript{395} takes place which safeguards against all encroachment, and provides a titled possession which needs fear no foreign presumption, even though it itself κατ’ ἀλήθειαν\textsuperscript{396} cannot be sufficiently proven.

\textsuperscript{395} κατάθροπον, i.e., “according to man(kind).”

\textsuperscript{396} κατάληθειαν, i.e., “according to truth.”
4.1 Now with the polemical use of pure reason I understand the defense of its propositions against their dogmatical denial.

4.2 Here it does not matter whether its assertions might not also perhaps be false, but rather only that no one is ever able to assert the opposite with apodictic certitude (indeed even if with greater semblance).

4.3 For then we are still not in our possession in a petitionary way if we have before us a title of that, even if not sufficient. And it is completely certain that no one is ever able to prove the illegitimacy of this possession.

5.1 It is something troublesome and humiliating that there is in general an antithetic of pure reason, and that this, which still represents the supreme court on all conflicts, should come into conflict with itself.

5.2 Above, of course, we had such an apparent antithetic of that before us. But it was shown to rest upon a misunderstanding, since namely we, conformable to the common prejudice, took appearances as things on their own, and then demanded an absolute completion of their synthesis in one way or the other (but which was equally impossible in both ways), but which cannot at all be expected of appearances.

5.3 It was therefore no actual contradiction of reason with itself with the propositions: “the series of given appearances on its own has an absolutely first beginning” and “this series is utterly and on its own without any beginning,” for both propositions exist quite well together, because appearances, with respect to their existence (as appearances), are nothing at all on their own, i.e., something contradictory and therefore the presupposition of which must naturally draw with itself contradicting consequences.

6.1 But such a misunderstanding cannot be subject to subterfuge and attributed in that way to the conflict of reason if per chance it were theistically asserted that, “there is a highest entity,” and atheistically in opposition, “there is no highest entity,” or, in psychology, “everything, which thinks, is of absolutely enduring unity and therefore distinguished from all transitory, material
unity,” to which another, namely: “the soul is not immaterial unity and cannot become excepted from the perishability,” is contrarily opposed.

6.2 For here the object of the question is free of all dissimilarities, which contradict its nature, and the understanding has to do only with matters on their own, and not with appearances.

6.3 Here, of course, a true conflict would be encountered if only pure reason had something to say on the negating side, which came nearer to the foundation of an assertion. For concerning the critique of the basis of proof of the dogmatic-affirming, we can very well admit to that without for that reason giving up these propositions which still at least have the interest of reason for itself, and to these the opponent cannot appeal at all.

7.1 Indeed I am not of the opinion, so often expressed by excellent and reflecting people (e.g., Sulzer), since they felt the weakness of the previous proofs, that we can hope one day to invent yet evident demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of our pure reason: there is a God, there is a future life.

7.2 I am far rather certain that this will never happen.

7.3 For where does reason want to obtain the basis for such synthetical assertions which do not refer to objects of experience and their inner possibility?

7.4 But it is also indubitably certain that no human will ever step forward who is able to assert the opposite with the least semblance, much less dogmatically.

7.5 For since he could establish this still merely through pure reason, he would have to undertake to prove that a highest entity and the subject thinking within us as pure intelligence are impossible.

7.6 But where will he obtain the information which justifies him in such a synthetical judgment of things beyond all possible experience?

7.7 Hence we can be entirely untroubled about someone ever proving the opposite to us someday, that we for that reason simply have no need of brooding about this with scholastic proofs. Rather we are able anyway to assume those propositions, which adhere quite will together with the speculative interest
of our reason in the empirical usage and moreover are the singular means for uniting it with the practical interest.

7.8 For the opponent (who here must be considered merely as critic), we have our non liquet\textsuperscript{397} in readiness, which must infallibly confuse him, while we are not concerned about his retort of that to us, in that we continually have the subjective maxims of reason in reserve which the opponent necessarily lacks and under the protection of which we can consider all his mock blows quietly and with indifference.

8.1 In this way there is actually no antithetic of pure reason at all.

8.2 For the single arena for it would be sought upon the field of pure theology and psychology. But on this field there is no knight in his entire armament and with weapons which were to be feared.

8.3 He can only step forth with derision or bragging, which can be ridiculed as child’s play.

8.4 That is a comforting remark which gives courage again to reason. For upon what else did it want to entrust itself, if it, which is called forth alone to dispose of all errors, were unhinged within itself, without being able to hope for peace and quite possession?

9.1 Everything, which nature itself arranges, is good for some sort of intention.

9.2 Even poisons serve in overcoming other poisons which are generated in our own fluids and hence are not to be missing in a complete collection of healing means (dispensary).

9.3 The objects against the persuasion and the conceit of our merely speculative reason are themselves raised through the nature of this reason and therefore will have their good determinations and intention which must not be ignored.

\textsuperscript{397} “It is not proven.”
9.4 Why has providence placed many objects so high, even though they adhere together with our highest interest, that it is almost delightful for us to encounter them in an unclear perception and be almost doubted by us, whereby spying glances become more enticed than satisfied?

9.5 Whether it be useful, with respect to such views, to dare impudent determinations, is at least doubtful, perhaps even injurious.

9.6 But in any case and without any doubt it is useful to place researching, as well as appraising, reason in complete freedom, so that it can care for its own interest unhindered, which is promoted just as well by setting restrictions to its insights as by expanding such, and which suffers in any case if foreign hands meddle with it in order to steer it against its natural way by compelled intentions.

10.1 Accordingly let your opponent only say “reason” and then fight him merely with weapons of reason.

10.2 By the way, do not be troubled about the good consideration (of practical reason), for it never comes into play in the merely speculative conflict.

10.3 The conflict then discovers nothing except a certain antinomy of reason which, since it rests upon its nature, belongs necessarily and must be tested.

10.4 It cultivates that through consideration of its object on two sides, and rectifies its judgment by limiting such.

10.5 That which is disputable in this is not the matter, but rather its tone.

10.6 For there remains yet enough left for you to speak the speech of a firm faith justified against the fiercest reason, even if you have had to give up the speech of knowledge.

11.1 If we could ask the audacious David Hume, who was actually supplied as the counter-weight to the judgment, “what stirs you through tediously brooded considerations to undermine a persuasion so comforting and useful for the human that their rational insight achieve to the assertion of, and to the determined concept of, a highest entity?” he would answer, “nothing except
the intention of bringing reason further in its self recognition and, simultaneous-ly, a certain reluctance about the compulsion which some will inflict upon reason, in that we do great things with it, and simultaneously hinder it in accounting for a frank acknowledgement of its weaknesses, which is revealed with a probe of itself.”

11.2 On the other hand, if you were to ask Priestly, who surrendered to the principles of the empirical, rational usage alone and diverged from all transcendental speculation, what his motivation was in tearing down freedom and immortality of our souls (the hope of a future life with him is only the expectation of a miracle in the restoration), which are two such fundamental pillars of all religion, and who himself is a devoted and enthusiastic teacher of religion; he would be able to answer in no other way than for the sake of the interest of reason, which loses by our wanting to remove certain objects from the laws of the material nature, the only ones which we can be precisely acquainted with and determine.

11.3 It would seem unreasonable to decry the latter, who knows how to unite his paradoxical assertion with the religious intention, and injure a well thinking man because he cannot find his way as soon as he has gone astray out of the field of instruction of nature.

11.4 But this favor must come forth just as well to Hume, not less well minded and blameless according to his moral character, who cannot leave his derived speculation for that reason because he properly holds that their object lies entirely outside of the limits of natural science and in the field of pure Ideas.

12.1 Now what is to be done with this, especially with regard to the danger which seems to threaten the common good?

12.2 Nothing is more natural nor anything more reasonable than the decision which they have to take on that score.

12.3 Let these people proceed; for if they show talent, if they show deep and new research, in brief, if they only show reason, then reason wins every time.

12.4 If you grasp other means than those of an uncompelled reason, if you scream about high treason, if you call together the commonweal as a fire brigade, as
it were, one which does not understand such subtle treatments at all, you make yourselves ridiculous.

12.5 For the discussion is not at all about what is here advantageous or disadvantageous for the common good, but rather only how far reason probably is able to bring it in its speculation, abstracted from all interest, and whether we would have to reckon something to this in general, or rather even surrender it for the sake of the practical.

12.6 Therefore instead of forging in that with the sword, serenely observe this conflict far rather from the secure seat of the critique, which must turn out as tiring for the participants as entertaining for you and, at a very definite bloodless termination, as profitable for your insights.

12.7 For it is something very absurd to expect enlightenment from reason and still to prescribe to it in advance the side that it necessarily would have to turn up with as victor.

12.8 Moreover reason of itself becomes already so well subdued through reason and held in restraints that it is not necessary at all to call out the watch in order to set up civil resistance against that portion, whose fearful ascendancy seems dangerous to you.

12.9 In this dialectic there is no victory about which you had cause to be concerned.

13.1 Also reason is very much in need of such a conflict, and it is unfortunate that it was not conducted earlier and with unrestricted, public permission.

13.2 For then a mature critique would have come forth much earlier, at whose appearance all these conflicting actions would have ceased of themselves. For the combatants would have learned to penetrate their facades and prejudices, which they have placed into opposition to one another.

14.1 There is a certain impurity in human nature, which still at the end, as everything which comes from nature, must contain a makeup for good purposes, namely an inclination to conceal our true dispositions and to bear certain assumed ones which we hold for good and laudatory.
14.2 Without doubt, through this bent for suppressing themselves, as well as also assuming an appearance advantageous to them, the humans have not merely civilized, but rather gradually, to a certain degree, moralized themselves, because no one was able to penetrate through the cosmetics of uprightness, honest and decency, and in this way to found a school of improvement for himself on alleged, genuine examples of the good which he saw about himself.

14.3 But this layout for pretending to be better than we are and to express dispositions which we do not have, serves only provisionally, as it were, to bring the human out of the rough, and allows him at first to assume at least the manners of the good with which he is acquainted. For afterwards, if the genuine principles are once developed and transferred over into the way of thinking, that duplicity must gradually be forcefully resisted, because otherwise it spoils the heart and does not allow good dispositions to arise from under the prolific weed of a pleasant semblance.

15.1 I am sorry to perceive the impurity, dissimulation and hypocrisy even in the expressions of the speculative way of thinking, in which still humans, to uncover the confession of their thoughts in cheap measure openly and without concealment, have far fewer obstacles and no advantage at all.

15.2 For what can be more disadvantageous to insights than communicating mere falsified thoughts to one another, concealing doubt which we feel against our own assertions, or conveying a coating of evidence to foundations of proof which are not sufficient even to ourselves?

15.3 Meanwhile, as long as merely the private conceit instigates these secret intrigues (which is usually the case in speculative judgments which have no particular interest and are not easily proficient for dogmatic certitude) the conceit resists with public permission and the matter finally comes there where the most sheer disposition and uprightness would have brought them much earlier anyway.

15.4 But where the commonweal considers ingenious rationalizers to go after nothing better than making the basic vestments of the public weal totter, there it seems not only conformable to prudence, but rather also allowed and indeed even laudatory, to come to the aid of the good cause rather through
apparent foundations than leaving the alleged opponent of the good cause even the advantage of toning down of his pitch to the moderation of a mere practical conviction, and of necessitating ourselves to acknowledge the lack of the speculative and dogmatical certitude.

15.5 Meanwhile I should think that nothing in the world allows more inappropriately of unification with the intention of asserting a good cause than fraud, deceit and cheating.

15.6 That everything would have to come about honestly in the weighing of the rational foundations of a mere speculation, surely that is the least that one can require.

15.7 But if we could safely count on no more than this little bit, the dispute of speculative reason about the important questions of God, immortality (of the soul) and freedom, could either have been decided long ago, or would be brought to an end very quickly.

15.8 Often does the integrity of the disposition stand in relationship to the good nature of the matter itself, and this perhaps has more honorable and sincere opponents than defenders.

16.1 I presuppose readers therefore who want to know no correct cause wrongly defended.

16.2 Now with respect to them, it is decided that, according to our principles of the critique, if we do not look to that which happens, but rather to what was reasonably supposed to happen, there would actually have to be no polemic of pure reason at all.

16.3 For how could two persons carry on a dispute about a matter, the reality of which neither of the two can present in an actual or even only in a possible experience, but about whose Idea it broods in order to produce something more out of it than the Idea, namely the actuality of the object itself?

16.4 By what means do they want to come out of the dispute, since neither of the two can make his case straightway comprehensible and certain, but rather only attack and refute that of this opponent?
16.5 For this is the fate of all assertions of pure reason, that since they go out beyond the conditions of all possible experience, apart from which no documentation of truth is encountered anywhere at all, but nonetheless must avail themselves of the laws of understanding, which are determined merely for the empirical usage, but without which not one step can be taken in the synthetical thinking, they give the opponent an opening every time and, for their part, take advantage of the exposure of their opponent.

17.1 We can consider the critique of pure reason as the true court for all controversies of this sort. For it is not embroiled in the understanding, except which go immediately to objects, but rather is established for the determination and judgment of the correctness of reason in general, according to the principles of its first institution.

18.1 Without this, reason is in the state of nature, as it were, and cannot make its assertions and claims otherwise valid or secure except through war.

18.2 The critique, on the other hand, which draws all decisions out of the foundational rules of its own establishment, the authority of which no one can doubt, supplies us with the tranquility of a legitimate state, in which we are not supposed to conduct our conflict otherwise than through proofs.

18.3 What ends the action in the first state is a victory, about which both parties boast, upon which very often only an uncertain peace follows, which the interceding authorities establish, but in the second, the aphorism, which, because it touches here the source of the dispute itself, must impart an eternal peace.

18.4 Also the endless conflicts of a merely dogmatic reason finally necessitates a search for peace in some sort of a critique of this reason itself and in a legislation which is based upon it; much as Hobbes asserts: “the state of nature is a state of injustice and might, and we would have to abandon it necessarily in order to subject ourselves to the lawful compulsion which limits all our freedom only so far that it is able to coexist with the freedom of every person and precisely in that way with the common good.”
19.1 To this freedom then belongs also that of exhibiting our thoughts and our doubts, which we cannot resolve for evaluation without being decried for that as an unruly and dangerous citizen.

19.2 This already lies in the original rights of human reason which recognizes no other judge than universal human reason itself, in which each has his vote, and since from this all improvements, to which our state is capable, must come, such a right is holy and may not be curtailed.

19.3 Also it is very unwise to proclaim as dangerous certain ventured assertions or considered attacks against that which already has on its side the determination of the greatest and best portion of the commonweal; for that is the same as giving them an importance which they were not at all supposed to have.

19.4 If I hear that an uncommon thinker is supposed to have demonstrated away the freedom of the human will, the hope of a future life and the existence of God, I am curious and want to read that book, for I expect from his talent that he will be able to bring my insight further.

19.5 I already know with complete certitude in advance that he will have performed nothing from all this, not because I per chance already believe myself to be in possession of incontrovertible proof of these important propositions. Rather the transcendental critique, which discloses to me the entire store of our pure reason, has completely convinced me that, as it is entirely inadequate to affirmations in this field, just as little and even less will it know in order to be able to assert something negative about this question.

19.6 For from whence does the alleged free spirit obtain this information that there is, e.g., no supreme entity?

19.7 This proposition lies outside of the field of possible experience and for that reason also apart from the limits of all human insight.

19.8 The dogmatic defender of the good side against this enemy I would not read at all, because I know in advance that he will attack the apparent foundations of the other side only in order to procure his own entrance, beyond which a common semblance still does not give as much material to new observations as one which is more strange and ingeniously thought.
19.9 On the other hand, the religious opponent of my critique, also dogmatic in his manner, would give some desired occupation and occasion to many rectifications of their principles, without there being anything to fear in the least on his part.

20.1 But the youth, which is entrusted to the academic instruction, is still at least to be warned about such writings and to be deferred from early acquaintance with such dangerous propositions before their judgmental capacity has matured, or rather until the teaching, which we will instill in them, is firmly rooted, so that they may forcefully withstand all persuasions to the contrary, regardless from whence it may arise.

21.1 If it would have to remain with the dogmatic proceeding in matters of pure reason and the dispatch of the opponent actually be polemical, i.e., so composed that we would engage ourselves in combat, and arm ourselves with proof bases to contrary assertions, then of course nothing more advisable were at hand, but simultaneously nothing more conceited and fruitless in the long run, than to place the reason of the youth for a time under guardianship and at least to protect it that long from seduction.

21.2 But if, as a consequence, either due to curiosity or the vogue of the time, such writings slip into their hands, will then that youthful persuasion yet stand the test?

21.3 He who brings nothing with him but dogmatical weapons, in order to withstand the attacks of his opponent and does not knows how to unravel the concealed dialectic which lies no less in his own bosom than in that of his opponent, sees apparent foundations which have the advantage of novelty come forth against apparent foundations which no longer have such novelty, but rather much more excites the suspicion of a misused credulity of the youth.

21.4 He does not believe himself better able to show that he has outgrown the child’s harness than by removing himself beyond those well-intended warnings and, dogmatically accustomed, he drinks the poison in long draughts which dogmatically spoils his principles.
22.1 Precisely the opposite of what some recommend must occur in the academic instruction, but, of course, only under the presupposition of a basic instruction in the critique of pure reason.

22.2 For, in order to bring the principles of pure reason as soon as possible into practice, and to show their adequacy with the greatest dialectical semblance, it is thoroughly necessary to direct the attacks, so terrible for the dogmatists, against his reason, although still weak, but enlightened through critique, and to let him make the attempt of testing the baseless assertions of the opponent piece by piece on those principles.

22.3 It cannot at all be difficult for him to dissolve them into sheer vapor, and so he early enough feels his own power to completely secure himself against such damaging illusions, which finally must lose all semblance for him.

22.4 Now even though precisely these blows, which demolish the edifice of the enemy, must also be just as despoiling to his own speculative construction if he per chance thought to erect such, he is still entirely unconcerned about that, in that he has no need of it at all as a residence, but rather has yet a vista into the practical field before himself, where he can hope with good reason for a firm footing for erecting his rational and salutary system in that field.

23.1 So accordingly there is no actual polemic in the field of pure reason.

23.2 Both sides are windmill fighters, who box about with their shadows, for they go out beyond nature, where nothing to be grasped and held is available for their dogmatical clutches.

23.3 They have fun fighting. The shadows, which they sunder, grow back together in an instant like the heroes in Walhalla, in order to be able to delight themselves anew in bloodless combat.

24.1 But there is also no admissible skeptical use of pure reason which we could term the principles of neutrality with all its disputes.

24.2 To incite reason against itself, to pass out weapons to it on both sides, and then to contemplate its most ardent fencing tranquilly and mockingly, does
not look very well from a dogmatic point of view, but rather has the appearance of a gloating and mischievous type of mind.

24.3 Meanwhile, if we consider the irreducible illusions and the great doings of the rationalizers, who will allow moderation through no critique, there is still actually no other council than of placing contrary to the great promises on the one side another which is footed upon just the same rights, only in order that reason is made at least perplexed through the resistance of an enemy, in order to place some doubts into their presumptions and for them to give ear to the critique.

24.4 But to let it rest entirely with these doubts, and to take exception to wanting to recommend the conviction and the acknowledgement of one’s ignorance, not merely as a healing aid against the dogmatical self conceit, but rather simultaneously as the way of ending the conflict of reason with itself, is an entirely vain stroke and in no way can be suitable for supplying reason with a state of rest, but rather is at most only a means of awakening itself out of its sweet, dogmatic dreams in order to draw its state into a thorough test.

24.5 Meanwhile, since this skeptical maneuver for drawing itself, as it were, out of an annoying business, appears to be the shortest way for achieving an enduring philosophical tranquility, or at least the highway which those gladly strike out upon who mean to give themselves a philosophical appearance in a mocking scorn of all investigations of this manner, I find it necessary to present this manner of thinking in its peculiar light.
Concerning the Impossibility of a Skeptical Satisfaction of Pure Reason United with Itself

1.1 The consciousness of my ignorance (if this is not simultaneously recognized as necessary), instead of ending my researches, is far rather the actual cause of arousing them.

1.2 All ignorance is either that of things or of the determination and boundary of my recognition.

1.3 Now if the ignorance is contingent, it must in the first case impel the investigation of the things (objects) dogmatically; while in the second, it must impel the limits of my possible recognition critically.

1.4 But that my ignorance be utterly necessary, and hence releases me from all further investigation, is ascertained not empirically out of observation, but rather only critically through an explication of the first sources of our recognition.

1.5 The boundary determinations of our reason therefore only happen a priori according to foundations; but the restriction of that, which is a recognition, albeit only undetermined, of an ignorance never fully to be removed, can also be recognized a priori through that which, with all knowledge, remains yet to be known by us.

1.6 That recognition of our ignorance, possible alone through a critique of reason itself, is therefore science, while the latter, i.e., an unremovable ignorance, is nothing but perception, of which we cannot say how far the conclusion out of that may reach.

1.7 If I represent to myself the surface of the earth (conformable to the visual semblance) as a plate, I cannot know how far it stretches.

1.8 But experience teaches me that no matter where I go, I always see a space around about me in which I could advance further. Thus I recognize the limits of my ever actual geography, but not the boundaries of all possible descriptions of the earth.

1.9 But, on the other hand, if I have come so far to know that the earth is a sphere and its surface a spherical surface, then out of a small portion of that,
e.g., the magnitude of a degree, I can also recognize the diameter as determined and according to principles a priori, and through this, the complete delineation of the earth, i.e., its outer surface. And even though I am ignorant with respect to the objects which this surface may contain, nevertheless I am not ignorant with respect to the scope which contains them, and of the magnitude and limits of those objects.

2.1 The epitome of all objects for our recognition seem to us to be a flat surface which has its apparent horizon, namely that which embraces the entire scope of that surface and which we call the rational concept of unconditioned totality.

2.2 It is impossible to reach that empirically, and all attempts in determining it a priori according to a certain principle for that have been in vain.

2.3 Nonetheless, all questions of our pure reason still go to what may lie outside of this horizon, or in every case also within its boundary lines.

3.1 The celebrated David Hume was one of these geographers of human reason who meant to have sufficiently disposed of these questions altogether, relegating them beyond the horizon of reason, which he still could not determine.

3.2 He tarried especially with the principle of causality and noted quite properly that we base its truth (indeed not even the objective validity of the concept of an effecting cause in general) on no insight at all, i.e., on no recognition a priori, and that accordingly the necessity of this law does not make up its authority in the least. Rather the necessity of this law is a mere universal utility of it in the course of experience, and hence a subjective necessity, which he terms “custom,” arising from that utility.

3.3 Now from this incapacity of our reason to make a use of this principle going out beyond all experience, he concluded in general the futility of all presumptions of reason to go out beyond the empirical.
4.1 A procedure of this manner, of subjecting a fact of reason to the test and, according to the outcome, to the reproof of reason, we can term a censure of reason.

4.2 It is beyond doubt that this censorship would lead unavoidably to the uncertainty of all transcendental utility of the principles.

4.3 But this is only the second step, which does not end the work by any means.

4.4 The first step in matters of pure reason, which marks its childhood, is dogmatic.

4.5 The just mentioned second step is skeptical, and this is evidence of the caution of the judgmental capacity sharpened through experience.

4.6 But now a third step is yet necessary, which befits only the matured and virile judgmental capacity, which has firm maxims as its foundation, maxims confirmed with respect to their universality; namely of exposing for estimation not facts of reason, but rather reason itself, with respect to its entire capacity and suitability for pure recognitions a priori. This is not the censorship, but rather the critique of reason, by means of which not merely limits, but rather the determined boundaries of that, not merely ignorance in one part or another, but with respect to all possible questions of a certain type, and are indeed not per chance only supposed, but rather proven out of principles.

4.7 So skepticism is a resting place for human reason, for it can ponder its dogmatic wanderings and make a sketch of the area where it finds itself so that it is able to choose its way further with more confidence. But it is not a homestead for a continuing response; for this can be encountered only in a complete certitude, be it now of the recognition of the objects themselves, or of the limits within which all of our recognition of objects is enclosed.

5.1 Our reason is not per chance a plane spread out undeterminably far, the limits of which we recognize only generally, but rather must be compared to a sphere, the radius of which allows of ascertainmet from the curvature of the circle on its outer surface (nature of synthetic propositions a priori), and from which also the content and the limitation of that is securely rendered.
5.2 Apart from this sphere (field of experience) nothing is an object for reason. Indeed, even questions about such alleged objects concern only subjective principles of a thorough determination of the relationships which can come forth under the concepts of the understanding within this sphere.

6.1 We are actually in possession of synthetic recognitions a priori, as this establishes the understanding principles which anticipate experience.

6.2 Now if someone cannot at all make the possibility of these comprehensible to himself, he may indeed at the beginning doubt whether they even actually reside with us a priori, but he cannot yet pass this off as an impossibility of that through mere powers of the understanding, nor all steps, which reason takes according to the guideline of them, as inane.

6.3 He can only say, “if we penetrated their origin and authenticity, we would be able to determine the scope and the boundaries of our reason.” But before this has happened, all assertions of this sort are ventured blindly.

6.4 And in such way a thorough doubt of all dogmatic philosophy, which goes its way without critique of reason, would be quite well founded. But such an advance still could not for that reason be entirely denied to reason if the advance were prepared and secured through foundations which were more securely laid.

6.5 For once again: all concepts, indeed all questions which pure reason presents to us, do not per chance lie in experience, but rather actually in turn only in reason, and hence must be able to be solved and comprehended according to their validity or nullity.

6.6 Still we are also not justified in dismissing this task under the pretext of our incapacity, as though its solution actually lay in the nature of things, and thus refusing further investigations into them, since reason alone has generated these Ideas itself within its womb, of whose validity or dialectic semblance it is therefore held to give an account.

7.1 All skeptical polemicizing is actually only turned against the dogmatist who, without positing any mistrust in his originally objective principles, i.e., without critique, sets forth gravely on his way. This polemicizing is actually
merely in order to upset his concept and bring him to self-recognition.

7.2 On its own, with respect to what we can know and, on the other hand, what we cannot know, there is no concern at all.

7.3 All miscarrying dogmatic attempts of reason are facts (Facta), and it is always useful to subject such to censure.

7.4 But this can decide nothing about the expectation of reason in hoping for a better success of its further endeavors and in making claims about that. Therefore the mere censure can never bring the disputability about the proper source of human reason to an end.

8.1 Since among all skeptics, Hume is perhaps the most spirited and, without challenge, the most pre-eminent with respect to the influence which the skeptical procedure can have upon the awakening of a thorough test of reason, it is worthwhile to make representable the way of his conclusions and the mistakes of such a penetrating and valued man which still have started on the clues of truth, to the extent it is appropriate to my intention.

9.1 Hume has in mind, perhaps, although he never completely developed it, that we, in judgments of a certain type, go out beyond our concept of objects.

9.2 I have termed this sort of judgment “synthetical.”

9.3 How I am able to go out from my concept, which I have up to then, by means of experience, is subject to no scruple.

9.4 Experience itself is such a synthesis of perceptions, which increase my concept, which I have by means of a perception, through others being added to it.

9.5 However we also believe to be able to go out a priori from our concepts and to expand our recognitions.

9.6 This we attempt to do either through pure understanding, with respect to what can at least be an object of experience, or even through pure reason,
with respect to such properties of things, or indeed actually to the existence of such objects, which can never come forth in experience.

9.7 Our skeptic did not distinguish these two sorts of judgments as he actually should have done, and this increase of concepts out of themselves and, so to speak, the self-birth of our understanding (together with reason), without being pregnant via experience, Hume held straightway as impossible, and accordingly held all alleged principles of experience as imagined a priori and found that they were nothing except a custom arising out of experience and its laws, thus merely empirical, i.e., rules contingent on their own, to which we attribute an allege necessity and universality.

9.8 But for the assertion of this strange proposition he referred to the universally recognized principles of the relationship of cause to effect.

9.9 For since no understanding capacity can lead from the concept of a thing to the existence of something else which were given via that concept universally and necessarily, he believed himself able to decide from this that without experience we have nothing which could increase our concept and justify us to such a judgment expanding itself a priori.

9.10 That the sunlight, which illuminates the wax, simultaneously melts it, while hardening clay, no understanding could render out of concepts which we possessed preceding these things, much less legitimately conclude. Only experience would be able to teach us such a law.

9.11 On the other hand, we have seen in the transcendental logic that even though we are never able to go out immediately beyond the content of the concept which is given to us, still, completely a priori, though in referral to a third something, namely possible experience, therefore still a priori, we are able to recognize the law of the connection with other things.

9.12 If therefore previously firm wax melts, I can recognize a priori that something would have to have preceded (e.g., the warmth of the sun), whereupon this has followed according to an enduring law, even though, without experience, determined a priori and without the instruction of experience I could recognize neither the cause from the effect, nor the effect from the cause.

9.13 From the contingency of our determinations according to the law therefore he concluded falsely to the contingency of the law itself. And the expansion
from the concept of a thing to possible experience (which happens a priori and makes up the objective reality of that) he confused with the synthesis of the objects of actual experience, which, of course, is always empirical. But from that, out of a principle of affinity which has its seat in understanding and expresses necessary connection, he made a rule of association, which is encountered merely in the imitative imagination, and can present only contingent, and by no means objective, connection.

10.1 But the skeptical mistakes of this otherwise extremely acute man arose especially out of a deficiency which he had in common with all dogmatists after all, namely that he did not systematically survey all sorts of synthesis of the understand a priori.

10.2 For then he would have discovered, e.g., without here mentioning the remaining ones, the proposition of endurance as such which anticipates experience just as much as that of causality.

10.3 In this way he would have also been able to point out determined boundaries of the understanding, which expands itself a priori, and of pure reason.

10.4 But since he only limited our understanding without delineating it and, indeed, produces a universal mistrust, but no determined information about the ignorance unavoidable to us, since he brings some principles of the understanding under censure without bringing this understanding, with respect to its entire capacity, to the testing scales of critique, and by denying to it what it actually cannot perform, goes further and impugns it of all capacity of expanding itself a priori; he disregards this entire capacity which was not drawn into the evaluation; such that that, which always suppresses skepticism, contradicts him, namely that he comes to doubt himself in that his challenges rest only on facts which are contingent, but not on principles, which could effect a necessary renunciation of the right of dogmatic assertions.

11.1 Since he is also acquainted with no distinction between the established claims of understanding and the dialectic presumptions of reason, against which still his attacks are primarily directed, reason, whose entire peculiar play with this was not in the least disturbed, but rather only hindered, does not feel the space to its expansion closed, and can never be entirely brought
away from its attempts, despite it becoming occasionally annoyed.

11.2 For against attacks we arm ourselves for resistance and set our mind even more stubbornly for carrying through with our demands.

11.3 But a complete estimation of our entire capacity and the conviction of the certitude of a small possession arising from it, at the conceit of higher claims, stops all dispute and motivates the peaceful enjoyment of a restricted, but undisputed, ownership.

12.1 Against the uncritical dogmatist, who has not measured the sphere of his understanding, thus has not determined the limits of his possible recognition according to principles, and who therefore does not already know in advance how much he can do, but rather thinks to uncover it through mere attempts, the skeptical attacks are not only dangerous, but even despoiling.

12.2 For if he is encountered in a single assertion, which he cannot justify, but whose semblance he can also not develop out of principles, the suspicion falls on everything, regardless of how persuasive they may be otherwise.

13.1 And so the skeptic is the disciplinarian of the dogmatic pseudo-rationalizer on a healthy critique of the understanding and reason themselves.

13.2 If it has reached this far, he has no reason to fear any duel any more; for he distinguishes then his possession from what lies entirely apart from his possession, concerning which he makes no claim and about which can also not become involved in conflicts.

13.3 So the skeptical procedure is indeed on its own not satisfying for the questions of reason, but still is a preparatory practice in order to awaken its cautions and to point to basic means, which can secure it in its rightful possession.
The First Chapter

3rd Section. The Discipline of Pure Reason with respect to Hypotheses

1.1 Since then through critique of our reason we finally know this much, namely that we can in fact know nothing at all in its pure and speculative use, was it not supposed to open up an even wider field to hypotheses, since it at least is permitted to compose and to conjecture, even if not to assert?

2.1 Where, per chance, imagination is not supposed to revel, but rather to compose under the strict supervision of reason, something must always be completely certain previously, not fabricated or merely conjectured, and that is the possibility of the object itself.

2.2 Indeed it is because of the actuality of the object that we are permitted to take refuge in conjecture, but which, in order not to be without a foundation, must, as an explanatory basis, be brought into connection with what is actually given and, consequently, what is certain, and hence is called hypothesis.

3.1 Now since we cannot a priori make the least concept of the possibility of the dynamic connection, and since the category of pure understanding does not serve to devise such, but rather only to understand where it is encountered in experience, we cannot originally concoct a single object, according to a new and not empirically assignable composition, which would conform to these categories, and position it as the foundation to a permitted hypothesis, for this would be the same as adding empty brainstorm to reason instead of concepts of facts.

3.2 Thus it is not permitted to devise any sort of new, original forces, e.g., an understanding which would be empowered to look at its object without senses, or an expansionary power without any contact, or a new type of substance, e.g., which were present in space without impenetrability, consequently also no communality of substance which would be distinct from all that experience provides; no presence other than that in space; no duration except merely in time.

3.3 In short, it is only possible for our reason to need the conditions of possible
experience as conditions of the possibility of the facts; but in no way to procure, as it were, something entirely independently of these, because such concepts, although without contradiction, would still also be without object.

4.1 The rational concepts, as stated, are merely Ideas, and have, of course, no object in any sort of an experience. But they still do not for that reason indicate objects contrived and simultaneously assumed as possible.

4.2 They are thought merely problematically in order to base regulative principles of the systematic use of the understanding in the field of experience in reference to them (as heuristic fictions).

4.3 If we depart from that, they are merely thought-things whose possibility is not provable, and which accordingly also cannot be positioned as a basis to the explanation of actual appearances through an hypothesis.

4.4 To think of the soul as simple, is quite properly permitted in order to lay a complete and necessary unity to all mental powers as the principle of our estimation of their inner appearance according to this Idea, even though we cannot penetrate them immediately in concreto.

4.5 But to assume the soul as simple substance (a transcendental concept) would be a proposition, which would not only be unprovable (as are many physical hypotheses), but rather even ventured entirely arbitrarily and blindly because the simple cannot come forth in any experience whatsoever. And if we understand here with substance the enduring object of sensitive perspective, the possibility of a simple appearance is not at all to be penetrated.

4.6 Mere intelligible entities, or merely intelligible properties of things of the sense world, do not allow of being assumed as opinion by any authority of reason, although (because we have no concept of their possibility or impossibility) cannot be dogmatically denied through any allegedly superior insight.

5.1 For the explanation of given appearances no other things and explanatory foundations can be introduced except which are placed in connection with the given ones, hence according to already known laws of appearances.
5.2 A transcendental hypothesis, with which a mere Idea of reason were used for the explanation of that which we do not sufficiently understand from known empirical principles, would have to be explained by something, about which we understand nothing at all.

5.3 Also, the principle of such an hypothesis would actually serve only for the satisfaction of reason and not for the promotion of the usage of the understanding with respect to the objects.

5.4 Order and purposefulness in nature must in turn be explained out of natural foundations and according to natural laws, and here even the wildest hypotheses, if they are only physical, are more tolerable than a hyperphysical one, i.e., an appeal to a divine originator which we presuppose in aid of this.

5.5 For it would be a principle of lazy reason (ignara ratioi) to suddenly pass over all causes, with the objective reality of which, at least according to possibility, we can yet achieve acquaintance through advanced experience, in order to rest in a mere Idea which is very comfortable to reason.

5.6 But concerning the absolute totality of the explanatory basis in the series of this, this can be no obstacle with respect to the world objects, because, since these are nothing but appearances, something complete can never be hoped of them in the synthesis of the series of the conditions.

6.1 Availing ourselves of transcendental hypotheses of the speculative use of reason, and of a freedom in compensation for the deficiency in physical explanatory bases in all cases hyperphysical, cannot be permitted at all, partly because reason is not brought further in that way at all, but rather which much more cuts off the entire advance of its use, and partly because this license would finally have to deprive it of all fruits of the preparation of its very own floor, namely experience.

6.2 For if the natural explanation becomes difficult for us here and there, we have at hand continually a transcendental explanatory basis, which exempts us from that investigation, and concludes our researches not through insight, but rather through complete incomprehensibility of a principle which was already so thought out in advance that it had to contain the concept for the absolute first.
7.1 The second required piece for the acceptability of an hypothesis is its adequacy in determining from it a priori the consequences which are given.

7.2 If we are necessitated in calling forth auxiliary hypotheses to this purpose, they render the suspicion of a mere concoction, because each of these on its own has need of the same justification which had necessitated the thoughts laid as the basis and hence can provide no sound witness.

7.3 If under the presupposition of an unrestrained perfect cause, indeed at the explanatory bases of all purposefulness, order and quantity which are found in the world, there is no deficiency, so still that has need of yet new hypotheses with the evident deviations and maladies in order to be rescued from these as challenges, at least with respect to our concepts.

7.4 If the simple independence of the human soul, which is laid as the basis of its appearances, is embattled through the difficulties of its phenomena similar to the modification of a material (growth and decline), new hypotheses must be called up which indeed are not without semblance, but still without any certification apart from that which the opinion assumed as the primary basis gives to them, to which they nonetheless are supposed to favor.

8.1 If the rational assertions cited here as examples (incorporeal unity of soul and existence of a highest being) are not supposed to hold as hypotheses, but rather as a priori proven dogmata, then this discussion is not of them at all.

8.2 But in such case we would have to be mindful indeed that the proof would have the indubitable certitude of a demonstration.

8.3 For to want to make the actuality of such an Idea merely probable, is an absurd design, just as though we thought to prove a proposition of geometry merely probabilistically.

8.4 Sundered from all experience, reason can only recognize everything a priori and as necessary, or not at all. Hence its judgment is never opinion, but rather either abstinence from all judgment or indubitable certitude.

8.5 Opinions and probable judgments of what pertains to things, can only arise as explanatory foundations of what is actually given or as consequences ac-
cording to empirical laws of what actually lies as a foundation, thus only in
the series of the objects of experience.

8.6 Apart from this field, conjecture is the same as playing with thoughts, except
that we would have merely the opinion of an uncertain way of judgment to
perhaps find the truth on that way.

9.1 But even though no hypotheses take place with merely speculative questions
of pure reason for the sake of grounding propositions on them, they are still
entirely permissible if only to defend them, i.e., indeed not in a dogmatical,
but still in the polemical, usage.

9.2 But with defense I do not mean the increase of the basis of proof of our as-
sertions, but rather the mere frustration of apparent insights of the opponent,
which are supposed to injure our asserted propositions.

9.3 But now all synthetical propositions out of pure reason have the peculiarity
as such, that if he, who asserts the reality of certain Ideas, still never even
knows enough to make this his proposition certain, on the other side, the op-
ponent can know just as little in asserting the counter play.

9.4 Now this equality in the speculative recognition, of the fate of human rea-
son, does not indeed favor either of the two, and here also is the proper arena
of a feud which is never to be laid aside.

9.5 But it will be revealed later that nevertheless, reason has a right of assuming
something with respect to the use of practical reason, which it would in no
way be authorized in presupposing in the field of mere speculation without
sufficient foundations of proof, because every such presupposition of perfec-
tion does injury to speculation, about which however the practical interest is
not at all concerned.

9.6 Here therefore reason has a possession, the legality of which it may not
prove, and concerning which in fact it could not even conduct the proof.

9.7 The opponent is therefore responsible for all proving.

9.8 But since he knows just as little of the questionable object for establishing its
non-being as the former, who asserts its actuality, an advantage is seen here
on the side of him who asserts something as a practically necessary presup-
position (*melior est conditio possidentis*).

9.9 It is open to him namely to avail himself with just the same means for his
good side in self defense, as it were, as the opponent against him, i.e., the
hypotheses, which are not at all supposed to serve to strengthen the proof,
but rather only to show that the opponent understands much too little of the
object of the dispute to flatter himself of having an advantage of any specu-
lative insight with respect to ourselves.

10.1 Hypotheses therefore are permitted in the field of pure reason only as weap-
ons of war, not in order to base some right on them, but rather only to defend
that right.

10.2 But the opponent here we must always seek within us ourselves.

10.3 For speculative reason in its transcendental use is dialectical as such.

10.4 The challenges which might be fearful, lie within us ourselves.

10.5 We must seek them out, equally old claims, but never out of date, in order to
base an eternal peace on their destruction.

10.6 Outward tranquility is only apparent.

10.7 The kernel of the attacks, which lies in the nature of human reason, must be
eradicated. But how can we eradicate it if we do not give it the freedom, in-
deed even the nourishment, to shoot forth sprouts in order to reveal itself in
that way, and afterwards to annihilate it at the roots.

10.8 Accordingly we should even think up challenges, upon which yet no oppo-
nent has lighted, and even lend him weapons, or grant him the most advan-
tages spot which he might only wish for himself.

10.9 There is nothing at all to be feared with this, though indeed something to be
hoped for, namely that you will supply to yourselves a possession, never
again in all the future to be attacked.
11.1 Now to your complete armament there also belongs the hypotheses of pure reason. And although they are only heavy leaden weapons (because they are hardened through no experience), they still always empower as much as those which any opponent may avail himself of to use against you.

11.2 Therefore if against (in some sort or another of a non-speculative respect) the nature of the soul, assumed as immaterial and subjected to no corporeal transformation, the difficulty hits you that experience seems nonetheless to prove to you the cancellation as well as disarrangement of our spiritual powers merely as diverse modifications of our organs, you weaken the power of this proof by assuming our body to be nothing except a fundamental appearance, to which, as condition, the entire capacity of sensitivity and with that all thinking refers in the present state (in life).

11.3 The separation from body would be the end of this sensitive use of your recognition power and the beginning of the intellectual.

11.4 Therefore the body would not be the cause of the thinking, but rather a merely restrictive condition for that, thus indeed to be viewed as promoter of the sensitive and animal life, but so much the more also as an obstacle to the pure and spiritual life, and the dependency of the former (the sensitive and animal life) upon the corporal composition would prove nothing about the dependency of our entire life upon the state of our organs.

11.5 But you could go even further and indeed even make discoverable new doubts, either not raised or not carried far enough.

12.1 The contingency of the reproduction, which with humans, as with irrational creatures, depends upon the opportunity, but beyond that also often upon the sustenance, upon the conduct, its moods and fancies, often even upon depravities, raises a great difficulty against the opinion of a continuation, stretching out into eternity, of a creature whose life has first begun under circumstances so trivial and left so entirely to our freedom.

12.2 Concerning the continuation of the entire species (here on earth), the difficulty with respect to this, has little to say, because the chance in the singular is subjected to no less of a rule in the whole. But with respect to each individual, to expect such a mighty effect from so insignificant a cause seems in any case thought provoking.
12.3 But against this you could summon up a transcendental hypothesis: that all life be actually only intelligible, and not at all subject to temporal changes, and has neither begun through birth, nor will end through death.

12.4 That this life be nothing except a mere appearance, i.e., a sensitive representation of the pure spiritual life, and that the entire sense world be a mere picture, which sways before our present manner of recognition and, as a dream, have on its own no objective reality; that if we should look at the matter and us ourselves as we are, we would see ourselves in a world of a spiritual nature, with which our single true communality would neither have begun through birth, nor would cease through the bodily death (as mere appearances), etc.

13.1 Now even though we do not know the least of all this which we throw up here hypothetically against the attack, nor assert it in earnest, indeed not everything being even a rational Idea, but rather concepts, thought out merely as a counterpunch, we still proceed here with entire rationality in that we only show the opponent, who thinks to have depleted all possibility by erroneously proclaiming the lack of empirical conditions as a proof of the entire impossibility of that which is believed by us: that through mere laws of experience he does not span the entire field of things on their own any more than we, apart from experience, can acquire something of a based manner for our rationality.

13.2 Such an hypothetical counterpunch provided against the presumptions of his audaciously denying opponent must not be so held as though he wanted to make them his own true opinions.

13.3 He abandons them as soon as he has dispatched the dogmatic conceit of the opponent.

13.4 For as modest and temperate as it is to be considered, if someone conducts himself merely in a rejecting and denying mode with respect to strange assertions, so still everything, as soon as he wants to make his object hold as proofs of the opposite, the claim is not less proud and conceited than if he had grasped the affirming party and its assertions.
14.1 We see from this therefore that in the speculative use of reason hypotheses have no validity as opinions on their own, but rather only relatively to the opposing transcendent presuppositions.

14.2 For the expansion of principles of possible experience to the possibility of things in general, is just as transcendental as the assertion of the objective reality of such concepts, which can find their objects nowhere except outside the boundary of all possible experience.

14.3 What pure reason judges in an asserting way must (as everything, which reason recognizes) be necessary, or it is nothing at all.

14.4 Accordingly it contains in fact no opinions at all.

14.5 But the mentioned hypotheses are only problematical judgments which at least cannot be refuted, although, of course, not proven through anything and therefore are purely private opinions, but still cannot conveniently be dispensed with (even for inner tranquility) against a scruple which arouses itself.

14.6 But in this quality we must retain them and indeed carefully preserve them, that they not step forward as certified on their own and of some absolute validity and drown reason with concoctions and illusions.
The First Chapter

4th Section. The Discipline of Pure Reason with respect to its Proofs

1.1 Among all proofs of a synthetic recognition a priori, the proofs of transcendental and synthetic propositions have the peculiarity on their own, that with these reason may not be applied directly to the object by means of its concepts, but rather must first set forth a priori the objective validity of the concepts and the possibility of their synthesis.

1.2 This is not per chance merely a necessary rule of caution, but rather concerns the essentiality and possibility of the proofs themselves.

1.3 If I am supposed to go out a priori beyond the concept of an object, then this is impossible without a special guidance located apart from this concept.

1.4 In mathematics it is the perspective a priori which guides my synthesis, and there all conclusions can be conducted immediately from the pure perspective.

1.5 In the transcendental recognition, as long as it has to do only with concepts of the understanding, this guide is the possible experience.

1.6 The proof does not show that the given concept (e.g., the concept of that which happens) leads directly to another concept (that of a cause); for such a transition would be a jump which permits of no justification at all. Rather it shows that the experience itself, thus the object of experience, would be impossible without such an connection.

1.7 The proof therefore had to indicate simultaneously the possibility of achieving synthetically and a priori to a certain recognition of things which was not contained in the concept of them.

1.8 Without this attention, the proofs flow out like water which breaks through its banks wildly and across the fields, where the slope of the concealed association accidentally leads it.

1.9 The semblance of the conviction which rests upon subjective causes of association and is held for insight of a natural affinity, can be no match at all for the scruple which must reasonably appear about such ventured steps.
1.10 Accordingly also all attempts to prove the proposition of sufficient reason, according to the universal acknowledgments of those with knowledge with that, have been in vain, and before the transcendental critique appeared, since we still could not abandon this principle, we have appealed definitely to the healthy human understanding (a sanctuary which proves every time that the matter of reason is doubtful) rather than to want to try new dogmatic proofs.

2.1 But if the proposition, of which a proof is supposed to be conducted, is an assertion of pure reason, and if I want to go out beyond my experiential concepts even by means of mere Ideas, then that would still have to contain within itself even more the justification of such a step of the synthesis (if it were otherwise possible) as a necessary condition of its power of proof.

2.2 Accordingly then, as apparent as the alleged proof of the simple nature of our thinking substance out of the unity of apperception may be, still a scruple stands unavoidable opposed to it, namely that since the absolute simplicity is still not a concept which can be referred immediately to a perception, but rather can merely be concluded as an Idea, it cannot be penetrated how the mere consciousness which is contained, or at least can be contained, in all thinking, though it is indeed to this extent a simple representation, is supposed to lead to the consciousness of, and knowledge with, a thing, in which the thinking alone can be contained.

2.3 For if I imagine the force of my body in motion, it is to this extent absolute unity for me, and my representation of it is simple. Accordingly I can also express this through the movement of a point, because its volume means nothing with this and, without reduction of the power, as small as we wish, and therefore also can be thought as located in a point.

2.4 But from this I will still not conclude that if nothing but the moving force of a body is given to me, the body can be thought as simple substance for that reason because its representation is abstracted from all magnitude of spatial content and therefore is simple.

2.5 Now by the simple being entirely distinguished from the simple in the object in the abstraction, and by the “I,” which in the first meaning embraces no manifold at all within itself, in the second, since it means the soul itself, be-
ing a very complex concept, namely to contain and to describe very much under itself, I detect a paralogism.

2.6 However in order to surmise this in advance (for without such a previous supposition we would embrace nothing at all against the proof), it is thoroughly necessary to have at hand perpetual criterion of the possibility of such synthetic propositions which are supposed to prove more than experience can provide, which consists in the proof not being conducted directly to the required predicate, but rather only by means of a principle of the possibility of expanding our given concept a priori up to the Ideas, and to recognize this.

2.7 If this care is always taken, if before the proof is even attempted, we first go wisely for consultation on how and with which basis of hope we could expect such an expansion through pure reason, and from whence we then in such cases want to obtain these insights which cannot be extracted out of the concept, and not even anticipated with regard to possible experience, in that we impute nothing to reason which obviously goes beyond its capacity, or even more, that we subject it, which does not gladly allow of restriction in a fit of its speculative expansion mania, to the discipline of temperateness.

3.1 The first rule therefore is this: to attempt no transcendental proofs without previously having reflected and justified to ourselves in these cases from whence we claim to take the principles on which we plan to erect them, and by what right we are able to expect good success with the conclusion from them.

3.2 If they are principles of understanding (e.g., of causality), it is vain to achieve to Ideas of pure reason by means of them, for they hold only for objects of possible experience.

3.3 If they were supposed to be principles from pure reason, then all effort in turn is vain.

3.4 For reason has them indeed; but as objective principles they are all together dialectical and in any case can only hold as regulative principles of the systematical linking of experience.
3.5 But if such alleged proofs are already at hand, then the deceptive conviction sets the *non liquet*\(^{398}\) of your mature judgmental capacity into opposition and even though you cannot yet penetrate the illusion of that, you still have the complete right to demand the deduction of the principles used in that which, if they are supposed to have arisen out of sheer reason, can never be delivered to you.

3.6 And so you do not simply have the necessity of occupying yourself with the development and refutation of each baseless semblance, but rather can at once dismiss in great heaps all mischievous dialectic at the court of a critical reason which demands laws.

4.1 The second peculiarity of transcendental proofs is this: that only a single proof can be found for each transcendental proposition.

4.2 If I am not suppose to conclude from concepts, but rather from the perspective which corresponds to a concept, be it a pure perspective as in mathematics or an empirical one as in natural science, then the perspective laid as foundation gives me multitudinous material for synthetic propositions, which I can connect in more than one manner and, by being able to go out from more than one point, achieve to the same concept by diverse ways.

5.1 But now every transcendental proposition goes out merely from one concept and expresses the synthetic condition of the possibility of the object according to this concept.

5.2 The basis of proof therefore can only be a single one, because apart from this concept there is nothing further whereby the object could be determined. The proof therefore can contain nothing further than the determination of an object in general according to this concept, which is also only a single one.

5.3 We had, e.g., in the transcendental analytic, extracted the principle: “Everything which happens has a cause,” out of the single condition of the objective possibility of a concept of that which happens in general: that the determination of an event in time, thus this (event) as belonging to experience, would be impossible without standing under such a dynamic rule.

\(^{398}\) “not proven.”
5.4 Now this is also the single, possible basis of proof. For only by an object being determined to the concept by means of the law of causality, does the represented event have objective validity, i.e., truth.

5.5 One has indeed attempted other proofs of this principle, e.g., from contingency. However, if this is carefully considered, we can discover no indicator of the contingency except the occurrence, i.e., the existence before which a non-existence of the object precedes and therefore this also comes back in turn to the cited basis of proof.

5.6 If the proposition, “everything which thinks is simple,” is supposed to be proven, we do not dwell on the manifold of the thinking, but rather stick merely to the concept of the “I” which is simple, and to which all thinking is referred.

5.7 In exactly this way it is related to the transcendental proof of the existence of God which rests solely upon the reciprocal play of the concepts of the most real and necessary entity, and can be sought nowhere else.

6.1 By means of this warning, the critique of rational assertions is brought very much into detail.

6.2 Where reason conducts its occupation through mere concepts, there is only a single proof possible, if one is even possible at all.

6.3 Hence if we see the dogmatist stepping forth directly with ten proofs, we can safely believe that he has none at all.

6.4 For if he had one, which (as it must be in matters of pure reason) would prove to be indubitable, why does he have need of the remaining ones?

6.5 His intention, like that of those parliamentary advocates, is only this: one argument is for this person, and another for that person, namely to make use of the weakness of his judges who, without getting too deeply involved and wish to quickly escape from the occupation, grasp the first one which occurs to them, and decide according to it.
7.1 The third peculiar rule of pure reason, if it is subjected to a discipline with respect to transcendental proofs, is that its proofs must never be apagogical, but always ostensive.

7.2 The direct or ostensive proof, in every sort of recognition, is that which along with the conviction of the truth, simultaneously connects insight into the source of that. The anagogic proof,\textsuperscript{399} on the other hand, can produce certitude indeed, but not comprehensibility of the truth with respect to the cohesion with the foundations of its possibility.

7.3 Hence the latter are more a needed aid than a procedure, one which provides satisfaction to all intentions of reason.

7.4 Still these do have a preference of evidence over the direct proof in that the contradiction always entails more clarity in the representation than the best connection, and more nearly approximates in that way the intuitive aspect of a demonstration.

8.1 The actual cause of the use of apagogic proofs in the various sciences is probably this.

8.2 If the foundations, from which a certain recognition is supposed to be derived, are too numerous or lie too deeply concealed, we attempt to see whether it might not be attainable through the consequences.

8.3 Now here the \textit{modus ponens}, i.e., inferring to the truth of a recognition from the truth of its consequences, would then be allowed only if all possible consequences from it are true; for then to this only a single foundation is possible which therefore is also the true one.

8.4 But this procedure is unfeasible because it goes beyond our powers to discern all possible consequences of some sort of an assumed proposition. Nevertheless, we avail ourselves of this manner of concluding, although, of course, with a certain indulgence, if it is concerned in proving something merely as hypothesis, in that we admit the conclusion according to an analogy: that if as many consequences as we may have attempted agree well with an assumed foundation, all remaining possible ones will agree with it.

\textsuperscript{399} If proposition A contradicts proposition B, then by showing that A is false, the suggestion, but not the proof, is that B is true.
8.5 In this way an hypothesis can never be transformed into a demonstrated truth.

8.6 The *modus tollens* of rational inferences, which conclude from the consequence to the foundation, proves not only rigorously, but furthermore even easily.

8.7 For if even only one single false consequence can be drawn out of a proposition, this proposition is false.

8.8 Now instead of going over the entire series of the foundations in an ostensive proof which can be laid to the truth of a recognition by means of the most complete insight into its possibility, we need only to find a single false one among the consequences flowing out of its opposite, then this opposite is also false, hence the recognition which we wanted to prove is true.

9.1 But the apagogical proof manner can be allowed only in those sciences where it is impossible to ascribe the subjective aspect of our representations to the objective, namely to the recognition of that which is on the object.

9.2 But where this latter rules, it frequently happens that either the opposite of a certain proposition contradicts merely the subjective conditions for the thinking, but not the object; or both propositions contradict one another only under a subjective condition which was erroneously held for objective, and, since the condition is false, both propositions can be false without being able to conclude from the falsity of the one to the truth of the other.

10.1 In mathematics this subreption or trickery is impossible; accordingly here these apagogical proofs are valid.

10.2 In the natural science, because everything there is based on empirical perspective, such a subreption can often be prevented indeed through many compared observations; but this apagogical style of proof there is still often times insignificant.

10.3 But the transcendental attempts of pure reason are actually employed altogether within the peculiar medium of the dialectical semblance, i.e., of the
subjective. This offers, or even compels, itself to reason in its premises as objective.

10.4 Now here with regard to synthetic propositions, it cannot at all be allowed to justify our assertions by refuting the contrary.

10.5 For either this refutation is nothing other than the mere representation of the conflict of the contrarily opposed opinion with the subjective conditions of the comprehensibility through our reason, which does nothing at all for the repudiation of the matter itself (so as, e.g., the unconditioned necessity in the existence of an entity cannot be comprehended by us whatsoever, and hence is not properly opposed subjectively to every speculative proof of a necessary supreme entity, but improperly to the possibility of such an original being on its own), or both the asserting as well as the denying part, deceived through the transcendental semblance, place an impossible concept of objects as foundation. And here holds the rule: *non entis nulla sunt praedicata*, i.e., both what we affirm as well as what we deny, of the object are improper and we cannot achieve to the recognition of truth apagogically through the refutation of the contrary.

10.6 So, for example, if it is presupposed that the sense world on its own is given with respect to its totality, it is false that it would have to be either infinite with respect to space or finite and bounded, because both are false.

10.7 For appearances (as mere representations), which still would be given on their own (as objects), are impossible, and the infinity of this imagined whole would be unconditioned indeed, but (because everything with appearances is conditioned) would contradict the unconditioned magnitude determination, which still is presupposed in the concept.

11.1 The apagogical style of proof is also the actual illusion with which the admirer of the thoroughness of our dogmatic sophisticates is contained every time. It is, as it were, the champion, who claims to prove the honor and the undisputed right of his party and who offers to scuffle with everyone who claimed to doubt it, although through such bombast nothing in the matter is made out except only the respective strengths, and indeed only on the side of the one who has acted aggressively.
11.2 The spectators, seeing that each in turn alternates, now being victor and then being subdued, often take occasion from that to doubt skeptically the object of the dispute itself.

11.3 But they have no cause to do so, and it is enough to call out to them: “non defensoribus istis tempus eget.”

11.4 Each must conduct his matter by means of a basis of proof, i.e., directly, so that we see what his rational claims have to adduce for themselves.

11.5 For if his opponent is positioned on subjective foundations, then he is, of course, easy to refute; but without advantage for the dogmatist, who usually adheres just as much to the subjective causes of the judgment and can be driven likewise into a corner by his opponent.

11.6 But if both partners proceed merely directly, they will either themselves note the difficulty, indeed the impossibility, of finding out the title of their assertions, and finally be able to appeal only to assertion, or else the critique will easily uncover the dogmatic semblance and necessitate pure reason to give up its claims as pressed too far in a speculative use, and to draw back within the limits of its peculiar area, namely practical principles.

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400 Virgil: Not such defenders does the time require.
1.1 It is humiliating for human reason that it can provide nothing in its pure usage, and indeed even has need of a discipline in order to restrain its excesses and to prevent the illusions which arise from that pure usage.

1.2 But on the other hand it is elevated in turn and given a confidence by being able to practice this discipline itself, and indeed having to do so and without permitting another censor over itself, and likewise by securing against all attacks the limits, which it is necessitated to place on its speculative use--while at the same time restraining the engineered presumptions of every opponent--and thus securing in this wise everything which might still remain from its previously exaggerated demands.

1.3 Therefore the greatest and perhaps only utility of all philosophy of pure reason is surely only negative. For it does not serve as an organon for expansion, but rather as a discipline for the determination of boundaries. And instead of uncovering truth, it has merely the quiet merit of preventing errors.

2.1 Nonetheless somewhere there must still be a source of positive recognitions which belong to the jurisdiction of pure reason, and which perhaps give occasion to error only through some misunderstanding, but in fact make up the goal of the endeavor of reason.

2.2 For otherwise indeed to what cause were we to attribute the irresistible appetite for taking sure footage somewhere entirely out beyond the limits of experience?

2.3 It is suspicious of objects which entail a great interest for it.

2.4 It sets out on the way of mere speculation, in order to approach them. But these flee before it.

2.5 Supposedly on the single way yet left to it, namely that of the practical usage, there will be hope for better fortune in this endeavor.
3.1 With a canon I understand the summary of principles a priori for the proper use of certain recognitional capacities in general.

3.2 Thus the universal logic in its analytical portion is a canon for understanding and reason in general, but only with respect to form, for it abstracts from all content.

3.3 Accordingly the transcendental analytic was the canon of pure understanding; for it alone is competent of true synthetic recognitions a priori.

3.4 But where no proper use of a recognitional capacity is possible, there is no canon.

3.5 Now according to all proofs conducted thus far, every synthetical recognition by pure reason in its speculative use is entirely impossible.

3.6 Therefore there is no canon at all of the speculative use of reason (for this is thoroughly dialectic). Indeed all transcendental logic in this intention is nothing except discipline.

3.7 Accordingly if there is a proper use of pure reason anywhere, and in which case there must also be a canon of that, this will not deal with the speculative, but rather with the practical use of reason, and which for that reason we now want to investigate.
Concerning The Canon Of Pure Reason

1st Section. The Ultimate Purpose of the Pure Use of Our Reason

1.1 Reason is driven through a bent of its nature to go out beyond the experiential use, to venture about in a pure employment and, by means of mere Ideas, out to the extreme limits of all recognitions, and not to find peace except in the completion of its course in a systematic whole existing of itself.

1.2 Now is this striving based merely upon its speculative, or much more solely and alone upon its practical, interest?

2.1 I will now set aside the fortune which pure reason attains in the speculative intention, and ask only about the attainability of those tasks, the solution of which makes up its ultimate purpose, and with respect to which all other tasks have merely the value of means.

2.2 These highest purposes, according to the nature of reason, will in turn have to have unity in order to promote in a unified way that interest of humanity which is subordinate to none higher.

3.1 The final intention, to which the speculation of reason finally arrives in the transcendental usage, concerns three objects: freedom of will, immortality of soul and the existence of God.

3.2 With respect to all three the merely speculative interest of reason is only very paltry. And in that regard such a tiring work of transcendental investigation, wrenching in unceasing obstacles, would hardly be undertaken, because despite all discoveries which might be made with that, we still can make no usage which might prove its utility in concreto, i.e., in the investigation of nature.

3.3 The will may indeed be free, but this still can only concern the intelligible cause of our willing.

3.4 For concerning the phenomena of the expression of that willing, i.e., the actions, and in accordance with an inviolable, foundational maxim, without which we can exercise no reasoning in the empirical use, we must never ex-
plain these phenomena otherwise than as all remaining appearances of nature, namely in accordance with invariable laws of that nature.\textsuperscript{401}

3.5 Secondly we may even be able to comprehend the spiritual nature of the soul (and with that also its immortality). Nevertheless no reckoning can be made on either with respect to the appearances as an explanatory basis nor on the particular constitution of the future state. The reason for this is that our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative and does not expand our recognition in the least, nor does it offer any suitable material for conclusions, except per chance for such which can hold only for fictions, but which cannot be permitted of philosophy.\textsuperscript{402}

3.6 Thirdly, even if the existence of a highest intelligence were proven, while we would indeed in that way make the purposefulness in the layout and order of the world comprehensible in general, we would in no way be authorized to derive or, where it is not perceived, to conclude boldly any sort of a particular institution and order from that. For it is a necessary rule of the speculative use of reason not to ignore natural causes and relinquish that, by means of which we can be instructed through experience, in order to derive that, with which we are familiar, from that which exceeds all our knowledge entirely.\textsuperscript{403}

3.7 In short, these three propositions remain always transcendent for speculative reason and have no immanent use at all, i.e., are not permissible for objects of experience, thus are not usable in any manner for us. Rather, considered on their own, they are entirely idle and even so still require an exceedingly difficult exertion of reason.

4.1 If, accordingly, these three cardinal propositions are not at all necessary for our knowledge, and nonetheless are urgently commended through our reason, their importance will most assuredly have to concern the practical alone.

\textsuperscript{401} As made clear in the comments to the Third Antinomy of the CPR (beginning on or near page 819), it is easy enough to dream up something like transcendental freedom, but there is never any occasion or need to utilize such a notion in any experience. So in that regard it is essentially meaningless.

\textsuperscript{402} It is also easy to conceive of a soul which is not material and which endures after life, but there is no possible way of using such a negative notion in the scientific investigation of the individual. It is essentially useless and sterile. This was presented in the Paralogisms of the CPR, beginning on or near page 336.

\textsuperscript{403} Knowledge of a God would not be helpful at all in the examination of the world as experienced, for we would be trying to conclude from something beyond our ken, i.e., God, to something that we are already familiar with via experience.
5.1 Everything which is possible through freedom is practical.

5.2 But if the conditions of the execution of our free choice are empirical, then in that way reason can have no other use except regulative and can serve only to effect the unity of empirical laws, e.g., in the instruction of prudence reason can effect the unification of goals which are proposed to us by our inclinations into a single one, namely happiness, and a like agreement of the means for achieving to that. And this unification makes up the entire occupation of reason, which accordingly can supply no other laws than pragmatic ones of free behavior for the achievement of the purposes commended to us through the senses. Here therefore reason can supply no pure laws which are fully determined a priori.\textsuperscript{404}

5.3 On the other hand pure practical laws whose purpose is given completely a priori through reason and which are not empirically conditioned, but rather are utterly commanding, would be the product of pure reason.

5.4 But such are the moral laws. Hence these alone belong to the practical use of pure reason, and permit a canon.

6.1 Therefore the entire mission of reason in the treatment, which we can term pure philosophy, is in fact directed only to the three mentioned problems.

6.2 But these themselves have in turn their more remote intentions, namely: what is to be done if the will is free, if there is a God and a future world?

6.3 Now since this concerns our conduct in reference to the highest purpose, the final intention of nature, wisely maintaining us with the institution of our reason, is actually furnished only for the moral.

7.1 But since we now turn our attention to an object which is foreign* to the transcendental philosophy, caution is necessary in order not to digress into fragmented episodes and to injure the unity of the system nor also, from an-

\textsuperscript{404} We can expect reason to aid us in coordinating our inclinations to a single one of happiness, and then also determining the means to that happiness. This would be the most to be expected from an empirical application of practical reason.
other side, to let it lack in distinctiveness or conviction by saying too little of our new material.

7.2 I hope to achieve both by holding myself as closely as possible to the transcendent, and by putting entirely to the side that which might per chance be psychological, i.e., empirical.

*Kant’s annotation.

1.1 All practical conceptions are aimed at objects of pleasure or displeasure, i.e., desire and repulsion, thus, at least indirectly, at objects of our feeling.

1.2 But since feeling is not a capacity of representation, but rather lies apart from the entire capacity of recognitions, the elements of our judgments, to the extent they refer to desire or repulsion, thus the elements of the practical judgments, do not belong in the summary of the transcendent philosophy which has to do solely with pure recognitions a priori.

8.1 And here then I note first of all that I will temporarily make use of the concept of freedom only in the practical understanding. And unlike what I did above, I will set aside understanding in the transcendental meaning which cannot be empirically presupposed as an explanatory basis of the appearances.

8.2 Now a discretionary choice [Willkür], which cannot be determined otherwise than through sensitive drives, e.g., pathologically, is merely animal (arbitrium brutum).

8.3 But that which can be determined independently of sensitive drives, hence through an inducement which can only be represented by reason, is called free choice (arbitrium liberum), and everything, which coheres together with this, be it as foundation or consequence, is termed practical.

8.4 Practical freedom can be proven through experience.

8.5 For not merely that which excites, i.e., immediately affects the senses, determines human choice. Rather we have a capacity for overcoming the impressions on our sensitive desire capacity through representations of what is itself useful or injurious in a more remote manner. But these deliberations of
what is desirable, i.e., good and useful with respect to our entire state, depend on reason.\textsuperscript{405}

8.6 Accordingly this also renders the laws which are imperatives, i.e., objective laws of freedom, and which say what is supposed to happen, even if perhaps it never does happen. And in that regard these laws are distinguished from natural laws which deal only with what happens. It is then also for this reason that they are called practical laws.

9.1 But it could be that reason itself in these actions, through which it prescribes laws, is in turn determined through other further influences, and what is called freedom with respect to sensitive drives might in turn be nature through higher and more remotely effecting causes. But then that does not concern us regarding the practical, since at this point we only ask reason about the precepts of conduct. Besides that notion of other further influences is a merely speculative question which, as long as our intention is directed to doing and refraining, we can set aside.\textsuperscript{406}

9.2 Through experience therefore we recognize practical freedom as one of the natural causes, namely a causality of reason in the determination of the will.\textsuperscript{407} Transcendental freedom, on the other hand, requires an independence of this reasoning itself (with respect to its causality in starting a series of appearances) from all determining causes of the sense world. And to this extent it seems to be contrary to the natural law, hence to all possible experience, and therefore remains a problem.\textsuperscript{408}

\textsuperscript{405} If we were merely animals, then when hungry we could not resist available food. But the human has the capacity of thinking about things in general and using his reason. And even though hungry, he could reason, for example, that he ought to wait before eating in order to accomplish some other purpose, e.g., conveying the impression that he is under self control and is polite, or perhaps knows the food is tainted.

\textsuperscript{406} Here we are concerned with the consciousness of actually determining laws for conduct, and so where it does not matter as to hidden and unconscious causes.

\textsuperscript{407} Accordingly the practical usage of our reason finds effect in the sense world by means of the actions which ensue from the precepts we rationally devise.

\textsuperscript{408} Whereas practical reason means a capacity for acting independently of the sensitive desires and finding a choice where the animals cannot, transcendental freedom denotes an action which is entirely independent from all conditions of the sense world and thus is absolute spontaneity. We find expression of this absolute spontaneity in the categorical imperative of the moral law.
9.3 For reason in the practical use, however, this problem is not pertinent.\textsuperscript{409} In a canon of pure reason therefore we have to do with only two questions, both of which concern the practical interest of pure reason, and with respect to which a canon of its use must be possible, namely: is there a God, and is there a future life?\textsuperscript{410}

9.4 The question about transcendental freedom concerns merely the speculative knowledge, which we can here set aside as entirely extraneous, if it has to do with the practical and which a sufficient exposition is already to be found in the antinomy of pure reason.\textsuperscript{411}

\textsuperscript{409} We are concerned here only with reason’s capacity to determine conduct, and are not interested in the speculative question of independence not only from prior causes but even from all circumstances.

\textsuperscript{410} We specified three problems, freedom, God and immortality and have concluded that there is no “pertinent” question regarding freedom, and so this leaves only the latter two to be considered.

\textsuperscript{411} In the Third Antinomy (see Appendix II.4, beginning on or near page 819) we saw the compatibility of two causalities, freedom and nature, with regard to one and the same effect.
Concerning The Canon Of Pure Reason

2nd Section. The Ideal of the Highest Good as a Determination Basis of the
Ultimate Purpose of Pure Reason

1.1 Reason in its speculative usage led us through the field of experience and, because complete satisfaction can never be encountered for it there, continued on to speculative Ideas, but which finally led us in turn back to experience and therefore fulfilled its intention and indeed in a very productive manner, but not at all commensurate with our expectation.

1.2 There still remains an attempt to determine whether pure reason also be encountered in the practical employment, i.e., whether in that way it leads to the Ideas which reach the highest purposes of pure reason (which we have just cited412) and therefore whether this, from the standpoint of its practical interest, not be able to impart what it entirely refuses to us with respect to the speculative.

2.1 Every interest of my reason (speaking of the speculative as well as the practical) is united in the following three questions:

1. What can I know?
2. What should I do?
3. What may I hope?

3.1 The first question is merely speculative.

3.2 We (as I flatter myself) have exhausted all possible replies to this question and have finally discovered what reason must indeed be content with, and, as long as it does not look to the practical, also has cause to be content. But we still remained just as far removed from the two great purposes toward which this entire endeavor of pure reason was actually directed, as though for the sake of convenience we had refrained from this work at the very outset.

412 Kant is speaking specifically of God and immortality.
3.3 With respect to knowledge therefore at least this much is safe and determined, i.e., regarding those two tasks such knowledge can never be imparted to us.  

4.1 The second question is merely practical.

4.2 As such it can indeed belong to pure reason. But since it is not transcendental, but rather moral, it cannot be dealt with in our critique as such.

5.1 The third question, namely: “if I now do what I am supposed to do, then what may I hope?” is simultaneously both practical and theoretical, such that the practical precedes only as a clue for the reply to the theoretical and, if this goes well, to the speculative question.

5.2 For every hope aims at happiness and, with intention to the practical and the moral law, it is just the same as is knowledge and the law of nature with respect to the theoretical recognition of things.

5.3 The former finally culminates with the conclusion that something be (which determines the ultimate possible purpose) because something is supposed to happen; the latter, that something be (which is effectual as supreme cause) because something does happen.

6.1 Happiness is the satisfaction of all our inclinations (extensively according to their manifold, intensively with respect to degree, and expansively with respect to duration).

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413 Essentially from the speculative use of reason we end up as agnostics regarding God and immortality.

414 For this we must await the Critique of Practical Reason.

415 This may mean that a person living with a hope will lead a life as affected by that hope just as one’s living will be affected by knowledge of the world of experience.
6.2 The practical law from the motivational basis of happiness I term pragmatic (rules of prudence). But that which has no other motivational basis than the **worthiness** to be happy, I call moral (law of morality).\(^{416}\)

6.3 The first advises as to what is to be done if we want to partake of happiness. The second commands how we are to conduct ourselves in order just to become worthy of happiness.

6.4 The first is based on empirical principles. For it is only by means of experience that I can know which inclinations exists which want to be satisfied, or also what the natural causes are which can effect their satisfaction.

6.5 The second abstracts from inclinations and the natural means of satisfying them, and instead considers only the freedom of a rational being in general and the necessary conditions under which alone that freedom accords with the distribution of happiness according to principles, and can therefore at least be based, and a priori recognized, on mere Ideas of pure reason.

7.1 Here I assume that there actually are pure moral laws which (without regard to empirical motivational bases, i.e., happiness) completely and a priori determine the doing and refraining, i.e., the use of the freedom of a rational being in general. I assume further that these laws command utterly (not merely hypothetically under the presupposition of other empirical purposes) and hence are necessary in every intention.\(^{417}\)

7.2 This proposition I can properly presuppose not only by appealing to the proofs of the most enlightened moralists, but even to the moral judgment of every human if he will distinctly think such a law to himself.

8.1 Pure reason therefore though not in its speculative employment, but still in a certain practical employment, i.e., the moral, contains principles of the possibility of experience, namely of such actions, conformable to the moral precepts, which could be met with in the history of humans.

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\(^{416}\) In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant finds it inappropriate to utilize “law” with regard to any principles in pursuit of happiness, for the principles of prudence are always hypothetical and depend upon a person’s inclinations and expectations.

\(^{417}\) While Kant assumes these presently, he will present a proof of them later in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. 
8.2 For since it commands that such actions are supposed to happen, they must also be able to happen and therefore a particular manner of systematic unity, namely the moral, must be possible. The systematic natural unity according to speculative principles, on the other hand, could not be proven, because reason has causality indeed with respect to freedom, but not with respect to the whole of nature. And moral rational principles can produce free actions, but not natural laws.

8.3 Accordingly the principles of pure reason have objective reality in their practical, and especially in their moral, employment.

9.1 The world, to the extent it were conformable to all moral laws (as it can be with respect to the freedom of rational beings, and is supposed to be according to the necessary laws of morality), I term a moral world.

9.2 Thus far it is thought merely as an intelligible world because in it we have abstracted from all conditions (purposes) and even from all obstacles to morality (weakness or sordidness of human nature).

9.3 To this extent therefore it is a mere Idea, albeit a practical Idea which can have and is supposed to have an influence on the sense world in order to make it conform as much as possible to this Idea.

9.4 Hence the Idea of a moral world has objective reality, but not as though it went to an object of an intelligible perspective (Anschauung) (which we cannot conceive of at all). Rather it applies to the sense world, but then as to an object of pure reason in its practical employment, and to a corpus mysticum\textsuperscript{418} of rational beings within it, to the extent their free choice has on its own thoroughly systematic unity not only with itself under moral laws, but also with the freedom of every other rational being.

10.1 That was the reply to the first of those two questions of pure reason which touched on practical interests, i.e., “do what makes you worthy of happiness.”

\textsuperscript{418} Mystical body.
10.2 The second question now arises: “If I conduct myself so as not to be unworthy of happiness, how may I hope to participate in that happiness?”

10.3 The reply to this question depends on whether the principles of pure reason, which a priori prescribe the laws, also connect this hope necessarily with these laws.

11.1 I say, accordingly, that just as the moral principles are necessary according to reason in their practical employment, it is also just as necessary according to reason in its theoretical employment to assume that everyone has cause to hope for happiness in the same measure as he has made himself worthy of it in his conduct and therefore that the system of morality is inseparably connected with that of happiness, but only in the Idea of pure reason.

12.1 Now in an intelligible, i.e., a moral, world, in whose concept we abstract from all obstacles to morality (of inclination), such a system can even be thought as necessary with the morality of connected, proportionate happiness because freedom itself, partly moved and partly restrained by moral laws, would be the cause of universal happiness. Accordingly the rational beings themselves, under the guidance of such principles, would be originators of their own enduring welfare and simultaneously that of others.

12.2 But this system of morality rewarding itself is only an Idea whose execution rests on the condition of each person doing as he is supposed to do, i.e., all actions of rational entities occurring as though they sprang from a supreme will which encompasses every personal choice within, or under, itself.

12.3 But since the obligation arising from the moral law remains valid for each particular employment of freedom, even if others did not comport themselves according to this law, it follows that neither from the nature of things of the world nor from the causality of actions itself and their relationship to morality is it determined how their consequences will relate to happiness. And if we position nothing else than nature as a foundation, the indicated necessary connection of the hope to be happy with the incessant striving to make ourselves worthy of happiness cannot be recognized through reason. Instead this connection may only be hoped for if, as its foundation, a supreme reason, commanding according to moral laws, is simultaneously positioned as the cause of nature.
13.1 The Idea of such an intelligence, in which the morally most perfect will connected with the highest blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in the world, to the extent that happiness stands in precise relationship with morality (as the worthiness to be happy), I term the Ideal of the highest good.

13.2 Only in the Ideal of the highest original good therefore can pure reason encounter the basis of the practically necessary connection of both elements of the highest derived good, namely of an intelligible, i.e., moral, world.

13.3 Since we must necessarily represent ourselves through reason as belonging to such a world, even though the senses present nothing to us except a world of appearances, we will have to assume this world of morality and happiness to be a consequence of our conduct in the sense world, and since this sense world does not offer us such a connection, as a future world for us.

13.4 God therefore and a future life are two presuppositions which are not to be separated from the obligation which pure reason lays upon us according to principles of that very same reason.

14.1 Morality on its own makes up a system, but not happiness, except to the extent it is distributed in precise proportion to morality.

14.2 But this is only possible in the intelligible world under a wise originator and governor.

14.3 Reason sees itself necessitated to assume such a governor, together with life in such a world (which we must consider to be a future one), in order to avoid considering the moral laws as empty make-believe. The reason for this is that the necessary success of those laws, which the selfsame reason

419 This obligation would be the categorical imperative of the moral law, to universalize our maxims of action.

420 The "success" would be the happiness that should attend those who have proven themselves to be morally worthy of happiness.
connects with them, would have to cease without the assumption of that presupposition.\textsuperscript{421}

14.4 Accordingly everyone understands the moral laws as commands, but which they could not be if they did not a priori connect commensurate consequences with their rule and therefore entail promises and threats.\textsuperscript{422}

14.5 But this they also cannot do where they do not lie in a necessary being as the highest good which alone can make such a purposeful unity possible.\textsuperscript{423}

15.1 The realm of grace is what Leibniz termed the world, to the extent we attend only to the rational beings in it and their cohesion according to moral laws and the government of the highest good. He then distinguished that from the realm of nature, where these beings also stand under moral laws, but expect no other consequence of their conduct except according to the course of nature of our sense world.

15.2 Therefore to see ourselves in the realm of grace, where all happiness waits on us except to the extent we ourselves restrict our portion of it through the unworthiness of being happy, is a practically necessary Idea of reason.\textsuperscript{424}

16.1 Practical laws, to the extent they simultaneously become subjective bases of action, i.e., subjective principles, are called maxims.

16.2 The evaluation of morality, with respect to its purity and consequences, happens according to Ideas. The compliance with its laws happens according to maxims.

\textsuperscript{421} According to this, without God and immortality for the highest good, the moral law would be considered as inane and a vanity. And so it seems that we must either postit such a governor and a future life or else give up the moral law as meaningless for us.

\textsuperscript{422} The effect of the highest good would be that of meaningfulness, i.e., that there is a consequence to moral conduct and that it is not a phantasy. Hence it makes a difference, i.e., something is accomplished, as to whether we are moral or not.

\textsuperscript{423} It is only in the context of the highest good that the moral law is provided with a connection of performance and commensurate recompense. For it is in this highest good that we find the necessity of a God.

\textsuperscript{424} Accordingly happiness belongs to us by virtue of being rational beings and then to the extent we do not prove ourselves as unworthy through violations of our moral duty.
17.1 It is necessary that our entire life course be subject to moral maxims. But at the same time it is impossible for this to happen if reason does not connect with the moral law, which is a mere Idea, an effecting cause which, with respect to conduct, determines to that life a culmination corresponding precisely to our highest purposes, be it in this life or in subsequent one.

17.2 Therefore without a God and a world not visible for us now, but hoped for, the splendid Ideas of morality are indeed objects of acclaim and amazement, but not motives for resolution and execution, because they do not fulfill the entire purpose which naturally, and through just this same pure reason, is a priori determined and necessary for every rational being.

18.1 Happiness alone is by far not the complete good for our reason.

18.2 Reason does not sanction such (even as much as inclination may wish that) where it is not united with the worthiness to be happy, i.e., with the morally proper conduct.

18.3 But morality alone, and with it the mere worthiness to be happy, is also not by far the highest good.\[425\]

18.4 In order to complete this he who has conducted himself as not unworthy of happiness, must be able to hope to become participant with it.

18.5 Even if reason, freed of all private intention and without drawing a personal interest into consideration, places itself in the position of a being which had to distribute all happiness to others, cannot judge otherwise.\[426\] For in the practical Idea both pieces are joined essentially, although in this order: that the moral disposition, as condition, first makes possible the participation in happiness, and not vice-verse, i.e., where the prospect of happiness would fashion the moral disposition.\[427\]

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\[425\] Morality alone would be similar to the Stoic’s conception of happiness, consciousness of virtue and of no self recrimination.

\[426\] In Par. 8 of the “Preface” to Kant’s *Religion*, Kant touches on this again, showing how a morally inclined person would naturally want the highest good to be the arbiter between virtue and happiness.

\[427\] And this latter is similar to the position of the Epicurean, where knowledge of true happiness would result in moral maxims.
18.6 For in the latter case it would not be moral and therefore also not worthy of the entire happiness, for reason recognizes no other reservation except that which comes from our immoral conduct.\textsuperscript{428}

19.1 Happiness therefore in precise proportion to the morality of rational beings, by means of which they are worthy of that happiness, makes up alone the highest good of a world in which we must thoroughly place ourselves according to the precepts of pure, albeit practical, reason. This, of course, is only an intelligible world, since the sense world does not promise us the same systematic unity of purposes from the nature of things, whose reality also can be based on nothing else than on the presupposition of a highest original good. For independent reason, armed with all sufficiency of a supreme cause, enables, preserves and completes the universal order of things according to the most perfect purposefulness, though very concealed from us in the sense world.

20.1 Now this moral theology has the peculiar superiority over the speculative by leading unavoidably to the concept of a single, all perfect and rational being, which speculative theology does not at all indicate to us out of objective bases, much less being able to convince us of that.

20.2 For neither in the transcendental nor in natural theology, as far as reason may also lead us in them, do we find a unifying and meaningful basis for even assuming a single being which we position before all natural causes, and upon which we simultaneously had sufficient grounds to make these dependent in all respects.

20.3 On the other hand, if from the standpoint of moral unity as a necessary world law, we ponder the cause which alone can give this the appropriate effect, hence also binding force for us, it must be a single, supreme will which encompasses all these laws within itself.

20.4 For how did we want to find perfect unity of purposes among diverse wills?

\footnotetext{\textsuperscript{428} And so pure reason would grant happiness to all people except solely to the extent they prove themselves unworthy in their actions. And in IX of the Dialectic of the \textit{Critique of Practical Reason} we see that such an arrangement (happiness determining morality) would result in the death of morality and duty and even of freedom.}
20.5 This will must be all powerful so that all nature and its referral to morality in
the world be subjected to it; all knowing so that it recognizes the most inner
of the dispositions and their moral worth; omnipresent so that it be immedi-
ately adjacent to every need which the supreme world best requires; eternal
so that in no time is there a lack of this agreement of nature and freedom, etc.

21.1 But this systematic unity of purposes in this world of intelligences, which as
mere nature can only be termed a sense world, but as system of freedom, can
be termed an intelligible, i.e., a moral, world (*regum gratise*429), also leads
unavoidably to the purposeful unity of all things which make up this grand
whole according to laws of nature just as the former does according to uni-
versal and necessary moral laws, and unites practical reason with the specu-
lative.

21.2 The world must be represented as having arisen from an Idea, if it is sup-
posed to cohere together with that rational use, without which we would hold
ourselves even unworthy of reason, namely the moral, as thoroughly resting
on the Idea of the highest good.

21.3 In this way every investigation of nature obtains a direction with respect to
the form of a system of purposes, and in it the highest expansion becomes
physico-theology.

21.4 But this, since it still arose from the moral order as a unity established in the
being of freedom and not contingently founded through external laws, brings
the purposefulness of nature to foundations which must be a priori and in-
separably connected with the inner possibility of things, and in that way to a
transcendental theology which takes the Idea of the highest ontological per-
fection as a principle of the systematical unity, which connects all things ac-
cording to universal and necessary laws of nature because they all have their
origin in the absolute necessity of single, original being.

429 Kingdom of grace.
22.1 What kind of use can we make of our reason even with respect to experience, if we did not propose purposes to ourselves? 

22.2 But the highest purposes are those of morality, and only pure reason can give these to us to be recognized.

22.3 Furnished now with these and with their guidance for us, we can make no purposeful use of the knowledge with nature itself with respect to the recognition, where nature has not itself laid down purposeful unity. For without this we would not even have reason itself, because we would have no school for it, and no cultivation through objects, which offered the material for such concepts.

22.4 But that purposeful unity is necessary. And based in the being of choice itself, this, which contains the condition of the application of that in concreto, must also therefore be it. Thus the transcendental ascension of our rational knowledge would not be the cause, but rather the effect of the practical purposefulness which pure reason imposes upon us.

23.1 Accordingly we also find in the history of human reason that before the moral concepts were sufficiently cleansed and determined and before the systematic unity of the purposes according to them was penetrated from necessary principles, the knowledge with nature and even an appreciable degree of the cultivation of reason in many other sciences could produce partly only rough and slippery concepts of divinity, and partly left an amazing and general indifference with respect to those questions.

23.2 A greater treatment of moral Ideas, which was made necessary through the most extreme pure moral law of our religion, sharpened reason on this object via the interest which it necessitated reason to take in that, and, without contributing to it either expanded recognitions of nature nor proper and reliable transcendental insights (for these have been lacking at all times), they brought forth a concept of the divine being which we now hold to be the proper one, not because speculative reason convinces us of its accuracy, but rather because it agrees perfectly with the moral rational principles.

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Practical reason is a means of attaining to purposes and thus is able to implement actions in pursuit of these purposes.
23.3 And so still at the end only pure reason, but only in its practical usage, has the merit of tying a recognition, which the mere speculation only fancies but cannot make valid, to our highest interest and in that way making not at all a demonstrated dogma, but still an absolutely necessary presupposition with its most essential purposes.

24.1 But now if practical reason has reached this pinnacle, namely the concept of a single original being as the highest good, it is not at all allowed to venture forth as though it had elevated itself above all empirical conditions of its application and had conjured up immediate information concerning new objects, and had soared forth from this concept to derive the moral law itself from that.

24.2 For those were precisely that whose inner practical necessity led us to the presupposition of a self-supporting cause or a wise world governor in order to give effect to those laws. Accordingly we cannot consider them with respect to this in turn as contingent and derived from the mere will, in particular from such a will, of which we would have no concept at all if we had not fashioned it conformable to those laws.\textsuperscript{431}

24.3 To the extent practical reason leads us, we will hold actions as binding not because they are commands of God, but rather treat them as commands of God because we are obligated to those actions inwardly.

24.4 We will study freedom under the purposeful unity according to principles of reason and believe ourselves to be conformable to the divine will only to the extent we hold the moral law, which reason teaches us out of the nature of actions themselves, as holy, and believe ourselves to serve it only by promoting the world best in us and in others.\textsuperscript{432}

24.5 Therefore the moral theology is only of immanent use, namely to fulfill our determination here in the world by adapting to all purposes in the system, and not by leaving the clue of the morally legislating reason fancifully or indeed even frivolously in the good course of life, in order to tie it immediately

\textsuperscript{431} To make the moral law meaningful we need the connection with happiness and that called for God. But now we can not turn around and declare the moral law simply a willful law of this same God and so where the authority of the moral law would arise from the will of this God.

\textsuperscript{432} We have to consider ourselves as pleasing to God only by virtue of our compliance with the moral law.
to the Idea of the highest being, which would provide a transcendental use, but just like that of sheer speculation, must pervert and frustrate the ultimate purpose of reason.\textsuperscript{433}

\textsuperscript{433} We come to God through the moral law and not to the moral law through God.
1.1 The avowal is an occurrence in our understanding which may rest upon objective foundations, but which also requires subjective causes in the mind of the person so judging.

1.2 If it is valid for everyone, to the extent that person has reason, the foundation of that is objectively sufficient and the avowal is then called conviction.

1.3 If it has its foundation only in the particular constitution of the subject, it is termed persuasion.

2.1 Persuasion is mere semblance, because the basis of the judgment, which lies solely in the subject, is held as objective.

2.2 Hence such a judgment also has only private validity and the avowal cannot be communicated to others.

2.3 But truth depends upon agreement with the object, with respect to which, consequently, the judgment of every understanding must be of one accord (consentientia uni tertio, consentiunt inter se).

2.4 The touchstone therefore of whether the avowal is conviction or merely persuasion is externally the possibility of communicating it and of finding the avowal valid for every human’s reason. For in that case there is at least a supposition that the foundation of the accord of all judgments (disregarding the diversity of the subjects among one another) will rest on the communal foundation, namely the object, with which they all will agree together, and by means of which the truth of the judgment will be proven.

3.1 Accordingly indeed persuasion cannot be subjectively distinguished from conviction if the subject has the avowal before his eyes merely as the appearance of his own mind. But still the attempt we make with the foundations of that, which are valid for us, on the reason of another to ascertain whether they have just the same effect on a foreign reason as on ours, is one means (though only subjective), indeed not to effect conviction, but still to
uncover the merely private validity of the judgment, i.e., something in it which is merely persuasion.

4.1 If beyond that we can develop the subjective causes of the judgment which we take for objective foundations of that, and hence explain the deceptive avowal as an occurrence in our minds without needing the constitution of the object for that, we expose the semblance and so are no longer fooled by it, although still tempted to a certain degree if the subjective cause of the semblance adheres to our nature.

5.1 I can assert nothing, i.e., pronounce judgment necessarily valid for everyone, except what effects conviction.

5.2 Persuasion I can keep for myself if I find myself comfortable with that, but cannot, and am not supposed to want to, make it valid apart from myself.

6.1 The avowal, or the subjective validity of the judgment in reference to the conviction (which simultaneously holds objectively), has the following three levels: opinion, belief and knowledge.

6.2 Opinion is an avowal consciously insufficient subjectively as well as objectively.

6.3 If the latter is only subjectively sufficient and is held simultaneously as objectively insufficient, it is called belief.

6.4 Finally the avowal sufficing both subjectively and objectively is called knowledge.

6.5 The subjective sufficiency is called conviction (for myself), the objective, certitude (for everyone).

6.6 I will not detain myself with any exposition of such easily grasped concepts.

7.1 I must never venture to make an opinion without at least knowing something by means of which the judgment, merely problematic on its own, obtains an
connection with truth which, even though not complete, is still more than willful fiction.\textsuperscript{434}

7.2 Moreover, the law of such an connection must be certain.

7.3 For if I also have nothing except opinion with respect to something, then everything is only a play of imagination, without the least referral to truth.

7.4 In judgments from pure reason, opinion is not allowed at all.

7.5 For since they are not supported by foundations of experience, but rather everything is supposed to be recognized a priori (where everything is necessary), the principle of connection requires universality and necessity, hence complete certitude, and in the contrary case no conduit to truth is encountered at all.

7.6 Hence opinion in pure mathematics is absurd. Here we must know or refrain from all judgments.

7.7 It is also the case with the principles of morality. For we may not dare an action on the mere opinion that something is allowed, but rather must know this.\textsuperscript{435}

8.1 In the transcendental use of reason, on the other hand, opinion is of course too little, but knowledge also too much.

8.2 In the merely speculative intention therefore we cannot judge of this at all. Indeed the subjective foundations of the avowal, like those which can effect belief, deserve no acclaim with speculative questions, since they do not keep themselves free from all empirical assistance, nor allow of communication to others in a like fashion.

\textsuperscript{434} It would then be one thing to assert the reality of God, and quite another to assert that of an invisible unicorn.

\textsuperscript{435} In \textit{Religion} in the section concerning conscience (on or around page 185), Kant takes the Inquisitor to task for this very reason.
9.1 But nowhere except solely in the practical referral can the theoretically insufficient avowal be termed belief.

9.2 Now this practical intention is either that of skill or of morality, the first for arbitrary and contingent purposes, but the second for utterly necessary purposes.

10.1 Once a purpose is presupposed, the conditions for the achievement of that are hypothetically necessary.

10.2 This necessity is subjective, but still only comparatively sufficient if I do not know any other conditions under which the purpose were attainable. But it is sufficient utterly and for everyone if I know with certainty that no one can be acquainted with other conditions which lead to the presupposed purpose.

10.3 In the first case my presupposition and the avowal of certain conditions is merely a contingent belief. In the second case, however, we are dealing with a necessary belief.

10.4 Regarding a sick person who is in danger, the physician must do something, but is not familiar with the sickness.

10.5 He looks to the appearances and, because he knows nothing better, judges it to be consumption.

10.6 His belief is merely contingent even in his own judgment. Another might come closer to the mark.

10.7 I term such as this “contingent beliefs.” But that which lies as a foundation for the actual use of the means to certain actions, I call “pragmatic belief.”

11.1 The usual touchstone of whether something which someone asserts is merely persuasion, or at least subjective conviction, i.e., firm belief, is the wager.

11.2 Often times someone expresses his propositions with such confident and intractable defiance that he seems to have entirely discarded all concern for error.
11.3 A wager catches him off balance.

11.4 Occasionally it indicates that indeed he posses persuasion enough which can be estimated at one dollar in value, but not ten.

11.5 The first he will quite easily dare. But with the ten he first becomes aware of what he previously did not note, namely that it is quite possible for him to have erred.

11.6 If we represent to ourselves in thought that we are supposed to stake on that the fortune of our entire life, our triumphant judgment dwindles very much indeed, so that we become quite timid and in this way first discover that our belief does not reach so far.

11.7 So the practical belief has only a degree which, according to the diversity of the interest which is in play, can be great or also small.

12.1 But even if we can undertake nothing at all with reference to an object (the avowal therefore being merely theoretical), nevertheless since we can in many cases grasp an undertaking in thought and imagine it to ourselves, to which we think to have an adequate basis, if there were a means of ascertaining the certainty for the matter, then in mere theoretical judgments there is an analogy of the practical, to whose avowals the word “belief” is suited, and which we can term the “doctrinal belief.”

12.2 If it were possible to be ascertained through some sort of an experience, I might well stake all that I have on there being inhabitants on at least one of the planets which we see.

12.3 Hence, I say, it is not merely opinion but a strong belief (on whose correctness I would dare many advantages of life), that there are inhabitants on other worlds.

13.1 Now we must insist that the teaching of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief.

13.2 For even though with respect to the theoretical world recognition I have nothing to account for which necessarily presupposes this belief as a condi-
tion of my explanation of the appearances of the world, but rather much more am bound to so utilize my reason as though everything were mere nature, nevertheless since a purposeful unity is such a great condition of the application of reason to nature, and moreover since experience is rich with examples of such unity, I cannot at all ignore them.

13.3 But with regard to this unity I am aware of no other condition which would make it the guide of investigations of nature for me unless I presuppose that a highest intelligence has so ordered everything according to the wisest purposes.436

13.4 Consequently it is a condition of an intention, contingent indeed, but still not insignificant, namely to presuppose a wise world originator in order to have a guide into the investigation of nature.

13.5 Also the result of my attempts so often certifies the utility of this presupposition—and nothing can be decisively taught against it—that I say much too little if I wanted merely to term my avowal an opinion, but rather even in this theoretical relation it can be said that I believe firmly in a God. But then this belief in a rigorous meaning is not practical, but rather must be termed a doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature (physico-theology) must necessarily produce in every case.

13.6 With respect to just the same wisdom and in regard to the superb makeup of human nature and the shortness of life which is so badly suited to that nature, an adequate basis for a doctrinal belief in a future for the human soul can be encountered just as well.

14.1 The expression of belief in such cases is an expression of modesty in an objective intention, and yet at the same time also an expression of firmness of confidence in a subjective intention.

14.2 Even if I wanted here to term the merely theoretical avowal an hypothesis, I would already be professing to have more concept of the constitution of a world cause and another world than I actually can demonstrate. For concerning that which I also assume only as hypothesis, I must at least be familiar

436 Kant might then be surprised by the theory of evolution which holds the make up of the world to be a function of a mindless aberration which occasionally results in a better fitness for survival. Now the Roman Catholics accept evolution, although they do not count it as random, but rather as directed.
enough with respect to its properties that I may not fabricate its concept, but only its existence.

14.3 But the word “belief” goes only to the route which gives me an Idea and to the subjective influence upon the promotion of my rational actions which hold me firmly to that, even though I am not in position to account for that in a speculative intention.

15.1 There is something unstable, however, in the sheer doctrinal belief. We are often moved away from that doctrinal belief through difficulties which arise in speculation. However we always and unavoidably return back to it again.

16.1 It is entirely different with the moral belief.

16.2 For there it is utterly necessary that something must happen, namely that I comply with the moral law in all particulars.

16.3 Here the purpose is unavoidably established, and according to all my insight there is only a single condition possible under which this purpose coheres with all purposes together and in that way has practical validity, namely that there be a God and a future world. I also know with complete certainty that no one is familiar with other conditions which lead to the same unity of purposes under the moral law.

16.4 But since therefore the moral precept is simultaneously my maxim (as also reason commands it to be), I will invariably believe in the existence of God and a future life. And I am confident that nothing is able to shake this belief because otherwise my moral principles themselves would topple. And these I cannot renounce without being worthy of abhorrence in my own eyes.

17.1 In such way, after the frustration of all ambitious intentions of a reason roaming about beyond the limits of all experience, enough yet remains for us to have cause to be satisfied with that in the practical intention.

437 Here the Idea of the highest good reconciles the purposes of prudence with those of morality.

438 The highest good is the purpose of the moral law and the conditions for the possibility of that highest good are God and immortality.
17.2 Of course no one indeed will be able to laud himself about knowing if there is a God and a future life, for, if he knows that, he is the very man whom I have long sought.

17.3 All knowledge (if it concerns an object of sheer reason) we can communicate and therefore I would also be able to hope to see my knowledge expanded to such a marvelous degree through that man’s instruction.

17.4 No! The conviction is not logical certitude, but moral, and since it rests upon subjective bases (of the moral disposition), I must not even say, “it is morally certain that there be a God, etc.,” but rather “I am morally certain, etc.”

17.5 This means that the belief in God and another world is so intertwined with my moral disposition that I am just as little in danger of forfeiting the former two, as I am concerned that someone might ever be able to tear the latter from me.

18.1 The only reservation to be found here is that this rational belief is based upon the presupposition of a moral disposition.

18.2 If we deviate from this and take a belief which were entirely indifferent with respect to moral laws, then the question which reason raises becomes merely a task for speculation. Then indeed it can be supported with strong foundations from analogy, but not with such that would force the most stubborn skeptic to yield.*

18.3 But with these questions no man is free of all interest.

18.4 For even though he might be separated from the moral via a lack of a good disposition, still even in this case enough remains to insure his fear of a divine being and a future life.

18.5 For nothing more is required for that except that he at least can plead no certainty that there be no such being and no future life. And the reason is that because it would have to be proven through mere reason, thus as apodictic,
he would have to establish the impossibility of both, which certainly no ra-
tional being can undertake to do.\textsuperscript{439}

18.6 So such belief would be a negative belief, which indeed could not effect mo-
rality or a good disposition, but still the analogy of that, namely it would
powerfully restrain the outbreak of an evil disposition.

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 The human mind (as I believe occurs necessarily with every rational be-
ing) takes a natural interest in morality, even if it is not undivided or prac-
tically paramount.

1.2 Strengthen and enlarge this interest and you will find reason very teach-
able and even enlightened in order to unify the practical and speculative
interest.

1.3 But if you do not first take care to make people good, at least halfway,
then you will also never make sincere believers out of them.

19.1 But is that all, someone will ask, that pure reason furnishes by opening pros-
pects out beyond the limits of experience: nothing more than two articles of
belief? That much even the common understanding could have furnished
without turning to philosophers for advice!

20.1 I will not praise here the merit, which philosophy has through the tedious
strivings of its critique on behalf of human reason, even granted that ulti-
mately it was deemed to be merely negative. We will see in the following
undertaking that something more will come yet from that.\textsuperscript{440}

20.2 But do you then demand that a recognition, which concerns all human be-
ings, is supposed to rise above the common understanding and be revealed to
you only through philosophy?

20.3 Precisely that which you fault is the best certification of the correctness of
the assertions thus far, for it uncovers what we could not have predicted at
the beginning, namely that nature, in that which is invested to humans without
distinction, is guiltless of any partisan distribution of its talents, and with

\textsuperscript{439} The rational thinker can at most be an agnostic, but certainly not an atheist.

\textsuperscript{440} This is a reference to \textit{The Critique of Practical Reason}. 
respect to the essential purposes of human nature the highest philosophy is unable to bring matters further than the guidance which it has bestowed to even the most common understanding.
1.1 With “architectonic” I understand the art of systems.

1.2 Because the systematic unity is what first makes common recognition into a science, i.e., a system out of a mere aggregate, it follows that architectonic is the teaching of the scientific in our recognition in general and therefore it belongs necessarily to the methodology.

2.1 Under the government of reason, our recognitions must not in general constitute any rhapsody, but rather must constitute a system, in which alone they can support and promote the essential purpose of government.

2.2 But with a system I understand the unity of multiple recognitions under one Idea.

2.3 This is the rational concept of the form of a whole to the extent the scope of the manifold, as well as the position of the parts relative to each another, is determined a priori through that concept.

2.4 The scientific rational concept therefore contains the purpose and the form of the whole which is congruent with that.

2.5 The unity of the purpose, to which all parts are referred and in the Idea of which also all parts are referred among one another, makes it such that any missing part can be noted through knowledge with the others, and no accidental contribution of undetermined magnitude of perfection, which does not have its a priori determined limits, may occur.

2.6 The whole therefore is segmented (articulatio) and not accumulated (coacervatio). It can grow inwardly indeed (per intus susceptionen), but not outwardly (per a positionem), as an animal body whose growth adds not members but rather, without alteration of the proportion, makes each stronger and more hearty.
3.1 The Idea has need of a schema for an execution, i.e., an essential manifold and an order of the parts determined a priori out of the principle of the purpose.

3.2 The schema, which is not devised according to an Idea, i.e., out of the primary purpose of reason, but rather empirically according to intentions presenting themselves contingently (the count of which we cannot know in advance), gives technical unity; but only what arises as the consequence of an Idea (where reason renders the purposes a priori, and without empirical expectations) enables architectonical unity.

3.3 That which we term science cannot arise technically from the similarity of the manifold or from the contingent use of the recognition *in concreto* to all sorts of arbitrary external purposes, but rather architectonically, for the sake of the kinship and the derivation from a single supreme and inward purpose which first makes the whole possible. The schema of that science must contain the outline (*monogramma*) and the division of the whole into members conformable to the Idea, i.e., a priori, and distinguish this from all others securely and according to principles.

4.1 No one attempts to bring forth a science without having an Idea lying to it as foundation.

4.2 In the working out of that, however, the schema, indeed even the definition, which is given at the very start of the science, very seldom matches this Idea; for this lies, as a sprout, in reason, in which all parts lie yet buried and much entangled and hardly discernible to the microscopic observation.

4.3 Because of this and because they still are all thought out from the viewpoint of a certain universal interest, we must explain and determine sciences not according to the description, which their originator gives to them, but rather according to the Idea, which we find from the natural unity of the parts which that originator has brought together based in reason itself.

4.4 For there it is found that the originator, and often even his most recent disciples, wander about concerning an Idea, which they themselves have not been able to make distinct and, hence, cannot determine the peculiar contents, the articulation (systematical unity) and limits of the science.
5.1 It is unfortunate that only after we have gathered many recognitions ecstatically for a long time, according to the direction of an Idea lying concealed within us, and have referred them to it as construction material, and indeed even for a long time have technically assembled them, that it is possible for us to consider the Idea in a brighter light and to design a whole architectonically according to the purposes of reason.

5.2 Like worms, the systems seem to have been fashioned through a *generatio aequivoca* out of the mere melding of accumulated concepts, truncated at the beginning, completed in time, even though together with their schema, they had, as the original sprout in reason, merely developed out of itself, and for that reason, not only segmented each for itself according to an Idea, but rather yet are all in turn united with each other purposefully to that in a system of human recognitions as segments of a whole, and allow an architectonic of all human knowledge, which in the current time, since so much material has already been gathered, or can be taken out of the ruins of collapsed, old buildings, would not only be possible, but rather even not difficult at all.

5.3 Here we are content with the completion of our occupation, namely of designing solely the architectonic of all recognitions out of pure reason and we start from the point where the universal root of our recognition capacity divides and renders up two trunks, of which one is reason.

5.4 But with the term “reason”, I understand here the entire supreme recognition capacity and, accordingly, oppose the rational to the empirical.

6.1 If I abstract from all content of the recognition, considered objectively, then each recognition, considered subjectively, is either historical or rational.

6.2 The historical recognition is *congitio ex datis*,\(^{441}\) but the rational *cognitio ex principiis*.\(^{442}\)

6.3 A recognition may be originally given, from whence it will, and so with him who posses it, it is historical if he recognizes it only to the degree and to the

\(^{441}\) Knowledge from facts (or data).

\(^{442}\) Knowledge from principles.
extent it was given to him from elsewhere, be this given to him through immediate experience or a narration, or also as instruction (universal recognitions).

6.4 Hence he who has actually learned a philosophy, e.g., the Wolffian, even though he had all principles, explanations and proofs, together with the division of the entire instructional edifice in his head and could count everything on his fingers, still has none other than historical recognition of the Wolffian philosophy—he knows and judges only as much as was given to him.

6.5 Deny a definition to him, and he does not know where he is supposed to obtain another.

6.6 He develops according to a foreign reason, but the imitating capacity is not the generating one, i.e., the recognition did not arise with him out of reason, and even though, objectively, it was a rational recognition, so still, subjectively, with him it is merely historical.

6.7 He has grasped and retained well, i.e., learned, and is a plaster cast of a living person.

6.8 Rational recognitions which are objective (i.e., at the beginning are able to arise only out of the personal reasoning of the human) may only then alone also carry subjectively this name if they are created out of universal sources of reason, from which also the critique, indeed even the repudiation of the learned, can arise, i.e., out of principles.

7.1 Now every rational recognition is either from concepts or from the construction of concepts. The first is called philosophical, the second mathematical.

7.2 With the internal distinction of each, I have already dealt with in the first section.

7.3 Accordingly a realization can be objectively philosophical, and still remain subjectively historical, as with most apprentices and with all who never look beyond the schools and who remain apprentices all of their lives.

7.4 But it is still strange that the mathematical recognitions, just as one has acquired it, can still hold even subjectively as a rational recognition and such a
 distinction with it does not take place as with the philosophical.

7.5 The reason for this is because the sources of recognition, from which the teacher alone can glean, lie nowhere else than in the essential and genuine principles of reason and, hence, cannot be obtained, nor perhaps even disputed, by the apprentice, and this indeed for the reason because here the use of reason happens only *in concreto*, although still a priori, namely in the pure and, precisely because of that, flawless perspective, and excludes every deception and error.

7.6 Of all (a priori) sciences of reason therefore we can learn only mathematics, but never philosophy (except it be historically), but rather, concerning reason, at most to philosophize.

8.1 Now the system of every philosophical recognition is philosophy.

8.2 We must take it objectively, if we understand with that the prototype of the estimation of all attempts to philosophize, which is supposed to serve for estimating every subjective philosophy, whose edifice is often very manifold and very alterable.

8.3 In this way philosophy is a mere Idea of a possible science which is given nowhere *in concreto*, but which we seek to approximate in diverse ways until the single step, much overgrown through sensitivity, is discovered, and until the thus far faulty imitation, to the extent it is granted to humans, succeeds in making it equal to the prototype.

8.4 Until then we cannot learn philosophy; for, where is it? Who has possession of it? And in what way does it allow of recognition?

8.5 We can only learn to philosophize, i.e., practice the talent of reason in compliance with its universal principles on certain present attempts, still always with the reservation of the right of reason to investigate and to certify or to reject those even in their sources.

9.1 But until then the concept of philosophy is only an academic concept, namely of a system of recognition which, as science, is only sought without
having more than the systematic unity of this knowledge, hence the logical perfection of the recognition, as purpose.

9.2 But there is yet a world concept (*conceptus cosmicus*), which has always been the basis of this denomination, especially if we were to personify it, as it were, and represent it to ourselves in the Ideal of the philosophers as a prototype.

9.3 In this intention philosophy is the science of the referral of all recognitions to the essential purposes of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*), and the philosopher is not a rationalizing artist, but rather the legislator of human reason.

9.4 In such meaning it would be very vain to call oneself a philosopher, and to presume to be equivalent to the prototype, which only lies in the Idea.

10.1 The mathematician, the natural researcher, the logician, even as admirably as the former may advance in rational recognitions in general, the second especially in the philosophical recognition, still are only artists of reason.

10.2 There is still a teacher in the Ideal who estimates all these, using them as tools, in order to promote the essential purposes of human reason.

10.3 This one alone we would have to term the philosopher. But since he himself still is nowhere encountered, but the Idea of his legislation is everywhere in every human reason, we want to hold solely to the latter, and more closely determine what philosophy, according to this world concept* prescribes for systematic unity from the standpoint of purposes.

* Kant’s annotation.

11.1 Essential purposes are not yet for that reason the highest, of which (at the perfect systematic unity of reason) only a single one can be.
11.2 Hence they are either the final purpose, or subordinate purposes which belong necessarily to the final purpose as means.

11.3 The first is none other than the entire determination of humans, and the philosophy about this is called moral.

11.4 Due to this preference, which the moral philosophy has before all other rational applications, with the name of the philosopher we understand, along with the ancients, always simultaneously and preferentially the moralist, and even the outward semblance of self-control through reason makes us even now term someone, with his restricted knowledge, philosopher according to a certain analogy.

12.1 Now the legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom, and contains therefore the natural law as well as the moral law, at first in two particular philosophical systems, but finally in a single one.

12.2 The philosophy of nature goes to everything which is present; that of morals only to that which is supposed to be present.

13.1 But every philosophy is either recognition out of pure reason, or rational recognition out of empirical principles.

13.2 The first is called pure, the second empirical, philosophy.

14.1 Now the philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic (preparation), which investigates the capacity of reason with respect to all pure recognitions a priori and is called critique, or secondly, the system of pure reason (science), the whole (true as well as apparent) philosophical recognition out of pure reason in systematical cohesion and is called metaphysics; although this name can also be given to the entire pure philosophy at the summary of the critique, in order to grasp together the investigation of all that can ever be recognized as well as the description of what makes up a system of pure philosophical recognition of this type, but is distinguished from all empirical, likewise the mathematical, rational usage.
15.1 Metaphysics is divided into that of the speculative and that of the practical use of pure reason, and is therefore either metaphysics of nature or metaphysics of morals.

15.2 The former contains all pure principle of reason out of sheer concepts of the theoretical recognition of all things (hence excluding mathematics). The latter contains the principles which a priori determine and make necessary action as well as restraint.

15.3 Now morality is the single legality of action which can be derived out of principles fully a priori.

15.4 Hence the metaphysics of morals is actually the pure moral, in which no anthropology (no empirical condition) is placed as foundation.

15.5 Now the metaphysics of speculative reason is that which we strive to call metaphysics in the more narrow meaning. But to the extent that pure moral instruction still nonetheless belongs to the particular root of human and, indeed, philosophical recognitions out of pure reason, we want to retain that denomination for it, although here we set it to the side as not belonging presently to our purposes.

16.1 It is of extreme importance to isolate recognitions which are distinguished from others with respect to their class and origin, and carefully to prevent their melding into a mixture with others, with which they are usually joined in usage.

16.2 What the chemists do with the separation of matter, and the mathematicians do in their pure instruction of magnitude, is yet far more incumbent upon the philosopher so that he can securely determine the actual value and influence of the portion which a particular manner of recognition has to the rambling usage of understanding.

16.3 Hence human reason, from the time of thinking it or far rather of reflecting on it, has never been able to dispense with a metaphysics, but nonetheless has not been able to describe it sufficiently purified from all extraneous elements.
16.4 The Idea of such a science is just as old as speculative human reason. And what reason does not speculate, be it in a scholastic or popular manner?

16.5 Meanwhile we must admit that the distinction of the two elements of our recognition, of which one is completely a priori, the other can only be taken a posteriori out of experience, remains only very vague even with professional thinkers, and hence could never bring forth the limits determination of a particular manner of recognition, thus of the genuine Idea of a science which has occupied reason so long and so much.

16.6 If someone said, “metaphysics is the science of the first principles of human recognition,” we do not note in this way a completely particular manner, but rather only a rank with respect to the universality, whereby therefore it could be discernibly distinguished from the empirical. For even among empirical principles some are more universal and, for that reason, higher than others, and in the series of such a subordination (since we cannot distinguish that which is recognized completely a priori from that which is recognized a posteriori), where shall we make the part which distinguished the first and the supreme part from the last and the subordinated?

16.7 What would we say if the calculation of time could only indicate the epochs of the world so that it divided them into the first centuries and the ones following after that?

16.8 “Does the fifth century, the tenth, etc., belong also the first ones?” we would ask. Just so I ask, “does the concept of expansion belong to metaphysics.” You reply, “Indeed.” “Well, but also that of body?” “yes.” “And that of fluid bodies?” You become perplexed, for, if it continues like this, everything will belong to metaphysics.

16.9 We see from this that the mere degree of subordination (the particular under the universal) can determine no limits of a science, but rather, in our case, the entire dissimilarity and diversity of the origin.

16.10 But what obscures the basic Idea of a metaphysics yet on another side was that it as recognition a priori shows a certain similarity with mathematics, which indeed, concerning the origin a priori, makes them kin to one another, but concerning the manner of recognition out of concepts with metaphysics, in comparison with the manner of judging merely through the construction of concepts a priori with mathematics, hence the distinction of a philosophi-
cal recognition from the mathematical one; it indicates such a decisive dissimilarity which indeed we always felt, as it were, but could never bring to distinct criterion.

16.11 Now in that way it has happened that since philosophers erred even in the development of the Idea of their science, the treatment of the science could have no determined purpose and no secure guideline, and with such a willfully made design, unknowing of the way which they had to take and always disputing among themselves about the discoveries which each claimed to have made on his own, first brought their science into disrespect with others, and finally in fact with themselves.

17.1 Every pure recognition a priori therefore empowered by the particular recognition capacity in which it alone can have its seat, makes up a particular unity, and metaphysics is that philosophy, which is supposed to describe that recognition in this systematic unity.

17.2 The speculative portion of this which has commandeered even this more preferential name, namely that which we term metaphysics of nature and which ponders everything to the extent it is (and not that, which is supposed to be) a priori out of concepts, becomes now divided in the following manner.

18.1 The so-called metaphysics in a more narrow meaning consists of the transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason.

18.2 The first considers only understanding and reason itself in a system of all concepts and principles which refer in general to objects, without assuming objects which were given (ontologia). The second considers nature, i.e., the encompassment of given objects (they may given to the senses or, if you will, to another sort of perspective), and is therefore physiology (although only rationalis).

18.3 But now the use of reason in this rational consideration of nature is either physical or hyperphysical, or better said: either immanent or transcendent.

18.4 The first goes to nature as far as its recognition can be applied in experience (in concreto), the second to that connection of objects in experience which
oversteps every experience.

18.5 Accordingly this transcendental physiology has either an inner connection, or outer, but both go out beyond possible experience. The former is the physiology of the whole nature, i.e., the transcendental recognition of world, the other of the coherence of the whole of nature with an entity beyond nature, i.e., the transcendental recognition of God.

19.1 The immanent physiology, on the other hand, considers nature as the summary of all objects of the sense, thus so as they are given to us, but only according to conditions a priori under which they can be given to us in general.

19.2 But there are only two types of objects of that physiology.

19.3 1. Those of the outer sense, hence the summary of that, the corpuscular nature.

19.4 2. The object of the inner sense, the soul, and according to the foundational concepts of that on their own, the thinking nature.

19.5 The metaphysics of the corpuscular nature is called physics, but because it is supposed to contain a priori the principles of its recognition, it is called rational physics.

19.6 The metaphysics of the thinking nature is called psychology, and out of the reason just cited only the rational recognition is to be understood here.

20.1 Accordingly the entire system of metaphysics consists of four main parts.

20.2 1. Ontology.

20.3 2. Rational physiology.

20.4 3. Rational cosmology.

20.5 4. Rational theology.
20.6 The second part, namely the instruction of pure reason concerning nature, contains two compartments, the *physica rationalis,* and *psychologia rati-

onalis.*

* Kant's annotation.

1.1 Let no one think that I mean with this what we normally term *physica gen-

eralis* and which is more mathematics than philosophy.

1.2 For the metaphysics of nature is entirely isolated from mathematics, and has by far not so many expansive insights to offer as mathematics does, but is still very important with respect to the critique of those understanding rec-

ognitions in general, applicable to nature. At the lack of these, even mathe-

matics, by attaching to certain, though in fact, metaphysical concepts, which have unknowingly burdened the instruction of nature with hypotheses, which vanish at a critique of these principles, still without injuring the use of mathematics in the field (which is entirely indispensable) in any way at all.

21.1 The original Idea of a philosophy of pure reason itself prescribes this divi-

sion. It is therefore architectonic, conformable to its essential purposes, and not merely technical, according to contingently perceived kinships and positioned, as it were, by good fortune, but just for that reason also inalterable and legislative.

21.2 But some points are found with this which can prompt reservation and weaken conviction of the legitimacy of that.

22.1 First how can I expect a recognition a priori, hence a metaphysics of objects, to the extent they are given to our senses, hence a posteriori? And how is it possible, according to principles a priori, to recognize the nature of things and to achieve to a rational physiology?

22.2 Here is the answer: “we take nothing from experience except what is neces-

sary for giving us an object, partly of the external and partly of the internal sense.”

22.3 The former occurs according to the mere concept of material (impenetrable and lifeless expansion), the other through the concept of a thinking entity (in the empirical, inner representation, “I think”).
22.4 By the way, in the entire metaphysics of these objects, we would have to refrain from all empirical principles entirely, which might add some sort of an experience additively yet beyond the concept, in order to judge something about these objects from that.

23.1 Second: what happens then with the empirical psychology which has so long asserted its place in metaphysics and from which we have expected such great things for its explanation in our times, after we give up the hope of furnishing something suitable a priori?

23.2 I answer, “it comes to where the actual (empirical) doctrine of nature must be positioned, namely on the side of applied philosophy, for which pure philosophy contains the principles a priori which therefore must be connected indeed with the them, but not mingled.”

23.3 Empirical psychology therefore must be banned entirely from metaphysics, and is already excluded entirely from that through the Idea of metaphysics.

23.4 Nonetheless someone will still always have to permit a small place in metaphysics for the empirical psychology according to the scholastic usage (although only as an episode), and indeed out of economic motives because it is not yet so rich that it alone makes up a study, and still too important for us to throw out entirely or to attach somewhere else where I might encounter even less kinship than in metaphysics.

23.5 Therefore it is so far merely a sheltered stranger, whom we allow to sojourn for a while until it will be able to move into its own housing in a determined anthropology (the pendant to the empirical doctrine of nature).

24.1 That is the universal Idea of metaphysics therefore which, since we at the beginning impute to it more than can reasonably be demanded and amuse ourselves for a time with pleasant expectations, has finally fallen into universal contempt, for we find ourselves deceived in our hopes.

24.2 Out of the entire course of our critique we will have adequately convinced ourselves that even if metaphysics cannot be the foundational vestments of religion, so it would still always have to remain standing as the defender of religion. And reason, which is already dialectic through the alignment of its
nature, can never dispense with such a science, which bridles it and, through a scientific and fully illuminated self-recognition, checks the desolation which a lawless, speculative reason would otherwise provide quite unfailingly in morals as well as religion.

24.3 We can also be confident therefore as inflexible or deprecating as those also are who know to judge a science not according to its nature, but rather only from its contingent effects, we will always return to her as though to a beloved divided between us, because reason, since here it concerns essential purposes, must work without rest either on basic insight or on the destruction of good insights already present.

25.1 Metaphysics therefore as much of nature as of morality, especially the critique of reason venturing out on its own wings, which precedes preparatorily (propaedeutically), actually makes up that alone which we can term philosophy in the genuine meaning.

25.2 This refers everything to wisdom, but through the way of science, the only way which, if it is once paved, will never become overgrown and will permit no error.

25.3 Mathematics, natural science, and even empirical knowledge with humans have a high value as means, mainly to contingent, but still finally to necessary and essential, purposes of humanity, but then only by means of a rational recognition out of mere concepts which, we may denominate it as we will, is actually nothing except metaphysics.

26.1 Precisely for that reason, metaphysics is also the fulfillment of all cultivation of human reason, which is indispensable, even if we set to the side its influence, as science, upon certain determined purposes.

26.2 For it considers reason according to its elements and supreme maxims, which themselves must lie as foundation to the possibility of some sciences and to the use of all.

26.3 That it, as mere speculation, serves more to restrain errors than to expand recognition does not detract from its value, but rather much more gives it dignity and esteem through the function of censoring which secures the uni-
versal order and concord, indeed the welfare, of the scientific communal being, and performs its courageous and fruitful treatment, not to remove itself from the principal purpose, i.e., universal happiness.
1.1 This title stands here only in order to indicate a position which remains in a system and must be completed in the future.

1.2 I am content to cast a fleeting glance from a merely transcendental viewpoint, namely the nature of pure reason at the whole of the previous treatment of it, which, of course, represents indeed a building to my eye, but only in ruins.

2.1 It is noteworthy enough, even though it could not naturally proceed otherwise, that in the childhood of philosophy humans began where we now would like to end, namely to study first the recognition of God and the hope, or indeed even the constitution, of another world.

2.2 What kind of rude religious concepts the old customs, which yet remained from the raw state of the people, may have introduced, this still did not hinder the enlightened portion from dedicating itself to free inquiry about this object, and we easily saw that there can be no enabling and more dependable way of pleasing the invisible power which governed the world, in order at least to be happy in another world, than good habits of living.

2.3 Hence theology and morals were the two motivational, or better, referral points to all honed rational inquiry, to which one always afterwards dedicated oneself.

2.4 The former was that, however, which gradually drew mere speculative reason into the occupation which subsequently became famous under the name of metaphysics.

3.1 I will not now distinguish the times in which this or that alteration of metaphysics arose, but rather only present in a cursory delineation the diversity of the Idea which occasioned the primary revolutions.

3.2 And here I find a three-fold intention, in which the most preeminent alterations were established on this stage of conflict.
4.1 1. With respect to the object of all our rational recognitions some were sen-
sual, others merely intellectual, philosophers.

4.2 Epicurus can be termed the most distinguished philosopher of sensitivity,
Plato of the intellectual.

4.3 But this distinction of the schools, as subtle as it may be, had already begun
in the earliest times and has maintained itself without interruption for a long
time.

4.4 Those of the first asserted all actuality to be the objects of the senses, every-
ting else being imagination. On the other hand those of the second said that
in the sense is nothing but semblance, and only understanding recognizes the
true.

4.5 For that reason the former still did not deny reality to the understanding, but
rather for them it was only logical, but for the latter it was mystical

4.6 The former admitted intellectual concepts, but assumed merely sensitive ob-
jects.

4.7 The latter demanded that the true objects were merely intelligible and as-
serted a perspective through the pure understanding accompanied by no
senses and, according to their opinion, was merely confused.

5.1 2. With respect to the origin of pure rational recognitions, whether they have
their source derived out of experience or independently of it in reason.

5.2 Aristotle can be viewed as the head of the empiricists, but Plato of the noo-
logist.

5.3 Locke, who in more recent times followed the former, and Leibniz, the sec-
ond (though with a modest distance from his mystical system), have none-
theless been able to bring no finality into this dispute.

5.4 At least Epicurus proceeded for his part much more consistently with respect
to his sensual system (for he never went with his conclusions further than
experience) than did Aristotle and Locke (but especially the latter) who, after he had derived all concepts and principles from experience, goes so far in the use of that to assert our ability to prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul (although both objects lie entirely beyond the boundaries of possible experience) just as evidently as any sort of a mathematical principle.

6.1 With respect to method.

6.2 If we are supposed to term something “method,” it must be a procedure according to principles.

6.3 Now we can divide the method, prevailing now in this branch of inquiry, into the naturalist and the scientific.

6.4 The naturalist of pure reason takes as base proposition: “through common reason without science (which he calls healthy reason) more can be accomplished merely with respect to the most sublime questions which make up the task of metaphysics than through speculation.”

6.5 He asserts therefore that “we can more precisely determine the magnitude and scope of the moon by visual estimation than through mathematical circumlocution.”

6.6 It is merely misology,\textsuperscript{443} brought to principles and, even more absurd, the neglect of all artificial means, and extolled as a personal method of expanding one’s recognition.

6.7 For concerning the naturalist at the deficiency of several insights, we have no basis to charge anything to them.

6.8 They follow common reason without boasting of their ignorance, which was supposed to contain the secret truth out of the deep well of Democritus.

6.9 \textit{Quod sapio, satis est mihi; non ego curo, esse quod Arcesilas aenumnosique Solones, pers}\textsuperscript{444} is their motto, with which they can live entertained and wor-

\textsuperscript{443} Hatred of reasoning.

\textsuperscript{444} “I know all that I need to know. I don't want to be like Arcesilas or some careworn Solon.”
thy of acclaim, without bothering themselves about science, nor to confuse their occupation.

7.1 Now with regard to the observers of a scientific method, they have here the choice of proceeding either dogmatically or skeptically, but in all cases still the obligation to proceed systematically.

7.2 If I term here with respect to the first (dogmatic) the famous Wolff, with the second (skeptic) David Hume, I can leave the others unnamed in accordance with my present intention.

7.3 The critical way alone is yet open.

7.4 If the reader has had the courtesy and patience to wander through this in my company, he may now judge whether, if it pleases him, to contribute something to it of his own in order to make this path into a royal highway that, which many centuries could not perform, may yet be reached before the end of the present century; namely to bring human reason, in that which always has occupied its longing to know, and vain until now, to full satisfaction.
Appendices

Group I of Appendices: Major Elements of the A Version
Excluded from the B Version

Appendix I.1  Preface to the A Edition

1.1  In one area of its recognitions human reason has the particular fate of being burdened with questions which it cannot ignore, for they are posed by the nature of reason itself, but which it also cannot answer, for they transcend every capacity of human reason.

2.1  It falls into this embarrassment without blame.

2.2  It begins with fundamental propositions, whose use in the course of experience is unavoidable and, at the same time, confirmed by that experience itself.

2.3  With these it ascends always higher to more remote conditions (as it is wont to do by its very nature).

2.4  But since in this way it becomes aware that its occupation would always have to remain incomplete--for the questions never cease--it considers itself called to take refuge with principles which go beyond all possible use of experience and seem so unquestionable that even common human reason concurs with them.

2.5  But in doing so it stumbles into obscurities and contradictions. And it is by virtue of these that it can surmise indeed that errors would have to lie concealed somewhere as the cause, but which it cannot itself discover because the principles, which it utilizes to go beyond the boundaries of all experience, no longer acknowledge any touchstone from experience.

2.6  The battleground of these endless disputations is called metaphysics.

3.1  There was a time when it was called the queen of all sciences, and if we take the will for the deed, it certainly deserved this honorary title by virtue of the preeminent importance of its object.
3.2 Now it is the vogue of this current age to show every contempt for her, and like Hecuba, offended and abandoned, the matron complains “modo maxima rerum, tot generis natisque potens - nunc trahor exul, inops - .” 445 Ovid. Metam.

4.1 Her rule at the beginning, under the administration of the dogmatists, was despotic.

4.2 But because the legislation still had traces of the old barbarism, it gradually deteriorated through internal warfare into complete anarchy, and the skeptics, a sort of nomad who detested all enduring settlements, periodically sundered the civil union.

4.3 But fortunately, since there were only a few of these skeptics, they could not keep the dogmatists from continually trying to establish a settlement anew, although not according to any plan which were agreeable to all.

4.4 In modern times it seemed indeed that finally all these disputes would come to an end through a certain physiology of human understanding (by the celebrated Locke) and the justification of those claims would be completely decided. But it turned out that even though the birth of that ostensible queen was derived from the rabble of common experience and would have to have her pretensions quite properly brought into suspicion, still, because this genealogy was in fact falsely imputed, she will continue to assert her claims. And so everything deteriorated again into the old, maggoty dogmatism and hence into contempt from whence some had wanted to erect a science.

4.5 Now after all ways have been tried in vain (as some are convinced) disgust and complete indifference, the mother of chaos and night, rule in the sciences, but still simultaneously there arose the origin, or at the least the foreplay, of their closer regeneration and enlightenment, as they became obscure, confused and unusable through all inept diligence.

5.1 It is namely futile to feign indifference with respect to such investigations, whose object cannot be indifferent to human nature.

445 “though even the highest of all, powerful through so many sons-in-law and children . . . I am now led away, rejected and helpless.”
5.2 Also those who are allegedly indifferent, even as much as they plan to make themselves indiscernible through an alteration of the scholastic language into a popular tone, with respect to which they hardly think anything anywhere, slip back unavoidably into metaphysical assertions.

5.3 This indifference, meanwhile, which rears up in the midst of the flowering of all sciences and concerns precisely that about which, if information were available, we would renounce least of all, is still a phenomenon which deserves attention and consideration.

5.4 It is obviously not the effect of frivolity, but rather of the mature judgmental power* of the times, which is no longer delayed by pseudo-knowledge and is a challenge to reason, to undertake anew the most difficult of all its occupations, namely that concerning self-recognition, and to institute a court of inquiry which would secure it with all its legitimate claims, but which, on the other hand, could dismiss all baseless presumptions, though not through sheer decree, but rather according to its eternal and unchanging laws, and this is none other than the critique of pure reason itself.

* Kant’s annotation:

1.1 Occasionally we hear complaints about the shallow level of the manner of thinking of our time and of the decline of sound science.

1.2 But I do not see that those, such as mathematics, doctrine of nature, etc., whose foundation is well grounded, deserve this allegation in the least, but rather continue the ancient fame of thoroughness, and indeed exceed that in the doctrine of nature.

1.3 Precisely the same spirit would now actually prove itself in other forms of recognition, if only there had been concern before the rectification of its principles.

1.4 At the lack of this an indifference and doubt and finally a strong critique are far rather a proof of a sound way of thinking.

1.5 Our age is the actual age of critique to which everything must be subjected.

1.6 Religion through its holiness, and legislation through its majesty, want generally to shuffle this aside.

1.7 But they arouse an justifiable suspicion against themselves and can claim no genuine respect which reason is only willing to grant to what its free and public testing is able to sustain.
6.1 But with this I do not mean a critique of the books and systems, but rather that of the rational capacity in general with respect to all information toward which, independently of all experience, it may strive; thus the decision of the possibility and impossibility of a metaphysics in general and the determination of the sources as well as the scope and boundaries of that metaphysics, but then everything from principles.

7.1 Now this way, the sole one remaining, I have taken and flatter myself to have encountered in it the remedy for all errors which had set reason at odds with itself in its experience-free usage.

7.2 I have not evaded its questions per chance by pleading the incapacity of human reason; but rather I have completely specified them according to principles and, after having discovered the core of the misunderstanding of reason with itself, have solved them for a complete satisfaction.

7.3 Indeed the answering of those questions did not turn out as a dogmatically delirious, intellectual curiosity might have expected; for that can do nothing except via sleight-of-hand, and which I do not mean with being satisfied.

7.4 That, however, was hardly the intention of the natural determination of our reason, and the duty of the philosopher was to remove the illusion which arose through misinterpretation, even if so much praised and beloved madness should come to naught.

7.5 In this occupation I have let completeness be my great aim, and I venture to say that there would have to be not a single metaphysical task which is not solved here, or at least the key of the solution to which has not been provided.

7.6 In fact pure reason is also such a perfect singularity that if its principle were insufficient for even one of all the questions which are posed by its own nature, we could nevertheless only cast this principle aside because it would also not be adequate to any of the others with complete dependability.
8.1 In saying this I believe to perceive in the face of the reader an unwillingness mingled with contempt at such apparently boastful and immodest claims, and nonetheless they are without comparison more moderate than those of every author of the most common project who alleges, perchance, to prove in that way the simple nature of the soul or the necessity of a first beginning of the world.

8.2 For such a project promises to expand human recognition out beyond all boundaries of possible experience, and where I merely insist that this oversteps my capacity entirely, and in place of which I have to do solely with reason itself and with its pure thinking, the complete knowledge with which I need not seek far from me, because I encounter it within myself and concerning which the entire logic also already gives me an example that all of its simple actions permit of full and systematic accounting; only that the question posed here is how much I might hope to accomplish with that if all material and support of experience is given up.

9.1 So much for the complexities in the attainment of all that and the detail in the attainment of all purposes together, which does not pose an arbitrary project to us, but rather the nature of the recognition itself, as the matter of our critical investigation.

10.1 Certitude and clarity, two items which concern the form of our investigation, are still to be viewed as essential demands which can properly be made of the author who dares such an indelicate undertaking.

11.1 Now concerning certitude, I have pronounced judgment on myself that in this type of considerations, it is in no wise permitted to conjecture, and that everything in these considerations which even looks like an hypothesis would be contraband, which is not even for sale at the lowest price, but rather must be confiscated as soon as it is discovered.

11.2 For each and every recognition itself, which is supposed to stand firmly a priori, announces that it will be held as utterly necessary; and even more: a determination of all pure recognitions a priori; which ought to be the standard, thus even the example, of every apodictical (philosophical) certitude.
11.3 Now whether I have performed that which I promise concerning these items belongs entirely to the judgment of the reader, because it is appropriate for the author only to present the reasons of his arguments, but not to judge of their effect upon his own judges.

11.4 But in order that something not innocently be a cause of the weakening of the argument, we might permit him to note those places which could give occasion for some misgiving (even if the only concern is a secondary purpose) in order to ward off the influence which even the least reservation of the reader might have at that point in his judgment with respect to the primary purpose.

12.1 I am familiar with no investigation more important for the establishment of the capacity which we term understanding, and simultaneously for the determination of the rules and limits of its usage, than that which I have employed in the second part of the transcendental analytic under the title of Deduction Of The Pure Understanding Concepts. They have also cost me the most trouble though, as I hope, not in vain.

12.2 This consideration, however, which is sketched somewhat deeply, has two sides.

12.3 The first refers to the objects of pure understanding and is supposed to set forth and make comprehensible the objective validity of its concepts a priori.

12.4 The other aims at the pure understanding itself with respect to its possibility, and the powers of recognition on which it itself is based, thus to consider it in a subjective referral and, although this exposition is of great importance with respect to my primary purpose, still it does not belong essentially to that purpose; because the primary question always remains, “what and how much can understanding and reason recognize free from all experience?” and not “how is possible that there be a capacity to think?”

12.5 Since the latter is, as it were, a search for the cause for a given effect and, to this extent, has some similarity on its own to a hypothesis (even though, as I will indicate at another opportunity, it does not relate so in fact), it seems as though here were also the case where I would have license for opinion, and therefore the reader would have to have the liberty to assert otherwise.
12.6 In this respect I must forestall the reader with the reminder that in case my subjective deduction did not effect the entire conviction with him which I expect, still the objective deduction, with which I especially am concerned here, would obtain its entire strength, where to in any case that, which is said on pages 92 and 93,\(^{446}\) can be sufficient alone.

13.1 Now finally, concerning the clarity, the reader has a right to first require the discursive (logical) clarity through concepts, but then also an intuitive (aesthetical) clarity through perspectives, i.e., examples or other expositions in concreto.

13.2 I have attended sufficiently to the first.

13.3 That concerned the essentiality of my project, but was also the fortuitous cause of my not being able to sufficiently perform the second, less rigorous, though still reasonable requirement.

13.4 I have been almost continuously undecided in the advance of my work concerning how I should handle this.

13.5 Examples and expositions always seemed necessary to me and hence also actually flowed in at their proper places in the first draft.

13.6 But I soon realized the magnitude of my task and the number of objects with which I would have to be concerned, and since I was aware that this entirely alone would already expand the work sufficiently in the dry, merely scholastic presentation, I found it inadvisable to expand it even more with examples and expositions which are necessary only for popular intentions, especially since this work could in no way be commensurate to popular usage and the actual specialists in science do not need this facilitation so much, even though it is always pleasing; but here would even draw in something counter productive.

13.7 Indeed the Abbot Terrason says that if we measured the size of a book from the time necessary to understand it rather than by the number of its pages, we would say of many books that they would have been much shorter had they not been so short.

\(^{446}\) In this translation Kant's pages 92 and 93 are found on pages 123 and 124.
13.8 But on the other hand, if we direct our intention to the comprehensibility of a wide-ranging whole of speculative recognitions, cohering yet together in one principle, we could say with equal right: many a book would have been much clearer if in fact it had not been so clear.

13.9 For the assistance of the distinctiveness is indeed of help in the parts, but frequently is distracting in the whole by not allowing the reader to achieve fast enough to the overview of the whole and to meld together all these clear colors at the same time and to make the articulation of the organization of the system indiscernible, upon which still it most depends, in order to be able to judge about the unity and soundness.

14.1 I think it can serve as a considerable attraction for the reader to unite his exertion with that of the author, if the reader has the intention of completing a large and important work entirely and still continuously according to the design.

14.2 Metaphysics now, according to the concepts which we have given of it, is the only one of all sciences which may promise such a completion and indeed in a short time and with only a little, though concentrated, effort so that nothing remains for posterity except to arrange everything according to their intentions in the didactical manner, without for that reason being able to increase that content in the least.

14.3 For metaphysics is nothing other than the inventory of all our possessions through pure reason, ordered systematically.

14.4 Now nothing can oppose us, because what reason produces entirely out of itself cannot be concealed, but rather is brought to light through reason itself as soon as we have uncovered its communal principle.

14.5 The complete unity of this type of recognitions, and indeed from utterly pure concepts without anything from experience (or even a particular perspective, which were supposed to lead to a determined experience) being able to have any influence on them for expanding and increasing them, not only makes this conditioned completeness feasible, but even necessary.
14.6 Tecum habita et noris, quam sil tibi curta supellex.\textsuperscript{447} Persius.

15.1 Such a system of pure (speculative) reason I hope myself to supply under the title: Metaphysics of Nature, which should have by far not the half the extent, though disproportionally richer content, than here the critique which first had to establish the sources and conditions of its possibility and to clear and to level a quite overgrown acreage.

15.2 Here with this critique I expect from my reader the patience and impartiality of a judge, but there the accommodation and support of a coworker, for, even as completely as all principles are brought forth for the system of the critique, there still remains yet for the execution of the system itself that no derived concept be lacking, which no one can enter in a twinkle, but rather which must gradually be sought out. Likewise, since there the entire synthesis of the concept would be exhausted, so beyond this it is required that just the same happen with respect to the analysis, which is easy and is more entertainment than work.

16.1 I have just a few things to note with respect to the printing.

16.2 Since the beginning of the printing was somewhat delayed, I obtained for inspection only about half of the proof sheets and in which I encountered some typographical errors, though not confusing the meaning, apart from that which appears on page 379, line four from the bottom where “specific” must be read instead of “skeptic.”\textsuperscript{448}

16.3 The antinomy of pure reason from page 425 to 461 is employed in the manner of a table, in that everything which belongs to the thesis continues on the left side, but what belongs to the antithesis on the right, which I so arranged in order that proposition and counter-proposition would be all the more easily compared with each other.

\textsuperscript{447} “Try stopping by your house as a visitor, and you will see how scant your household is.”

\textsuperscript{448} This correction has been made in this translation. And the pages cited in 16.3 below refer to pages 376 through 403 in this translation.
Appendices - First Group: Major Elements of the A Version
Excluded from the B Version

Appendix I.2  The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding

See Translator’s Notes and Comments on this Version of the Deduction in Appendix II.3

2nd Section.  A Priori Foundations for the Possibility of Experience

1.1 It is entirely contradictory and impossible for a concept to be generated completely a priori and refer to an object without belonging to the concept of a possible experience or at least consisting of the elements of such.

1.2 For since no perspective would correspond to such a concept, and since perspectives in general make up the entire field or subject matter of possible experience (by means of which alone an object can be given to us), the concept would have no content.

1.3 Indeed a concept a priori which did not refer to a perspective would really be only the logical form for a concept and not itself the actual concept by means of which something were thought.

2.1 If therefore there are such things as pure concepts a priori, then while they may not, of course, contain anything empirical, they must still be utter conditions a priori of a possible experience, upon which alone their objective reality can be based.

3.1 To determine how pure concepts of understanding are possible, we must uncover the conditions on which the possibility of experience depends and which would remain as a foundation for it even if we were to abstract from all empirical aspects of the appearances.

3.2 A concept which expressed this formal and objective condition of experience universally and sufficiently, would be called a pure concept of understanding.

3.3 Once I have pure concepts of understanding, of course, I can think of objects which are perhaps impossible or, if not actually impossible per se, still cannot be given in any experience, because something would be left out of the
connection of their concepts which belonged necessarily to the condition of a possible experience (in the concept of a ghost), or perhaps it would entail an extension of a pure concept which is further than experience can encompass (in the concept of God).

3.4 But even though the elements to all recognitions, even to arbitrary and inane fancies, can certainly not be borrowed from experience (for otherwise they would not be recognitions a priori), they must still always contain the pure conditions a priori of a possible experience and its object. Otherwise not only would nothing be thought through them, but they themselves, without data, could not even have arisen in thought.

4.1 Now these concepts, which contain a priori the pure thinking for every experience, are found to be the categories, and it is already a sufficient deduction for them and a justification of their objective validity if we can prove that it is only by means of them that an object can be thought.

4.2 But because in such a thought more than the single capacity, i.e., the understanding, is involved and because even this, as a capacity of recognition which is to refer to objects, has need of an explanation concerning the possibility of this referral, we must consider the subjective sources which make up the foundations a priori for the possibility of experience, not with regard to their empirical makeup, but rather to their transcendental makeup.

5.1 If every representation were entirely alien to the other, isolated, as it were, and separate from it, then nothing like a recognition, i.e., a whole of compared and connected representations, would ever arise.

5.2 If therefore I attribute to the sensitivity a synopsis because it contains a manifold in its perspective, there will always be a synthesis corresponding to this, and only by means of spontaneity can the receptivity make connected recognitions possible.

5.3 Now this is the basis of a three-fold synthesis which appears necessarily in every recognition: the apprehension of the representations as modifications of the mind in the perspective, the reproduction of these representations in the imagination, and their recognition [Rekognition] in the concept.
5.4 These provide us with a clue to three subjective recognition sources which actually make possible the understanding and, through this, every experience as an empirical product of the understanding.

**Preceding Reminder**

6.1 The deduction of the categories involves so many difficulties and necessitates such an intense inquiry into the first grounds of the possibility of our recognitions in general that in order to avoid the wide scope of a complete theory and still not miss anything in such a necessary inquiry, I have found it more advantageous to prepare the reader in the following four parts than to instruct him; and not to present the elucidation of the elements of the understanding systematically until the subsequent third section.

6.2 For that reason the reader will have to remain somewhat in the dark, which is at first unavoidable on a path which has never been trod before, but who, I hope, will be fully enlightened in that third part.

1. **The Synthesis of the Apprehension in the Perspective**

1.1 Our representations may arise from whence they will, whether effected through the influence of outer things or through internal causes, and whether they have arisen a priori or empirically as appearances; nevertheless, as modifications of the mind, they belong to the internal sense and, as such, all our recognitions are ultimately subject to the formal conditions of the internal sense, namely time, in which they altogether must be ordered, connected and brought into certain relationships.

1.2 This is a universal remark which we must thoroughly lay as the foundation to all that follows.

2.1 Every perspective contains a manifold within itself which still would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the sequence of the impressions upon one another; for, as contained in one moment, no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity.
2.2 Now in order that out of this manifold there arises unity of the perspective (as perchance in the representation of space) first the perusal of the manifold is necessary and then the collection of that manifold, which action I term the apprehension, because it is focused directly upon the perspective which offers indeed a manifold, but can never effect this as such and indeed as contained in one representation without a synthesis arising.

3.1 Now this synthesis of the apprehension must also be exercised a priori, i.e., with respect to the representations which are not empirical.

3.2 For without it, we would not be able to have either the representations of space nor of time, for these can only be generated through the synthesis of the manifold which the sensitivity offers in its original receptivity.

3.3 We have therefore a pure synthesis of the apprehension.

2. The Synthesis of the Reproduction in the Imagination

1.1 There is a law (merely an empirical one, of course) according to which representations which have frequently followed or accompanied one another finally congregate and combine in such a way that one of them produces a transition of the mind to the other according to an enduring rule and even without the presence of the object.

1.2 But this law of reproduction presupposes that the appearances themselves are actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of their representations a coincidence or succession actually takes place in conformity with certain rules;

   for otherwise our empirical imagination would never have anything to do commensurate to its capacity and therefore would remain concealed in the interior of the mind as a dead faculty, not even known to us.

1.3 If cinnabar were sometimes red, and sometimes black, sometimes light and sometimes heavy, if a person appeared sometimes in one animal shape and sometimes in another, if on the longest day the land were sometimes covered with fruit and sometimes with ice and snow, then my empirical imagination would never be able to find the least opportunity for recalling the heavy cinnabar upon the representation of red; or if a certain word sometimes meant
one thing and sometimes another, or if the same thing were called one thing at one time and something else at another without there being a certain rule to which the appearances were already subject of themselves, then no empirical synthesis of the reproduction could take place.

2.1 Therefore there must be something which makes this very reproduction of the appearances possible by being the a priori basis of their necessary, synthetic unity.

2.2 We recognize this very quickly once we recall that appearances are not things on their own, but rather the sheer play of our representations which finally resolve into determinations of the inner sense.

2.3 If we can now establish that even our purest perspectives a priori procure no recognition except to the extent they contain such a connection of the manifold that a thorough synthesis of the reproduction is made possible, then this synthesis of the imagination is also based a priori upon principles preceding all experience and we must assume a pure, transcendental synthesis of that imagination as the foundation for even the possibility of experience (which necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of the appearances).

2.4 Now it is clear that if I draw a line in thought, or think the time from one midday to the other, or if I merely want to represent a certain count, I would necessarily first have to grasp in thought each of these representations of the manifold, one after the other.

2.5 And if I were always to forget the preceding (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of the time, or the units represented successively) and not reproduce them as I proceeded to the subsequent one, then an entire representation would never be able to arise, nor any of the thoughts just mentioned; indeed not even the purest and first fundamental representations of space and time.

3.1 The synthesis of the apprehension is therefore inextricably linked with the synthesis of the reproduction.

3.2 And since the former constitutes the transcendental basis of the possibility of all recognitions in general (not merely the empirical, but also even those pure
and a priori), the reproductive synthesis of the imagination belongs to the
transcendental actions of the mind, and with regard to this inclusion we will
call this capacity the transcendental capacity of the imagination.\textsuperscript{449}

3. The Synthesis of the Recognition [Rekognition] in the Concept

1.1 Without being aware that what we are thinking now is precisely what we
were thinking a moment ago, all reproduction in the series of the representa-
tions would be pointless.

1.2 For there would be a new representation in the present state which would not
at all belong to the act by means of which it was to have been gradually gen-
erated, and its manifold would never make up a whole, because the unity
which only the consciousness can provide would be lacking.

1.3 If I forget, while counting, that the units which I presently have in mind have
been gradually added by me, then I would recognize neither the generation
of the quantity through this successive addition of ones, nor also therefore
the count; for this concept consists solely in the consciousness of the unity of
the synthesis.

2.1 The word concept itself might aid us here.

2.2 For this is a consciousness which unites into a single representation the
manifold which was gradually looked at and then reproduced.

2.3 This consciousness can frequently be very weak; so much so in fact that we
connect it with the generation of the representation only in the effect and not
in the act itself. But regardless of that difference, a consciousness must al-
ways be encountered, even if the distinctive clarity is not, and without this
consciousness concepts are not possible at all nor, in their absence, any rec-
ognition of objects.

3.1 First we need to make clear what is meant by the expression "an object of
representations."

\textsuperscript{449} This blog may be helpful in understanding this part of the Deduction.
3.2 Earlier we indicated that appearances were really nothing other than representations which must not be looked at in just this way as objects on their own (independently of the representational capacity).

3.3 But then what do we mean when speaking of an object corresponding to, and hence then also differing from, a recognition?

3.4 Obviously this object must be thought of only as a something in general = X, because apart from our recognition we have nothing to place in opposition to it in order then to correspond to it.

4.1 And yet we find that our thought of the reference of all recognitions to their object entails some sort of necessity, for a recognition is not haphazard or arbitrary, but rather a priori determined in a certain way. Indeed it is by reference to the object that recognitions also necessarily agree among themselves with regard to it, i.e., they must have that unity which makes up the concept of the object.

5.1 But since we are dealing only with the manifold of our representations, and since that X (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing apart from us, and yet since it is supposed to be something distinct from all our representations, it is clear that the unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the perspective.

5.2 For we say we recognize an object when we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of the perspective.

5.3 But this is impossible unless the perspective were capable of production according to a rule through such a function of synthesis that makes the reproduction of the manifold necessary a priori, and a concept uniting this manifold possible.
5.4 We think of a triangle, for example, by being cognizant of the assemblage of three straight lines according to a rule whereby such a perspective could be presented at any time.

5.5 Now this unity of the rule determines all the manifold, and limits it to conditions which make the unity of apperception possible, and the concept of this unity is the representation of the object = X which I think through the cited predicates of a triangle.

6.1 Every recognition requires a concept, regardless of how imperfect or vague, and it is always something general with respect to its form, and which serves as a rule.

6.2 The concept of a body, for example, serves as a rule for our recognition of external appearances with respect to the manifold which is thought in that concept.

6.3 But it can be a rule of perspectives only in this way: with given appearances it represents the necessary reproduction of their manifold, and hence the synthetic unity of the consciousness we have of them.

6.4 Upon the perception of a something apart from us therefore the concept of body makes the representation of extension necessary, and along with it that of impenetrability, shape, etc.

7.1 There is always a transcendental condition as the basis to every necessity.

7.2 A transcendental basis of the unity of the consciousness therefore must be encountered in the synthesis of the manifold of all our perspectives, hence also in the concept of objects in general, consequently then of all objects of experience, for without this it would be impossible to think any sort of object to our perspectives;
for this object is nothing other than that something concerning which the concept expresses such a necessity of the synthesis.

8.1 Now this original and transcendental condition is none other than the transcendental apperception.

8.2 The consciousness of one's self, according to the determinations of our state, is merely empirical with regard to the inner perception, always changeable, renders no enduring or abiding self in the flood of the inner appearances, and is commonly referred to as the inner sense or empirical apperception.

8.3 That which is to be represented as numerically identical cannot be so thought by means of empirical data.

8.4 There must be a condition which proceeds all experience and even makes this possible, which is to make such a transcendental presupposition valid.

9.1 Now no recognitions can take place within us, nor any connection and unity among them, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of the perspective and solely in reference to which every representation of object is possible.

9.2 This pure, original, unchangeable consciousness I will call the transcendental apperception.

9.3 That such a name is warranted is clear from the fact that even the purest, objective unity, namely that of the concepts a priori (space and time), is only possible through the referral of the perspectives to it, i.e., to this apperception.

9.4 The numerical unity of this apperception therefore lies a priori as a foundation to all concepts just as much as the manifold of space and time is the foundation to the perspectives of the sensitivity.

10.1 But it is just this transcendental unity of the apperception which takes all possible appearances which could ever be together in an experience, and makes a cohesion of all these representations in accordance with laws.
10.2 For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind, in the recognition of the manifold, were not aware of the identity of its function in combining this (manifold) synthetically in a recognition.

10.3 The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of one's self, therefore, is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts, i.e., according to rules which not only make them reproducible necessarily, but also in that way determine an object to their perspective, i.e., the concept of a something in which they necessarily cohere.

For the mind could not possibly think the identity of its own self in the manifold of its representations, and certainly (not) a priori, if it were not cognizant of the identity of its action in subjecting every synthesis of the apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity by means of which its cohesion (that of the apprehension), according to rules a priori, is first made possible.

10.4 And now we are also in a better position to determine our concept of an object in general.

10.5 All representations, as such, have their object and can in turn be objects of other representations.

10.6 Appearances are the only objects which can be given to us immediately, and that in them which refers immediately to the object is called perspective.

10.7 But now these appearances are not things on their own, but rather only representations, which in turn have their own object which therefore cannot be observed by us and which therefore may be termed the non-empirical, i.e., transcendental, object = X.

11.1 The pure concept of this transcendental object (which, with all our recognitions, is actually always the same = X) is what can procure objective referral to an object, i.e., objective reality, in all our empirical concepts in general.
11.2 Now this concept can contain no determined perspective at all and therefore will pertain to nothing except the unity which must be encountered in a manifold of the recognition to the extent it refers to an object.

11.3 But this referral is nothing other than the necessary unity of the consciousness, hence also of the synthesis of the manifold, by a common function of the mind in combining that manifold into a single representation.

11.4 Now since this unity must be considered as necessary a priori (because otherwise the recognition would be without any object), the referral to a transcendental object, i.e., the objective reality of our empirical recognition, will rest upon the transcendental law that

all appearances, to the extent objects are to be given to us through them, must stand under an a priori rule of their synthetic unity by means of which alone their relationship in the empirical perspective is possible,

i.e., they must stand under the conditions of the necessary unity of apperception in an experience just as much as they must stand under the formal conditions of space and time in a perspective,

indeed it is by means of the former (the necessary unity of apperception) that every recognition is first possible.

### 4. Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the Categories as A Priori Recognitions

1.1 There is only a single experience in which all perceptions are represented in thorough and orderly cohesion; just as there is only one space and one time in which all forms of the appearance and all relationships of being or not being take place.

1.2 If someone speaks of diverse experiences, these are only so many perceptions to the extent they belong to one and the same general experience.

1.3 Actually it is precisely the thorough and synthetic unity of the perceptions which makes up the form of experience, and this is nothing other than the synthetic unity of the appearances by means of concepts.
2.1 Unity of synthesis by means of empirical concepts would be entirely contingent, and if these were not based on a transcendental foundation of unity, it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill our souls without experience ever being able to arise from them.

2.2 But in that case, every reference of the recognition to the object would vanish because of the lack of connection according to universal and necessary laws. And so while there would certainly be a perspective devoid of all thought, it would never be a recognition, and hence nothing at all for us.

3.1 The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are simultaneously conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience.

3.2 Now I assert that the categories introduced earlier are nothing other than the conditions of the thinking in a possible experience, just as space and time contain the conditions for the perspective in that possible experience.

3.3 Hence these categories are also fundamental concepts for thinking objects in general to the appearances and have therefore a priori, objective validity, which is what we actually wanted to know.

4.1 But the possibility and indeed even the necessity of these categories depend upon the relationship which the entire sensitivity, and hence also all possible appearances, have to the original apperception where everything is necessarily conformable to the conditions of the thorough unity of self-consciousness, i.e., must stand under universal functions of synthesis, namely the synthesis by means of concepts wherein alone the apperception can prove a priori its thorough and necessary identity.

4.2 The concept of a cause, for example, is nothing other than a synthesis (of what follows in the temporal series with other appearances) according to concepts, and without such unity, which has its rule a priori and subjugates the appearances to itself, no thorough, universal and necessary unity of consciousness would be encountered in the manifold of the perceptions.

4.3 But then these perceptions would also belong to no experience, and hence would be devoid of any object and no more than a blind play of representations, i.e., less than a dream.
5.1 Every attempt therefore to derive these pure understanding concepts from experience and to ascribe to them a merely empirical birth, is doomed to failure.

5.2 I do not even need to mention, e.g., that the concept of cause entails a feature of necessity which no experience whatsoever can provide, teaching, as it does, that an appearance customarily follows upon something, but not that it must do so necessarily nor that we could infer the appearance from that something a priori and entirely universally as a condition.

5.3 But what about the empirical rule of association which we must unquestionably accept once we assert that everything in the series of succession of events is subject to rules such that nothing happens unless something else precedes, upon which it always follows? What is the basis of this as a law of nature, I ask, and how is even this association possible?

5.4 The basis of the possibility of the association of the manifold, to the extent it lies in the object, is called the affinity of the manifold.

5.5 I ask therefore how do you make the thorough affinity of the appearances understandable (that they do and must stand under enduring laws)?

6.1 According to my principles this is quite easy.

6.2 All possible appearances, as representations, belong to the entire, possible self-consciousness.

6.3 But from this consideration, as a transcendental representation, the numerical identity is inseparable and a priori certain because nothing can enter into a recognition except by means of this original apperception.

6.4 Now since this identity is necessary in the synthesis of every manifold of the appearances to the extent this manifold is to become empirical knowledge, it follows that the appearances are subject to a priori conditions to which their synthesis (of the apprehension) must be thoroughly conformable.
6.5 But now the representation of a universal condition by which a certain manifold (regardless of what it might be) can be posited is called a rule, and if it must be so granted, a law.

6.6 Therefore all appearances stand in a thorough connection according to necessary laws, and hence in a transcendental affinity, regarding which the empirical affinity is merely a consequence.

7.1 It certainly seems curious and even nonsensical that nature should arrange itself according to the subjective foundations of our apperception and should even depend on that with regard to its conformity to order.

7.2 But when we consider that this nature is nothing but a complex of appearances, hence not a thing on its own, but rather a flood of representations of the mind, then we will not wonder to find nature in the radical capacity of all our recognitions, namely in the transcendental apperception and in that unity whereby alone it can be called an object of every possible experience, i.e., nature; and that also for that reason we are able to recognize this unity a priori, hence also as necessary, which we would not be able to do if it were independent of the first sources of our thinking as such.

7.3 For in that case I would not know where we were to obtain the synthetic propositions of such a universal unity of nature, because in that case we would have to borrow them from the objects of nature itself.

7.4 But since this could only occur empirically, nothing would be derived from that except contingent unity, but which does not reach by far to the necessary cohesion which we mean by nature.

3rd Section. The Relationship of the Understanding to Objects in General, and the Possibility of Recognizing Them A Priori

1.1 We now want to unify and present cohesively what we presented as isolated and individual in the previous parts.

1.2 There are three subjective recognition sources upon which the possibility of an experience in general and the recognition of its objects depend: sense, imagination and apperception. Each of these can be considered empirically,
i.e., in the application to given appearances, but all are also a priori elements or fundamentals which make this empirical usage first possible.

1.3 The sense represents the appearances empirically in the perception, the imagination in the association (and reproduction), and the apperception in the empirical consciousness of the identity of these reproduced representations with the appearances whereby they were given, hence in the recognition.

2.1 But there is an a priori basis for each of these three.

For the perception we have the pure perspective (with respect to it as a representation, the form of the inner perspective, time).

For the association there is the pure synthesis of the imagination.

And for the empirical consciousness there is the pure apperception, i.e., the thorough identity of one's self with all possible representations.

3.1 Now if we want to pursue the internal foundation of this linkage of the representations to the point where they all merge in order first to obtain unity of recognition for a possible experience, we must begin with the pure apperception.

3.2 No perspective is anything to us nor does it concern us in any way if it cannot be incorporated into consciousness, be that directly or indirectly, and in this way alone is recognition possible.

3.3 We are a priori conscious of the thorough identity of ourselves with respect to all representations which can ever belong to our recognition, and this as a necessary condition of the possibility of all representations (since in any case these only represent something within me by belonging to one consciousness with all others, hence by being at least subject to connection into a single one).

3.4 This principle stands firmly a priori and can be called the transcendental principle of the unity of every manifold of our representations (hence also in the perspective).
3.5 Now the unity of the manifold in a subject is synthetic; Therefore the pure apperception gives us a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in every possible perspective.*

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 This statement, which is of great importance, is to be given considerable attention.

1.2 All representations are necessarily subject to a possible, empirical consciousness, for if they were not and if it were entirely impossible to be conscious of them, that would mean they did not even exist.

1.3 But every empirical consciousness is necessarily subject to a transcendental consciousness (preceding every particular experience), namely that of myself as the original apperception.

1.4 It is therefore utterly necessary that in my recognition every consciousness belongs to one consciousness (of myself).

1.5 Now here is a synthetic proposition which is recognized a priori, and which renders in this way the basis for synthetic propositions a priori which concern the pure thinking in the same way that space and time concern those propositions having to do with the mere perspective.

1.6 The synthetic proposition that every diverse, empirical consciousness would have to be connected in one single self-consciousness, is the utterly first principle of our thinking in general, and it is synthetic.

1.7 But we need to remember that the mere representation “I” in reference to all others (whose collective unity it makes possible) is the transcendental consciousness.

1.8 Now this representation may be clear (empirical consciousness) or unclear; this does not matter, indeed not even its reality is important. But what is important is that the possibility of the logical form of every recognition rests necessarily upon the relationship to this apperception as a capacity.

4.1 But this synthetic unity presupposes a synthesis, or encompasses it, and if this synthetic unity is a priori necessary, then the synthesis itself must also be a priori.
4.2 Therefore the transcendental unity of the apperception refers to the pure synthesis of the imagination as an a priori condition of the possibility of every assemblage of the manifold in a recognition.

4.3 But only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori; for the reproductive depends on conditions of experience.

4.4 Therefore the principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of the imagination in light of the apperception is the basis of the possibility of every recognition, and especially of experience.

5.1 Now we term the synthesis of the manifold in the imagination transcendental if, without regard to any distinction in the perspective, it aims merely at the connection of the manifold a priori. And the unity of this synthesis is called transcendental if, with reference to the original unity of the apperception, it is represented as a priori necessary.

5.2 And since this latter lies as the basis of the possibility of every recognition, the transcendental unity of the synthesis of the imagination is the pure form of every possible recognition, through which therefore all objects of a possible experience must be represented a priori.

6.1 The unity of the apperception with regard to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding, and this same unity with regard to the transcendental synthesis, the pure understanding.

6.2 In the understanding therefore are pure recognitions a priori which contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of the imagination with reference to all possible appearances.

6.3 But these are the categories, i.e., pure concepts of the understanding. Hence the empirical capacity of the human for recognitions necessarily contains an understanding which pertains to all objects of the senses (even if only by means of the perspective) and to their synthesis through the imagination as data for a possible experience.

6.4 Now since this referral of the appearances to a possible experience is just as necessary (for without it we would not achieve to any recognition at all
through them, and they would not concern us in the least), it follows that the pure understanding, by means of the category, is a formal and synthetic principle of all experience, and that the appearances have a necessary referral to the understanding.

7.1 Now we will present the necessary cohesion of the understanding with the appearances by means of the categories by beginning from below, i.e., from the empirical.

7.2 The first that is given to us is appearance which, if we combine it with consciousness, is called perception. (Without the relationship to an at least possible consciousness, appearance would never be able to be an object of experience and therefore nothing at all for us, and because it has no objective reality on its own and only exists in the recognition, it would be nothing whatsoever).

7.3 But because every appearance contains a manifold, hence diverse perceptions being encountered dispersed and individual as such in the mind, a connection of these, which they cannot have in the senses themselves, is necessary.

7.4 There is within us therefore an active capacity for the synthesis of this manifold, and this capacity we call imagination; and its action, executed immediately on the perceptions, I call apprehension.*

7.5 This means that the imagination is to bring the manifold of the perspective into a picture; hence it must previously take the impressions into its capacity, i.e., apprehend them.

* Kant’s footnote:

1.1 No psychologist seems to have considered the imagination being a necessary ingredient of the perception itself.

1.2 That is because we typically thought of this capacity partly as limited to reproduction, and partly because we thought that the senses not only supplied us with impressions, but also even assembled these and brought forth pictures of objects. But it is beyond doubt that something more than the receptivity of the impressions was required, namely a function for their synthesis.
8.1 But it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold alone would produce no picture and no cohesion of the impressions if a subjective basis were not at hand to call one perception, from which the mind transits to another, over to the following ones, and thereby to describe entire series of these, i.e., a reproductive capacity of the imagination, which then also is only empirical.

9.1 But if representations were to be reproduced without distinction, just as they were gathered together, no determined cohesion would develop from them, but rather only disordered heaps, and hence no recognition at all. Their reproduction therefore must have a rule according to which a representation must be combined in the imagination with one of these rather than with another.

9.2 This subjective and empirical basis of the reproduction according to rules we call association of the representations.

10.1 But if this unity of association did not also have an objective basis such that it were impossible for the appearances to be apprehended by the imagination except under the condition of a possible synthetic unity of this apprehension, then it would be entirely accidental for appearances to fit into a cohesion of human recognition.

10.2 For even though we had the capacity for associating perceptions, it would still remain entirely undetermined and contingent whether they were actually associable as such;

and in case they were not, then a flood of perceptions and indeed an entire sensitivity would be possible in which considerable empirical consciousness would be encountered in my mind,

but disjointed and without belonging to a consciousness of myself.

But that is impossible,

10.3 for it is only by counting all my perceptions to one consciousness (the original apperception) that I can say with all perceptions that I am conscious of them.
10.4 Therefore there must be an objective basis, i.e., preceding all empirical laws of the imagination, whereupon would rest the possibility, indeed the necessity, of a law reaching through all the appearances, namely to consider them altogether to be such data of the senses that are associable as such and subject to universal rules of a thorough connection in the reproduction.

10.5 This objective basis of all association of the appearances I call the affinity of the appearances.

10.6 But this we can encounter nowhere else than in the fundamental proposition concerning the unity of the apperception with respect to all recognitions which can ever belong to me.

10.7 According to this all appearances whatsoever must so enter the mind or be apprehended so that they accord with the unity of the apperception, which would be impossible without a synthetic unity in their connection, which therefore is also objectively necessary.

11.1 The objective unity of every (empirical) consciousness in one consciousness (the original apperception) is therefore the necessary condition even of every possible perception, and the (close or remote) affinity of all appearances is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in the imagination which is a priori based on rules.

12.1 The imagination therefore is also a capacity of a priori synthesis, which is why we call it the productive imagination. And to the extent it aims at nothing further than the necessary unity in the synthesis of all manifold of the appearance, it can be termed the transcendental function of the imagination.

12.2 It is indeed curious, but nonetheless quite illuminating from the preceding, that it is only by means of this transcendental function of the imagination that the affinity of the appearances first becomes possible, and with this the association and through this finally the reproduction according to laws, and consequently experience itself.

13.1 For the steady and abiding I (the pure apperception) constitutes the correlate (correlatum) of all our representations to the extent it is even possible to be-
come conscious of them, and every consciousness belongs to an all-
encompassing, pure apperception just as much as every sensitive perspective
as a representation does to a pure, internal perspective, namely time.

13.2 Now this apperception is what must be added to the pure imagination to
make its function intellectual.

13.3 For on its on, the synthesis of the imagination, even though executed a priori,
is still always sensible because it only binds the manifold as it appears in the
perspective, e.g., the shape of the triangle.

13.4 But by means of the relationship of the manifold to the unity of the appercep-
tion, concepts (which belong to the understanding) can emerge, but only by
means of the imagination in reference to the sensitive perspective.

14.1 We have therefore a pure, imaginative capacity as a fundamental capacity of
the human soul, one which lies a priori as the basis to every recognition.

14.2 By means of it we bring the manifold of the perspective on one hand into
connection with the conditions of the necessary unity of the pure appercep-
tion on the other.

14.3 Both extremes, sensitivity and understanding, must cohere necessarily by
means of this transcendental function of the imagination; because otherwise
the former would indeed render appearances, but no objects of an empirical
recognition, hence no experience.

14.4 The actual experience, which arises from the apprehension, association (and
reproduction), and finally the recognition [rekognition] of the appearances,
finds concepts in the latter [the understanding], the highest (of the merely
empirical elements of experience), and these concepts make the formal unity
of experience possible, and with it, every objective validity (truth) of the em-
pirical recognition.

14.5 Now these foundations of the recognition of the manifold, to the extent they
concern merely the form of an experience, are the categories.

14.6 Upon them therefore every formal unity in the synthesis of the imagination is
based, and by means of this also every empirical usage of that (in the repro-
duction, association, apprehension) down to the appearances, because only by means of these elements can they belong to the recognition and in general to our consciousness, hence to us.

15.1 Therefore we ourselves introduce the order and regularity of the appearances which we call nature, and also would not find such there if we or the nature of our minds had not done this originally.

15.2 For this unity of nature is to be a necessary, i.e., an a priori certain, unity of the connection of the appearances.

15.3 But how could we bring about a priori a synthetic unity, were not subjective foundations of such unity contained a priori in the original recognition sources of our mind, and were these subjective conditions not simultaneously objectively valid by being the foundations of the possibility of recognizing an object in experience in general?

16.1 We have already explained the understanding in various ways: as spontaneity of the recognition (in contrast to the receptivity of the sensitivity), as a capacity for thinking, or even a capacity for concepts, or yet of judgments, which explanations, when properly considered, blend into one.

16.2 Now we can characterize it as the capacity for rules.

16.3 This characterization is fruitful and comes close to the essential nature of the matter.

16.4 Sensitivity gives us the forms (of the perspective), but understanding the rules.

16.5 The understanding is ever occupied with perusing the appearances with an eye toward discovering some sort of rule for them.

16.6 Rules, to the extent they are objective (hence adhering necessarily to the recognition of the object), are called laws.

16.7 Even though we learn many laws through experience, these are nonetheless only particular determinations of yet higher laws, among which the highest
(under which all others stand) are taken a priori from the understanding itself, and are not borrowed from experience, but rather provide the appearances with their law-likeness, and precisely in that way make experience possible.

16.8 The understanding therefore is not merely a capacity by which the appearances are compared in order to make rules. It is itself the legislator preceding nature, i.e., without the understanding there would not even be a nature, i.e., there would not be any synthetic unity of the manifold of the appearances according to rules. For appearances, as such, cannot take place apart from us, but rather exist only within our sensitivity.

16.9 But this, as an object of recognition in an experience, with everything which it (the experience) may contain, is only possible in the unity of the apperception.

16.10 But this unity of the apperception is the transcendental foundation of the necessary law-likeness of all appearances in an experience.

16.11 Precisely this unity of the apperception with respect to a manifold of representations (i.e., to determine it from a single representation) is the rule, and the capacity of these rules is the understanding.

16.12 All appearances therefore as possible experience, lie just as a priori in the understanding and obtain their formal possibility from it, as they lie, as mere perspectives, in the sensitivity and are only possible, with regard to their form, through this.

17.1 As exaggerated and nonsensical as it may seem, nonetheless, to say that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and hence of the formal unity of nature, is entirely proper and commensurate to the object, namely experience.

17.2 Empirical laws as such, of course, can certainly not derive their origin from the pure understanding any more than the immeasurable manifold of the appearances can be sufficiently grasped from the pure form of the sensitive perspective.
17.3 But all empirical laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws of the understanding, under which and according to the form of which those empirical laws are first possible, and by which the appearances receive a form of regularity, even as also all appearances, regardless of the diversity of this empirical form, still must always be conformable to the conditions of the pure form of the sensitivity.

18.1 By means of the category therefore the understanding is the law of the synthetic unity of all appearances and in that way makes experience first and originally possible according to its form.

18.2 But in the transcendental deduction of the categories, we were not to accomplish any more than make comprehensible this relationship of the understanding to the sensitivity and, by means of this, the objective validity of its pure a priori concepts, and thereby to establish their origin and truth.

**Summary Representation of the Correctness and Unique Possibility of this Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding**

1.1 If the objects, with which our recognition is employed, were things on their own, then we would be able to have absolutely no concepts of these a priori.

1.2 For where would we then be able to derive these concepts?

1.3 If we take them from the object (without examining here yet again how this object could become known to us), then our concepts would be merely empirical and not concepts a priori.

1.4 If we take them from within ourselves, then that, which is merely within us, cannot determine the constitution of an object which differs from our representations, i.e., any reason as to why there should be a thing which should match something that we have in mind, instead of all these representations being empty.

1.5 On the other hand if all we are dealing with are appearances, then it is not merely possible, but in fact even necessary, that certain concepts a priori would precede the empirical recognition of the objects.
1.6 For as appearances they will make up an object which is merely within us, because as a mere modification of our sensitivity apart from us nothing is to be encountered at all.

1.7 Now even this representation expresses this as necessary: that all these appearances, thus all objects which can occupy us, are all together within me, i.e., are determinations of my identical self, i.e., a thorough unity of these in one and the same apperception.

1.8 But in this unity of the possible consciousness (whereby the manifold, as belonging to one object, is thought) the form of every recognition of objects also consists.

1.9 The manner therefore as to how the manifold of the sensitive representation (perspective) belongs to one consciousness, heralds every recognition of objects as their intellectual form, and even makes up a formal recognition of all objects a priori in general, to the extent they are thought (categories).

1.10 The synthesis of these through the pure imagination, the unity of all representations with respect to the original apperception, precedes every empirical recognition.

1.11 Pure concepts of the understanding therefore are for that reason possible a priori, and indeed even necessary because our recognition has nothing to do with anything except experience, the connection and unity of which (in the representation of an object) is encountered within us, thus precedes before every experience, and must first make these possible with respect to form.

1.12 And from this foundation, the only possible one of all, our deduction of the categories has then also been conducted.
Appendices - First Group: Major Elements of the A Version
Excluded from the B Version

The Second Book of the Transcendental Dialectic

Appendix I.3 1st Chapter - Concerning The Paralogisms Of Pure Reason

Note: This chapter of the paralogisms from the First (A) version is identical with the first paragraphs of the Second (B) version through sentence 10.2.

1.1 The logical paralogism consists in the falseness of a syllogism according to the form, be the content what it will.

1.2 But a transcendental paralogism has a transcendental basis for inferring falsely with respect to the form.

1.3 In this way one such fallacious inference will have its basis in the nature of human reason and will entail an unavoidable, though not insoluble, illusion.

2.1 We now come upon a concept which was not recorded above in the universal list of the transcendental concepts and which nevertheless must be counted with them, still without for that reason altering that table in the least, or declaring it deficient.

2.2 This is the concept or, if you will, the judgment, “I think.”

2.3 But we easily see that this is the vehicle for all concepts in general and thus also of the transcendental ones and therefore is always comprehended under these, and thus is transcendental just as well. But it is able to have no particular title because it only serves to present all thinking as belonging to the consciousness.

2.4 Nevertheless, as pure as this also is from empirical input (from the impressions of the senses) it still serves in distinguishing two objects out of the nature of our representational capacity.

2.5 I, as thinking, am an object of the inner sense and am called soul.

2.6 That which is an object of outer sense is called body.
Accordingly the expression “I” as thinking being already means the object of psychology. And this can be called the rational doctrine of soul if I have need of nothing further concerning the soul than what can be inferred out of this concept “I” to the extent it arises with all thinking and thus independently of all experience (which determines me more closely and in concreto).

Now the rational doctrine of soul is actually a venture of this sort, for if the least empirical input of my thinking, or any kind of a particular perception of my inner state, were mixed in among the recognitional foundations of this science, then it would no longer be a rational, but rather an empirical, doctrine of soul.

Therefore we already have before us an avowed science which was erected upon the single proposition, “I think,” and whose foundation, or absence of which, we can examine here quite properly and as commensurate to the nature of a transcendental philosophy.

We must not stumble on the fact that I still have an internal experience with this proposition, one which expresses the perception of one’s self, and thus the rational doctrine of soul which is erected upon it never being pure, but rather based partly upon an empirical principle.

For this inner perception is nothing further than the mere apperception “I think” which in fact makes all transcendental concepts possible in “I think substance, cause, etc.”

For inner experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general and its relationship to other perceptions, without there being given empirically any particular distinction and determination of that, cannot be viewed as an empirical recognition, but rather as a recognition of the empirical in general. Accordingly it belongs to the investigation of the possibility of each and every experience, and such an investigation is always transcendental.

The least object of perception (e.g., even pleasure or displeasure), which were added to the universal representation of the self consciousness, would at once convert rational psychology into an empirical psychology.
4.1 Therefore “I think” is the solitary text of rational psychology, from which it is to develop its entire wisdom.

4.2 We easily see that this thought, if it is supposed to refer to an object (myself), is not able to contain anything beyond transcendental predicates of that object, because the least empirical predicate would contaminate the rational purity and independence of the science from all experience.

5.1 But here we merely have to follow the guidelines of the categories. However since here first a thing “I,” as thinking being, was given, we will indeed not change the order of the categories among one another as they are represented in their table, but we will begin from the category of substance, and thus follow their series backwards.

5.2 Accordingly the topic of the rational doctrine of soul, from which all else which it may contain must be derived, is as follows:

1. The soul is substance,

2. simple with respect to its quality, numerically identical, i.e., unity (not plurality), with respect to the different times in which it is present, and

3. in relationship to possible objects in space.*

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 The reader, who will not so easily guess from these expressions, in their transcendental abstraction, the psychological sense they have and why the last attribute of the soul belongs to the category of existence, will find them sufficiently explained and justified in what follows.

1.2 Furthermore, due to the Latin expressions which, contrary to good form in writing, have entered in place of the synonymous German ones, as well as with respect to the entire work, I have to cite as excuse that I have wanted to reduce somewhat the elegance of the language rather than to impede the scholastic usage through the least misunderstanding.
6.1 Out of these elements spring all concepts of the pure instruction of soul, solely through assemblage, and there is not the least need to recognize another principle.

6.2 This substance, merely as object of the inner sense, renders the concept of the immateriality; as simple substance, that of incorruptibility; the identity of it, as intellectual substance, renders the personality; all these three pieces together, that of spirituality; and the relationship to the objects in space gives the *commercium* with bodies. Accordingly the doctrine represents the thinking substance as the principle of the life in matter, i.e., it as soul (*anima*) and as the basis of animality; and this restricted by the spirituality, i.e., immortality.

7.1 Now to each of these four there refers a paralogism of a transcendental doctrine of soul, which was held falsely as a science of pure reason from the nature of our thinking being.

7.2 But as the basis of this thinking being we can assign nothing other than the simple representation “I” and which, of itself, is entirely empty of content, concerning which we cannot even say that it be a concept as rather a mere consciousness which accompanies all concepts.\(^{450}\)

7.3 Now through this “I” or “he” or “it” (that thing) which thinks, nothing further is represented beyond a transcendental subject of the thoughts = X, which is recognized solely through the thoughts which are its predicates and about which, in isolation, we can never have the least concept. Concerning this therefore we must turn about in a continuous circle because in order to judge any sort of something at all about it we must already and always avail ourselves of its representation. This inconvenience is inseparable from our judging because the consciousness by itself is not so much a representation distinguishing a particular object as rather a form of a representation in general to the extent it is supposed to be termed recognition. It is of that alone that I can even say that I think any sort of something by means of it.

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\(^{450}\) The “I” represents the apperception.
8.1 But it must seem strange at the very beginning that the condition, under which I think in general and which therefore is merely a constitution of my subject, is simultaneously supposed to be valid for everything which thinks and that we can presume to base an apodictic and universal judgment on a seemingly empirical proposition, namely that everything which thinks is so constituted as the verdict of the self consciousness testifies about me.

8.2 But the cause of this lies in the necessity of our having to attribute a priori to things all the properties which make up the conditions under which alone we think them.

8.3 Now I cannot have the least representation of a thinking being through any outer experience, for this arises only through the self consciousness.

8.4 Such objects therefore are nothing more than the transference of my consciousness to other things, and it is only in this way that these objects can be represented as thinking beings.\footnote{In order then to think about a thinking being in general we have to use ourselves as a representative of a thinker in general.}

8.5 But here the proposition “I think” is taken only problematically; not to the extent it may contain a perception of an existence (the Cartesian “\textit{cogito, ergo sum}”\footnote{“I think; therefore I am.”}), but rather only with respect to its mere possibility in order to see which properties may flow out of this very simple proposition to the subject of the “I think” (whether existing or not).\footnote{So this will be very abstract and we will consider only the rational meaning of the “I.”}

9.1 If more than the \textit{cogito} were placed as the basis to our pure rational recognition of thinking beings in general, we would also take recourse to the observation about the play of our thoughts and the natural laws of the thinking self to be drawn from that. And then an empirical psychology would arise, which would be a sort of physiology of the inner sense, perhaps to explain the appearances of that inner sense, but which could never serve in revealing such properties which do not at all belong to possible experience (like that of the simple), nor to teach something apodictically of thinking beings in general, something which concerns their nature. And so it would not be rational psychology.
10.1 Now since the proposition “I think” (taken problematically) contains the form of each and every understanding judgment in general and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is clear that the inferences from this proposition can contain a merely transcendental usage of understanding. This wards off all admixture of experience and of whose advance, according to what we have shown above, we are unable to fashion any advantageous concept in advance.

10.2 We want to pursue it therefore through all predicates of the pure doctrine of soul with a critical eye, although, for the sake of brevity, allowing the test to proceed in uninterrupted cohesion.
First Paralogism of Substantiality

1.1 That, the representation of which is the absolute subject of our judgments, and hence cannot be used as determination of another thing, is substance.

2.1 I, as a thinking being, am the absolute subject of all my possible judgments, and this representation of myself cannot be used as the predicate of any other sort of thing.

3.1 Therefore I, as a thinking being (soul), am substance.

Critique of the First Paralogism of Pure Psychology

4.1 In the analytical part of the transcendental logic we showed that pure categories (and among them also that of substance) have no objective meaning at all on their own when no perspective is laid to them, on whose manifold they, as functions of the synthetic unity, can be utilized.

4.2 Without that they are solely functions of a judgment without content.

4.3 I can say of anything in general, “it is substance,” to the extent I distinguish it from mere predicates and determinations of things.454

4.4 Now in all our thinking the “I” is the subject in which thoughts inhere only as determinations, and this “I” cannot be used as the determination of another thing.

4.5 Accordingly everyone must necessarily consider himself as substance, and the thinking only as the accidents of his existence and the determinations of his state.

5.1 But now what usage am I supposed to make of this concept of a substance?

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454 I can say that the table is brown but not the brown is table, for table is not a predicate, but a subject. Accordingly the table would have to be considered as always enduring while the color, etc., could change.
5.2 I can in no way conclude from that concept that I, as a thinking being, continue apart from myself and naturally neither commence nor perish. But still only with that can the concept of the substantiality of my thinking subject be useful to me. Without this I could quite well dispense with the concept.

6.1 So much is lacking for us to be able to infer these properties merely from the pure category of a substance that we far rather must lay the persistence of a given object from experience as the foundation if we want to apply the empirically usable concept of a substance to that object.\[455\]

6.2 But with our proposition we have laid no experience as basis, but rather have concluded solely from the concept of the referral which all thinking has to the “I” as the communal subject to which that thinking inheres.\[456\]

6.3 And furthermore, even if we aimed for an experience as foundation, we would not be able to establish such a persistence through any secure observation.

6.4 For the “I” is indeed in all thinking, but not the least perspective is combined with this representation which would distinguish it from other objects of the perspective.\[457\]

6.5 Indeed then we can perceive that this representation always arises with all thinking, but not that it be a standing and abiding perspective in which the thoughts (as alterable) alternate.\[458\]

\[455\] And here, I suspect, we are referring merely to the continuation of the self during life. This remotely suggests the Refutation of Idealism in the B version, beginning on or near page 242.

\[456\] This will mean the grammatical “I” of all our sentences and thoughts.

\[457\] I “see” or think the thinking, but I don’t say that I am made up as the sum of all my thoughts, as the top and legs make up the table. I don’t see myself as a collection of thoughts; I think, but nothing comes forth to me other than the apperception, my capacity to think the “I think.” There is nothing enduring given in this apperception.

\[458\] This abiding perspective is given only for external objects. So I can think the table as a substance such that the colors can alternate, but I don’t have anything comparable for a substance for the soul such that the thoughts can alternate. Whenever I think, the “I” arises in consciousness (and even represents that consciousness), but not that this “I” abides also in unconsciousness.
7.1 It follows from this that the first syllogism of transcendental psychology renders for us only an alleged new insight by masquerading the enduring logical subject of the thinking as the recognition of the real subject of inherence, with which we do not have the least knowledge. Nor could we have any knowledge because the consciousness is the single thing which makes all our representations into thoughts and hence wherein all our perceptions, as in the transcendental subject, must be encountered, and apart from this logical meaning of the “I” we have no knowledge with the subject on its own which lies as the basis to this, just like to all thoughts, as substratum.

7.2 Meanwhile we can quite easily let the expression “the soul is substance” hold if we are only satisfied that this concept does not lead further in the least or that any sort of the customary consequence of the rationally contrived instruction of soul can be taught as, e.g., the perpetual endurance of the soul with all alterations and even with the death of the human. Therefore it indicates only a substance in the Idea, but not a reality.\footnote{In brief: we must perforce assume the “I” as abiding while the thoughts alternate, but we cannot infer from this to the permanent endurance of our subject also beyond life.}
Second Paralogism of Simplicity

1.1 That thing, the actions of which can never be viewed as the concurrence of many acting things, is simple.

2.1 Now the soul, or the thinking “I,” is such a thing.

3.1 Therefore etc.

Critique of the Second Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology

4.1 This is the Achilles-heel of all dialectical conclusions of the pure doctrine of the soul, and not per chance a sophistical play which a dogmatist fabricates to give his assertions a superficial façade. It is rather an inference which seems to withstand even the sharpest test and the greatest qualm of investigations.

4.2 It is as follows:

5.1 Each and every assembled substance is an aggregate of many, and the action of an assemblage, concerning what inheres to it as such, is an aggregate of many actions or accidents which are distributed among the number of substances.

5.2 Now an effect which arises from the concurrence of many acting substances is possible indeed if this effect is merely external (as, e.g., the movement of a body in the united movement of all its parts).

5.3 With the thoughts, however, as accidents pertaining inwardly to a thinking being, it is constituted otherwise.

5.4 For suppose that the assembled would think, then every part of that would contain a part of the thought, but then only all taken together the entire thought.

5.5 But now this is contradictory.
5.6 For because the representations which are distributed among diverse beings (e.g., the singular words of a verse) can never make up an entire thought, the thought cannot inhere in an assemblage as such.

5.7 Therefore it is possible only in a substance which is not an aggregate of many, thus is utterly simple.*

Kant’s annotation.
1.1 It is very easy to give to this proof the usual academic gage of the trappings.
1.2 However it is already sufficient for my purposes to lay bare the sheer proof basis to a popular manner, if needed.

6.1 The so-called nervus probandi\textsuperscript{460} of this argument lies in the proposition that many representations must be contained in the absolute unity of the thinking subject in order to make up a single thought.\textsuperscript{461}

6.2 But no one can prove this proposition from concepts.

6.3 For how would we want to begin in order to perform this?

6.4 The proposition “a thought can only be the effect of the absolute unity of the thinking being” cannot be treated as analytical.

6.5 For the unity of the thought, which consists of many representations, is collective and, with respect to the mere concepts, can just as well refer to the collective unity of the substances co-effecting in that (as the movement of a body is the assembled movement of all the parts of that body) as to the absolute unity of the subject.

6.6 By means of the rule of identity therefore the necessity of the presupposition of a simple substance with an assembled thought cannot be penetrated.

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\textsuperscript{460} nervus probandi (L): the crux of the argument; the most conclusive and decisive proof.

\textsuperscript{461} In this paragraph Kant wants to show that the assertion of the absolute unity of the thinking being is not an analytical thought.
6.7 But no one, who penetrates the basis of the possibility of synthetic propositions a priori, as we have established it earlier, will trust himself to validate that just the same proposition is supposed to be recognized synthetically and completely a priori from sheer concepts.

7.1 But now it is also impossible to derive this necessary unity of the subject, as the condition of the possibility of each and every thought, from experience.⁴⁶²

7.2 For this gives no necessity to be recognized, not to mention that the concept of the absolute unity is far apart from its sphere.

7.3 Where then do we obtain this proposition, upon which the entire psychological syllogism is supported?

8.1 It is obvious that if someone will represent to himself a thinking being, he will take the place of that being and therefore would have to substitute his own subject for the object which he wishes to ponder (which is the case in no other manner of investigation). And we require absolute unity of the subject for a thought only because otherwise it could not be said, “I think (the manifold in a representation).”

8.2 For even though the whole of the thought could be divided and distributed among many subjects, still the subjective “I” cannot be divided and distributed, and it is this that we presupposed with all thinking.

9.1 Here therefore just as in the previous paralogism, the formal proposition of apperception, “I think,” remains the entire basis upon which rational psychology ventures the expansion of its recognitions. But of course this proposition is not an experience, but rather is the form of apperception which adheres to every experience and precedes it, but nonetheless must be viewed always only with respect to a possible experience in general as its merely subjective condition, which we improperly make into the condition of the possibility of a recognition of the object, namely into a concept of a thinking being in general, because we cannot represent this to ourselves without plac-

⁴⁶² Now we shall see that experience could never give us any information on the unity of the subject.
ing ourselves with the formula of our consciousness in place of every other intelligent being.

10.1 But the simplicity of myself (as soul) is also not actually inferred from the proposition, “I think;” rather the former is already contained in that thought.

10.2 The expression “I am simple” must be viewed as an immediate expression of the apperception, just as the alleged Cartesian conclusion, “cogito, ergo sum,” is in fact tautological, by the cogito (sum cogitans) immediately expressing the actuality.

10.3 But “I am simple” means nothing more than this representation “I” does not encompass the least manifold within it and that it is absolute (even though merely logical) unity

11.1 The exceedingly famous psychological proof therefore is based solely on this indivisible unity of a representation which channels only the verbiage with respect to a person.

11.2 But it is obvious that the subject of the inherence is only transcendentally indicated through the “I” adhering to the thought without noting the least property of that or in general knowing, or being familiar with, something concerning it.

11.3 It means a something in general (transcendental subject) whose representation in any case must be simple precisely because we determine nothing to it. And certainly nothing more simple can be represented through the concept of a mere something.

11.4 But the simplicity of the representation of a subject is not for that reason a recognition of the simplicity of the subject itself, for we abstract from its properties entirely, if it is indicated solely through the expression “I,” and

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463 “I think; therefore I am”, i.e., therefore I exist.
which is entirely empty of content (which expression I can apply to every thinking subject).\textsuperscript{464}

12.1 This much is certain: that through the “I,” I always bear in mind an absolute, albeit logical, unity of the subject (simplicity), but not that I in that way recognize the actual simplicity of my subject.

12.2 Even as the proposition, “I am substance,” meant nothing except the pure category, of which I can make no (empirical) use \textit{in concreto}, I am also permitted to say, “I am a simple substance,” i.e., whose representation never contains a synthesis of the manifold. But this concept, or also this proposition, does not teach us anything at all with respect to myself as an object of experience, because the concept of subject itself is used only as a function of the synthesis without a perspective supporting it, thus without an object, and is valid only of the condition of our recognition, but not of any sort of an alleged object.\textsuperscript{465}.

12.3 We want to employ a test of the alleged utility of this proposition.

13.1 Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul is of value only to the extent I can in this way distinguish this subject from every material and, consequently, can exempt it from the decay to which the latter is subject.

13.2 To this usage the above proposition is also entirely and peculiarly aimed. Accordingly it is often expressed in this wise: the soul is not corporeal.

\textsuperscript{464} The “I think” is simple and expresses the apperception which comes forth with regard to the recognition of any object. But then we get confused and think that it is therefore valid for the “I” of the “I think” as an object.

\textsuperscript{465} I pay attention, but without content, and then I hold that pure apperception as an object of experience, but it is only the form of an object in general, and is not a perspective at all. The table is a representation which encompasses and includes that of a top and legs, but with the “I” we do not assemble the thoughts as though we were the composite of those parts as the table is of its parts. So the representation of the “I” never includes a synthesis. There is no object as there is no perspective relating to the concept of the subject. The “I” makes the syntheses possible, but is not itself a synthesis. In the table with have a manifold calling for a synthesis. But we don’t look at the thoughts as a manifold calling for a synthesis. And so the “I” is not just a bunch of thoughts which hold together as a subject. Thus there is no manifold here. It is one thing to put the top and the legs together as a single object (table), but this is different from putting the different colors of the table over time together as a table. So the thoughts relate to the “I” as the colors or textures relate to the table. But we don’t assemble the “I” out of a manifold as we do the table.
13.3 If I can show that even were we to admit all objective validity (everything which thinks is simple substance) to this cardinal proposition of the rational instruction of soul in the pure meaning of a merely rational judgment (from pure categories), still, with respect to the non-uniformity of kinship of that with matter, not the least usage of this proposition could be made. This then will be as much as though I had banished this alleged psychological insight into the field of mere Ideas, where there is a lack of reality for the objective usage.

14.1 In the transcendental aesthetic we have indisputably proven that bodies are mere appearances of our external sense and not things on their own.

14.2 In conformity with this we could properly say that our thinking subject is not corporeal, which is to say that since it is represented by us as an object of the internal sense to the extent it thinks, it could be no object of external senses, i.e., no appearance in space.

14.3 Now this will say as much as thinking beings could never come forth to us among external appearances as such; or: externally we cannot look at their thoughts, their consciousness, their desires, etc., for these all belong to the internal sense.

14.4 In fact this argument seems also to be the natural and popular one upon which even the most common understanding seems to have lighted and to have already begun very early in that way to consider souls as beings entirely distinguished from bodies.\textsuperscript{466}

15.1 But now even though extension, impenetrability, cohesion and movement (in short, everything which only the external sense can supply to us) are not thoughts, feelings, inclinations or resolutions, nor contain these (for in no way are these latter to hold as objects of the external perspective), this something, which lies as the basis to the external appearances and which so affects our sense that it obtains the representations of space, material, shape, etc., and, considered as \textit{noumenon} (or better, as transcendental object), could still also simultaneously be the subject of the thoughts, even though in the

\textsuperscript{466} See GMM.III, (beginning on or near page 64) on how we think of ourselves as a soul.
manner as our external sense is affected by that, we obtain no perspective of representations, will, etc., but rather merely of space and its determinations.

15.2 But this something is neither extended nor impenetrable nor assembled, because all these predicates concern only the sensitivity and its perspective to the extent we are affected by such objects (which are unknown to us, by the way).

15.3 But these expressions give nothing at all by which we can recognize what kind of object it be, but rather only that to it, as such which is considered on its own without referral to the external sense, these predicates of external appearances cannot be attributed.

15.4 However the predicates of the internal sense, representations and thinking, do not contradict it.

15.5 Accordingly even through the admitted simplicity of nature the human soul is not at all adequately distinguished from matter with respect to the substratum of that, if we consider it (as we are supposed to do) merely as an appearance.

16.1 If matter were a thing on its own, then as an assembled being it would be entirely distinguished from the soul as a simple being.

16.2 But now it is merely external appearance, whose substratum is recognized through no assignable predicates at all. Thus I can easily assume of this substratum that it be simple on its own, even though in the way in which it affects our senses, it produces in us the perspective of the extended, and thus of the assembled, and that therefore with the substance on its own, which befits extension with respect to our external sense, thoughts can co-reside which can be represented with consciousness through its own internal sense.

16.3 In such way what is called corporeal in one referral would be simultaneously a thinking being in another, and not indeed the thought, but still the indications of the thought we can observe in the appearance.

16.4 In this way the expression that only souls think (as particular types of substances) would cease and instead would render, as is the usual case, that humans think, i.e., the same thing which is extended as external appearance is
inwardly (on its own) a subject which is not assembled but rather which is simple and which thinks.

17.1 But without permitting such hypothesis, we can note universally that if with soul I understand a thinking being on its own, the question is inappropriate on its own, namely whether or not it be the same type with matter (which is not a thing on its own at all, but rather only a type of representations within us); for then it is already self understood that a thing on its own is of another nature than the determinations which make up merely its state.

18.1 But if we do not compare the thinking “I” with matter, but rather with the intelligible which lies as basis to the appearance, which we term matter, then because we know nothing at all of the intelligible we also cannot say that the soul is distinguished from this in any way inwardly.

19.1 So accordingly the simple consciousness is not information about the simple nature of our subject to the extent this is supposed to be distinguished in that way from matter, as an assembled being.

20.1 But if this concept does not serve in the only case where it is usable, namely in the comparison of myself with objects of external experience from determining the peculiar and distinguishing aspect of its nature, then we may always allege that we know that the thinking “I,” the soul (a name for the transcendental object of the internal sense), is simple, but for all that, this expression has no usage at all in reaching to actual objects and hence cannot expand our recognition in the least.

21.1 Thus the entire rational psychology collapses with its primary supports and we can hope as little here as anywhere else to expand insight through mere concepts (but even less through the mere subjective form of all our concepts, the consciousness) without referral to possible experience. And this is especially the case since even the fundamental concept of a simple nature is of the type that it can be encountered nowhere in experience, and thus there is no way of achieving to that as an objectively valid concept.
Third Paralogism of Personality

1.1 That which is aware of the numeral identity of itself in diverse times is to this extent a person.\(^\text{467}\)

2.1 Now, the soul is, etc.

3.1 Therefore it is a person.

Critique of the Third Paralogism of the Transcendental Personality

4.1 If I want to recognize the numerical identity of an external object through experience, I will attend to the endurance of that appearance, to which, as subject, all else refers as determination, and I note the identity of the endurance in the time in which the determination alternates.\(^\text{468}\)

4.2 But now I am an object of the internal sense, and all time is merely the form of the internal sense.

4.3 Consequently I refer each and every one of my successive determinations to the numerically identical self in every time, i.e., in the form of the inward perspective of me myself.

4.4 On this footing the personality would have to be viewed not as inferred, but rather as a completely identical proposition of the self consciousness, and that is also the cause of why it holds a priori.

4.5 For it actually says no more than I am aware of this time as pertaining to the unity of myself, and it is the same whether I say, “this entire time is within

\(^{467}\) Without that identity I would not be a person, but rather a disconnected series of consciousness, like the alphabet and not like the numbers. There is a unity in the numbers which is lacking in the alphabet. In his Religion Kant speaks of the moral drive as being the seat of personality. We are persons because we respect the moral law. Otherwise we are simply rational beings and with no more dignity than animals. See this blog concerning a quick take on Kant “perceptions.”

\(^{468}\) I am reminded of the continuation of the substance as water is frozen into ice, of which I must be aware if I am not to mistake the arrival of the ice for a new creation which only happens to appear at the same time and place where the water vanishes.
me as an individual unity” or “I am present with numerical identity in all this time.”

5.1 The identity of the person therefore is to be encountered unavoidably in my own consciousness.

5.2 But if I considered myself from the standpoint of another (as object of his external perspective), this external observer first considers me in time, for in the apperception, time is actually only represented within me.

5.3 That other person therefore will still not yet conclude to the objective endurance of me myself from the “I” which accompanies all representations at every time in my consciousness and indeed with complete identity, even if he admits it.

5.4 For since then the time in which the observer places me is not that which is encountered in my own sensitivity, but rather in his, the identity which is necessarily combined with my consciousness is not for that reason combined with that of his, i.e., with the external perspective of my subject.

6.1 The identity of the consciousness of myself in diverse times therefore is only a formal condition of my thoughts and their cohesion, but does not at all prove the numerical identity of my subject in which, disregarding the logical identity of the “I”, such an alternation can still have proceeded which does not permit it to preserve the identity of that; although still always to assign to it the like-sounding “I”, which in every other state, even in the inflection of the subject, could still preserve always the thoughts of the preceding subject and so relay it to the succeeding one.*

* Kant’s annotation.

1.1 An elastic sphere, which precisely strikes a like one in a straight line, communicates to the latter its entire motion, thus its entire state (if we look merely to the positions in space).

1.2 Now according to an analogy with such bodies, let us suppose substances, from which the one representation, together with its consciousness, flowed into the other. In that case an entire series of these will permit of being thought, of which the first communicates its own state, together with its consciousness, to the second, this its own state, together with that of the previous substance to the third and
likewise to this the state of all previous ones together with its own and their consciousness.

1.3 The last substance therefore would be conscious of all states of the earlier, altered substances as its own, because the former together with the consciousness were transferred into it, and for all that, it would still not have been just the same person in all these states.

7.1 Even if the proposition of some old schools that “everything is fleeting and nothing in the world is persistent and abiding” cannot be granted as soon as we assume substances, it is still not refuted through the unity of the self-consciousness.

7.2 For we ourselves cannot judge about that from our consciousness, whether we as souls are persistent or not, because we count to our identical self only that of which we are conscious, and so in any case we must necessarily judge that we are the same in the entire time of which we are aware.

7.3 But from the standpoint of a stranger we could not yet explain this as valid because, since we encounter no persistent appearance with the soul except only the representation “I” which accompanies and connects all, we can never make out whether this “I” (a mere thought) might not flow equally well as the other thoughts which are linked to one another by that.

8.1 But it is noteworthy that the personality and its presupposition, persistence and thus the substantiality of the soul, must only now be proven.

8.2 For if we could presuppose these, the continuation of the consciousness would not yet follow from that, though still the possibility of a continuing consciousness in an abiding subject, which is already sufficient for the personality, which does not immediately cease by its effect being perchance interrupted in this way for a time.

8.3 But this persistence is not given to us through anything in advance of the numerical identity of ourselves, which we infer from the identical apperception, but rather is first inferred from that (and, if it proceeds properly, only upon this would the concept of substance follow, which alone is empirically useful).
8.4 Now since this identity of the person follows in no way from the identity of the “I” in the consciousness of every time in which I recognize myself, the substantiality of the soul was also not able to be based upon it above.

9.1 Meanwhile, as with the concept of substance and that of the simple, the concept of personality can remain (to the extent it is transcendental, i.e., unity of the subject, which by the way is unknown to us, but in whose determinations is a thorough connection through apperception). And to this extent the concept is necessary and sufficient for the practical usage, but we can never again make a show of it as an expansion of our recognition of self through pure reason, with which an uninterrupted continuation of the subject from the mere concept of the identical self so dazzles us, since this concept always turns upon itself and brings us no further with respect to any question which is laid out on a synthetic recognition.

9.2 What kind of matter a thing is on its own (the transcendental object) is indeed entirely unknown to us. Nevertheless the persistence of that as appearance, as long as it is represented as something external, can be observed\(^{469}\)

9.3 But since I, if I want to observe the mere “I” at the alternation of all representations, have no other correlate of my comparison than in turn me myself with the universal conditions of my consciousness, I can give no other answer to all questions except tautological ones, namely by substituting the properties, which befit me myself as object, for my concept and its unity, and presupposing that which we wanted to know.

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\(^{469}\) I like to think of touching something while looking at it, and then closing my eyes and still feeling it and looking while not touching and then with not touching and not looking and then by looking and touching. This is schopenhaueren, I suspect.
Fourth Paralogism of the Ideality (of the External Relationships)

1.1 If something is such that its existence can only be inferred as a cause of given perceptions, the existence of that something is suspect.

2.1 Now all external appearances are of the sort that their existence cannot be perceived immediately, but rather only inferred as the cause of given perceptions.

3.1 Therefore the existence of all objects of the external sense is suspect.

3.2 This uncertainty I term the Ideality of external appearances and the teaching of this Ideality is called Idealism in contrast to dualism which is the assertion of a possible certainty with regard to objects of the external senses.

Critique of the Fourth Paralogism of the Transcendental Psychology

4.1 First we want to subject the premises to a test.

4.2 We can assert quite rightly that only what is in us ourselves can be immediately perceived, and that only my own existence can be the object of a simple perception.

4.3 The existence of an actual object apart from me, therefore (if this term is taken in an intellectual meaning), can never be given immediately in perception (a modification of the internal sense), but rather can only be thought additively to it as an external cause of that perception, and hence inferred.

4.4 In accordance with this, Descartes quite properly restricted all perception in the most narrow meaning to the proposition, “I (as a thinking being) am.”

4.5 For it is clear that since the external is not within me, I am not able to encounter it in my apperception, thus also in no perception (which is actually only the determination of the apperception).
5.1 Hence I cannot actually perceive external things, but rather erroneously infer their existence from my internal perception by considering this (perception) as the effect, of which something external is the immediate cause.

5.2 But now any conclusion from a given effect to a determining cause is always uncertain because an effect can arise from more than one cause.

5.3 Accordingly, in the reference of the perception to its cause, it always remains doubtful as to whether this be internal or external, whether therefore all so-called external perceptions are not a mere play of our external sense, or whether they are referred to an actually external object as their cause.

5.4 The existence of the latter is, at best, only inferred and hence runs the risk of all conclusions, since in contrast the object of the internal sense (I myself with all my representations) is immediately perceived and the existence of which admits of no doubt at all.

6.1 With an “Idealist” here therefore we will not mean someone who denies the existence of external objects of the senses, but rather only a person who does not admit that they are recognized through immediate perception, and who concludes therefore that we can never be completely sure of their actuality through any possible experience.

7.1 Now before I describe our paralogism with respect to its deceptive illusion, I must first note that we need to distinguish a two-fold Idealism, the transcendental and the empirical.

7.2 With “transcendental Idealism” of all appearances I mean the theory whereby we consider them altogether as mere representations and not as things on their own. Consistent with this, we treat time and space simply as
sensitive forms of our perspective, and not determinations given of themselves nor conditions of objects as things on their own.\footnote{There are two things to notice here: “not determinations given of themselves” and also “not conditions of objects as things on their own.” The former means that we cannot glean spatial and temporal relationships from observation of things, for things are not to the right or left of each other on their own, for example, and these terms have meaning only in relationship to the viewer/perceiver. The latter indicates that things on their own, and without reference to appearance, are not dependent upon space and time for their existence, and so, for example, God is not dependent upon space and time for his own existence. So we can think of the chair as a thing which exists as a chair on its own, or we can think of it as merely the representation of a chair and without trying to imagine what it is or looks like when not being thought about or looked at. When I think about the chair with regard to its looks when not being looked at, I start off with imagining atoms and then particles, etc., and with this there is nothing to end up with as the “real” thing or real chair. The “chair” is a representation which has no existence apart from me. Thus the “chair” that I perceive is actually in space apart from me and not my imagination. And so first of all we come to perceive and then recognize the chair, and then we begin to wonder how this is possible and fall into empirical Idealism.}

7.3 In contrast to this Idealism, there is a transcendental realism which views time and space as something given on their own (independently of our sensivity).

7.4 The transcendental realist therefore if he admits the actuality of external appearances, imagines them to be things on their own existing independently of us and our sensibility and therefore also as apart from us with respect to pure understanding concepts.

7.5 Thus a transcendental realist is actually the one who accordingly plays the empirical Idealist. After he has falsely presupposed of objects of the senses that if they were supposed to be external, they would have their existence on their own even without sense, finds in this viewpoint all our representations of the senses inadequate for making the actuality of these objects certain.\footnote{Accordingly then, when I see my coffee cup on the table, I could not say for sure that it were not a dream or a mirage, for that would always be possible; and thus my knowledge is problematical.}

8.1 The transcendental Idealist, on the other hand, can be an empirical realist, hence, as we say, a dualist, i.e., admitting the existence of matter without going out from the mere self-consciousness and assuming something other than the certitude of the representations within me, thus the \textit{cogito, ergo sum}.\footnote{Now here I am not concerned with the question as to whether there is a real cup on the table independently of my perception, but rather merely as to whether I see a cup on the table. And here there can be no question: I do in fact see a cup on the table.}
8.2 For since the transcendental Idealist lets this material and even its internal possibility hold as appearance, which is nothing separated from our sensitivity, it becomes for him only a type of representations (perspective), which are called external, not as though they were referred to objects which were external on their own, but rather because they refer perceptions to a space in which everything is apart from everything else; but that space is within us. 473

9.1 Now we have already in the beginning dedicated ourselves to this transcendental Ideality.

9.2 With our theorem therefore there is no more scruple about assuming the existence of matter and in declaring it as much proven by the testimony of our mere self-consciousness as is the existence of myself as a thinking being.

9.3 For I am still conscious of my representations. These exist therefore and I myself who have these representations.

9.4 But now external objects (bodies) are mere appearances, thus also nothing other than a mode of my representations whose objects are something only through these representations, and nothing apart from them.

9.5 External things therefore exist just as much as I myself exist, and indeed both upon the immediate testimony of my self-consciousness, with the only difference being that the representation of myself, as the thinking subject, is referred to the internal, while the representations which indicate extended objects are referred to the external sense.

473 Could this mean that without the concept of space, we might see everything as mere modifications of some underlying substance, like, perhaps, the Gia theory of the earth as a living being, and so where bushes and trees and birds, etc., are like fingernails, hair, teeth, etc.? And thus to see things in space is to see them as detached and as individuals.

I think especially here of the pantomimic objects (like circles drawn in the air) which we spy in space; we see them apart from us, and yet they are all along entirely within us, for the space is within us. It is now clear to me that Kant is referring here to the “split-finger space” of our empirical perception, and, of course, we must admit that is within us. Thus the finger is external and in space (which is clear upon the least perception and attention, but then we must say that this space is within my head, for otherwise I would have to say that the finger itself splits as it approaches the nose.

Interesting. Therefore I claim nothing more than the indubitable fact that I see the cup on the table over here to my right; and thereby I am perfectly correct and this can not be doubted, for even if I were dreaming, I still see the cup over here on the table on my right. And I certainly can say that this space is within me (and that is the way that I come to make sense of the split finger touching my nose).
9.6 With respect to the reality of external objects I have no more need of inference than I do with regard to the actuality of the objects of my internal sense (my thoughts). For in both cases they are nothing but representations, the immediate perception (consciousness) of which is simultaneously an adequate proof of their actuality.474

10.1 The transcendental Idealist therefore is an empirical realist and concedes to matter as appearance an actuality which does not need to be inferred, but rather which is perceived immediately.475

10.2 The transcendental realist, on the other hand, is necessarily embarrassed and finds himself compelled to make room for empirical Idealism because he views the objects of external sense as something distinct from the senses themselves. He views mere appearances as independent beings which are located apart from us. In such case, of course, with our best consciousness of our representation of these things, it is by no means certain that if the representation exists, the object corresponding to it also exists. In our system, on the other hand, these external things, i.e., matter in all its shapes and alterations, are nothing but sheer appearances, i.e., representations within us, whose reality we are immediately conscious of.476

11.1 Now since, as far as I know, all psychologists subscribing to empirical Idealism are transcendental realists, they proceed with perfect consistency in conceding great importance to empirical Idealism as one of the problems about which human reason hardly knows what to do.

11.2 For if we in fact consider external appearances as representations which are effected in us by objects situated apart from us as things on their own, it is unfathomable how we are to recognize their existence otherwise than

474 Therefore I see immediately that the thoughts are internal and the pictures external (relative to each other). I actually do see the cup to my right over here on the table, and of this there cannot be the least question, i.e., it is as certain as it is that I am thinking and reading these words to myself in my internal sense.

475 Thus I say that the things I see in space about me are truly external to me, and that my thoughts are truly internal. For that is what I mean with external and internal. Hence even if I am dreaming, I am making the distinction [which I really could not do if this were not the meaning of internal and external].

476 It is an error to consider the objects of external sense as something distinct from the senses.
through an inference from the effect to the cause, whereby it must always remain doubtful whether the latter be within us or apart from us.

11.3 Now a person can admit indeed that something of our external perspective, which may be apart from us according to a transcendental understanding, is the cause. But this is not the object we mean with the representations of matter and corporeal things. For these are solely appearances, i.e., mere modes of representations which are always located entirely within us and whose actuality rests on the immediate consciousness exactly the same as with the consciousness of my own thoughts.

11.4 The transcendental object is equally unknown with respect to the internal as well as to the external perspective.\(^{477}\)

11.5 But our discussion does not concern this, but rather the empirical object which is called an external object if it is in space, and an internal object if it is represented solely in relationship of time. But space and time can only be encountered within us.\(^{478}\)

12.1 Nevertheless the expression “apart from us” entails an unavoidable equivocation by sometimes meaning something which exists entirely apart from us as a thing on its own, and sometimes something which belongs to mere appearance. In order therefore to securely assign to this concept the latter meaning (in which the psychological question is actually understood because of the reality of our external perspective), we want to empirically distinguish external objects from those which might be called so in the transcendental sense by directly terming the former “things to be encountered in space.”

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\(^{477}\) I am as sure that the coffee cup is on the table to my right as I am that I even exist as a thinking being. And I am no more sure of what it is that is existing as myself than I am of what is existing as the cup.

\(^{478}\) I look at the TV on the shelf and say that I really see the TV, and mean with that that what I see is a look at or view of that TV. I go to it and touch it and say that this is really the touch of the TV and I know because I carefully correlate the visual touch with the physical touch. So what I see is really the TV, but it is so only via a representation of the TO=X, and by means of that (and the Transcendental Deduction) I see the TV itself, i.e., an appearance of it, of course. The empirical Idealist must say that there is a something which exists apart from me and affects me is some way such that a picture of a squarish box (the TV) arises in my head, but which may have no more relationship to that real thing than the man in the moon. This is extreme skepticism. Surely here Kant is talking about the space of the “split” finger, for this is most certainly in a space which is entirely within us.
13.1 Space and time are indeed representations a priori which, even before an actual object has yet determined our sense through sensation, reside with us as forms of our sensitive perspective in order to represent that object in those sensitive relationships.

13.2 But this material or real, this something which is supposed to be considered in space, necessarily presupposes perception and cannot be fabricated and produced through any imaginative power independently of that. For perception indicates the actuality of something in space.\(^\text{479}\)

13.3 Sensation therefore is what denotes a reality in space and time, once it has been referred to the one or the other mode of sensitive perspective.

13.4 Once sensation has been given (which is called perception when applied to an object in general, without determining that object), then through its manifold many objects can be fabricated by the imagination which have no place apart from the imagination in space or time.\(^\text{480}\)

13.5 This is undoubtedly certain, thinking now of sensations, pleasure and pain, or even the external sense as colors, warmths, etc. In other words, perception is the means of first giving a material for the thinking of objects to the sensitive perspective.\(^\text{481}\)

13.6 Perception therefore represents something actual in space (focusing now just on external perspective).\(^\text{482}\)

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\(^\text{479}\) This corresponds to comments made in CPR B’s Refutation of Idealism (beginning on or near page 242). Here we need to remember that perception is an a priori awareness, hence not necessarily even of an object so much as rather an awareness of a representation as such, and hence, to perceive something in space means such a cognizance of the object amongst others in space, e.g., that one is before the other and next to the other and 5 inches from the other, etc. As a representation, the perception entails a making certain, and/or a clear, determination of data for a possible recognition.

\(^\text{480}\) Here we see clearly Kant’s meaning of perception, namely an a priori awareness with a content of sensation. I usually think of it as the “second look”, meaning the careful discernment of an object. Accordingly we cannot perceive a pantomimic circle (for it is only in the perspective, thus a “first look”, although we can perceive an entry of something into a space). I want to distinguish now between subjective and objective perceptions.

\(^\text{481}\) Here I think of a stepwise progression from a pure pantomimic to an appearance by the addition of sensation (= material) to the pantomimic (cf. Anticipations of Perception, on or around page 187).

\(^\text{482}\) As opposed to a pantomimic object, for example, which we sight in space, but which we say is not really in space at all, e.g., tracing out a circle in midair.
13.7 For first of all, perception is the representation of an actuality, even as space is the representation of a mere possibility of the togetherness.

13.8 Secondly this actuality is represented in the sighting of the external sense, i.e., within space.

13.9 Thirdly space itself is nothing other than a mere representation. Thus only what is represented in it holds as actual* and, conversely, what is given within it, i.e., represented through perception, is also actually within it. For if it were not actually within it, i.e., not given immediately through empirical perspective, it could also not be fabricated, because we can never dream up a priori the real of the perspective.

* Kant’s footnote:
1. We must note well this paradoxical, but correct, statement that nothing is in space except what is represented in it.
2. For space is itself nothing but a representation, consequently what is in space must be contained in the representation, and in space there is nothing at all except to the extent something is actually represented in it.
3. This is a proposition which in any case must sound strange: that a thing can exist only in its representation, but which loses here its offensiveness because the things with which we have to do are not things on their own, but only appearances, i.e., representations.

14.1 Every external perception therefore immediately proves something actual in space or, far rather, is the actual itself. And to this extent therefore empirical realism is beyond doubt, i.e., there is something actual which corresponds to our external perspective in space.

14.2 Of course space itself with all its appearances, as representations, is only within me, but the real, the material of all objects of external perspective, is nonetheless actually given within this space and independently of every fabrication, and it is also impossible that any sort of something external to us (in the transcendental sense) should be given within this space, because space itself is nothing but our sensitivity.

14.3 The most rigid Idealist therefore cannot demand a proof that an object apart from us (in the strict meaning) match our perception.
14.4 For if there were such a thing, it would still not be able to be represented and looked at otherwise than apart from us, because this presupposes space. And the actuality within space, as a mere representation, is nothing other than the perception itself.

14.5 The real of external appearances therefore is actually only in the perception and cannot be actual in any other way.

15.1 Now a recognition of objects can be generated from perceptions either through a mere play of the imagination or also by means of experience.

15.2 And so deceptive representations can certainly arise which do not match the objects, and where the deception is sometimes attributable to an illusion of the imagination (in dreams) and sometimes to defective judgment (with the so-called optical illusions).

15.3 Now in order to avoid the false semblance in this, we proceed according to this rule: whatever coheres with a perception according to empirical laws is actual.

15.4 This delusion, however, as well as the precaution against it, affects Idealism as much as it does dualism, for with this we are concerned only with the form of experience.

15.5 To refute empirical Idealism as a false scruple about the objective reality of our external perceptions, it is already sufficient that external perception immediately proves an actuality in space, which space, even though merely the form of the representations on its own, still has objective reality with respect to all external appearances (which are also nothing other than mere representations), that likewise, without perception even the fantasy and the dream would not be possible, and so Therefore with respect to the data from which experience can arise, our external senses have their actual, corresponding objects in space.
16.1 The dogmatic Idealist would be one who denies the existence of matter, while the skeptical Idealist would be one who doubts it because he holds it to be unprovable.\textsuperscript{483}

16.2 The first can arise only because he believes there is a contradiction in the possibility of matter in general; and with this we are not concerned at this juncture.

16.3 (The following section of the dialectical conclusions, where reason is represented in an internal conflict with respect to the concepts of the possibility of what pertains to the cohesion of experience, will also remedy this difficulty.)

16.4 The skeptical Idealist, however, who disputes merely the basis of our assertion and declares our persuasion of the existence of matter, which we believe to be based in immediate perception, as insufficient, is to this extent a benefactor of human reason, for he necessitates us to open our eyes even with the smallest step in experience and not immediately to take possession of what we have perhaps obtained only surreptitiously.

16.5 The utility provided by these Idealistic challenges comes now clearly to light.

16.6 They force us (if we do not want to entangle ourselves in our most exasperating assertions) to consider all perceptions, be they internal or external, merely as a consciousness of what adheres to our sensitivity, and to consider the external objects of these perceptions not as things on their own, but rather only as representations, of which, as with every representation, we can be immediately conscious, but which are called external because they adhere to that sense which we term the external sense, whose perspective is space. But this space is still nothing more than an internal representational manner in which certain perceptions are linked with each another.

17.1 If we let external objects hold as things on their own, it is utterly impossible to comprehend how we should come to the recognition of their actuality apart from us by supporting ourselves merely on a representation which is within us.

\textsuperscript{483} In section 8 of the Transcendental Aesthetic (beginning on or near page 76) Kant shows that Bishop Berkeley exemplifies the dogmatic Idealist. Decartes would be a skeptical Idealist.
17.2 For still we cannot sense something apart from ourselves, but rather only within ourselves, and hence the entire self-consciousness supplies nothing except our own determinations.

17.3 Skeptical Idealism necessitates us therefore to lay hold of the single refuge remaining to us, namely the Ideality of all appearances; which we have established in the Transcendental Aesthetic independently of this consequence, and which we could not have foreseen at that point.

17.4 Now if we ask whether in consequence of this, dualism alone takes place in the science of soul, the answer is, “of course!” but only in the empirical understanding. In other words it is in the cohesion of experience that matter is actually given as substance in the appearance in the external sense, even as the thinking “I” is likewise given as substance in the appearance in the internal sense, and in both cases appearances must be connected among one another according to the rule which introduces this category into the cohesion of both our external and our internal perceptions for an experience.\(^{484}\)

17.5 But if we wanted to expand the concept of dualism, as commonly occurs, and take it in a transcendental meaning, then neither it nor the pneumaticity contrary to it on one side or materialism on the other, would have the least basis, for we would lack the determination of our concepts and would hold the diversity of the representational manner of objects, which remain unknown to us with respect to what they are on their own, as a diversity of these things themselves.

17.6 I, represented through the internal sense in time, and objects in space apart from me are indeed specifically quite distinct appearances, but it is not due to that that they are thought as diverse things.\(^{485}\)

17.7 The transcendental object, which lies as the basis to the external appearances, as well as to the internal perspective, is neither matter nor a thinking being on its own, but rather an unknown foundation of the appearances which gives us the empirical concept of the first as well as the second type.

\(^{484}\) It is here, in my opinion, that we are to imagine an experiment of perception (a priori consciousness with awareness of our sensitivity) whereby we correlate touch and sight. But then how do we do this with regard to the internal perception? I think it must be the section concerning: “the cohesion . . . .” that’s key for Kant here, I think, that ultimately we need the external existence to determine the time line and enable us to position on that line perceptions and memories and thoughts, etc. See also Discerning Dreams.

\(^{485}\) This must have been of interest to Schopenhauer.
18.1 If we therefore as then the present critique obviously necessitates us to do, remain true to the rule stipulated above, not to press our question any further than the ability of possible experience to give us the object of experience, it will not even occur to us to employ our inquiry concerning the objects of our sense with respect to what they may be on their own, i.e., without any referral to our senses.

18.2 But if the psychologist takes appearances as things on their own, then as a materialist he can take matter or, as a spiritualist, merely thinking beings (namely with respect to the form of our internal sense) or, as a dualist, both, into his theorem as things existing of themselves, but through misunderstanding he is always compelled to theorize about the way in which that thing might exist on its own, although it is not a thing on its own, but rather only the appearance of a thing in general.
Consideration about the Summation of the Pure Doctrine of Soul in Consequence of this Paralogism

1.1 If we compare the theory of soul as the physiology of the inner sense with the theory of body as a physiology of objects of the external sense, then apart from being able to empirically recognize much in both, we still find this noteworthy distinction: in the latter science much can be synthetically recognized a priori from the concept of an extended, impenetrable being, but nothing at all a priori in the former from the concept of a thinking being.

1.2 The cause is this.

1.3 Even though both are appearances, the appearance before the external sense has something abiding or enduring which renders a substratum lying as base to the alterable determinations and thus a synthetic concept, namely that of space and of an appearance in that space. But time, on the other hand, which is the single form of the internal perspective, has nothing abiding, and hence renders only the alternation of the determinations to be recognized, but not the determinable object.\textsuperscript{486}

1.4 For in that which we term soul, everything is in a continual flux and nothing is abiding, apart perhaps (if we must have it so) from the “I” which is so very simple because this representation has no content, thus no manifold. For this reason it also seems to represent or, better said, to indicate a simple object.\textsuperscript{487}

1.5 This “I” would have to be a perspective which, since it would have to be presupposed with thinking in general (before every experience), would, as a perspective, supply a prior synthetic propositions, assuming it were possible

\textsuperscript{486} I wonder. I see a tree in the same location and of the same shape in different time and with red leaves instead of the earlier green, and I see that it is one and the same tree that I observed earlier, even though its determinations are now different. With regard to myself, I notice one thought now and another thought later, but have no abiding self to hold constant so that the earlier thoughts are now superseded by the latter ones. All I have are the different thoughts. And so the concept of the tree gives me a substratum for thinking the changes that I then perceive in the color, but the concept of myself gives me nothing, and all I have are the changes in the thoughts.

\textsuperscript{487} And so all I have are the flux of thoughts. The proper analogy would be seeing green leaves and then red leaves and with nothing in mind that would signal the same and abiding tree.
to bring forth a pure rational recognition from the nature of a thinking being in general.\textsuperscript{488}

1.6 But this “I” is no more a perspective than it is a concept of some sort of an object. It is merely the form of the consciousness which accompanies both perspective and concept, and which can elevate both of these to recognitions, i.e., to the extent that some sort of a something is given additionally in the perspective which provides a material for the representation of an object.

1.7 So then this entire rational psychology, as a science exceeding all powers of human reason, collapses and nothing else remains for us except to study our soul upon the guidelines of experience and to remain within the confines of questions which go no further than to what possible, internal experience can establish as content.

2.1 Even if rational psychology is supposed to be nothing more than a critical treatment of our dialectic appearance and especially of common and natural reason, then even though it has no utility in expanding our recognition, we still cannot deny that it provides an important negative utility.

3.1 Why do we even need a theory of soul based merely on a pure rational principle?

3.2 Without doubt and above all we need this for the purpose of securing our thinking subject against the danger of materialism.

3.3 But this is performed by the rational concept of our thinking subject, which we have already given.

3.4 For after this treatment not the slightest fear can remain that upon the removal of matter all thinking and even the existence of thinking beings would be removed. Indeed it is far rather clearly indicated that if I remove the thinking subject, the entire corporeal world must cease, for it is nothing but

\textsuperscript{488} With a perspective I conceive of a manifold which appears as a singularity, e.g., the elements of a face in the cloud or on the front of a person’s head or the Big Dipper in the Northern sky. But there is no manifold given regarding the “I” which comes across as a singularity. There is no manifold at all, and the “I” is about as simple as one can imagine.
the appearance in the sensitivity of our subject and a manner of the representations by that subject.

4.1 In this way I do not, of course, recognize this thinking self with respect to its properties, nor can I penetrate its persistence, indeed not even the independence of its existence from the eventual transcendental substratum of external appearances, for this latter is as little known to me as the former.

4.2 But because it is nonetheless possible for me to find cause elsewhere, apart from merely speculative foundations, to hope for an independent and, with all possible alternation of my state, persistent existence of my thinking subject, this much is already gained by the free acknowledgement of my own ignorance: I am still able to parry the dogmatic attack of a speculative opponent and to show him that he can never know more of the nature of my subject in order to deny possibility to my expectations than I can in order to uphold them.

5.1 Hence three dialectic questions are based upon this transcendental illusion of our psychological concept and make up the actual goal of rational psychology and can be decided in no other way than through the above investigations, namely:

1. the possibility of communion of the soul with an organized body in the life of the human,

2. the beginning of this communion, i.e., of the soul at and before the birth of the human, and

3. the end of this communion at and after the death of the human (question concerning immortality).

6.1 Now I assert that all difficulties which we believe to encounter with these questions and with which, as dogmatic objections, we seek to give the appearance of a deeper insight into the nature of things than the common understanding can easily have, all these difficulties are based upon a mere mirage according to which we hypostatize what exists only in thought and assume in precisely the same quality as an actual object apart from the thinking subject, namely to hold extension, which is nothing except appearance,
as a property of external things, subsisting even without our sensitivity, and movement, as its effect which actually proceeds on its own, even apart from our senses.

6.2 For matter, the communion of which with the soul excites such deliberation, is nothing other than a mere form of a certain representational manner of an unknown object through that perspective which we term the external sense.

6.3 There may well be something apart from us therefore to which this appearance, which we term matter, corresponds. But it is not apart from us in the same quality as appearance, but solely as a thought within us, even though this thought represents it, via the external sense, as locatable apart from us.

6.4 Matter therefore does not mean a type of substance, entirely distinguished from, and heterogeneous with, the object of the internal sense (soul), but rather only the dissimilarity of the appearances of objects (which are unknown to us on their own), whose representations we term external in comparison with those which we count to the internal sense, even though, like all other thoughts, they belong just as well merely to the thinking subject, only that they have a certain inherent deception by representing objects in space, which separate them, as it were, from the soul and seem to hover apart from it, since still even space, in which they are looked at, is nothing but a representational manner, whose counterpart in the same quality apart from the soul cannot be encountered at all.

6.5 Now the question is no longer of the communion of the soul with other known and foreign substance apart from us, but rather merely of the connection of the representations of the internal sense with the modifications of our external sensitivity, and how this might be linked among one another according to enduring laws so that they cohere together in an experience.

7.1 As long as we hold internal and external appearances together with one another as mere representations in experience, we find nothing absurd or what could make the communion of both types of sense strange.

7.2 But as soon as we hypostatize the external appearances, referring no longer as representations but rather in this same quality as they are in us, also as things existing apart from us of themselves, but refer the actions, which they as appearances show in relationship to one another, to our thinking subject,
we have the character of effecting causes apart from us which will not square with the effects within us, because the former refer merely to the external sense, but the latter to the internal, which, even thought they are united in one subject, are still highly dissimilar.

7.3 Here then we have no other effects except alterations of place, and no powers except mere efforts which result in relationships in space as their effects.

7.4 But within us the effects are thoughts, among which no relationships of place, movement, shape or spatial determinations in general take place, and we lose the guidelines of the causes entirely on the effects which are supposed to reveal themselves in the internal sense in that way.

7.5 But we should consider that the bodies which are present to us are not objects on their own, but rather a sheer appearance -- who knows of what unknown object? -- and that movement is not the effect of this unknown cause, but rather merely the appearance of its influence on our senses, and that, consequently, both are nothing apart from us, but mere representations within us, thus not that the movement of matter effects representations within us, but rather that it itself (thus also the material which makes itself discernible in that way) is a mere representation. Finally the entire self-made difficulty goes out to how and through what cause the representations of our sensitivity stand so in combination among one another, that those, which we term external perspectives, can be represented according to empirical laws as objects apart from us, which question now does not at all contain the alleged difficulty of explaining the origin of the representations of entirely heterogeneously effecting causes located apart from us, in that we take the appearances of an unknown cause as the cause apart form us, which can occasion nothing but confusion.

7.6 In judgments in which a misinterpretation comes forth, rooted by a long custom, it is impossible to bring the correction immediately to that comprehensibility which can be required in other cases where no such alleged illusion confused the concept.

7.7 Hence this release of our reason from sophistical theories will hardly have the clarity which is necessary for complete release.

8.1 I believe I can facilitate this in the following way.
9.1 All objections can be divided into the dogmatic, the critical and the skeptical.

9.2 The dogmatic objection is that directed against a proposition, while the critical objection is against the proof of the proposition.

9.3 The skeptical objection has need of an insight into the constitution of the nature of objects in order to be able to assert the opposite of what the proposition alleges of this object, hence it is itself dogmatic and alleges to be better acquainted with the constitution, which is being discussed, than the contrary.

9.4 The critical objection, because it ignores the proposition and parries only with the proof, has no need at all of being better acquainted with the object or of presuming better information about it. It only shows that the assertion is baseless, not that it be incorrect.

9.5 The skeptical objection positions proposition and counter-proposition in alternation against one another as objects of equal importance, each one to the other in an alternating way as dogma and the other as its objection. This is dogmatic with respect to semblance on two opposing sides in order to completely destroy every judgment about the object.

9.6 Both the dogmatic and the skeptical objection therefore must allege as much insight into the object as is necessary for asserting something affirming or denying of it.

9.7 The critical alone is of such type that merely by showing that we assume something in aid of our assertion, which is inane and merely imagined, the theory topples by the removal of the foundation presumed to it without claiming to make out something otherwise about the constitution of the object.

10.1 Now we are dogmatic with respect to the common concepts of our reason in regard to the community in which our thinking subject stands with things apart from us. And we consider these things apart from us as genuine objects existing independently of ourselves according to a certain transcendental duality which counts those external appearances not as representations for the
subject, but places them, even as sensitive perspective renders them to us, as objects apart from us and isolates them entirely from the thinking subject.

10.2 Now this subreption is the foundation of all theories about the community between body and soul, and no one ever asks whether this objective reality of the appearances be so entirely correct. Instead this is presupposed as incumbent upon us and the pseudo-rationalizing concerns only the manner of how this would have to be explained and comprehended.

10.3 The usual three systems thought up about this, and actually the only possible ones, are those of physical influence, pre-established harmony and supernatural assistance.

11.1 The two latter explanatory types of communion of soul with matter are based on objections to the first, which is the representation of the common understanding, namely that what appears as matter could not, through its immediate influence, be the cause of an entirely heterogeneous type of effects.

11.2 But with what they understand with the object of external sense they cannot combine with the concept of a material, which is nothing but appearance, thus already on its own a mere representation which was effected through some sort of external objects. Indeed otherwise they would say that the representations of external objects (the appearance) cannot be external causes of the representations within our mind, which would be an entirely senseless objection, because it will not occur to anyone to hold that, which he has once acknowledged as mere representation, to be an external cause.

11.3 According to our principles therefore they must align their theories on this: that which is the true (transcendental) object of our external sense cannot be the cause of these representations (appearances) which we understand with the name “material.”

11.4 Now since no one can presume with any basis to be familiar with something concerning the transcendental cause of our assertions of external sense, their assertion is entirely baseless.

11.5 But if the alleged rectifiers of the theory of physical influence wanted to consider matter as such, according to the usual representational manner of a
transcendental dualism, as a thing on its own (and not as the mere appearance of an unknown thing) and to direct their objection toward showing that such an external object, which shows on its own no other causality than that of movement, could never be the effecting cause of representations, but rather a third being would have to be added in order to institute, if not alternating effects, at least still correspondence and harmony between both, they would begin their refutation by assuming the ποωτοτ ρευδψοζ (flowing along?) of the physical influence in their dualism and therefore refute not so much the natural influence through their objection as rather their own dualistic presupposition.

11.6 For all difficulties, which touch on the combination of a thinking nature with matter, arise without exception solely from that surreptitious, dual representation, namely that matter as such not be appearance, i.e., mere representation of the mind, to which an unknown object corresponds, but the object on its own as it exists apart from us and independently from all sensitivity.

12.1 No dogmatic objection therefore can be made against the commonly assumed physical influence.

12.2 For if the opponent assumes that matter and its movement be mere appearances and therefore themselves only representations, he can only place the difficulty in the unknown object of our sensitivity not being able to be the cause of the representations within us, but the allegation of which does not justify it in the least, because no one can make out anything about what an unknown object could do or not do.

12.3 He must, however, according to our above proof, necessarily admit this transcendental Idealism, unless he wants to hypostatize obvious representations and place them, as true things, apart from himself.

13.1 Nonetheless a well-founded, critical objection can be made against the common instructional opinion of the physical influence.

13.2 Such an alleged communality between both types of substances, the thinking and the extended, places a gross dualism as foundation and makes the extended substances, which are nothing except mere representations of the thinking subject, into things which exist of themselves.
13.3 The misunderstood physical influence therefore can be completely thwarted by our uncovering the proof basis as inane and surreptitious.

14.1 The notorious question concerning the communality of the thinking and the extended therefore if we isolate all imaginary aspects, would resolve itself solely into how external perspective, namely that of space (of a filling of that and shape and movement) be possible in a thinking subject in general.

14.2 But to this question it is impossible for any human to find an answer, and we can never fill this gap in our knowledge, but only indicate that we attribute the external appearance to a transcendental object which is the cause of this type of representation, but with which object we are not at all familiar, nor will we ever obtain any concept of it.

14.3 In all tasks which might arise in the field of experience, we treat those appearances as objects on their own without troubling ourselves about the first basis of their possibility (as appearances).

14.4 But if we go out beyond their limits, the concept of a transcendental object becomes necessary.\footnote{These last two sentences indicate something which must be thoroughly grasped and understood. For all experiential purposes the appearance is considered as a thing on its own which is being viewed. Science considers this thing on its own as simply the total of all that the appearance can provide, i.e., the object of experience. But then on a transcendental level we run into illusion if we treat the appearance as a thing on its own, e.g., which changes size and shape on its own per our angle of looking at it.}

15.1 From these reminders about the communality between the thinking and the extended being, the resolution of all difficulties or interpolations which concern the state of the thinking subject before this communality (life), or after the cessation of such communality (in death), is an immediate consequence.

15.2 The opinion that the thinking subject would be able to think before all communality with bodies would be expressed in this sort of way: before the beginning of our type of sensitivity, by means of which something appears to us in space, the same transcendental objects, which appear in the present state as bodies, would have to be considered in an entirely different manner.
15.3 But the opinion that the soul, after removal of all communality with the corporeal world, is yet able to continue to think, would be announced in this form if the manner of sensitivity, whereby transcendental and, until now entirely unknown, objects appear as a material world, should cease. Nevertheless not for that reason is all perspective of these objects removed and it is easily possible that precisely this same, unknown object would continue to be recognized by the thinking subject although, of course, no longer in the quality of bodies.

16.1 Now no one can introduce the least basis for such an assertion from speculative principles, indeed not even establish the possibility of such, but rather only presuppose it; but just as little can anyone make a valid, dogmatic objection against it.

16.2 For whoever he may be, he knows just as little of the absolute and internal causes of external and corporeal appearances as I or anyone else.

16.3 He also can not allege to know with any basis what the actuality of the external appearances depends upon in the present state (life), thus also not that the condition of all external perspective, or even the thinking subject himself, will cease afterwards (in death).

17.1 So then all conflict about the nature of our thinking being and the connection of that with the corporeal world is a consequence of our filling in the gaps, with respect to what we know nothing about, through paralogisms of reason, since we make our thoughts into things and hypostatize them, from which then an imagined science arises with respect to him who asserts the affirmative as well as to him who asserts the denial, by each alleging to know either something of objects, concerning which no human has a concept, or by making his own representations into objects and so revolving about in an eternal circle of equivocations and contradictions.

17.2 Nothing except the sobriety of a rigorous, but fitting, critique can release us from this dogmatic illusion which constrains so many minds through imagined happiness, among theories and systems, and limits all our speculative attempts, not per chance through shallow disdain about such frequently aborted attempts or pious sighs about the limits of our reason, but rather by means of a determination of boundary, completed in accordance with secure
principles, which with the greatest confidence nails its nihil ulterius to the Herculean pillars which nature itself has erected to advance the travel of our reason only so far as the steadily continuing coasts of experience reaches, which we cannot abandon without venturing upon an unbounded ocean which finally necessitates us with continuing deceptive views to give up as hopeless all exhausting and protracted endeavors.

* * *

Concerning The Summation Of The Pure Doctrine Of Soul
18.1 We were earlier obligated to give a clear and universal exposition of the transcendental, and still natural, semblance in the paralogism of pure reason, likewise the justification of the systematic arrangement of that, running parallel to the table of the categories.

18.2 We were not able to undertake it at the beginning of this section without the risk of stumbling into obscurities, or anticipating ourselves in an unskillful manner.

18.3 We now want to try to fulfill this obligation.

19.1 All semblance we can attribute to the holding of the subjective condition of thinking as the recognition of the object.

19.2 We have furthermore shown in the introduction to the transcendental dialectic that pure reason is occupied solely with the totality of the synthesis of the conditions for a given conditioned.

19.3 Now since the dialectic semblance of pure reason can be no empirical semblance, which occurs with determined, empirical recognitions, it will touch upon the universal of the conditions of the thinking, and there will be only three cases of the dialectic usage of pure reason.

20.1 1. The synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general.

21.1 2. The synthesis of the conditions of the empirical thinking.

22.1 3. The synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking.

23.1 In all three of these cases pure reason is occupied with the totality of this synthesis, i.e., with that condition which itself is unconditioned.

23.2 Upon this division the three-fold transcendental semblance is based, which gives us the occasion for the three sections of the dialectic and the Idea for
the same number of apparent sciences from pure reason, i.e., transcendental psychology, cosmology and theology.

23.3 Here we have to do only with the first.

24.1 Because we abstract from all reference of the thoughts to any sort of object (be it of the senses or of pure understanding) in the thinking in general, the synthesis of the conditions of a thought in general (No. 1) is not objective at all, but rather merely a synthesis of the thoughts with the subject, but which are taken erroneously as a synthetic representation of an object.

25.1 But it follows from this that the dialectic conclusion to the condition of all thinking in general, which itself is unconditioned, does not meet with an error in the content (for it abstracts from all content or object), but rather it errs in the form alone and would have to be termed a paralogism.

26.1 Furthermore, because the single condition which accompanies all thinking is the “I” in the universal proposition, “I think,” reason has to do with this condition to the extent it is not unconditioned itself.

26.2 But it is only the formal condition, namely the logical unity, of every thought, where I abstract from every object, and is represented nonetheless as an object which I think, namely “I myself” and the unconditioned unity.

27.1 If any one raises to me the question: “what is the constitution of a thing which thinks?” I do not at all know a priori what to answer, because the answer is supposed to be synthetic (for an analytic answer explains the thinking very well, perhaps, but gives no expanded recognition of that on which this thinking is based with regard to its possibility).

27.2 But for every synthetic solution, perspective is required, which would entirely cease in such an universal task.

27.3 Accordingly then no one can answer the question in its universality: “What kind of thing indeed would that have to be which is movable?”
27.4 For the impenetrable expansion (matter) is not then given.

27.5 Now even though I know of no answer to the question universally, it still seems to me that I can give it in the singular case in the proposition which expresses the self consciousness, “I think.”

27.6 For this “I” is the first subject, i.e., substance, it is simple, etc.

27.7 But then these would have to be sheer experiential propositions, which nonetheless, without a universal rule which would pronounce a priori the conditions of the possibility of thinking in general, could contain no such predicates (which are not empirical).

27.8 In such way my originally so apparent insight about the nature of a thinking being, and indeed from sheer concepts, becomes suspicious even though I have not yet uncovered the error of that.

28.1 However the further investigation behind the origin of these attributes, which I attribute to myself as a thinking being in general, can uncover this error.

28.2 They are nothing more than pure categories, whereby I never think a determined object of those categories.

28.3 Without a perspective lying as basis, the category can supply me with no concept of an object, for only through perspective is the object given which afterwards is thought commensurate to the category.

28.4 If I explain a thing as a substance in the appearance, then predicates of its perspective must be given to me previously, by which I distinguish the persistent from the alterable, and the substance (the thing itself) from that which merely adheres to it.

28.5 If I term a thing simple in the appearance, I understand in that way that the perspective of that thing is indeed a part of the appearance, but itself cannot be divided, etc.

28.6 But if something is recognized only as simple in the concept and not in the perspective, then in that way I don’t actually have any recognition whatso-
ever of the object, but rather only of my concept, which I make of something in general, which is capable of no actual perspective.

28.7 I only say that I think something as entirely simple because I don’t actually know how to say anything further than merely, “it is something.”

29.1 Now the mere apperception (the “I”) is substance in concept, simple in concept, etc., and so all those psychological tenets have their indisputable correctness.

29.2 Nonetheless that which we actually want to know is in no way recognized in that way of the soul, for none of these predicates hold at all of the perspective and, hence, can also have no consequences which would be applied to objects of experience; thus they are completely empty.

29.3 For the concept of substance does not teach me that the soul continues of itself, nor that it be a part of the external perspective which itself cannot be further divided and therefore can arise or perish through no alteration of nature; which are sheer properties which could make the soul discernible to me in cohesion with experience and give disclosure with regard to its origin and future state.

29.4 But now if I say through mere categories, “the soul is a simple substance,” it is clear that since the sheer understanding concept contains nothing further of substances than that a thing is to be represented as a subject on its own without being in turn the predicate of another thing, and nothing of persistence follows from that, and the attribute of the simple can certainly not be added to persistence, thus we are not in the least instructed by this concerning what the soul can encounter given the world alterations.

29.5 If someone could say to us, “it is a simple part of matter,” then from that which experience teaches about it, we would be able to derive the persistence and, together with the simple nature, the indestructibility of that.

29.6 But the concept of the “I,” in the psychological base proposition “I think,” says not a word concerning that.
30.1 But that the being, which thinks in us, alleges to recognize itself through pure categories and indeed through those which express the absolute unity under that title of those categories, is stirred accordingly.

30.2 The apperception is itself the basis of the possibility of the categories, which for their part represent nothing further than the synthesis of the manifold of the perspective to the extent this manifold has unity in the apperception.

30.3 Hence the self-consciousness in general is the representation of that which is the condition of all unity and still itself is unconditioned.

30.4 Hence of the thinking “I” (soul) which thinks itself as substance, simple, numerically identical in every time, and the correlatum of all existence from which every other existence must be concluded, we can say that it not so much recognizes itself through the categories as rather recognizes the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of the apperception, thus through itself.

30.5 Now it is quite illuminating that what I must presuppose in general in order to recognize an object, I cannot recognize as object itself, and that the determining self (the thinking) is distinguished from the determinable self (the thinking subject) as recognition differs from the object.

30.6 Nonetheless nothing is more natural and more seductive than the semblance of holding the unity in the synthesis of the thoughts as a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts.

30.7 We could call it the subreption of the hypostatized consciousness (apperceptionis substantiatae).

31.1 If we want to logically entitle the paralogism in the dialectic syllogisms of the rational doctrine of soul, to the extent they nonetheless have proper premises, it can hold as a sophisma figurai dictionis in which the major premise makes a transcendental usage of the category with respect to the soul which was subsumed under this condition,

31.2 e.g., the concept of substance in the paralogism of simplicity is a purely intellectual concept which is merely of transcendental usage, i.e., of no use at all without conditions of the sensitive perspective.
31.3 But still in the minor premise the same concept is applied to the object of all internal experience without stipulating in advance the condition of its application in *concreto*, namely the persistence of that, and laying it as basis, and hence an empirical, though here inadmissible, usage was made of it.

32.1 Finally to show the systematic cohesion of all these dialectic assertions in a pseudo-rationalized doctrine of soul in a cohesion of pure reason, thus the completeness of that, we note that the apperception is conveyed through all classes of the categories, but only to those understanding concepts which lie in each of those categories as basis of the unity of a possible experience for the others, consequently substance, reality, unity (not plurality) and existence; and that reason represents them all here as conditions of the possibility of a thinking being which themselves are unconditioned.

32.2 Therefore the soul on its own recognizes:

1. the unconditioned unity of the relationship,  
   i.e., itself not as inhering but rather subsisting

2. the unconditioned unity of the quality, i.e., not as a real whole, but rather simple*  
3. the unconditioned unity at the plurality in time, i.e., not numerically diverse times, but rather one and the same subject

4. the unconditioned unity of the existence in space, i.e., not as the consciousness of several things apart from it, but rather only of the existence of itself, but of other things merely as representations.

* Kant’s annotation

1.1 How the simple here matches in turn the category of reality I cannot yet show; but it will be indicated in the following sections, concerning the antinomies, at the occasion of another rational usage of the very same concept.
33.1 Reason is the capacity of principles.

33.2 The assertions of pure psychology do not contain empirical predicates of the soul, but rather such which, if they take place, are supposed to determine the object on its own independently of experience, thus through pure reason.

33.3 Therefore they would reasonably have to be based upon principles and universal conditions of the thinking natures in general.

33.4 In its place it is found that the singular representation, “I am,” rules them all together which just for that reason, because it expresses the pure formula of all my experience (undetermined), announces itself as a universal proposition which holds for all thinking beings, and since it is nonetheless singular in every intention, entails the semblance of an absolute unity of the conditions of the thinking in general and in that way expands itself further than possible experience can reach.
Appendices - First Group: Major Elements of the A Version
Excluded from the B Version

Appendix I.4  Introduction - I. Idea Of The Transcendental Philosophy

1.1 Without doubt experience is the first product which our understanding produces by treating the raw material of sensuous sensations.

1.2 Accordingly it is the first instruction and, in the progression, so inexhaustible with respect to new familiarity that the linked life of all future witnesses to additional familiarity which can be assembled, will never be lacking.

1.3 Nevertheless it is by far not the only field in which our understanding is restricted.

1.4 It tells us indeed what is, but not that it is so in necessarily and cannot be otherwise.

1.5 Precisely for that reason it provides us with no true universality, and reason, which is so desirous of this sort of knowledge, is more provoked than satisfied.

1.6 Now such universal knowledge, which at the same time has the character of internal necessity, must be independent of experience, and clear and certain of itself. This sort of knowledge we term a priori. In contrast to this what is borrowed solely from experience, is, as we put it, only a posteriori or empirical.

2.1 Now it is revealed, and what is thoroughly remarkable, that among our experiences various sorts of knowledge blend together, which must have their origin a priori, and which perhaps only serve to vindicate the association of our representations of the senses.

2.2 For if we remove everything that belongs to the senses from the first of these, there still remains certain original concepts and judgments generated from them which are entirely a priori and which must have arisen independently of experience, for they enable us to say more of the objects, which ap-

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490 This section was replaced by the first two sections of the B version of the Introduction which begin on or about page 81.
pear to the senses, or at least enable us to believe to say more than mere experience would teach us, and that the assertions contain true universality and strict necessity, which mere empirical knowledge can never convey to us.
Appendix II.1 Translator’s Introductory Notes and Terminology

Beginning on page v of Kant’s *Religion Within The Bounds Of Sheer Reason*, a concise summary of this *Critique of Pure Reason* is available.

And a more expansive summary may be found in *Kant In A Nutshell*.

I have maintained Kant’s original sentence structure and presented it in terms of numbered paragraphs and then of sentences within those paragraphs. For example 1.3 below would refer to the 1st paragraph of a given section and the 3rd sentence of that paragraph. Also notice that I have divided this particular sentence into two sentences:

1.3 The internal sense, by means of which the mind itself, or its internal state, is looked upon, certainly does not give us a perspective of the soul itself as an object. But it is still a determined form, by means of which alone the perspective of its internal state is possible, so that everything which belongs to the internal determinations is represented in relationships of time.

Footnotes represent my own comments to the text, while Kant’s footnotes have been converted into paragraph notes and follow the relevant paragraph.

The following terms are especially important with respect to the translations:

**Anschauung** I render in English with “perspective” although “intuition” is far more common in translations of Kant’s works. The suggestion of “etwas anschauen” in German is “looking at something.” According to one person’s Anschauung there is a face of a wolf in the cloud, and according to that of another person there will be no such face, but rather the form of a fish or perhaps nothing but a cloud. I am also partial to “envisagement,” e.g., seeing a face in a cloud is a envisagement, a term I have used often in recent years. Or: the face is not in the cloud, but only in one’s perspective of, or looking at, the cloud. “Viewing” can also suggest much of this. And we might speak of someone’s “take” on something, i.e., what that person gleans from that something. The suggestion is a direct and personal receipt of information without any use of reasoning. For example, I see that one object is to the left of another; and I see that directly and immediately, and that
is a function of my perspective or viewing or envisagement; my take on the situation. For more on this see Anschauung.

Perspective denotes a particular way of considering or regarding something.

**Idea** is a technical term for Kant and I render it always as “Idea” and not with a lower case i. Generally it denotes a concept for which no object can be given corresponding to it, at least not given to the human who is limited to a sensitive perspective of things. For example there may be a soul, but this is not subject to a sighting or perspective through any looking whatsoever. Thus the idea or notion of a soul would be an Idea.

**Erkenntnis.** The root of this word is “kennen” which means to know or to have familiarity with. In all of my translations I have used “recognition” over the more commonly used “knowledge.”

**Erscheinung.** For this I use “appearance” which is very common, although I have also utilized “specter” in some other works on Kant. When St. Paul reports seeing a Jesus-in-the-sky this is given in German as an Erscheinung. There is with this a suggestion of “shining forth.” The rainbow is considered to be an Erscheinung by the Germans. The appearance of water on the heated road ahead which vanishes as you approach it is an Erscheinung. So the word has some affinity also with “mirage” and “hallucination.” The import for the student of Kant is that this appearance is not a thing which exists on its own as it appears, but which has its existence solely within the perception.

I would be much obliged if the reader would notify me of any suggestions for this translation and/or comments. I can be reached at this pmr&&kantwesley.com (and where @ is to be used in the place of &&).

I have undertaken this translation solely for my own amusement and to maintain my limited understanding of the German language. This is an ongoing endeavor and the editing will likely never be completed. I present this translation on the web for whatever use anyone may wish to make of it. I do not intend to acquire any copyright on this work.

I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Benjamin Turnbull with regard to the Latin and Greek expressions utilized by Kant in this Critique.
The objects of the senses are called specters or appearances in that they are objects which have their entire physical existence within the confines of what I call the brainarium. What strikes my eye is transformed into electrical impulses, sent to the brain, and there a projection unfolds full of myriad visions, not unlike a kaleidoscope or, perhaps even better, a planetarium. And since this projection is dependent upon electrical impulses from the eye, the entire brainarium world goes in and out of existence per the blinks of our eyes. And here all the objects that appear to us arise as appearances, the looks of something, a something that we notice or get out of the brainarium, e.g., a table, a face on the front of a human head and also in the cloud. This holds true for all the sense organs such that we can say that our entire physical existence along with what we call the entire universe are appearances and as such have no existence apart from the brainarium. In contrast to this spectral world or world of appearances we also imagine a physical world which the spectral world of appearances represents to us, which the world of appearances stands for or represents in our brainarium. So the appearance of a table represents a real object which exists independently of the table in the eye which (appearance) changes shape and size with distance, and color depending upon the time of day. So we do not say that the appearance is an illusion when we recognize that it is not a real thing on its own (as it exists in the brainarium). It represents a real object to us. The only illusion that would arise would be to treat the appearance of the table in the brainarium as though it were a real thing which physically got smaller at a distance from us and physically itself changed color according to the time of day (being dark red at night and bright red in the day, for example).

The objects of our brainarium are totally spectral/appearances and appear to us in accordance with our way of looking at things. This way of perspective or looking at things is configurable, i.e., what we spy as an object appears as a singularity. I use the word perspective (or also take) while most translators use intuition (and where Kant used Anschauung, or the “at-look”). There is no necessity in any such sighting, for as some objects come and go over time, e.g., the face in the cloud and, for example, the smiling face on the front of someone's head, even so can all appearances, as spectral, come and go. And for all we know one minute we see the appearance of a dog on the road ahead, and the next moment, and upon a closer

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491 Kant does not use any such term but I think this expresses quite well his conception of the presentation of appearances (Erscheinungen) that occupy us in our quest for knowledge. It was suggested to me by my reading in Schopenhauer's work on Kant.

492 The seven stars of the Big Dipper appear altogether as a singularity once this “dipper” has been sighted.
look, it has “transformed” into a mail box. And so the mountain before me, as appearance and having no existence apart from my brainarium, could, as far as I could tell from the observation itself, just as easily turn into a mail box or a dog or anything else. What we are speaking of now are the tentative and contingent objects that appear to us spectrally. They are the result of a perhaps happenstance perspective/Anschauung/intuition and, as appearances, are totally contingent and even ephemeral.

Now let's consider again and more fully the recognition of a world which exists apart from our brainarium and which the appearances of the brainarium represent to us. Accordingly there are real things all about us and the appearances are representations of these real things, how these real things appear and look to us. Those appearances which are representations of real things are called objects. Those appearances which do not represent real things are themselves the object as appearances, for example the rainbow or the Big Dipper or the face in the cloud. Hence once a spectral object is identified and determined, we consider it a real object apart from us and not an appearance like the rainbow, i.e., we look upon the appearance as a representation of this real object, an image of the real object.

Thus, for example, we look out and spy the table and above it, through the window, a cloud in which we see a face (per our perspective) and perhaps a rainbow, and we recognize that the table is a real object while the face and the rainbow are just appearances and do not represent real things. So I see the table and walk over and touch it and notice its color and sheen and hardness, and I call that a real object. And when I walk away and look back I say that the table looks smaller, which is understood as the table remaining always constant and enduring, as a real object, and only appearing smaller due to the distance from it. In this way, as we mentioned above, we avoid illusion.

And so in our imagination we conceive of a real world apart from the brainarium and to which the appearances of the brainarium correspond, and we imagine it looking like the world in the brainarium, a red table before the window for example. And this is a legitimate use of the imagination. On a deeper level, however, we must admit that all that we see in the brainarium is composed of our own sensations, the electrical impulses and the way the brain makes its projections (which it can do in dreams as well) and therefore it is not correct to assume that things on their own, independently of their representation by the appearances, have any meaningful relationship to the appearances. The table on its own (independent of our looking) is neither large nor small, it is not smooth or hard or red, for all of this is our perspective of the table (consisting of our our sensations) and that is always
based on a mere appearance within the brainarium. And if we are speaking of what the table might be as a thing on its own without the least reference to any human perception of it, it is impossible to say anything positive. We can only say what it is not, not red for example, but never what it is.

So that is the situation with the objects which are given by the senses. They are entirely appearances and yet represent something real (and which we commonly refer to as real in terms of our perspective of them), but what that real might be independently of any looking, we have no idea.

I want to give an example of some other consideration of the things which the appearances represent to us. Instead of the spectral table representing a table, let it represent an angel who has no shape and is not even in time, but who is able to take on the shape of the representation that we have of a table. I'm not suggesting this as factual, but want merely to remind us that while we commonly speak of the object as appearance as a facsimile of the real object, and while that is acceptable in every day and scientific speech, it is not valid for our transcendental consideration here. This transcendental consideration suggests then merely that there is a thing on its own which the appearance represents to us, but that we can say nothing at all about it (as a thing on its own) except in terms of what it certainly is not, e.g., the table is not heavy on its own, for heaviness is a sensation.

This then is our understanding of the brainarium and of the appearances which are projected within. A related consideration, and which is perhaps not so easily grasped, is the fact that space and time, as we know anything about them, are nothing more than our way of looking at objects in the brainarium (our perspective). They are the forms of our looking/perspective. And so the rainbow that we see in the distant rain as well as the raindrops themselves are entirely within the brainarium and even the space and time in which we spy all this is nothing but our own looking. There is no real space and real time existing apart from the brainarium from which we get our knowledge of space and time, and they are things that we know that we could not have gotten through any exposure to any real space and time (apart from the brainarium). Kant describes them as two infinite non-things which must exist in order for all existence of things is possible. For example, look as we will, we will never spy space, but only things which are in space.

No matter how hard you look at the table, and the window behind it, you will not spy that the table is in front of the window (and it is not in front of the window

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493 Red is a color and hence is the way the brainarium reacts to certain stimulus arising via the optical nerve from the retina.
when spied from the other side of the window, but rather on the far side the window! for that information is not contained in the spectral objects, but rather is added to the appearances as the form of our perspective/anschauung. We get this picture intuitively, for that's the way we see it. And since the “in front of” is not in the appearance, this means it is a sheer intuition or perspective or looking-at, our take on or perspective of the appearance.

If we had gotten our knowledge of space and time from something real on its own like we do other objects (of our perspective), then just like we can imagine the absence of any object by imagining a void space or a void time, we would be able to imagine the absence of space and time themselves. But we cannot do this. Space and time are not real things, but merely the form of our perspective, the way we look at objects.\footnote{This and the following two paragraphs are paraphrases of Kant's expressions in the Aesthetic beginning on or near page 48.}

Our concept of space and time is not like that of all other objects of the brainarium. Empirical (exposure based) objects are assembled as we recognize a table through the unification of top and legs and let this concept hold for many examples of a table. But the various spaces and times that we consider are simply parts of a single space and a single time, and indeed these parts are nothing else than limitations of that space and time, each of these two being a singularity. Thus we don't assemble space out of the unification of many spaces, but see all spaces as limitations of a single space and that is a perspective, our way of considering things in the brainarium; and the same thing holds of time.

Space and time are conceived of as infinite givens. For other concepts, e.g., table, the infinitude of possible examples are understood as being contained under the concept, while with space and time the infinitude of possible examples are understood as being contained within the single space and single time.\footnote{Accordingly the concept of table would encompass myriad different tables under it as their common denominator. But space does not encompass many different spaces under it, for all spaces are merely limitations of the one single space and thus are within it. Likewise with time.} And so space and time are not at all like other concepts. They are based on pure perspectives; indeed they are the form of our looking, of our own perspective.

Hence our knowledge of space and time is not derived from real things (as is the case with all empirical objects). Space and time are nothing more than the human way of visualizing and looking at things and, as a consequence, they have no existence or use apart from the brainarium. The space and time of our brainarium do
not represent anything real apart from the brainarium, and so in this regard are different from the appearances which do represent real objects. Space and time are nothing more than human perspectives and represent nothing more than our way of considering the appearances in the brainarium.

Let's pause for a quick recap of what we have established. We are in the process of considering truth in objects provided by our sensitivity and our understanding and our reasoning. So far we have only been considering the objects of the senses as they appear to us in the brainarium.

We will now expand a bit on this topic of the objects of sensitivity. Actually there are two types of objects which appear in the brainarium, the objects as appearances that we have been speaking about and then pure perspectives which we provide ourselves through our looking/perspective and indeed in space and time. A good example of the latter is the circle that we can describe via a pantomimic with our finger tip out in space and “see” it there in that funny, imaginative way. Thus it is the work of our productive imagination; but we are able in our imagination to see the circle out in space before us and see it there, shimmering as it were. That circle can be required of all people (though some children will think we are only kidding) and can be pointed out and diameters added, etc.

Now earlier we established that space and time are not things on their own, but merely the appearance of the brainarium projections to us, i.e., what our take of it is, or what we see or intuit. We did that by showing that our concept of space and time could not have been derived from experience. Now we want to show an example of how space and time as perspectives are able to teach us about pure objects, like circles traced out in mid air.

There are only two sources of knowledge, we must pause to inject, namely empirical and pure. Empirical knowledge arises through the recognition of real objects (phenomena/appearances) in space and time (and not just imaginary circles in the air, which are not real objects), and thus empirical knowledge is knowledge gleaned from the brainarium as sensed by us in time and space. In addition to being

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496 It is one thing to think about a circle or to picture it within the mind, and another to picture it and "see" it out in space before one's eyes and where it can be pointed out to others.

497 Incidentally I note that time is also at play here, for it is in time that we distinguish the relevant from the irrelevant, e.g., we ignore the finger as it approaches the beginning position of Noon (when tracing out the circle in midair), and then accumulating the path it traces out to 1 and 2 and on back around to Noon where it is then ignored again. See also Drawing Circles In The Air.
the form of all looking within the brainarium (appearances/Erscheinungen), space and time are themselves perspectives and can provide their own objects.\textsuperscript{498}

We will now consider the truth of mathematics and see that it actually depends upon an object which is provided, as with the circle in the air, as a pure perspective and still, because it is in space, has validity for any appearance that might ever appear (in other words, and perhaps now unnecessarily noted, we can see the form of a triangle, but it is another question as to whether there is any real object which has that shape).

Consider first the proposition that every two sides of every triangle are together greater than the third. When we analyze the concept of a triangle (for what is contained in the concept holds for all triangles absolutely) we think three straight line segments, each with two end points, and each end point of each being an end point of two of the segments. Since this information is arrived at via an analysis of the concept it is called analytical. But with this you don't think: “any two sides are greater than the third” for that information is not contained in the concept, and hence is added to it, and accordingly is called synthetic.

There are two sorts of synthetic statements, as we might have guessed, the empirical and the pure. It is a synthetic statement to say of the table that it is heavy, for that is not contained in the concept of a table, but this is based entirely upon an exposure to the table, in lifting it. So it is synthetic but still empirical and might not be required of all people, e.g., those traveling in space. That is the mark of empirical statements, and they are all contingent, that they are based on exposure to the actual object, i.e., via experience with the object.

The other sort is a pure synthetic statement and that is the sort that we have been considering in the matter of the triangle and the length of its sides. First we will look at the triangle as we would an empirical object, and consider various examples, i.e., this triangle and that. We would see that any two sides of each triangle were always greater than the remaining side. That would be called batting 100%.

\textsuperscript{498} At the end of this entire section (and beginning on or near page 79), and in a conceptual sense, Kant comments on how the relegation of space and time to mere perspectives frees God from limitations and makes him omnipotent and not subject to any real space and time. God does not think things, but rather views/intuits such that the viewed object comes into existence. We humans cannot go so far, but if we were divine then when we spied a circle in mid air there would be a real object there and not just the representation of a circle. All we can do is construct the shape of objects in space. Note: here Kant is not trying to establish the existence of God, but merely to indicate that if there is a God this God would not be limited by conditions of time and space, for time and space, as we have indicated, are not real things but merely the way we humans look at things.
And it would be our best bet for the future. But there would be no capacity to speak authoritatively of all triangles whatsoever without having to wait for further validation through experience, through inspection of actual triangles. The only way this certitude and authority can arise is by virtue of an actual construction of the object in question (in midair even) so that it is not simply imagined to be in space, but is actually seen in that space as an object which could be required seeing of all people (for even though it is “in the air” it can be pointed out to other people). So in the construction of the triangle we will notice that two sides have to be greater than the third because otherwise we could not construct a triangle. We do have a certitude in mathematics (here geometry) by the provision of an actual object as a pure perspective and, furthermore, we can see then the application of this pure perspective to the spectral world of appearances, for it is in the space of the brainarium, and what holds in the pure perspective of an object as a shape holds in the empirical perspective of any real object of that shape.

The same effect is had from our knowledge of time, it (as with space) being a way we look at the world. There is only one way that it is possible to make the empirical fact of change discernible, and that is to see two different conditions in a time, where one is designated before and the other after and that two true statements cannot contradict each other, for example: before = the table is red and after = the table is black, and that is a contradiction except for the capacity of perspective which enables us to put two different appearances (red table and black table) into a single strand of time, and thereby avoid the contradiction (which would be the purely logical and analytical way, i.e., ignoring time as an infinite, existing nothing) and make possible the perception of a change, through our understanding given to us as a pure perspective. I.e., while earlier the table was red, now it is black. It is helpful to note that any memory, while being remembered, is now, and so it is only the perspective, how we look at it, which denotes it as a before.

Consider finally arithmetic, and especially the problem of 7+5 and what it equals. Consider it first via dissection of the 7 and the 5 and an understanding of a unity, i.e., something which combines the 7 and the 5 in a unity, an object. The 12 will never come to mind, except as a guess and thus only contingently. So analytically
we cannot tell that the answer is 12.\(^{499}\) Also empirically we cannot know this, for even if many examples were given of \(7 + 5 = 12\), and we were batting 100\% in our predications, we would never know if perhaps \(7 + 5\) might somehow be identified with 13. The only way is to use the hand as a constellation, as it were,\(^{500}\) to represent the 5 and then holding the 7 in mind as a total of all that preceded in arriving to the 7 and then continuing the count (thought to have resulted in the seven) by adding the units of the fingers to keep track of the 5 and finding that the answer, the object, is 12.\(^{501}\)

Briefly recapping again: We are in search of truth and are considering the possible objects of human knowledge. Specifically we are looking at the objects of our sensitivity, our sensitive nature and capacity, and we are seeing them in space and time and recognizing them as real objects. We know that the space and time of our looking is nothing more than our own capacity for perspective/intuition/Anschauung within the brainarium. By virtue of this fact we are able to make statements regarding the appearances before we are exposed to them, e.g., that they are extended in space and time, and so in this way show how it is that mathematics is applicable to all that shall ever arise in space and time.

Before leaving this consideration of the spectral/appearance world we need to consider the fact that the perceiver himself is also known and recognized as an appearance, just like all objects in the brainarium. We have an inner sense (given in moments of time) and an outer sense (given in terms of space). In the inner sense we express all our feelings and emotions and also our thoughts, and they arise to our

\[\text{Translator's Appendix II.2}\]

\[\text{7+5}\]

\[\text{499}\) There is a match and map consideration which is analytical. The 7 and the 5 are reduced to twelve 1's and 11 +'s. Likewise in the reduction of the 12. All the elements of one can be substituted for those of the other, i.e., they are interchangeable. That would be the result of the analysis, except for the fact of the incongruent counterparts (Kant’s term) where two perfectly identical hands cannot wear the same glove and thus cannot be substituted for each other. Thus we cannot conclude from the identity of the elements of two wholes that the two wholes are congruent and substitutable for each other. Accordingly there is no certitude in the match and map approach, and the student must wonder. See especially a short essay on \text{7+5} where this is developed in more detail.

\[\text{500}\) The fingers can represent a five as a singularity encompassing a manifold much as the Big Dipper in the sky could represent a seven. This is also and incidentally a characteristic of a perspective, namely that a manifold is taken and seen as a singularity, e.g., the Big Dipper comes across as a unity even though it is 7 unrelated and disjoined stars. And a face is seen as a singularity even though it will consist of two eyes and a nose, etc.

\[\text{501}\) Incidentally I'm taken by the fact that 12 is the first number that the student knows independently of the teacher. All the numbers, 1 through 9, are given by the teacher. And then the 10; but upon the 10 the student has reason to at least guess that another number is coming and that it will be 20. Then when the 11 is given the student sees immediately the pattern and conceives its logic and is able to produce the 12 as what is coming next on his or her own, and then of course all other possible numbers. See also \text{7+5}.\]
looking (as a perceiver, here a self perceiver) only as appearances. And so we are in the same situation with regard to the soul as we are to the table which we see in space. In both cases we do not see the object as a thing on its own, but only its appearance. And so we know ourselves only as we appear to ourselves and not as we are on our own, just as the table is known only spectrally, as it appears to us and not as it is on its own independently of our perspective. Again this does not mean that the soul is just an appearance. It is no more an appearance on its own than the table we spy is. Both appearances represent real objects which are considered as really existing things, but which are only known empirically, i.e., as they appear to us, i.e., spectrally in our brainarium. And so the soul is certainly no more an illusion than is the table.\textsuperscript{502}

After this final consideration we can then conclude that all our knowledge of objects of the senses deals solely with appearances (and with pure imaginaries [like the circle in the air] seen in space) and these are seen in a space and time of our own brainarium, and while they can represent real things existing apart from our brainarium, i.e., things on their own, we can never know any more about these real things than their appearances tell us in the brainarium; and what we ascribe to them as real objects apart from the brainarium is a overstepping of our bounds, and we can only speak negatively of them, namely that they are not appearances and thus not endowed with the characteristics of appearances, e.g., not large and not small. The only positive is that there is a real thing which the appearance represents or depicts (vorstellt) to us.

\textbf{Addendum to Notes on the Aesthetic: Captain Hook and the Rainbow}

I present this as a humorous assist in grasping the illusion that arises by virtue of treating appearances as things on their own.

Captain Hook, the great antagonist of the arch-hero, Peter Pan, finally developed a hypothesis regarding the rainbow. The facts he gathered through careful research are as follows:

\\[\textsuperscript{502} \text{Kant takes advantage of this consideration to offer a refutation of Berkeley's dogmatic idealism (beginning on or near page 76, Item III). Berkeley held that the concept of space were absurd, a really existing infinite nothing which were necessary for the existence of all things, and the perception of things in space were therefore an illusion. Kant counters this by noting that since time is just as absurd, it would follow that the perceiver himself were an illusion and that we were dealing with perceptions without anything being perceived and with no one perceiving, and noted gratefully that no one had yet made that claim.}\]
Whenever any one is near him, and Hook spies a rainbow, the others admit also to seeing the rainbow, but
those who are not near often refuse such admission; and
when Hook does not spy a rainbow, those near him also say they see no rainbow, but, sometimes,
when they are further off they say they do see a rainbow even though it is clear to Hook that there is no rainbow.

In general: no one has ever contradicted Hook while close to him, nor in the absence of rain. (He has never had this problem in the absence of rain, for the rainbow has never yet appeared in the absence of rain) He has also never noticed any such penchant to contradict him with regard to other things, e.g., the rain itself, but only with the rainbow. It could be, Hook thinks, that the rainbow affects people mentally and drives them to taunt him (and perhaps other right thinking men), somewhat as people are occasionally alleged to be the affected by the full moon.

Solution (Hook's hypothesis): Occasionally, and especially in wet weather, people (are driven [for some yet unknown reason] to) have no respect for Hook and think he is a fool, but are afraid to admit that when they are close to him, for they know he will beat them.

Hook is as yet unable to account for this phenomenon, except that in the sun-lit rain others occasionally gang up on him to make sport of him. And this he will not tolerate!

Consideration: if Hook looks at a rainbow in the same way that he does the rain and chairs, etc., then in the same way that the rainbow is funny, all things would be funny, only we will simply not yet have noticed a like penchant for coming into and going out of existence like that exemplified by the rainbow. Then missing or overlooked objects would not be stolen so much as merely have gone out of existence, or to rainbow land, wherever that might be.

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503 I assume that the reader knows that rainbows are not in the rain at all, but only in the perception of the rain and thus only in the eye (or camera); and so to see a rainbow requires a particular configuration of rain, sun and perceiver/focus. Otherwise they miss the humor of this appendix, much as children, who are too young, miss the humor of Peter Pan's shadow being rolled up in Wendy's chest-of-drawers, and are even saddened by his situation.

504 But then, of course, nothing would be funny (in this regard) for nothing would be different, and questions regarding this behavior would never come to mind. It would be like trying to grasp the notion of time and or space from experience--since time (as well as space) is omnipresent, it could not even be noticed, like a certain buzz in one's ear from birth to death.
Further consideration of Hook's frame of mind: it is a sheer perspective to notice the spatial and temporal sightings of any appearance, e.g., a rainbow or the rain. and that, since we are limited to subjective, split-finger space, is only possible if we dream up a so-called real space into which our own subjective, split-finger space might fit as a perspective of that, and indeed it is only by means of this what we can make these spatial and temporal observations.

Another Hookian consideration. One day on the way home (on August 4, 1998), while riding my motorbike toward the foothills of the Georgia mountains and some distance in front of my wife (who was driving our motor home), a deer and I collided. While I remained upright (and I was only slightly injured), the deer (a doe) was tossed onto its back with legs kicking in the air before righting itself and scampering off, a bit dazed, no doubt, but apparently none the worse physically for the encounter. My wife reported to me later that at first sight she thought the deer were a piece of brown cardboard (trash on the highway) which I had sought to avoid hitting by swerving (when the deer actually collided with me) and which had been tossed up into the air through the wind that I was causing with my bulk and speed; and then as she came closer, she saw that she had been mistaken, and that it was actually a deer.505 506

Had Captain Hook looked at this same scene in the place of my wife, his experience would have been quite different, for he would have been able to report that I had struck a piece of cardboard and then almost immediately, the cardboard turned into a deer and scampered off. "Damnedest thing you can imagine! turned suddenly into a deer. Probably a magician disguised to do me harm, and was suddenly sur-

505 Which expression intimates: it was a deer all along! It is my strongest conviction that such an experience as being mistaken in this way cannot possible arise in the context of Hume's empiricist school of epistemology, nor even in the rationalist schools, but only via the capacity of human recognition as envisioned by Kant. It certainly could not have been an intuition, i.e., a direct, intellectual (or spiritual or intelligible?) sighting, for, in that case (it seems to me), it would never have been thought of as a cardboard in the first place.

506 Kant's greatest insight in his development from the Inaugural Dissertation to the Critique of Pure Reason was, in my opinion, the realization that the objects of this world are not givens which are intuited (Dissertation), but are merely appearances (Erscheinungen, things appearing, retinal objects) which we then assemble into objects (and which is the validation of the categories of pure understanding), and which we then see, as objects, so clearly before our eyes that we must think that they always existed as such, and which is precisely the meaning we give to the objects of experience. See Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section 118. This understanding first came to me when I realized that little children were not imposed upon by the fact that Peter Pan's shadow was rolled up in Wendy's chest-of-drawers, but were more saddened by his plight of having lost that shadow.
prised by Philip on his motor bike and his evil intention against me thwarted."\(^{507}\)

If told that he must have been mistaken and that it only looked like a piece of cardboard, Hook would have most surely struck the speaker for his insolence and would have straightaway ordered him not again to use nonsense words (à la the surds of Leibniz) such as "looked like" or "seemed," words that have no reference, nothing to refer to and hence are no more meaningful than the "huh" that we often sprinkle our speech with.

Hook's compatriots soon learn, through many beatings, not to contradict their leader and never to use "seems to be" or "appears to be" for they can never find any example of that to be used to show Hook what they mean with these terms.

See also this humorous Onion article on the size of humans.

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\(^{507}\) According to the rationalist school, when we see the deer, this means that we would know immediately that the cardboard were only a mirage (Erscheinung). This is very close to the notion of an intuition, only here, with the rationalists, the senses would be charged with the perversion of our sighting and then corrected by the intellect. So perhaps intuition is an integral part of the rationalist system. Kant, of course, rejected the rationalist system when he realized that it would be impossible for a rationalist, like Hook, for example, to tell the difference between his left and right hand, for the description of the one would match perfectly the description of the other, when no reference to an externally encompassing space were made. Hook might marvel that his gloves fit sometimes (the left glove on the left hand) and not at other times (the left glove and the right hand), but would have to ascribe that to some magic, and he might even figure out a counter-magic, e.g., switching the gloves, perhaps when saying some Hocus Pocus words. Furthermore the reference to space were only of temporary benefit in the rationalist system, and would be dispensed with eventually when everything were seen by us, like Paul says in 1 Corinthians 13, in the same way that we are seen by God, i.e., immediately, without need for categories of any sort. For example, I am sure Leibniz would have used an example like this: we say "the fellow over there" until we learn his name, and then we say "Joe" or whatever the name might be.

\(^{508}\) The rationalist, once having come to the conclusion (sheer awareness?) that the cardboard and the deer were related, since they would assert the principle of sufficient reason, would doubtlessly appeal to magic of some sort, or God, to account for the sudden change. I think there is a basic inconsistency in this system in that I don't think that you would ever have come to the thought for a need of causation and adequate reason if you reasoned from within this intellectual system from the very beginning since, by Leibniz' own admission, each monad is a self-contained system or world and what we call causation of one thing to another is merely the march of the internal states of the monad, i.e., its perceptions and depictions, and so (the question must arise): what is the relationship of the representations to real things existing independently of them and to which these depictions are supposed to refer? Especially since the rainbow is not an external thing, but looks as much external as the retinal image of the rain.
Appendix II.3  Translator’s Comments on the First (A) Version of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

For a gloss on this Deduction and especially Section II, No. 4, the reader is invited to review a revision of the publication of the translator’s essay entitled "Circles In The Air" by Kant-Studien in 1996.

Following is a closer consideration of some important terms used by Kant.

**Perspective (or Looking-at) and Understanding**

What we see and sense in general ends up as a projection within the brainarium. For example, light waves from a light source strike an object and then some are reflected by the object and some of these reflected waves in turn enter the eye and are converted into electrical impulses which travel along the optical nerves to the brain where finally a picture/appearance (*Erscheinung*) of the object (actually the visible universe like a panorama) unfolds within the brain to consciousness.\(^{509}\)

Space and time are the form of the outer and inner sense, respectively. They are pure lookings at things, the perspective or *Anschauung* (at-look). If I see something to the left or right of something else, that left and right are not things on their own nor are they relationship of things on their own, but merely the way that I look at things, my take on things, my perspective of things.\(^{510}\) A memory is *now*, of course, whenever I am conscious of it, but as a memory it is looked upon and considered or viewed as before or earlier, and thus to this extent is a function of my looking (with respect to timing), my Anschauung/perspective. When I look at my cup of coffee I see it, let us say, as the second cup this morning, and since that "second" is not any aspect of the cup, it is obvious that that is a perspective of, or my take on, the cup, my way of looking at the cup, my Anschauung. Even how I look at something in space or time is subjective, and I make it objective by orienting myself to others within my brainarium, e.g., my left will be your right if we are facing each other. What we see when we look at something is very subjective and individual and depends upon our experience and exposure.

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\(^{509}\) It is even more involved: the reflected light waves passing through the eye lens are reversed (left and right) and projected upside down on the retina. And the optical nerve from the right eye pass into the left side of the brainarium and likewise for the left eye. Within the brain then a correction is made and an image of the object arises. Something similar occurs with hearing and the other senses.

\(^{510}\) If space were something real on its own or the relationship of real things, then I could look as long and hard as I might and I would never be able to discern a here or a there or a left or a right. These are merely forms of my looking, of my perspective. See especially: [Kant and the Meaning of the Anschauung](#).
Understanding something means a necessitation or connection of some manifold, and this is accomplished by means of a concept. The understanding itself is comprised of a set of certain pure concepts which are called categories.\footnote{There are four classes of the pure concepts of understanding, i.e., quantity, quality, relationship and mode, with each class made up of three categories, e.g., the categories of relationship being: substance, causation and reciprocity, and representing time in terms of endurance, succession and simultaneity, respectively. All these are connective devices, as it were, whereby two representations are unified into one, much as 1 and 2 are unified in the number 3.} By means of these categories a manifold or diversity of sensitive data\footnote{Sensitive data would be either a pure perspective such as the three sides of a triangle traced out in midair, or an empirical perspective such as the legs and top of a table, or even the top as an extended surface.} is unified via some rule,\footnote{The 20th Century philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, objected to Kant’s understanding of the importance of rules for recognitions of objects and experience, and instead argued that the connection of the various uses of a word was like a rope where no strand went the entire length of the rope. All games, for example, could not be joined by any common rule/description. To counter this I offer this rule describing all games: a game is an activity undertaken for the sake of an arbitrary rule, and would not be undertaken otherwise.} which is a connective device (the concept of the object), and the data is necessitated in this way. For example the manifold of legs and the top are unified as parts of a single object, a table, and in this wise the manifold is necessitated, i.e., it is understandable that the legs and top are configured as they are, e.g., that the legs are positioned between the top and the floor,\footnote{It is by means of this empirical necessitation that we are able to recognize a broken table, one where the legs are above the top, for example, in being repaired and in an upside down storage position.} because the table is an surface elevated for human use in writing, etc.

**Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories**

In order to understand the context of the deduction of the categories we need to be aware that these categories are not, and cannot be, derived from experience and are not contained in any appearance. David Hume establishes this very clearly, especially with regard to the concept or category of causation. No matter how many times lightening is followed by thunder, there is no necessity in the perspective of this sequence.\footnote{This is called the metaphysical deduction of the categories, namely that the concept cannot have been derived from experience. Actually David Hume came to treat causation as nothing more than an abbreviation for saying: every time A has appeared B has followed, and every time B has appeared, it was following an A. For Hume this was simply a matter of customary behavior without any necessitation.} As a result we can understand that the notion of causation must be a priori (preceding and independent all experience).
And this very independence of the categories from all empirical data suggests a problem, namely how is it that something that we devise of ourselves, e.g., the concept of causation, would have any relevance and application to the appearances/Erscheinungen of the brainarium which arise independently of our understanding? We can dream up the notion of a unicorn, for example, but that would not in any way suggest that there were any appearance possible to which this concept might be applied.

**Transcendental Deduction of the Categories**

The transcendental (knowledge-enabling) deduction of the categories will show how it is that a concept which is devised before and independently of any experience, i.e., a priori, can have application to the appearances which in turn are given entirely independently of the concept in the brainarium.\(^{516}\) Essentially the application will be justified by showing that it is only by means of this concept that experience and even perception are possible in the first place.

In order to prepare for this deduction it will be helpful to consider what we mean by perception and by experience. We will look first to perception.

**Perception** denotes a “careful take” (Wahrnehmung) and so is not momentary and fleeting as when we sight things when driving a car while preoccupied, the so-called “auto pilot.” It has to do with what Kant in the B Deduction called “paying attention.”\(^{517}\) I have likened it to the “second look” when you “make sure,” e.g., checking the clock to make sure that you did indeed set it, as you thought you had, but having done so while preoccupied and not paying attention. And so in a sense there is an a priori aspect of the perception, namely various elements are consciously apprehended and kept in mind as a single manifold in search of the object, i.e., the concept of which necessitates the unification of these elements. This can also be called the subjective perception to contrast it with a recognition which will be described as an objective perception.

Accordingly then we are dealing with a perusal of some appearances and accumulating a manifold of these, e.g., noticing that the legs are between the top and the

\(^{516}\) So while the metaphysical deduction shows that a concept is arrived at independently and before all exposure to appearances, the transcendental deduction will show how such a concept, even though devised by the mind independently of appearances, finds application to the appearances, and indeed necessarily, even though these appearances arise independently of the categories.

\(^{517}\) See footnote to “Recap” on or around page 809.
floor (in the perception of a table). We apprehend a manifold which is seen as a single, composite thing in the perspective/intuition/Anschauung (again like a face in the cloud or looking at, and seeing, the Big Dipper in the Northern night sky), and we remember it and then we also associate the manifold with such as not only legs and top (which is no better than some sequence in the alphabet, e.g., H and I and J), but with the legs below the top, or between the top and the floor. That would be an association, arranging the manifold according to some kind of rule in pursuit of a necessitation of the manifold. Kant’s own example of perception in his subsequent Prolegomena was: when the sun shines on the stone, the stone grows warmer. That is a rule which describes the careful look at the manifold, but, again, has as of yet no suggestion of any necessity and does not denote a unified consciousness, but at this stage more a rote remembrance.

Now the recognition is very clear and constitutes knowledge/Erkenntnis. Here we conceive of an object according to a rule which is universal and is binding on all recognized objects, i.e., in accordance with the category, and also binds the immediate manifold of the perception and results in a unified consciousness. With regard to the stone and sunlight mentioned just above the recognition is that the sunlight warms the stone, and so where it is obviously such that, and then also why, the perception holds true, i.e., the reason that the stone is warm when the sun is shining on it is because the light of the sun is warm and thus causes the stone to warm up. And the reason the legs are between the top and the floor is because they are a table and a table is a flat surface elevated by legs for human convenience in use. Since this manifold of the perception is now integrated into the unified consciousness of self, we have a recognition (an objective perception).

The concept of an object is a rule which determines and then connects a particular manifold in the appearance in the unifying description/rule of a single object called

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518 See more about “association” below on or near page 809.

519 When I try to remember certain numbers I like to make up a rule to describe them, e.g., today it was 321, which is very easy and nice for me to find a rule like this, i.e., there are the same number of digits as the first number, and then each subsequent numeral decreases by 1. All this, Kant tells us, is the work of the productive imagination which is to be understood as a capacity for providing rules, connective rules.

520 See Prolegomena, Kant’s footnote to Par. 16, on or around page 51.
nature. Once this concept/rule accords with a category of the connective understanding, the appearances in the manifold then represents a specific object as a component of this all-encompassing nature.

Perception, therefore and now obviously, is a function of the category as the only means for achieving to a unified consciousness (called “self”) for it is in pursuit of the object of experience (originally called something general = X) that the perception is first undertaken, namely in this apprehension of a manifold, the careful sighting (paying attention) in the perspective/intuition/Anschauung of a composite thing, i.e., a manifold seen as a single thing (face in the cloud, a tree, table, the Big Dipper, etc.) and then a careful, relatively a priori, look at the manifold in order to associate the manifold and discover the object that the manifold represents.

Now it is possible to have an empirical perspective of some object, e.g., a table or a tree or a face in the cloud, without achieving to a perception, by simply seeing a something accompanied by a total absence of thought, and then seeing something else and then something else, etc., in a progression like the ABC's where upon B, A is forgotten and we are conscious of B, and which might lead to a C and where-upon then B is forgotten, etc., a disjointed consciousness. And so the perception is based on the premise that the manifold represents something, an object, i.e., can be unified, and it is in pursuit of that unification/object that we first come to appre-

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521 Kant speaks of a single experience, even as there is a single nature, and all so-called individual experiences are recognitions, all of which together make up this single experience. We need to keep in mind that the subjective perception is not yet integrated into this single, all-encompassing experience, but when it becomes a recognition, then this integration is complete. With a perception, therefore, we are still wondering and trying to figure it out and how it fits in with all our recognitions. See the “slamming door” at the end of this section. See also Two Metaphors concerning the integration of perceptions and recognitions.

522 Even the perception arises as a function of the category as the entire point and purpose in apprehending and reproducing a given manifold, for all this is undertaken in anticipation of a unification of the manifold. First, as we will see in TDA II 1-3 (Transcendental Deduction (A) Section II, 1-3 in Appendix I.2 beginning on or near page 711), we apprehend and retain the manifold, and then we utilize the productive imagination in pursuit of some binding/connection, and which binding is based on the categories, and which binding necessitates the manifold by means of the provision of an object, and that object expresses a unified consciousness, where diverse consciousness, e.g., legs and top, are make into one, e.g., legs of the table and top of the table. Accordingly all (subjective) perceptions are undertaken in anticipation of the recognition (objective perception) of an object and indeed of an object which fits in with a unified consciousness with respect not only to the immediate manifold, but also to experience in general. The primary justification for the application of the categories to the appearances is that the perception would not occur in the first place were it not for an anticipation of a connected manifold per those categories. And this is a key component of Kant’s “correction” of Hume’s conception of knowledge.
hend and reproduce (remembering as we go) and associate the manifold (in pursuit of a unifying rule) that happens to stand out to us in the empirical perspective.\textsuperscript{523}

So then this is how it goes (as a short review): there is the empirical perspective of something (like the table) just like there is a pure perspective of a triangle or circle traced out in midair. And there is no consciousness of self involved (other than the unity called “paying attention”), but merely some manifold composed of some diverse appearances, like the face in the cloud and seen as such, but totally without necessity. This is the careful apprehension and collection of the manifold (taking it all in), and then the reproduction of the manifold and association by the imagination via the application of some rule, e.g., when the sun shines on the stone, the stone gets warm. From this perception we move to the recognition when we have unified and necessitated the manifold via the concept of an object (which we devise for this very purpose), and where it is assumed (here we come to the affinity of all the appearances\textsuperscript{524}) that this object is compatible with all objects, or more precisely: this perception is compatible with all perceptions because the appearances are connected (directly or remotely), i.e., the appearances are part and parcel of a single object = nature. Regarding the stone and the sun we would now say in the recognition: the warmth of the sunlight causes the stone to grow warm.

And the unified consciousness of self arises by means of the necessitation of the sensitive manifold via the concept of the object and in accordance with the connective categories. Before this unification the consciousness is disjointed and held together, if at all, by rote. The consciousness of 1 is different from the consciousness of 2 and only when they are unified in the number 3 have we attained to a unified consciousness of self. Or the consciousness of legs and the consciousness of a top

\textsuperscript{523} I can easily imagine that my dog, Jacky, can look at me hundreds of times every day and not realize that I have two hands, as opposed to five or six (and not even to mention a left and right hand, which even most people don’t notice). I don’t think he has ever apprehended me, although he has seen me all the time. I’m not sure he knows that I am actually not twins or a bunch of clones who resemble each other, some in motorcycle outfits, some in pajamas, some naked (and I am not even sure he knows that my skin is not just another garment like the pants and shirt). In fact I am not even sure he sees me as opposed to my face and my arm and my leg and my hand and my fingers, etc., in the same way that I look out and see the trunk and the branch and the leaves and the clouds and the sky and the mountains, etc., i.e., a disjoined this and that. The apprehension of the perception is a conscious, careful look to determine a manifold, to establish a fact, as we might say.

\textsuperscript{524} This is one of the most critical and important aspect of Kant’s thinking regarding recognition, namely that we automatically and in advance of all experience make the assumption that all the appearances that invade our eyes and the brainarium in general are connected, either directly or remotely. This is the primary basis of human experience and which works to make all perceptions compatible with each other eventually, each being an element in a general experience of a single all-encompassing nature (which corresponds to, and arises from, the categorical make up of the human mode of understanding).
are disjoined and are finally unified in the consciousness of the object, table, so that the legs becomes the legs of the table, etc. And as the three straight lines (sides of a triangle) are necessitated by the rule of common end points and become a single thing (a triangle) consisting of a manifold (the three sides). Preceding all combination of a diverse and disjointed consciousness there is the potential called the pure apperception.

The **pure apperception** (a potential for unified consciousness) is the capacity for paying attention, and it must precede all experience because it is only by means of the apprehension and retention of data, i.e., the manifold (the elements of paying attention [TDA II 1 & 2]525), that we come to the first perception (which represents a determined fact, but which is not yet necessitated by being incorporated into a general experience, and hence is a subjective perception) and which then leads [TDA II 3 & 4] to the recognition (necessitating the perspective and at the same time unifying the consciousness by including this perception in the single, all encompassing experience, the focus of which is nature).526 And so the pure apperception is the potential for self awareness and the capacity for the perception, and when the manifold of data is unified via the object/rule and in accordance with a category of the understanding there arises an actual recognition of self which can then be considered in pure thought as in Descartes' “I think, therefore I am.”

The **association** is a difficult term in the Deduction. As I understand it there are two aspects. There is the Law of Association (see especially the TDA II 2) where we are speaking of how it is that by exposure we come to associate terms, so that when we see lightning we expect to hear the sound of thunder. This is an empirical law. The other use seems to be an a priori search for relevant information. For example, in the case of the Slamming Door below, upon the perception of the door trying to shut itself against my hand, I try to find something which I can associate with this as a cause, and find it in the open window. It is a search for a unifying rule. In the case of the Phantom Rain (also below) I perceive the sound of rain and, since the sky is sunny, I look about to find something to associate with this sound, and find it in the fluttering price tags of the recently purchased potted plants.

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525 “TDA” references the First (A) version of the Transcendental Deduction. The “II” indicates the Second Section of the TDA, and the “1 & 2” denote parts 1 and 2. This TDA is found in Appendix I.2 on or around page 711.

526 This unification of the consciousness may not be immediate, and until this is accomplished we remain with just a perception and not yet a recognition. In the case below of the Balky Bike it took several days for a recognition of the situation to arise. The information of the perception (the manifold of the appearances) would be included with my experience, as a potentiality and expectation, but not yet integrated.
Recap. We have a connective understanding consisting of various categories. When we wish to figure something out or to understand some situation, we undertake a perception which is premised on the possible connections available via the categories and which entails an accumulation of data by means of distinguishing time into the relevant (obtaining data) and the irrelevant. We then mull over and associate this data, utilizing our productive imagination, in search of a rule which will necessitate it. The rule, of course, will also have the category as the standard of acceptability. Once a rule is discovered which is consistent with a category, we can supply a name and we have a concept whereby then the manifold of the perception is necessitated and we end up with the recognition of the object of that concept. Due to the necessity of conformity with the categories (required for a unified consciousness), all of our recognitions will mesh and fit together as part of a single understanding and a single nature. The original prompt to undertaking an investigation (leading to the perception) is the assumption on the part of the understanding that all appearances are connected in one way or another (the so-called affinity of all appearances). As a result of all this we are able to realize that not only experience (connected perceptions = recognitions) but even perception itself is dependent upon the categories. This certification of the utility and necessity of the categories of the understanding with respect to the appearances (given independently of those categories) is the goal of this transcendental deduction.

Examples of Perceptions and Recognitions of the Object

Slamming Door

I live in a high rise condo. I am leaving my unit and shutting the door, and suddenly it seems to shut itself, putting pressure on my hand as I stand outside the unit in the hallway. That was funny, I think to myself (for it had never happened before); and in an effort to confirm this, I carefully open the door again and, sure enough, the door presses against my hand in an effort to shut itself. So this was a

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527 As the second footnote to Section 24 of the B version of the Deduction (on or around page 145 above) Kant had this to say about paying attention: "I do not understand why people find so much difficulty about the inner sense being affected by ourselves. Every time we pay attention to something we have an example of this. For there the understanding always determines the inner sense conformable to the connection which it thinks to the inner perspective which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How frequently the mind is affected in this way can be easily perceived within each person."

528 This second, "making sure" look constitutes what Kant would call a (subjective) perception (Wahrnehmung). I was taken by this hint of something odd and I had undertaken a deliberate test of that and paid attention to what I was doing and discovered that the door indeed tried to shut itself and had pushed against my hand.
fact (a perception). But why? How could this be? Here, of course, with this very question I am already assuming the affinity of all the appearances,\textsuperscript{529} namely that there is a reason for this, a connection (for all appearances are connected, one way or another), and this assumption is the basis for me to look about to find something which could be associated with this appearance (of the slamming door) and possibly lead to a connection. The door had never done anything like this before and so something must have changed (which is a conclusion based on the Second Analogy of Experience, namely causation [and which is only incidentally considered here in this treatment of the Transcendental Deduction] and which means essentially that the word “event” is a synonym for “effect”). Again I opened the door in an effort to find something to associate\textsuperscript{530} with this odd occurrence and noticed that the window was open (which was very rare) which was occasioned at this point in time by some painting that I done in the unit, i.e., in an effort to rid the condo air of the paint fumes. Not only was the window open, but the curtains were flapping in a breeze. Both the pressure of the door and the open window and wind were elements of the apprehension and which I was keeping in mind by reproducing them all together as a manifold (or grouping) as I continued. But where would the breeze be going? for I noticed that all the other doors in the hallway were closed. Then I suddenly remembered that in the hallway there were exhaust ducts which acted by gravity, i.e., warm air would rise through them to the vents in the roof whenever air might enter the hallway via the occasional opened unit and elevator doors (and worked to freshen the air in the otherwise sealed hallway). This information was added to the growing manifold of data in my effort to find something to associate with this odd occurrence. And in a flash, it all came together in a unified consciousness whereby the manifold of the perceptions were necessitated, and thus constituted a recognition.\textsuperscript{531} The air within the building was much warmer than the external air (this was in the winter, but I didn’t make that association immediately), but could not easily escape through the ducts because there were no intake ducts for air to enter the hallway (except, again, when a door and a window were opened). When I opened the door to my unit this constituted an opening for the cooler air to enter the building through my condo window and enabled the warmer,

\textsuperscript{529} For the meaning of “appearance” go to Perspectives, beginning on or near page 803. As a hint, in German an appearance (\textit{eine Erscheinung}) includes such as the “water” that commonly appears in a highway in the distance and which vanishes when the location of that “water” is reached.

\textsuperscript{530} This rather remarkable assumption on the part of the human, deliberately looking for something to associate with what has happened, is an a priori search which is prompted by the productive imagination and based upon the affinity (connection of all appearances in one way or another) which is in turn based upon the category as the only means for unifying the human consciousness.

\textsuperscript{531} I had gathered the manifold into a single consciousness, held together thus far essentially by rote as I sought a unification, and now I had a unified consciousness.
interior air to rise rapidly to the roof through the vents, thus permitting the outside air to enter my condo. When I had tried to close the door, this was like shutting a valve or damper in the airflow system set up by the exhaust ducts and the open window and door, and the pressure of the moving air was strong enough to force the door to close without my assistance. Thus I had unified the manifold in my consciousness and had done so in a way that was integrated with all my perceptions in general (as functions of a single nature, i.e., warmer air rises and cooler air sinks) via the category of causation. I had explained and necessitated the slamming door by means of the concept of a value in an air flow system.

Briefly: I apprehended the pressing of the door and the open window (and fluttering curtains denoting a movement of air). I kept this manifold in mind in my reproduction imagination as I looked for something to tie in with this, to associate with it, and then I also added the hallway vents leading to the roof and the cooler air outside the building. Finally, maintaining presence of mind regarding this puzzle, I put this all together in the form of the object via my productive imagination, namely a “chimney” where both the door and the window played the role of dampers or valves. The subjective perception was now a recognition (objective perception) and it all made sense, i.e., the manifold was necessitated and unified in my consciousness and fit in with my general experience, e.g., the play of warm and hot air.

The critical component for Kant’s purposes in the deduction of the categories is that the deliberate reopening of the door (the beginning of the perception in paying attention to make sure) was premised on the affinity of connection of the appearances and the basis of all connection, i.e., the categories of understanding. Without them it would not have occurred to me to take a second look (a perception) and try the door again. And so to this extent even perception is dependent upon the affinity and that in turn upon the category-connections of our understanding.

**Phantom Rain**

I want to include another example of this process in the hope that it will aid the students of Kant to try to catch themselves in process of engaging in the steps related to a connection and recognition.\(^{532}\) I am sitting out on the porch of my new home one afternoon and suddenly I am taken by a pitter-patter sound. I pay atten-

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\(^{532}\) We usually look for and make connections automatically and do not pay attention to what we are doing, and thus forget the process. If we can learn to pay attention to the process of what we are about, we can see ourselves engaging in precisely what Kant is talking about in this TDA (Appendix I.2).
tion and hear the sound of rain drops falling down the roof’s drain pipe close by (or so I thought). A perception and apprehension and retention of a manifold. But I also notice there is no rain and not even any clouds, and the only possibility might be that my solar hot water heater on the roof has sprung a leak. (Here we add to the perception, obtaining a growing manifold.) But I think that a leak there is highly unlikely and dismiss that for the moment as not significant. As I listen longer and stare out into the garden I suddenly notice that the wind is blowing something (something which is perhaps associable) and is blowing the price tags attached to two potted plants that I had purchased that morning and which were sitting in the garden waiting to be planted. A manifold of perceptions has arisen now: the sound, no rain and the wind and the slight clatter of the wind-blown price tags. And so suddenly my productive imagination puts it all together and I recognize what is going on: the sound of rain drops was actually the noise made by the price tags being blown against the pots by the wind (and which were close to the drain pipe). Now a connection was made and the sound of the “dripping rain water” was explained, and I had necessitated the manifold and unified the consciousness. Thus a recognition. As in the previous case of the slamming door, my look for an explanation (the object) was predicated on the affinity of appearances and the connective categories. Otherwise I would simply have enjoyed the sound of rain on that sunny afternoon and the beautiful, bright vista before me.

**Balky Bike**

And now to another example. When the brand new motorbike suddenly sputtered to a stop on the way home from the dealer, I was confused and looked about to see if I had thrown the stop switch by accident. I couldn’t see anything amiss. And then it cranked up again and sounded ok, and so I thought that it was just some fluke = a happenstance. And so I took off again. Then suddenly after a little while it sputtered to a stop again. Now I tried to make associations. I checked the gas lever and looked everything over again including the gas tank, thinking that maybe it was almost empty. But the tank had gas enough. And then again it cranked up and sounded ok again. And so I just shook my head and started again, no problem, but with some trepidation about what might happen next. This happened twice more.

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533 This example, but not this terminology, was utilized in my “Circles in the Air” essay appearing in 1996 in the *Kant-Studien*.

534 I don’t think that “fluke” is a term suitable for Kant’s system. Here it will have meant an odd, unrecognized cause which would not be repeated and might remain unexplained, although an explanation would be presupposed per the affinity of all appearances, but of not interest. For example, perhaps a bit of trash were in the gasoline tank.
before I finally reached home. Something was definitely amiss. Perhaps something the dealer had done or failed to do.

So far I had taken in a manifold of a new bike that runs fine and then suddenly stops and then starts up and runs fine for a while, before going through all that again. I kept it in mind. This running and stopping was very sporadic, only now and then. I could find nothing to associate with this peculiar functioning.

A couple of days later I could make a further association, this time with the weather. I had realized that the bike was cranky only when I was riding to work in the morning, and when going home in the afternoon, it worked fine. So I included this in the manifold and kept all this in mind as I sought to make some association. (Probably someone more familiar with motorbikes could already have suspected a certain problem based on this information, this manifold of perceptions.) Still I could not conceive of what was happening (which, again, was an assumption of my understanding, namely there is a cause for this and it can be discovered by considering all aspects of the bike and the driving and the fuel, etc., and it just had not yet been discovered [the affinity of all appearances]).

So far then and subjective speaking, we have the apprehension of a manifold (the bike and its sporadic failures and per TDA II 1) and a retention of this manifold via a reproduction of the imagination (TDA II 2) and where I am trying to put things together (productive imagination) and solve this problem.

This is the perception, the recognition of an individual fact (of a manifold), but without understanding and unification in a single apperception.

During this period of the bike problems I was also using my imagination not only to reproduce and remember the manifold (start, stop, etc.) but also to make associations with something, with anything, that might be at play, some evidence of the actual cause of this odd behavior (‘odd” given the concept of the motor bike as a rationally conceived and presumably well engineered machine).

Two days later and during the warm part of the day I removed the gas tank cover (to check on the level of gasoline in the tank) and heard a hissing sound. Suddenly everything (the manifold of irregularity in performance) came together and I saw or perceived the object, namely what all this manifold represented. The vent in the tank for the gravity feed from the gas tank into the engine must have gotten partly clogged somehow and in cold weather (mornings) a partial vacuum was forming in the tank and keeping the gasoline from entering freely and properly into the engine.
below the tank (and via gravity). But in hot weather (afternoons), when the bike functioned very well, the gas was expanding and trying even to force itself out to the engine and despite the partly clogged vent (and also into the engine and making for good performance) and also caused the hissing when I removed the cover during the heat of the day.

Now I had attained to a recognition (objective perception). For I had conceived of an object for the apprehended and reproduced (and associated) manifold to represent, namely a clogged tank vent system. Now I understood the behavior of the bike, and it fit in with all my perceptions concerning the bike, and all motorbikes and machines and everything else in the world. And later the dealer confirmed my conclusion and made a repair.

Two things now to take from this.

1. The connection of the manifold of my looking and perceiving was a function of a rule, called the concept of the object, which necessitates the manifold (sputtering only in cool weather). This necessitation is a function of the productive imagination as it takes the reproduced manifold and seeks to make associations in an attempt to combine the manifold (of the perceptions) in accordance with one of the categories of connection (in this case: causation). And this connection is an expression of the original a priori consciousness of self called the pure apperception (whereby I was keeping the manifold in a single consciousness, but not yet unified, i.e., by mere reproduction or rote). The categories enabled a manifold to be joined as parts of a single object. This join or connection represents a numerically identical apperception, a consciousness of the disparate elements of a manifold or composite as seen originally in my looking alone, but now seen as parts of a single thing, as representing an object (faulty gas line). Due to this makeup of the apperception to obtain its unity solely by means of the categories of understanding ("now I understand"), it follows that no appearance can represent an object for us except by means of the category. There is no connection except via the appropriate category (here that of causation). Indeed even the perception itself is dependent upon the category as the basis for paying attention to (or the careful-take of) the manifold of the bike’s functioning in an effort to identify the problem in the first place.

2. The second consideration obtains from this. Namely it is one thing for the recognition of a given appearance to be subject to the categories, but it is still another thing to know this is to be expected and even required, that there are no such things as “flukes” (sheer chance) and that all the appearances are connected per a tran-
scendental affinity known as a totally interconnected nature. It was for this reason that I had undertaken associations; I was in search for a connection in the manifold of the perception. This is the reason that perceptions are held in abeyance until they are integrated in with all the perceptions which together make up a single experience (which is a composite of all recognitions); or if they don’t repeat, then eventually perhaps just forgotten (until by some circumstance the solution is seen, at which point the “fluke” is recalled and counted as solved = the manifold is perceived consistently with the composite of all perceptions called experience).

The upshot of this second consideration is that all the appearances fit together in a single nature, and so an explanation must be forthcoming, even if difficult to uncover and piece together at any given moment.

Nature is the ultimate Transcendental Object = X and it encompasses all of the appearances; and so they are all under laws of a single nature and which therefore can be discovered and recognized. The choice before the human, perhaps one could say, is between treating the appearance as a thing on its own (as the animals surely do), or else treating it as merely the appearance of some object (which ultimately = nature). If we consider it as a thing on its own, there would be no justification for looking for any necessitation in the manifold of the balky bike (for then it would be a thoughtless look at a manifold in the appearances). The only option is to treat the appearance as the representation of an object (here a correctly engineered bike with some defect). But all representations, obviously, are functions of the apperception (for it is only via this apperception that they can be my representations) and likewise also my conception of the manifold of appearances and the assignment of an object for that manifold to represent. And since the possibility of an actual connection depends on the makeup of the apperception as the capacity for unification, and since that unification in turn depends upon the categories, we can understand how all the appearances must be subject to the categories, for otherwise they cannot represent anything at all and consequently would have to come across to us as things on their own.⁵³⁵ And likewise (as stated above) even the perception in paying attention is dependent upon the category as the foundation of an orderly and connected world (in our perspective).

More generally speaking, we can say there are two components concerning perception and recognition, namely:

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⁵³⁵ The most we could do with things on their own would be to memorize them or develop associations, à la David Hume, in terms of the frequency or intensity of the exposure to the thing, i.e., a perception, but where there would be no a priori insistence or even conception of a connection, i.e., a recognition of the object. It would be like dealing with an alphabet instead of numbers (see Two Metaphors).
1. Subjective. The capacity for apprehending and collecting a manifold of appearances, and then reproducing that as a manifold and associating it in an attempt to find a rule (concept) which would necessitate the manifold so that it represents an object.

2. Objective. Here the focus is on the apperception. There is a single self-consciousness which must permeate all representations. The rule for the necessitating of the manifold (above in the subjective component) must accord with a category in order to be assimilated into the apperception.

Review of the First (A) Version of the Transcendental Deduction, Section 2

Now we may take a broader look at TDA.II. We are given a manifold in the senses (looking or perspective or Anschauung) which is called a synopsis. We apprehend that manifold or composite (TDA.II.1) and we reproduce it mentally and keep it in mind (TDA.II.2). In order to recognize an object we must conceive of something which were so constituted that it would have to appear as the manifold appears to us. We are not restrained by the apprehended order (which is subjective) and can play with the manifold in an effort to find an objective apperception. When we come up with this rule of connection we recognize the object as being represented by the manifold (TDA.II.3). Essentially this connection of the manifold of the appearance is based on the transcendental unity and identity of the apperception, the consciousness of self which is numerically identical with all perceptions (TDA.II.4) and where we are able to keep the entire manifold in mind and have it fit in with all our recognitions. This identity is maintained by devising the manifold-unifying rule such that the necessitated manifold will also reflect the connective categories of our understanding. Consequently it is clear that all appearances which are to be recognized as objects are subject to these connective categories. Otherwise the perception of the manifold is entirely subjective and disjointed and not connected with any identical consciousness of self, and thus essentially meaningless.

536 In the case of Balky Bike above the original apprehension (dealt with in TDA II 2 in Appendix I.2) began with a stuttering and stopping of the bike and then encompassed the performance in cool and warm weather, but then the objective apprehension (per the productive imagination) began with the cooler weather and then the halting of the bike. This reordering and association would be a function of the productive (as opposed to the merely reproductive) imagination. And later, of course, the beginning element (not known until later) was the faulty tank vent.

537 For example we conceive of a table as an elevated surface for human usage and by means of that unify the top and the legs as parts of a single object, i.e., the table.
But then how do we make sure that the recognition of this object is consistent with
the recognition of another object or with another recognition of this same object?
Experience is a single composite of all of the recognitions. The categories, by pro-
viding for the connection of the perceptions in a single experience, also then render
the connection of any single object so that its perception can be joined in the com-
mon experience. And so the connection of a given appearance via an object is un-
dertaken in a universal manner so that all the perceptions whatsoever will be and
remain connected (once they become recognitions, i.e. objective recognitions).

But then why do we think that all the appearances are subject to this connection,
that they represent objects rather than just being things on their own which we may
memorize if we wish, i.e., where everything is simply a fluke? We do in fact make
this assumption. What is our justification for doing this?

It is only in this way (by the manifold being subject to the conditions of the unified
and identical apperception) that we can have the appearances represent anything at
all and not instead be the so-called things on their own. If the appearances don’t
represent an object, then they are things on their own and can never be understood
by the human,\textsuperscript{538} and so there would never be any justification for going beyond, or
even to initiate, a perception, which is a manifold which could be simply consid-
ered as happenstance and which is observed, memorized and mentally reproduced
by rote. It would include just appearances as: trees get smaller at a distance and
people tend to speak more softly at a distance, and where distant dogs (at a dis-
tance) morph into mail boxes when approached, and where large chunks of melting
snow on the side of the road ahead turn into discarded white plastic trash bags
closer up. This would be the character of our consciousness: entirely isolated and
unique and no more connected than the ABC’s.\textsuperscript{539}

In a word: the appearance is either a thing on its own (or better: thoughtless object
of the perspective/anschauung), or it is the representation of some object, i.e., na-

\textsuperscript{538} Since the appearance of a table, for example, can serve as a representation of a table or of the color
brown, let us say, or a certain shape, etc., what is the manifold of the appearance of a table without a
concept of the object that the particular table under consideration to represent? It would represent nothing
and simply be a thing on its own.

\textsuperscript{539} In the TDA.II.4 (Appendix I.2) Kant stresses the fact that it is only via the connective capacity of the
apperception (via the categories of the pure understanding) that appearances can represent anything at
all. He speaks of “thoughtless objects of our looking” while here I call them the thing on its own. Strictly
speaking Kant is more accurate, for the object of our looking does appear in terms of the forms of our
looking, i.e., space and time, and these are not binding on things on their own which cannot be looked at,
but only thought in a negative way, e.g., not this and not that.
ture = law-driven connections. To be a representation of any object it must comply with the connective conditions of the unity of the apperception. And that means connection of the manifold via the rule binding the manifold into representations of the relevant object, and also at the same time in accordance with the category, which is necessary for the unification of the apperception. And so by looking at all the appearances as representations of some, as yet undetermined, object we subject them to the categories. This is Kant’s transcendental affinity of all the appearances.

Connection of the manifold for a single recognition is one with the connection of the manifold of all recognitions in a single experience.

Now let’s step even further back and see what we have accomplished so far. We began our inquiry concerning knowledge by considering the way things appear to us. This is not the thinking of the object, but rather the looking at the object. We see all things, which can ever come to our sight, in terms of space and time. We don’t get space and time from the images of things, but add them as the peculiar way that we happen to notice things, how we look at and see them, our anschauung of, or take on, appearances. We see them here and there, and now and earlier. We can’t get this from experience. This is within us as the form of human looking/perspective or anschauung in general. Accordingly we know that we don’t see things on their own as rather objects of our looking which for us are entirely appearances, i.e., manifolds pictured as single things and made up of sensations (indeed like the face in the cloud). Faces don’t exist in the cloud, but are a product of our imaginative looking, our anschauung/perspective and our capacity for grasping a manifold in terms of time and space. We know of space and time, e.g., that two sides of a triangle are greater than the third, and that something can both be and not be, but only at different times, we supply of ourselves as our way of looking. These hold for all things which can ever possibly arise to our sight and senses, and all appearances are thus subject to the conditions of our looking and only exist as objects in our looking, and that is always space and time.

So here we understand how all appearances are thus subject to time and space in order to be objects for us.

Then Kant introduces the thinking into the equation and shows how the various possible judgments that humans make are in an order, and reflect certain connective concepts called the categories of understanding. We saw that we could not

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540 What we see when we look, i.e., per the anschauung, is essentially a function of our background and exposure, e.g., spying a face in a cloud depends first on discerning a face on the front of a human head (and “front” is also a way of looking at the head, a perspective).
have come to these categories via experience (the metaphysical deduction), just as
we could not have come to the notions of time and space via experience; rather
they are added to the impression of the senses in order to have experience. And so
they are simply connective devices for representing states of mind and are called
concepts. Now we want to see how it is that these concepts/categories, that we our-
selves arrive it independently of all experience, could nevertheless be binding of
the appearances just as space and time bind them, i.e., necessarily.

And that is what we then undertook to show above. The concept is a unified con-
sciousness where a manifold of consciousness is singular and identical (held to-
gether in one presence of mind), and the object is a perspective which matches that
concept. Therefore the only way an object can be recognized (with thought and
anschauung/perspective matching) is in accordance with the requirements of a uni-
fied consciousness, and for the human that means the categories of our understand-
ing. So that shows that any given object is subject to the categories. But how about
all the objects together? How can we be sure that we are putting all objects to-
gether in a compatible way? And how can we be sure that all appearances are rep-
resentations of objects? Might some of them not be merely appearances, but rather
things on their own?

The key to this puzzle lies in the notion of representation, of having a “stand in” or
a “stand for” or “example of.” As things on their own appearances are whatever
they are and are beyond the pale of human knowledge. As objects of looking with-
out thought (without the connection of the manifold) they are in space and time,
but they are much like things on their own in that they are unpredictable and spon-
taneous (like faces in clouds) and at best might be memorized or naturally associ-
ated through exposure, somewhat like the ABC’s. There is no necessitation in the
appearances as such. We could have a host of unrelated and unique perceptions of
all sorts of things (and it would be less organized than a dream, as Kant puts it). We
approach the objects of the looking/perspective with an expectation of making
sense of them, making connections, for we conceive of them not as things or
thoughtless objects of the looking (like a face in the cloud), but as representations
of something. And that something is the object of our perspective. And again this
expectation is based on the affinity of all appearances which is based on the cate-
gory makeup of our understanding.

The option is clear: essentially speaking we intellectually approach the manifolds
of the appearances in the empirical looking as being either things on their own, or
else as merely representation of things. The object which all of these appearances
would represent in general is nature. Nature (law abiding existence) is the ultimate transcendental object.

Thus the reason that the appearances are subject to the categories is that categorical connection is the only way that we can think any object that the appearances can represent to us. The only way that the appearances can represent something instead of being something (an object of looking, like the face in the cloud) is by means of the apperception, and the condition for a unified apperception is the category of human understanding. Accordingly all appearances are subject to the categories of understanding, the form of our thinking, just as they are subject to the forms of our looking in space and time.

In this way then Kant completes the transcendental deductions of the categories in application to the appearances just as he has done with the transcendental deduction of the applicability of time and space (as the peculiar forms of our looking) to those same appearances. The categories of the understanding are necessary for even the first perception to be undertaken.541 And this shows that even Hume’s vaunted perceptions are subject to the categories, a primary objective of Kant in composing The Critique of Pure Reason.

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541 I suggest that the reader consider the essay “Circles in the Air” for a more expansive discussion of this Transcendental Deduction A and especially the very difficult Part II.
The Antinomy in General.

The antinomy arises by the juxtaposition of two contradictory assertions and where it is clear that one must be true and the other false. For example the following could constituted an antinomy (albeit quite contrived):

Judy smells better than Bill versus Bill smells better than Judy.

It is obvious (at first glance) that there is a contradiction and both assertions cannot be true. The proofs could proceed as follows: For the thesis, i.e., if Bill smelled better than Judy then people would not be holding their noses when around Bill but not around Judy; but they do precisely this and so Judy must smell better than Bill. And as far as the antithesis is concerned we can say, i.e., that if Judy smells better than Bill, then Judy would discern the slight odors that Bill does, but tests prove that she cannot, and so it is clear that Bill must smell better than Judy.

The solution to this conflict is, of course, very simple: the term “smell” is taken into two different senses, once as an unpleasant odor, and secondly as a capacity for discerning odors.

We should note that this example does not capture the full sense of the antinomy indicated by Kant. In the first place if I had stated the matter as: Judy smells better than Bill does, versus: Bill smells better than Judy can, then it would be clear that we were speaking of two different uses of the term “smell”, and there would be no illusion. Furthermore with an antinomy proper, there is no appeal to experience directly, for the argument is based on reasoning alone, i.e., out beyond any possible experience. But the example still gives us the feel of the antinomy and how there can be an illusion involved which is based on a different use and meaning of the same terms. It is also clear that in such an argument as an antinomy, whoever pre-

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542 There is still another alternative, namely: both could be false, and this would be the case if neither person smelled better than the other in that both were without smell or both lacked any capacity for smelling odors. Another example of a both-correct antinomy (where driving is on the right side of the road, as in England): to drive on the left side is to drive on the right side, and to drive on the right side is to drive on the wrong side. Following the logic: therefore to drive on the left side is to drive on the wrong side. But that is a contradiction. Here both statements are true, for the left is spatial (opposed to right) and the “right” in the second part means proper or correct (and opposed to wrong). Right is understood here in two different ways. And so there is no contradiction at all and both statements are true.

543 The reasoning begins with experience, but then goes out beyond any experience in pursuit of the unconditioned.
sents the last argument wins, for since each is able to proof his point by refuting the premise of the other, it follows that whoever argues last would prove his point by refuting his opponent.

Now while in the case of some of the four antinomies that Kant examines, namely the first two, the solution arises that both arguments are false and due to the relevant terms having no objective meaning, while the case with the others, as with our example here (the third antinomy), is that both sides can be true and where the illusion arises in the use of the same term in a different meaning.

**The Third Antinomy.**

Here the thesis has it that not all causality in the world is natural and that there must be some freedom. And the antithesis asserts that all causality in the world is that of the laws of nature, and so there is no freedom. We now look at the summaries of these arguments in the style of Kant who wanted to present them side by side in his book (see page 391 of the *Critique*), and where we can clearly see that neither can be proven on its own and directly, but only by a proof that the opposing argument must be false.

Since, as we warned, the argument for each side is based solely on proving the opposite side false, and since both sides can do this, and yet since the arguments are mutually contradictory, the question must now arise as to whether reason itself is irrational? Unless a solution can be found for this, such a conclusion will be obvious. We now turn to an investigation of a solution to this antinomy.

**Conceivable Solution of Third Antinomy.**

As we have seen from the previous consideration of experience we are not allowed to break the chain of causation we find for nature, and so this must extend backwards without reference to any spontaneous action. Thus the antithesis must be asserted a priori, namely that every event is caused and that cause itself is an

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544 This is based on the Second Analogy of the Transcendental Analytic (around page 207) where we see that the principle of universal causation is necessary for the recognition of an event and thus of experience itself, i.e., to recognize that something has happened. Without this there is no way of distinguishing an objective event from a subjective event, e.g., that the table has been moved to the window versus noticing that a table is in front of the window. In the first case we become aware that earlier the table was not in front of the window and in the second case we only notice the relationship of the table to the window, but not that it has come about, for it could be that we simply did not notice a continuing relationship earlier, i.e., the table was always in front of the window and we had not paid any attention.
event which has arisen and so which must have been caused, and so on. Accordingly the only possible solution would arise if one and the same event could be the effects of two different causalities, one of nature and the other of freedom. This would show that both sides can be right.\(^{545}\)

**Dual Causality as a Solution.**

One aspect that will be helpful is to recognize Kant’s point in the remarks to the thesis where we understand that we can look at freedom more generally, and not consider just an *original* spontaneous action, but to allow such spontaneous actions to arise at any time in the march of time.\(^{546}\) Accordingly we will conceive of a current natural reaction to circumstances and conditions of the past and consider the possibility that what passes here as a *natural reaction* could also at the same time be a *free action* by considering a different, albeit simultaneous, causality. In anticipation of such a solution we need first to understand what we mean regarding the object.

**Transcendental Idealism.**

What do we mean with the objects that we see here and there and now and then? According to common and scientific understanding light waves from the sun strike a tree before us in the yard, to use as an example, and some light is absorbed by the tree and that the light that we call the color of the tree is reflected and some of it enters into the eye through the lens and is projected upside down and with left and right reversed on the retina. Then optical nerves relay this information electrically to the brain and there, after adjustments are made for the distortion by the lens of the eye, a visa unfolds which we call the tree, and more precisely the appearance of the tree or an image of the tree. This appearance of the tree along with the sky and ground and everything else appearing to us would have its existence *as an appearance* in what we might call the brainarium. This would be on the order of a planetarium, and would exist only within the confines of our skulls.

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\(^{545}\) This solution will not seek to prove any fact of freedom, but only that freedom is compatible with the necessity of nature by speaking of two different causalities, i.e., nature and freedom.

\(^{546}\) Thus if freedom could exemplify itself even once, then why not twice, etc.? Kant gives an example of such a sudden spontaneous action by suddenly rising from his chair without any reason, and thus which is independent of the laws of nature and which then also starts a new series on its own.
Now there are two ways of considering this appearance of a tree. We could conceive of it to be a real thing just as it appears to us and which, for example, would physically get larger and smaller depending on the distance from us. And if this were the case then our connective understanding would have no basis for any sort of judgments about this appearance. The most we could do would be to get used to this difference in size relative to distance and come to expect it à la David Hume.

On the other hand we can also consider the appearance to be just what it is, namely an appearance and not a real thing at all. In this case the tree we spy would be only the representation of a tree and we would not think that the tree, which this appearance represents to us, were changing shape or size.

We come to this second understanding by considering a priori and in advance of all experience that all appearances are connected in a single object which we call nature. With this suggestion of connection, which is a manifestation of our connective understanding (connecting diverse representations by means of certain categories), we are on the lookout for hints of this connection and are especially taken by coincidences, and undertake experiments to discover and recognize the connections. This routine enables us ultimately to conceive of a real thing, which we call the object of experience (a technical term), i.e., the tree in our example, which we think of as existing in a real space and time and independently of us and in accordance with certain laws of nature. And is by virtue of this conceived real tree that we are able to realize and recognize that what we actually see is an appearance within our brainarium, which indeed is the beginning of all experience.

547 It is needful to realize that this “real” space and time in which we position the tree as an object of experience is itself a projection of the space and time of the brainarium. For it is one thing to notice the tree, and another thing, for example, to notice it now to the left of the bush where earlier it was in front of the bush (per our position of looking). And so space and time are the way that we look at things within the brainarium; they are the forms of our looking/perspective; they are what we can notice when we look at things, but which are not in the objects looked at at all, but solely and entirely within us, within our brainarium. Time and space seem real enough independently of us, but this is the illusion of the refrigerator light: every time we open the refrigerator door we see that the interior is illuminated, and so it seems like it is always illuminated. Likewise space and time seem omnipresent, but that’s because anytime we want to look at anything we are looking in terms of space and time, the forms of our looking.

548 These laws are suggested by our connective understanding and are discerned in particular experiments to be laws of this nature, e.g., action and reaction are equal or cooled air causes some liquids to solidify.
David Hume knew this, but could not figure out how he could have known it, and so resorted to “academic skepticism” where he doubted even his own system.549

So and as a recap: for the sake of experience it is necessary that we posit this thing on its own (and which assumption is then validated by the fact of experience itself, for only in this way can experience ever arise in the human being). But since we are dependent upon our looking/perspective and our thinking (via the connective understanding) the thing that we actually see is the object of experience, i.e., how this thing appears in time and space and how it is subject to laws of nature (conceived of by our understanding). This is a limitation of our knowledge and a very important point and bears repeating: we conceive of the thing on its own, but we can only recognize the object of experience. From a common and scientific standpoint we say that the object of experience is the thing on its own. But in a transcendental setting we see that the object of experience is merely a conceptual device for combining the appearances and making them representations of this object, and fundamentally nothing more is actually available or given to us than the appearances. Hence from a transcendental standpoint, this object of experience is merely itself an appearance, how the thing on its own appears within a brainarium, and not how it is on its own independently from any looking.

The Two Characters.

Now when we consider the thing on its own transcendentally we can know that it can never appear to us as a thing on its own, but only as looked at and thought about as the object of experience. In other words there can be other properties of this thing besides what is attributed to the object of experience, properties which cannot appear within a brainarium. Such properties might be call intelligible, to indicate a reality which cannot appear within a brainarium. Such a property of the human, for example, might be the capacity of freedom, transcendental freedom, i.e., a capacity for a spontaneous action which is not subject to the laws of nature, even if that free event might also be expected in the course of the things of a lawful nature. Such a property, like the thoughts and motives of another person, cannot appear to us within a brainarium, and must be inferred, if at all, from the appearances, from that person’s actions and speech.

549 According to Hume’s system we are dealing with things on their own and so where we could never come to any necessity and so where what is causation is merely a customary occurrence, e.g., on a certain road I always spy a dog sitting by the road, and when I reach the end of the road I see that the dog has morphed into a mailbox. Hume knew this was incorrect, but was never able to account for the recognition we have that the dog was not a thing, but only the appearance of a something from a distance. He knew it was an appearance but was unable to explain how it is that we could realize that it was only an appearance.
The solution to the third antinomy then can lie in the hypothesis of a transcendental freedom, the capacity to start a series at any point in time, but independently of the determinations of time, and as a property of the thing on its own, an intelligible property which can be expressed in the brainarium in terms of its actions, but which can no more be sensed than the blind can sense color or the deaf sound. All that is available to the eye of science will be the empirical character which can be completely explained in terms of experience and the laws of nature.

The Empirical Character.

Now we turn to the human and consider his condition. He reasons about things and this is reflected in what we might called the empirical character, i.e., the object of experience in sociology and psychology. And he uses his reasoning to fashion rules of conduct, even though this formulation may be accomplished subconsciously. And the goals for the rules of accomplishing something will be a function of his background and upbringing and various (and often conflicting) desires. And so his use of reason will be a function of his makeup and mentality. Accordingly then we infer a person’s motives and temperament from his actions and speech and even gestures and then we can trace this empirical character back to his childhood and upbringing and other conditions and in this way understand how he could come to possess such a characteristic way of behavior, and finally then we can utilize this character to predict with accuracy all of the future actions of the individual, given the circumstances and occasions that arise in time.

Let us take the example that Kant suggests in the solution to this antinomy, namely a person who voluntarily lies and produces in that way a certain confusion into society. This person will have a certain background and makeup and a temperament which arouses resentments against people whom he perceives to treat him in a disparaging way. As a result of these elements he will tend to respond to perceived slights in a way designed for retribution. All this is understandable and expected and this routine represents a characteristic of his personality. Thus when the appropriate circumstances arise, he reacts according to his character and seeks his revenge by telling lies about the person who has offended him. And he utilizes his own reason to assist him how best to express himself, and this becomes part and parcel of his empirical character.

550 Perhaps an analogy arises in modern astrophysics in the form of dark matter and energy which cannot be seen or sensed, but the effects of which (or at least of something) are noted in the otherwise inexplicable movements of the galaxies. These two dark “things” are needed for the equations.
Another example might be the case of St. Paul of Christian fame. He started off as a young man with a determination to keep his Jewish culture free of the influences of the new Christian movement and sought to persecute and to deter the early Christians who were Jews. Later he changed his mind and obtained a new understanding and orientation, and started working on behalf of the Christian faith. What remain constant was his zeal and dedication for what he understood to be the will of God, be it for the Jews against the Christians, or be it, as later, on behalf of the Christians. He exemplified an empirical character which was constant as expected, and which will have been a product of his mentality and temperament and upbringing, etc. His behavior was remained consistent with his empirical character, although it was affected by his particular understanding.

So the empirical character constitutes a customary behavior which comes into play when the opportunities arise. In this way everything is explained and there is no question as to how it is that the individual developed the rules that he did. And in this way the use of reason also becomes one of the laws of nature, and certain effects, e.g., a malicious lie, arise by means of that.551

The Intelligible Character.

Now at the same time (and drawing on the notion of the thing on its own versus the object of experience as indicated above in the section on the Transcendental Idealism) we can look upon the human being as an intelligible being with an intelligible character and (here posited only as a fiction, to prove the point of compatibility) as a transcendentally free agent who can act independently of the laws of nature, and so to which we ascribe responsibility of the empirical character. In that case all of the faults of the person (the malicious liar cited above) we can ascribe to the person and declare that he did not have to choose as he did, and that he could have chosen different rules and different actions, and the reason is that he himself knows that he ought to have chosen differently. And so what he did he chose to do and chose to do so freely and without the compulsions of any laws of nature. And so in the case just described we can hold the individual responsible for his actions in telling the lie, i.e., we can consider him as free in a transcendental way and thus where the empirical character is a freely chosen appearance of his intelligible character.

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551 Then, as Hume asserted, reason is considered as the “slave to passion” and is utilized to further the interest of the individual in terms of his empirical character.
We might look at a rather silly example for emphasis, and consider a tree to have an empirical character and an intelligible one. On the intelligible basis, the tree actually decides freely to put out leaves in the spring and to discard them in fall, and it just looks like it is the work of nature. It is a spontaneous action on the part of the tree and it could have decked itself out with leaves in the middle of the winter if it had so chosen. The empirical character, in contrast, is putting out leaves in spring and discarding in fall, and this is a work of nature and there is no basis for any consideration of something called freedom. And so we can simply assert as an arbitrary fiction that the tree is free and is deliberately and unilaterally putting forth and discarding leaves, and that it is only a coincidence that this occurs when the weather changes. Such an assertion is of no use at all to science, of course, but it can be arbitrarily maintained without contradiction (which is all that Kant wants to accomplish at this stage in his thinking).

**Solution to the Third Antinomy.**

In this wise then we have the solution to this antinomy: we can look at a single event (the lie in the case of our example) and declare it to be both a necessary effect of some natural cause (the background and temperament, etc.) and still also the effect of a free action (being a product of reason), depending upon whether we are considering the empirical character as the object of experience (which is the way of science) or merely as an appearance of the intelligible character, i.e., a freely chosen action, and which would be considering the human as a thing on its own independently from all appearances of the brainarium.

**Transcendental Reflection.**

It is worthwhile to compare the thing on its own with the object of experience, which is essentially merely an abbreviation for some connected appearances, e.g., the tree in winter and the tree in summer. As a thing on its own the tree is conceived of as given in its totally and all of its conditions. But this does not hold of the tree as an appearance. As an appearance none of the conditions are given, but only what is discernible in the appearance. With a tree at first all that is given is the external appearance. When we dig into the tree and find pulp and further that the pulp consists of cells. And so far all that is given in the appearance are these cells.

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552 We do accept this freedom concerning the human because he has reasoning and he understands what “ought” means and he knows (or believes to know) that for any reasoned action he could have acted differently than he did.
Next we can look and dig closer and find molecules and then atoms and finally (so far in our looking) we find particles which appear to bounce around and in and out of existence and, so it appears, at random.

In the case of this Third Antinomy the world as a thing on its own is conceived of as given with all of its conditions. But this is not the case of the world as an appearance, and all that is ever given in the appearance is what has actually appeared to us in one way or another, and nothing else is given.

**Practical vs Transcendental Freedom, and additional Writings**

Now we want to focus on the critical element in the Third Antinomy, that of freedom, and specifically practical and transcendental freedom. Here are excerpts from several of Kant’s writings on this subject:

**Critique of Pure Reason - Antinomy - 9th Section**

3.1 It is worth noting that the practical concept of freedom depends upon this transcendental idea of freedom, and it is the latter which constitutes the particular difficulties which questions about the possibility of the former have always entailed.

3.2 From a practical standpoint freedom denotes an independence of the discretionary choice (Willkür) from any necessity through the drives of sensitivity.

3.3 For discretionary choice is sensitive to the extent it is affected pathologically (through motivational causes of the sensitivity). It is termed animal (arbitrium brutum) if it can be pathologically necessitated.

3.4 Human discretionary choice is indeed an arbitrium sensitivum, though not brutum, but rather liberum, because sensitivity does not make human actions necessary, for there is a capacity in the human whereby one is determined of oneself independently of necessitation through sensitive drives.

4.1 It is easy to see that if all causality in the world of sense were merely nature, then every event would be determined through another event in time and in accordance with necessary laws, and hence, since appearances, to the extent they determine the volition, would have to necessitate every action as their
natural consequence, it follows that the elimination of transcendental freedom would simultaneously eradicate all practical freedom.

4.2 For the latter presupposes that even though something did not happen, it still should have happened, and so its cause in the appearance was not so determining that a causality could not exist in our volition to produce something which were completely independent of that natural cause and even in opposition to its power and influence, and hence (there is the assumption that) it could begin a series of events completely of itself.

**Critique of Pure Reason - Canon - Ultimate Purpose**

8.4 Practical freedom can be proven through experience.

8.5 For not merely that which excites, i.e., immediately affects the senses, determines human choice. Rather we have a capacity for overcoming the impressions on our sensitive desire capacity through representations of what is itself useful or injurious in a more remote manner. But these deliberations of what is desirable, i.e., good and useful with respect to our entire state, depend on reason.

8.6 Accordingly this also renders the laws which are imperatives, i.e., objective laws of freedom, and which say what is supposed to happen, even if perhaps it never does happen. And in that regard these laws are distinguished from natural laws which deal only with what happens. It is then also for this reason that they are called practical laws.

9.1 But it could be that reason itself in these actions, through which it prescribes laws, is in turn determined through other further influences, and what is called freedom with respect to sensitive drives might in turn be nature through higher and more remotely effecting causes. But then that does not concern us regarding the practical, since at this point we only ask reason about the precepts of conduct. Besides that notion of other further influences is a merely speculative question which, as long as our intention is directed to doing and refraining, we can set aside.553

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553 Here we are concerned with the consciousness of actually determining laws for conduct, and so where it does not matter as to hidden and unconscious causes.
9.2 Through experience therefore we recognize practical freedom as one of the natural causes, namely a causality of reason in the determination of the will. Transcendental freedom, on the other hand, requires an independence of this reasoning itself (with respect to its causality in starting a series of appearances) from all determining causes of the sense world. And to this extent it seems to be contrary to the natural law, hence to all possible experience, and therefore remains a problem.

Critique of Practical Reason - Critical Illumination

7.1 But instead of the deduction of the supreme principle of pure practical reason, i.e., the explanation of the possibility of such a recognition a priori, nothing further could be introduced except this: if we penetrated the possibility of the freedom of an effective cause, we could penetrate not only merely the possibility, but rather even the necessity, of the moral law as the supreme practical law of rational beings, to whom one attributes freedom to the causality of their will. The reason for this is that both concepts are so inseparably connected, that one could also define practical freedom as independence of the will from any law except the moral law alone.

It would seem then that practical freedom indicates a causality of reason in determining the will, i.e., an independence of action from the excitements of the senses, and where the goals of the individual are represented rationally and where this rationality is one of the natural causes. But the implication might remain that it is in pursuit of personal goals that reason is utilized in this practical sense. In that case then the distinguishing mark of transcendental freedom means a determination of the will via pure reason and which is independent of all personal goals arising in the world of sense, i.e., which is absolutely spontaneous and not subject to prior condition. And so when we speak about practical freedom of the human we are thinking specifically of that quality which is denoted by transcendental freedom,

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554 We can then also say that the human considers himself free if he can do what he feels like doing or wants to do (which would be the psychological definition of freedom). But of course then his feelings and his wants will be a function of his makeup, etc., and so accordingly this freedom would really be an illusion and he is thoroughly determined in all regards. And this is the understanding of the human on the part of science. In this wise we see that the actions and thinking and rule-making are all totally conceived by reason, but always in conformity with the background and upbringing, etc., of the actor and thus where there is no freedom at all. Accordingly the individual does not act so much as rather reacts to his circumstances in accordance with his temperament and traits and the reasoning based on them.
i.e., the capacity to determine the will independently of all desires of the individual, and indeed in opposition to them.

In the quotation below, the first case is obviously practical freedom in the sense of ignoring the immediate excitement of the senses for the sake of a longer range goal, but one which is a natural inclination, i.e., for life. In the second case we are speaking of a transcendental freedom where we are able to disregard all concern for individual goals of the sensitivity and have pure reason itself determine the will, and indeed even in opposition to all the desires of sensitivity.

**Critique of Practical Reason - 2nd Task**

3.10 Suppose that some one were to aver of his most passionate desire that it were irresistible if the alluring object and the opportunity to it were at hand; ask him whether he might not be able to master this desire if a gallows were erected before the house where he is to avail himself of this opportunity, in order that he might be hanged there immediately after his savored passion--it won’t take long to guess his answer.

3.11 But inquire of him further: suppose his sovereign, threatening him with the same inexorable death penalty, should require him to bear false witness against an upright man whom the king very much wishes to ruin through trumped up charges, and given how much his love for life might be, ask him whether he would consider it possible that he might overcome this love of life?

3.12 Whether he would do it or not, he may not be able to say; but that it be possible for him to do so, this he will admit without hesitation.

3.13 Therefore he judges that he can do something for the simple reason that he is aware that he ought to do so, and recognizes within himself the freedom which otherwise, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him.

Note: we need to keep in mind that this selection from *The Critique of Practical Reason* goes to the fact of transcendental freedom which is not yet of concern in this Third Antinomy. For in this present work we are not concerned at all with the reality of freedom, or even with its possibility, but solely with the question as to
whether freedom is compatible with the universal necessitation according to laws of nature.